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Introduction: What Can the Philosophy of Science Do for the Philosophy of Art (and Vice Versa)?

Over the past thirty years or so the notion of *representation* has moved to center stage in the philosophy of science. Various accounts have been given of this notion, with examples and counter-examples drawn from both science and art. Thus, for example, certain formal accounts of the relationship between a given representation and the system represented have been taken to be ruled out on the basis of the claim that such accounts fail for certain cases of representation in art, leading to the obvious objection that the relevance of such cases for representation in science is simply not clear. More generally, the extent of that relevance has not been systematically analyzed or discussed and the question whether a 'one size fits all' notion of representation can be maintained has not been addressed.

But of course, there is vastly more to the philosophies of science and art than is captured in discussions around representation! Consider the ontological questions 'what is a theory?' and 'what is an artwork?' The former has also begun to achieve a certain prominence in the philosophy of science following the widespread adoption of the so-called 'model-theoretic' or 'semantic' approach which analyzes or represents (that word again!) theories in terms of families of scientific models. Some have argued that this approach *identifies* theories with such models, leading to well-known concerns, whereas others have resisted this move, leaving the question still to be answered. On the philosophy of art side, the related question is of course the focus of considerable discussion and here again considerations from that discussion – in this case at the meta-level of philosophical reflection, rather than at the 'object' level of artistic examples – can be exported to the philosophy of science. Again, however, the issue of relevance arises: to what extent is a scientific theory like a piece of music? Or a work of literature?

It was in order to initiate a discussion of these questions of relevance between the two fields that the workshop 'What Can the Philosophy of Science Do for the Philosophy of Art (and vice versa)?' was held in the School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science, University of Leeds, in October 2012. The idea was to bring together interested people in an informal context to discuss the above questions in the context of four presentations drawing on examples, moves and considerations from painting, music, literature and art in general. Our intention is that the workshop will be the first of several, involving other speakers of course, and held in other locations, but all focusing on the interactions and inter-relationships between these two important fields. To further the project, this *Newsletter* prints two presentations from the conference; the next issue will contain the other two.

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Representation, Ontology, and Heuristics: Regulating Trade Between the Philosophy of Art and Philosophy of Science

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Introduction

One way of approaching the relationship between science and art is via the way we characterize and represent science and art at the level of philosophical enquiry (indeed, some would say there is no other way!). My interest in particular is in the way that certain devices, approaches and manoeuvres from one field of enquiry might be brought over into the other. Elsewhere (French and McKenzie 2012) I have referred (tongue in cheek) to the 'Viking approach' that a philosopher of science might adopt towards metaphysics, grabbing and appropriating what she needs to help her in the effort to understand science. But as we all now know, taking the Vikings to be nothing but a bunch of looters is to do them an injustice and given the more sedate atmosphere of aesthetic enquiry (!), perhaps it is better to refer to a 'trading' approach when it comes to the relationship between the philosophy of science and the philosophy of art. For the most part I shall be considering trade that runs from the latter to the former, but examples of the reverse movement can also be given. And in particular I am interested in those factors that might constrain or limit that trade.

The trading zone I wish to focus on is that which deals in theories and artworks, and the core question I wish to examine is: to what extent are these two kinds of 'things' similar? The constraints on trade I shall briefly look at are the role of intentions and the nature of heuristics, and the conclusion I shall sketch is that to the extent that theories are like paintings, but also not, and like musical works, but also are not, perhaps we should drop the assumption that theories are kinds of objects to begin with.

Theories as Representations

In recent years the question of the relationship between scientific theories and the world, or the phenomena (depending on one's realist inclinations) has been reframed in terms of representation, with philosophers of science explicitly drawing on accounts and examples in the philosophy of art (see Bueno and French 2011; Suarez 2003, van Fraassen 2008). Van Fraassen, in particular, has identified at least two central features of this relationship where the philosophy of science can learn from the philosophy of art: the first is that representation has to be acknowledged as representation *as*, giving his 'Hauptsatz': "There is no representation except in the sense that some things are used, made or taken, to represent some things as thus or so" (2008, p. 23). Thus theory T represents phenomenon P only for a user A in an appropriate context C. Here the role of the user's intentions may become manifest, something I will return to shortly. The second

concerns the significance of perspective and invariance, something which greatly interests me as a structural realist but which I shall not discuss here.

Now this shift in interest towards representation arose in part as a result of the shift in characterization of scientific theories within the philosophy of science from closed sets of logico-linguistic sentences to families of set-theoretic models (this forming the heart of the so-called semantic or 'model-theoretic' approach). In terms of the former, the relationship between theories and the world is captured by the notion of reference, holding between linguistic terms and objects; whereas for the latter, the relationship is best captured in terms of representation, holding between a model and the relevant system. In these terms the idea of a representational mapping can then be formally captured via the notion of an isomorphism – even if only partial (Bueno and French op. cit.) – holding between the model and the system, allowing us to say that the representation consists in the preservation of selected relations.

This works well (I would claim) for many examples from the philosophy of science and some (e.g., Budd 1993) have attempted to articulate something similar in the philosophy of art (less successfully perhaps). However, it has been objected that isomorphism-based accounts are neither necessary nor sufficient for representation (Suarez 2003). They are not necessary, it is claimed, because one can give examples of representations for which isomorphism is inappropriate to capture the relationship. Thus consider Picasso's *Guernica*; here, it is argued, there lies a crucial ambiguity: on the one hand the painting represents the concrete pain of the inhabitants of the Basque town; on the other, it represents the abstract threat of the rise of fascism. Hence it cannot be placed in a 1-1 mapping with the things it represents. But of course, an obvious move that the philosopher of science can make is to insist that such apparent counter-examples cannot be traded over from the philosophy of art, not least because it is hard to come up with similar cases of ambiguity in science. And of course, even remaining within the domain of aesthetics, one might be inclined to say that although elements of Picasso's composition do represent, for example, a dying horse, a bereaved mother and child and so on, the intent here is not so much to represent but to express the horror of war, the injustice of the attack and so on. Furthermore, to say that scientific theories *express* rather than represent would be a radical move that all but the most extreme anti-realists would be reluctant to endorse! The point here is that already we can see that trade between the philosophy of art and the philosophy of science needs some regulation – an obvious point perhaps but one that not all contributors to the relevant debate have appreciated.

Isomorphism is also argued to be insufficient for representation because of the latter's directionality – the classic portrait of van Gogh represents van Gogh but not vice versa (at least not on most accounts) and hence something further is needed. Appealing to intentions – whether of the artist or the observer – is an obvious option, although it still leaves isomorphism as the underlying mechanism of representation. Here intentions function so as to transform a given object from non-art to art. Consider the classic case of Damien Hirst's pile of apparent detritus, intended to represent the chaos of the artist's studio, which was inadvertently swept away by a cleaner unaware of this intention. Or imagine that you are walking out in the forest and you come across a rock formation with caves that looks just like a human skull. Typically it would be insisted that without the relevant intention this could not be called a representation and this matches our intuitions. But now imagine that you walk out of the forest and into the desert and there you encounter Einstein's famous equation $E = mc^2$, apparently carved by the wind and rain out of the sand and rock. Here it is not so clear that our intuition supports the claim that

without the relevant intention behind it, this edifice cannot represent relativistic phenomena. After all, who cares how this manifestation of Einstein's equation came about? The provenance seems less important in this case and I would suggest that our discomfort with the claim that it cannot be said to represent relativistic phenomena without the appropriate representation has something to do with our unease over the presumption that theories are the sorts of objects that can be transformed from non-scientific to scientific in the way that artworks apparently can; indeed, I shall suggest that we should not consider theories as objects at all.

The Ontology of Theories

What kinds of things are theories? I've already mentioned two characterizations of theories: one in terms of logico-linguistic statements, the other in terms of families of set-theoretic models. One way of answering our question is to appeal to one or other of these characterizations and insist that that is what a theory is: either a closed set of statements on the former view, or a family of models on the latter. Indeed, with the rise of the latter, it has been suggested that models, and hence theories, should be seen as abstract entities (Giere 1988). Of course, this raises concerns regarding the second of my trade constraints above: how are we to understand the heuristics of scientific discovery and pursuit as applied to abstract entities?

Now, there is a sense in which we have been here before. Popper famously took theories to be inhabitants of his 'world 3' – distinct from both world 1 of concrete, material entities and world 2 of the mind – along with works of literature and music: "Examples of world 3 objects are: the American Constitution; or Shakespeare's *The Tempest*; or his *Hamlet*; or Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony*; or Newton's theory of gravitation" (Popper 1978, p. 145). And he continued, "One can, if one wishes, say that the world 3 objects themselves are *abstract* objects, and that their physical embodiments or realizations are *concrete* objects" (ibid.). Of course Popper was equally famously dismissive of scientific discovery, relegating it to psychology at best, but he did allow the inhabitants of his world 3 to be causally interactive, in the sense of being both subject to change and affecting us.

His justification for placing theories and artworks in world 3 were different in each kind of case. When it came to Beethoven's *Fifth*, for example, he argued that this should be regarded as real and as living in world 3 because we can objectively judge good and bad performances. This is obviously inappropriate for scientific theories, and here he appeals to the element of surprise: "... it must have been a surprise for Einstein when he found, shortly after writing his first paper on Special Relativity, that the now-famous formula $E = mc^2$ could be deduced from it as a theorem" (Tanner Lectures, p. 162). Thus Einstein's Theory of Relativity is real (and lives in world 3) because it has surprising consequences, just as, for example, material objects do (they have hidden 'sides' to them, or hidden properties or they behave in unexpected ways and so on). This is not an uncommon way of distinguishing the 'real' from the not-real, of course. However, it's not a good criterion in this case. As Wittgenstein famously noted, the reasons why people are surprised by certain deductive consequences has to do with their limitations and even Einstein could not have been expected to have been logically omniscient!

However, Popper also had what he called a "fundamental argument" for including theories in world 3 and this was that "... scientific conjectures or theories can exert a causal or an instrumental effect upon physical things; far more so than, say, screwdrivers or scissors" (ibid., p. 154). Indeed, he took world 3 objects to be causally interactive in that not only can they affect us, but we can change them. This is obviously reminiscent of Thomasson's more recent view of

artworks as abstract artifacts, which are created by and depend for their continued existence on certain human intentional states but are not to be identified with either the imaginary creations of individual minds or physical objects (Thomasson 2006).

Two questions obviously arise at this point: first, in what sense can world 3 objects causally affect us? Of course, a *copy* of Newton's *Principia* may certainly affect us (if its thrown at us ...), as may a performance of Beethoven's *Fifth*, but that's not the same thing as saying that the theory/musical work qua object living in world 3 can affect us. Here the advocate of world 3 ontology obviously owes us an account of that causal relationship, just as the Platonist does with, say, mathematical objects. The second question concerns how we, or our intentional states, can create, sustain and generally interact with these world 3 entities, and again some account is owed. In particular, the claim that theories qua world 3 entities are subject to change requires an appropriate account of how the heuristic moves embedded in the practices of world 1 affect such objects in world 3. Likewise, the claims that musical works are created and subject to change require a similarly appropriate account of the way in which intentions are constrained.

So, at one extreme, one might consider that any heuristic move, however 'slight' or minor, or any relevant intention to produce a theory or musical work in world 1 creates the corresponding abstract artifact in world 3. But then a quick scan through the bulky pages of *Physical Review*, or even worse, a review of the notes, presentations, work in progress seminars, blogs etc. of the world's scientists will immediately establish just how vast the ontological inflation involved in such a suggestion would be. Alternatively, one might take the sub-set of the resultant plethora of such artifacts that meet the relevant heuristic criteria to count as (bone fide) musical works or 'theories' respectively. But obviously some account is needed of these heuristic effects. In some cases, this seems comparatively straightforward. So, one well-known heuristic move in the philosophy of science concerns what is sometimes called the General Correspondence Principle, which comes in various formulations but is often expressed as 'keep the best (i.e., the empirically successful parts) of what you have.' Applying this suggests that new theories are built upon the 'best' / empirically successful / most well confirmed parts of their predecessors. It raises obvious concerns as to how one is to account for scientific revolutions (and, relatedly, runs counter to Kuhn's controversial thesis that in some cases the 'best' / empirically successful / most well confirmed parts of certain theories are lost through revolutionary change) but let's leave that to one side. Then one might see how certain practices involving the construction of a new theory via building on the successful parts of an old theory in world 1 might be paralleled by a similar relationship between artifacts in world 3. But it is less clear what story one might tell about other heuristic moves, such as the exportation of certain symmetry principles from one domain of physics to another, to considerable heuristic effect. Are such principles effectively picking out artifacts already present in some sense in world 3? Or is it the case that their application in world 1 is again paralleled by something similar in world 3, leading to the coming into existence of an artifact in that world?

Of course, different moves can be identified in art. Consider Picasso's sketches of dying horses and bulls in the bullring and the way they informed various features of *Guernica*. Or take the famous motif of Beethoven's *Fifth* and the song of the yellowhammer. Is the latter 'there' in world 3, bearing the same relationship to the former as in world 1? Or is it the case that when Beethoven heard that birdsong in world 1, his intention to incorporate it into his symphony generated the corresponding artifact in world 3? The point is that the relation-

ship between the moves in worlds 1 and 3 needs to be spelled out somehow.

Similar concerns arise with regard to the further question: in what sense do world 3 objects/abstract artifacts depend for their continued existence on certain intentional states? To answer this requires the articulation of an appropriate notion of world-spanning dependence and this can still be filed under 'forthcoming.' Now, I think that the notion of dependence in general is sufficiently elastic that some such account can surely be given, but the point is that once one considers the relevant heuristic moves the relationship between world 1 practices and world 3 artifacts becomes quite complex!

However, there is a way of cutting through that complexity, Alexandrian style, at least when it comes to scientific theories. This is to deny that theories are objects at all, whether 'living' in world 1 or 3. On this eliminativist line, there are no theories (qua objects) in science, merely elements or features of practice that make true certain statements, such as 'Einstein's theory of relativity is empirically successful' or 'Einstein's theory of relativity is beautiful', that are ostensibly but only apparently about theories (see French and Vickers 2011). We are multiply misled, I think, into viewing theories as objects: by the supposed element of surprise, when it comes to Popper's world 3 entities, by their apparent representational character, where discussions draw extensively on concrete artworks such as certain paintings and by the comparison with musical works and the latter's relationship with scores, for example. But if we drop the object-oriented ontology and simply focus on the relevant features of scientific practice, we have no need to find a world for these objects to live in, or to articulate the relevant dependence between entities of that world and this, and, I would argue (not here though) we will obtain a more perspicuous view of that practice itself. Can we say the same about artworks? This way of cutting the knot in science draws explicitly on a similar and earlier move made by Cameron with regard to musical works (Cameron 2008) and here we have a nice example of a two stage Viking raid: from the philosophy of art into metaphysics and from the philosophy of science into the philosophy of art! Alternatively, thinking in terms of the idea of a trading zone, here we have multiple trades going on. And, of course, there are other, different trades to be had—there are other ways of articulating the nature of theories and artworks than eliminativism, obviously—but such trading will have to be appropriately constrained, as I have sketched here, by considerations of the role of intentions when it comes to theories as representational devices and the role of heuristic factors with regard to their discovery.

Notes

Budd, M. (1993), "How Pictures Look," in D. Knowles and J. Skorupski (eds.), *Virtue and Taste*, Blackwell, pp. 154-175.

Cameron, R. (2008), "There Are No Things That Are Musical Works," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 48: 295-314.

French, S. and Vickers, P. (2011), "Are There No Things That are Scientific Theories?" *British Journal of the Philosophy of Science* 62: 771-804.

Popper, K.R. (1978), *Tanner Lectures*.

Suárez, M. (2003), "Scientific Representation: Similarity and Isomorphism", *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, 17: 225-244.

Thomasson, A. (2006), "Debates about the Ontology of Art," *Philosophy Compass* 1/3: 245-255.

Musicology as an Object for HPS? An Exploration

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Whither Philosophy of Musicology?

A large part of philosophy involves work falling within 'Philosophy of X' studies (where X = some specific field or subject matter: physics, mind, art, and so on). Though philosophy of music is one such area that receives considerable attention, *musicology* (not music, but rather the *study* thereof) has yet to be given the full 'Philosophy of X' treatment (at least not in any systematic way). Of course, within philosophy of music, philosophers often discuss elements that involve musicology in some way, but musicology itself is rarely the direct object of investigation and there tends to be a curious disconnect between discussions of philosophy of music and musicology. It has long been a lingering ambition of mine to establish 'philosophy of musicology' within the philosophy of science, in much the same vein as physics, biology, economics, and other sciences (in this case, it would be, uniquely so far as I can see, the philosophy of science of a *study of an art*).

In this brief note I present a snapshot of the form this might take by pointing to some potential issues and themes, borrowing from standard research avenues in history and philosophy of science (HPS). The main lesson will be that there is a *fundamental problem of musicology* that has a strong philosophy of science flavor and that unifies many apparently distinct issues: there is a question mark over whether musicology is/should be an analysis of 'given' subjective experience of a musical work, or an analysis of the objective sonic structure of the work (or some other such non-subjective aspect). I would argue that examining this problem has the potential to add some clarity and focus to many old debates in philosophy of music (some of which will be touched upon below). (This note is based on a talk that covered a far greater range of issues. Here, I select a small subset.)

Very roughly, I take musicology to be the *analysis of musical structure*—what it is and how it works (i.e., how it generates its effects)—both particular and general: that is, for *specific* musical works and families of works or *all* musical works. My own attention was drawn to the possibility of studying musicology from an HPS-oriented perspective after reading Milton Babbitt's work. Babbitt himself explicitly linked his ideas to those coming from HPS, in particular the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle (see McCreless 1997 for a discussion). A particular remark triggered my interest: "[E]very musical composition justifiably may be regarded as an experiment, the embodiment of hypotheses as to certain specific conditions of musical coherence" (1962: 49). Babbitt's central concern was the way electronic music lifted the limits of music from instrumental capabilities to the "perceptual and conceptual capacities of the human auditor"—though while electronic music opens up infinite acoustic possibilities, he argued that "realistic musical needs .. are satisfied by a discrete, finite collection of values" (1964: 92).

Babbitt also draws attention, albeit in an indirect way, to what I called "the fundamental problem." In a famous passage, castigated for its

elitism, he writes:

Why should the layman be other than bored and puzzled by what he is unable to understand, music or anything else? It is only the translation of this boredom and puzzlement into resentment and denunciation that seems to me indefensible. After all, the public does have its own music, its ubiquitous music: music to eat by, to read by, to dance by, and to be impressed by. Why refuse to recognize the possibility that contemporary music has reached a stage long since attained by other forms of activity? The time has passed when the normally well-educated man without special preparation could understand the most advanced work in, for example, mathematics, philosophy, and physics. Advanced music, to the extent that it reflects the knowledge and originality of the informed composer, scarcely can be expected to appear more intelligible than these arts and sciences to the person whose musical education usually has been even less extensive than his background in other fields. (1958: 39)

What interests me here are the reasons behind this disparity of treatment. I would argue that the situation is analogous to the study of time: there too, the layman is happy to engage in discussions about the flow of time, the end of time, and any number of issues that strictly speaking demand some technical expertise (in the psychology and neuroscience of time or the physics and philosophy of time). In both cases, time and music, there seems to be a sense of *immediacy* or *directness* in our access that is absent in the perusal of a mathematical proof. One has the sense that no skill or training is needed to *hear* music or *experience* time, and that the scientific study of both builds on some basic phenomena shared by all (perhaps even shared by some non-human animals). With respect to time, Poincaré wrote that “psychologic time is given to us and must needs create scientific and physical time” (1913: 27). Yet, in both cases, time and music, there is an apparently external, objective component too. We have a split, and there is a question mark over what we intend by time and music in both cases too: inner sense or outer structure?

This idea, of some brute non-conceptual content that forms the raw materials of musicology, is explicit in many musicological studies. Rameau, for example, claimed to have based his own harmonic research (setting the standard for well over a century) on the idea of the ‘blank slate’: forgetting all that one knows about music and rebuilding from untainted elements of consciousness – he claimed to have employed Descartes’ skeptical method to reach this state (see Christensen 2004). Schoenberg too, most likely borrowing from early positivist ideas, expressed a similar belief in basic phenomena: “again and again, to begin at the beginning; again and again to examine anew for ourselves and attempt to organize anew for ourselves. Regarding nothing as given but the phenomena” (1911/1983: 8).

Here we see the origins of a tension between the subjective experience of music and the objective structure as the ‘proper object’ of musicology. Ultimately, an integration of the two is most likely required, since the ‘objective’ (external) structure, while not quite *dependent* on observers in a deep sense, will bear many of its properties (e.g., the range of pitches and durations used) as a result of aspects of the construction of observers and the limits of their experience.

Let us now focus on some specific applications that an HPS might have within musicology. We see this fundamental problem arise again and again in these applications. Rather than pursuing these in detail,

I simply point towards some potential research topics, and discuss some of the interpretive options.

Musical Paradigms?

With respect to the “H” part of HPS, we can include the study of musical paradigms (in terms of both musical style and performance style), the issue of authenticity, and ‘historical performance.’ On the subject of musical paradigms, there has in fact been some work carried out already, by Ed Slowik (2007), though using an analogy between musical style and Kuhn’s notion of a paradigm primarily as a means of making sense of the latter rather than the former. However, the analogy can be used in the other direction. Slowik’s example of sonata form is indeed amenable to a paradigm interpretation. As he notes, eighteenth-century sonata form gave composers a “solid framework in which to construct and arrange their musical ideas” (providing the pattern: introduction; exposition; development; recapitulation; coda). Sonata form accounted for a huge proportion of classical composition and given the *constraints* it imposes, “a musical paradigm thereby largely determines and controls the musical thoughts and experiences of the composer” (p. 10).

The analogy is not perfect, however: what counts as “competition,” “crisis” or “anomaly?” Otavio Bueno suggested to me that the lack of novel phenomena might itself function as a generator of crisis, demanding new forms of composition or variations to the existing sonata form. This lack of development (in the case of Western pop music) has in fact been modeled recently, using statistical techniques (Serra et al., 2012), where the authors use the terminology of “blockage” to describe the dearth of new musical ideas. What they show, more precisely, is that frequency distributions for pitch, timbre, and loudness fit a relatively stationary pattern – especially so for pitch, which obeys a power law distribution (with simple pitch sequences possessing significantly larger probability mass in the distribution). One can, given this, make fairly good (successful) predictions about the likelihood of hearing some chord given an initial chord (within Western music). Moreover, there is a strong tendency to prefer simpler chords and keys (C major, and its relative minor A minor, with no sharps or flats) are far more prevalent.

Repertoire selection paradigms (governing allowable program choices) also submit to quantitative, statistical analysis. So far as I know, the first attempt was conducted by statistician John Mueller (1951), using paybills, programs, diaries, and reviews as data. What he showed was that the repertoire was dominated by a handful of composers leading to a skewed performance distribution he labelled a “popularity pyramid.” This has some resemblance to Robert Merton’s notion of the Matthew effect, whereby cumulative advantage accrues to those that have some initial edge. There have been similar studies in HPS (e.g. Bettencourt et al., 2006) whereby epidemiological techniques have been applied to model the spread of ideas (including theories and theoretical tools, such as Feynman diagrams). Zanette (2006) has studied Zipf’s law (governing word usage frequency) in the context of note usage frequency in music, showing how the law can be related to the creation of musical context (that is, a background within which musical coherence and incoherence can be established). One can envisage a very useful cross-fertilisation of ideas here whereby just as musical styles and revolutions can be statistically modelled and detected, so can scientific revolutions. I might also add that such automated classification of styles, performance, and genre can be

interpreted as pointing to underlying regularities, whether ultimately conventional or not.

Authenticity or Incommensurability?

What of the thorny topic of 'historical performance'? The issue is easily expressed: Suppose we could give a perfect sonic replication of Bach's music as played in his own period: would we hear it *as they did*? One influential school of musicology argues that we do an injustice to the music if we fail to recreate it as closely as possible to how it would have originally sounded. Roger Scruton argues that the idea of historical performance "cocoon[s] the past in a wad of phoney scholarship, to elevate musicology over music, and to confine Bach and his contemporaries to an acoustic time-warp" (1997, 448). I tend to agree with Scruton. Lawson and Stowell in their study *The Historical Performance of Music* (1999) object offering the reconstruction of "dead languages" as an "effective" counterexample to Scruton's claim, yet they admit, that we can't tell "what they really sounded like" (158). This surely defeats their argument since the 'phenomenological' aspect is exactly at the root of this issue! It's no counterexample at all.

Here one can also introduce the Kuhnian notion of incommensurability, for doesn't the ability to reproduce "as Bach's contemporaries would have heard" involve the idea that listening is simple, unfettered by concepts (as described above)? Certainly, Malcolm Budd (1985) has argued that one can understand the core experience of music as given in this way, as has DeBellis (2008) more recently (though with subtle differences), arguing that musical understanding is constructed from 'phenomenological feel'. But as Goodman and Elgin point out:

A particular auditory event might be heard as a noise, as a piercing noise, as the sound of a trumpet, as a B flat, as the first note of a fanfare, or in any of indefinitely many other ways. To characterise what is heard as the sound of a trumpet or as the first note of a fanfare requires a good deal of background knowledge. But every characterisation relies on background knowledge of one sort or another. Even to recognise something as a sound requires knowing how to differentiate sounds from other sources of sensory stimulation, and how to segment auditory input into separate events. Sensation is sometimes supposed to be primarily given. Doesn't a sound present a certain quality or set of qualities even to a person ignorant of its source or musical context? The trouble with saying this is that neither a sensation nor anything else comes already labelled. (1988: 9-10)

If we accept this analysis, as I think we should, then at best our experiments with historical performance can indicate what it would be like if we transplanted *ourselves* (replete with all of our modern concepts) into some other period.

This way of looking at authenticity and historical performance can be related back to the fundamental problem alluded to earlier, since if the object of music is the subjective experience of a listener, then recreating the sonic structure alone (however accurate) will never be enough to achieve parity between a period listener and a present day listener. If the sonic structure is our focus, however, then playing in the right style, on the right instruments, would bring us towards parity. Even here, however, without recordings, I fail to see how historical performers could claim to match older ways of actually *performing*—one only has to look at the variations in rubato and portamento in early recordings to see that a written description such as "played with heavy portamento" could pick out many violinists that sound utterly distinct. Hence, simply playing on period instruments, with some basic qualitative descriptions about how they were played, will not pin down how the instruments were played. In fact, the example

of dead languages from above applies very well here: one can use such languages, but working out how they were actually *spoken* will always be guesswork.

Observer Selection in Musicology?

With respect to the concept of tonality, Brian Hyer notes that there is a "recurrent tension" in music theory over "whether the term [tonality] refers to the objective properties of the music—its fixed internal structure—or the cognitive experience of listeners, whether tonality is inherent in the music or constitutes what one author [R. Norton] describes as 'a form of consciousness'" (2002: 727). This is, of course, just a restricted version of our fundamental problem.

It is clear that there will be some kind of 'observer selection' process involved in basic musicological concepts such as tonality, since music lies within a limited pitch range as a consequence of the frequency sensitivity of the human auditory system, having nothing to do specifically with music—aliens with entirely different auditory capabilities might well have very different music that we would be incapable of experiencing! That is, at least part of the way (our) music is has to do with the way we are put together. One can probe deeper in the case of tonality, in fact, and bring in empirical studies. For example, there is something distinctly structural about tonal music. As Carol Krumhansl notes, "tones acquire meaning through their relationships to other tones" (1979, p. 370). In other words, musical context affects the perception and representation of pitch. Tonic tones are perceived as "closest," then diatonic, then non-tonic (this generates a tonal hierarchy). It is precisely the interplay of tonal stability and instability that generates musical *tension* (produced by motions away from the tonal center) and *release* (produced by motion back to tonal center).

There are, of course, a variety of elements, beyond tonality, that go into music, forming the structure of a musical work (though it is possible to carve this structure in different ways, depending on the method of analysis). This includes pitch, meter, and loudness as important elements. Pitch is simply the brain's representation of the periodicity (frequency) of sound waves. It is not frequency itself, but is linked to perception, thus demanding a *subject*: frequency does not. *Relative* pitch is central to music perception: we can change absolute pitch leaving relative pitches invariant and 'preserve the musical structure.' In fact, relative pitch recognition appears to be rather a basic feature of the human mind: infants can recognize transposed melodies as the same melody. But general *melodic contour* information is easier to assess than interval information. For example, untrained listeners can barely distinguish a major from a minor third (octaves are the exception here, which untrained listeners, and infants, can easily recognize). Notes possess basic frequencies (cycles per second), e.g., A = 440hz. It is the *ratio* between frequencies that is essential: one experiences 'consonance' when the frequency ratio is a ratio of small integers, e.g. 1:1 = unison; 2:1 = octave (440hz: 880hz); 3:1 = perfect fifth. Consonance has an obvious psychological element: it is pleasing to us. The octave is the foundation for musical scales: it is divided in such a way precisely so as to preserve consonance! Hence, we see clearly how aspects of human cognitive architecture filter in to the nature of music and musicology—this is what I meant by my phrase "observer selection" above.

Meter is also part of the structural representation of a piece. However, it too is grounded in aspects of human cognitive architecture. It is a form of *entrainment*: i.e., a synchronization of internal biological features with external aspects of environment. This is what causes bodily movements to become coordinated with music in dance and foot tapping. However: crucially, there's a small threshold of time-scales within which temporal groupings will trigger our rhythmic responses

(and this responsiveness is distinctly human, it seems – cf. Tecumseh Fitch, 2011). Mari Riess Jones (1989) argues that people utilize invariant structure abstracted from the “temporal rhythmicities” of some event to attentionally prepare for ‘when’ forthcoming events will happen (= “expectancies”). Meter relates, then, to an “attentional stance” an observer has towards sounds, such that a pattern or grouping is imposed by the observer: one and the same set of sounds could be carved up like this in multiple ways – London (2012) gives a detailed analysis and defense of the idea that meter functions in this way. It is, again, an act of observer selection.

In fact, the observer selectivity involved in tonality has an identified neural basis, revealed by localized activation patterns in the cortex mapping to relationships among tonal keys. Janata et al. claim to have found evidence, in fMRI experiments, of “an area in rostromedial prefrontal cortex that tracks activation in tonal space” mapping on the “formal geometric structure that determines distance relationships within a harmonic or tonal space” in the context of Western tonal music. They found that “[d]ifferent voxels [3D pixels] in this area exhibited selectivity for different keys” (2002, p. 2167). There is a psychological analogue of the “formal geometric structure” highlighted by Janata et al. too that can be seen in a paper of Mary Riess Jones, on the selectivity involved in music, where she argues that that “world patterns [musical patterns] are subjectively represented as nested relations within a multidimensional space defined by pitch, loudness, and time” (1976, p. 523). (See Raffman, 2011, pp. 595-6 for more on the neural basis of tonality.)

This notion of a “tonal space” forms the basis of an influential approach to musical analysis due to David Lewin (1987), which models and analyses musical structure using the idea that intervals are tantamount to transformations on such a space (i.e., functions that take some point in the space and spit out another). Dmitri Tymoczko (2011) has recently built this basic idea up into a detailed geometrical framework. He aims to chart the ‘shape’ of musical spaces and does so using fairly advanced topological notions producing a kind of translation manual between musicological ideas and (highly non-trivial) abstract spaces. Firstly, rather than thinking in terms of pitch space (simply a space whose points are different pitches, ordered in the traditional linear way, such that a musical work traces a path through it), Tymoczko, following standard practice, *identifies* the same pitches (e.g., middle C, C above, C below, and all other Cs), producing “pitch-class” spaces. This is rooted in simple octave-equivalence which generates a cyclic pattern. Tymoczko notes that now the corresponding space is an example of an “orbifold” (an orbit manifold, where the manifold has been “quotiented” by octave equivalence, thus identifying certain points). Tymoczko generalizes this to all intervals. For example, one could go from middle C to E flat by going up or down (and then jump any number of octaves up or down) to get the *same* interval. Hence, these motions are identified. What this means is that Lewin’s intervals are here transformed into equivalence classes of motions (orbits). Again one can apply this to chords of any type: the same chord will simply be playable in many different ways, and these are to be identified. There are five musical transformations for quotienting out redundant structure, according to Tymoczko, which generate various equivalence classes of musical entity (e.g., chords, chord types, chord progressions, pitch class, ...).

Into this basic formal framework, Tymoczko introduces five “principles” that refer back to subjective (and neural) elements, such as preference for consonance, and also efficiency in progressions. He claims these function as constraints, and when one adds such constraints on the organization of musical structure one can understand how musical structure works in the sense of how it sounds pleasing. One can represent pieces of great classical music in Tymoczko’s space, and can

test whether the constraints are satisfied. Indeed, in many cases they are. However, while this sounds like a miracle, it is, in fact, highly unsatisfactory as any kind of explanation of musical structure since the constraints are simply the results of empirical studies (such as those mentioned above) that have been plugged in by hand: they are not emergent features of the mathematical framework. It is not really so surprising, then, that one will have a model of ‘pleasing music.’ However, this way of *envisioning* musical structure does provide a very neat way of making sense of Babbitt’s claim that “every musical composition ... may be regarded as an experiment, the embodiment of hypotheses as to certain specific conditions of musical coherence.” Musical compositions can have their tonal structures modelled in such spaces, and if we accept Tymoczko’s constraints (given that they do have some reasonable psychological and neural foundation), then we can judge the success or failure of compositions relative to them. That is, we have a space of musical possibilities and a means of testing which will ‘work.’ Indeed, Tymoczko refers to his constraints as “quasi-laws of musical coherence.” Of course, there will remain a large question mark over the legitimacy and universality of the constraints. But it remains testable territory.

The broad cognitive patterns mentioned above can also be found in another influential, Schenkerian, approach to music, that of Lehrdahl and Jackendoff (1983). Roughly, Schenkerian theory seeks to find the universal patterns in which music is composed; hence, it is natural to look for the roots of universality in shared cognitive features. Lehrdahl and Jackendoff do just this, abstracting out a set of rules for well-formed formulae [WFF] for musical structure. These appear to implement (some of) the observer selection effects, putting them center-stage. For example, they identify the following elements of musical structure:

- Grouping Structure: the brain’s method of grouping together musical events that sound like they belong together, into a linear stream
- Metrical Structure: beat structure, to which musical events are related
- Time-span reduction: selection of important musical events
- Prolongational reduction: [Schenkerian Principle]

They also supply various “Preference Rules” for each WFF rule, based on the “relatively unchanging cognitive foundations of the musical mind”. The question of just *how universal* these cognitive foundations are is still a matter for experiment (though a relatively straightforward one to *design*). If they are found to be universal features, then we would appear to have, in sense, *laws* of music – an idea that clearly would be in need of close scrutiny from philosophers of science.

So what *belongs* in musicology? What should a musical theory be *about*? Should we do as in physics and try to eliminate these human-side components and perform what Eddington calls “an epistemological purge” ridding theory of all subjectivity? What would be left behind here if we did this? Really, it is difficult to see how such a purge could ever be possible in the case of music, so integral is the composition of human cognitive architecture to the kinds of musical structure we are faced with. The observer will always be present, then, in some sense, since the ranges of possible structures are constrained by our ability to process them (they must be audible and playable). Instruments too can clearly constrain the regions of musical space that we can sample (and are themselves related again to human auditory processing capabilities, and other physiological aspects in this case) – though we

can easily imagine advances in technology that would enable us to both generate and detect a greater range of the spectrum, sampling more regions.

I think what this brief survey shows is that musicology really demands a deeply interdisciplinary approach. It is therefore perfectly understandable to find the music theorist David Lewin writing that “[a]ctually, I am not really sure what a ‘theory of music’ might be” (1986: 377), for a theory of music might well be a theory of many things! Of course, one need not cover all aspects for all kinds of purpose. I don’t expect musicologists to become neuroscientists. My point is, at the deepest level, if we want to understand *why* musical structure is the way it is – e.g., rather than simply accepting the structure as *basic* and performing standard analyses of it – then, it requires an integrated approach. However, the kind of integrated analysis that results (involving observer selection effects) makes this an ideal case study for philosophers of science.

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Essentialist Abstraction

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In 1910, Wassily Kandinsky painted *Abstract Watercolor*, which is typically taken to be the first work of abstract art in history. The ground for organic abstraction was prepared by late Turner, and evolves from him through Kandinsky, and through minimally figurative works of such painters as Soutine, (some) Matisse, and late Monet, to de Kooning, Pollock, and Rothko.¹ Geometric abstraction stems from Cézanne, through the Analytic Cubism of Braque and Picasso, to Robert Delaunay, Malevich, (some) Matisse, and Mondrian, and then to Minimalism. A different approach to abstraction was taken by Marcel Duchamp in his readymades, such as *Bottle Rack*, that dispensed with creation in having been simply excerpted by choice from preexistent reality. And Rauschenberg combined the selection of Duchamp with reductive art’s elimination of subject matter in his *Erased de Kooning Drawing*. Building on the extreme reductivism of Judd, LeWitt, Martin, Morris, Newman, Rauschenberg (the white paintings) Reinhardt (the black paintings), and Ryman, such Conceptual artists as Robert Barry, Victor Burgin, Christine Koslov, Joseph Kosuth, and Lawrence Weiner used language to produce works that were even more radically abstract than those that influenced them. In 1965, Kosuth exhibited a transparent sheet of glass as a token of a type of work that he called *Any Five Foot Sheet of Glass to Lean Against Any Wall*, and it is clear that language here does more than function as a title. Some four years later, at 1:36PM, June 15, 1969, Robert Barry wrote ALL THE THINGS I KNOW BUT OF WHICH I AM NOT AT THE MOMENT THINKING, using that language, with the time and date appended, to identify the work with something of which not even the artist himself could be aware.² One thread of art history then proceeds, through a fairly anfractuouse route, from realistic art at one point in history to what might be thought to be the limit of abstraction determined in a work produced on a June afternoon in 1969. What could be more abstract than a work that neither we nor

the artist can experience?


Questions that I have asked myself as a thinker—as both a philosopher and an artist—include: Is it possible to make a work that is even more abstract than Barry's *all the things I know . . .*? How would one go about doing that? If you can get rid of subject matter, color, opacity, the standard act of creation, and even an object of experience, is there anything else with which you can dispense? What *can't* you get rid of? Could things that can't be gotten rid of then constitute the most severely reductive 'material' of ultimate abstraction?

To answer these questions philosophically, it seemed to me that one would have to identify the fundamental elements of making (in an expanded sense of making) and apprehending (in sometimes novel senses of apprehending, following Barry) works of art. This is what I attempted to do in my book *Subjects and Objects: Art, Essentialism, and Abstraction*. I tried to identify what is philosophically required to make and apprehend works of art in general, with an idea of what then would be required to make the more abstract works possible in particular.³ This proved to be no easy exercise, and I uncovered layers of depth and complexity in the question of what is required to make and apprehend works of art, including radically abstract works, that I had not anticipated when I began to think about it. I not only had to consider things that had been done, but had to imagine what might be done, and I thought of things, both as a philosopher and as an artist, that would not have occurred to me had I not asked the question.

However, I knew that, even should it prove possible to identify what is necessary to make and apprehend art, philosophy itself could not identify the limits of abstraction in art. It can only identify the 'material' with which the artist must work. Or, it can only tell the artist what is unavoidable, but the artist himself must try to figure out what to do with what is essential, and must accept the creative challenge of investigating the aesthetic, artistic, and philosophical possibilities of working with the ultimately reductive material identified.⁴

As an artist, I am interested in using the indispensable conditions of making and apprehending works of art to produce works of art that, among other things of interest, reside at the limits of Abstraction.⁵ What are these indispensable conditions? To produce a work of art an artist must single something out that the work is meant to be. That is logically unavoidable. Something must be conceptually delineated, or marked off from everything that it is not, or there is no work to discuss, interpret, or evaluate, or even to know of as something with a particular identity that everything else lacks.⁶ Whatever is so delineated is an object. The term 'object' here is to be understood in the widest possible sense, and so to go beyond physical, perceptual, and existential objects to include things that are purely intellectual, conceptual, or imaginary. It is to be understood to be synonymous with either 'thing' or 'entity,' and to lack ontological commitment. That is, an object that an artwork is meant to be need not exist or have any sort of being conceivable—other than its being the object that it is—but may rest entirely on the possibility of its conception. Indeed, an artwork may in fact be the very event of understanding its identity as that event of that understanding, as is the case with *Haecceity 9.1.0*. An artwork may also depend on the attempt to conceive of its identity, but in such a way that, as with *Haecceity 12.0.0*, its identity is linked to the necessary failure of that conception.⁶

As does each individual entity, a particular object that a particular artwork is meant to be has a particular identity that everything else lacks. It must be possible to understand the intended identity of an artwork. That understanding rests on a public perceptual object. While that is the case, an artwork need not be either any perceptual



Haecceity 9.1.0. Jeffrey Strayer (2009). 48" x 92." Contact prints and paper mounted to Gatorfoam with Plexiglas, hexagonal bolts, washers, and screws. German Silver metal frame. Image courtesy of the artist.

object on which understanding its intended identity depends, or any other perceptible object.⁷ And it may not be possible to be aware of, or to perceive or otherwise experience, the object itself *that* a work is meant to be, as opposed to being aware that it is to be understood as a particular object.⁸ It is only necessary to be able to understand what we are to understand the work to be.⁹

So, an artist must single something out that a work is meant to be; that something is an object with a particular identity that everything else lacks; it must be possible for others to understand the intended identification of a particular artwork with a particular object; and that understanding rests on a public perceptual object or objects.

When a subject attends to a perceptual object on which knowledge of the identity of a work depends, an 'artistic complex' results of which the subject, the perceptual object, and her consciousness of that object are constituents. Consciousness is an essential element of an artistic complex, as are the subject's agential, indexical, epistemological, historical, and causal relations to the perceptual object of the complex. Spatial and other apprehensible properties of the perceptual object that mark it as perceptual, and that provide a route to knowledge of the work's intended identity, are unavoidable aspects of an artistic complex, as are the time that the complex exists, and its coming to be and ceasing to be in time. These, and other things identified in *Subjects and Objects* that will be characteristic of any artistic complex, can be thought of as "material" to be used in some way to produce the objects that the more Abstract artworks possible are meant to be.¹⁰ How consciousness and agency can be used as media, and how elements of artistic complexes can be used in the production of artistic identity, are complex and interesting matters that, I believe, have rather remarkable artistic and aesthetic potential, extending considerably beyond the determination of Abstract limits, which is fertile enough ground of its own.


Because works from what I call the "*Haecceities Series*" only result from, or consist of, things that are essential to making and apprehending works of art, or since I am only utilizing things that are indispensable

to conveying and effecting the identity of an artwork, I call what I am doing "Essentialism."¹¹

Language must be used to identify the limits of Abstraction by 'specifying,' or conceptually delineating, objects with which artworks are meant to be identified.¹² To use language to effect and convey the identity of a work is to use it as a medium. And since it can be written to combine with consciousness and agency to produce the identity to be understood, these things too become media of Essentialism.¹³ An essentially Abstract artwork results from using language to engage the comprehension of that language in the identification of what all or part of the work is meant to be.¹⁴ The ways in which this can be done turn out to be intriguingly myriad, and to result in the determination of a number of different Abstract limits, and a number of things of interest beyond that determination. In engaging a subject's comprehension of language to affect the Essentialist object to be comprehended, one utilizes the conscious comprehension of identity that is ineliminable from even the most Abstract artwork. Choice can also be engaged in the construction of identity. And, generally, part of the creative identification of the limits of Abstraction includes using language and its comprehension to address, either explicitly or implicitly, necessary elements of artistic complexes as they are utilized in the determination of what a work is meant to be.

As every artwork must have an identity – must be intended to be identified with *something* of some sort – each artwork is *this* particular thing that it is, and no other thing, no matter how similar it is to anything else, and despite its nature. Thus an artwork's identity is particular. The word 'haecceity' comes from the Latin *haecceitas* for thisness. And as each particular artwork has to be identified with an object that is this thing and no other thing, and as language has to be used to single out the more Abstract artworks possible, I call each specification of the *Haecceities* series a "Haecceity" to emphasize the importance of the thisness of each artwork, the particular identity that it has that everything else lacks.

How language is utilized in relation to essential elements of artistic complexes has an aesthetic in addition to an artistic and philosophical function. Most artists who have used language have written it in a straight line, as it would appear in a book. Such use neither recognizes, nor attempts to solve, four interrelated problems that come



Haecceity 12.0.0. Jeffrey Strayer (2002). 20 1/4" x 22 7/16". Transparent print, screws, contact print, and paper mounted to Gatorfoam. Image courtesy of the artist.

with the artistic use of visible language on a two-dimensional surface. These are the problems of number, distribution, figure-ground, and asymmetry.¹⁵ To solve these problems I use either circular language, whose visibly reflexive form often mirrors the reflexive form of its comprehension, or I use linear language that is repeated and distributed in correlated sets of matrices according to an algorithm that I discovered that ensures that the language of a pair of correlated matrices is repeated a number of times vertically, and a number of times horizontally, equal, in each case, to the number of words of which the specification consists.¹⁶ This algorithm solves at once all four of the language-surface problems cited, and the algorithmic repetition and distribution of language has both a philosophical and an aesthetic effect on the issue of identity, and on the Abstract limit that is determined in a particular identity.

I am not only attempting to identify different limits of Abstraction, but am equally concerned with things that are of philosophical and aesthetic interest and importance to that identification. These include, but are not limited to: thingness; the relation of thisness to its comprehension; how identity stands in relation to its determination; the subject-object relationship; novel notions of artistic media, including, as noted, the use of consciousness and agency in the identification of Abstract limits; the multifarious nature of the aesthetic; and problems that are raised by, and knowledge that is due to, the identification of Abstract limits that would not arise, and would not be possible, apart from that identification.

Selected works from the *Haecceities* series, as well as reductive limits identified by them, and things that are of aesthetic, artistic, and philosophical relevance to those limits will appear in my forthcoming book *Haecceities: Essentialism, Identity, and the Limits of Abstraction*.¹⁷ Works from the *Haecceities* series can be found at my website at <www.JeffreyStrayer.com>.

Notes

1. The artists named in this first paragraph as important to various strands of abstraction are not meant to exhaustively identify figures of importance to those lines of art-historical development. I will be bold enough to suggest though that the importance of Turner to the history of art, and to abstract art in particular, can hardly be overestimated. His blurring of the distinction between recognizable objects; the integration of positive and negative space; the more formal than natural use



Haecceity 12.0.0 (detail). Jeffrey Strayer (2002). Image courtesy of the artist.

of color, line, and shape; taking time out of the picture and putting it into the observation of the work – which his composition favors the extension of – and taking narrative out of the work and replacing it with the narrative of the past and future history of art, make Turner, to my mind, the first Modernist in painting, not Manet, as Clement Greenberg would have it. At a Turner exhibition Rothko is reported to have said, “This guy Turner learned a lot from me.”

2. By the very nature of the language, Barry could not then be aware of any individual member of what, one supposes, was a very large class of epistemological entities, without thereby excluding the object of awareness from membership in the class of things delineated by the language. The radical nature of this work comes from its use of language to identify an artwork with an object that cannot be experienced, that is, of which we cannot be aware, as opposed to being aware that the work is to be understood to be to what the language refers.

3. Leiden, *The Netherlands*: Brill (2007). Information about this work can be found at my website, including an interview in which I talk about *Subjects and Objects*; see <<http://www.jeffreystrayer.com/written-interview-landing.php>>.

4. Perhaps it is worth noting that I did not first write the philosophy and then start to make the work. Rather, the two projects were pretty much intertwined from the start, and I had started to use language in the interest of what I call ‘Essentialist Abstraction’ before I started to write the philosophy that it conceptually presupposed. In fact, I do not think that I could have written *Subjects and Objects* had I not been an artist in addition to being a philosopher. And it seems fair to recognize the influence of philosophy on the art. Art and philosophy in my work then have had a symbiotic relationship that I anticipate will continue.

5. I capitalize “Abstraction” both to distinguish it from the association of abstract objects with spaceless and timeless entities – although an Abstract entity can be spaceless and timeless it need not be – and to recognize its relation to art, and to the reduction of art to its essentials. And I speak of the “limits” of Abstraction because there is more than one.

6. Conventionally, one singled out an artwork by creating it, by painting it or sculpting it, for instance. Duchamp showed that one could simply select something and exhibit it as a work of art, as long as that intention was understood. And certain Conceptual artists showed that language could be used to single out works of art by specifying them.

7. See <<http://www.jeffreystrayer.com/sequences/sequence-9.php>> for *Haeccesity 9.1.0* and <<http://www.jeffreystrayer.com/sequences/sequence-12.php>> for *Haeccesity 12.0.0*. These two *Haeccesities* illustrate different ways in which identity can be investigated in relation to its comprehension. Each image can be enlarged by clicking on it. The ‘supporting language’ beneath the matrices of *Haeccesity 9.1.0* should be read to see its language, and to understand how it is distributed algorithmically in the matrices above it.

8. The perceptual object of a *Haeccesity* artwork is only the work of art if its language can be understood to refer to it, as in *Haeccesity 2.0.3*: this here now. See <<http://www.jeffreystrayer.com/sequences/index.php>>. Other than that sort of case, the perceptual object of a *Haeccesity* artwork can only be understood to be part of the work with what is singled out by the language that it contains..

9. This is the case, for instance, with *Haeccesity 12.0.0*, the language

of which is reproduced in this article, and the link to which appears in endnote seven.

10. This at least is what is the required artistic and philosophical starting point, but, as seen in a *Haeccesity* such as *12.0.0*, one can use language to experiment artistically with that requirement. And even in *Haeccesity 12.0.0*, it singles out what is named by its language, which is distinct, as a kind of Essentialist impossible object, from everything that lacks the identity of that object. On the use of the term ‘Essentialist’ see below. On impossible objects see *Subjects and Objects*

11. See <<http://www.jeffreystrayer.com/events.php>> for a lecture and PowerPoint illustration on these matters.

12. There is precedence in the history of art for an artist himself naming what he is doing. Malevich gave the name ‘Suprematism’ to his work, and de Chirico called what he was doing ‘Metaphysical Art.’

13. The use of language to single something out that an artwork is to be understood to be I called ‘specification’ in *Subjects and Objects*. George Dickie said that Barry’s *all the things I know . . .* “was not crafted with anything, it was just specified.” Dickie takes this either to show that the Barry piece is not a work of art or, if it is, it has “transcended the need for a medium.” (See Dickie, George, *The Art Circle*, New York: Haven (1984) pp. 59-61.) I think that Dickie is wrong on both counts, and I defend a new and wider notion of medium and media that is required to accommodate certain works of Conceptual art, and what I am doing in the *Haeccesities* series. On the notion of a medium see *Subjects and Objects*, pp. 234-253.

14. See, for instance, *Haeccesities 9.0.0* and *9.1.0* at <<http://www.jeffreystrayer.com/sequences/sequence-9.php>>.

15. An object that is singled out by a *Haeccesity* is said to be ‘ideational,’ and an ideational object can be understood to be the artwork of the *Haeccesity* by which it is specified. An object is ideational when its identification with a particular artwork is implicitly or explicitly dependent on a concipient’s understanding of a *Haeccesity* that specifies the object in relation to that understanding. See both *Subjects and Objects* and *Haeccesities*.

16. I talk about these problems in a videotaped interview that can be seen at my website at <<http://www.jeffreystrayer.com/artwork-interview.php>>. None of the Conceptualists who have used language have addressed, nor have their appeared to understand, these problems.

17. For instance, *Haeccesity 7.0.0* has 33 words. There are two correlated pairs of matrices in the perceptual object of this work. Two *Haeccesity* matrices are correlated when they can be theoretically combined to form a new matrix consisting of them, so that the new matrix would contain the information of each matrix of the correlated pair of which it consists. In the case of *Haeccesity 7.0.0*, its language reads correctly 33 times vertically and 33 times horizontally in the matrix that would result from combing a pair of correlated matrices, and so 66 times in all in that matrix, albeit in different beginning and ending cells in each column and in each row of the matrix. As there are two pairs of correlated matrices, the language reads correctly 132 times in all. See <<http://www.jeffreystrayer.com/sequences/sequence-7.php>>.

18. I talk about this work in an interview that can be seen at <<http://www.jeffreystrayer.com/written-interview-landing.php>>. The current introduction to the work, and a provisional TOC, are at <<http://www.jeffreystrayer.com/limits-of-abstraction.php>>.

Call for Papers: Printmaking and the Philosophy of Art

A special issue of the *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*.

Guest Editors: Christy Mag Uidhir and Cynthia Freeland

Submissions on any philosophical treatment of printmaking are welcome, but papers addressing these topics are especially welcome:

- Is printmaking an essential part of the art-historical narrative, Western or otherwise?
- What are the implications of the relationship between print artists and master printers for issues of authorship and artistry?
- What are the descriptive or evaluative implications of the practices of editioning, proofing, or plate striking?
- What are the implications of printmaking practices for print ontology – whether prints are best construed as repeatable works, single-instance works, or something else entirely?
- How do issues of originality or authenticity for printmaking compare to those for other forms of visual art?
- What are the implications qua art (if not also qua print) of digital prints (for example, laser C-prints or inkjet Giclée prints)?

Submissions should not exceed 7,000 words and must comply with the general guidelines for submissions (see “Submissions” on the JAAC page on the American Society for Aesthetics website: <www.aesthetics-online.org>). Upload submissions to the JAAC online submission website, <<http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/jaac>>, making sure they are identified as submissions for the special issue.

If you have questions please contact:

Christy Mag Uidhir, University of Houston, at <cmaguidhir@gmail.com>
Cynthia Freeland, University of Houston, at <cfreeland@uh.edu>

Deadline: 15 January 2014

News from the National Office

Preparations are in full swing for the 71st annual meeting of the American Society for Aesthetics. The meeting will begin with the usual welcome reception on Wednesday, 30 October and end on Saturday, 2 November. The location is the Sheraton Suites Symphony Hall, San Diego. For reservations, paste <<https://www.starwoodmeeting.com/StarGroupsWeb/res?id=1307023865&key=B7245>> into your web browser. That will take you to a special web site set up for the ASA meeting where you can reserve a room and where you can also find further information about the hotel. You can also call the hotel at (619) 696-9800. If you call, please be sure that you specify that your reservation is for the ASA meeting. Our contract arrangements with meeting hotels guarantee a certain number of rooms, in return for which we get the meeting rooms free and some other complimentary additions to the contract. If we do not meet our room guarantee, we will have to pay a penalty, so it is very important that you stay in the meeting hotel. The rate is \$139 / night, single or double, and our room block will be held until 29 September. I have to order food for the receptions and the Saturday business lunch well in advance, so it is very helpful to have a registration list as early as possible. Thanks to all who have registered already. The meeting registration and preliminary program are up on the ASA web site, <www.aesthetics-online.org>, where you can pay by credit card or download a registration form. As always, you can send a check, payable to the American Society for Aesthetics, to me at PO Box 915, Pooler, GA 31322. (Checks save us money since we don't have to pay the credit card transaction fees!).

The meeting program is looking very good. Aaron Meskin is the program chair, and Jennifer Judkins is handling local arrangements from UCLA. She will be bringing UCLA students to help with registration. The Wollheim Lecturer this year is Gregory Currie from the University of York. The Wollheim Lecture is sponsored by the ASA and the BSA and occurs at the ASA annual meeting in odd numbered years. The Friday plenary session will feature an artist's talk, "The Mind on Fire," by James Welling from UCLA. Receptions will follow both talks. As has become customary, the business lunch on Saturday will offer free lunch to all members. The Sheraton Suites is actually connected to the San Diego Copley

Symphony Hall. On Tuesday, 29 October, the Shanghai Ballet will be performing; on Wednesday, the 1925 film version of *The Phantom of the Opera* is being shown, and on Friday, 1 November, there will be an International Passport Presentation of *Día De Los Muertos* – Honoring Mexico's Singers & Composers, with the Symphonic Mariachi Champana Nevin, directed by Jeff Nevin. The performance includes San Diego favorite Mónica Ábrego, Metropolitan opera veteran José Luis Duval, and one of the most famous mariachi musicians in the world, Rafael Palomar. Tickets are now on sale. Visit the San Diego Symphony web site for further information.

The 2014 meeting will be in San Antonio. Andrew Kania is local arrangements chair, and Trinity University is providing support. Derek Matravers is program chair and is already at work. 2015 will be my last meeting as meeting planner; my term as Secretary/Treasurer ends 31 January 2016. I hope to be able to host the 2015 meeting in Savannah or on Hilton Head Island. Feedback on that idea is welcome. I will be working on the 2016 meeting and the 2017 meeting, however, before a new Secretary/Treasurer is elected. Suggestions and expressions of interest for those meetings will be appreciated very much. No commitment is necessary at this time, but it is very advantageous to have contracts arranged at least two years in advance.

If you go to the ASA web site to register, renew your membership, or make some other payment through the ASA shop, you may encounter some minor glitches. To use the shop, you need to set up an account that applies only to the shop. It is just one of the conditions of our shop software. The account is a formality to make the software work; it has no bearing on anything else, and we do not record the information. We never share email addresses, even if we occasionally sell our mailing list. There is also a second glitch that we haven't yet been able to track down. When you order something through the web site, the web site itself sends you a receipt. When you enter your credit card information later on a secure link to Bank of America, that transaction is processed separately. Right now, the web site is sending out duplicate order receipts. If you receive two order receipts, you can tell that one is a duplicate if you look at the authorization numbers, which will be the same. That order comes directly from the web site before you enter your credit card information, which is not affected by the duplication. I get a notification from the credit card processor and am careful to check that you are not charged twice. Everything is

safe and secure; you are not being charged twice. We are working to find out why the duplication occurs; it probably has something to do with the way our web site interacts with the shopping cart, which is a not very programmer friendly piece of commercial e-commerce software. On the other hand, the actual processing through Bank of America is much better than the old shopping cart and saves us money on each transaction. Dom Lopes, who is now ASA President, has been handling our web site for years on a more or less volunteer basis and has done a great job. We will try to get the problem fixed, but, again, it is merely a glitch that does not actually affect security or transactions.

The *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Vol. 71.3, is now with the publisher and printer. If you joined before I sent the mailing labels on 16 July, you should receive that issue. If you joined after that date, your first issue will be *JAAC* 71.4, but your membership will extend to the end of 2014, so you will receive all of *JAAC* 72 as well. I remind you that as a member, you are entitled to use the Wiley On-line Library to view pdf's of all articles in back issues of *JAAC*. To access the library, you need instructions and a password, which are obtainable directly from Wiley (contact Rhonda Riccardi at <rriccardi@wiley.com>). I cannot issue passwords, but if there is any problem, I can confirm your membership. Just copy me with your email.

In the past, we have published a printed membership directory. In this electronic age, that seems both outmoded and expensive. I can send you an electronic directory on request. I update it whenever a member is added or renews membership, so it is more current than a printed version. The problem is that we do not want members' information circulated to marketers and spammers. If you request a copy, please treat it as for your use only and do not loan or otherwise distribute it. If it is getting in circulation outside the membership, I will have to discontinue it. As always, you can opt out of being included in any membership list. Just send me an email asking not to be listed. The membership directory will show when your membership expires. We work on a calendar year membership cycle. I will be sending renewal notices after the annual meeting if your membership expires at the end of 2013. As I noted above, any new members who join or anyone who rejoins before the end of 2013 will be credited to the end of 2014 (five issues of *JAAC* for the price of four!). Anyone who still has not joined the electronic age and does not have an email address can request a copy of the directory, but I think it only fair to charge for printing and postage in that case. Ludites

awake; gmail is free. Incidentally, I still get an occasional email at <asa@armstrong.edu>. The ASA no longer has an office at Armstrong Atlantic State University. I can still view those emails, but I seldom do, and that link may be shut down if AASU ever realizes that it still exists. Please send email to me at <dabney.townsend@armstrong.edu>, my personal email address.

One of the most important pieces of business at the annual meeting is the selection of a program chair for the 2015 meeting and nominations for the board of trustees for the elections that will be held as soon after the annual meeting as possible. Expressions of interest in being program chair or serving on the board of trustees are in order. The board selects the program chair and nominates at least two members for each board vacancy, but members can also nominate someone for the board by submitting a nominating petition with at least eight names. Please send expressions of interest to me or to Dom Lopes at <dom.lopes@ubc.ca>.

A reminder that the ASA awards two prizes, the Cohen Dance Aesthetics prize, in memory of Selma Jean Cohen, who left a generous bequest to the ASA, and the outstanding monograph prize. The Cohen Prize is awarded in even numbered years for a book or essay in dance aesthetics published in the preceding two years and is open to anyone. The monograph prize is awarded every year and is limited to a scholarly monograph by an ASA member published in the previous year. Books published in 2012 are now being considered by a select committee of senior scholars. Any author or publisher of a book in 2013 is invited to nominate a book for the monograph prize to be awarded at the annual meeting in 2014. (Anyone who would like to discuss naming rights for the monograph prize is invited to discuss the possibility with me.)

Finally, the economy is severely curtailing publishers exhibiting at small meetings. Scholar's Choice, which has always exhibited, has informed me that they cannot come this year, even after I offered to waive the usual exhibit fee. Other publishers are only willing to consider sending books if we handle set up. I have declined to take on that task. We will have a room with tables, but if you want your book displayed, please bring a copy. If you think that your publisher should exhibit, please contact them and, if possible, offer to handle the set up. I will waive the table fee in that case.

Dabney Townsend
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Aesthetics News

The Berlin Prize: Call for Applications 2014-2015

The American Academy in Berlin invites applications for its residential fellowships for 2014-2015, as well as early applications for the academic years 2015-2016 and 2016-2017. The deadline is Monday, 2 September, 2013 (12 pm EST or 6 pm CET). Applications may be submitted online or mailed to the Berlin office.

The Academy welcomes applications from emerging and established scholars and from writers and professionals who wish to engage in independent study in Berlin. Approximately 26 Berlin Prizes are conferred annually. Past recipients have included historians, economists, poets and novelists, journalists, legal scholars, anthropologists, musicologists, and public policy experts, among others. The Academy does not award fellowships in the natural sciences.

Fellowships are typically awarded for an academic semester or, on occasion, for an entire academic year. Bosch Fellowships in Public Policy may be awarded for shorter stays of six to eight weeks. Fellowship benefits include round-trip airfare, partial board, a \$5,000 monthly stipend, and accommodations at the Academy's lakeside Hans Arnhold Center in the Berlin-Wannsee district.

Fellowships are restricted to individuals based permanently in the United States. US citizenship is not required; American expatriates are not eligible. Candidates in academic disciplines must have completed a PhD at the time of application. Applicants working in most other fields - such as journalism, filmmaking, law, or public policy - must have equivalent professional degrees. Writers should have published at least one book at the time of application. The Academy gives priority to a proposal's scholarly merit rather than any specific relevance to Germany.

For further information and to apply online, please see <<http://www.americanacademy.de/home/fellows/applications>>, or contact The American Academy in Berlin, Attn: Fellows Selection, Am Sandwerder 17-19, 14109 Berlin, Germany, Telephone +49-30-804-83-0, Fax +49-30-804-83-111, email <cs@americanacademy.de>.

PJA Special Issue: Global Aesthetics (Autumn 2013)

The editors of the *Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics* will publish a special issue that examines the philosophical reflection on art as practiced outside the western philosophical traditions.

Philosophy of art in the western academy has largely grown out of the western philosophical tradition, as well as out of the history of western art. While much of this tradition purports to describe all aesthetic concepts and practices, its theories are rarely confronted with non-western art or philosophy. There is still alarmingly little professional interest taken in non-western philosophies of art and aesthetics in the anglophone and European academy.

PJA is unique among postgraduate journals in that it is peer-reviewed by full time academics. *PJA* operates a strict anonymous editorial procedure in order to increase fairness for those from groups currently under-represented in philosophy. We aim to provide feedback on all submissions, whether successful or not.

Please direct all enquiries to: <editor@pjaesthetics.org>.

PJA also welcome submissions of short reviews (between 500 and 1000 words) of any recent books on philosophical aesthetics. The *PJA* also publishes interviews with professional philosophers of art written by postgraduates, please contact us if you would be interested in writing an interview for publication.

New in Contemporary Aesthetics

As *Contemporary Aesthetics* begins its second decade of publication, we would like to alert you to new work appearing in Volume 11 (2013). All earlier volumes (1 through 10 as well as four special volumes) are directly accessible on our website from the Journal page: <<http://www.contempaesthetics.org/newvolume/pages/journal.php>>.

Papers recently published in CA include "Public Aquariums and Marine Aesthetics" by Nola Semczyszyn, "In Praise of Ambiguity: Musical Subtlety and Merleau-Ponty" by Tiger C. Roholt, "Pornography and Disgust" by Laurent Stern, "Atopia & Aesthetics. A Modal Perspective" by Yves Millet, and "Perspective East and West" by Ken-ichi Sasaki. Forthcoming are "Experiencing photographs qua photographs: what's so special about them?" by Jiri Benovsky and "The Influence of Global Aesthetics on Chinese Aesthetics: The Adaptation of Moxie and the Case of Dafen Cun" by Eva Kit Wah Man. *Contemporary Aesthetics* is freely accessible and welcomes readers and contributors.

Culture, Theory, and Critique

We are pleased to announce the publication of a new (special topic) issue of *Culture, Theory, Critique*, which is available online at: <<http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rctc20/54/2>>. The topic is "Mimesis and Culture," and the issue is guest edited by Matthew Lamb (University of Queensland, Australia), Costica Bradatan (Texas Tech University, USA) and Greg Hainge (University of Queensland, Australia).

Aniki: Portuguese Journal of the Moving Image

Aniki: Portuguese Journal of the Moving Image accepts original essays on, among others, the following areas: cinema, television,

media archaeology, video, digital cultures, sound and the moving image, history and theory of the moving image. It is an open access, peer-reviewed online journal that publishes original research essays in the fields of the moving image from diverse methodological perspectives. A bi-annual publication (June/December), this journal publishes essays (with double blind peer review), interviews, book reviews and conference reports, as well as critical reviews of art exhibitions and international film festivals. In its first issue, which will be launched in December 2013, *Aniki* aims to publish a special thematic section, to be edited by Tiago Baptista, on the relationship between new technologies, filmic analysis, and new cinephilias. Please visit <www.aim.org.pt/aniki> for further details.

Evental Aesthetics

Announcing our latest issue: "Premodern Aesthetics," with contributions by: S.D. Chrostowska, Peter Hanly, C.A. Tsakiridou, James Wierzbicki. Topics include Hegelian aesthetics, Gothic architecture, Racine, Elliott Carter, and more! See <eventalaesthetics.net>. Our newest issue is available right now. And it's free.

Aesthetics and the Senses

Some colleagues may find this special issue on the aesthetics of the senses of great interest. All essays can be downloaded for

free from the Essays in Philosophy web-site: <http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/vol13/iss2/1/#.UCL3abh8_us.email>.

Journal for Artistic Research

An online, peer-reviewed journal for the publication and discussion of artistic research, *JAR3* is now online with contributions by: Miriam Ewers (QA), Gert Germeraad (NL/SE), Marc Goodwin (FI), Carolina Goradesky (BR), Simón Granel (GB), Michael Kahr (AT), Neil Mulholland (GB) and Tero Nauha (FI).

Artistic research is a newly emergent and rapidly evolving field, whose status is still hotly debated. *JAR* provides an influential voice in this debate, creating a platform for the re-negotiation of the relationship between art and academia, and the role and function of research in artistic practice.

European Journal of Philosophy

The *European Journal of Philosophy* is pleased to publish a Virtual Issue on the theme of 'Kant.' Sections include: Theoretical Philosophy, Practical Philosophy, Aesthetics, and After Kant. View the full introduction and access the articles at: <<http://bit.ly/EJPKant>>.

American Society for Aesthetics 71st Annual Meeting

Sheraton Suites San Diego Symphony Hall
30 October – 1 November 2013

Hotel Reservations (before September 29):
<<https://www.starwoodmeeting.com/StarGroupsWeb/res?id=1307023865&key=B7245>>
or
(619) 696-9800

Meeting Registration:
<www.aesthetics-online.org>

A New Newsletter Feature

Because there is presently no forum for comments about the state of the ASA in general, the editors will now welcome letters on such topics. Letters regarding the *Newsletter* and its contents are welcome as well. Depending on interest, selected letters will appear in a Letter to the Editors column in forthcoming issues. Letters may be edited for length or content. Please submit your letters to: David Goldblatt at <goldblatt@denison.edu> or Henry Pratt at <henry.pratt@marist.edu>.

Conference Reports

ASA Eastern Division Meeting

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
19-20 April 2013

This year's meeting was jointly organized with the Monroe Beardsley Lecture, which was given at Temple's Center City Campus in the evening of the 19th. This year's Beardsley speaker was David Freedberg (Columbia) with a talk entitled "Empathy and Art: Adjusting the Neuroscientific Perspective." Noël Carroll gave the ASA plenary lecture, presenting excerpts from his forthcoming work on humor and morality. The conference hosted two invited panels, on "Disgust" (Carolyn Korsmeyer, Gregg Horowitz, and William Day) and "Nietzsche and Art" (Bob Guay, Daniel Conway, Matthew Meyer, Randal Havas). There was also a submitted panel on Black Aesthetics (Luvell Anderson, Paul C. Taylor, Lindsey Stewart, and Sabrina Strings).

The number of excellent submissions continued to grow this year resulting in an acceptance rate of under forty percent. With more than eighty people officially registered, talks were very well attended. The twelve sessions were evenly divided between historical and contemporary topics and featured papers from the European as well as analytic strands of aesthetics. In addition to two sessions on German Aesthetics, there were sessions on "Aesthetics and Ethics," "Artifice, Fiction, and Reading," "Work, Trompe-l'oeil, and Medium," "Everyday and Environmental Aesthetics," "Fiction," "Reason and Judgment," and "Beauty, Profundity, and Shame in Music."

Speakers and panel Chairs came from Europe (including Helsinki, Freie Universität, Berlin, Oxford), as well as Canada and the United States and included faculty and students alike.

A special thanks should go to the graduate students from Temple for their continued assistance and help in making the Eastern Meeting a successful event. We would also like to thank those who served as the this year's reviewers: Chris Bartel, John Carvalho, Brandon Cooke, Richard Eldridge, Cynthia Freeland, Alessandro Giovannelli, Theodore Gracyk, Espen Hammer, James Harold, Net Hettinger, Sherri Irvin, Andrew Kania, Paul Kottman, Jason Miller, Lara Ostaric, John Protevi, Charles Repp, Guy Rohrbaugh, Stephanie Ross, Aaron Smuts, Brian Soucek, and Thomas Wartenberg. Thanks to everyone for helping to make this a great weekend!

Respectfully submitted,

John Gibson
Jonathan Neufeld
Kristin Gjesdal

Graduate Conference in Aesthetics

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
21 April 2013

The second annual Graduate Conference in Aesthetics occurred the day after the ASA Eastern Division Meeting. The conference was sponsored by the Greater Philadelphia Philosophy Consortium and the American Society for Aesthetics. Four papers were accepted from twenty-five submissions: student presenters included Matt Harman (University of Chicago), Tano Posteraro (McMaster), Allison Fritz (Nebraska), and

David Freidell (UCLA). Topics ranged from environmental aesthetics to Merleau-Ponty on painting to the metaphysics of artworks. The commentators were Espen Hammer (Temple), John Carvalho (Villanova), Nola Semczynszyn (Franklin and Marshall), and Margaret Moore (Tennessee). All of the commentators are faculty members rather than graduate students, and provided insightful critiques from a more experienced point of view. Rob Hopkins (Sheffield/NYU) delivered a terrific keynote lecture.

Each graduate student paper was well-received, due in part to the fact that, like last year, submissions for the conference went through a careful blind-review process of two to three referees each. Each referee was an experienced philosopher with a good deal of familiarity in the subdiscipline of the paper they were reviewing; the list of referees was an impressive list of many familiar names in aesthetics and philosophy of art.

Attendance was fairly good. Aside from the eleven names mentioned above, there were about twenty-five attendees throughout the duration of the conference; these included graduate and undergraduate students from around the Philadelphia area, and some individuals from the ASA Eastern Division conference who were able to stay for the graduate conference. We were able to have sessions chaired by graduate students at programs outside the Philadelphia area. In addition, the tone of the conference was friendly and positive.

The main goal of the graduate conference was to foster and encourage graduate work in aesthetics. There were multiple ways that the conference realized this goal: (a) through encouraging presenters to continue their work in aesthetics by providing a venue at which they can present their work, (b) through providing commentary on the presenters' work from experienced philosophers at the conference, (c) through the interaction between graduate students working in aesthetics that this conference facilitates, and (d) through the keynote lecture. Again, there was a refreshingly friendly atmosphere that seemed to help the conference foster graduate work in aesthetics through all of the ways stated above.

Respectfully submitted,

John Dyck and Erum Naqvi, co-organizers

Calls for Papers

ASA Pacific Division Meeting

Pacific Grove, California
9 – 11 April 2014

Paper and panel submissions from persons in all arts-related disciplines, including graduate students, are welcome. Papers and panels may treat any area of interest within aesthetics and the philosophy of art. Suggested topics include, but are not limited to: reflections on humor and/or comedy; the philosophy of literature and/or poetry; philosophical discussions of nature and environment; everyday aesthetics; issues in the philosophy of film and/or photography; issues in the performing arts; the intersection between art and other values; and reflections on the state of the discipline, including the relationship between aesthetics and other philosophical domains and modes of enquiry.

Paper submissions must not exceed 3,000 words in length (20 minutes in presentation time), and should be accompanied by 100-word abstracts. Panel proposals should include a general description of the topic or theme, along with the names and affiliations of all proposed participants and brief abstracts of all papers. Essays written by graduate students will be considered for a \$200 award, and all graduate student submissions should be clearly marked as such. Volunteers to serve as commentators and/or chairs are welcome.

All papers or proposals should be submitted electronically to <asapacific2014@gmail.com>. You may also forward any inquiries to Renee Conroy at <rmconroy@comcast.net> or to Anna Pakes at <A.Pakes@roehampton.ac.uk>.

As 2014 marks the 40th year the American Society for Aesthetics Pacific Division Meeting will convene at the beautiful Asilomar Conference Grounds in Pacific Grove, CA, the organizers would be delighted to receive any available copies of past programs from previous attendees. If you have old programs you would be willing to share to help us honor this anniversary, please forward electronic versions to <asapacific2014@gmail.com>. Thank you in advance for your help.

Deadline: 7 December 2013

ASA Eastern Division Meeting

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
28-29 March 2014

Papers on any topic in aesthetics are invited, as well as proposals for panels, author-meets-critics, or other special sessions. We welcome volunteers to serve as session chairs and commentators. All participants must be members of the American Society for Aesthetics and must register for the conference. Papers should not exceed 3,000 words, should be accompanied by a 100-word abstract, and must be prepared for blind review.

Please send submissions in PDF, Word, or RTF format to <easa.submissions@gmail.com>.

Please feel free to direct questions to the Program Co-Chairs: John Gibson (University of Louisville) <john.gibson@louisville.edu>; Kristin Gjesdal (Temple University) <kgjesdal@temple.edu>; or Kristin Boyce (Johns Hopkins) <kboyce2@jhu.edu>.

Deadline: 27 December 2013

Evental Aesthetics

We are pleased to invite submissions for our Winter 2013 issue. The editors seek submissions in two categories. 1. Aesthetics and philosophy (“unthemed”): This section will be devoted to philosophical matters pertaining to any aesthetic practice or experience, including but not limited to art and everyday aesthetics. 2. Asceticism and Poverty: The themed section of this issue will focus on aesthetic practices that are necessitated, constrained, inspired, or otherwise characterized by asceticism or poverty. Both categories may be freely interpreted, however all submissions must address philosophical matters.

Deadline: 31 August 2013

ReMEDIating Flusser

Storrs, Connecticut
1-3 November 2013

The symposium ReMEDIating Flusser brings together scholars in media studies, literature, art and cultural studies and international Flusser specialists to dialogue about Flusser’s work, his philosophy and approaches, and to engage each other in discussions on the arts and humanities in a digital age. Importantly, this symposium seeks to take Flusser scholarship and the representation of Flusser’s work one step further: for three days, participants will work collaboratively to create a script to remediate Flusser’s main ideas and concepts for an online publication. As such, the symposium – in form and con-

tent – will present an entirely novel approach to present research on Flusser while applying Flusser’s own methods to the exploration and dissemination of knowledge and ideas.

Papers/Presentations (20 minutes) to be delivered in 6 morning workshops may address the following: media epistemology, aesthetics and perception, visualization, digitization, gamification of humanistic concepts, specific Flusser texts, digital humanities, media convergences, any of the key concepts listed on the symposium website.

Please submit a 250-word abstract to <anke.finger@uconn.edu>. See the website for further details: <<http://symposium.digitalmediauconn.org/>>.

Deadline: 1 September 2013

Critical Perspectives on Music, Education, and Religion

Helsinki, Finland
20-22 August 2014

In recent years, professional and academic discourses in Western music education have been increasingly secularized, distancing policies and practices from religion. A renewed consciousness of cultural diversity in music education, however, has revitalized discussion regarding the nexus of music, education and religion. The presence of religion in music education contexts is a situation fraught with political, cultural, social, legal, educational, aesthetic, ethical, and religious tensions. This conference will bring together scholars from different disciplines for a critical examination of these complex issues in both theory and practice.

The Sibelius Academy at the University of the Arts Helsinki, invites paper proposals for a conference on 20-22 August 2014 and a subsequent book on topics at the intersection of music, education, and religion.

Papers from relevant perspectives and disciplines such as education, music education, critical pedagogy, musicology, ethnomusicology, religious studies, philosophy, sociology, anthropology, cultural studies, gender studies, policy studies, legal studies, etc. are welcome.

For further information including submission details, please visit the website <<http://sites.siba.fi/web/cpmer>> or contact Alexis Kallio at <alexis.kallio@siba.fi>.

Deadline: 1 September 2013

2013 John Fisher Memorial Prize

The American Society for Aesthetics is pleased to announce that the 2013 John Fisher Memorial Prize Essay is Nicholas Diehl's "Satire, Analogy, and Moral Philosophy." The Prize is intended to foster the development of new talent in the field of aesthetics. The competition is limited to those persons who have completed the terminal degree in their field and are in the early stages of participation in their profession. Diehl will present the essay at the 2013 American Society for Aesthetics Conference, and it will be published in *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*.

Art and Emotion

University of Hong Kong
12-13 December 2013

There is a growing interest in understanding emotions and their place in human experience. What is emotion – is it a state, or is it a process? What, if anything, do our emotions tell us about the world or our needs? What is and should be the role of emotions in, for example, approaching ethical dilemmas? One of the areas in which these questions become most vibrant is in thinking about art in its broadest possible sense (fine arts, music, cinema, literature, etc). Do artworks arouse real or quasi emotions? How do we derive pleasure from experiencing negative emotions in art? Is there any moral – or pragmatic – value in an emotional engagement with artworks? If artworks succeed in evoking emotion, what can that tell us about the nature of emotions per se? This conference is designed to provide postgraduate students who are working on said issues in aesthetics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of art and other relevant fields (inc. psychology, arts, and literature) the opportunity to present their work-in-progress to peers for review and dialogue.

If you are interested in giving a paper please submit an Abstract (250 words) to <art.emotion.hku@gmail.com>. For any inquiries, please contact us via the same conference email address.

Deadline: 2 September 2013

Inside. Outside. Other: The body in the work of Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault

Münster, Germany
28-30 November 2013

The aim of this interdisciplinary conference is to examine the significance of the body in Deleuze's and Foucault's works. This is particularly relevant in view of the intellectual exchange between the two philosophers. Specifically this event provides the possibility of tracing connections and contrasts between the two thinkers' conceptions of the bodily and thereby complement the existing reception.

We invite abstracts for 20 min presentations in German or English (max 300 words) that engage with these aspects from the perspectives of philosophy, art history, literary studies

or adjacent areas of research.

Please send your abstracts together with a short CV to: Katharina D. Martin at <k.d.martin@uni-muenster.de> and Ann-Cathrin Drews at <acdrews@gmx.de>.

Deadline: 15 September 2013

Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts

San Diego, California
16-20 April

The Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts (SPSCVA) invites papers to be presented at its divisional meetings held in conjunction with the Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. Papers may address any topic that involves the connection between philosophy and 20th & 21st century visual arts: film, photography, video games, or other visual aesthetic media. Presentations should be 20-25 minutes (10-12 pages double spaced). Participants must be currently paid members of the SPSCVA. (You do not need to be a member of the SPSCVA to submit a paper for consideration.) Please submit full papers only

(not abstracts). The Society also welcomes proposals for panels, author-meets-critics, or other special sessions. Submissions should be sent to Richard Nunan (College of Charleston) at <nunanr@cofc.edu>.

Deadline: 15 September 2013

The British Society for Aesthetics Connections Conference, Call for Conference Proposals

The British Society of Aesthetics is offering a grant of up to £12,000 to support a conference designed to enhance the dialogue between aesthetics and other areas of philosophy.

The majority of papers at the conference should be by philosophers who have hitherto not had a primary research focus in aesthetics (effectively an AOS in aesthetics), though they may have made some contributions to the field. The remainder of the presenters should have a research specialism in aesthetics. Papers should explore the connections of other areas of philosophy with aesthetics, or be in aesthetics. The organizers of the conference are responsible for all practical matters concerning its running; and the conference must be held in the UK, though the organizers need not be based there. The BSA expects to be the sole funder of this conference, which should include 'British Society of Aesthetics Connections' in its title, and all conference materials should publicize the role of the BSA.

Proposals should be sent to <admin@british-aesthetics.org> should be no more than 2,000 words long, and include a proposed date range and venue, a draft budget, and a list of proposed speakers and topics (indicating which speakers have already agreed to contribute, conditional on the success of the application). Applicants will be informed of the outcome of their applications by mid-November.

Any questions about this Call for Proposals should be addressed to the President of the BSA, Berys Gaut: <bng@st-andrews.ac.uk>.

Deadline 1 October 2013

Visual Activism

San Francisco, California
14-16 March 2014

The International Association of Visual Culture (IAVC) invites proposals for its third biennial conference. The conference is centered

on the concept of Visual Activism. How can we better understand the relationships between visual culture and activist practices? There are ways in which art can take the form of political/social activism and there are also ways in which activism takes specific, and sometimes surprising, visual forms that are not always aligned with or recognizable by art-world frameworks. How can we engage in conversations about abstract or oblique visual activism, for instance as is demanded in conditions of extreme censorship? How can we approach the complexity of governmental or commercial 'visual activism' to better address hegemonies of visual culture (for example, in advertising and the mass media)? What becomes of the temporal lag that attends such images, when the politics of visual production are only made legible in retrospect, with historical distance? How does the past become a form of 'visual activism' in the present? To what degree do forms of visual activism travel, and in what ways are they necessarily grounded in locally specific knowledge and geographically specific spaces?

Presentations should respond to these questions or related topics and may take the form of scholarly papers (20 minutes), artist talks (20 minutes), short performances (5 to 30 minutes), or lighting-round interventions (5 minutes). Proposals should include a 400-word abstract, links to websites with additional publications or relevant images and information, and a CV. Please send proposals to <edu@sfmoma.org> (with 'visual activism' as the subject line).

Deadline: 1 October 2013

Cave Hill Philosophy Symposium

Cave Hill Campus, Barbados
11-13 November 2013

The broad theme for the ninth Cave Hill Philosophy Symposium (CHiPS) will be issues related to aesthetics. Most philosophical reflection under the heading 'aesthetics', especially within mainstream Western philosophy, presents itself as an esoteric engagement with a very limited number of masterpieces in a very limited variety of genres/forms. While not wishing to exclude the usual suspects, we believe that what is of concern to aesthetics is of fundamental concern to all of us, shapes our understandings of self and others in countless ways, and deserves integration into much of our present-day social and political thinking. To that end, we hope to provoke discussion of the, perhaps, over-narrow boundaries of aesthetics' concern as it is generally conceived; what might be learnt from examination of the ways different

cultures view the role of aesthetic categories and activities; how distinctively aesthetic categories shape our thinking in other areas; and other such concerns. In keeping with the spirit of our conversations, we hope to bring together thinkers operating in and across different cultural and philosophical traditions as well as other disciplines that share a boundary with philosophy. In addition to regular paper presentations, we would also welcome suggestions for workshops, demonstrations and other relevant activities.

Contact persons: Prof. Frederick Ochieng'-Odhiambo at <frederick.ochieng-odhiambo@cavehill.uwi.edu>, Prof. Ed Brandon at <ed-brandon@gmail.com> and Ms. Roxanne Burton at <roxanneburton@gmail.com>.

Deadline: 14 October 2013

Film: Thinking Reality and Time through Film

Lisbon, Portugal
7-10 May 2014

During the last two decades film has been increasingly recognized as a medium of philosophical reflection, in an ontological and epistemological perspective. But what does it mean to understand film as philosophizing? Can we access specific, reliable knowledge of the world and our relation to it through the aesthetic form of moving images? Considering film's claim of continuity with the world - what is the essence of film and what is exactly its connection with reality? Within the growing canon of the attempts to relate film and philosophy, we therefore invite reflection on reality and time by asking for the ontology and essence of film. In this context the double-questions of time and space, motion and matter, life and death, finitude and infinity, multitude and authenticity are proposed to be the centre of the conference themes.

The proposal submission for a 20 minutes speaking time must have between 300 to 400 words and contain the title of the paper, author(s), affiliation and email, abstract and 4 to 6 keywords. Please also attach a brief note on your CV (150 words max.) The conference main working language is English, but we admit French or German proposals in exceptional cases.

Please submit your proposals to <philosophyfilm2014@gmail.com>. For information, please contact <filmtimereality@gmail.com> or visit the conference's website at <https://sites.google.com/site/philosophyandfilm2014>.

Deadline: 31 October 2013

21st Century Theories of Literature: Essence, Fiction and Value

University of Warwick, UK
27-29 March 2014

This conference aims to explore a series of theoretical themes that are relevant both for the philosophy of art and for literary criticism and theory. The aim is to bridge the gap between “philosophical” and “literary” approaches to the theory of literary interpretation, and to prompt participants coming from different backgrounds (Continental, Analytical...) to engage with one another.

500-word abstracts for 20-minute presentations should be sent to the organizers at <fve-conference@live.warwick.ac.uk>. We welcome contributions on the following themes: (1) Essence; (2) Fiction; (3) Value. We would particularly appreciate an engagement both with philosophical and literary-critical literature, but this is not a requirement. We welcome case studies and historical analyses, as long as there is an explicit theoretical dimension to the discussion.

Further information can be found on the website: <<http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/research/activities/21stcenturytheoriesofliterature>>.

Deadline: 30 November 2013

Annual International Conference on Humanities & Arts in a Global World

Athens, Greece
3-6 January 2014

Academic Member Responsible for the Conference: Dr. Gregory A. Katsas, Head, Sociology Research Unit, ATINER & Associate Professor of Sociology, The American College of Greece-Deree College, Greece. Conference Website: <<http://www.atiner.gr/social.htm>>.

Deadline to submit abstracts: 6 January 2014

Goodman Today

Nancy, France
8-11 September 2014

The Laboratory of History of Science and Philosophy - Archives Henri-Poincaré (Université de Lorraine/Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) organizes an international symposium, Goodman Today, devoted to the work of Nelson Goodman. The four areas in which it is possible to submit are: (1) Metaphysics (2) Philosophy of Language (3) Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art (4) Epistemology and Pragmatism. Of course, propos-

als must have a relationship to the thought of Goodman. 500-600 word proposals, without the name of the author in the text, should be sent to this address: <Roger.Pouivet@univ-lorraine.fr>. Languages of the conference are French, English and German. For questions, contact Pierre Edouard Bour at <pierre-edouard.bour@UNIV-LORRAINE.FR>.

Deadline: 1 February 2014

Canadian Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting

Ontario, Canada
24-26 May 2014

The 2014 annual meeting of the Canadian Society for Aesthetics will take place in company with meetings of other Canadian associations, including the Canadian Philosophical Association, as part of the 83rd Congress of the Humanities and Social Sciences. Submissions on any topic in aesthetics are invited. But special interest is expressed for papers in the following areas: 1) Aesthetics of food and wine (in view of our location in Ontario's wine district); 2) Artistic performance: Cognitive and aesthetic issues; 3) Assessing borderline and outlier cases in art; 4) The logic of narrative; 3) Ethical issues in any of the arts.

In the initial stage of consideration, preference will be given to completed papers of 10-12 standard pages, accompanied by a 150-word abstract and suitable for presentation in fewer than 25 minutes. Abstracts, if submitted alone, will be assessed later and only if vacancies occur in the program. Proposals for panels on special topics or recent publications are also invited, and should include names and affiliations of all participants plus an abstract of the subject matter. Participants selected for inclusion on the program are required to pay CSA membership and conference registration fees. For graduate submissions included on the program, there is the possibility of some funding to help support travel. Submissions must be sent as e-mail attachments (MS Word or .RTF files). Inquiries or submissions in English may be sent to Ira Newman; Philosophy; Mansfield University; Mansfield PA 16933 (USA) <inewman@mansfield.edu>. Those in French to: François Chalifour; Département des arts, Cégep de l'Outaouais, Campus Félix-Leclerc, 820 boul. De la Gappe, Gatineau, (Québec) CANADA J8T 7I7 <francois.chalifour@cegep-outaouais.qc.ca>.

Deadline: 17 February 2014

Upcoming Events

American Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting

San Diego, California
30 October–2 November 2013

Professor Gregory Currie will give the Wollheim Lecture, and the photographer James Welling will give a keynote address. There will be panels on such topics as aesthetics and implicit bias, the aesthetics of wine, the aesthetics of Friday Night Lights, artworks and place, aesthetics and the senses, and aesthetics and the law. Please feel free to direct questions to the Program Chair: Aaron Meskin (University of Leeds) at <hutama13@leeds.ac.uk>.

For more information, including details for registration, hotel reservation, and the program, see <<http://aesthetics-online.org/annual/>>.

British Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting

Cambridge, England
20-22 September 2013

Registration is now open and the full program is available at <www.british-aesthetics.org/conference2013>. Keynote speakers include Carolyn Korsmeyer (Buffalo, SUNY) and Peter Railton (Michigan, Ann Arbor).

In addition to reduced conference fees, BSA members now enjoy a 20% discount off OUP and Routledge titles. Please see <<http://british-aesthetics.org/membership.aspx>>.

Comics and Popular Arts Conference

Atlanta, Georgia
30 August-2 September 2013

The Comics and Popular Arts Conference (CPAC) is an annual academic conference for the studies of comics and the popular arts, including science/speculative fiction and fantasy literature, film, and other media, comic books, manga, graphic novels, anime, gaming, etc. with the support of The Institute for Comics Studies, Comic Book Convention Conference Series and Dragon*Con (see <<http://dragoncon.org>>).

This conference takes place at Dragon*Con is part of the Institute for Comics Studies' mission to promote the study, understanding, and cultural legitimacy of comics and to support the discussion and dissemination of this study and understanding via public venues.

More information, including programs and topics from previous years can be found at <<http://thehangedman.com/cpac>>. Send any questions to: <cpac@thehangedman.com>.

Hearing Landscape Critically: Music, Place, and the Spaces of Sound

Stellenbosch, South Africa
9-11 September 2013

The second meeting of the 'Hearing Landscape Critically' network is concerned with finding ways to articulate and listen to landscape that challenge established patterns of cognition and intervention, and which probe the archival and everyday silences and ruptures exacerbated by social, political and intellectual intervention. Following the first meeting at Oxford University, May 2012, the Stellenbosch symposium marks the continuation of an inter-disciplinary and inter-continental project addressing the intersections and cross-articulations of landscape, music, and the spaces of sound.

Keynote speakers: Prof. Richard Taruskin (Department of Music, University of California, Berkeley) and Prof. Cheryl Walker (Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Stellenbosch University). Further information will be made available at the website: <<http://musiclandscapeconference.wordpress.com>>.

Creative Processes in Art International Colloquium

Lisbon, Portugal
12-13 September 2013

The Center for Research and Studies of Fine Arts of the University of Lisbon and the Nucleus of Research in Painting and Education of the Federal University of Uberlandia are jointly organizing a two-day international Colloquium on Creative Processes in Art. The aim of this event is to provide an interdisciplinary platform to the discussion of artistic creative processes. By bringing together artists, art educators, philosophers and art theorists, we intend to trace a comprehensive overview of this theme.

For further information and inquiries please e-mail us at <creativeprocessesinart@gmail.com>.

Evaluative Perception: Aesthetic, Ethical, and Normative

University of Glasgow
13-15 September 2013

The conference is to be held at the University of Glasgow in association with the Centre for the Study of Perceptual Experience. After long having been neglected, the possibility of evaluative perception is once again being given serious philosophical consideration. In light of these developments, the Centre for the Study of Perceptual Experience at the University of Glasgow is convening a conference on the topic of Evaluative Perception, where 'evaluative' is being understood so as to include aesthetic, ethical, and normative perception. The central questions to which the conference will be addressed include: Are there good reasons for thinking that evaluative perception is possible? Is this limited to any particular sensory modality/ies? Is there anything distinctive about evaluative perception, or particular types of evaluative perception? What are the epistemological consequences of evaluative perception?

As well as these questions, the topic of the conference will connect with broader discussions and debates in aesthetics, epistemology, ethics, and the philosophy of perception, e.g., the possibility of cognitive penetration, amodal perception, and cross-modal perception, the admissible contents of experience, the relationship between imagination and perception, the impact of so-called 'framing effects' on perceptual experience, whether perception can be said to be rational and whether perception could be the conclusion of an argument, the role of experience in aesthetic appreciation, and the prospects for various approaches in ethics, e.g., ethical intuitionism and virtue ethics.

Any enquiries should be addressed to Dr Anna Bergqvist at <a.bergqvist@mmu.ac.uk> or, Dr Robert Cowan at <robert.cowan@glasgow.ac.uk>.

Inter-University Workshop on Mind, Art, and Morality: Themes from Malcolm Budd

University of Murcia, Spain
2-4 October 2013

Invited Speaker: Malcolm Budd (formerly Grote Professor of Philosophy of Mind and Logic at University College London). Malcolm Budd is the author of *Aesthetic Essays* (Oxford U. P., 2008), *The Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature: Essays on the Aesthetic of Nature* (Oxford U. P., 2002), *Values of Art* (Harvard U. P., 2003), *Music and the Emotions* (1985), and many papers on the philosophy of mind and aesthetics.

The Interuniversity Workshop on Mind, Art and Morality promotes the relation between different areas in philosophy; more specifi-

cally, the Workshop aims at exploring issues lying at the intersection of ethics, aesthetics and the philosophy of mind. In former editions, the Workshop has been devoted either to the work of specific philosophers, such as, Richard Wollheim, Jonathan Dancy, Christine Korsgaard, Shaun Nichols and David Filkenstein, or to broad subjects, such as the Philosophy of Music (with the presence of Peter Kivy, Noël Carroll or Derek Matravers). In this occasion, the Workshop will focus on the philosophical work of Malcolm Budd.

To see more information about conference, see <<http://um.symposium.com/go/VI-IAMM>>.

Art and the Nature of Belief

York, England
11-12 October 2013

The conference aims to bring together recent work on belief and its connection to truth, with issues concerning belief that arise in aesthetics. The question of whether we can arrive at truth, and indeed gain knowledge, from engaging with artworks has received much attention in aesthetics. However, much less has been said about the nature of the beliefs formed as a result of engaging with art. It seems clear that at least some of our experiences of artworks produce beliefs either about the world more generally or beliefs about significant human concerns, for example, moral, cultural, psychological, or political beliefs. In the case of literature, this might be achieved through what has been called 'transportation', which is 'a mechanism whereby narratives can affect beliefs' (Green and Brock 2000: 'The Role of Transportation in the Persuasiveness of Public Narratives'. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. Vol. 79, No. 5, pp. 701-721, p. 701). If a reader is sufficiently engaged in a story, 'they may show effects of the story on their real-world beliefs' (Ibid). However, it is often the case that the nature of the attitudes which arise out of transportative experiences casts doubt on their belief status. They are for example, unstable, that is, they are not retained by subjects. Nor do they look like they are justified or reliable. On the basis of these features, philosophers of mind working on the connection between belief and truth may be inclined to take a non-doxastic approach to these attitudes. Consequently, work done on this area may pose a considerable threat to the idea that justified or reliable beliefs can be formed on the basis of engaging with art.

Thus far belief theorists have had little to say about the sorts of issues that arise out of beliefs formed on the basis of engaging with

art. But given that such beliefs do not always behave in the same way as garden-variety beliefs, which are generally agreed to be necessarily connected to truth, they present an interesting case to belief theorists, and as such they demand attention. In light of all of this, there is an opportunity for a significant philosophical interaction between aestheticians and belief theorists that not only addresses these issues but also illuminates the nature of belief for both parties.

This interaction presents the belief theorist with pertinent questions regarding the status of beliefs formed as a result of engaging with art and, in turn, demands philosophers of art to further consider the relation between art and truth. This conference aims to address these issues through a collaboration of philosophers working on belief and aesthetics in the hope that this can illuminate the aesthetic cases and, potentially, impact on our understanding of the nature of belief itself.

Any queries should be sent to the conference organizers, Helen Bradley and Ema Sullivan-Bissett, at <art.belief.conference@gmail.com>. Further information will soon be available on the conference website: <https://artbelief.wordpress.com/>.

Fourth International Conference on the Image

Chicago, Illinois
18-19 October 2013

The Image Conference is a forum at which participants will interrogate the nature and functions of image-making and images. The conference has a cross-disciplinary focus, bringing together researchers, teachers and practitioners from areas of interest including: architecture, art, cognitive science, communications, computer science, cultural studies, design, education, film studies, history, linguistics, management, marketing, media studies, museum studies, philosophy, photography, psychology, religious studies, semiotics, and more. Thematic areas include The Form of the Image: examining the nature and form of the image as a medium of representation; Image Work: investigating image making processes and spaces of image representation; The Image in Society: exploring the social effects of the image.

Full details of the conference, may be found at the conference website: <http://www.ontheimage.com/the-conference>.

American Society for Theatre Research: Performance Philosophy Working Session

Dallas, Texas
7-10 November 2013

Working Session within the American Society for Theatre Research (ASTR). The international, interdisciplinary research network known as Performance Philosophy seeks to draw upon and develop the philosophical activity alive within ASTR's membership to determine the benefits, challenges, theoretical obstacles, and performative potential Performance Philosophy offers to scholars and practitioners in the present moment.

Understood not as a "turn" in the fields of theatre or performance studies but, rather, as a new field in its own right involving researchers based in a wide range of disciplines, Performance Philosophy presents the possibility of thinking theatre and performance anew, against the backdrop of current philosophical debates. Performance philosophers understand those debates to have the ability to thrust theatre and performance events into a new light, while, simultaneously, recognizing that the specific material conditions of theatre and performance events have the ability to invest philosophical concepts with new life.

For more information, check out the website: <http://www.astr.org/conference>.

Visual Learning Budapest Conference

Budapest, Hungary
15-16 November 2013

This conference brings together contributions from educational, communication, and media theorists, philosophers, linguists, psychologists, and other interested scholars. For further information, contact Prof. Andras Benedek <benedek.a@eik.bme.hu> or Kristof Nyiri at <knyiri@t-email.hu>.

3rd International Conference on Eastern Thought

Cracow (Poland)
28-30 November 2013

It is our great honor to announce the third conference on Eastern thought. This year's meeting will be dedicated to the issues of sound, language and book which, although frequently featuring in contemporary Western thought, are rarely and still insufficiently addressed through their long lasting reflection in the Eastern cultures.

Unquestionably, language is one of the central themes in contemporary philosophical, cognitive and cultural thought in the West. Having been researched from many different points of view, language appears both as a logical tool, a means of thinking or a medium of communication and as a creative factor within culture. Being a strictly human phenomenon, language has always sparked interest –Western civilization is certainly not the first to explore it. Yet although it is broadly acknowledged that the Western linguistics owes its modern development to the Sanskrit grammarians, in case of other aspects of language it seems that the Western thinkers prefer to reinvent the wheel rather than to ask the ancients. Our goal in this conference is to show all the richness of the speculations, conceptions and solutions concerning language through various Eastern philosophies and cultures.

For more information, contact the Secretary of the Conference, Małgorzata Ruchel at <malgorzata.ruchel@uj.edu.pl> or see the conference website at <http://www.iphils.uj.edu.pl/zfw/eng/konf.html>.

SPSCVA at the APA Eastern Division Meeting

Baltimore, Maryland
27-30 December 2013

The Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts (SPSCVA) will have its divisional meeting held in conjunction with the Eastern divisional meeting of the American Philosophical Association. For more information, contact the Eastern Division coordinator, Christopher Grau, at <grau@clemson.edu>.

Jaspers and Heidegger on the Art of Vincent Van Gogh

San Diego, California
14-19 April 2014

Papers in this conference compare Jaspers and Heidegger with respect to their analyses of Vincent van Gogh. Special priority is given to proposals pertaining to the "world" of the artist or his work.

For more information, contact David Nichols at <dpnichol@svsu.edu>.

Culture, Values and Justice

University of Vaasa, Finland
21-23 May 2014

Subtopics: Ethnic identity and culture, Personal identity in society, Society, culture and

consumption, Social identification, Dynamics of group culture, Ethnic boundaries, Constructing and deconstructing ethnic identity, Evolution of society, Encountering different cultures, Indian civilization and society, Cultural shock, Society and effect of colonization, Media and society, Morality and society, Taoist view on morality, Enlightened anarchy, Values in Confucius ethics, Perfectionist and situational ethics, Spirituality and modern age, Humanism and positivism, Reductionist approach to moral responsibility, Archaeological approaches to society, Asian society and culture, Globalization's effects on culture and values, Hybrid cultural systems, Hybrid ethical theory, Cultural meaning, Secularization of religion, Culture and postmodernity, Buddhist ethics, Buddhism and philosophy of deconstruction, Culture and values of modernity, Cultural roots of environmental problems, Uneven income distribution as a social ethical issue, The point of view of justice, Core values, traditions and justice etc.

See <http://legacy.lclark.edu/~sipr/SIPR2.html> for further details. or contact Dr. Chandana Chakrabarti at chandanaachak@gmail.com.

Active Aestheticians

THEODORE GRACYK has published *On Music in the Routledge Thinking in Action* series, released simultaneously in paperback, hardcover, and as a Kindle edition.

Routledge announces the paperback publication of **THEODORE GRACYK** and **ANDREW KANIA**, eds., *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music*, previously available only as hardcover or Kindle edition.

JAMES GRANT has published *The Critical Imagination* with Oxford University Press. It is a study of the role of metaphor and imaginativeness in art criticism.

We welcome any news of your significant scholarly and professional achievements: please submit to the editors at goldblatt@denison.edu or henry.pratt@marist.edu.

ASA Prizes

A reminder that the ASA awards two prizes, the Cohen Dance Aesthetics prize, in memory of Selma Jean Cohen, who left a generous bequest to the ASA, and the outstanding monograph prize.

The Cohen Prize is awarded in even numbered years for a book or essay in dance aesthetics published in the preceding two years and is open to anyone.

The monograph prize is awarded every year and is limited to a scholarly monograph by an ASA member published in the previous year. Books published in 2012 are now being considered by a select committee of senior scholars.

Any author or publisher of a book in 2013 is invited to nominate a book for the monograph prize to be awarded at the annual meeting in 2014.

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Send calls for papers, event announcements, conference reports, and other items of interest to:

David Goldblatt, Department of Philosophy, Denison University, Granville, OH 43023, <goldblatt@denison.edu>

or

Henry Pratt, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Marist College, 3399 North Road, Poughkeepsie, NY 12601,
<henry.pratt@marist.edu>

Deadlines: 1 November, 15 April, 1 August