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of The American Philosophical Association



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PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Pacific Division Program

The American Philosophical
Association
Pacific Division

Eighty-Fifth
Annual Meeting



Hilton Bayfront Hotel
San Diego, CA

April 20 - 23, 2011

Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association

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Each annual volume contains the programs for the meetings of the three Divisions; the membership list; Presidential Addresses; news of the Association, its Divisions and Committees, and announcements of interest to philosophers. Other items of interest to the community of philosophers may be included by decision of the Editor or the APA Board of Officers.

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All correspondence should be sent to the APA, 31 Amstel Avenue, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716, directed to the appropriate staff member as follows: Erin Shepherd for inquiries and publication copy concerning programs of the Divisional meetings, general issues of the *Proceedings*, announcements, awards to members, and advertising; Janet Sample for membership information, address changes, and memorial minutes; and the Executive Director for letters to the editor.

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IMPORTANT NOTICES FOR MEETING ATTENDEES

***PROCEEDINGS* NO LONGER DISTRIBUTED TO MEMBERS AT REGISTRATION**

Starting with the 2011 meeting, APA members will no longer receive a duplicate copy of this issue of the *Proceedings* at the Pacific Division conference registration desk. All registrants will receive a Pocket Program with session titles, times, and locations. Only non-members will receive a copy of the *Proceedings* at registration.

If you plan to attend the meeting and wish to consult the full program, please bring a copy of the *Proceedings* to the meeting or use the online program at apa-pacific.org.

The Pacific Division has discontinued the practice of printing and shipping duplicate copies of the *Proceedings* in order to promote more sustainable operations. This year an estimated 120,000 pages of paper and 4 gigaJoules of energy will be saved.

DIFFERENTIAL ADVANCED AND ON-SITE REGISTRATION FEES

Also starting this year, fees for advanced registration are substantially lower than on-site registration fees. Advanced registration is \$60 for regular members of the APA, \$90 for non-members, and \$10 for student members as well as pre-college teachers and students. On-site registration fees are \$90 for regular members of the APA, \$120 for non-members, and \$15 for student members and pre-college teachers and students.

To register in advance, visit apaonline.org or send in the registration form included in this issue of the *Proceedings*. The deadline for advanced registration is two weeks prior to the meeting.

LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY- TREASURER

To All Members of the Association:

On behalf of the Executive Committee of the Pacific Division of The American Philosophical Association, I cordially invite you to attend the Division's 85th annual meeting in San Diego, California, from Wednesday, April 20 through Saturday, April 23, 2011.

1. MEETING LOCATION AND LOCAL ATTRACTIONS

The 2011 meeting will take place at the Hilton Bayfront Hotel. The address is 1 Park Boulevard, San Diego, California 92101. The telephone number is +1 619-564-3333 and the fax number is +1 619-564-3344.

The convention rate is available until March 21, subject to availability, and members are strongly advised to book early. To book, connect to the hotel's online reservation page for this meeting through apa-pacific.org or call +1 800-321-3232 and give the name and dates of the meeting. The convention rate is \$179 for a double or single room. Rooms may also be booked by fax or mail using the hotel reservation form in this issue of the *Proceedings*.

The Hilton Bayfront combines dramatic views of San Diego Bay with a location steps from the historic Gaslamp Quarter and the hip East Village and within an easy walk of downtown and Little Italy. San Diego's diverse food culture is well represented at dozens of restaurants in the downtown area, all a pleasant stroll from the conference hotel, whose own offerings are exceptionally strong. Be sure to sample fish tacos, the local street food.

Attractions downtown include San Diego MoCA and the New Children's Museum. The Birch Aquarium is further afield in La Jolla. Minutes from downtown is Balboa Park, an "urban cultural park" housing the world-famous San Diego Zoo as well as performing arts venues, gardens, and fifteen museums, including the Timken Museum of Art, the Museum of Photographic Arts, and the Air and Space Museum. For details visit balboapark.org.

2. TRAVEL INFORMATION

Driving south on I-5: exit at Front Street, proceed on Front to Harbor Drive, turn left on Harbor Drive then right onto Park Boulevard. **Driving North on I-5:** exit at Cesar Chavez Parkway, turning left at the lights onto Cesar Chavez Parkway, then proceed to Harbor Drive, turn right onto Harbor Drive and turn left onto Park Boulevard. **Driving from the Airport:** follow

Harbor Drive southbound to Park Boulevard and turn right. **Hotel parking** is \$25 per day.

San Diego Airport is three miles from the conference hotel. **Taxis** are \$15 to \$18. **SuperShuttle** is \$8 and may be booked at +1 800-974-8885 or supershuttle.com. To use **public transit** take bus 992 to the Orange Line trolley and exit the trolley at Gaslamp Quarter Station. Detailed information about public transportation can be obtained by dialing 511 on landline and most mobile phones.

3. MEETING REGISTRATION

Advanced registration is \$60 for regular members of the APA, discounted to \$10 for student members as well as pre-college teachers and students, and \$90 for non-members. To register in advance, visit apaonline.org or send in the registration form included in this issue of the *Proceedings*. The deadline for advanced registration is two weeks prior to the meeting.

On-site registration fees are \$90 for regular members of the APA, \$120 for non-members, and \$15 for student members and pre-college teachers and students. A limited number of tickets are available to non-members for single sessions or receptions.

Those who are not now members of the APA may take advantage of the lower registration fee by becoming members. Membership forms are available online at apaonline.org and will also be available at the meeting registration desk.

4. 2011 MINICONFERENCES

The 2011 meeting kicks off with two miniconferences, both beginning at 9:00 a.m. on Wednesday, April 20. Attendance is open to all.

The Miniconference on Philosophy for Children features pre-college philosophy practitioners from the United States and around the world. Emphasizing the impact of pre-college instruction in philosophy on the teaching of philosophy in colleges and universities, a wide range of issues will be discussed and examples of different programs for bringing philosophy to pre-college children and youths will be presented. The miniconference will include a live philosophical discussion among children from local schools. Those interested in attending are asked to pre-register at kidsphilmini.co.cc.

The second miniconference is devoted to Experimental Epistemology. Some of the earliest and best-known work in experimental philosophy focuses on people's epistemic intuitions and much of the subsequent debate has focused on whether the experimental work undermines traditional philosophical approaches to epistemology. A new wave of work advances a more constructive approach to the relationship between experimental philosophy and traditional epistemology. This miniconference brings together traditional epistemologists, experimental philosophers associated with the negative program, and those pursuing the more constructive approach to experimental epistemology.

5. 2011 PROGRAM

The 2011 Program Committee, chaired by Joseph Keim Campbell, has organized a diverse and exciting program. Highlights include a Presidential Address by Michael Tooley, Marilyn McCord Adams's Dewey Lecture on "God and Evil Among the Philosophers," and panels in memory of Paul Hoffman and John Pollock. The winner of the 2011 Jean Hampton Prize is Ty Landrum from the University of Virginia, who will present his paper, "The Education of Amour-Propre," in the Colloquium on Modern Political Philosophy at 9:00 a.m. on Saturday, April 23. Principal papers in Colloquia and Symposia were selected after blind review of all submitted papers. Participants in Invited Paper, Invited Symposia, and Author-Meets-Critics sessions were invited by the Program Committee. Participants in sessions arranged by APA Committees were selected by those Committees.

The Pacific Division once again welcomes its affiliated groups, who have organized more than fifty evening sessions, in addition to the Association for Symbolic Logic, which has organized a slate of sessions on Thursday, April 21 and Friday, April 22.

6. PILOT OF POSTER SESSIONS

This year the Division is piloting refereed poster sessions. For the purposes of the pilot, submissions were solicited in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, and the Program Committee selected eight posters for presentation at the meeting. Please help with the pilot by visiting the posters, speaking to their authors, and filling out a survey. The results of the survey will help the Division to decide whether posters should become a regular part of the meeting.

Posters will be on display adjacent to the book tables on Thursday and Friday, April 21 and 22. Presenters will be available to discuss their posters from 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. on Friday, April 22. Drinks and snacks will be provided.

7. RECEPTIONS AND SPECIAL EVENTS

The Annual Reception will be held from 10:00 p.m. to midnight on Thursday, April 21. The Presidential Reception follows the Presidential Address on Friday, April 22. A reception follows the Dewey Lecture at 2:30 p.m. on Saturday, April 23.

Please check the Special Events page of the Pocket Program (distributed at registration) for information about receptions added to the schedule as the convention date nears. Receptions are for those registered at the convention, but tickets for guests may be purchased at the convention desk.

8. BUSINESS MEETING

The annual Business Meeting will be held at noon on Thursday, April 21. The list of regular members that appears in the November 2010 issue of the *Proceedings* is used as the list of eligible voters for the Divisional Business Meeting.

Michael Bratman (chair), Julia Annas, Ann Garry, and Dominic McIver Lopes (*ex officio*) served as the 2010-11 Nominating Committee. They have nominated the following APA Pacific Division members for terms beginning July 1, 2010: for Vice President: John M. Fischer; for Representative to the Board: Manuel Vargas; and for Member at Large: Jean Roberts.

The Executive Committee is proposing an amendment to the Division's Bylaws to allow for electronic mail ballots. The text of the proposed amendment is printed in this issue of the *Proceedings*.

Pacific Division members may make nominations or volunteer for membership on the Program Committee or the Nomination Committee. Nominations should be sent by email to the Secretary-Treasurer, Dominic McIver Lopes, at dom.lopes@ubc.ca, no later than March 1, 2011.

9. PLACEMENT SERVICE

Only APA members are eligible to use the placement service. Appointing officers and applicants are urged to make preparations for their part in the placement operation in advance of the meeting.

10. 2012 MEETING SITE AND PROGRAM

The 2012 Pacific Division Meeting will be held at the Westin Hotel, in Seattle. The Program Committee invites contributions. The deadline for submission is September 1, 2011. Each author may make only one submission. Electronic submissions are strongly encouraged (please note that the deadline for electronic submissions is 5:00 p.m. EDST). Postal submissions should indicate prominently that the paper is submitted for the 2012 Pacific Division Meeting. Because the Program Committee must blind-review all submissions, the names and institution of the author may not appear in the paper in any way that defeats the operation of blind-reviewing. Papers that are not prepared for blind review will not be considered. The 2012 Program Committee also welcomes suggestions for topics and/or speakers of invited sessions. Volunteers to comment and chair sessions are invited to fill out the form at apa-pacific.org.

11. ACCOMMODATING MEMBERS WITH MULTIPLE CHEMICAL SENSITIVITIES

To provide a welcoming environment for those with multiple chemical sensitivities, all participants are requested to refrain from wearing scented products.

On behalf of the Pacific Division, I extend to every member of The American Philosophical Association a warm invitation to take part in our 2011 Annual Meeting.

Cordially,

Dominic McIver Lopes

Secretary-Treasurer

PACIFIC DIVISION COMMITTEES, 2010-2011

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Julie Van Camp (Chair)
Michael Bratman
Heather Battaly
Joseph Campbell
Dominic McIver Lopes

Ned Markosian
Alastair Norcross
Michael Tooley
Alison Wylie

PROGRAM COMMITTEE

Joseph Keim Campbell (Chair)
Neera Badhwar
Tim Black
Amy Coplan
Sharon Crasnow
Stephen Finlay
Patrick R. Frierson
Franz-Peter Griesmaier
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David Hills
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Nadeem J. Z. Hussain
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Jay Odenbaugh
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Lisa Raphals
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David Schmitz
Adam Sennet
Janet Stemwedel
Julie Tannenbaum
Kevin L. Timpe
Manuel Vargas
Eric Watkins
Shelley Wilcox
Aaron Zimmerman

NOMINATING COMMITTEE

Michael Bratman, Chair
Julia Annas

Ann Garry
Dominic McIver Lopes, *ex officio*

MINICONFERENCE PROGRAM

MINICONFERENCE I: EXPERIMENTAL EPISTEMOLOGY

This miniconference was organized by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Duke University), Shaun Nichols (University of Arizona), and Ron Mallon (University of Utah).

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 20

MI-1 Experimental Epistemology, Session 1

9:00 a.m.-12:15 p.m., Location: Indigo 202B

Chair: Shaun Nichols (University of Arizona)

Speakers: Stephen Stich (Rutgers University)

Wesley Buckwalter (City University of New York)

“Epistemology and Demography”

Jonathan Weinberg (Indiana University–Bloomington)

“Bring in Da Funk, Bring in Da Noise: The Challenge of Performance Errors, Ecological Invalidity, Rough Heuristics, and Generally Deflationary Hypotheses Concerning Intuitive Data”

Ram Neta (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

“Knowing from the Armchair When Our Intuitions Are Reliable: A Reply to Swain, Alexander, and Weinberg”

Jen Wright (College of Charleston)

“Intuitional Stability: An Experimental Exploration”

LUNCH

12:15-1:30 p.m.

MI-2 Experimental Epistemology, Session 2

1:30-5:45 p.m., Location: Indigo 202B

Chair: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Duke University)

Speakers: Ángel Pinillos (Arizona State University)

“Knowledge and Stakes”

Jonathan Schaffer (Rutgers University and Australian National University)

“Knowledge, Stakes, and Mistakes”

Jennifer Nagel (University of Toronto)

“Armchair-Friendly Xphi”

Stewart Cohen (University of Arizona)

“Metaphilosophical Implications of Experimental Philosophy”

Robert Audi (University of Notre Dame)

“Experimental Philosophy and the Evidential Value of Intuition”

RECEPTION

6:00-7:00 p.m.

MINICONFERENCE II: PHILOSOPHY FOR CHILDREN

This miniconference was organized by Thomas E. Wartenberg (Mount Holyoke College), Gareth B. Matthews (University of Massachusetts–Amherst), Sara Goering (University of Washington), Jana Mohr Lone (University of Washington), and David Shapiro (Cascadia Community College).

Those interested in attending are asked to pre-register at kidsphilmini.co.cc. Attendance is open to all.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 20

BREAKFAST AND WELCOME

8:00-9:00 a.m., Location: Aqua Terrace

MII-1A P4C in the High School Community and Beyond

9:00-10:30 a.m., Location: Aqua 304

Chair: Elaine E. Englehardt (Utah Valley University)

Speakers: Thomas Jackson (University of Hawaii–Manoa)
“Big P and Little p Philosophy”

Ben Lukey (University of Hawaii–Manoa)

“The Idea of the Philosopher-in-Residence”

Amber Makaiau (University of Hawaii–Manoa)

“Ethnic Studies and Philosophy”

Chad Miller (University of Hawaii–Manoa)

“P4C as the Basis for a High School Curriculum”

MII-1B Philosophical Games for Children

9:00-10:30 a.m., Location: Aqua 306A

Chair: Natalie Fletcher (University of Ottawa)

Speakers: Renée Smith (Coastal Carolina University)

Julinna Oxley (Coastal Carolina University) “The Summer Ethics Academy: Teaching Ethics to Young Leaders”

Kristopher Holland (Indiana University)

David Phelps (Indiana University)

“Participatory Simulations and Young Children: The Foucault, Habermas, and Wittgenstein Games”

John Simpson (University of Alberta)

“EUREKAMP! A Philosophy Summer Camp”

MII-2A Rethinking Philosophy for Children

10:30 a.m.-Noon., Location: Aqua 304

Chair: Lena Green (University of the Western Cape)

Speakers: John Cleary (Montclair State University)

“The Role of Community of Inquiry in Critical Media Literacy: Operational Definitions”

Michael Burroughs (University of Memphis)

“A Contemporary Response to a Historical Challenge: Approaching the Child as Philosopher”

Rory Kraft (York College of Pennsylvania)

“Philosophy in the Great Green Room: Early Children’s Literature as Philosophy for Children”

MII-2B Observing Children Philosophizing

10:30 a.m.-Noon., Location: Aqua 306A

Chair: Paul Thomson (Columbia Secondary School)

Speakers: Kory De Clark (University of Southern California)

“Philosophy for What? Field Notes from a Free School”

Susan Gardner (Capilano University)

“Questioning to Hesitation, Rather Than Hesitating to Question”

Caren Walker (University of California–Berkeley)

“Teaching Children Philosophy: Effects on Epistemological Understanding”

LUNCH

Noon-1:00 p.m.

MII-3 Philosophy for Children Programs for College Professors

1:00-3:45 p.m., Location: Aqua 304

Chair: Deborah Tollefsen (University of Memphis)

Speakers: Thomas Wartenberg (Mount Holyoke College)

Sara Goering (University of Washington)
 “College Students as Pre-College Philosophy Teachers”

Maughn Gregory (Montclair State University)
 Wendy Turgeon (St. Joseph’s College)
 “Teaching Teachers to Be Philosophy Teachers”

MII-4 What Is Philosophy for Children? Demonstration and Discussion

4:00-6:00 p.m., Location: Aqua 304

Chair: Michael Pritchard (Western Michigan University)

Speakers: Gareth B. Matthews (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)

“Demonstration Using Local School Children”

Jana Mohr Lone (University of Washington)

Megan Laverty (Teachers’ College)

“How Do We Philosophize with Children?
 Evaluation of Demonstration”

RECEPTION AND VIDEO PREMIER

6:00-8:30 p.m., Location: Aqua 310

Speaker: Julie Akeret (Twentycentsleft Productions)

THURSDAY, APRIL 21

MII-5 How Teaching Philosophy to Children Has Changed How I Teach Philosophy to College and University Students

9:00-10:30 a.m., Location: Aqua 304

Chair: Debbie Whittaker (California State University–Long Beach)

Speakers: Claudia Mills (University of Colorado–Boulder)

David Shapiro (Cascadia Community College)

MII-6 Global Perspectives on Philosophy for Children

10:30 a.m.-Noon, Location: Aqua 304

Chair: Rob Wilson (University of Alberta)

Speakers: Lynne Hinton (Buranda State School)

Robert Fisher (Brunel University)

Walter Kohan (Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro)

PANEL DISCUSSION WITH LUNCH

Noon-1:00 p.m.

MAIN PROGRAM

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 20

PLACEMENT INFORMATION

11:00 a.m.-8:00 p.m., Indigo Foyer West

REGISTRATION

11:00 a.m.-8:00 p.m., Indigo Foyer West

WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, APRIL 20

SESSION 1 — 1:00-4:00 P.M.

1A Author-Meets-Critics: Brian Skyrms, *Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information*

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Jeffrey Barrett (University of California–Irvine)

Critics: J. McKenzie Alexander (London School of Economics)

Steve Downes (University of Utah)

Peter Godfrey-Smith (Harvard University)

Gerhard Jäger (Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen)

Author: Brian Skyrms (University of California–Irvine)

1B Author-Meets-Critics: Stephen Engstrom, *The Form of Practical Knowledge: A Study of the Categorical Imperative*

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Tamar Schapiro (Stanford University)

Critics: Carla Bagnoli (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)

Thomas Hill (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

Andrews Reath (University of California–Riverside)

Author: Stephen Engstrom (University of Pittsburgh)

1C Invited Symposium: Divine Action

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Imran Aijaz (University of Michigan–Dearborn)

Speakers: John Bishop (University of Auckland)

Ken Perszyk (Victoria University of Wellington)

“Divine Action Beyond a Personal OmniGod”

Andrei Buckareff (Marist College)

“Divine Materialism”

Hugh McCann (Texas A&M University)

“Divine Simplicity and Divine Freedom”

1D Invited Symposium: Language and Metaphysics

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Susanna Schellenberg (Australian National University)

Speakers: David Manley (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)
Gillian Russell (Washington University in St. Louis)
Kenneth Taylor (Stanford University)

1E Invited Symposium: Perception and Imagination

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Amy Kind (Claremont McKenna College)

Speakers: Jennifer Church (Vassar College)
“Imagination and the Experience of Objectivity”
Fiona Macpherson (University of Glasgow)
“Perception and Imagination: Heavenly Vision and the Content of Experience”
Bence Nanay (University of Antwerp and University of Cambridge)
“Perceptual Content and the Content of Mental Imagery”

1F Colloquium: Aristotle’s Ethics

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00

Chair: Maura Priest (University of California–Irvine)

Speaker: Joseph Stenberg (University of Colorado–Boulder)
“Aristotle, the Common Good, and τὸ καλόν”

Commentator: Gary Hartenburg (University of California–Irvine)

2:00-3:00

Chair: Joseph Lee (University of California–Santa Barbara)

Speaker: Jerry Green (University of Texas–Austin)
“Self-Love in the Aristotelian Ethics”

Commentator: Corinne Gartner (Princeton University)

3:00-4:00

Chair: Rex Martin (University of Kansas)

Speaker: Christiana Olfert (Tufts University)

“What Can Pleasure Tell Us About the Good?”

Commentator: Mark Alfano (City University of New York–Graduate Center)

1G Colloquium: History of Philosophy

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00

Chair: Samantha Mattherne (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: Daniel Schwartz (University of California–San Diego)

“The Certainty of Baconian Forms”

Commentator: Kurt Smith (Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania)

2:00-3:00

Chair: Georgios Anagnostopoulos (University of California–San Diego)

Speaker: Andrew Blom (Central Michigan University)

“Grotius and Aristotle: The Justice of Taking Too Little”

Commentator: Charles Young (Claremont Graduate University)

3:00-4:00

Chair: Max Murphey (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: David J. Yount (Mesa Community College)

“Mysticism in Plato and Plotinus”

Commentator: Michael Goerger (University of California–Riverside)

1H Colloquium: Mental Properties

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00

Chair: Byeong-Uk Yi (University of Toronto)

Speaker: Joel Pust (University of Delaware)

“Property Theories of Belief and Degrees of Belief”

Commentator: Brad Armendt (Arizona State University)

2:00-3:00

Chair: Gerald Vision (Temple University)

Speaker: Justin Tiehen (University of Puget Sound)

“Kim and Shoemaker on Causal Inheritance”

Commentator: Christian Loew (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

3:00-4:00

Chair: David Pitt (California State University–Los Angeles)

Speaker: Daniel Lim (University of Cambridge)

“Exclusion, Overdetermination, and Vacuity”

Commentator: Alyssa Ney (University of Rochester)

11 Colloquium: Politics and Pragmatism

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00

Chair: Nicole A. Smith (Bowling Green State University)

Speaker: Thomas Dougherty (Stanford University)

“Fickle Consent: Why Is There No Time Like the Present?”

Commentator: Larry Alexander (University of San Diego)

2:00-3:00

Chair: Ann Garry (California State University–Los Angeles)

Speaker: Amrita Banerjee (University of Oregon)

“Re-conceiving Identities: A Pragmatist Ontology of ‘Groups’ for a Critical Feminist Politics”

Commentator: Shannon Dea (University of Waterloo)

3:00-4:00

Chair: Quayshawn Spencer (University of San Francisco)

Speaker: Nathan Pai Schmitt (University of Oregon)

“A Radical Reconstruction of Race-Thinking”

Commentator: Yolonda Wilson (Duke University)

1J Colloquium: Puzzles and Paradoxes

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00

Chair: Geoff Georgi (University of Southern California)

Speaker: Alex Grzankowski (University of Texas–Austin)

“Antonymy in the Attitudes”

Commentator: Brandon Biggerstaff (University of California–Davis)

2:00-3:00

Chair: Adam Swenson (California State University–Northridge)

Speaker: John Brunero (University of Missouri–St. Louis)

“Evidence, ‘Ought,’ and the Mine Shaft Paradox”

Commentator: Daniel Guevara (University of California–Santa Cruz)

3:00-4:00

Chair: Ann Levey (University of Calgary)

Speaker: Alex Baia (University of Texas–Austin)
“Surprise Exams Are Conditionally Possible”

Commentator: Alexander Jackson (Boise State University)

1K Colloquium: Rationality

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00

Chair: Carolyn Brighthouse (Occidental College)

Speakers: Michael S. Brownstein (New Jersey Institute of
Technology)

Alex Madva (Columbia University)

“Alief and Affordance: The Normativity of
Automaticity”

Commentator: Eric Schwitzgebel (University of California–
Riverside)

2:00-3:00

Chair: Rasmus Thybo Jensen (Københavns Universitet)

Speaker: Dustin Locke (Claremont McKenna College)
“Knowledge-Free Decision Theory”

Commentator: Jonathan Ichikawa (University of St. Andrews)

3:00-4:00

Chair: Alexandre Marcellesi (University of California–San
Diego)

Speaker: Paul Weirich (University of Missouri)
“Decisions Without Sharp Probabilities”

Commentator: Roger Clarke (University of British Columbia)

1L APA Committee Session: 9/11 Ten: Approaching the Tenth Anniversary of 9/11 Through Asian/American Eyes

1:00-4:00 p.m.

**Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of Asian and
Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies**

Chair: Gary Mar (State University of New York–Stony
Brook)

Speakers: George Lipsitz (University of California–Santa
Barbara)

“Affinities, Affiliations, and Alliances: Why Asian
American Perspectives Matter Now”

Gary Y. Okihiro (Columbia University)

“Border Wars: Reflections on 9/11”

Nobuko Miyamoto (Ford Foundation)
 “Leaps of Faith”

Mary Watkins (Pacifica Graduate Institute)
 “Toward Psychologies of Liberation”

WEDNESDAY EARLY EVENING, APRIL 20

SESSION 2 — 4:00-6:00 P.M.

2A Author-Meets-Critics: Raffaella De Rosa, *Descartes and the Puzzle of Sensory Representation*

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Amy Schmitter (University of Alberta)

Critics: Alan Nelson (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

Thomas Vinci (Dalhousie University)

Author: Raffaella De Rosa (Rutgers University–Newark)

2B Invited Paper: Kant on the Ontological Argument

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Robert Hanna (University of Colorado–Boulder)

Speaker: Ian Proops (University of Texas–Austin)
 “Kant on the Ontological Argument”

Commentators: Desmond Hogan (Princeton University)

2C Invited Symposium: Exploitation and the State

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Hsin-wen Lee (University of Southern California)

Speakers: Ruth Sample (University of New Hampshire)
 “State Exploitation: The Anarchist’s Silver Bullet?”

Matt Zwolinski (University of San Diego)
 “Toward a Theory of State Exploitation”

Commentator: Roderick Long (Auburn University)

2D Invited Symposium: Luck and Responsibility

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Kevin L. Timpe (Northwest Nazarene University)

Speakers: Neal Tognazzini (College of William and Mary)
 “Grounding the Luck Objection”

Christopher Evan Franklin (Biola University)
 “What’s Luck Got to Do with It?”

Commentator: Alfred Mele (Florida State University)

2E Colloquium: Epistemology

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00

Chair: Chelsey Booth (University of Manitoba)

Speaker: Benjamin Lennertz (University of Southern California)

"Epistemic Modal Belief Reports Are a Problem for von Fintel and Gillies"

Commentator: Kai von Fintel (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

5:00-6:00

Chair: Alex Bundy (University of California–Santa Barbara)

Speaker: Daniel Immerman (University of Notre Dame)
"Pritchard, Safety, Value"

Commentator: Michael Blome-Tillmann (McGill University)

2F Colloquium: Family and Marriage

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00

Chair: Carol Hay (University of Massachusetts–Lowell)

Speaker: S. Stewart Braun (University of Virginia)

"Equal Opportunity Despite Family Autonomy?"

Commentator: Abigail Levin (Niagara University)

5:00-6:00

Chair: Lijun Yuan (Texas State University–San Marcos)

Speakers: Christie Hartley (Georgia State University)

Lori Watson (University of San Diego)

"Political Liberalism, Marriage, and the Family: A Reply to Brake"

Commentator: Susanne Sreedhar (Boston University)

2G Colloquium: Nietzsche

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00

Chair: Mandy Mitchell (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: Thomas Steinbuch (Independent Scholar)

"Sarah Kofman on *Ecce Homo*: or, How *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* Became a Fable of Hitlerism"

Commentator: Shari Starrett (California State University–Fullerton)

5:00-6:00

Chair: Maudemarie Clark (Colgate University and University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: Aaron Harper (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)

“Fiction and Projection in Nietzsche’s Conception of Value”

Commentator: Paul Loeb (University of Puget Sound)

2H Symposium: Belief and Action

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Fred Schueler (University of Delaware)

Speaker: Berislav Marušić (Brandeis University)
“Belief and Difficult Action”

Commentators: Kevin Falvey (University of California–Santa Barbara)

Amir Saemi (University of California–Santa Barbara)

2I Symposium: Idealizations

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Christian Wüthrich (University of California–San Diego)

Speaker: Roy Sorensen (Washington University in St. Louis)
“Veridical Idealizations”

Commentators: Anjan Chakravartty (University of Toronto)
Ulrich Meyer (Colgate University)

2J Symposium: Metaethics

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Holly M. Smith (Rutgers University)

Speaker: Sean Drysdale Walsh (University of Minnesota–Duluth)

“Indeterminacy of Compatibilist Counterfactuals in Consequentialist Theories of Right”

Commentators: Jussi Suikkanen (University of Birmingham)

Jean-Paul Vessel (New Mexico State University)

2K APA Committee Session: How the APA Defends the Professional Rights of Its Members (And Other Philosophers)

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Arranged by the APA Committee on the Defense of the Professional Rights of Philosophers

Chair: William Stephens (Creighton University)

Speaker: Larry May (Vanderbilt University)

GROUP MEETINGS, 6:00-8:00 P.M.

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

Josiah Royce Society

Society for Analytical Feminism, Session 1

Society for Natural Religion, Session 1

Society of Christian Philosophers

Western Phenomenology Conference

GROUP MEETINGS, 6:00-9:00 P.M.

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

Hume Society

International Association for the Philosophy of Sport

International Hobbes Association, Session 1

International Society for Chinese Philosophy, Session 1

Karl Jaspers Society of North America, Session 1

North American Spinoza Society, Session 1

North American Wittgenstein Society

Society for German Idealism, Session 1

Society for the History of Political Philosophy

Society of Indian Philosophy and Religion

THURSDAY, APRIL 21**PLACEMENT INTERVIEWING**

8:30 a.m.-8:00 p.m., Aqua 305, 307, and 309

PLACEMENT INFORMATION

8:30 a.m.-8:00 p.m., Indigo Foyer West

REGISTRATION

8:30 a.m.-8:00 p.m., Indigo Foyer West

BOOK DISPLAYS

11:00 a.m.-5:30 p.m., Indigo Ballroom AE

ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING

Noon-1:00 p.m., Aqua 303

**MEETING OF CALIFORNIA PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT CHAIRS CAUCUS, THE
APA COMMITTEE ON PHILOSOPHY IN TWO-YEAR COLLEGES, AND THE
APA COMMITTEE ON THE TEACHING OF PHILOSOPHY**

**Topic: Rescuing the Philosophy Curriculum from Articulation
Madness**

1:00-3:00 p.m.

ANNUAL RECEPTION

10:00 p.m.-Midnight

THURSDAY MORNING, APRIL 21

SESSION 3 — 9:00 A.M.-NOON

3A Author-Meets-Critics: Gideon Yaffe, *Attempts*

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: David M. Adams (California State Polytechnic
University-Pomona)

Critics: Michael E. Bratman (Stanford University)
David Brink (University of California-San Diego)
Michael Moore (University of Illinois-Urbana-
Champaign)

Author: Gideon Yaffe (University of Southern California)

**3B Author-Meets-Critics: Nicholas D. Smith, *Socratic Moral
Psychology***

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Keith McPartland (Williams College)

Critics: Travis Butler (Iowa State University)
Daniel Devereux (University of Virginia)
Russell Jones (Harvard University)

Author: Nicholas D. Smith (Lewis & Clark College)

**3C Author-Meets-Critics: Jonathan Cohen, *The Red and the
Real: An Essay on Color Ontology***

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Justin Broackes (Brown University)

Critics: Andy Egan (Rutgers University)
Michael Tye (University of Texas-Austin)

Author: Jonathan Cohen (University of California-San
Diego)

3D Invited Symposium: Engaging Science*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Sharon Crasnow (Norco College)

Speakers: John Dupre (University of Exeter)
Inmaculada de Melo-Martin (Cornell University)
Kristen Intemann (Montana State University)
Wendy Parker (Ohio University)
Sarah Richardson (Harvard University)**3E Invited Symposium: Statistics in Applied Epistemology***9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Adam Morton (University of Alberta)

Speakers: Sherri Roush (University of California–Berkeley)
“Calibration, Credibility, and Equity”
Kent W. Staley (St. Louis University)
“Justification with Secure Evidence: Possibility Before Probability”
Joan Weiner (Indiana University–Bloomington)
“Might the Methodology of Biostatistics Be Telling Us Something Important About Semantics?”
Nancy Cartwright (London School of Economics and University of California–San Diego)
“Predicting What Will Happen When We Act: What Evidence Can Help”**3F Colloquium: Disagreement***9:00 a.m.-Noon**9:00-10:00*

Chair: Mark Kaplan (Indiana University–Bloomington)

Speaker: Jonathan D. Matheson (University of North Florida)
“Equal Weight Views and the Evidential Impact of Peer Opinions”

Commentator: Anthony Brueckner (University of California–Santa Barbara)

10:00-11:00

Chair: Justin Dallmann (University of Southern California)

Speaker: S. Matthew Liao (New York University)
“Disagreeing with Peers: The Set Aside View”

Commentator: Michael Pace (Chapman University)

11:00-12:00

Chair: Helen Daly (University of Arizona)

Speaker: Tim Sundell (University of Kentucky)
 “Objectivity Without Falsehood: Disagreement,
 Reference Magnetism, and the Possibility of
 Systematic Error”

Commentator: Alex Radulescu (University of California–Los Angeles)

3G Colloquium: Early Modern Philosophy

9:00 a.m.–Noon

9:00–10:00

Chair: Glenn Ross (Franklin and Marshall College)

Speaker: Jennifer S. Marusic (Brandeis University)
 “Propositions and Judgments in Locke and
 Arnauld: A Monstrous and Unholy Union?”

Commentator: Lex Newman (University of Utah)

10:00–11:00

Chair: Amy Coplan (California State University–Fullerton)

Speaker: Daniel M. Johnson (Baylor University)
 “Reidian Internalism”

Commentator: Kenneth L. Pearce (University of Southern California)

11:00–12:00

Chair: Thomas Holden (University of California–Santa Barbara)

Speaker: Jonathan Cottrell (New York University)
 “Fictions of Bodies’ Existence in Hume’s *Treatise*”

Commentator: Donald Ainslie (University of Toronto)

3H Colloquium: Moral Theory

9:00 a.m.–Noon

9:00–10:00

Chair: Monique Wonderly (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: Charlie Kurth (University of California–San Diego)
 “How Assurance-Based Accounts of Promising Can
 Solve Their Circularity Problem”

Commentator: Stephen White (University of California–Los Angeles)

10:00–11:00

Chair: Xinyan Jiang (University of Redlands)

Speaker: JeeLoo Liu (California State University–Fullerton)
 “The Is-Ought Correlation in Neo-Confucian Qi-Naturalism: How Normative Facts Exist in Natural States of Qi”

Commentator: Robin Wang (Loyola Marymount University)

11:00-12:00

Chair: Tanya Rodriguez (City University of New York–City College)

Speaker: Eva Dadlez (University of Central Oklahoma)
 “Being Evil: RPGs, Imaginative Immersion, and Moral Complicity”

Commentator: Jason D’Cruz (State University of New York–Albany)

3I Colloquium: Philosophy of Mind

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00

Chair: Stephan Johnson (City College of San Francisco)

Speaker: Charles Starkey (Clemson University)
 “Emotions in a Bind”

Commentator: Angela Mendelovici (University of Western Ontario)

10:00-11:00

Chair: Mark Scala (West Texas A&M University)

Speaker: Jennifer J. Matey (Florida International University)
 “Can Blue Mean Four?”

Commentator: Anya Farennikova (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

11:00-12:00

Chair: Paul Skokowski (Stanford University)

Speaker: Peter Ross (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)
 “Perceived Colors and Perceived Locations: Problems for Color Projectivism”

Commentator: James Genone (Stanford University)

3J Colloquium: Rational Agency

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00

Chair: Adrienne Martin (University of Pennsylvania)

Speaker: Alida Liberman (University of Southern California)
 “The Domain Relativity of Norms of Strength of Will”

Commentator: Garrett Pendergraft (University of California–Riverside)

10:00-11:00

Chair: Sara Waller (Montana State University)

Speaker: Peter Brian Barry (Saginaw Valley State University)
 “How Internalism Cannot Be Saved from the Psychopath”

Commentator: Gunnar Björnsson (Linköpings Universitet)

11:00-12:00

Chair: Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: Svetlana Beggs (University of California–Riverside)
 “Maturity and Self-Presentation”

Commentator: Randall Harp (University of Vermont)

3K APA Committee Session: When Should a Bioethicist Speak Out?

9:00 a.m.–Noon

Arranged by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Medicine

Chair: Sandra Woien (Arizona State University)

Speakers: David Magnus (Stanford University)

“Academia and Activism in Bioethics”

Kenneth Kipnis (University of Hawaii–Manoa)

“Bioethics and the Socratic Conception of Philosophy”

Laurence B. McCullough (Baylor College of Medicine)

“Intellectual and Moral Integrity in Bioethics Advocacy”

Leslie Pickering Francis (University of Utah)

“Speaking Out As an Obligation of Justice”

3L Special Session: Arranged by the Association for Symbolic Logic

9:00 a.m.–Noon

Topic: Logic and Linguistics

Speakers: Kai von Fintel (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

“Deontic Logic and Natural Language”

Terence Parsons (University of California–Los Angeles)

“Is There a Hierarchy of Indirect Senses and References?”

Ed Stabler (University of California–Los Angeles)

“Logics of Syntax”

ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING*12:00-1:00 p.m., Aqua 303***MEETING OF CALIFORNIA PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT CHAIRS CAUCUS, THE APA COMMITTEE ON PHILOSOPHY IN TWO-YEAR COLLEGES, AND THE APA COMMITTEE ON THE TEACHING OF PHILOSOPHY****Topic: Rescuing the Philosophy Curriculum from Articulation Madness***1:00-3:00 p.m.***THURSDAY AFTERNOON, APRIL 21****SESSION 4 — 1:00-4:00 P.M.****4A Author-Meets-Critics: Christopher Hill, *Consciousness****1:00-4:00 p.m.*

Chair: Janet Levin (University of Southern California)

Critics: Ned Block (New York University)

Alex Byrne (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Fred Dretske (Duke University)

Author: Christopher Hill (Brown University)

4B Author-Meets-Critics: Robert Pippin, *Hollywood Westerns and American Myth**1:00-4:00 p.m.*

Chair: George Wilson (University of Southern California)

Critics: Daniel Morgan (University of Pittsburgh)

Gilberto Perez (Sarah Lawrence College)

Cheyney Ryan (University of Oregon)

Author: Robert Pippin (University of Chicago)

4C Special Memorial Session: Paul Hoffman*1:00-4:00 p.m.*

Chair: John Carriero (University of California–Los Angeles)

Speakers: Dan Kaufman (University of Colorado–Boulder)

David Ivy (University of Texas–Austin)

“Trialism and the Independence Criterion of Substance”

Marleen Rozemond (University of Toronto)

“Descartes’s Real Distinction”

Edwin McCann (University of Southern California)

“Freedom and Strength of Will: Descartes, Albritton, Hoffman”

John Martin Fischer (University of California–Riverside)
 “Indeterminism and Control—The Problem of Luck”

4D Invited Symposium: Aristotle’s Epistemology

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Gareth Matthews (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)

Speakers: Robert Bolton (Rutgers University)
 “Epistemology and Psychology in Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* II.19”

David Bronstein (Boston University)
 “*Episteme* and *Doxa* in Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* I.33”

Commentators: Andrea Falcon (Concordia University)
 Benjamin Morison (Princeton University)

4E Colloquium: Belief

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00

Chair: Nicoletta Orlandi (Rice University)

Speaker: Brett Sherman (University of Rochester)
 “A Plea for Tracking”

Commentator: Carrie Figdor (University of Iowa)

2:00-3:00

Chair: Susan Vineberg (Wayne State University)

Speaker: Jane Friedman (Oxford University)
 “Middling Credence and Suspended Judgment”

Commentator: Nikolaj Jang Pedersen (University of California–Los Angeles)

3:00-4:00

Chair: Abrol Fairweather (University of San Francisco)

Speaker: Mark E. Wunderlich (Union College)
 “In Defense of Consistency Checks”

Commentator: Ryan Hebert (Washington State University)

4F Colloquium: Metaethics

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00

Chair: Ben Wolfson (Stanford University)

Speaker: Robert A. Mabruto (North Carolina State University)
 “Are Expressivists Guilty of Wishful Thinking?”

Commentator: Mark Budolfson (Princeton University)

2:00-3:00

Chair: Emily Parker (Santa Clara University)

Speaker: Cristian Constantinescu (University of Cambridge)
 “Value Incomparability and Indeterminacy”

Commentator: Erik Carlson (Uppsala Universitet)

3:00-4:00

Chair: Michael Lacewing (University of London)

Speaker: Sean Aas (Brown University)
 “The Significance of Consequentialism”

Commentator: Lewis Powell (University of Southern California)

4G Colloquium: Metaphysics

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00

Chair: Sanjay Merchant (Grand Canyon University)

Speaker: Brandon Carey (University of Rochester)
 “The Power to Do the Impossible”

Commentator: Sean Choi (Allan Hancock College)

2:00-3:00

Chair: Catherine Legg (University of Waikato)

Speaker: Neil A. Manson (University of Mississippi)
 “No Chance for Nothing?”

Commentator: Ron Wilburn (University of Nevada–Las Vegas)

3:00-4:00

Chair: Alexandre V. Korolev (University of British Columbia)

Speaker: Sara Bernstein (Duke University)
 “Overdetermination and Counterfactual Sensitivity”

Commentator: Bradley Rettler (University of Notre Dame)

4H Colloquium: Perceptual Phenomenology

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00

Chair: Michael Trestman (University of Utah)

Speaker: Aaron Schiller (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)

“Austin Meets Adelson: Where Ordinary Language Intersects with Experimental Phenomenology”

Commentator: David Shier (Washington State University)

2:00-3:00

Chair: Damon Crockett (University of California–San Diego)

Speaker: Kevin Connolly (University of Toronto)
“Concept Acquisition and Perceptual Phenomenology”

Commentator: Charles Siewert (Rice University)

3:00-4:00

Chair: Joseph Ulatowski (University of Nevada–Las Vegas)

Speaker: René Jagnow (University of Georgia)
“Representational Content and Perceptual Organization: On a Counterexample to Intentionalism”

Commentator: Charles Wallis (California State University–Long Beach)

4I Colloquium: Philosophy of Science

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00

Chair: Yuval Avnur (Scripps College)

Speakers: Tarun Menon (University of California–San Diego)
Jacob Stegenga (University of California–San Diego)
“The Independence Requirement for Robust Evidence”

Commentator: Eric Barnes (Southern Methodist University)

2:00-3:00

Chair: Tamar Weber (University of California–Los Angeles)

Speaker: Theodore Bach (University of Connecticut)
“Relational-System Natural Kinds and the Function of Analogy”

Commentator: Bernard Molyneux (University of California–Davis)

3:00-4:00

Chair: Eugen Zelenak (Catholic University in Ružomberok)

Speaker: Louis H. deRosset (University of Vermont)
“Grounding Explanations”

Commentator: Robert Rupert (University of Colorado–Boulder)

4J APA Committee Session: Constructive Engagement of Analytic and Continental Approaches in Philosophy: From the Point of View of Asian Philosophy

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies

Chair: Bo Mou (San Jose State University)

Speakers: Mario Wenning (University of Macau and Universität Frankfurt)

“Daoism and the Future of Critical Theory”

Marshall Willman (New York Institute of Technology–Nanjing)

“A Daoist Perspective on Analytical and Phenomenological Methodologies in the Analysis of Mind”

Sandra A. Wawrytko (San Diego State University)

“Psychosis and Buddhist Awakening”

Bo Mou (San Jose State University)

“Quine/Lewis, Heidegger, and Lao Zi/Zhuang Zi on Being”

4K APA Committee Session: Philosophy Undisciplined: A Broader Vision of Accountability

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Arranged by the APA Committee on Public Philosophy

Chair: Noëlle McAfee (Emory University)

Speakers: Ann J. Cahill (Elon University)

“A Theory of the Undisciplined”

Robert Frodeman (University of North Texas)

J. Britt Holbrook (University of North Texas)

“Philosopher Kings and Philosopher Bureaucrats: The Public Sector’s Need for Philosophy”

Stephen Bloch-Schulman (Elon University)

“Undisciplining the Undergraduate Experience”

4L APA Committee Session: Why Philosophy Before College?

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Arranged by the APA Committee on Pre-College Instruction in Philosophy

Chair: Wendy Turgeon (St. Joseph’s College–New York)

Speakers: Jen Glaser (Mandel Leadership Institute and Columbia University)

Jana Mohr Lone (University of Washington)
 Walter Omar Kohan (Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro)
 Robert Fisher (Brunel University)
 Lynne Hinton (Queensland University of Technology)

4M Special Session: Arranged by the Association for Symbolic Logic

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Topic: Logic and Early Analytic Philosophy

Speakers: Erich Reck (University of California–Riverside)
 “Frege versus Dedekind: On the Nature and Purpose of Logicism”
 Marcus Rossberg (University of Connecticut)
 “Platonism in Frege’s *Grundgesetze*?”
 Robert May (University of California–Davis)
 “The Proof of Hume’s Principle”

THURSDAY EARLY EVENING, APRIL 21

SESSION 5 — 4:00-6:00 P.M.

5A Author-Meets-Critics: Nancy E. Snow, *Virtue as Social Intelligence: An Empirically Grounded Theory*

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Christina Chuang (University of California–Irvine)
 Critics: Christian Miller (Wake Forest University)
 Dan Russell (Wichita State University)
 Author: Nancy E. Snow (Marquette University)

5B Invited Paper: Counterfactuals and Dispositions

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Aaron Veek (University of Southern California)
 Speaker: Kadri Vihvelin (University of Southern California)
 “Counterfactuals and Dispositions”
 Commentators: Charles Hermes (University of Texas–Arlington)
 Jennifer McKittrick (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)

5C Invited Paper: Easy Knowledge and Reliabilism

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Avram Hiller (Portland State University)
 Speaker: Ram Neta (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
 “Easy Knowledge, Reliabilism, and the Transparency of Justification”

Commentators: Stewart Cohen (University of Arizona)
Anna-Sara Malmgren (University of Texas–Austin)

5D Invited Paper: Frege’s *Grundlagen*

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Erich Reck (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: Robert May (University of California–Davis)
“Leibniz’s Problem, Frege’s Puzzle, and the Failure
of the *Grundlagen*”

Commentators: Richard Mendelsohn (City University of New
York–Graduate Center)
Terence Parsons (University of California–Los
Angeles)

5E Colloquium: Disability Ethics

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00

Chair: Meredith McFadden (University of California–
Riverside)

Speaker: William P. Kabasenche (Washington State University)
“Genetic Testing, Parenting, and Moral Identity: A
Response to Jeff McMahan”

Commentator: Dana Nelkin (University of California–San Diego)

5:00-6:00

Chair: Wanda Teays (Mount St. Mary’s College)

Speaker: Gregory S. Poore (Baylor University)
“Why Care for the Severely Disabled? A Critique of
MacIntyre’s Account”

Commentator: Janet Giddings (San Jose State University)

5F Colloquium: Epistemology

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00

Chair: Ethan Nowack (University of California–Berkeley)

Speaker: Ian Schnee (University of Puget Sound)
“Duplicate Reasons”

Commentator: Edward Cushman (Lewis & Clark College)

5:00-6:00

Chair: Cory Wright (California State University–Long Beach)

Speaker: Michael R. Hicks (Brooklyn College)
“Know-Who and Testimony Mediated
Acquaintance”

Commentator: Michael J. Raven (University of Victoria)

5G Colloquium: Heidegger*4:00-6:00 p.m.**4:00-5:00*

Chair: Dana Belu (California State University–Dominguez Hills)

Speaker: S. West Gurley (Sam Houston State University)
 “Reconsidering What It Is to Pay Attention:
 Heidegger and Letting-Be-ness”

Commentator: William Bracken (University of California–Riverside)

5:00-6:00

Chair: Mark Wrathall (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: Joshua L. Tepley (University of Notre Dame)
 “Heidegger’s Name for Dasein’s Being: ‘Existence’
 or ‘Care?’”

Commentator: Martin Schwab (University of California–Irvine)

5H Colloquium: Lying and Deception*4:00-6:00 p.m.**4:00-5:00*

Chair: Ryan Hay (University of Southern California)

Speaker: Julia Staffel (University of Southern California)
 “Lying, Deceiving, and Degrees of Belief”

Commentator: Stephen Lenhart (Northern Arizona University)

5:00-6:00

Chair: Thomas Pearson (University of Texas–Pan American)

Speaker: Don Fallis (University of Arizona)
 “What Is Deceptive Lying?”

Commentator: James Mahon (Washington and Lee University)

5I Colloquium: Thought Experiments*4:00-6:00 p.m.**4:00-5:00*

Chair: Mitchell Herschbach (University of California–San Diego)

Speaker: Brian T. Talbot (University of Colorado–Boulder)
 “An Argument for Old-Fashioned Intuition
 Pumping”

Commentator: Justin Sytsma (East Tennessee State University)

5:00-6:00

Chair: Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley (California State University–Bakersfield)

Speaker: Charles Repp (University of Toronto)
 “Acquiring Justification from Fictional Narratives: What’s Wrong with the Thought Experiment Analogy”

Commentator: Margaret Moore (University of Leeds)

5J Symposium: Anselmianism

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Henrik Lagerlund (University of Western Ontario)

Speaker: Michael J. Almeida (University of Texas–San Antonio)

“A Paradox Free Anselmianism”

Commentators: David Hunt (Whittier College)
 James Taylor (Westmont College)

5K Symposium: Cognition and Association

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Rod Bertolet (Purdue University)

Speaker: Cameron Buckner (Indiana University–Bloomington)
 “In Defense of the Distinction Between Cognition and Mere Association”

Commentators: Jacob Beck (Texas Tech University)
 Robert Briscoe (Ohio University)

5L Symposium: The Value of True Belief

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: David Boersema (Pacific University)

Speaker: Chase B. Wrenn (University of Alabama–Tuscaloosa)
 “Truth: The Worst of All Goods”

Commentators: Maria Baghramian (University College, Dublin)
 Lindsay Craig (University of Oklahoma)

5M APA Committee Session: Under-Represented Groups in Philosophy: An International Conversation

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Arranged by the APA Committee on Inclusiveness

Chair: Anita Silvers (San Francisco State University)

Speakers: Pamela Hood (San Francisco State University)
 Teresa Blankmeyer Burke (Gallaudet University)
 Samantha Brennan (University of Western Ontario)
 Shannon Dea (University of Waterloo)

ANNUAL RECEPTION*10:00 p.m.-Midnight***GROUP MEETINGS, 6:00-8:00 P.M.**

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

Charles S. Peirce Society

International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western
Philosophy, Session 1

North American Society for Social Philosophy, Session 1

Society for Natural Religion, Session 2

Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts

GROUP MEETINGS, 6:00-9:00 P.M.

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 1

Concerned Philosophers for Peace

Kierkegaard Society

North American Kant Society, Session 1

North American Nietzsche Society

Society for Analytical Feminism, Session 2

Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy

Society for Empirical Ethics

Society for Systematic Philosophy

Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 1

GROUP MEETINGS, 8:00-10:00 P.M.

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

American Society for Aesthetics

Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking

International Society for Environmental Ethics, Session 1

Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy

Society for the Metaphysics of Science, Session 1

FRIDAY, APRIL 22

PROGRAM COMMITTEE BREAKFAST

7:30-9:00 a.m.

PLACEMENT INFORMATION

8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m., *Indigo Foyer West*

REGISTRATION

8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m., *Indigo Foyer West*

BOOK DISPLAYS

10:00 a.m.-6:00 p.m., *Indigo Ballroom AE*

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

6:00-7:00 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL RECEPTION

7:00-8:00 p.m.

FRIDAY MORNING, APRIL 22

SESSION 6 — 9:00 A.M.-NOON

6A Author-Meets-Critics: J. Angelo Corlett, *Heirs of Oppression*

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Bill E. Lawson (University of Memphis)

Critics: Bernard Boxill (University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill)

Jennifer Harvey (Drake University)

Author: J. Angelo Corlett (San Diego State University)

6B Author-Meets-Critics: Michael Slote, *Moral Sentimentalism*

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Yang Xiao (Kenyon College)

Critics: Michael Frazer (Harvard University)

Virginia Held (City University of New York-Graduate School)

Karsten Stueber (College of the Holy Cross)

Author: Michael Slote (University of Miami)

6C Invited Symposium: Pejorative Epithets*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Patrick Rysiew (University of Victoria)

Speakers: Luvel Anderson (Rutgers University)

Ernest LePore (Rutgers University)

"Slurring Words"

Stavroula Glezakos (Wake Forest University)

"The Limits of Meaning Well"

Robin Jeshion (University of Southern California)

"The Truth About Slurs"

6D Colloquium: Ethics and Politics*9:00 a.m.-Noon**9:00-10:00*Chair: Steven Scalet (State University of New York–
Binghamton)

Speaker: David Rondel (Trent University)

"G. A. Cohen and the Logic of Egalitarian
Congruence"

Commentator: Dan Shahar (University of Arizona)

10:00-11:00

Chair: Keith Hankins (University of Arizona)

Speaker: Edward H.K. Song (Louisiana State University)

"Acceptance, Fairness, and Political Obligation"

Commentator: Daniel Silvermint (University of Arizona)

*11:00-12:00*Chair: James Crippen (California State University–
Fullerton)

Speaker: Robert C. Hughes (National Institutes of Health)

"A Moral Interest in Democracy"

Commentator: Guido Pincione (University of Arizona)

6E Colloquium: Evil and Death*9:00 a.m.-Noon**9:00-10:00*

Chair: Kristen Irwin (Biola University)

Speaker: Justin P. McBrayer (Fort Lewis College)

"Context and Skeptical Theism"

Commentator: Trent Dougherty (Baylor University)

10:00-11:00

Chair: Asia Ferrin (University of Washington)

Speaker: Ingrid V. Albrecht (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)

“Life After Death: Making Sense of Grief”

Commentator: Dan Moller (University of Maryland–College Park)

11:00-12:00

Chair: Matthew Davidson (California State University–San Bernardino)

Speaker: Jason Raibley (California State University–Long Beach)

“On the Intrinsic Evil of Death”

Commentator: Adam Streed (University of California–San Diego)

6F Colloquium: Justification

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00

Chair: Bruce Hunter (University of Alberta)

Speaker: Ryan Byerly (Baylor University)

“Evidentialism and the Principle of Inferential Justification”

Commentator: Earl Conee (University of Rochester)

10:00-11:00

Chair: Sara Qualin (University of Wyoming)

Speaker: Kraig Martin (Baylor University)

“Can Epistemic Obligation Be Reduced to Synchronic Evidential Justification?”

Commentator: Jacob Caton (University of Arizona)

11:00-12:00

Chair: Steven Luper (Trinity University)

Speakers: Peter Kung (Pomona College)

Masahiro Yamada (Claremont Graduate University)

“There Is No Easy Bootstrapping Problem”

Commentator: Michael Titelbaum (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

6G Colloquium: Language, Thought, and Convention

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00

Chair: Dave Beisecker (University of Nevada–Las Vegas)

Speaker: Marija Jankovic (Indiana University–Bloomington)

“The Intentional Underpinnings of Convention”

Commentator: Charles Lang (University of California–Davis)

10:00-11:00

Chair: John Kwak (University of Southern California)

Speaker: Nicholas Georgalis (East Carolina University)
 "On Frege's Supposed Hierarchy of Senses"

Commentator: Ben Caplan (Ohio State University)

11:00-12:00

Chair: Donovan Wishon (Stanford University)

Speaker: Eric Hagedorn (University of Notre Dame)
 "Is Ockham's Mental Language a Language of Thought?"

Commentator: Margaret Cameron (University of Victoria)

6H Colloquium: Logic and Entailment

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00

Chair: Vijay Mascarenhas (Metropolitan State College of Denver)

Speaker: Joongol Kim (Western Illinois University)
 "A Logic of 'Another'"

Commentator: Luca Struble (University of California–Los Angeles)

10:00-11:00

Chair: David Barnett (University of Colorado–Boulder)

Speaker: Jon Erling Litland (Harvard University)
 "The Barcan Formula(e) for Determinacy"

Commentator: Raul Saucedo (Yale University and Australian National University)

11:00-12:00

Chair: Ali Kazmi (University of Calgary)

Speaker: Elijah Chudnoff (University of Miami)
 "Grounding and Entailment"

Commentator: Troy Cross (Reed College)

6I Colloquium: Moral Responsibility

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00

Chair: Joshua Hollowell (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: Chelsea Haramia (University of Colorado–Boulder)
 "The Moral Asymmetry of Praise and Blame"

Commentator: Michael Robinson (Grand Valley State University)

10:00-11:00

Chair: David DeMoss (Pacific University)

Speaker: Xiaofei Liu (University of Missouri)

“Does Moral Responsibility Require Choice?”

Commentator: Scott Sehon (Bowdoin College)

11:00-12:00

Chair: Nicole Brunson (Washington State University)

Speaker: David Palmer (University of Tennessee)

“Dialectical Difficulties in Justifying the Principle of Alternative Possibilities”

Commentator: Larry Fike (Independent Scholar)

6J Colloquium: Philosophy of Art

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00

Chair: Michelle Saint (Rollins College)

Speaker: Scott Clifton (University of Washington)

“Branching Versus Non-Branching Models and Moderate Moralism”

Commentator: J. M. Fritzman (Lewis & Clark College)

10:00-11:00

Chair: Alan Goldman (College of William and Mary)

Speaker: Marina Folescu (University of Southern California)

“The Peculiar Photographic Character of Documentaries”

Commentator: Richard Hanley (University of Delaware)

11:00-12:00

Chair: Dominic McIver Lopes (University of British Columbia)

Speaker: Richard Kamber (The College of New Jersey)

“Experimental Philosophy of Art”

Commentator: William P. Seeley (Bates College)

6K Colloquium: Virtue Ethics

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00

Chair: Michael Stannard (Reedley College)

Speaker: Jeppe von Platz (University of Pennsylvania)

“Kant’s Two Concepts of Virtue”

Commentator: Christopher Yeomans (Purdue University)

10:00-11:00

Chair: Zoe Alshire (Washington State University)

Speaker: Luke Gelinus (University of Toronto)

“Consequentialist Virtue”

Commentator: Brian Berkey (University of California–Berkeley)

11:00-12:00

Chair: Stephen Capone, Jr. (University of Utah)

Speaker: Ian Stoner (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)

“On Why Liars, Drunks, and Squash Players Should Emulate Virtuous People”

Commentator: Stephen Brown (Briar Cliff University)

6L APA Committee Session: Best Placement Practices Handbook

9:00 a.m.–Noon

Arranged by the APA Committee on Academic Career Opportunities and Placement

Chair: Leslie Pickering Francis (University of Utah)

Speakers: Paul Weirich (University of Missouri)

Nancy E. Snow (Marquette University)

6M APA Committee Session: Kavka Prize Paper

9:00 a.m.–Noon

Arranged by the APA Committee on Lectures, Publications and Research

Chair: Margaret Gilbert (University of California–Irvine)

Speaker: Christopher Heath Wellman (Washington University in St. Louis)

“Immigration and Freedom of Association”

Commentators: Arash Abizadeh (McGill University)

Michael Blake (University of Washington)

Eric Cavallero (Southern Connecticut State University)

Shelley Wilcox (San Francisco State University)

6N Special Session: Arranged by the Association for Symbolic Logic

9:00 a.m.–Noon

Speakers: Allen Hazen (University of Alberta)

“Alberta: Realism and Metaphysical Necessity”

Volker Halbach (Oxford University)

“Axiomatic Approaches to Truth: An Overview”

Gila Sher (University California–San Diego)

“Truth and Knowledge in Logic and Mathematics”

FRIDAY AFTERNOON, APRIL 22

SESSION 7 — 1:00-4:00 P.M.

7A Author-Meets-Critics: Stephen M. Gardiner, *A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change*

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Mark Woods (University of San Diego)

Critics: Richard W. Miller (Cornell University)

Clare Palmer (Texas A&M University)

Mathias Risse (Harvard University)

Author: Stephen M. Gardiner (University of Washington)

7B Author-Meets-Critics: Mark Balaguer, *Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem*

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Joseph Keim Campbell (Washington State University)

Critics: Robert Kane (University of Texas–Austin)

Michael McKenna (University of Arizona)

Derk Pereboom (Cornell University)

Author: Mark Balaguer (California State University–Los Angeles)

7C Author-Meets-Critics: Jesse Prinz, *The Emotional Construction of Morals*

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: John Bailar (University of Idaho)

Critics: Agnes Callard (University of Chicago)

Ronald De Sousa (University of Toronto)

Kyle Menken (University of Toronto)

Jonathan A. Tresan (University of Florida)

Author: Jesse Prinz (City University of New York–Graduate Center)

7D Author-Meets-Critics: Takashi Yagisawa, *Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise*

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Linda Wetzel (Georgetown University)

Critics: Roberta Ballarin (University of British Columbia)

Reina Hayaki (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)

Seahwa Kim (Ewha Womans University)

Author: Takashi Yagisawa (California State University–Northridge)

7E Invited Symposium: Empathy and Imagination*1:00-4:00 p.m.*

Chair: Heather Battaly (California State University–Fullerton)

Speakers: Derek Matravers (Open University)
Heidi Maibom (Carleton University)
Eva-Maria Engelen (Universität Konstanz)

Commentator: Julinna Oxley (Coastal Carolina University)

7F Invited Symposium: Hegel*1:00-4:00 p.m.*

Chair: John McCumber (University of California–Los Angeles)

Speakers: Richard Eldridge (Swarthmore College)
“Hegel as a Philosopher of Modern Art”
Karsten Harries (Yale University)
“Two Views of One Temple: Either Hegel or Heidegger!”
Fred Rush (University of Notre Dame)
“The Contemporary Significance of Hegel’s Aesthetics”
Kathleen Wright (Haverford College)
“Hegel and the Problem of Chinese Aesthetics”
Robert Stern (University of Sheffield)
“Unholy Wills?: Kant and Hegel on the Struggle to Be Good”**7G Invited Symposium: Reid’s Theory of Aesthetic Perception***1:00-4:00 p.m.*

Chair: Christopher Williams (University of Nevada–Reno)

Speakers: Laurent Jaffro (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)
“Reid on Aesthetic Response and the Perception of Beauty”
Rachel Zuckert (Northwestern University)
“Reid’s Expressivist Aesthetics”
Rebecca Copenhaver (Lewis & Clark College)
“Thomas Reid on Acquired Aesthetic Perception”
Commentator: James Van Cleve (University of Southern California)

7H Invited Symposium: Uncommon Virtues: Creativity, Productivity, and Pride

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: George Sher (Rice University)

Speakers: Christine Swanton (University of Auckland)
 “Virtues of Creativity and Productivity, Moral Theory, and Human Nature”

Allan Gotthelf (University of Pittsburgh)

“Pride as a Virtue: Learning from Aristotle and Ayn Rand”

Commentators: Helen Cullyer (Andrew W. Mellon Foundation)
 Gregory Salmieri (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

7I Colloquium: Aristotle

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00

Chair: Michael Ferejohn (Duke University)

Speaker: Jurgis (George) Brakas (Marist College)
 “Aristotle’s Homonyms Reconsidered”

Commentator: Philip Corkum (University of Alberta)

2:00-3:00

Chair: Laura Landen (Providence College)

Speaker: Margaret Scharle (Reed College)
 “Teleological Explanation in Aristotle’s *Meteorologica*”

Commentator: Jessica Davis (San Diego State University)

3:00-4:00

Chair: Peter Gratton (University of San Diego)

Speaker: Evan Keeling (University of Virginia)
 “Unity in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* H.6”

Commentator: Scott O’Connor (Cornell University)

7J Colloquium: Kant

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00

Chair: Paul Guyer (University of Pennsylvania)

Speaker: Nick Stang (University of Miami)
 “Double Affection Vindicated”

Commentator: Tim Jankowiak (University of California–San Diego)

2:00-3:00

Chair: Pierre Keller (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: Thomas Land (University of Chicago)

“Intuition and Judgment: How Not to Think About the Singularity of Intuition (and the Generality of Concepts) in Kant”

Commentator: Courtney Morris (University of California–Riverside)

3:00-4:00

Chair: Henry E. Allison (University of California–San Diego and Boston University)

Speaker: Seung-Kee Lee (Drew University)

“Logical Forms, Indeterminacy, and the Subjective Unity of Consciousness in Kant”

Commentator: Clinton Tolley (University of California–San Diego)

7K Colloquium: Moral Realism

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00

Chair: Joshua Crabill (University of Southern California)

Speaker: Travis N. Rieder (Georgetown University)

“Why Parity Arguments Cannot Save Normative Realism”

Commentator: Reid Blackman (Colgate University)

2:00-3:00

Chair: Adam Graves (Metropolitan State College of Denver)

Speaker: Chris Heathwood (University of Colorado–Boulder)
“Could Morality Have a Source?”

Commentator: Robert Gressis (California State University–Northridge)

3:00-4:00

Chair: Mark Nelson (Westmont College)

Speaker: C. D. Meyers (University of Southern Mississippi)
“Expressivism, Constructivism, and the Supervenience of Moral Properties”

Commentator: Justin Snedegar (University of Southern California)

7L Posters: Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Speakers: Gabriel Rabin (University of California–Los Angeles)
“Blocking the Blocking Defense”

Jason Ford (University of Minnesota–Duluth)

“Defending Consciousness, Self, and Attention”

Adrienne Prettyman (University of Toronto)
 “Diffuse Attention”

Tim Fuller (Ohio State University)
 “Is Scientific Theory Change Similar to Early
 Cognitive Development? Gopnik on Science and
 Childhood”

Tony Cheng (City University of New York–Graduate
 Center)
 “Self-Identification and a Puzzle about Mental
 Ownership”

Vanessa Lehan-Streisel (York University)
 “Semantic Modelling and Probabilistic Analysis: A
 Defence of Stalnaker’s Account of Conditionals
 as a General Theory of Conditional Reasoning”

Abigail Gosselin (Regis University)
 “Toward a Pragmatic Conception of Mental
 Disorder”

Esa Diaz-Leon (University of Manitoba)
 “Tye on the Phenomenal Concept Strategy”

**7M APA Committee Session: Philosophical Collaboration:
 Theoretical and Practical Considerations**

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Arranged by the APA Committee on Public Philosophy

Chair: Thomas M. Powers (University of Delaware)

- Speakers: Melinda Fagan (Rice University)
 “Collaboration and Experiment in Studies of
 Biomedicine”
- Thomas M. Powers (University of Delaware)
 “Fabrics of Science: Quine and the Possibility of
 Collaboration”
- Mark Greene (University of Delaware)
 “Teaching Research Ethics Across Disciplines”
- Fritz Allhoff (Western Michigan University)
 “Technology, Ethics and Interdisciplinarity”
- Paul Humphreys (University of Virginia)
 “The Solitary Philosopher and the Cooperating
 Scientist”
- Darrel Moellendorf (San Diego State University)
 “What Political Philosophers Can Learn from
 Climate Scientists”

7N APA Committee Session: Regenerating Queer: The Ethical Challenges of Recent Biopolitics

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Arranged by the APA Committee on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender People in the Profession

Chair: Loren Cannon (Humboldt State University)

Speakers: Margaret Denike (Dalhousie University)

“Homonormative Collusions and the Subject of Rights”

Chris Cuomo (University of Georgia)

“Is Greenpeace Gay? Homophobia as a Weapon of Eco-Destruction”

Kimberly Leighton (American University)

“The Dis-assembly of Genetic Meaning: Countering the Bio-normative Valuation of Genetic Relatedness: A Strategy for Queer Politics?”

FRIDAY EARLY EVENING, APRIL 22

SESSION 8 — 4:00-6:00 P.M.

8A Author-Meets-Critics: Andrew Janiak, *Newton as Philosopher*

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Mary Domski (University of New Mexico)

Critics: Lisa Downing (Ohio State University)

Lynn S. Joy (University of Notre Dame)

Author: Andrew Janiak (Duke University)

8B Invited Paper: Naturalizing Moral Philosophy

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Asta Sveinsdottir (San Francisco State University)

Speakers: Alison Jaggar (University of Colorado–Boulder)

Theresa Tobin (Marquette University)

“Dis-Locating Moral Authority: Justifying Moral Claims in a Diverse and Unequal World”

Commentators: Lisa H. Schwartzman (Michigan State University)

Margaret Walker (Arizona State University)

8C Invited Paper: Practical Reasoning and Inference

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Nadeem J. Z. Hussain (Stanford University)

Speaker: Jonathan Dancy (University of Texas–Austin and University of Reading)

“From Thought to Action”

Commentators: Jason M. Bridges (University of Chicago)
Timothy Schroeder (Ohio State University)

8D Invited Symposium: Philosophical Theology

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Lara Buchak (University of California–Berkeley)

Speakers: Jonathan Kvanvig (Baylor University)
“An Epistemic Theory of Creation”

Dennis Whitcomb (Western Washington
University)

“Grounding and Omniscience”

Commentators: Bradley Monton (University of Colorado–Boulder)
Joseph Shieber (Lafayette College)

8E Colloquium: Explanation

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00

Chair: Carla Merino-Rajme (Princeton University)

Speaker: Ray Rennard (University of the Pacific)
“Sophisticated Joint Attention and Intersubjective
Explanation”

Commentator: Graham Hubbs (University of Idaho)

5:00-6:00

Chair: Jay Odenbaugh (Lewis & Clark College)

Speaker: Kelly G. Trogdon (Lingnan University)
“The Non-Transitivity of Metaphysical Explanation”

Commentator: Matthew H. Slater (Bucknell University)

8F Colloquium: Frankfurt on Care

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00

Chair: Michael Tiboris (University of California–San
Diego)

Speaker: Scott O’Leary (Fordham University)
“Emotion, Evaluation, and Identification”

Commentator: Daniel Speak (Loyola Marymount University)

5:00-6:00

Chair: Sara Mrsny (Stanford University)

Speaker: Adam Pelser (Baylor University)
“Against Frankfurt’s Care Ground of Importance”

Commentator: Agnieszka Jaworska (University of California–
Riverside)

8G Symposium: Aristotle and Perception

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Christine Lopes (Independent Scholar)

Speaker: Anthony Carreras (Rice University)

"Higher-Order Perception and Aristotle's Use of
'Sunaisthanesthai' in *Nicomachean Ethics* IX.9"

Commentators: Mary Krizan (California State University–Fullerton)

Ravi Sharma (Clark University)

8H Symposium: Consistency in Moral Reasoning

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: David Shoemaker (Tulane University of New Orleans)

Speakers: Victor Kumar (University of Arizona)

Richmond Campbell (Dalhousie University)

"Moral Theorizing on the Ground"

Commentators: Dan Demetriou (University of Minnesota–Morris)

Colin Klein (University of Illinois–Chicago)

8I Symposium: Philosophy of Biology

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Joyce Havstad (University of California–San Diego)

Speaker: Grant A. Ramsey (University of Notre Dame)

"Drift as an Individual-Level Process"

Commentators: Vadim Keyser (University of California–Davis)

Mohan Matthen (University of Toronto)

Sarah Roe (University of California–Davis)

8J Special Session: Arranged by the Association for Symbolic Logic

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Speakers: Brian Rogers (University of California–Irvine)

"Propositional Functions and Expressive
Completeness of Tractarian Logic"

Jordan Stein (University of California–Irvine)

"The Illusion of Two Notions of Necessity"

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

6:00-7:00 p.m.

Introduction: Alison Wylie (University of Washington)

Speaker: Michael Tooley (University of Colorado–Boulder)

"The Skeptical Challenges of Hume and Berkeley:
Can They Be Answered?"

PRESIDENTIAL RECEPTION*7:00-8:00 p.m.***GROUP MEETINGS, 7:00-10:00 P.M.***(See Group Meeting Program for details)*

International Hobbes Association, Session 2

International Society for Chinese Philosophy, Session 2

International Society for Environmental Ethics, Session 2

Karl Jaspers Society of North America, Session 2

North American Kant Society, Session 2

North American Spinoza Society, Session 2

Radical Philosophy Association, Session 1

Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy

Society for German Idealism, Session 2

Society for Phenomenology and Analytic Philosophy

Society for Realist/Antirealist Discussion

Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Graduate Student Section

Society for the Metaphysics of Science, Session 2

Society for the Study of Process Philosophies

Society for Women in Philosophy, Session 1

SATURDAY, APRIL 23**PLACEMENT INFORMATION***8:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m., Indigo Foyer West***PLACEMENT INTERVIEWING***8:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m., Aqua 305, 307, 309***REGISTRATION***8:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m., Indigo Foyer West***BOOK DISPLAYS***9:00 a.m.-1:00 p.m., Indigo Ballroom AE***DEWEY LECTURE***1:00-2:30 p.m.*

DEWEY LECTURE RECEPTION*2:30-4:00 p.m.***SATURDAY MORNING, APRIL 23****SESSION 9 — 9:00 A.M.-NOON****9A Author-Meets-Critics: Joseph Mendola, *Anti-Externalism****9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Tim Black (California State University–Northridge)

Critics: Gary Ebbs (Indiana University–Bloomington)

David Hilbert (University of Illinois–Chicago)

Mark Richard (Harvard University)

Author: Joseph Mendola (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)

9B Author-Meets-Critics: Mark Csikszentmihalyi, *Material Virtue: Ethics and the Body in Early China**9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Lisa Raphals (National University of Singapore)

Critics: Alan K. L. Chan (Nanyang Technological University)

Romain Graziani (École Normale Supérieure)

Michael Puett (Harvard University)

Author: Mark Csikszentmihalyi (University of California–Berkeley)

9C Invited Symposium: Conflict and Conscience*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: John Thrasher (University of Arizona)

Speakers: Alastair Norcross (University of Colorado–Boulder)
“How to be a Good Consequentialist in a Deontological World”

Colin Macleod (University of Victoria)

“If You’re a Libertarian, How Come You’re So Rich?”

Robert Talisse (Vanderbilt University)

“Religious Conviction and Conflicts of Conscience: Was Rawls Right After All?”

9D Invited Symposium: Fundamentality*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Jonathan Schaffer (Australian National University)

Speakers: Shamik Dasgupta (Princeton University)

Kathrin Koslicki (University of Colorado–Boulder)

Terry Horgan (University of Arizona)

9E Invited Symposium: Philosophical Naturalism and Mathematics*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Penelope Maddy (University of California–Irvine)

Speakers: Robert Batterman (University of Pittsburgh)

“A Methodology for Applied Mathematics”

Michael Friedman (Stanford University)

“Mathematical Science, Naturalism, and Normativity”

Mark Wilson (University of Pittsburgh)

“Real Structures Have Insides: Comments upon a Coherent Naturalism”

9F Invited Symposium: Sexual Harassment in the Academy: The 21st Century*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Janet Kourany (University of Notre Dame)

Speakers: Margaret Crouch (Eastern Michigan University)

Kathryn Forbes (California State University–Fresno)

Janet Slagter (California State University–Fresno)

Jeanine Weekes Schroer (Arkansas State University)

9G Invited Symposium: Social Epistemology*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Matthew J. Brown (University of Texas–Dallas)

Speakers: Michael Lynch (University of Connecticut)

“Democracy and Epistemic Incommensurability”

Guy Axtell (Radford University)

“Individual, Social, and Institutional Virtue”

Heidi Grasswick (Middlebury College)

“Knowledge for Whom? The Question of ‘Significance’ in Feminist Epistemology”

Commentator: Nancy Daukas (Guilford College)

9H Colloquium: Modern Political Philosophy*9:00 a.m.-Noon**9:00-10:00*

Chair: Alan McLuckie (Stanford University)

Speaker: Ty Landrum (University of Virginia)

“The Education of Amour-Propre”

Winner of the Jean Hampton Prize

Commentator: Han van Wietmarschen (Stanford University)

10:00-11:00

Chair: Robert Miner (Baylor University)

Speaker: Jeremy Anderson (DePauw University)

“Suicide Terrorism and the Hobbesian Sovereign”

Commentator: David Koukal (University of Detroit Mercy)

11:00-12:00

Chair: Andrew Greetis (San Diego State University)

Speaker: Ericka Tucker (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)

“Emotion, Individuation, and Social Power in Spinoza”

Commentator: Steve Barbone (San Diego State University)

9I Colloquium: Perception

9:00 a.m.–Noon

9:00-10:00

Chair: Bernard W. Kobes (Arizona State University)

Speaker: Adrienne Prettyman (University of Toronto)

“Shifts of Attention and the Content of Perception”

Commentator: Bill Fish (Massey University)

10:00-11:00

Chair: Tobias Schlicht (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)

Speaker: John Spackman (Middlebury College)

“Conceptualism and the Richness of Perceptual Content”

Commentator: Brit Brogaard (University of Missouri–St. Louis)

11:00-12:00

Chair: Dorit Bar-On (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

Speaker: Derek Brown (Brandon University)

“Losing Grip on the World: From Illusion to Sense-Data”

Commentator: Maja Spener (Oxford University)

9J Colloquium: Philosophy of Language

9:00 a.m.–Noon

9:00-10:00

Chair: Matt Leonard (University of California–Davis)

Speaker: James R. Shaw (University of Pittsburgh)

“Semantic Defect in Context”

Commentator: Megan Wallace (University of Kentucky)

10:00-11:00

Chair: Brian Blackwell (University of Southern California)

Speaker: Paul Saka (University of Texas–Pan American)
 “The T-schema Argument Against Realism”

Commentator: Angel Pinillos (Arizona State University)

11:00-12:00

Chair: Herminia Reyes (San Diego State University)

Speaker: Eliot Michaelson (University of California–Los Angeles)
 “Lying and Content I”

Commentator: Marga Reimer (University of Arizona)

9K Colloquium: Philosophy of Mind

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00

Chair: Christopher Healow (University of California–Davis)

Speaker: Paul R. Audi (University of Nebraska–Omaha)
 “Lewis Versus Kripke: The Debate over the Rigidity of ‘Pain’”

Commentator: Jonathan Dorsey (University of California–Davis)

10:00-11:00

Chair: Keith Simmons (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

Speaker: Gary Bartlett (Central Washington University)
 “Activity and Experience”

Commentator: Majid Amini (Virginia State University)

11:00-12:00

Chair: Dimitria Gatzia (University of Akron)

Speaker: James Blackmon (San Francisco State University)
 “The Physical Realizations of Mind”

Commentator: Robert Howell (Southern Methodist University)

9L Colloquium: Philosophy of Science

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00

Chair: Franz-Peter Griesmaier (University of Wyoming)

Speaker: K. Brad Wray (State University of New York–Oswego)
 “What Are the Prospects for an Optimism Induction from the History of Science?”

Commentator: William Devlin (Bridgewater State University)

10:00-11:00

Chair: Helmut Wautischer (Sonoma State University)

Speaker: Alan C. Love (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)
 “Formal and Material Theories in Philosophy of
 Science: A Methodological Interpretation”

Commentator: Alexandra Bradner (Denison University)

11:00-12:00

Chair: Joseph Ullian (Washington University in St. Louis)

Speaker: Gerald Doppelt (University of California–San
 Diego)
 “Scientific Realism Defended”

Commentator: Benjamin Bayer (Loyola University–New Orleans)

**9M APA Committee Session: Author-Meets-Critics: Enrique
 Dussel, *Politics of Liberation: Architectonics*, Volume 2**

9:00 a.m.–Noon

Arranged by the APA Committee on Hispanics

Chair: Carlos Alberto Sanchez (San Jose State University)

Critics: George Ciccariello-Maher (Drexel University)
 Oscar Guardiola-Rivera (Birkbeck College London)
 Amós Nascimento (University of Washington)
 Eduardo Mendieta (State University of New York–
 Stony Brook)

Author: Enrique Dussel (Universidad Nacional Autónoma
 de México)

9N APA Committee Session: Berger Prize Paper

9:00 a.m.–Noon

Arranged by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Law

Chair: David Lefkowitz (University of Richmond)

Speakers: Mark Greenberg (University of California–Los
 Angeles)
 Alexander Guerrero (New York University)

Commentator: Gideon Yaffe (University of Southern California)

PLACEMENT INFORMATION

8:30 a.m.–1:00 p.m., Indigo Foyer West

PLACEMENT INTERVIEWING

8:30 a.m.–1:00 p.m., Aqua 305, 307, 309

REGISTRATION

8:30 a.m.–1:00 p.m., Indigo Foyer West

BOOK DISPLAYS*9:00 a.m.-1:00 p.m., Indigo Ballroom AE***SATURDAY AFTERNOON, APRIL 23****SESSION 10 — 1:00-4:00 P.M.****10A Author-Meets-Critics: Tyler Burge, *Origins of Objectivity****1:00-4:00 p.m.*

Chair: Michael A. Rescorla (University of California–Santa Barbara)

Critic: Christopher Peacocke (Columbia University)

Author: Tyler Burge (University of California–Los Angeles)

10B Authors-Meet-Critics: Joshua Cohen, *Rousseau: A Free Community of Equals* and Fred Neuhouser, *Rousseau's Theodicy of Self-Love: Evil, Rationality, and the Drive for Recognition**1:00-4:00 p.m.*

Chair: David Williams (University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point)

Critics: Rafeeq Hasan (University of Chicago)

Dasha Polzik (University of Chicago)

Authors: Joshua Cohen (Stanford University)

Fred Neuhouser (Barnard College)

10C Special Memorial Session: John Pollock*1:00-4:00 p.m.*

Chair: Keith Lehrer (University of Arizona)

Speakers: Scott Sturgeon (Oxford University)

“Pollock on Defeasible Reasons”

Joseph Hernandez Cruz (Williams College)

“Pollock's Naturalism”

Iris Oved (University of Arizona)

“Computing Joint Conditional Probabilities”

10D Invited Symposium: Sensory Substitution and Sensory Augmentation*1:00-4:00 p.m.*

Chair: Brian L. Keeley (Pitzer College)

Speakers: J. Kevin O'Regan (Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique)

“Sensory Substitution and the Sensorimotor Approach to Phenomenal Consciousness”

Malika Auvray (Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique)

“Perceiving with Compensatory Devices: Quasi-Vision or New Sensory Modality?”

Jon Bird (Open University)

“Transparency in Sensory Substitution and Sensory Augmentation”

10E Colloquium: Identity

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00

Chair: Daniel Krasner (Metropolitan State College of Denver)

Speaker: Andrew M. Bailey (University of Notre Dame)
“A Priority Problem for the Constituent Solution”

Commentator: Shieva Kleinschmidt (University of Southern California)

2:00-3:00

Chair: Philip Atkins (University of California–Santa Barbara)

Speaker: H. E. Baber (University of San Diego)
“What, Me Worry: Cohabitation and the Problem of the Many”

Commentator: Brad Armour-Garb (State University of New York–Albany)

3:00-4:00

Chair: Gregory Janssen (University of Nevada–Las Vegas)

Speaker: Kevin W. Sharpe (St. Cloud State University)
“Persons, Animals, and Persistence Conditions”

Commentator: Todd R. Long (California Polytechnic State University)

10F Colloquium: Justice and Moral Responsibility

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00

Chair: Kritika Yegnashankaran (Bard College)

Speaker: Joseph Q. Adams (Rice University)
“Retributive Prepunishment”

Commentator: Justin Caouette (Washington State University)

2:00-3:00

Chair: Luis Cheng-Guajardo (Stanford University)

Speaker: Stan Husi (Rice University)
“Inescapability and Authority”

Commentator: Luca Ferrero (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)

3:00-4:00

Chair: Patrick Ryan (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: Jeff Cervantez (University of Tennessee)

“Intuitive Justice: Thoughts on Neutralizing Luck”

Commentator: Alex Hughes (Illinois Wesleyan University)

10G Colloquium: Kant

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00

Chair: Andrew Hsu (University of California–Los Angeles)

Speaker: Alex Rueger (University of Alberta)

“Kant on Beauty and Morality Circa 1784: On the Genesis of the Third Critique”

Commentator: Kristi Sweet (Texas A&M University)

2:00-3:00

Chair: Peter Thielke (Pomona College)

Speaker: Paul Tulipana (Georgia State University)

“Kant’s Conception of Autonomy in Two Objections to Metaethical Constitutivism”

Commentator: Justin Coates (University of California–Riverside)

3:00-4:00

Chair: Kory Schaff (Occidental College)

Speaker: Japa Pallikkathayil (New York University)

“Persons and Bodies”

Commentator: Helga Varden (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)

10H Colloquium: Plato

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00

Chair: Chris Tennberg (University of California–Santa Barbara)

Speaker: Brian Prince (Rice University)

“Rotation Without Change in the *Statesman*”

Commentator: Rosemary Twomey (City University of New York–Graduate School)

2:00-3:00

Chair: Malek Khazaei (California State University–Long Beach)

Speaker: Emily A. Austin (Wake Forest University)

“Fools, Malice, and Public Refutation in the *Philebus*”

Commentator: Joshua Wilburn (University of Victoria)

3:00-4:00

Chair: Marisa Diaz-Waian (San Diego State University)

Speakers: Ara Astourian (University of Southern California)

Michael Cholbi (California State Polytechnic
University-Pomona)

“A Socratic Critique of Socrates’ Noble Falsehood”

Commentator: Michelle Jenkins (Whitman College)

10I Colloquium: Political Philosophy

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00

Chair: Carmen Zinn (University of California–Santa
Barbara)

Speaker: Dale Dorsey (University of Kansas)

“Desire-satisfaction, Time, and the Argument from
Internalism”

Commentator: Rebecca Lynn Stangl (University of Virginia)

2:00-3:00

Chair: Deirdre Golash (American University)

Speaker: Pin-Fei Lu (Independent Scholar)

“A Minimalist Duty for Gender Justice”

Commentator: Matthew Lister (University of Pennsylvania)

3:00-4:00

Chair: Jeffrey Hein (San Diego State University)

Speaker: Steven J. Daskal (Northern Illinois University)

“Saving for Retirement Without Harming Others”

Commentator: Adam Hosein (University of Colorado–Boulder)

10J APA Committee Session: Author-Meets-Critics: Oscar Guardiola-Rivera, *What If Latin America Ruled the World? How the South Will Take the North Through the 21st Century*

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Arranged by the APA Committee on Hispanics

Chair: Amós Nascimento (University of Washington)

Critics: Eduardo Mendieta (State University of New York–
Stony Brook)

Amy Oliver (American University)

Enrique Dussel (Universidad Nacional Autónoma
de México)

Author: Oscar Guardiola-Rivera (Birkbeck College London)

10K APA Committee Session: Gender Climate, Institutional Recognition, and Material Compensation

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of Women

Chair: Anna Carastathis (California State University–Los Angeles)

Speakers: Jill Gordon (Colby College)
“Grassroots Organizing for Compensation Equity”

Alison Wylie (University of Washington)

“Inequity Reconceptualized: What Are the Implications for Philosophy?”

Janet McCracken (Lake Forest College)

“Managing Women and Men of the Faculty: Reflections of an Outgoing Dean”

Ann Cudd (University of Kansas)

“What Does It Take to Be a Distinguished Professor? Mid-career Mentoring to Reach the Top”

10L APA Committee Session: Teaching History of Philosophy: History or Philosophy?

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Arranged by the APA Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy

Chair: Marc Bobro (Santa Barbara City College)

Speakers: Alan Nelson (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

Patricia Easton (Claremont Graduate University)

Nils Rauhut (Coastal Carolina University)

Dan Kaufman (University of Colorado–Boulder)

Nicholas Jolley (University of California–Irvine)

10M Dewey Lecture

1:00-2:30 p.m.

Chair: Derk Pereboom (Cornell University)

Speaker: Marilyn McCord Adams (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

“God and Evil Among the Philosophers”

DEWEY LECTURE RECEPTION

2:30-4:00 p.m.

Convention attendees are cordially invited to a reception sponsored by the Dewey Foundation in honor of the Dewey Lecturer.

SATURDAY EARLY EVENING, APRIL 23**SESSION 11 — 4:00-6:00 P.M.****11A Invited Paper: The Nature of Reasoning***4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Aaron Zimmerman (University of California–Santa Barbara)

Speaker: Paul Boghossian (New York University)
“Reasons and Reasoning”Commentators: John Broome (Oxford University)
Crispin Wright (New York University and University of Aberdeen)**11B Invited Paper: What Is Justice in Education?***4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: David Schmidtz (University of Arizona)

Speaker: Harry Brighouse (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
“Justice in Education”Commentators: Matthew Clayton (Warwick University)
Andrew Williams (Warwick University and ICREA/
Universitat Pompeu Fabra)**11C Invited Symposium: Feminist Aesthetics***4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Phyllis Rooney (Oakland University)

Speakers: Peg Brand (Indiana University–Purdue University–
Indianapolis)
Anne Eaton (University of Illinois–Chicago)

Commentator: Mitch Avila (California State University–Fullerton)

11D Invited Symposium: Moral Obligation*4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Julie Tannenbaum (Pomona College)

Speakers: Stephen Darwall (Yale University)
“Bipolar Obligation”
Jon Garthoff (Northwestern University)
“The Priority and Posteriority of Right”Commentator: Julia Markovits (Massachusetts Institute of
Technology)**11E Colloquium: Autonomy***4:00-6:00 p.m.**4:00-5:00*

Chair: Christina Hendricks (University of British Columbia)

- Speakers: Dwight Furrow (San Diego Mesa College)
 Mark Wheeler (San Diego State University)
 “Blunting the Blind Impress: Autonomy, Self-Reflection, and Tracking the Truth”
- Commentator: Joshua May (University of California–Santa Barbara)

5:00-6:00

- Chair: Matt King (Virginia Tech)
- Speaker: Eric L. Chwang (University of Colorado–Boulder)
 “Freedom from Autonomy”
- Commentator: Oisín Deery (University of British Columbia)

11F Colloquium: Friendship

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00

- Chair: Neera Badhwar (University of Oklahoma and George Mason University)
- Speaker: Matthew Walker (Rutgers University)
 “Aristotle on the Conditional Final Value of Friends”
- Commentator: Noell Birondo (Augustana College)

5:00-6:00

- Chair: Daniel Considine (Metropolitan State College of Denver)
- Speaker: Brian Watkins (Duke University)
 “Friendship and Enlightenment in Kant”
- Commentator: John Anders (University of Nevada–Las Vegas)

11G Colloquium: Supernaturalism

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00

- Chair: James Gibson (University of California–Irvine)
- Speaker: Eric R. Kraemer (University of Wisconsin–La Crosse)
 “Proper Functions and the Natural and Divine Designers”
- Commentator: Elizabeth Goodnick (University of Washington)

5:00-6:00

- Chair: Adam Arico (University of Arizona)
- Speakers: Alexis Mourenza (University of California–Santa Cruz)
 Nicholas D. Smith (Lewis & Clark College)
 “Knowledge Is Sexy”
- Commentator: Peter Graham (University of California–Riverside)

11H Colloquium: The Synthetic A Priori*4:00-6:00 p.m.**4:00-5:00*

Chair: Kenneth Lucey (University of Nevada–Reno)

Speaker: Glen Hoffmann (Ryerson University)

“Synthetic A Priori Infallibility”

Commentator: W. Russ Payne (Bellevue College)

5:00-6:00

Chair: Kaija Mortensen (University of California–Santa Cruz)

Speaker: Tyler Hildebrand (University of Colorado–Boulder)

“Genuine Empirical Metaphysics”

Commentator: Chris Tillman (University of Manitoba)

11I Symposium: Ethics and Practical Reason*4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Sarah Paul (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

Speaker: Michael D. Nelson (University of California–Riverside)

“An Uncompromising Connection Between Practical Reason and Morality”

Commentators: Elizabeth Harman (Princeton University)

Jennifer Morton (City University of New York–City College)

11J Symposium: Formal Epistemology*4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Valia Allori (Northern Illinois University)

Speakers: Richard Scheines (Carnegie Mellon University)

Gregory Wheeler (New University of Lisbon)

“Causation, Association, and Confirmation”

Commentators: Kenneth Easwaran (University of Southern California)

Christopher Hitchcock (California Institute of Technology)

11K Symposium: Kant and Animal Rights*4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Richard Dean (California State University–Los Angeles)

Speaker: Mark Shelton (Central Michigan University)

“Korsgaard, Kant, and Animals: A Response”

Commentators: Robert Jones (California State University–Chico)

Jennifer K. Uleman (Purchase College–State University of New York)

GROUP PROGRAM

WEDNESDAY EVENING, APRIL 20

GROUP SESSION G1 — 6:00-8:00 P.M.

G1A Josiah Royce Society

6:00-8:00 p.m.

Topic: Royce and Religion

Chair: Carol Hay (University of Massachusetts–Lowell)

Speakers: Douglas Anderson (Southern Illinois University–
Carbondale)

“Job in California: An Existential Royce”

John Kaag (University of Massachusetts–Lowell)

“Relocating the Problem of Job in Royce’s Philosophy”

Aaron L. Pratt (University of Oregon)

“The Problem of God in the Problem of Job”

G1B Society for Analytical Feminism, Session 1

6:00-8:00 p.m.

Topic: Women in Introductory Philosophy

Chair: Robin S. Dillon (Lehigh University)

Speakers: Kathryn J. Norlock (Trent University)

“Intro Syllabi, Recognition, and Moral Perception”

Evelyn Brister (Rochester Institute of Technology)

“Women in Intro to Philosophy: Good for Women,
Good for Philosophy”

Marilyn Friedman (Vanderbilt University and Charles
Stuart University)

“Women in Philosophy: Why Should Women Care?”

G1C Society for Natural Religion, Session 1

6:00-8:00 p.m.

Speakers: Lawrence Pasternack (Oklahoma State University)

“Kant and the Debt of Sin”

Joe Shin (Arizona State University)

“Natural Theology and the Mind”

Thomas Pearson (University of Texas–Pan American)

“Reason, Tradition, Practice: Alasdair MacIntyre’s
Naturalized Christianity”

G1D Society of Christian Philosophers*6:00-8:00 p.m.*

Chair: Daniel Speak (Loyola Marymount University)

Speaker: Thomas M. Crisp (Biola University)
"Jesus and Affluence"Commentators: Kenneth Himma (Seattle Pacific University)
Mark Nelson (Westmont College)**G1E Western Phenomenology Conference***6:00-8:00 p.m.*

Moderator: Jason Winfree (California State University–Stanislaus)

Speakers: Clark Buckner (San Francisco Art Institute)
"Form, Play, Power: Aesthetics and Antagonism"
Kalliopi Nikolopoulou (University at Buffalo)
"Myth, Truth, and Self in Roland Barthes' *Camera Lucida*"

Commentator: Hakhamanesh Zangeneh (California State University–Stanislaus)

GROUP SESSION G2 — 6:00-9:00 P.M.**G2A Hume Society***6:00-9:00 p.m.***Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: Tom Holden, *Spectres of False Divinity: Hume's Moral Atheism***

Chair: Robert McIntyre (University of California–Santa Barbara)

Author: Thomas Holden (University of California–Santa Barbara)

Critics: James Baillie (University of Portland)
Saul Traiger (Occidental College)**G2B International Association for the Philosophy of Sport***6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Chair: Douglas McLaughlin (California State University–Northridge)

Speakers: William Morgan (University of Southern California)
"Sport, Moral Argument, and Moral Redescription"
Joan Grassbaugh Forry (Vanderbilt University)
"The United Nations' Millennium Development Goals and Sport: A Case for Global Sport Feminism"

Stephen Schmid (University of Wisconsin–Rock County)

“Valuing Zero-Sum Games”

Kevin Krein (University of Alaska–Southeast)

“What Are Nature Sports and Why Are They Important?”

G2C International Hobbes Association, Session 1

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Moderators: Martin Bertman (Hobbes Studies)

Rosamond Rhodes (Mount Sinai School of Medicine and City University of New York–Graduate Center)

Speakers: Andrei Marasoiu (University of Bucharest)

“An Inquiry into Hobbes’s Theory of Language”

Juhana Lemetti (University of Helsinki)

“Hobbes on Mind and Thinking: A Less Mechanistic View”

Johan Olsthoorn (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)

“Hobbes’s Moral Psychology and His Moral Theory”

Commentator: Jerry Green (University of Texas–Austin)

Speaker: Andrew Terjesen (Rhodes College)

“Hobbes’s New Version of Magnanimity and Its Neo-Stoic Roots”

Commentator: Jay Mikelman (Boston University)

G2D International Society for Chinese Philosophy, Session 1

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Topic: Chinese Aesthetics: Comparative Approaches

Chair: Sandra A. Wawrytko (San Diego State University)

Presenters: Reanne Brandt (San Diego State University)

“Seeking Virtue in Beauty: A Glimpse of Arete Through the Lens of Chinese Aesthetics”

Jordan Schummer (San Diego State University)

“The Future Lay in Our Hands: Tool Use and Human Evolution in Li Zehou and *2001: A Space Odyssey*”

Michael J. Tetreault (San Diego State University)

“The Sky Is the Limit—Aesthetics and Archetypes for Chinese Women in an Ever Changing World”

Commentator: Chung-Ying Cheng (University of Hawaii–Manoa)

G2E Karl Jaspers Society of North America, Session 1*6:00-9:00 p.m.***Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: Lou Agosta, *Empathy in the Context of Philosophy***

Chair: Helmut Wautischer (Sonoma State University)

Author: Lou Agosta (Independent Scholar)

Critics: Elena Bezzubova (University of California–Irvine)

Brigitte Essl (Private Practice)

Gladys L. Portuondo (Independent Scholar)

Presenter: Alina N. Feld (Hofstra University)

“Morbid Psyche and Apocalypse: Jaspers, Baudrillard, and Altizer”

Commentator: Lydia Voronina (Independent Scholar)

G2F North American Spinoza Society, Session 1*6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Chair: Idit Dobbs-Weinstein (Vanderbilt University)

Speaker: Ericka Tucker (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)

“Emotion, Individuation, and Social Power in Spinoza”

Commentator: Diane Steinberg (Cleveland State University)

Speaker: Andrew Greetis (San Diego State University)

“Spinoza’s Rejection of Teleology”

Commentator: Idit Dobbs-Weinstein (Vanderbilt University)

Speaker: Steve Barbone (San Diego State University)

“Not Just ‘an Unmitigated and Seemingly Unmotivated Disaster’: Spinoza on ‘Sentimus Experimurque, Nos Aeternos Esse’”

Commentator: Rachel Heller (Independent Scholar)

G2G North American Wittgenstein Society*6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Chair: Jack Woods (Princeton University)

Speaker: Laurence Goldstein (University of Kent)

“Wittgenstein, Vagueness, and the Sorites”

Commentator: Jeff Johnson (St. Catherine University)

Speaker: Francey Russell (Vanderbilt University)

“What We Talk About When We Talk About Pain”

Commentator: John W. Powell (Humboldt State University)

Speaker: Cato Wittusen (Universitetet i Stavanger)

“Philosophical Method as a Technique of Art”

Commentator: Joshua Kortbein (Independent Scholar)

G2H Society for German Idealism, Session 1*6:00-9:00 p.m.***Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: Rebecca Comay, *Mourning Sickness: Hegel and the French Revolution***

Chair: J. M. Fritzman (Lewis & Clark College)

Author: Rebecca Comay (University of Toronto)

Critics: Andrew Cutrofello (Loyola University Chicago)
Chad Kautzer (University of Colorado–Denver)
John McCumber (University of California–Los Angeles)**G2I Society for the History of Political Philosophy***6:00-9:00 p.m.***Topic: Nature and Politics**

Chair: Ronna Burger (Tulane University of New Orleans)

Speakers: Patrick Goodin (Howard University)

“Aristotle’s Definition of the Soul in *De Anima*”

Jason Tipton (St. John’s College)

“Borrowed Plumes: Mimetic Powers and the Polymorphism of Humans”

Jonathan Badger (St. John’s College)

“Domination in Bacon’s *New Atlantis*”

Steven Berg (Bellarmine University)

“Teleology, Necessity, and the Nature of Man”

Commentators: Seth Appelbaum (Tulane University of New Orleans)

Paul Wilford (Tulane University of New Orleans)

G2J Society of Indian Philosophy and Religion*6:00-9:00 p.m.***Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: Kisor Chakrabarti, *Classical Indian Philosophy of Induction***

Chair: Gordon Haist (University of South Carolina–Beaufort)

Author: Kisor Chakrabarti (Davis and Elkins College)

Critics: Michael Allen (East Tennessee State University)
Prasanta Bandyopadhyay (Montana State University)

Gordon Haist (University of South Carolina–Beaufort)

David Lawrence (University of North Dakota)

Linda Mackey (Texas State University–San Marcos)

Alan Preti (Rosemont College)

Nancy E. Snow (Marquette University)
 Sthaneshwar Timalisina (San Diego State University)
 Paul Williams (University of Texas–Austin)

THURSDAY EVENING, APRIL 21

GROUP SESSION G3 — 6:00-8:00 P.M.

G3A Charles S. Peirce Society

6:00-8:00 p.m.

Chair: Risto Hilpinen (University of Miami)

Speaker: Cheryl Misak (University of Toronto)

“Pragmatism and Indispensability Arguments” TBA
 2010-11 Peirce Society Essay Contest winning paper

G3B International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy, Session 1

6:00-8:00 p.m.

Topic: Increasing Unity and Community

Chair: Eirik Harris (Yonsei University)

Speakers: Alan Tomhave (Youngstown State University)
 “Confucian Civility and Egalitarianism”

Benjamin Huff (Randolph-Macon College)

“Friendship and Political Solidarity in Aristotle and Classical Confucianism”

Deborah Mower (Youngstown State University)

“Pride, Prejudice, and Partiality: How Mencius Minimizes In-group Bias”

Sara Rushing (Montana State University)

“Tradition and Hermeneutical Humility in Confucius and Gadamer”

G3C North American Society for Social Philosophy, Session 1

6:00-8:00 p.m.

Topic: Political Stability and Instability

Chair: Jeff Gauthier (University of Portland)

Presenters: Celina Bragagnolo (State University of New York–Stony Brook)

“Between Religion and the State: Hannah Arendt’s ‘What Is Authority’ in a Post-Secular World”

Brendan Hogan (New York University)

“Instability, Political Economy, and Capabilities”

Andrew F. Smith (Drexel University)

“Our ‘Can’t Do’ Spirit: Political Stability, Institutional Sclerosis, and Dysfunctional Governance”

Joseph Betz (Villanova University)

“Political Stability Demands the Realization of Human Rights”

G3D Society for Natural Religion, Session 2

6:00-8:00 p.m.

Speakers: Stephen Evans (Baylor University)

“Must a Divine Command Theorist View Moral Obligations As Communicated Through Special Revelation Only?”

Adam Green (St. Louis University)

“Natural Law Epistemology?”

James Bruce (John Brown University)

“The Dignity of Damnation”

G3E Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts

6:00-8:00 p.m.

Topic: Architecture, Film, and Performance Art

Chair: Julie C. Van Camp (California State University–Long Beach)

Speakers: Richard N. Fox (Interior Designers Institute)

“Ambiguous Works of Architecture: A Krauszian-style Interpretive Approach to the Gehry Residence”

Andrea Reynolds (Ventura College)

“Who Is Art?”

Richard Nunan (College of Charleston)

“*Memento* as an Aristotelian Conception of Personal Identity”

GROUP SESSION G4 — 6:00-9:00 P.M.

G4A Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 1

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Topic: Contemporary Moral Problems from Chinese Philosophy’s Perspective

Chair: Steven Geisz (University of Tampa)

Speaker: Elizabeth Woo Li (Peking University)

“On Recent Discussion Concerning Zhang Zai’s Virtue Ethics”

Commentator: Weimin Sun (California State University–Northridge)

- Speaker: Henrique Schneider (Fernfachhochschule Schweiz)
 “Emotion and Sympathy in Confucius and Adam Smith”
- Commentator: JeeLoo Liu (California State University–Fullerton)
- Speaker: Ellen Zhang (Hong Kong Baptist University)
 “The Daodejing’s View on War and Peace”
- Commentator: Predrag Cicovacki (College of the Holy Cross)
- Speaker: Qingjie Wang (Chinese University of Hong Kong)
 “Human Nature, Heidegger, and Euthanasia”
- Commentator: Xianduan (Judy) Shi (Westminster College of Salt Lake City)

G4B Concerned Philosophers for Peace

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Topic: Perspectives on the Middle East

- Chair: David Boersema (Pacific University)
- Speakers: Ron Hirschbein (Walden University)
 “Confessions of a Self-Hating Jew”
- Ovadia Ezra (Tel Aviv University)
 “Moral Responsibility at the End of Military Occupation”
- Andrew Fiala (California State University–Fresno)
 “Pluralism, Religion, and Peace”
- David Boersema (Pacific University)
 “Positive Peace in the Middle East”
- Fuat Gursozlu (State University of New York–Binghamton)
 “Strife, Violence, and Harm”

G4C Kierkegaard Society

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Topic: Kierkegaard, Subjectivity, and Love

- Chair: George Connell (Concordia College–Moorhead)
- Presenters: Michael Strawser (University of Central Florida)
 “Deliberating on Love and Sin”
- Mark Alznauer (Northwestern University)
 “Kierkegaard and Hegel on the Inner-Outer Problem”
- Brock Bahler (Duquesne University)
 “Kierkegaard’s ‘Greatness’: Human Subjectivity as an Ordinary Impossibility”
- Commentator: Shannon Nason (Loyola Marymount University)

G4D North American Kant Society, Session 1*6:00-9:00 p.m.***Topic: Tensions in Kant's Doctrine of the Highest Good**

Chair: Pablo Muchnik (Emerson College)

Speakers: Lara Denis (Agnes Scott College)

"If I Do What I Should, What May I Then Hope?
On Happiness and Kant's Highest Good"

Stephen Engstrom (University of Pittsburgh)

"The Complete Object of Practical Knowledge"

David Sussman (University of Illinois–Urbana-
Champaign)

"The Highest Good: One Thought Too Many?"

G4E North American Nietzsche Society*6:00-9:00 p.m.***Topic: Nietzsche and the Free Spirit**

Chair: R. Lanier Anderson (Stanford University)

Speakers: Keith Ansell-Pearson (Warwick University)

Peter Poellner (Warwick University)

Bernard Reginster (Brown University)

BUSINESS MEETING**G4F Society for Analytical Feminism, Session 2***6:00-9:00 p.m.***Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: Anita Superson, *The Moral Skeptic***

Chair: Sharon Crasnow (Norco College)

Author: Anita Superson (University of Kentucky)

Critics: Ann Cudd (University of Kansas)

Duncan MacIntosh (Dalhousie University)

James P. Sterba (University of Notre Dame)

G4G Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy*6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Chair: Mark Wheeler (San Diego State University)

Speakers: Blake Hestir (Texas Christian University)

"Aristotle on Truth, Facts, and Relations (*Cat, Int, Metaph Gamma*)"

Riin Sirkel (University of Alberta)

"Knowledge of Particulars in Aristotle"

Kirk R. Sanders (University of Illinois–Urbana-
Champaign)

"Not Every Apology Carries Equal Weight"

G4H Society for Empirical Ethics

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Topic: Folk Meta-Ethical Commitments—Are People Objectivists?

- Panelists: James Beebee (State University of New York–Buffalo)
 Shaun Nichols (University of Arizona)
 Hagop Sarkissian (City University of New York–Baruch College)
 Jen Cole Wright (College of Charleston)

G4I Society for Systematic Philosophy

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Topic: Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*

- Chair: J. M. Fritzman (Lewis & Clark College)
 Speakers: Richard Dien Winfield (University of Georgia)
 "Is a Phenomenology Necessary to Introduce Foundation-free Systematic Philosophy?"
 Robert Berman (Xavier University of Louisiana)
 "How to Understand the *Sittlichkeit*/Moralitaet Distinction in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*"
 William Maker (Clemson University)
 "Religion and Enlightenment in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*"

G4J Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 1

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Topic: Naturalized Epistemology and/as Historicism

- Chair: Mark Bevir (University of California–Berkeley)
 Speakers: Paul Roth (University of California–Santa Cruz)
 "Irrealism, Historicism, Naturalism"
 David K. Henderson (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)
 "Neurath's Boat Will Take You Where You Want to Go"
 John H. Zammito (Rice University)
 "The Last Dogma of Positivism and the Relation of Naturalism to Historicism"

GROUP SESSION G5 — 8:00-10:00 P.M.**G5A American Society for Aesthetics***8:00-10:00 p.m.***Topic: Environmental Aesthetics**

Chair: Christopher Williams (University of Nevada–Reno)

Speakers: Robert A. Stecker (Central Michigan University)

“Epistemic Norms, Moral Norms, and the Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature”

Stephen Davies (University of Auckland)

“Landscape Aesthetics and Evolutionary Psychology”

John Andrew Fisher (University of Colorado–Boulder)

“Reframing the Aesthetics of Nature”

G5B Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking*8:00-10:00 p.m.***Topic: Inside Arguments: Logic Versus Argumentation Theory**

Chair: Wanda Teays (Mount St. Mary’s College)

Speaker: Maurice Finocchiaro (University of Nevada–Las Vegas)

“Logical Theory, Argumentation Theory, and Meta-argumentation”

Remarks: Darin Dockstader (College of Southern Nevada)

“A Response to Maurice Finocchiaro”

Peter Tan (Mount St. Mary’s College)

“A Response to Maurice Finocchiaro and Darin Dockstader”

Commentator: Michael Scriven (Claremont Graduate University)

G5C International Society for Environmental Ethics, Session 1*8:00-10:00 p.m.***Topic: The Past, Environmental Damage, and the Future**

Chair: Geoffrey Frasz (College of Southern Nevada)

Presenter: John Nolt (University of Tennessee)

“Why Climate Ethics Must Be Non-anthropocentric”

Commentator: Chris Cuomo (University of Georgia)

Presenter: Derek Turner (Connecticut College)

“What Should Environmentalists Say About Recent Developments in Paleogenomics?”

Commentator: Andrew Askland (Arizona State University)

G5D Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy*8:00-10:00 p.m.***Topic: Am I an American Philosopher? Revisited**

Chair: Lara Trout (University of Portland)

Presenters: Tommy J. Curry (Texas A&M University)

Jose Jorge Mendoza (University of Oregon)

G5E Society for the Metaphysics of Science, Session 1*8:00-10:00 p.m.***Topic: Abstraction, Idealization, and Multiple Realization**

Chair: Thomas W. Polger (University of Cincinnati)

Speakers: Matthew Haug (College of William and Mary)

"Abstraction and Explanatory Relevance"

Colin Klein (University of Illinois–Chicago)

"Against Scientific Levels: The Problem of Within-Theory Abstraction"

Angela Potochnik (University of Cincinnati)

"Idealizing the Realizers"

FRIDAY EVENING, APRIL 22**GROUP SESSION G6 — 7:00-10:00 P.M.****G6A International Hobbes Association, Session 2***7:00-10:00 p.m.***Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: Bernard Gert, *Hobbes***

Moderator: Timo Airaksinen (University of Helsinki)

Critics: Jeremy Anderson (DePauw University)

John Deigh (University of Texas–Austin)

Al Martinich (University of Texas–Austin)

Larry May (Vanderbilt University)

Respondent: Bernard Gert (Dartmouth College and University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

G6B International Society for Chinese Philosophy, Session 2*7:00-10:00 p.m.***Topic: Confucian Ethics and Phenomenology of Mind**

Chair: Chung-Ying Cheng (University of Hawaii–Manoa)

Presenters: Chung-Ying Cheng (University of Hawaii–Manoa)

"Confucian Ethics in the Analects and Structure-Process of Mind-Nature"

Dagfinn Føllesdal (Stanford University)

“Inter-subjectivity of Humanity and Moral
Consciousness in Confucianism”

Sandra A. Wawrytko (San Diego State University)

“Sedimentation in Chinese Aesthetics: Confucian
and Buddhist Perspectives”

Franklin Perkins (DePaul University)

“Self-Cultivation and Human Nature in the Guodian
Texts”

G6C International Society for Environmental Ethics, Session 2

7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic: Interests Conflicts

Chair: Clare Palmer (Texas A&M University)

Presenter: Karen S. Emmerman (University of Washington)

“Beyond the Basic/Nonbasic Interest Distinction:
Inter-Species Conflicts of Interest and the
Problem of Overdemandingness”

Commentator: Mark Woods (University of San Diego)

Presenter: Shan Gao (University of North Texas)

“Can the West Save the East?”

Commentator: Jason Simus (University of North Texas)

Presenter: Darren Domsy (Texas A&M University–Galveston)

“Taking Down the Repugnant Conclusions”

Commentator: Avram Hiller (Portland State University)

G6D Karl Jaspers Society of North America, Session 2

7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic: The Axial Age: Renewal or New Axial Age?

Chair: Gregory Walters (Saint Paul University)

Presenter: Stephen Erickson (Pomona College)

“Is a Renewal of the Axial Age Possible?”

Commentator: Alan M. Olson (Boston University)

Presenters: Raymond Langley (Manhattanville College)

“Jaspers and James”

Rajesh C. Shukla (Saint Paul University)

“The Modern Tripartition, the Axial Age, and East-
West Philosophical Communication”

Commentator: Malek Khazaee (California State University–Long
Beach)

G6E North American Kant Society, Session 2*7:00-10:00 p.m.***Topic: Concepts, Principles, and Ideas in Kant's Philosophy**

Chair: Lawrence Pasternack (Oklahoma State University)

Speakers: Alexandra Newton (University of Pittsburgh)

"Concepts and Apperception: Kant's Account of the Logical Origin of Concepts"

Tal Glezer (Stanford University)

"Kant on Existence and the Impossibility of the Ontological Proof"

James Hebbeler (St. Joseph's University)

"The Principles of the First Critique"

G6F North American Spinoza Society, Session 2*7:00-10:00 p.m.*

Chair: Steve Barbone (San Diego State University)

Speaker: Sean Butler (Western Michigan University)

"Spinoza's Spiritual Prescription"

Commentator: Idit Dobbs-Weinstein (Vanderbilt University)

Speaker: Matt Wion (Marquette University)

"Spinoza and the Welfare State"

Commentator: Steve Barbone (San Diego State University)

Speaker: Paige McAdoo (Independent Scholar)

"Spinoza's Philosophy of Existential Joy: A Model for Good Diabetic Management"

Commentator: Ericka Tucker (California State Polytechnic University-Pomona)

G6G Radical Philosophy Association, Session 1*7:00-10:00 p.m.***Topic: Undocumented People: Political Philosophy at the Intersection of Race, Ethnicity, Class, and the Nation-State**

Chair: Naomi Zack (University of Oregon)

Speakers: José-Antonio Orosco (Oregon State University)

"Aliens and Neighbors: Jane Addams and the Reframing of 'Illegal' Immigration"

Grant Silva (Illinois Institute of Technology)

"Immigration, Democracy, and the Problem of Democratic Exclusion?"

Jose Jorge Mendoza (University of Oregon)

"The Braid of Non-Whiteness: White Supremacy and 'Illegal' Immigration"

Shelley Wilcox (San Francisco State University)
 “Three Approaches to Undocumented
 Immigration”

G6H Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy

7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic: Aspects of Selfhood in Comparative Philosophy

Chair: Henrique Schneider (Fernfachhochschule
 Schweiz)

Presenters: Shihong Du (Southwest University)
 “Can We Pretend to Pretend?”

Henrique Schneider (Fernfachhochschule
 Schweiz)

“Hanfeizi, Self-Cultivation, Practical Problems”

David Falgout (University of Hawaii–Manoa)

“Religious Experience as Ritualized Self-Creativity”

G6I Society for German Idealism, Session 2

7:00-10:00 p.m.

Chair: Aaron Bunch (Washington State University)

Presenter: Jason J. Howard (Viterbo University)
 “Emotional Life and Subjective Spirit”

Commentator: Oliva Blanchette (Boston College)

Presenter: Liesbet Vanhoute (Universiteit Antwerpen)

“Systematic Classification or a Teleology of
 Moralization? Why Teleological Judgment Is Not
 the (Only) Key to Kant’s Anthropology from a
 Pragmatic Point of View”

Commentator: Eric v. d. Luft (SUNY Upstate Medical University)

Presenter: Rocío Zambrana (University of Oregon)
 “Hegel’s Logic of Finitude”

Commentator: Martin Donougho (University of South Carolina)

G6J Society for Phenomenology and Analytic Philosophy

7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic: Intersubjectivity

Chair: Amie L. Thomasson (University of Miami)

Panelists: Christopher Lay (University of California–Irvine)

Kay Mathiesen (University of Arizona)

Ronald McIntyre (California State University–
 Northridge)

David Woodruff Smith (University of California–
 Irvine)

G6K Society for Realist/Antirealist Discussion*7:00-10:00 p.m.***Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: Gary Ebbs, *Truth and Words***

Author: Gary Ebbs (Indiana University–Bloomington)

Critics: Michael Glanzberg (University of California–Davis)
Henry Jackman (York University)**G6L Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Graduate Student Section***7:00-10:00 p.m.***Topic: Approaches to Social and Ethical Issues in American Philosophy**

Chair: Jessica Soester (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)

Speakers: Benjamin Craig (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)

“Dewey’s Aesthetics as Cultivating Community”

Danielle Lake (Michigan State University)

“Rational Democratic Deliberation: A Deweyian Critique of Our Healthcare Crisis”

Tom Doyle (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)

“Thoreau’s Contribution to Moral Philosophy”

Commentator: Erick Ramirez (University of California–San Diego)

G6M Society for the Metaphysics of Science, Session 2*7:00-10:00 p.m.***Topic: How Is the Metaphysics of Science Possible? If It Is Possible?**

Speakers: Paul Humphreys (University of Virginia)

“Analytic and Scientific Metaphysics”

Andrew Melnyk (University of Missouri)

“Can There Be a Naturalistic Metaphysics?”

Anjan Chakravartty (University of Toronto)

“Ontological Relativity as Indispensible Metaphysics of Science”

Alyssa Ney (University of Rochester)

“What Should a Scientifically-Informed Metaphysics Be?”

G6N Society for the Study of Process Philosophies*7:00-10:00 p.m.***Topic: Philosophy of Biology**

Chair: Steve Hulbert (Claremont Graduate University)

Speakers: Olav Bryant Smith (Butte College)

"An Evolution in Communication"

Adam Scarfe (University of Winnipeg)

"Guardians of Our Genes: Epigenetics and Ethics
in Process Philosophical Perspective"

John Quiring (Victor Valley College)

"Mapping the Reduction-Emergence, Origins-of-
Life, and Units-of-Selection Debates"

Frederic Tremblay (University at Buffalo)

"Nicolai Hartmann's Influence on the Development
of Phylogenetic Systematics"**G6O Society for Women in Philosophy, Session 1***7:00-10:00 p.m.***Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: Gayle Salamon, *Assuming a Body***

Chair: Mary Krizan (California State University–Fullerton)

Author: Gayle Salamon (Princeton University)

Critics: Ann Murphy (Fordham University)

Dean Spade (Seattle University)

Gail Weiss (George Washington University)

SATURDAY EVENING, APRIL 23**GROUP SESSION G7 — 6:00-8:00 P.M.****G7A Ayn Rand Society***6:00-8:00 p.m.***Topic: Rand and Punishment**

Chair: Allan Gotthelf (University of Pittsburgh)

Speakers: David Boonin (University of Colorado–Boulder)

Irfan Khawaja (Felician College)

G7B North American Society for Social Philosophy, Session 2*6:00-8:00 p.m.***Topic: Identity, Human Rights, and the Law**

Chair: Cindy Holder (University of Victoria)

- Presenters: Alison Dundes Renteln (University of Southern California)
 “Human Rights and Cultural Difference”
 Lori Watson (University of San Diego)
 “Identity and the Law”
 Avigail Eisenberg (University of Victoria)
 “Reasons of Identity”

G7C Radical Philosophy Association, Session 2

6:00-8:00 p.m.

Topic: Philosophy of Disaster: The Ethics, Politics, and Economics of Natural and Human-Made Disasters

- Chair: Jose Jorge Mendoza (University of Oregon)
 Speakers: Fernando Zapata (State University of New York–Binghamton)
 “‘Fair and Balanced’ Bigotry: Hurricane Katrina and Haiti’s Earthquake in the News”
 Eddy Souffrant (University of North Carolina–Charlotte)
 “Disaster Ethics and the Problem of Chronic Need”
 Naomi Zack (University of Oregon)
 “Ethics for Disaster”

G7D Society for Skeptical Studies

6:00-8:00 p.m.

- Chair: Sven Bernecker (University of California–Irvine)
 Presenters: Renata Zieminska (Uniwersytet Szczecinski)
 “Inconsistency of Pyrrhonian Skepticism”
 Heather Battaly (California State University–Fullerton)
 “Sosa’s Reflective Knowledge: How Damaging Is Epistemic Circularity?”

G7E Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy, Session 1

6:00-8:00 p.m.

Topic: The Carnap/Quine Debate and Its Contemporary Relevance to Metaontology

- Chair: Paul Livingston (University of New Mexico)
 Speakers: Amie L. Thomasson (University of Miami)
 “Carnap and the Prospects for Easy Ontology”
 Richard Creath (Arizona State University)
 “Carnap’s Ontological Caution”

GROUP SESSION G8 — 6:00-9:00 P.M.**G8A American Association of Philosophy Teachers***6:00-9:00 p.m.***Topic: Teaching the Philosophy of Happiness**

Chair: Nils Rauhut (Coastal Carolina University)

Speakers: Christina Hendricks (University of British Columbia)

Jennifer Wilson Mulnix (University of Massachusetts–Dartmouth)

“Does Teaching the Philosophy of Happiness Make One’s Students Happier?”

Ami Harbin (Dalhousie University)

“Teaching Critical Perspectives on Happiness: Political Emotions and Marginalization”

Lucas Fain (Harvard University)

“Teaching Happiness in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis”

Andrew Terjesen (Rhodes College)

“Using the Natural and Social Sciences to Teach the Philosophy of Happiness”

G8B Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 2*6:00-9:00 p.m.***Topic: Issues in Chinese Philosophy**

Chair: JeeLoo Liu (California State University–Fullerton)

Speaker: Weimin Sun (California State University–Northridge)

“Zhu Xi on Gewu”

Commentator: JeeLoo Liu (California State University–Fullerton)

Speaker: Shan Gao (University of North Texas)

“The Beauty of Nature: China and the West”

Commentator: Robin Wang (Loyola Marymount University)

Speaker: Bongrae Seok (Alvernia University)

“Does Mencius Care? The Heart of Compassion and Care”

Commentator: Steven Geisz (University of Tampa)

Speaker: Daniel Coyle (Birmingham–Southern College and Our Lady of the Lake University)

“A Praxeological Reading of Yinyang Thinking”

Commentator: Robin Wang (Loyola Marymount University)

G8C Experimental Philosophy Society*6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Chair: Maria Baghramian (University College, Dublin)

Speakers: Mark Alfano (City University of New York–Graduate Center)

“An Empirical Investigation of Social Distance Heuristics”

Tania Lombrozo (University of California–Berkeley)

“Evidence for Two Concepts of Causation”

William Brady (Georgia State University)

Felipe De Brigard (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

“Responsibility and the Principle of Alternative Future Possibilities”

Gunnar Björnsson (Linköpings Universitet)

“The Explanation Explanation of Knobe Effects”

Joshua Alexander (Siena College)

Jonathan M. Weinberg (Indiana University–Bloomington)

“Thin Versus Substantial Conceptions of Intuition: You Can Run but You Cannot Hide”

David Danks (Carnegie Mellon University)

Edouard Machery (University of Pittsburgh)

David Rose (Carnegie Mellon University)

“When Is a Raven (Reason) Like a Writing Desk (A Causal Explanation)?”

G8D International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy, Session 2*6:00-9:00 p.m.***Topic: Prospects for Confucian Political Philosophy**

Chair: Alexis McLeod (University of Dayton)

Speakers: Justin Mok (University of Toronto)

“Exploring the Political Vision with Chinese Characteristics: The Establishment of the Justification of Rule”

Chengyi (Andrew) Peng (City University of Hong Kong)

“Traditional Confucian Constitutionalism: Current Explorations and the Prospects of Success”

Eirik Harris (Yonsei University)

“Xunzi and Han Fei on Constraining the Ruler”

Commentators: Alexis McLeod (University of Dayton)
Henrique Schneider (Fernfachhochschule
Schweiz)

G8E Philosophy of Time Society

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Chair: L. Nathan Oaklander (University of Michigan–Flint)
Speaker: Thomas Sattig (Washington University in St. Louis)
“Ordinary Objects in the Relativistic World”
Commentator: Cody Gilmore (University of California–Davis)
Speaker: Bradley Monton (University of Colorado–Boulder)
“Time Travel and the Flow of Time”
Commentator: Thomas M. Crisp (Biola University)
Speakers: Craig Callender (University of California–San
Diego)
Christopher Suhler (University of California–San
Diego)
“Explaining the Temporal Value Asymmetry”
Commentator: Michael Tooley (University of Colorado–Boulder)

G8F Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 2

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Topic: Naturalized Epistemology and/as Historicism

Chair: Mark Bevir (University of California–Berkeley)
Speakers: Nina Hagel (University of California–Berkeley)
“After Virtue and the Attempt at Generating a
Historicist Ethics”
Herman Paul (Universiteit Leiden)
“How Do We Know the Past? A Historicist Model of
Intellectual Virtue”
Guy Axtell (Radford University)
“The Dialectics of Objectivity”

G8G Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Topic: Other Objects: Critical, Queer, and Trans Encounters with Sexual Objectification and Contracts

Chair: Patricia Marino (University of Waterloo)
Speakers: Talia Bettcher (California State University–Los
Angeles)
“‘The Other Woman’: Transgender Women,
Objectification, and Sexual Abuse”
Kory Schaff (Occidental College)
“Political Liberalism and Other Sexual Contracts”

Ann J. Cahill (Elon University)

“The Difference Sameness Makes: Objectification,
Sex Work, and Queerness”

G8H Society for the Study of Philosophy and the Martial Arts

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Topic: Teaching Philosophy and the Martial Arts

Chair: Joseph J. Lynch (California Polytechnic State
University)

Speakers: Johnathan Flowers (Southern Illinois University–
Carbondale)

“Martial Arts and Ethical Responsibility”

Rebekka Hufendiek (Humboldt-Universität Berlin)

“Martial Practice and Philosophical Reflection”

Michael J. Monahan (Marquette University)

“Mind, Body, Identity, and the Practice of the
Martial Arts: Teaching Martial Arts in a Philosophy
Seminar”

Matthew Pike (University of Colorado–Boulder)

“The Epistemology of the Neuro-Warrior”

Clancy Smith (Duquesne University)

“The Fusion of Mind and Matter: Pragmatic
Adaptation and the Martial Arts”

Commentator: Joseph J. Lynch (California Polytechnic State
University)

G8I Society for Women in Philosophy, Session 2

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Topic: Authors-Meet-Critics: Lupe Davidson, Kathryn Gines, and Donna-Dale Marcano, *Convergences: Black Feminism and Continental Philosophy*

Chair: Emily S. Lee (California State University–Fullerton)

Discussants: Kathryn T. Gines (Pennsylvania State University)

Donna-Dale L. Marcano (Trinity College
Connecticut)

Diane Perpich (Clemson University)

Camisha Russell (Pennsylvania State University)

G8J Molinari Society

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: Gary Chartier, *Economic Justice and Natural Law*

Chair: Roderick T. Long (Auburn University)

- Critics: Jennifer Baker (College of Charleston)
 Kevin A. Carson (Center for a Stateless Society)
 Douglas Den Uyl (Liberty Fund)
 David Gordon (Ludwig von Mises Institute)
 Douglas B. Rasmussen (St. John's University)
- Author: Gary Chartier (La Sierra University)

GROUP SESSION G9 — 8:00-10:00 P.M.

G9A David Kellogg Lewis Society

8:00-10:00 p.m.

- Chair: Richard Hanley (University of Delaware)
- Speakers: Joshua Spencer (Syracuse University)
 "Alien Properties and Rigidified Roles"
 David Chalmers (Australian National University)
 "Lewis's Aufbau"

G9B Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy

8:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: Raja Halwani, *The Philosophy of Love, Sex, and Marriage*

- Author: Raja Halwani (School of the Art Institute of Chicago)
- Commentators: John Corvino (Wayne State University)
 Carol Quinn (Metropolitan State College of Denver)
 Andy Wible (Muskegon Community College)

G9C Society for Natural Religion, Session 3

8:00-10:00 p.m.

- Speakers: Horance Fairlamb (University of Houston–Victoria)
 "How Garrigou-Lagrange Naturalizes Grace"
 Matt Nolen (Arizona State University)
 "The Possibility for Natural Religion Within a Critical Pedagogy"
 Greg Goodrich (Arizona State University)
 "The Role of Natural Theology in Substance Dualism"

G9D Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy, Session 2

8:00-10:00 p.m.

- Topic: The Carnap/Quine Debate and Its Contemporary Relevance to Metaontology**
- Chair: Sandra Lapointe (Kansas State University)

- Speakers: Greg Lavers (Concordia University)
“On the Quinean-analyticity of Mathematical Propositions”
- Luke Thompson (Monash University)
“Why Carnap Needs a Rationalist Psychology to Support His Deflationism”

MAIN, GROUP, AND MINICONFERENCE PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS

(Group sessions begin with a “G” and miniconferences with an “M.” All others are main sessions.)

A

Aas, Sean (Brown University)	4F Thu PM
Abizadeh, Arash (McGill University)	6M Fri AM
Adams, David M. (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)	3A Thu AM
Adams, Joseph Q. (Rice University)	10F Sat PM
Agosta, Lou (Independent Scholar).....	G2E Wed PM
Aijaz, Imran (University of Michigan–Dearborn)	1C Wed PM
Ainslie, Donald (University of Toronto)	3G Thu AM
Airaksinen, Timo (University of Helsinki).....	G6A Fri PM
Akeret, Julie (Twentycentsleft Productions)	MII Wed PM
Albrecht, Ingrid V. (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)	6E Fri AM
Alexander, J. McKenzie (London School of Economics)	1A Wed PM
Alexander, Joshua (Siena College)	G8C Sat PM
Alexander, Larry (University of San Diego).....	1I Wed PM
Alfano, Mark (City University of New York–Graduate Center)	1F Wed PM, G8C Sat PM
Allen, Michael (East Tennessee State University)	G2J Wed PM
Allhoff, Fritz (Western Michigan University)	7M Fri PM
Allison, Henry E. (University of California–San Diego and Boston University)	7J Fri PM
Allori, Valia (Northern Illinois University)	11J Sat PM
Almeida, Michael J. (University of Texas–San Antonio)	5J Thu PM
Alshire, Zoe (Washington State University).....	6K Fri AM
Alznauer, Mark (Northwestern University).....	G4C Thu PM
Amini, Majid (Virginia State University).....	9K Sat AM
Anagnostopoulos, Georgios (University of California–San Diego)	1G Wed PM
Anders, John (University of Nevada–Las Vegas).....	11F Sat PM
Anderson, Douglas (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)	G1A Wed PM
Anderson, Jeremy (DePauw University)	G6A Fri PM, 9H Sat AM

Anderson, Luvell (Rutgers University)	6C Fri AM
Anderson, R. Lanier (Stanford University)	G4E Thu PM
Ansell-Pearson, Keith (Warwick University)	G4E Thu PM
Appelbaum, Seth (Tulane University of New Orleans).....	G2I Wed PM
Arico, Adam (University of Arizona)	11G Sat PM
Armendt, Brad (Arizona State University)	1H Wed PM
Armour-Garb, Brad (State University of New York–Albany).....	10E Sat PM
Askland, Andrew (Arizona State University).....	G5C Thu PM
Astourian, Ara (University of Southern California).....	10H Sat PM
Atkins, Philip (University of California–Santa Barbara)	10E Sat PM
Audi, Paul R. (University of Nebraska–Omaha).....	9K Sat AM
Audi, Robert (University of Notre Dame)	MI-2 Wed PM
Austin, Emily A. (Wake Forest University)	10H Sat PM
Auvray, Malika (Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique)	
.....	10D Sat PM
Avila, Mitch (California State University–Fullerton).....	11C Sat PM
Avnur, Yuval (Scripps College).....	4I Thu PM
Axtell, Guy (Radford University).....	9G Sat AM, G8F Sat PM

B

Baber, H. E. (University of San Diego)	10E Sat PM
Bach, Theodore (University of Connecticut)	4I Thu PM
Badger, Jonathan (St. John's College).....	G2I Wed PM
Badhwar, Neera (University of Oklahoma and George Mason University)	
.....	11F Sat PM
Baghramian, Maria (University College, Dublin)....	5L Thu PM, G8C Sat PM
Bagnoli, Carla (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)	1B Wed PM
Bahler, Brock (Duquesne University)	G4C Thu PM
Baia, Alex (University of Texas–Austin)	1J Wed PM
Bailar, John (University of Idaho).....	7C Fri PM
Bailey, Andrew M. (University of Notre Dame).....	10E Sat PM
Baillie, James (University of Portland).....	G2A Wed PM
Baker, Jennifer (College of Charleston)	G8J Sat PM
Balaguer, Mark (California State University–Los Angeles).....	7B Fri PM
Ballarin, Roberta (University of British Columbia).....	7D Fri PM
Bandyopadhyay, Prasanta (Montana State University)	G2J Wed PM
Banerjee, Amrita (University of Oregon).....	1I Wed PM
Bar-On, Dorit (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill).....	9I Sat AM
Barbone, Steve (San Diego State University)	
.....	G2F Wed PM, G6F Fri PM, 9H Sat AM
Barnes, Eric (Southern Methodist University).....	4I Thu PM
Barnett, David (University of Colorado–Boulder).....	6H Fri AM

Barrett, Jeffrey (University of California–Irvine)	1A Wed PM
Barry, Peter Brian (Saginaw Valley State University).....	3J Thu AM
Bartlett, Gary (Central Washington University)	9K Sat AM
Battaly, Heather (California State University–Fullerton)	
.....	7E Fri PM, G7D Sat PM
Batterman, Robert (University of Pittsburgh)	9E Sat AM
Bayer, Benjamin (Loyola University–New Orleans)	9L Sat AM
Beck, Jacob (Texas Tech University)	5K Thu PM
Beebee, James (State University of New York–Buffalo).....	G4H Thu PM
Beggs, Svetlana (University of California–Riverside)	3J Thu AM
Beisecker, Dave (University of Nevada–Las Vegas).....	6G Fri AM
Belu, Dana (California State University–Dominguez Hills).....	5G Thu PM
Berg, Steven (Bellarmine University)	G2I Wed PM
Berkey, Brian (University of California–Berkeley).....	6K Fri AM
Berman, Robert (Xavier University of Louisiana)	G4I Thu PM
Bernecker, Sven (University of California–Irvine)	G7D Sat PM
Bernstein, Sara (Duke University)	4G Thu PM
Bertman, Martin (Hobbes Studies)	G2C Wed PM
Bertolet, Rod (Purdue University)	5K Thu PM
Bettcher, Talia (California State University–Los Angeles)	G8G Sat PM
Betz, Joseph (Villanova University).....	G3C Thu PM
Bevir, Mark (University of California–Berkeley)....	G4J Thu PM, G8F Sat PM
Bezzubova, Elena (University of California–Irvine).....	G2E Wed PM
Biggerstaff, Brandon (University of California–Davis).....	1J Wed PM
Bird, Jon (Open University)	10D Sat PM
Birondo, Noell (Augustana College)	11F Sat PM
Bishop, John (University of Auckland)	1C Wed PM
Björnsson, Gunnar (Linköpings Universitet)	3J Thu AM, G8C Sat PM
Black, Tim (California State University–Northridge)	9A Sat AM
Blackman, Reid (Colgate University).....	7K Fri PM
Blackmon, James (San Francisco State University).....	9K Sat AM
Blackwell, Brian (University of Southern California)	9J Sat AM
Blake, Michael (University of Washington)	6M Fri AM
Blanchette, Oliva (Boston College).....	G6I Fri PM
Blankmeyer Burke, Teresa (Gallaudet University).....	5M Thu PM
Bloch-Schulman, Stephen (Elon University)	4K Thu PM
Block, Ned (New York University).....	4A Thu PM
Blom, Andrew (Central Michigan University)	1G Wed PM
Blome-Tillmann, Michael (McGill University).....	2E Wed PM
Bobro, Marc (Santa Barbara City College)	10L Sat PM
Boersema, David (Pacific University)	5L Thu PM, G4B Thu PM

Boghossian, Paul (New York University)	11A Sat PM
Bolton, Robert (Rutgers University)	4D Thu PM
Boonin, David (University of Colorado–Boulder).....	G7A Sat PM
Booth, Chelsey (University of Manitoba).....	2E Wed PM
Boxill, Bernard (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill).....	6A Fri AM
Bracken, William (University of California–Riverside)	5G Thu PM
Bradner, Alexandra (Denison University).....	9L Sat AM
Brady, William (Georgia State University).....	G8C Sat PM
Bragagnolo, Celina (State University of New York–Stony Brook)	G3C Thu PM
Brakas, Jurgis (George) (Marist College)	7I Fri PM
Brand, Peg (Indiana University-Purdue University–Indianapolis)	11C Sat PM
Brandt, Reanne (San Diego State University)	G2D Wed PM
Bratman, Michael E. (Stanford University).....	3A Thu AM
Braun, S. Stewart (University of Virginia)	2F Wed PM
Brennan, Samantha (University of Western Ontario).....	5M Thu PM
Bridges, Jason M. (University of Chicago).....	8C Fri PM
Brighthouse, Carolyn (Occidental College)	1K Wed PM
Brighthouse, Harry (University of Wisconsin–Madison).....	11B Sat PM
Brink, David (University of California–San Diego).....	3A Thu AM
Briscoe, Robert (Ohio University)	5K Thu PM
Brister, Evelyn (Rochester Institute of Technology)	G1B Wed PM
Broackes, Justin (Brown University).....	3C Thu AM
Brogaard, Brit (University of Missouri–St. Louis).....	9I Sat AM
Bronstein, David (Boston University).....	4D Thu PM
Broome, John (Oxford University)	11A Sat PM
Brown, Derek (Brandon University)	9I Sat AM
Brown, Matthew J. (University of Texas–Dallas)	9G Sat AM
Brown, Stephen (Briar Cliff University)	6K Fri AM
Brownstein, Michael S. (New Jersey Institute of Technology).....	1K Wed PM
Bruce, James (John Brown University).....	G3D Thu PM
Bruckner, Anthony (University of California–Santa Barbara) ...	3F Thu AM
Brunero, John (University of Missouri–St. Louis)	1J Wed PM
Brunson, Nicole (Washington State University)	6I Fri AM
Buchak, Lara (University of California–Berkeley).....	8D Fri PM
Buckareff, Andrei (Marist College).....	1C Wed PM
Buckner, Cameron (Indiana University–Bloomington)	5K Thu PM
Buckner, Clark (San Francisco Art Institute).....	G1E Wed PM
Buckwalter, Wesley (City University of New York)	MI-1 Wed AM
Budolfson, Mark (Princeton University)	4F Thu PM

Bunch, Aaron (Washington State University)	G6I Fri PM
Bundy, Alex (University of California–Santa Barbara)	2E Wed PM
Burge, Tyler (University of California–Los Angeles).....	10A Sat PM
Burger, Ronna (Tulane University of New Orleans).....	G2I Wed PM
Burroughs, Michael (University of Memphis)	MII-2A Wed AM
Butler, Sean (Western Michigan University)	G6F Fri PM
Butler, Travis (Iowa State University).....	3B Thu AM
Byerly, Ryan (Baylor University)	6F Fri AM
Byrne, Alex (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)	4A Thu PM

C

Cahill, Ann J. (Elon University)	4K Thu PM, G8G Sat PM
Callard, Agnes (University of Chicago).....	7C Fri PM
Callender, Craig (University of California–San Diego)	G8E Sat PM
Cameron, Margaret (University of Victoria)	6G Fri AM
Campbell, Joseph Keim (Washington State University).....	7B Fri PM
Campbell, Richmond (Dalhousie University).....	8H Fri PM
Cannon, Loren (Humboldt State University)	7N Fri PM
Caouette, Justin (Washington State University)	10F Sat PM
Caplan, Ben (Ohio State University)	6G Fri AM
Capone, Jr., Stephen (University of Utah)	6K Fri AM
Carastathis, Anna (California State University–Los Angeles).....	10K Sat PM
Carey, Brandon (University of Rochester).....	4G Thu PM
Carlson, Erik (Uppsala Universitet).....	4F Thu PM
Carreras, Anthony (Rice University)	8G Fri PM
Carriero, John (University of California–Los Angeles).....	4C Thu PM
Carson, Kevin A. (Center for a Stateless Society)	G8J Sat PM
Cartwright, Nancy (London School of Economics and University of California–San Diego).....	3E Thu AM
Caton, Jacob (University of Arizona)	6F Fri AM
Cavallero, Eric (Southern Connecticut State University).....	6M Fri AM
Cervantez, Jeff (University of Tennessee).....	10F Sat PM
Chakrabarti, Kisor (Davis and Elkins College).....	G2J Wed PM
Chakravarty, Anjan (University of Toronto).....	2I Wed PM, G6M Fri PM
Chalmers, David (Australian National University).....	G9A Sat PM
Chan, Alan K. L. (Nanyang Technological University)	9B Sat AM
Chartier, Gary (La Sierra University).....	G8J Sat PM
Cheng, Chung-Ying (University of Hawaii–Manoa)	G2D Wed PM, G6B Fri PM
Cheng, Tony (City University of New York–Graduate Center)	7L Fri PM
Cheng-Guajardo, Luis (Stanford University)	10F Sat PM
Choi, Sean (Allan Hancock College)	4G Thu PM

Cholbi, Michael (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)	10H Sat PM
Chuang, Christina (University of California–Irvine)	5A Thu PM
Chudnoff, Elijah (University of Miami)	6H Fri AM
Church, Jennifer (Vassar College)	1E Wed PM
Chwang, Eric L. (University of Colorado–Boulder)	11E Sat PM
Ciccariello-Maher, George (Drexel University)	9M Sat AM
Cicovacki, Predrag (College of the Holy Cross)	G4A Thu PM
Clark, Maudemarie (Colgate University and University of California–Riverside)	2G Wed PM
Clarke, Roger (University of British Columbia)	1K Wed PM
Clayton, Matthew (Warwick University)	11B Sat PM
Cleary, John (Montclair State University)	MII-2A Wed AM
Clifton, Scott (University of Washington)	6J Fri AM
Coates, Justin (University of California–Riverside)	10G Sat PM
Cohen, Jonathan (University of California–San Diego)	3C Thu AM
Cohen, Joshua (Stanford University)	10B Sat PM
Cohen, Stewart (University of Arizona)	MI-2 Wed PM, 5C Thu PM
Comay, Rebecca (University of Toronto)	G2H Wed PM
Conee, Earl (University of Rochester)	6F Fri AM
Connell, George (Concordia College–Moorhead)	G4C Thu PM
Connolly, Kevin (University of Toronto)	4H Thu PM
Considine, Daniel (Metropolitan State College of Denver)	11F Sat PM
Constantinescu, Cristian (University of Cambridge)	4F Thu PM
Copenhaver, Rebecca (Lewis & Clark College)	7G Fri PM
Coplan, Amy (California State University–Fullerton)	3G Thu AM
Corkum, Philip (University of Alberta)	7I Fri PM
Corlett, J. Angelo (San Diego State University)	6A Fri AM
Corvino, John (Wayne State University)	G9B Sat PM
Cottrell, Jonathan (New York University)	3G Thu AM
Coyle, Daniel (Birmingham–Southern College and Our Lady of the Lake University)	G8B Sat PM
Crabill, Joshua (University of Southern California)	7K Fri PM
Craig, Benjamin (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)	G6L Fri PM
Craig, Lindsay (University of Oklahoma)	5L Thu PM
Crasnow, Sharon (Norco College)	3D Thu AM, G4F Thu PM
Creath, Richard (Arizona State University)	G7E Sat PM
Crippen, James (California State University–Fullerton)	6D Fri AM
Crisp, Thomas M. (Biola University)	G1D Wed PM, G8E Sat PM
Crockett, Damon (University of California–San Diego)	4H Thu PM
Cross, Troy (Reed College)	6H Fri AM

Crouch, Margaret (Eastern Michigan University)	9F Sat AM
Cruz, Joseph Hernandez (Williams College)	10C Sat PM
Csikszentmihalyi, Mark (University of California–Berkeley)	9B Sat AM
Cudd, Ann (University of Kansas)	G4F Thu PM, 10K Sat PM
Cullyer, Helen (Andrew W. Mellon Foundation)	7H Fri PM
Cuomo, Chris (University of Georgia)	G5C Thu PM, 7N Fri PM
Curry, Tommy J. (Texas A&M University)	G5D Thu PM
Cushman, Edward (Lewis & Clark College)	5F Thu PM
Cutrofello, Andrew (Loyola University Chicago)	G2H Wed PM

D

D’Cruz, Jason (State University of New York–Albany)	3H Thu AM
Dadlez, Eva (University of Central Oklahoma)	3H Thu AM
Dallmann, Justin (University of Southern California)	3F Thu AM
Daly, Helen (University of Arizona)	3F Thu AM
Dancy, Jonathan (University of Texas–Austin and University of Reading)	8C Fri PM
Danks, David (Carnegie Mellon University)	G8C Sat PM
Darwall, Stephen (Yale University)	11D Sat PM
Dasgupta, Shamik (Princeton University)	9D Sat AM
Daskal, Steven J. (Northern Illinois University)	10I Sat PM
Daukas, Nancy (Guilford College)	9G Sat AM
Davidson, Matthew (California State University–San Bernardino)	6E Fri AM
Davies, Stephen (University of Auckland)	G5A Thu PM
Davis, Jessica (San Diego State University)	7I Fri PM
De Brigard, Felipe (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	G8C Sat PM
De Clark, Kory (University of Southern California)	MII-2B Wed AM
de Melo-Martin, Inmaculada (Cornell University)	3D Thu AM
Den Uyl, Douglas (Liberty Fund)	G8J Sat PM
De Rosa, Raffaella (Rutgers University–Newark)	2A Wed PM
De Sousa, Ronald (University of Toronto)	7C Fri PM
Dea, Shannon (University of Waterloo)	1I Wed PM, 5M Thu PM
Dean, Richard (California State University–Los Angeles)	11K Sat PM
Deery, Oisín (University of British Columbia)	11E Sat PM
Deigh, John (University of Texas–Austin)	G6A Fri PM
Demetriou, Dan (University of Minnesota–Morris)	8H Fri PM
DeMoss, David (Pacific University)	6I Fri AM
Denike, Margaret (Dalhousie University)	7N Fri PM
Denis, Lara (Agnes Scott College)	G4D Thu PM
deRosset, Louis H. (University of Vermont)	4I Thu PM
Devereux, Daniel (University of Virginia)	3B Thu AM

Devlin, William (Bridgewater State University)	9L Sat AM
Diaz-Leon, Esa (University of Manitoba)	7L Fri PM
Diaz-Waian, Marisa (San Diego State University)	10H Sat PM
Dillon, Robin S. (Lehigh University)	G1B Wed PM
Dobbs-Weinstein, Idit (Vanderbilt University)	G2F Wed PM, G6F Fri PM
Dockstader, Darin (College of Southern Nevada)	G5B Thu PM
Domski, Mary (University of New Mexico)	8A Fri PM
Domsky, Darren (Texas A&M University–Galveston)	G6C Fri PM
Donougho, Martin (University of South Carolina)	G6I Fri PM
Doppelt, Gerald (University of California–San Diego)	9L Sat AM
Dorsey, Dale (University of Kansas)	10I Sat PM
Dorsey, Jonathan (University of California–Davis)	9K Sat AM
Dougherty, Thomas (Stanford University)	1I Wed PM
Dougherty, Trent (Baylor University)	6E Fri AM
Downes, Steve (University of Utah)	1A Wed PM
Downing, Lisa (Ohio State University)	8A Fri PM
Doyle, Tom (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)	G6L Fri PM
Dretske, Fred (Duke University)	4A Thu PM
Du, Shihong (Southwest University)	G6H Fri PM
Dupre, John (University of Exeter)	3D Thu AM
Dussel, Enrique (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México)	9M Sat AM, 10J Sat PM

E

Easton, Patricia (Claremont Graduate University)	10L Sat PM
Easwaran, Kenneth (University of Southern California)	11J Sat PM
Eaton, Anne (University of Illinois–Chicago)	11C Sat PM
Ebbs, Gary (Indiana University–Bloomington)	G6K Fri PM, 9A Sat AM
Egan, Andy (Rutgers University)	3C Thu AM
Eisenberg, Avigail (University of Victoria)	G7B Sat PM
Eldridge, Richard (Swarthmore College)	7F Fri PM
Emmerman, Karen S. (University of Washington)	G6C Fri PM
Engelen, Eva-Maria (Universität Konstanz)	7E Fri PM
Englehardt, Elaine E. (Utah Valley University)	MII-1A Wed AM
Engstrom, Stephen (University of Pittsburgh)	1B Wed PM, G4D Thu PM
Erickson, Stephen (Pomona College)	G6D Fri PM
Essl, Brigitte (Private Practice)	G2E Wed PM
Evans, Stephen (Baylor University)	G3D Thu PM
Ezra, Ovadia (Tel Aviv University)	G4B Thu PM

F

Fagan, Melinda (Rice University)	7M Fri PM
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Fain, Lucas (Harvard University)	G8A Sat PM
Fairlamb, Horance (University of Houston–Victoria)	G9C Sat PM
Fairweather, Abrol (University of San Francisco)	4E Thu PM
Falcon, Andrea (Concordia University)	4D Thu PM
Falgout, David (University of Hawaii–Manoa)	G6H Fri PM
Fallis, Don (University of Arizona)	5H Thu PM
Falvey, Kevin (University of California–Santa Barbara)	2H Wed PM
Farennikova, Anya (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	3I Thu AM
Feld, Alina N. (Hofstra University)	G2E Wed PM
Ferejohn, Michael (Duke University)	7I Fri PM
Ferrero, Luca (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)	10F Sat PM
Ferrin, Asia (University of Washington)	6E Fri AM
Fiala, Andrew (California State University–Fresno)	G4B Thu PM
Figdor, Carrie (University of Iowa)	4E Thu PM
Fike, Larry (Independent Scholar)	6I Fri AM
Finocchiaro, Maurice (University of Nevada–Las Vegas)	G5B Thu PM
Fischer, John Martin (University of California–Riverside)	4C Thu PM
Fish, Bill (Massey University)	9I Sat AM
Fisher, Robert (Brunel University)	MII-6 Thurs AM, 4L Thu PM
Fisher, John Andrew (University of Colorado–Boulder)	G5A Thu PM
Fletcher, Natalie (University of Ottawa)	MII-1B Wed AM
Flowers, Johnathan (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)	G8H Sat PM
Folescu, Marina (University of Southern California)	6J Fri AM
Forbes, Kathryn (California State University–Fresno)	9F Sat AM
Ford, Jason (University of Minnesota–Duluth)	7L Fri PM
Fox, Richard N. (Interior Designers Institute)	G3E Thu PM
Francis, Leslie Pickering (University of Utah)	3K Thu AM, 6L Fri AM
Franklin, Christopher Evan (Biola University)	2D Wed PM
Frasz, Geoffrey (College of Southern Nevada)	G5C Thu PM
Frazer, Michael (Harvard University)	6B Fri AM
Friedman, Jane (Oxford University)	4E Thu PM
Friedman, Marilyn (Vanderbilt University and Charles Sturt University)	G1B Wed PM
Friedman, Michael (Stanford University)	9E Sat AM
Fritzman, J. M. (Lewis & Clark College)	G2H Wed PM, G4I Thu PM, 6J Fri AM
Frodeman, Robert (University of North Texas)	4K Thu PM
Fuller, Tim (Ohio State University)	7L Fri PM
Furrow, Dwight (San Diego Mesa College)	11E Sat PM
Føllesdal, Dagfinn (Stanford University)	G6B Fri PM

G

Gao, Shan (University of North Texas).....	G6C Fri PM, G8B Sat PM
Gardiner, Stephen M. (University of Washington).....	7A Fri PM
Gardner, Susan (Capilano University)	MII-2B Wed AM
Garry, Ann (California State University–Los Angeles)	II Wed PM
Garthoff, Jon (Northwestern University)	11D Sat PM
Gartner, Corinne (Princeton University).....	1F Wed PM
Gatzia, Dimitria (University of Akron).....	9K Sat AM
Gauthier, Jeff (University of Portland).....	G3C Thu PM
Geisz, Steven (University of Tampa).....	G4A Thu PM, G8B Sat PM
Gelinas, Luke (University of Toronto).....	6K Fri AM
Genone, James (Stanford University).....	3I Thu AM
Georgalis, Nicholas (East Carolina University)	6G Fri AM
Georgi, Geoff (University of Southern California)	1J Wed PM
Gert, Bernard (Dartmouth College and University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill).....	G6A Fri PM
Gibson, James (University of California–Irvine).....	11G Sat PM
Giddings, Janet (San Jose State University)	5E Thu PM
Gilbert, Margaret (University of California–Irvine)	6M Fri AM
Gilmore, Cody (University of California–Davis).....	G8E Sat PM
Gines, Kathryn T. (Pennsylvania State University)	G8I Sat PM
Glanzberg, Michael (University of California–Davis)	G6K Fri PM
Glaser, Jen (Mandel Leadership Institute and Columbia University)	4L Thu PM
Glezakos, Stavroula (Wake Forest University)	6C Fri AM
Glezer, Tal (Stanford University).....	G6E Fri PM
Godfrey-Smith, Peter (Harvard University)	1A Wed PM
Goerger, Michael (University of California–Riverside).....	1G Wed PM
Goering, Sara (University of Washington).....	MII-3 Wed PM
Golash, Deirdre (American University)	10I Sat PM
Goldman, Alan (College of William and Mary)	6J Fri AM
Goldstein, Laurence (University of Kent).....	G2G Wed PM
Goodin, Patrick (Howard University).....	G2I Wed PM
Goodnick, Elizabeth (University of Washington)	11G Sat PM
Goodrich, Greg (Arizona State University)	G9C Sat PM
Gordon, David (Ludwig von Mises Institute)	G8J Sat PM
Gordon, Jill (Colby College).....	10K Sat PM
Gosselin, Abigail (Regis University)	7L Fri PM
Gotthelf, Allan (University of Pittsburgh).....	7H Fri PM, G7A Sat PM
Graham, Peter (University of California–Riverside)	11G Sat PM
Grassbaugh Forry, Joan (Vanderbilt University)	G2B Wed PM

Grasswick, Heidi (Middlebury College)	9G Sat AM
Gratton, Peter (University of San Diego).....	7I Fri PM
Graves, Adam (Metropolitan State College of Denver)	7K Fri PM
Graziani, Romain (École Normale Supérieure)	9B Sat AM
Green, Adam (St. Louis University)	G3D Thu PM
Green, Jerry (University of Texas–Austin)	1F Wed PM, G2C Wed PM
Green, Lena (University of the Western Cape)	MII-2A Wed AM
Greenberg, Mark (University of California–Los Angeles)	9N Sat AM
Greene, Mark (University of Delaware).....	7M Fri PM
Greetis, Andrew (San Diego State University)	G2F Wed PM, 9H Sat AM
Gregory, Maughn (Montclair State University).....	MII-3 Wed PM
Gressis, Robert (California State University–Northridge)	7K Fri PM
Griesmaier, Franz-Peter (University of Wyoming).....	9L Sat AM
Grzankowski, Alex (University of Texas–Austin)	1J Wed PM
Guardiola-Rivera, Oscar (Birkbeck College London)	9M Sat AM, 10J Sat PM
Guerrero, Alexander (New York University)	9N Sat AM
Guevara, Daniel (University of California–Santa Cruz).....	1J Wed PM
Gurley, S. West (Sam Houston State University)	5G Thu PM
Gursozlu, Fuat (State University of New York–Binghamton) ...	G4B Thu PM
Guyer, Paul (University of Pennsylvania).....	7J Fri PM

H

Hagedorn, Eric (University of Notre Dame)	6G Fri AM
Hagel, Nina (University of California–Berkeley)	G8F Sat PM
Haist, Gordon (University of South Carolina–Beaufort).....	G2J Wed PM
Halbach, Volker (Oxford University)	6N Fri AM
Halwani, Raja (School of the Art Institute of Chicago)	G9B Sat PM
Hankins, Keith (University of Arizona)	6D Fri AM
Hanley, Richard (University of Delaware).....	6J Fri AM, G9A Sat PM
Hanna, Robert (University of Colorado–Boulder)	2B Wed PM
Haramia, Chelsea (University of Colorado–Boulder)	6I Fri AM
Harbin, Ami (Dalhousie University)	G8A Sat PM
Harman, Elizabeth (Princeton University).....	1I Sat PM
Harp, Randall (University of Vermont)	3J Thu AM
Harper, Aaron (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)	2G Wed PM
Harries, Karsten (Yale University)	7F Fri PM
Harris, Eirik (Yonsei University)	G3B Thu PM, G8D Sat PM
Hartenburg, Gary (University of California–Irvine)	1F Wed PM
Hartley, Christie (Georgia State University).....	2F Wed PM
Harvey, Jennifer (Drake University)	6A Fri AM

Hasan, Rafeeq (University of Chicago)	10B Sat PM
Haug, Matthew (College of William and Mary).....	G5E Thu PM
Havstad, Joyce (University of California–San Diego).....	8I Fri PM
Hay, Carol (University of Massachusetts–Lowell)	2F Wed PM, G1A Wed PM
Hay, Ryan (University of Southern California)	5H Thu PM
Hayaki, Reina (University of Nebraska–Lincoln).....	7D Fri PM
Hazen, Allen (University of Alberta).....	6N Fri AM
Healow, Christopher (University of California–Davis)	9K Sat AM
Heathwood, Chris (University of Colorado–Boulder).....	7K Fri PM
Hebbeler, James (St. Joseph’s University)	G6E Fri PM
Hebert, Ryan (Washington State University).....	4E Thu PM
Hein, Jeffrey (San Diego State University).....	10I Sat PM
Held, Virginia (City University of New York–Graduate School)	6B Fri AM
Heller, Rachel (Independent Scholar).....	G2F Wed PM
Henderson, David K (University of Nebraska–Lincoln).....	G4J Thu PM
Hendricks, Christina (University of British Columbia)	11E Sat PM, G8A Sat PM
Hermes, Charles (University of Texas–Arlington).....	5B Thu PM
Herschbach, Mitchell (University of California–San Diego)	5I Thu PM
Hestir, Blake (Texas Christian University)	G4G Thu PM
Hicks, Michael R. (Brooklyn College).....	5F Thu PM
Hilbert, David (University of Illinois–Chicago).....	9A Sat AM
Hildebrand, Tyler (University of Colorado–Boulder).....	11H Sat PM
Hill, Christopher (Brown University).....	4A Thu PM
Hill, Thomas (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill).....	1B Wed PM
Hiller, Avram (Portland State University)	5C Thu PM, G6C Fri PM
Hilpinen, Risto (University of Miami).....	G3A Thu PM
Himma, Kenneth (Seattle Pacific University)	G1D Wed PM
Hinton, Lynne (Buranda State School).....	MII-6 Thurs AM
Hinton, Lynne (Queensland University of Technology).....	4L Thu PM
Hirschbein, Ron (Walden University)	G4B Thu PM
Hitchcock, Christopher (California Institute of Technology)	11J Sat PM
Hoffmann, Glen (Ryerson University).....	11H Sat PM
Hogan, Brendan (New York University)	G3C Thu PM
Hogan, Desmond (Princeton University)	2B Wed PM
Holbrook, J. Britt (University of North Texas)	4K Thu PM
Holden, Thomas (University of California–Santa Barbara)	G2A Wed PM, 3G Thu AM
Holder, Cindy (University of Victoria)	G7B Sat PM
Holland, Kristopher (Indiana University).....	MII-1B Wed AM

Hollowell, Joshua (University of California–Riverside)	6I Fri AM
Hood, Pamela (San Francisco State University)	5M Thu PM
Horgan, Terry (University of Arizona)	9D Sat AM
Hosein, Adam (University of Colorado–Boulder).....	10I Sat PM
Howard, Jason J. (Viterbo University)	G6I Fri PM
Howell, Robert (Southern Methodist University)	9K Sat AM
Hsu, Andrew (University of California–Los Angeles).....	10G Sat PM
Hubbs, Graham (University of Idaho).....	8E Fri PM
Hufendiek, Rebekka (Humboldt-Universität Berlin)	G8H Sat PM
Huff, Benjamin (Randolph-Macon College)	G3B Thu PM
Hughes, Alex (Illinois Wesleyan University)	10F Sat PM
Hughes, Robert C. (National Institutes of Health).....	6D Fri AM
Hulbert, Steve (Claremont Graduate University)	G6N Fri PM
Humphreys, Paul (University of Virginia)	7M Fri PM, G6M Fri PM
Hunt, David (Whittier College).....	5J Thu PM
Hunter, Bruce (University of Alberta)	6F Fri AM
Husi, Stan (Rice University)	10F Sat PM
Hussain, Nadeem J. Z. (Stanford University)	8C Fri PM

I

Ichikawa, Jonathan (University of St. Andrews)	1K Wed PM
Immerman, Daniel (University of Notre Dame)	2E Wed PM
Intemann, Kristen (Montana State University)	3D Thu AM
Irwin, Kristen (Biola University)	6E Fri AM
Ivy, David (University of Texas–Austin).....	4C Thu PM

J

Jackman, Henry (York University)	G6K Fri PM
Jackson, Alexander (Boise State University)	1J Wed PM
Jackson, Thomas (University of Hawaii–Manoa).....	MII-1A Wed AM
Jaffro, Laurent (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)	7G Fri PM
Jaggar, Alison (University of Colorado–Boulder).....	8B Fri PM
Jagnow, René (University of Georgia)	4H Thu PM
Janiak, Andrew (Duke University)	8A Fri PM
Jankovic, Marija (Indiana University–Bloomington)	6G Fri AM
Jankowiak, Tim (University of California–San Diego)	7J Fri PM
Janssen, Gregory (University of Nevada–Las Vegas).....	10E Sat PM
Jaworska, Agnieszka (University of California–Riverside)	8F Fri PM
Jenkins, Michelle (Whitman College)	10H Sat PM
Jensen, Rasmus Thybo (Københavns Universitet)	1K Wed PM
Jeshion, Robin (University of Southern California).....	6C Fri AM
Jiang, Xinyan (University of Redlands).....	3H Thu AM

Johnson, Daniel M. (Baylor University)	3G Thu AM
Johnson, Jeff (St. Catherine University)	G2G Wed PM
Johnson, Stephan (City College of San Francisco)	3I Thu AM
Jolley, Nicholas (University of California–Irvine).....	10L Sat PM
Jones, Robert (California State University–Chico)	11K Sat PM
Jones, Russell (Harvard University)	3B Thu AM
Joy, Lynn S. (University of Notre Dame).....	8A Fri PM
Jäger, Gerhard (Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen)	1A Wed PM

K

Kaag, John (University of Massachusetts–Lowell).....	G1A Wed PM
Kabasenche, William P. (Washington State University)	5E Thu PM
Kamber, Richard (The College of New Jersey).....	6J Fri AM
Kane, Robert (University of Texas–Austin)	7B Fri PM
Kaplan, Mark (Indiana University–Bloomington).....	3F Thu AM
Kaufman, Dan (University of Colorado–Boulder) ...	4C Thu PM, 10L Sat PM
Kautzer, Chad (University of Colorado–Denver)	G2H Wed PM
Kazmi, Ali (University of Calgary)	6H Fri AM
Keeley, Brian L. (Pitzer College).....	10D Sat PM
Keeling, Evan (University of Virginia)	7I Fri PM
Kegley, Jacquelyn Ann K. (California State University–Bakersfield)	
.....	5I Thu PM
Keller, Pierre (University of California–Riverside).....	7J Fri PM
Keyser, Vadim (University of California–Davis)	8I Fri PM
Khawaja, Irfan (Felician College)	G7A Sat PM
Khazae, Malek (California State University–Long Beach)	
.....	G6D Fri PM, 10H Sat PM
Kim, Joongol (Western Illinois University).....	6H Fri AM
Kim, Seahwa (Ewha Womans University)	7D Fri PM
Kind, Amy (Claremont McKenna College)	1E Wed PM
King, Matt (Virginia Tech).....	11E Sat PM
Kipnis, Kenneth (University of Hawaii–Manoa)	3K Thu AM
Klein, Colin (University of Illinois–Chicago)	G5E Thu PM, 8H Fri PM
Kleinschmidt, Shieva (University of Southern California).....	10E Sat PM
Kobes, Bernard W. (Arizona State University)	9I Sat AM
Kohan, Walter Omar (Universidade do Estado	
do Rio de Janeiro)	MII-6 Thurs AM, 4L Thu PM
Korolev, Alexandre V. (University of British Columbia)	4G Thu PM
Kortbein, Joshua (Independent Scholar).....	G2G Wed PM
Koslicki, Kathrin (University of Colorado–Boulder).....	9D Sat AM
Koukal, David (University of Detroit Mercy).....	9H Sat AM
Kourany, Janet (University of Notre Dame)	9F Sat AM

Kraemer, Eric R. (University of Wisconsin–La Crosse)	11G Sat PM
Kraft, Rory (York College of Pennsylvania)	MII-2A Wed AM
Krasner, Daniel (Metropolitan State College of Denver)	10E Sat PM
Krein, Kevin (University of Alaska–Southeast)	G2B Wed PM
Krizan, Mary (California State University–Fullerton)	8G Fri PM, G6O Fri PM
Kumar, Victor (University of Arizona)	8H Fri PM
Kung, Peter (Pomona College)	6F Fri AM
Kurth, Charlie (University of California–San Diego).....	3H Thu AM
Kvanvig, Jonathan (Baylor University).....	8D Fri PM
Kwak, John (University of Southern California)	6G Fri AM

L

Lacewing, Michael (University of London).....	4F Thu PM
Lagerlund, Henrik (University of Western Ontario)	5J Thu PM
Lake, Danielle (Michigan State University)	G6L Fri PM
Land, Thomas (University of Chicago).....	7J Fri PM
Landen, Laura (Providence College)	7I Fri PM
Landrum, Ty (University of Virginia)	9H Sat AM
Lang, Charles (University of California–Davis)	6G Fri AM
Langley, Raymond (Manhattanville College).....	G6D Fri PM
Lapointe, Sandra (Kansas State University)	G9D Sat PM
Lavers, Greg (Concordia University)	G9D Sat PM
Laverty, Megan (Teachers' College)	MII-4 Wed PM
Lawrence, David (University of North Dakota)	G2J Wed PM
Lawson, Bill E. (University of Memphis)	6A Fri AM
Lay, Christopher (University of California–Irvine)	G6J Fri PM
Lee, Emily S. (California State University–Fullerton)	G8I Sat PM
Lee, Hsin-wen (University of Southern California)	2C Wed PM
Lee, Joseph (University of California–Santa Barbara).....	1F Wed PM
Lee, Seung-Kee (Drew University)	7J Fri PM
Lefkowitz, David (University of Richmond)	9N Sat AM
Lehan-Streisel, Vanessa (York University)	7L Fri PM
Lehrer, Keith (University of Arizona)	10C Sat PM
Leighton, Kimberly (American University)	7N Fri PM
Lemetti, Juhana (University of Helsinki)	G2C Wed PM
Lenhart, Stephen (Northern Arizona University).....	5H Thu PM
Lennertz, Benjamin (University of Southern California)	2E Wed PM
Leonard, Matt (University of California–Davis).....	9J Sat AM
LePore, Ernest (Rutgers University)	6C Fri AM
Levey, Ann (University of Calgary).....	1J Wed PM

Levin, Abigail (Niagara University).....	2F Wed PM
Levin, Janet (University of Southern California)	4A Thu PM
Li, Elizabeth Woo (Peking University).....	G4A Thu PM
Liao, S. Matthew (New York University).....	3F Thu AM
Lieberman, Alida (University of Southern California)	3J Thu AM
Lim, Daniel (University of Cambridge).....	1H Wed PM
Lipsitz, George (University of California–Santa Barbara).....	1L Wed PM
Lister, Matthew (University of Pennsylvania).....	10I Sat PM
Litland, Jon Erling (Harvard University)	6H Fri AM
Liu, JeeLoo (California State University–Fullerton)	
.....	3H Thu AM, G4A Thu PM, G8B Sat PM
Liu, Xiaofei (University of Missouri).....	6I Fri AM
Livingston, Paul (University of New Mexico)	G7E Sat PM
Locke, Dustin (Claremont McKenna College).....	1K Wed PM
Loeb, Paul (University of Puget Sound).....	2G Wed PM
Loew, Christian (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	1H Wed PM
Lombrozo, Tania (University of California–Berkeley).....	G8C Sat PM
Long, Roderick (Auburn University).....	2C Wed PM, G8J Sat PM
Long, Todd R. (California Polytechnic State University).....	10E Sat PM
Lopes, Christine (Independent Scholar).....	8G Fri PM
Lopes, Dominic McIver (University of British Columbia).....	6J Fri AM
Love, Alan C. (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)	9L Sat AM
Lu, Pin-Fei (Independent Scholar).....	10I Sat PM
Lucey, Kenneth (University of Nevada–Reno).....	11H Sat PM
Luft, Eric v. d. (SUNY Upstate Medical University)	G6I Fri PM
Lukey, Ben (University of Hawaii–Manoa).....	MII-1A Wed AM
Luper, Steven (Trinity University)	6F Fri AM
Lynch, Joseph J. (California Polytechnic State University)	G8H Sat PM
Lynch, Michael (University of Connecticut).....	9G Sat AM

M

Mabrito, Robert A. (North Carolina State University).....	4F Thu PM
Machery, Edouard (University of Pittsburgh)	G8C Sat PM
MacIntosh, Duncan (Dalhousie University)	G4F Thu PM
Mackey, Linda (Texas State University–San Marcos)	G2J Wed PM
Macleod, Colin (University of Victoria).....	9C Sat AM
Macpherson, Fiona (University of Glasgow).....	1E Wed PM
Maddy, Penelope (University of California–Irvine).....	9E Sat AM
Madva, Alex (Columbia University)	1K Wed PM
Magnus, David (Stanford University)	3K Thu AM
Mahon, James (Washington and Lee University)	5H Thu PM

Maibom, Heidi (Carleton University)	7E Fri PM
Makaiau, Amber (University of Hawaii–Manoa).....	MII-1A Wed AM
Maker, William (Clemson University).....	G4I Thu PM
Malmgren, Anna-Sara (University of Texas–Austin)	5C Thu PM
Manley, David (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)	1D Wed PM
Manson, Neil A. (University of Mississippi)	4G Thu PM
Mar, Gary (State University of New York–Stony Brook)	1L Wed PM
MarasoIU, Andrei (University of Bucharest)	G2C Wed PM
Marcano, Donna-Dale L. (Trinity College Connecticut).....	G8I Sat PM
Marcellesi, Alexandre (University of California–San Diego)	1K Wed PM
Marino, Patricia (University of Waterloo)	G8G Sat PM
Markovits, Julia (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)	11D Sat PM
Martin, Adrienne (University of Pennsylvania)	3J Thu AM
Martin, Craig (Baylor University)	6F Fri AM
Martin, Rex (University of Kansas).....	1F Wed PM
Martinich, Al (University of Texas–Austin).....	G6A Fri PM
Marusic, Jennifer S. (Brandeis University)	3G Thu AM
Marušić, Berislav (Brandeis University).....	2H Wed PM
Mascarenhas, Vijay (Metropolitan State College of Denver)	6H Fri AM
Matey, Jennifer J. (Florida International University)	3I Thu AM
Matheson, Jonathan D. (University of North Florida)	3F Thu AM
Mathiesen, Kay (University of Arizona)	G6J Fri PM
Matravers, Derek (Open University)	7E Fri PM
Matthen, Mohan (University of Toronto)	8I Fri PM
Mattherne, Samantha (University of California–Riverside).....	1G Wed PM
Matthews, Gareth (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)	
.....	MII-4 Wed PM, 4D Thu PM
May, Joshua (University of California–Santa Barbara).....	11E Sat PM
May, Larry (Vanderbilt University).....	2K Wed PM, G6A Fri PM
May, Robert (University of California–Davis)	4M Thu PM, 5D Thu PM
McAdoo, Paige (Independent Scholar)	G6F Fri PM
McAfee, Noëlle (Emory University).....	4K Thu PM
McBrayer, Justin P. (Fort Lewis College)	6E Fri AM
McCann, Edwin (University of Southern California)	4C Thu PM
McCann, Hugh (Texas A&M University)	1C Wed PM
McCord Adams, Marilyn (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	
.....	10M Sat PM
McCracken, Janet (Lake Forest College)	10K Sat PM
McCullough, Laurence B. (Baylor College of Medicine).....	3K Thu AM
McCumber, John (University of California–Los Angeles)	
.....	G2H Wed PM, 7F Fri PM

McFadden, Meredith (University of California–Riverside).....	5E Thu PM
McIntyre, Robert (University of California–Santa Barbara)	G2A Wed PM
McIntyre, Ronald (California State University–Northridge)	G6J Fri PM
McKenna, Michael (University of Arizona).....	7B Fri PM
McKittrick, Jennifer (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)	5B Thu PM
McLaughlin, Douglas (California State University–Northridge)	
.....	G2B Wed PM
McLeod, Alexis (University of Dayton)	G8D Sat PM
McLuckie, Alan (Stanford University)	9H Sat AM
McPartland, Keith (Williams College)	3B Thu AM
Mele, Alfred (Florida State University).....	2D Wed PM
Melnyk, Andrew (University of Missouri)	G6M Fri PM
Mendelovici, Angela (University of Western Ontario)	3I Thu AM
Mendelsohn, Richard (City University of New York–Graduate Center)	
.....	5D Thu PM
Mendieta, Eduardo (State University of New York–Stony Brook)	
.....	9M Sat AM, 10J Sat PM
Mendola, Joseph (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)	9A Sat AM
Mendoza, Jose Jorge (University of Oregon)	
.....	G5D Thu PM, G6G Fri PM, G7C Sat PM
Menken, Kyle (University of Toronto)	7C Fri PM
Menon, Tarun (University of California–San Diego).....	4I Thu PM
Merchant, Sanjay (Grand Canyon University)	4G Thu PM
Merino-Rajme, Carla (Princeton University).....	8E Fri PM
Meyer, Ulrich (Colgate University)	2I Wed PM
Meyers, C. D. (University of Southern Mississippi)	7K Fri PM
Michaelson, Eliot (University of California–Los Angeles).....	9J Sat AM
Mikelman, Jay (Boston University)	G2C Wed PM
Miller, Chad (University of Hawaii–Manoa)	MII-1A Wed AM
Miller, Christian (Wake Forest University)	5A Thu PM
Miller, Richard W. (Cornell University)	7A Fri PM
Mills, Claudia (University of Colorado–Boulder)	MII-5 Thurs AM
Miner, Robert (Baylor University)	9H Sat AM
Misak, Cheryl (University of Toronto)	G3A Thu PM
Mitchell, Mandy (University of California–Riverside).....	2G Wed PM
Mitchell-Yellin, Benjamin (University of California–Riverside)	3J Thu AM
Miyamoto, Nobuko (Ford Foundation)	1L Wed PM
Moellendorf, Darrel (San Diego State University)	7M Fri PM
Mohr Lone, Jana (University of Washington)	MII-4 Wed PM, 4L Thu PM
Mok, Justin (University of Toronto)	G8D Sat PM
Moller, Dan (University of Maryland–College Park)	6E Fri AM

Molyneux, Bernard (University of California–Davis)	4I Thu PM
Monahan, Michael J. (Marquette University)	G8H Sat PM
Monton, Bradley (University of Colorado–Boulder)	8D Fri PM, G8E Sat PM
Moore, Margaret (University of Leeds)	5I Thu PM
Moore, Michael (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)	3A Thu AM
Morgan, Daniel (University of Pittsburgh)	4B Thu PM
Morgan, William (University of Southern California)	G2B Wed PM
Morison, Benjamin (Princeton University)	4D Thu PM
Morris, Courtney (University of California–Riverside)	7J Fri PM
Mortensen, Kaija (University of California–Santa Cruz)	11H Sat PM
Morton, Adam (University of Alberta)	3E Thu AM
Morton, Jennifer (City University of New York–City College)	11I Sat PM
Mou, Bo (San Jose State University)	4J Thu PM
Mourenza, Alexis (University of California–Santa Cruz)	11G Sat PM
Mower, Deborah (Youngstown State University)	G3B Thu PM
Mrsny, Sara (Stanford University)	8F Fri PM
Muchnik, Pablo (Emerson College)	G4D Thu PM
Mulnix, Jennifer Wilson (University of Massachusetts–Dartmouth)	G8A Sat PM
Murphey, Max (University of California–Riverside)	1G Wed PM
Murphy, Ann (Fordham University)	G6O Fri PM

N

Nagel, Jennifer (University of Toronto)	MI-2 Wed PM
Nanay, Bence (University of Antwerp and University of Cambridge)	1E Wed PM
Nascimento, Amós (University of Washington)	9M Sat AM, 10J Sat PM
Nason, Shannon (Loyola Marymount University)	G4C Thu PM
Nelkin, Dana (University of California–San Diego)	5E Thu PM
Nelson, Alan (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	2A Wed PM, 10L Sat PM
Nelson, Mark (Westmont College)	G1D Wed PM, 7K Fri PM
Nelson, Michael D. (University of California–Riverside)	11I Sat PM
Neta, Ram (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	5C Thu PM, MI-1 Wed AM
Neuhouser, Fred (Barnard College)	10B Sat PM
Newman, Lex (University of Utah)	3G Thu AM
Newton, Alexandra (University of Pittsburgh)	G6E Fri PM
Ney, Alyssa (University of Rochester)	1H Wed PM, G6M Fri PM
Nichols, Shaun (University of Arizona)	MI-1 Wed AM, G4H Thu PM
Nikolopoulou, Kalliopi (University at Buffalo)	G1E Wed PM

Nolen, Matt (Arizona State University).....	G9C Sat PM
Nolt, John (University of Tennessee).....	G5C Thu PM
Norcross, Alastair (University of Colorado–Boulder).....	9C Sat AM
Norlock, Kathryn J. (Trent University).....	G1B Wed PM
Nowack, Ethan (University of California–Berkeley).....	5F Thu PM
Nunan, Richard (College of Charleston).....	G3E Thu PM

O

O'Connor, Scott (Cornell University).....	7I Fri PM
O'Leary, Scott (Fordham University).....	8F Fri PM
O'Regan, J. Kevin (Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique).....	10D Sat PM
Oaklander, L. Nathan (University of Michigan–Flint).....	G8E Sat PM
Odenbaugh, Jay (Lewis & Clark College).....	8E Fri PM
Okiihiro, Gary Y. (Columbia University).....	1L Wed PM
Olfert, Christiana (Tufts University).....	1F Wed PM
Oliver, Amy (American University).....	10J Sat PM
Olson, Alan M. (Boston University).....	G6D Fri PM
Olsthoorn, Johan (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven).....	G2C Wed PM
Orlandi, Nicoletta (Rice University).....	4E Thu PM
Orosco, José-Antonio (Oregon State University).....	G6G Fri PM
Oved, Iris (University of Arizona).....	10C Sat PM
Oxley, Julinna (Coastal Carolina University).....	MII-1B Wed AM, 7E Fri PM

P

Pace, Michael (Chapman University).....	3F Thu AM
Pallikkathayil, Japa (New York University).....	10G Sat PM
Palmer, Clare (Texas A&M University).....	7A Fri PM, G6C Fri PM
Palmer, David (University of Tennessee).....	6I Fri AM
Parker, Emily (Santa Clara University).....	4F Thu PM
Parker, Wendy (Ohio University).....	3D Thu AM
Parsons, Terence (University of California–Los Angeles)	3L Thu AM, 5D Thu PM
Pasternack, Lawrence (Oklahoma State University)	G1C Wed PM, G6E Fri PM
Paul, Herman (Universiteit Leiden).....	G8F Sat PM
Paul, Sarah (University of Wisconsin–Madison).....	11I Sat PM
Payne, W. Russ (Bellevue College).....	11H Sat PM
Peacocke, Christopher (Columbia University).....	10A Sat PM
Pearce, Kenneth L. (University of Southern California).....	3G Thu AM
Pearson, Thomas (University of Texas–Pan American)	G1C Wed PM, 5H Thu PM
Pedersen, Nikolaj Jang (University of California–Los Angeles)....	4E Thu PM

Pelser, Adam (Baylor University).....	8F Fri PM
Pendergraft, Garrett (University of California–Riverside)	3J Thu AM
Peng, Chengyi (Andrew) (City University of Hong Kong).....	G8D Sat PM
Pereboom, Derk (Cornell University)	7B Fri PM, 10M Sat PM
Perez, Gilberto (Sarah Lawrence College)	4B Thu PM
Perkins, Franklin (DePaul University)	G6B Fri PM
Perpich, Diane (Clemson University).....	G8I Sat PM
Perszyk, Ken (Victoria University of Wellington).....	1C Wed PM
Phelps, David (Indiana University).....	MII-1B Wed AM
Pike, Matthew (University of Colorado–Boulder).....	G8H Sat PM
Pincione, Guido (University of Arizona)	6D Fri AM
Pinillos, Angel (Arizona State University)	MI-2 Wed PM, 9J Sat AM
Pippin, Robert (University of Chicago)	4B Thu PM
Pitt, David (California State University–Los Angeles)	1H Wed PM
Poellner, Peter (Warwick University)	G4E Thu PM
Polger, Thomas W. (University of Cincinnati)	G5E Thu PM
Polzik, Dasha (University of Chicago).....	10B Sat PM
Poore, Gregory S. (Baylor University)	5E Thu PM
Portuondo, Gladys L. (Independent Scholar)	G2E Wed PM
Potochnik, Angela (University of Cincinnati)	G5E Thu PM
Powell, John W. (Humboldt State University).....	G2G Wed PM
Powell, Lewis (University of Southern California)	4F Thu PM
Powers, Thomas M. (University of Delaware)	7M Fri PM
Pratt, Aaron L. (University of Oregon)	G1A Wed PM
Preti, Alan (Rosemont College).....	G2J Wed PM
Prettyman, Adrienne (University of Toronto).....	7L Fri PM, 9I Sat AM
Priest, Maura (University of California–Irvine).....	1F Wed PM
Prince, Brian (Rice University)	10H Sat PM
Prinz, Jesse (City University of New York–Graduate Center)	7C Fri PM
Pritchard, Michael (Western Michigan University).....	MII-4 Wed PM
Proops, Ian (University of Texas–Austin)	2B Wed PM
Puett, Michael (Harvard University).....	9B Sat AM
Pust, Joel (University of Delaware).....	1H Wed PM

Q

Qualin, Sara (University of Wyoming)	6F Fri AM
Quinn, Carol (Metropolitan State College of Denver).....	G9B Sat PM
Quiring, John (Victor Valley College).....	G6N Fri PM

R

Rabin, Gabriel (University of California–Los Angeles)	7L Fri PM
Radulescu, Alex (University of California–Los Angeles)	3F Thu AM

Raibley, Jason (California State University–Long Beach).....	6E Fri AM
Ramirez, Erick (University of California–San Diego)	G6L Fri PM
Ramsey, Grant A. (University of Notre Dame)	8I Fri PM
Raphals, Lisa (National University of Singapore)	9B Sat AM
Rasmussen, Douglas B. (St. John’s University)	G8J Sat PM
Rauhut, Nils (Coastal Carolina University)	10L Sat PM, G8A Sat PM
Raven, Michael J. (University of Victoria)	5F Thu PM
Reath, Andrews (University of California–Riverside).....	1B Wed PM
Reck, Erich (University of California–Riverside)	4M Thu PM, 5D Thu PM
Reginster, Bernard (Brown University).....	G4E Thu PM
Reimer, Marga (University of Arizona).....	9J Sat AM
Rennard, Ray (University of the Pacific).....	8E Fri PM
Renteln, Alison Dundes (University of Southern California).....	G7B Sat PM
Repp, Charles (University of Toronto)	5I Thu PM
Rescorla, Michael A. (University of California–Santa Barbara)....	10A Sat PM
Rettler, Bradley (University of Notre Dame)	4G Thu PM
Reyes, Herminia (San Diego State University).....	9J Sat AM
Reynolds, Andrea (Ventura College)	G3E Thu PM
Rhodes, Rosamond (Mount Sinai School of Medicine and City University of New York–Graduate Center)	G2C Wed PM
Richard, Mark (Harvard University)	9A Sat AM
Richardson, Sarah (Harvard University).....	3D Thu AM
Rieder, Travis N. (Georgetown University).....	7K Fri PM
Risse, Mathias (Harvard University).....	7A Fri PM
Robinson, Michael (Grand Valley State University).....	6I Fri AM
Rodriguez, Tanya (City University of New York–City College)	3H Thu AM
Roe, Sarah (University of California–Davis)	8I Fri PM
Rogers, Brian (University of California–Irvine)	8J Fri PM
Rondel, David (Trent University)	6D Fri AM
Rooney, Phyllis (Oakland University)	11C Sat PM
Rose, David (Carnegie Mellon University)	G8C Sat PM
Ross, Glenn (Franklin and Marshall College)	3G Thu AM
Ross, Peter (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona) ...	3I Thu AM
Rossberg, Marcus (University of Connecticut)	4M Thu PM
Roth, Paul (University of California–Santa Cruz)	G4J Thu PM
Roush, Sherri (University of California–Berkeley).....	3E Thu AM
Rozemond, Marleen (University of Toronto)	4C Thu PM
Rueger, Alex (University of Alberta).....	10G Sat PM
Rupert, Robert (University of Colorado–Boulder).....	4I Thu PM
Rush, Fred (University of Notre Dame)	7F Fri PM
Rushing, Sara (Montana State University).....	G3B Thu PM

Russell, Camisha (Pennsylvania State University).....	G8I Sat PM
Russell, Dan (Wichita State University).....	5A Thu PM
Russell, Francey (Vanderbilt University).....	G2G Wed PM
Russell, Gillian (Washington University in St. Louis)	1D Wed PM
Ryan, Cheyney (University of Oregon)	4B Thu PM
Ryan, Patrick (University of California–Riverside).....	10F Sat PM
Rysiew, Patrick (University of Victoria).....	6C Fri AM

S

Saemi, Amir (University of California–Santa Barbara)	2H Wed PM
Saint, Michelle (Rollins College)	6J Fri AM
Saka, Paul (University of Texas–Pan American)	9J Sat AM
Salamon, Gayle (Princeton University).....	G6O Fri PM
Salmieri, Gregory (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	7H Fri PM
Sample, Ruth (University of New Hampshire)	2C Wed PM
Sanchez, Carlos Alberto (San Jose State University)	9M Sat AM
Sanders, Kirk R. (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign) ...	G4G Thu PM
Sarkissian, Hagop (City University of New York–Baruch College)	
.....	G4H Thu PM
Sattig, Thomas (Washington University in St. Louis)	G8E Sat PM
Saucedo, Raul (Yale University and Australian National University)	
.....	6H Fri AM
Scala, Mark (West Texas A&M University)	3I Thu AM
Scalet, Steven (State University of New York–Binghamton)	6D Fri AM
Scarfe, Adam (University of Winnipeg).....	G6N Fri PM
Schaff, Kory (Occidental College)	10G Sat PM, G8G Sat PM
Schaffer, Jonathan (Australian National University)	
.....	MI-2 Wed PM, 9D Sat AM
Schapiro, Tamar (Stanford University)	1B Wed PM
Scharle, Margaret (Reed College).....	7I Fri PM
Scheines, Richard (Carnegie Mellon University).....	11J Sat PM
Schellenberg, Susanna (Australian National University).....	1D Wed PM
Schiller, Aaron (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee).....	4H Thu PM
Schlicht, Tobias (Ruhr-Universität Bochum).....	9I Sat AM
Schmid, Stephen (University of Wisconsin–Rock County)	G2B Wed PM
Schmidt, David (University of Arizona).....	11B Sat PM
Schmitt, Nathan Pai (University of Oregon)	1I Wed PM
Schmitter, Amy (University of Alberta)	2A Wed PM
Schnee, Ian (University of Puget Sound).....	5F Thu PM
Schneider, Henrique (Fernfachhochschule Schweiz)	
.....	G4A Thu PM, G6H Fri PM, G8D Sat PM
Schroeder, Timothy (Ohio State University)	8C Fri PM

Schroer, Jeanine Weekes (Arkansas State University)	9F Sat AM
Schueler, Fred (University of Delaware)	2H Wed PM
Schummer, Jordan (San Diego State University)	G2D Wed PM
Schwab, Martin (University of California–Irvine)	5G Thu PM
Schwartz, Daniel (University of California–San Diego).....	1G Wed PM
Schwartzman, Lisa H. (Michigan State University)	8B Fri PM
Schwitzgebel, Eric (University of California–Riverside)	1K Wed PM
Scriven, Michael (Claremont Graduate University)	G5B Thu PM
Seeley, William P. (Bates College)	6J Fri AM
Sehon, Scott (Bowdoin College).....	6I Fri AM
Seok, Bongrae (Alvernia University).....	G8B Sat PM
Shahar, Dan (University of Arizona).....	6D Fri AM
Shapiro, David (Cascadia Community College).....	MII-5 Thurs AM
Sharma, Ravi (Clark University)	8G Fri PM
Sharpe, Kevin W. (St. Cloud State University).....	10E Sat PM
Shaw, James R. (University of Pittsburgh)	9J Sat AM
Shelton, Mark (Central Michigan University)	11K Sat PM
Sher, George (Rice University)	7H Fri PM
Sher, Gila (University California–San Diego).....	6N Fri AM
Sherman, Brett (University of Rochester)	4E Thu PM
Shi, Xianduan (Judy) (Westminster College of Salt Lake City)	G4A Thu PM
Shieber, Joseph (Lafayette College).....	8D Fri PM
Shier, David (Washington State University).....	4H Thu PM
Shin, Joe (Arizona State University).....	G1C Wed PM
Shoemaker, David (Tulane University of New Orleans)	8H Fri PM
Shukla, Rajesh C. (Saint Paul University)	G6D Fri PM
Siewert, Charles (Rice University)	4H Thu PM
Silva, Grant (Illinois Institute of Technology)	G6G Fri PM
Silvermint, Daniel (University of Arizona)	6D Fri AM
Silvers, Anita (San Francisco State University)	5M Thu PM
Simmons, Keith (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	9K Sat AM
Simpson, John (University of Alberta)	MII-1B Wed AM
Simus, Jason (University of North Texas).....	G6C Fri PM
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (Duke University)	MI-2 Wed PM
Sirkel, Riin (University of Alberta)	G4G Thu PM
Skokowski, Paul (Stanford University).....	3I Thu AM
Skyrms, Brian (University of California–Irvine)	1A Wed PM
Slagter, Janet (California State University–Fresno)	9F Sat AM
Slater, Matthew H. (Bucknell University)	8E Fri PM
Slote, Michael (University of Miami).....	6B Fri AM

Smith, Andrew F. (Drexel University).....	G3C Thu PM
Smith, Clancy (Duquesne University).....	G8H Sat PM
Smith, David Woodruff (University of California–Irvine)	G6J Fri PM
Smith, Holly M. (Rutgers University)	2J Wed PM
Smith, Kurt (Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania).....	1G Wed PM
Smith, Nicholas D. (Lewis & Clark College)	3B Thu AM, 11G Sat PM
Smith, Nicole A (Bowling Green State University)	II Wed PM
Smith, Olav Bryant (Butte College).....	G6N Fri PM
Smith, Renée (Coastal Carolina University).....	MII-1B Wed AM
Snedegar, Justin (University of Southern California)	7K Fri PM
Snow, Nancy E. (Marquette University)	
.....	G2J Wed PM, 5A Thu PM, 6L Fri AM
Soester, Jessica (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)	G6L Fri PM
Song, Edward H.K. (Louisiana State University)	6D Fri AM
Sorensen, Roy (Washington University in St. Louis)	2I Wed PM
Souffrant, Eddy (University of North Carolina–Charlotte)	G7C Sat PM
Spackman, John (Middlebury College).....	9I Sat AM
Spade, Dean (Seattle University).....	G6O Fri PM
Speak, Daniel (Loyola Marymount University).....	G1D Wed PM, 8F Fri PM
Spencer, Joshua (Syracuse University)	G9A Sat PM
Spencer, Quayshawn (University of San Francisco)	II Wed PM
Spener, Maja (Oxford University)	9I Sat AM
Sreedhar, Susanne (Boston University)	2F Wed PM
Stabler, Ed (University of California–Los Angeles).....	3L Thu AM
Staffel, Julia (University of Southern California).....	5H Thu PM
Staley, Kent W. (St. Louis University)	3E Thu AM
Stang, Nick (University of Miami).....	7J Fri PM
Stangl, Rebecca Lynn (University of Virginia)	10I Sat PM
Stannard, Michael (Reedley College)	6K Fri AM
Starkey, Charles (Clemson University)	3I Thu AM
Starrett, Shari (California State University–Fullerton)	2G Wed PM
Stecker, Robert A. (Central Michigan University)	G5A Thu PM
Stegenga, Jacob (University of California–San Diego)	4I Thu PM
Stein, Jordan (University of California–Irvine).....	8J Fri PM
Steinberg, Diane (Cleveland State University).....	G2F Wed PM
Steinbuch, Thomas (Independent Scholar)	2G Wed PM
Stenberg, Joseph (University of Colorado–Boulder)	1F Wed PM
Stephens, William (Creighton University).....	2K Wed PM
Sterba, James P. (University of Notre Dame)	G4F Thu PM
Stern, Robert (University of Sheffield)	7F Fri PM
Stich, Stephen (Rutgers University)	MI-1 Wed AM

Stoner, Ian (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)	6K Fri AM
Strawser, Michael (University of Central Florida).....	G4C Thu PM
Streed, Adam (University of California–San Diego)	6E Fri AM
Struble, Luca (University of California–Los Angeles)	6H Fri AM
Stueber, Karsten (College of the Holy Cross)	6B Fri AM
Sturgeon, Scott (Oxford University)	10C Sat PM
Suhler, Christopher (University of California–San Diego)	G8E Sat PM
Suikkanen, Jussi (University of Birmingham).....	2J Wed PM
Sun, Weimin (California State University–Northridge)	
.....	G4A Thu PM, G8B Sat PM
Sundell, Tim (University of Kentucky)	3F Thu AM
Superson, Anita (University of Kentucky)	G4F Thu PM
Sussman, David (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign) ..	G4D Thu PM
Sveinsdottir, Asta (San Francisco State University)	8B Fri PM
Swanton, Christine (University of Auckland).....	7H Fri PM
Sweet, Kristi (Texas A&M University).....	10G Sat PM
Swenson, Adam (California State University–Northridge)	1J Wed PM
Sytsma, Justin (East Tennessee State University).....	5I Thu PM

T

Talbot, Brian T. (University of Colorado–Boulder)	5I Thu PM
Talisse, Robert (Vanderbilt University).....	9C Sat AM
Tan, Peter (Mount St. Mary's College)	G5B Thu PM
Tannenbaum, Julie (Pomona College).....	11D Sat PM
Taylor, James (Westmont College)	5J Thu PM
Taylor, Kenneth (Stanford University).....	1D Wed PM
Teays, Wanda (Mount St. Mary's College)	5E Thu PM, G5B Thu PM
Tennberg, Chris (University of California–Santa Barbara)	10H Sat PM
Tepley, Joshua L. (University of Notre Dame)	5G Thu PM
Terjesen, Andrew (Rhodes College).....	G2C Wed PM, G8A Sat PM
Tetreault, Michael J. (San Diego State University).....	G2D Wed PM
Thielke, Peter (Pomona College)	10G Sat PM
Thomasson, Amie L. (University of Miami)	G6J Fri PM, G7E Sat PM
Thompson, Luke (Monash University)	G9D Sat PM
Thomson, Paul (Columbia Secondary School)	MII-2B Wed AM
Thrasher, John (University of Arizona)	9C Sat AM
Tiboris, Michael (University of California–San Diego)	8F Fri PM
Tiehen, Justin (University of Puget Sound)	1H Wed PM
Tillman, Chris (University of Manitoba).....	11H Sat PM
Timalsina, Sthaneshwar (San Diego State University).....	G2J Wed PM
Timpe, Kevin L. (Northwest Nazarene University).....	2D Wed PM

Tipton, Jason (St. John's College)	G2I Wed PM
Titelbaum, Michael (University of Wisconsin–Madison)	6F Fri AM
Tobin, Theresa (Marquette University)	8B Fri PM
Tognazzini, Neal (College of William and Mary)	2D Wed PM
Tollefsen, Deborah (University of Memphis)	MII-3 Wed PM
Tolley, Clinton (University of California–San Diego)	7J Fri PM
Tomhave, Alan (Youngstown State University)	G3B Thu PM
Tooley, Michael (University of Colorado–Boulder)	Fri PM, G8E Sat PM
Traiger, Saul (Occidental College)	G2A Wed PM
Tremblay, Frederic (University at Buffalo)	G6N Fri PM
Tresan, Jonathan A. (University of Florida)	7C Fri PM
Trestman, Michael (University of Utah)	4H Thu PM
Trogdon, Kelly G. (Lingnan University)	8E Fri PM
Trout, Lara (University of Portland)	G5D Thu PM
Tucker, Ericka (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)	G2F Wed PM, G6F Fri PM, 9H Sat AM
Tulipana, Paul (Georgia State University)	10G Sat PM
Turgeon, Wendy (St. Joseph's College–New York)	MII-3 Wed PM, 4L Thu PM
Turner, Derek (Connecticut College)	G5C Thu PM
Twomey, Rosemary (City University of New York–Graduate School)	10H Sat PM
Tye, Michael (University of Texas–Austin)	3C Thu AM

U

Ulatowski, Joseph (University of Nevada–Las Vegas)	4H Thu PM
Uleman, Jennifer K. (Purchase College, State University of New York)	11K Sat PM
Ullian, Joseph (Washington University in St. Louis)	9L Sat AM

V

Van Camp, Julie C. (California State University–Long Beach)	G3E Thu PM
Van Cleve, James (University of Southern California)	7G Fri PM
van Wietmarschen, Han (Stanford University)	9H Sat AM
Vanhaute, Liesbet (Universiteit Antwerpen)	G6I Fri PM
Varden, Helga (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)	10G Sat PM
Veek, Aaron (University of Southern California)	5B Thu PM
Vessel, Jean-Paul (New Mexico State University)	2J Wed PM
Vihvelin, Kadri (University of Southern California)	5B Thu PM
Vinci, Thomas (Dalhousie University)	2A Wed PM
Vineberg, Susan (Wayne State University)	4E Thu PM
Vision, Gerald (Temple University)	1H Wed PM

von Fintel, Kai (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)	2E Wed PM, 3L Thu AM
von Platz, Jeppe (University of Pennsylvania)	6K Fri AM
Voronina, Lydia (Independent Scholar)	G2E Wed PM

W

Walker, Caren (University of California–Berkeley)	MII-2B Wed AM
Walker, Margaret (Arizona State University)	8B Fri PM
Walker, Matthew (Rutgers University)	11F Sat PM
Wallace, Megan (University of Kentucky)	9J Sat AM
Waller, Sara (Montana State University)	3J Thu AM
Wallis, Charles (California State University–Long Beach)	4H Thu PM
Walsh, Sean Drysdale (University of Minnesota–Duluth)	2J Wed PM
Walters, Gregory (Saint Paul University)	G6D Fri PM
Wang, Qingjie (Chinese University of Hong Kong)	G4A Thu PM
Wang, Robin (Loyola Marymount University)	3H Thu AM, G8B Sat PM
Wartenberg, Thomas (Mount Holyoke College)	MII-3 Wed PM
Watkins, Brian (Duke University)	11F Sat PM
Watkins, Mary (Pacifica Graduate Institute)	1L Wed PM
Watson, Lori (University of San Diego)	2F Wed PM, G7B Sat PM
Wautischer, Helmut (Sonoma State University)	G2E Wed PM, 9L Sat AM
Wawrytko, Sandra A. (San Diego State University)	G2D Wed PM, 4J Thu PM, G6B Fri PM
Weber, Tamar (University of California–Los Angeles)	4I Thu PM
Weinberg, Jonathan (Indiana University–Bloomington)	MI-1 Wed AM, G8C Sat PM
Weiner, Joan (Indiana University–Bloomington)	3E Thu AM
Weirich, Paul (University of Missouri)	1K Wed PM, 6L Fri AM
Weiss, Gail (George Washington University)	G6O Fri PM
Wellman, Christopher Heath (Washington University in St. Louis)	6M Fri AM
Wenning, Mario (University of Macau and Universität Frankfurt)	4J Thu PM
Wetzel, Linda (Georgetown University)	7D Fri PM
Wheeler, Gregory (New University of Lisbon)	11J Sat PM
Wheeler, Mark (San Diego State University)	G4G Thu PM, 11E Sat PM
Whitcomb, Dennis (Western Washington University)	8D Fri PM
White, Stephen (University of California–Los Angeles)	3H Thu AM
Whittaker, Debbie (California State University–Long Beach)	MII-5 Thurs AM
Wible, Andy (Muskegon Community College)	G9B Sat PM
Wilburn, Joshua (University of Victoria)	10H Sat PM

Wilburn, Ron (University of Nevada–Las Vegas)	4G Thu PM
Wilcox, Shelley (San Francisco State University)	6M Fri AM, G6G Fri PM
Wilford, Paul (Tulane University of New Orleans)	G2I Wed PM
Williams, Andrew (Warwick University and ICREA/Universitat Pompeu Fabra)	11B Sat PM
Williams, Christopher (University of Nevada–Reno)	G5A Thu PM, 7G Fri PM
Williams, David (University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point)	10B Sat PM
Williams, Paul (University of Texas–Austin).....	G2J Wed PM
Willman, Marshall (New York Institute of Technology–Nanjing)	4J Thu PM
Wilson, George (University of Southern California)	4B Thu PM
Wilson, Mark (University of Pittsburgh).....	9E Sat AM
Wilson, Rob (University of Alberta)	MII-6 Thurs AM
Wilson, Yolonda (Duke University)	1I Wed PM
Winfield, Richard Dien (University of Georgia).....	G4I Thu PM
Winfree, Jason (California State University–Stanislaus).....	G1E Wed PM
Wion, Matt (Marquette University).....	G6F Fri PM
Wishon, Donovan (Stanford University).....	6G Fri AM
Wittusen, Cato (Universitetet i Stavanger).....	G2G Wed PM
Woien, Sandra (Arizona State University)	3K Thu AM
Wolfson, Ben (Stanford University).....	4F Thu PM
Wonderly, Monique (University of California–Riverside)	3H Thu AM
Woods, Jack (Princeton University).....	G2G Wed PM
Woods, Mark (University of San Diego).....	7A Fri PM, G6C Fri PM
Wrathall, Mark (University of California–Riverside).....	5G Thu PM
Wray, K. Brad (State University of New York–Oswego).....	9L Sat AM
Wrenn, Chase B. (University of Alabama–Tuscaloosa)	5L Thu PM
Wright, Cory (California State University–Long Beach)	5F Thu PM
Wright, Crispin (New York University and University of Aberdeen)	11A Sat PM
Wright, Jen Cole (College of Charleston)	MI-1 Wed AM, G4H Thu PM
Wright, Kathleen (Haverford College).....	7F Fri PM
Wunderlich, Mark E. (Union College)	4E Thu PM
Wylie, Alison (University of Washington)	Fri PM, 10K Sat PM
Wüthrich, Christian (University of California–San Diego)	2I Wed PM

X

Xiao, Yang (Kenyon College).....	6B Fri AM
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Y

Yaffe, Gideon (University of Southern California)	3A Thu AM, 9N Sat AM
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Yagisawa, Takashi (California State University–Northridge)	7D Fri PM
Yamada, Masahiro (Claremont Graduate University)	6F Fri AM
Yegnashankaran, Kritika (Bard College)	10F Sat PM
Yeomans, Christopher (Purdue University).....	6K Fri AM
Yi, Byeong-Uk (University of Toronto)	1H Wed PM
Young, Charles (Claremont Graduate University)	1G Wed PM
Yount, David J. (Mesa Community College)	1G Wed PM
Yuan, Lijun (Texas State University–San Marcos).....	2F Wed PM

Z

Zack, Naomi (University of Oregon).....	G6G Fri PM, G7C Sat PM
Zambrana, Rocío (University of Oregon)	G6I Fri PM
Zammito, John H. (Rice University).....	G4J Thu PM
Zangeneh, Hakhamanesh (California State University–Stanislaus)	G1E Wed PM
Zapata, Fernando (State University of New York–Binghamton)	G7C Sat PM
Zelenak, Eugen (Catholic University in Ružomberok)	4I Thu PM
Zhang, Ellen (Hong Kong Baptist University).....	G4A Thu PM
Zieminska, Renata (Uniwersytet Szczeciński)	G7D Sat PM
Zimmerman, Aaron (University of California–Santa Barbara)...	11A Sat PM
Zinn, Carmen (University of California–Santa Barbara)	10I Sat PM
Zuckert, Rachel (Northwestern University)	7G Fri PM
Zwolinski, Matt (University of San Diego)	2C Wed PM

GROUP SESSIONS

A

American Association of Philosophy Teachers, *Saturday, April 23, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

American Society for Aesthetics, *Thursday, April 21, 8:00-10:00 p.m.*

Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 1, *Thursday, April 21, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 2, *Saturday, April 23, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking, *Thursday, April 21, 8:00-10:00 p.m.*

Ayn Rand Society, *Saturday, April 23, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*

C

Charles S. Peirce Society, *Thursday, April 21, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*

Concerned Philosophers for Peace, *Thursday, April 21, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

D

David Kellogg Lewis Society, *Saturday, April 23, 8:00-10:00 p.m.*

E

Experimental Philosophy Society, *Saturday, April 23, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

H

Hume Society, *Wednesday, April 20, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

I

International Association for the Philosophy of Sport, *Wednesday, April 20, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

International Hobbes Association, Session 1, *Wednesday, April 20, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

International Hobbes Association, Session 2, *Friday, April 22, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

International Society for Chinese Philosophy, Session 1, *Wednesday, April 20, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

International Society for Chinese Philosophy, Session 2, *Friday, April 22, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy, Session 1, *Thursday, April 21, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*

International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy, Session 2, *Saturday, April 23, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

International Society for Environmental Ethics, Session 1, *Thursday, April 21, 8:00-10:00 p.m.*

International Society for Environmental Ethics, Session 2, *Friday, April 22, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

J

Josiah Royce Society, *Wednesday, April 20, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*

K

Karl Jaspers Society of North America, Session 1, *Wednesday, April 20, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Karl Jaspers Society of North America, Session 2, *Friday, April 22, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

Kierkegaard Society, *Thursday, April 21, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

N

North American Kant Society, Session 1, *Thursday, April 21, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

North American Kant Society, Session 2, *Friday, April 22, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

North American Nietzsche Society, *Thursday, April 21, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

North American Society for Social Philosophy, Session 1, *Thursday, April 21, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*

North American Society for Social Philosophy, Session 2, *Saturday, April 23, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*

North American Spinoza Society, Session 1, *Wednesday, April 20, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

North American Spinoza Society, Session 2, *Friday, April 22, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

North American Wittgenstein Society, *Wednesday, April 20, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

P

Philosophy of Time Society, *Saturday, April 23, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

R

Radical Philosophy Association, Session 1, *Friday, April 22, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

Radical Philosophy Association, Session 2, *Saturday, April 23, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*

S

Society for Analytical Feminism, Session 1, *Wednesday, April 20, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*

Society for Analytical Feminism, Session 2, *Thursday, April 21, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy, *Thursday, April 21, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, *Friday, April 22, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

Society for Empirical Ethics, *Thursday, April 21, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Society for German Idealism, Session 1, *Wednesday, April 20, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

- Society for German Idealism, Session 2, *Friday, April 22, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
- Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy, *Saturday, April 23, 8:00-10:00 p.m.*
- Society for Natural Religion, Session 1, *Wednesday, April 20, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*
- Society for Natural Religion, Session 2, *Thursday, April 21, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*
- Society for Natural Religion, Session 3, *Saturday, April 23, 8:00-10:00 p.m.*
- Society for Phenomenology and Analytic Philosophy, *Friday, April 22, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
- Society for Realist/Antirealist Discussion, *Friday, April 22, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
- Society for Skeptical Studies, *Saturday, April 23, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*
- Society for Systematic Philosophy, *Thursday, April 21, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*
- Society for Women in Philosophy, Session 1, *Friday, April 22, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
- Society for Women in Philosophy, Session 2, *Saturday, April 23, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*
- Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Graduate Student Section, *Friday, April 22, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
- Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, *Thursday, April 21, 8:00-10:00 p.m.*
- Society for the History of Political Philosophy, *Wednesday, April 20, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*
- Society for the Metaphysics of Science, Session 1, *Thursday, April 21, 8:00-10:00 p.m.*
- Society for the Metaphysics of Science, Session 2, *Friday, April 22, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
- Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts, *Thursday, April 21, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*
- Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 1, *Thursday, April 21, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*
- Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 2, *Saturday, April 23, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*
- Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love, *Saturday, April 23, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*
- Society for the Study of Philosophy and the Martial Arts, *Saturday, April 23, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*
- Society for the Study of Process Philosophies, *Friday, April 22, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
- Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy, Session 1, *Saturday, April 23, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*
- Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy, Session 2, *Saturday, April 23, 8:00-10:00 p.m.*
- Society of Christian Philosophers, *Wednesday, April 20, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*
- Society of Indian Philosophy and Religion, *Wednesday, April 20, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

W

- Western Phenomenology Conference, *Wednesday, April 20, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*

SESSIONS ARRANGED BY APA COMMITTEES

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 20

9/11 Ten: Approaching the Tenth Anniversary of 9/11 Through Asian/American Eyes (1L)

Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies

1:00-4:00 p.m.

How the APA Defends the Professional Rights of Its Members (And Other Philosophers) (2K)

Committee on the Defense of the Professional Rights of Philosophers

4:00-6:00 p.m.

THURSDAY, APRIL 21

When Should a Bioethicist Speak Out? (3K)

Committee on Philosophy and Medicine

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Constructive Engagement of Analytic and Continental Approaches in Philosophy: From the Point of View of Asian Philosophy (4J)

Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Philosophy Undisciplined: A Broader Vision of Accountability (4K)

Committee on Public Philosophy

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Why Philosophy Before College? (4L)

Committee on Pre-College Instruction in Philosophy

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Under-Represented Groups in Philosophy: An International Conversation (5M)

Committee on Inclusiveness

4:00-6:00 p.m.

FRIDAY, APRIL 22**Best Placement Practices Handbook (6L)**

Committee on Academic Career Opportunities and Placement

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Kavka Prize Paper (6M)

Committee on Lectures, Publications, and Research

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Philosophical Collaboration: Theoretical and Practical Considerations (7M)

Committee on Public Philosophy

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Regenerating Queer: The Ethical Challenges of Recent Biopolitics (7N)

Committee on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender People in the Profession

1:00-4:00 p.m.

SATURDAY, APRIL 23**Author-Meets-Critics: Enrique Dussel, *Politics of Liberation: Architectonics*, Volume 2 (9M)**

Committee on Hispanics

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Berger Prize Paper (9N)

Committee on Philosophy and Law

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Author-Meets-Critics: Oscar Guardiola-Rivera, *What If Latin America Ruled the World? How the South Will Take the North Through the 21st Century* (10J)

Committee on Hispanics

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Gender Climate, Institutional Recognition, and Material Compensation (10K)

Committee on the Status of Women

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Teaching History of Philosophy: History or Philosophy? (10L)

Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy

1:00-4:00 p.m.

ABSTRACTS

A LOGIC OF “ANOTHER”

JOONGOL KIM, WESTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY

This paper argues that in order to capture the inference patterns in logical reasoning involving the locution “there is another,” we need a logical framework that admits exclusive quantifiers (in addition to the usual inclusive quantifiers such as “there is a(n)”). It will be argued that a major advantage of such a logical framework is that it provides for intuitive definitions of basic arithmetical operations such as successor, addition, and multiplication.

A MINIMALIST DUTY FOR GENDER JUSTICE

PIN-FEI LU, INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR

In order to meet the demand of gender justice in a pluralist democracy, I uphold there is a political duty that every citizen should and could accept. Such a duty, each person to respect all citizens as free and equal, is famously assumed in Rawls’s theory, but has not been correctly understood and sufficiently demonstrated in its connection to gender justice. Thus, with the aid primary from the theoretical framework of Rawls’s political liberalism and the critical urge of Jean Hampton’s feminist contractarianism for contracting just relationships, here I intend to sustain how the achievement of women’s substantive equality, a realization of gender justice, in a pluralistic democracy is crucially dependent on citizens following the duty by way of three arguments—a reconstruction of Rawlsian conception of the political, an amalgamation of the political and the personal, and an appeal of minimalism.

A MORAL INTEREST IN DEMOCRACY

ROBERT C. HUGHES, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH

This paper presents a new argument that one of the central features of democracy has non-instrumental value. All citizens who regard current law or policy as unjust should have meaningful opportunities to try to bring about change. Without meaningful opportunities to try to change the law, individuals who regard existing laws as partially unjust face a morally problematic dilemma. If they comply with these laws voluntarily without also trying to change them, they become complicit in injustice by their own lights, if not in fact. If they disobey, or if they obey only to avoid sanction, they respond inadequately to the important purposes that the law advances despite its injustice. Because individuals have a moral interest in acting on their considered views about justice whether or not

these views are correct, a responsive political process is desirable even when a less inclusive process would likely yield more just law.

A PARADOX FREE ANSELMIANISM

MICHAEL J. ALMEIDA, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS–SAN ANTONIO

I argue that Anselmians ought to abandon traditional Anselmianism in favor of Moderate Anselmianism. Moderate Anselmianism advances the view that a being $x = \text{God}$ iff (i) for every essential property P of x , it is secondarily necessary that x has P , (ii) for most essential properties of x , it is not primarily necessary that x has P , and (iii) the essential properties of x include omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness, and necessary existence. Traditional Anselmians have no cogent response to most a priori atheological arguments. But a priori atheological arguments present no serious problem for moderate Anselmians. Unlike traditional Anselmianism, Moderate Anselmianism explains why a priori atheological arguments can be convincing and nonetheless illusory.

A PLEA FOR TRACKING

BRETT SHERMAN, UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER

In this paper, I challenge the traditional idea that the content of a belief is a piece of information that is separable from the mechanism by which the information is stored, a view defended recently by Robert Stalnaker. I present some puzzling data about belief reports which I argue motivate a picture of referential content that appeals to a notion of tracking an individual over time. I argue that Stalnaker's account has trouble explaining the anomalous data.

A PRIORITY PROBLEM FOR THE CONSTITUENT SOLUTION

ANDREW M. BAILEY, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

Jeffrey Brower has recently offered a new solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics. In this paper, I highlight a problem for that solution; it runs afoul of a plausible priority principle.

A RADICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF RACE-THINKING

NATHAN PAI SCHMITT, UNIVERSITY OF OREGON

The question that most often frames philosophic discourse on race—roughly, “What is it, and what should we do with it?”—is a question that leads us astray nearly as often as it is asked. In this paper I argue that this traditional question of race is problematic and discourages us from solving problems in a way that adequately reflects our experience of them. We should instead consider the problem of race, with help from classical and contemporary American pragmatists, in light of what I identify as the three modes of experience, and I argue that my new model of thinking offers us powerful tools that we ought to employ to solve both conceptual and practical problems of race.

A SOCRATIC CRITIQUE OF SOCRATES' NOBLE FALSEHOOD

ARA ASTOURIAN, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL CHOLBI, CALIFORNIA STATE POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY—POMONA

Most commentators have dismissed the *Republic's* "noble falsehood" as unjust and manipulative without noting that this falsehood is introduced after an explicit discussion of justified and unjustified deception. As a result, little attention has been given to whether the noble falsehood is justified on Socrates' own terms. We first outline Socrates' contrast between two types of falsehood: "true falsehood," a contemptible state of the soul, and useful falsehood or a "lie in words." Since the noble falsehood is intended to strengthen citizens' allegiance to the just city, it belongs to a category of useful falsehood, namely, lies told to prevent others from doing evil because of ignorance. However, the noble falsehood can only meet Socrates' aims if it also meets the criteria for a contemptible true falsehood. The noble falsehood thus turns out to be both contemptible and unjustified, according to Socrates, while also being useful and justified.

ACCEPTANCE, FAIRNESS, AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION

EDWARD H.K. SONG, LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY

Among the most popular strategies for justifying political obligations are those that appeal to the principle of fairness. These theories face the challenge, canonically articulated by Robert Nozick, of explaining how it is that persons are obliged to schemes when they receive goods that they do not ask for but cannot reject. John Simmons offers one defense of the principle of fairness, arguing that a person could be bound by obligations of fairness if he or she voluntarily accepts goods produced by a cooperative scheme. Simmons, however, thinks that such a theory will do little work in justifying political obligations since virtually no one voluntarily accepts state goods. This paper will attempt to advance just such a theory by arguing that states are in fact genuine cooperative schemes, and that Simmons is overly pessimistic in his appraisal of whether the majority of citizens accept the goods provided by their states.

ACQUIRING JUSTIFICATION FROM FICTIONAL NARRATIVES: WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE THOUGHT EXPERIMENT ANALOGY

CHARLES REPP, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

In this paper I consider and critique one popular response to what I call the "no-justification" argument—the argument that fictional narratives have no way of supplying justification for their themes. Some philosophers, including Noël Carroll and David Davies, have tried to answer the argument by drawing an analogy between fictional narratives and thought experiments. I argue that this analogy fails to capture some of the distinctive ways in which narrative fictions, especially long forms such as novels, plays, and epics, can supply justification for their themes. In particular, I argue that long narrative fictions, unlike thought experiments, can earn

our acceptance of themes by leading us to recognize them as belonging to coherent systems of beliefs or as arising from virtuous habits of mind.

ACTIVITY AND EXPERIENCE

GARY BARTLETT, CENTRAL WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

The general approach of this paper is motivated by the idea that it seems abundantly clear that our experiences require neural activity, and that if this fact is taken seriously then functionalism is in trouble—for it cannot make a place for this fact in anything other than a stipulative sense (as in the lip service assumption that experiences are produced by neural firings). The argument of the paper is that since (1) functionalist theories of conscious experience entail that a human could have a conscious experience that was realized by a state involving no physical activity, and (2) conscious experiences in humans can only be realized by states involving physical activity, it therefore follows that (3) functionalist theories of conscious experience are false.

AGAINST FRANKFURT'S CARE GROUND OF IMPORTANCE

ADAM PELSER, BAYLOR UNIVERSITY

Harry Frankfurt argues that importance is not inherent. He contends that importance is grounded solely in what we care about (or, love). Frankfurt argues that there is no care-independent ground of importance since, he thinks, there can be no care-independent ground of our knowledge of importance. This argument fails on account of its confusing the epistemic ground of our knowledge of importance with the ontological ground of importance. Moreover, Frankfurt's Care Ground of Importance principle undermines his own treatment of "volitional irrationality" as a morally significant defect of some moral agents. Frankfurt argues that while those who perform even the most "unthinkable" acts are not objectively immoral, they are "volitionally irrational" and "inhuman." Frankfurt's Care Ground of Importance, however, undermines any plausible attempt to understand the defect of such agents as a failure of rationality or as a lack of human nature.

ALIEF AND AFFORDANCE: THE NORMATIVITY OF AUTOMATICITY

MICHAEL S. BROWNSTEIN, NEW JERSEY INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

ALEX MADVA, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

We aim to bridge two psychologically informed movements in philosophy, which have thus far progressed independently. (1) We explore Tamar Szab Gendler's promising concept of "alief," an associative and arational mental state more primitive than belief. Alief represents, among other things, an attempt to make sense of so-called "automatic" behaviors, in particular those automatic behaviors which are discordant with reflective judgments. (2) We situate alief in a philosophical and psychological framework broader than the classic cognitivist picture Gendler aims to supplement and revise. By drawing on ecological psychology and phenomenology,

we argue that alief is the cognitive state that responds to affordances, which are perceived opportunities for appropriate behavior. We explain how apparently brute, alief-driven behavior can actually be intelligent and norm-sensitive—neither (merely) causal nor (fully) rational—and suggest that a unified alief-affordance conception of unreflective behavior provides new directions for philosophical and empirical research.

AN ARGUMENT FOR OLD-FASHIONED INTUITION PUMPING

BRIAN T. TALBOT, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO—BOULDER

One mainstream approach to philosophy involves trying to learn about philosophically interesting, non-mental, phenomena—ethical properties, for example, or causation—by gathering data from human beings. This approach is associated with the use of philosophers' intuitions as data, the making of deductive arguments from this data, and the gathering of intuitions by eliciting reactions to often quite bizarre thought experiments. These methods have been criticized, and these criticisms point out important areas for improvement. In this paper I will argue that, despite this, these methods should not be entirely jettisoned, that some of the old ways really are the best ways. Specifically, our commitment to using intuitions and gathering them with bizarre thought experiments is well founded, both philosophically and empirically.

AN EPISTEMIC THEORY OF CREATION

JONATHAN KVANVIG, BAYLOR UNIVERSITY

The standard view is that only Molinism offers any hope of preserving the doctrine of divine providence while retaining libertarian freedom. I present here a new middle position between Theistic Determinism and Open Theism, one that has no need of counterfactuals of freedom. Instead of relying on counterfactuals of freedom, this model of creation involves epistemic principles and an update semantics in place of the focus on strict and subjunctive conditionals and the truth-conditional semantics for such typical in debates in this area. The result is a view not subject to the standard worries about Molinism and its reliance on counterfactuals of freedom.

AN UNCOMPROMISING CONNECTION BETWEEN PRACTICAL REASON AND MORALITY

MICHAEL D. NELSON, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—RIVERSIDE

Velleman defends a novel intermediate between moral rationalism and moral skepticism. Like the moral rationalist, he maintains that only irrational agents act immorally. Like the moral skeptic, he maintains that some immoral acts are not irrational; immorality is not always contrary to the dictates of practical reason. Velleman motives his skepticism by considering hard cases of agents allegedly lacking reason to be moral. I defend an orthodox Kantian view, arguing that Velleman misdescribes the reasons the hard cases have. I argue that every autonomous agent has reason to be moral. This follows, I argue, from Velleman's conception

of practical reason as having the aim of self-understanding. I end by briefly discussing the problem of conflicting requirements and Velleman's argument against the claim that morality is self-imposed.

ANTONYMY IN THE ATTITUDES

ALEX GRZANKOWSKI, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS—AUSTIN

A good semantics for attitude ascriptions will allow us to make reports without paradox or puzzle. In what follows, I argue that this task cannot be accomplished without taking some attitudes to be antonyms or opposites much like "good/bad" and "large/small." The most important feature of this relation for the present discussion is that it is not definable in terms of Boolean negation. Below I will try to say a bit more about antonymy, though my primary focus is motivating the importance of antonymy rather than offering an explication of the relation. I begin by highlighting both the virtues and limitations of a very attractive approach to the semantics of attitude ascriptions espoused by Nathan Salmon. I then show that even if one adopts this type of picture, a puzzle remains. I argue that the most natural way to solve the remaining puzzle is by appeal to antonymy.

ARE EXPRESSIVISTS GUILTY OF WISHFUL THINKING?

ROBERT A. MABRITO, NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY

Recently, Cian Dorr (2002) has argued that even an expressivist theory with sufficient resources to solve the Frege-Geach problem faces what he claims is a new and distinct objection: any such expressivist theory—regardless of the nature of its solution to the Frege-Geach problem—entails that intuitively rational beliefs are in fact irrational. If Dorr is correct about this, then the new problem he raises would be as devastating as the old Frege-Geach problem is often thought to be. In this paper, I argue that Dorr is not correct. Rather than constituting a new and potent objection to expressivism, the issue Dorr raises does not pose a serious problem for any version of expressivism that is able to solve the Frege-Geach problem.

ARISTOTLE ON THE CONDITIONAL FINAL VALUE OF FRIENDS

MATTHEW WALKER, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

Aristotle's account of the value of friends generates what I call the instrumentality problem: Can Aristotle simultaneously (i) argue that friends possess sufficient final value as to be essential constituents of the happy life, yet (ii) appeal to the utility of friends for eliciting self-awareness as part of his case for (i)? In this paper, I argue that Aristotle's account of friendship can respond to the instrumentality problem. By adopting a key distinction of Christine Korsgaard's, I argue for a reading of Aristotle according to which the value of friends for their own sakes—the "final" or "end" value of friends—is (in part) conditional upon their usefulness in eliciting self-awareness. On this reading, Aristotle's account can reasonably appeal to the utility of friends, but in a way that does not reduce their value to that utility.

ARISTOTLE'S HOMONYMS RECONSIDERED

JURGIS (GEORGE) BRAKAS, MARIST COLLEGE

I address two issues pertaining to Aristotle's homonyms. The first concerns their nature. According to the traditional interpretation, homonyms are things having the same "name" whose "definitions" are different—for example, a man and his picture are homonyms because they are both called "[an] animal." I argue that this interpretation is false: it is the animals signified by the predicates in the two cases that are homonyms. The second concerns Aristotle's claim in *Metaphysics* G2 that beings are not homonyms. This is puzzling since they should be homonyms. Scholars are divided on how to solve this puzzle. I argue that they are not homonyms at the *Metaphysics* G stage of his development—nor synonyms or relata falling into a category between homonyms and synonyms. They are things related to one and the same thing and for that very reason are no longer considered to be homonyms, for Aristotle.

ARISTOTLE, THE COMMON GOOD, AND τὸ καλόν

Joseph Stenberg, University of Colorado–Boulder

Among the great interpretive challenges confronting those who study Aristotle's ethics and politics is elucidating the nature of τὸ καλόν, which is often translated the beautiful, the fine, or the noble. In this essay, I offer a basic synthesis of two views that are generally held to be irreconcilable, namely, those defended by proponents of the aesthetic view of τὸ καλόν, particularly Kelly Rogers and Gabriel Richardson Lear, and those of Terrence Irwin, a proponent of what might be called a civic view of τὸ καλόν. By combining these views, I create what I call a "modified civic view of τὸ καλόν," which retains distinctive features of both views as well as the advantages attendant on Irwin's view, namely, responses to both the charge that Aristotle was an ethical egoist and the related charge that his theory is without even a basic conception of what we would call "morality."

AUSTIN MEETS ADELSON: WHERE ORDINARY LANGUAGE INTERSECTS WITH
EXPERIMENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY

AARON SCHILLER, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN–MILWAUKEE

A serious challenge to the view that facts are perceived (and not inferred or constructed, say) is the lack of plausible accounts relating fact perception to the perception of other widely recognized types of perception, most notably that of objects and properties. In this paper, I attempt to provide a sketch of such an account, one that starts from J. L. Austin's Ordinary Language analysis of the argument from illusion for the existence of sense data and ends up in a discussion of Edward Adelson's checker shadow illusion. My conclusions are that (1) when facts are perceived they contextualize the perception of objects and that (2) to perceive a property is to perceive an object.

AXIOMATIC APPROACHES TO TRUTH: AN OVERVIEW

VOLKER HALBACH, OXFORD UNIVERSITY

GILA SHER, UNIVERSITY CALIFORNIA–SAN DIEGO

The language of arithmetic is augmented with a new unary predicate T and axioms characterizing T as a truth predicate for codes of sentences are added to Peano arithmetic. Some well-known systems such as the Kripke-Feferman and the Friedman-Sheard systems will be surveyed and compared. I will then concentrate on some more recent developments. It will be shown that there are consistent and attractive systems that are purely disquotational, i.e., based on T -sentences as axioms and that therefore deflationary axiomatizations of truth are not necessarily weaker than compositional systems. Moreover I will look at the prospects of formulating axiomatic theories of truth in non-classical logics. I will discuss different ways to compare axiomatic truth theories. For instance, such theories can be compared by their proof-theoretic strength, their truth-free content, or their ability to define the truth predicate of the other theory.

BEING EVIL: RPGs, IMAGINATIVE IMMERSION, AND MORAL COMPLICITY

EVA DADLEZ, UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL OKLAHOMA

I will explore the applicability of the philosophical literature on imaginative resistance and moderate moralism to role-playing games (RPGs). Those who maintain that fiction can sometimes make us complicit in the moral perspective it endorses infer that perspective on the basis of what is fictionally the case. Moral complicity depends, in this argument, on our own conception of what is morally permissible. We will not be able to imagine the correctness of an action in the absence of some genuine belief that it is possible for actions of that kind to be right, since we can't imagine what we can't conceive. This would immediately seem damning when we consider role-playing games. However, I will argue that the perspective of the RPG gamer is analogous to that of an author or an actor, and that the arguments concerning moral complicity do not apply in any necessary way to writing and improvisational acting.

BELIEF AND DIFFICULT ACTION

BERISLAV MARUŠIĆ, BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY

Suppose you decide or promise to do something that you know is difficult to do. For example, you decide to quit smoking or promise to be with your spouse all the days of your life. Should you believe that you will uphold your decision or keep your promise? If you do, you believe against the evidence. If you don't, your decision is not serious, and your promise is not sincere. Neither option seems acceptable. My paper has two aims. First, I argue that these reflections reveal an important philosophical problem that is not recognized in contemporary discussion but that has tangible importance. After all, we know that our most important decisions are difficult to uphold and our most important promises are difficult to keep. Second, I argue that

evidentialism does not offer an adequate solution to this problem. To solve the problem, we must adopt a new form of pragmatism.

BLOCKING THE BLOCKING DEFENSE

GABRIEL RABIN, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—LOS ANGELES

According to the zombie argument against physicalism, a zombie world is conceivable, and therefore possible. The possibility of such a world falsifies physicalism. Leuenberger (2008) offers an ingenious defense against the zombie argument. According to him, we do not conceive a genuine zombie world; instead we conceive a zombie-ish world in which, because of the presence of strange alien properties, phenomenal experiences are blocked from arising out of the physical world. Since no genuine zombie world is possible, physicalism is saved from the zombie argument. I'll argue that Leuenberger's blockers defense proves too much. The blockers move can also be used to defend preposterous metaphysical supervenience claims, including the claim that the entire state of the world supervenes on a peanut. Thus, I conclude, despite the promise of an easy reply to the most damaging anti-physicalist argument of our time, the physicalist should not adopt the blocking defense.

BLUNTING THE BLIND IMPRESS: AUTONOMY, SELF-REFLECTION, AND TRACKING THE TRUTH

DWIGHT FURROW, SAN DIEGO MESA COLLEGE

MARK WHEELER, SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY

The dominant conception of autonomy is a hierarchical/procedural model—defended by Frankfurt, Bratman, and Christman, among others—in which reflective self-appraisal is the key element in constituting the autonomy of an action. We argue that there are two fatal objections to this model: (1) the limits of genuine self-knowledge; and (2) the plethora of counter-examples to this conception—activities directed by and under the control of the self that do not involve self-reflection. Thus, we propose an alternative model that anchors autonomy in the degree to which desires are “attuned” to what an agent cares about and the degree to which an agent's beliefs track facts about the world that enable a desire to causally contribute to the realization of its satisfaction conditions. Neither of these conditions requires self-reflection.

BRANCHING VERSUS NON-BRANCHING MODELS AND MODERATE MORALISM

SCOTT CLIFTON, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

Noël Carroll advocates moderate moralism, which holds that in some instances moral judgments can affect aesthetic judgments of works of art. In this paper I present his view, as well as criticism made by James Anderson and Jeffrey Dean. I argue that their criticism is of the branching structure of Carroll's position. I note that even when this is pointed out, Carroll wishes to preserve the structure by arguing against the priority of sufficient reason. I end the paper by suggesting a way that a moderate

moralist can adopt a non-branching model, which needn't take a stand on what kind of reason is apt.

CAN BLUE MEAN FOUR?

JENNIFER J. MATEY, FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

In recent years, a growing number of philosophers have defended the view that conscious perceptual experiences have content on account of their phenomenal characters (Chalmers 2004, Horgan and Tienson 2002, Siegel 2005, Siewert 1998). One still relatively under-explored issue, however, concerns what sort of information the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is capable of representing. Positions on this issue fall into two general categories. Conservative views hold that only directly sensible properties such as colors, shapes, and the spatial relations among these properties are represented in perceptual experience (Tye 1995, Dretske 1995). The liberal position, on the other hand, holds that information over and above these properties can be perceptually represented. This paper presents a counterexample to conservative views, drawing on the visuo-perceptual phenomenon of higher-grapheme color synaesthesia.

CAN EPISTEMIC OBLIGATION BE REDUCED TO SYNCHRONIC EVIDENTIAL JUSTIFICATION?

KRAIG MARTIN, BAYLOR UNIVERSITY

Richard Feldman claims that what one epistemically ought to believe is always that which fits one's evidence. Keith DeRose challenges Feldman with two cases in which it seems as though there is a sense in which one epistemically ought not believe what fits one's evidence. I first consider a reply to the challenge presented in the first DeRose case. It seems as though an argument by Trent Dougherty gives a means for the evidentialist to argue that the responsibilist sense of ought can be reduced to non-epistemic normativity. However, I argue that this attempt to reply to DeRose's first challenge doesn't work. A possible reply to the second DeRose case involves restricting what it is for one to "have evidence." I argue that there are good reasons to doubt that restricting what it is to "have evidence" will allow the evidentialist an adequate response.

CAUSATION, ASSOCIATION, AND CONFIRMATION

RICHARD SCHEINES, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY

GREGORY WHEELER, NEW UNIVERSITY OF LISBON

Many philosophers of science have argued that a set of evidence that is "coherent" confirms a hypothesis which explains such coherence. In this paper, we examine the relationships between probabilistic models of all three of these concepts: coherence, confirmation, and explanation. For coherence, we consider Shogenji's measure of association (deviation from independence). For confirmation, we consider several measures in the literature, and for explanation, we turn to Causal Bayes Nets and resort to causal structure and its constraint on probability. All else equal, we show

that focused correlation, which is the ratio of the coherence of evidence and the coherence of the evidence conditional on a hypothesis, tracks confirmation. We then show that the causal structure of the evidence and hypothesis can put strong constraints on how coherence in the evidence does or does not translate into confirmation of the hypothesis. Our results suggest how to reset the discussion of Bayesian coherentism within formal epistemology, for once we control for the role that causal structure plays in probabilistic models of coherence, we can see that the impossibility results have a much more limited scope than generally noted.

CONCEPT ACQUISITION AND PERCEPTUAL PHENOMENOLOGY

KEVIN CONNOLLY, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

Suppose you recently acquired the concept of an oriole. If you look at an oriole now, your perceptual phenomenology might differ from before. Charles Siewert and Susanna Siegel make this claim. In this paper, I evaluate it. I argue that while the concept directs your attention, you could have attended in that way without the concept, just as you might accidentally hit a backhand without ever actually learning the skill. Acquiring a concept does not add to your repertoire of perceptual acts. Rather, it selects an act you could already perform and makes it repeatable. It creates a skill.

CONCEPTUALISM AND THE RICHNESS OF PERCEPTUAL CONTENT

JOHN SPACKMAN, MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE

This paper presents an argument for a restricted content conceptualism, which holds that the contents of conscious, human perceptual experience are, like belief contents, constituted by concepts. Several recent authors have alleged that traditional arguments for conceptualism leave open the possibility that even if concepts are necessarily correlated with perceptual contents, they might not determine their essential nature. I argue (1) that studies of change blindness are best interpreted as showing that it is a necessary condition of an item being a constituent of conscious perceptual content that the subject recognize it as a token of some type, however general, (2) that if a subject recognizes a perceptual item as a token of some type, and perhaps also satisfies certain other general conditions, she satisfies the minimal conditions on possessing a concept of that type, and (3) that the subject's concepts determine the nature of her perceptual content.

CONSEQUENTIALIST VIRTUE

LUKE GELINAS, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

A number of writers in the consequentialist tradition endorse the view that to be morally virtuous is to be related to the good in a causal or productive way: the virtuous person is the one who brings about a relevant measure of good. First I formulate this view in light of difficulties implied by recent statements of it. Then I advance an objection: any view which explains virtue solely by reference to the production of good is incapable of placing

significant constraints on the actions or behavior associated with virtue. I show why this is undesirable, and identify the structure of a theory of virtue, present in the writings of G. E. Moore, which avoids the objection while remaining significantly consequentialist.

CONTEXT AND SKEPTICAL THEISM

JUSTIN P. MCBRAYER, FORT LEWIS COLLEGE

Skeptical theists argue that, given our cognitive limitations, the fact that we cannot see a compensating good for some instance of evil is not a reason to think that there is no such good. If so, we are not justified in concluding that any actual instance of evil is gratuitous, thus undercutting the argument from evil for atheism. This paper focuses on the epistemic role of context to advance the debate over skeptical theism in two ways. First, considerations of context can be invoked to offer a novel defense of skeptical theism. Second, considerations of context can be invoked to undermine the most serious objection to skeptical theism, viz. the moral objection. The gist of the paper is to defend a connection between context-driven views in epistemology with skeptical views in philosophy of religion. This paper argues that the two stand or fall together.

COULD MORALITY HAVE A SOURCE?

CHRIS HEATHWOOD, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO—BOULDER

It is a common idea that morality, or moral truths, if there are any, must have some sort of source, or grounding. It has also been claimed that constructivist theories in metaethics have an advantage over realist theories in that the former but not the latter can provide such a grounding. This paper has two goals. First, it attempts to show that constructivism does not in fact provide a complete grounding for morality, and so is on a par with realism in this respect. Second, and more tentatively, it explains why it seems that morality in fact couldn't have a source.

DECISIONS WITHOUT SHARP PROBABILITIES

PAUL WEIRICH, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

Adam Elga (2010) argues that no principle of rationality leads from unsharp probabilities to decisions. He concludes that a perfectly rational agent does not have unsharp probabilities. This paper defends unsharp probabilities. It shows how unsharp probabilities may ground rational decisions. Unsharp probabilities arise from sparse or unspecific evidence. For example, meteorological evidence, because unspecific, often does not suggest a sharp probability that tomorrow will bring rain. An agent may assign to rain a range of probabilities going from, say, 0.4 to 0.6. Elga argues that unsharp probability assignments may lead an agent to a sure loss. In this event, a dilemma arises: the agent may have either unsharp probability assignments that accurately represent evidence, or sharp probabilities that prevent sure losses. Should an agent's probability assignments be faithful to the evidence, or should they promote practical

success? This paper maintains that an agent's probability assignments can attain both goals.

DEFENDING CONSCIOUSNESS, SELF, AND ATTENTION

JASON FORD, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA–DULUTH

In his paper, "Representationalism, Peripheral Awareness, and the Transparency of Experience," Gennaro argues against Ford and Smith's "Consciousness, Self and Attention." I defend the Ford and Smith position against his arguments. First, Gennaro charges that the cases Ford and Smith use to motivate their position could also be interpreted as involving unconscious self-representations, rather than elements of a peripheral self-image. I introduce evidence from cases of thought insertion, phantom limbs, visual capture, and somatoparaphrenia, arguing that damage to a peripheral self-image within the structure of attention provides the best explanation for these phenomena. Second, Gennaro takes Ford and Smith to task for not matching the explanatory structure of HOT theories. I offer a more nuanced category scheme for Self-Referential approaches, thereby defusing Gennaro's objection.

DEONTIC LOGIC AND NATURAL LANGUAGE

KAI VON FINTEL, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

TERENCE PARSONS, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA–LOS ANGELES

In this talk, I will first give an overview of the connections and differences between the concerns of deontic logic and those of natural language semantics, touching on issues like the context-dependency of deontic modal constructions, the systematic cross-linguistic relationship between strong deontic necessity modals ("must," "have to") and weak deontic necessity modals ("ought," "should"), the distinction between personal deontic modality and propositional deontic modality, the problem of free choice permission, the interpretation of imperatives, and others. The second part looks in more detail at one central problem: the interaction of "if"-clauses and deontic modals.

DESIRE-SATISFACTION, TIME, AND THE ARGUMENT FROM INTERNALISM

DALE DORSEY, UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

A classic difficulty for a desire-satisfaction theory of welfare concerns the time at which I am benefitted by the satisfaction of a desire. Assume that I desire, at 10 a.m., January 12th, 2010, to climb Mount Everest sometime during 2012. Also assume, however, that during 2011, my desires undergo a shift: I no longer desire to climb Mount Everest during 2012. In fact, I develop an aversion to so doing. Imagine, however, that despite my aversion, I am forced to climb Mount Everest. Does climbing Mount Everest benefit me? If so, when? Recently Ben Bradley has argued that a desire-satisfaction view cannot answer this question plausibly. Bradley's arguments are powerful and merit attention. However, as I argue in this paper, they do not hold up

under scrutiny; at least one desiderative approach to the time of welfare benefits survives Bradley's critique.

DIALECTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN JUSTIFYING THE PRINCIPLE OF ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES

DAVID PALMER, UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE

According to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. Over the last few decades, PAP has dominated discussions of free will and moral responsibility. But despite this renewed attention, there is a significant gap in the literature concerning PAP. Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the fundamental question of why we should think that PAP is true in the first place. What reasons are there to think that moral responsibility requires alternative possibilities? How plausible are they? In what follows, I address this gap and take up the question of PAP's justification. I survey five possible arguments for PAP but argue that each faces dialectical difficulties. More generally, I argue that, despite the principle's apparent plausibility, it is harder to provide a convincing argument for PAP's truth than might be thought.

DIFFUSE ATTENTION

ADRIENNE PRETTYMAN, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

While there is a growing body of empirical research on the relationship between consciousness and attention, how to interpret this evidence remains a matter of dispute. Some researchers interpret the evidence to show that attention and consciousness are "distinct processes" (Koch and Tsuchiya 2006); others think the evidence shows that attention is both necessary and sufficient for consciousness (deBrigard and Prinz 2010). In this poster, I reconsider one influential body of evidence for consciousness without attention drawn from the dual-task paradigm. I provide a new interpretation of the evidence, on which subjects rely on non-selective diffuse attention to perform tasks without selectively attending to them. I end by proposing an experiment that could help researchers determine whether the evidence supports the existence of diffuse attention, and consider the implications this study would have for the philosophical debate over the relationship between attention and consciousness.

DIS-LOCATING MORAL AUTHORITY: JUSTIFYING MORAL CLAIMS IN A DIVERSE AND UNEQUAL WORLD

ALISON JAGGAR, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO–BOULDER

THERESA TOBIN, MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY

In two closely related talks, Alison Jaggar and Theresa Tobin discuss some central themes of our co-authored book-in-progress. The book addresses the question of how real people in real world situations may reason well about moral issues. We assume that, in real world situations, cultural diversity and social inequality are the norm rather than the exception.

Rather than offering a single model of moral justification designed to provide rational warrant for morally authoritative conclusions in all circumstances, we argue instead that different reasoning strategies are appropriate for different contexts. Drawing on several case studies, we offer some guidelines for selecting among available strategies. We think that our work has implications for conceiving the task of moral epistemology. We suggest that philosophers should not seek a single privileged method of moral reasoning but instead should seek to understand why different reasoning strategies work well in different circumstances.

DISAGREEING WITH PEERS: THE SET ASIDE VIEW

S. MATTHEW LIAO, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

What should you do in a case of disagreement with an epistemic peer? Are you epistemically justified in sticking to your guns or does the mere fact of the peer disagreement require at least some belief revision on your part? In this paper, I draw a distinction between two kinds of peer disagreement: Surface Disagreement and Reflective Disagreement. I first argue that in a Surface Disagreement, belief revision is required. But the explanation I offer of why belief revision is required is different from the explanation given in the literature. Next, I argue that in a Reflective Disagreement, you can stick to your guns. I defend what I call the Set Aside View, according to which you can stick to your guns because you can set aside the fact that your peer disagrees with you.

DOES MORAL RESPONSIBILITY REQUIRE CHOICE?

XIAOFEI LIU, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

A heated debate in recent discussion over moral responsibility is whether choice or voluntary control is a precondition for moral responsibility. Volitionists hold that an agent is not morally responsible for some thing unless the agent has, directly or indirectly, chosen it. Attributivists, on the other hand, hold that an agent is morally responsible for certain behavior insofar as the behavior is attributable to her in the sense that it is expressive of her attitudes, judgments, or normative commitments, and thus moral responsibility does not require choice. One serious challenge to attributivism, according to the volitionist, is that the attributivist's notion of moral responsibility fails to be a deep responsibility, one that explains the agent's credit or fault. After showing why some current attributivists' responses fail to successfully silence this challenge, I will offer a new response, one that refutes a basic assumption in this deep responsibility challenge.

DOUBLE AFFECTION VINDICATED

NICK STANG, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI

Some commentators have attributed to Kant the doctrine of double affection: subjects are causally affected both by things in themselves, and by appearances. Several commentators have claimed that this doctrine

faces serious philosophical problems. I begin by explaining what I take to be the worst problem faced by the doctrine of double affection: appearances cannot cause the very representations in virtue of which they exist. I then offer my own solution to the problem, and my own version of the doctrine of double affection.

DRIFT AS AN INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL PROCESS

GRANT A. RAMSEY, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

In this paper, I argue (contra some recent work in the philosophy of biology) that a distinction between natural selection and drift can be drawn. I draw this distinction by conceiving of drift as an individual-level process. This goes against other attempts to distinguish selection from drift, which have argued either that drift is a population-level process or product. Instead of identifying drift with population-level features, the account introduced here can instead explain these population-level features.

DUPLICATE REASONS

IAN SCHNEE, UNIVERSITY OF PUGET SOUND

Duplicate reasons are those that satisfy the following schema: that *p* is one's reason for believing that *p*. I examine two common arguments against duplicate reasons and show that neither is successful. The first argument is that duplicate reasons are viciously circular. The second is that assertions about duplicate reasons are always inappropriate. I develop the view that duplicate reasons occur when the fact that *p* is one's reason for believing that *p*, and I show that such reasons are neither circular nor refuted by the pragmatic bind we often find ourselves in when we hold beliefs for duplicate reasons.

EMOTION, EVALUATION, AND IDENTIFICATION

SCOTT O'LEARY, FORDHAM UNIVERSITY

Though it is not always apparent what distinguishes mental states we identify with from those that are external, it seems we cannot but identify with those things we care about. Harry Frankfurt has developed this connection between caring and identification. Recently, Agnieszka Jaworska has criticized Frankfurt's and other accounts of identification for ignoring marginal cases, in particular young children and Alzheimer's patients. Reflecting on marginal cases reveals that caring and identification cannot be reduced to evaluative judgment or a reflective stance toward first-order desires. Jaworska's account relies upon emotions to explain the phenomenon of identification. Yet Jaworska's appeal to emotions is correct for the wrong reasons. Her explanation that emotions are important for maintaining psychological continuity and connections inadequately explains emotions' importance. It also provides an unduly complicated explanation for their intuitive appeal. The answer is simpler and contradicts her conclusion: Emotions are important for identification because emotions are evaluative.

EMOTION, INDIVIDUATION, AND SOCIAL POWER IN SPINOZA

ERICKA TUCKER, CALIFORNIA STATE POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY–POMONA

In the contemporary literature on Spinoza's metaphysics there is an ongoing debate about the status of individuals, and particularly about the status of the state. Such debates tend to ignore the context and the aim of Spinoza's larger project and thus they tend to misunderstand Spinoza's treatment of human beings and states as complex individuals. Rejecting Aristotelian notions of natural sociability, Spinoza argued that the emotions, the bases of human sociability, contain the seeds of both social harmony and social disintegration. On Spinoza's view, to create strong political communities, we need to understand how to organize and coordinate the emotions of individuals. Only in affectively organized political communities can individuals become empowered and free. In this paper I outline the key features of Spinoza's theory of the emotions, their social dimension, and show these yield Spinoza's account of the "best state."

EMOTIONS IN A BIND

CHARLES STARKEY, CLEMSON UNIVERSITY

Neither of the two dominant strains of emotion theory—cognitive and non-cognitive approaches—are tenable. So-called hybrid theories of emotion which include both of these elements may seem to offer a way to resolve or circumvent the problems facing cognitive and non-cognitive theories. However, existing hybrid theories fail to adequately explain emotions because they leave the relation between physiological or affective and cognitive components nebulous. This paper outlines a new direction for emotion theory that explains emotions as distinct, unified psychological states that incorporate cognitive and affective elements. But unlike existing hybrid theories of emotion, it provides a more thorough explanation of the relation of the elements of emotion than existing hybrid theories by utilizing and adapting work in cognitive science on the unification of separate streams of information into a single cognitive representation.

EPISTEMIC MODAL BELIEF REPORTS ARE A PROBLEM FOR VON FINTEL AND GILLIES

BENJAMIN LENNERTZ, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

In this paper I present a problem for the view that Kai von Fintel and Anthony Gillies put forward in their paper, "Might' Made Right." In that paper they offer a sophisticated contextualist view about the epistemic modal, "might," in an attempt to account for the intuitive data about denial and retraction that seem to favor relativism. After presenting their attempt to deal with this problematic data, I argue that their view cannot explain appropriate responses to epistemic modal belief reports, like "George believes that the Dodgers might have won last night." This is because their account relies on the suggestion that there are multiple speech acts performed by utterances of epistemic modal sentences. But beliefs are mental states, not speech acts, and so resist such a treatment.

EQUAL OPPORTUNITY DESPITE FAMILY AUTONOMY?

S. STEWART BRAUN, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

Equal opportunity of life prospects and family autonomy are both valued principles. However, if they are held without compromise, they are incompatible. Thus, we must either reject equal opportunity of life prospects in favor of a weaker account of equal opportunity or abandon our commitments to family autonomy. In this paper, I contend that the choice is not as stark as it first appears. I argue for two key distinctions. First, I contend that there is a difference between family autonomy and family sanctity, the latter being consistent with a fairly robust equal opportunity. Secondly, I argue for a distinction between internal and external contingencies that demonstrates it is possible to separate the wealth of the family from the family proper. The two distinctions weaken the force of the incompatibility problem and help justify interference with the family for the sake of equal opportunity.

EQUAL WEIGHT VIEWS AND THE EVIDENTIAL IMPACT OF PEER OPINIONS

JONATHAN D. MATHESON, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH FLORIDA

Thomas Kelly has recently criticized Equal Weight Views of the epistemic significance of disagreement. Such views claim that in cases of peer disagreement the parties of the dispute should split the difference and adopt the doxastic attitude halfway between their two conflicting doxastic attitudes. According to Equal Weight Views, what one should believe having discovered a peer disagreement is entirely a matter of the evidence coming from peer opinions—the original evidence used by both parties to form their opinions has no role to play. Kelly finds this consequence of Equal Weight Views problematic and offers four arguments in support of his conclusion. In this paper I explain Kelly's four arguments and defend Equal Weight Views from each. As it turns out, Equal Weight Views give peer opinions exactly the evidential impact they deserve.

EVIDENCE, "OUGHT," AND THE MINE SHAFT PARADOX

JOHN BRUNERO, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI—ST. LOUIS

I consider an alleged paradox arising from Derek Parfit's Mine Shaft example, and argue that the paradox can be resolved by disambiguating "ought"—in particular, by distinguishing between the subjective and objective senses of "ought." An objection to this approach to the paradox has recently been advanced by Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane. They argue that the disambiguation approach predicts that in certain contexts interlocutors will be "talking past" one another when it is actually clear that they are genuinely disagreeing. Against this objection, I argue that the disambiguation approach is not committed to interpreting the interlocutors as talking past one another, and that there is a plausible interpretation, consistent with the disambiguation approach, which has it come out that the interlocutors are genuinely disagreeing. Crucial to my argument is the introduction of a third, evidential sense of "ought."

EVIDENTIALISM AND THE PRINCIPLE OF INFERENCE JUSTIFICATION

RYAN BYERLY, BAYLOR UNIVERSITY

Many epistemologists, including evidentialists Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, have found the following principle of inferential justification compelling: (PIJ) For any agent S and propositions $p_1 \dots p_n$ and q , if S is not justified in believing $p_1 \dots p_n$, then S is not justified in believing q on the basis of an inference from $p_1 \dots p_n$. I argue, however, that anyone attracted to evidentialist views like those of Conee and Feldman should be doubtful of PIJ. For, such a person will be attracted to the view that a subject S is justified in believing p just in case she ought to believe p , and I show that, given this thesis, PIJ is false. Further, I offer an explanation of why many have erroneously taken certain particular cases in which we are inclined to judge subjects unjustified in believing things on the basis of inferences from unjustified beliefs as offering support for PIJ.

EXCLUSION, OVERDETERMINATION, AND VACUITY

DANIEL LIM, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

Jaegwon Kim argues that if mental properties are irreducible with respect to physical properties then mental properties are epiphenomenal. I believe this conditional is false and argue that mental properties, along with their physical counterparts, may overdetermine their effects. Kim contends, however, that embracing overdetermination in the mental case, due to supervenience, renders the attribution of overdetermination vacuous. This way of blocking the overdetermination option, however, makes the attribution of mental epiphenomenalism equally vacuous. Furthermore, according to Kim's own logic, physical properties, and not mental properties, may be in danger of losing their causal relevance.

EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF ART

RICHARD KAMBER, THE COLLEGE OF NEW JERSEY

Although experimental philosophers have been busy kindling fires under well-worn armchairs in many areas of philosophy, the philosophy of art has remained largely untouched. I argue in this paper that techniques borrowed from experimental psychology can begin to bring new warmth and light to the old debate over "What is art?" I begin by explaining why systematic data on intuitions are indispensable to this debate, then present data from a recent survey I conducted that suggest that none of the principal theories of art advanced since the 1950s is fully successful in tracking the intuitions of art professionals (or others) about what is or is not art. I close by arguing that although there are other roles for theories of art besides tracking people's intuitions about what is art, these roles also require experimental research.

EXPRESSIVISM, CONSTRUCTIVISM, AND THE SUPERVENIENCE OF MORAL PROPERTIES

C. D. MEYERS, *UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI*

A major argument for non-cognitivism is the claim that moral realism cannot provide a satisfying explanation of why moral properties supervene on natural properties. Non-cognitivism, however, has its own problems explaining supervenience. Explanations based on second-order disapprovals of type-inconsistent moral evaluations are not sufficient because these are merely contingent attitudes that people just happen to have. And appeal to pragmatic considerations does not allow for appraisers to take their own moral attitudes seriously enough. What has been overlooked is a third alternative. The metaethical theory that can best account for supervenience is neither realist nor non-cognitivist but an objectivist version of constructivism. On the constructivist theory, right and wrong are determined by the principles that people would (hypothetically) consent to under ideal conditions. Type-consistency (and thus supervenience) is a required feature of any principles regulating our conduct, if they are to be freely agreed to by ideally rational people.

FICKLE CONSENT: WHY IS THERE NO TIME LIKE THE PRESENT?

THOMAS DOUGHERTY, *STANFORD UNIVERSITY*

It is familiar enough that typically we ought not lay hands on someone's body without their consent. What has not received attention is the fact that it is their present consent that matters—even if James has consented and will consent to my piercing his ears at the moment, it is (all else equal) impermissible for me to pierce them if he presently does not consent. In this paper, I discuss the question of why present consent matters. I consider several possible explanations, which I find unsatisfactory. I end by suggesting that a pragmatic conventionalist theory could provide an explanation. But this will be, at the very best, only a partial solution to the problem because I am not able to fully defend such a theory here. As such, the main purpose of this paper is to pose a puzzle, rather than solve it.

FICTION AND PROJECTION IN NIETZSCHE'S CONCEPTION OF VALUE

AARON HARPER, *UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS—URBANA-CHAMPAIGN*

In this paper, I develop Nietzsche's conception of value. I argue that Nietzsche believes values are projections or expressions of drives and desires. Nietzsche does not mean this in the same way as many in the neo-Humean tradition. Valuing reflects a complicated process of the development of commitments. Valuing is an achievement, involving the ability of people to commit to something. Valuing can be understood through natural and physiological explanations, but Nietzsche retains the use of the language of value. This means Nietzsche offers values as fictions or pretense, yet in practice it amounts to a naïve or quasi-realism. Values are important for Nietzsche since they reflect the individual, and Nietzsche's therapeutic aims entail the revaluation and creation of values. To give further context to my view, I contrast my view with Hussain's

interpretation of Nietzschean fictionalism. I argue that my account best makes sense of Nietzsche's activity of valuing.

FICTIONS OF BODIES' EXISTENCE IN HUME'S *TREATISE*

JONATHAN COTTRELL, *NEW YORK UNIVERSITY*

In his landmark study of Hume's philosophy, Norman Kemp Smith observed that "Hume's manner of employing the terms 'fiction' and 'illusion' places many difficulties in the reader's path." In this paper, I address one such difficulty: that of reconciling Hume's claim to believe in the existence of bodies with his claim that this belief involves accepting a "fiction," or "fictions." In order to resolve the apparent tension between these claims, I propose a general interpretation of Hume's use of the term "fiction" in the *Treatise*, show how this interpretation illuminates his discussion of our belief that "there be body" in the "*Treatise*" section "Of scepticism with regard to the senses," and show its superiority to several other interpretations.

FOOLS, MALICE, AND PUBLIC REFUTATION IN THE *PHILEBUS*

EMILY A. AUSTIN, *WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY*

In Plato's *Philebus*, Socrates argues that the pleasure we receive from watching fools is tinged with the pain of injustice. We are pleased when those who believe themselves wise are exposed to ridicule (49e9). However, taking pleasure in someone's self-ignorance is malicious (48b11-12), and malice is a "pain of the soul" (48b8-9), so we mix pain with pleasure when we laugh at fools. Since malice is "unjust" (49d6-7), commentators have assumed that the philosopher does not experience mixed pleasures when fools are exposed, and that mixed pleasures do not contribute to the good human life outlined at the end of the dialogue (61b-67b). I argue that absent universal self-knowledge or a solitary life, Plato thinks the philosopher will enjoy some mixed pleasures, which are an element of the best life available to her. She encounters fools, enjoys exposing them as fools, and this pleasure increases the value of her life.

FORMAL AND MATERIAL THEORIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: A METHODOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION

ALAN C. LOVE, *UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA-TWIN CITIES*

John Norton's argument that all formal theories of induction fail raises substantive questions about the philosophical analysis of scientific reasoning. What are the criteria of adequacy for philosophical theories of induction, explanation, or theory structure? Is more than one adequate theory possible? Using a generalized version of Norton's argument, I demonstrate that the competition between formal and material theories in philosophy of science results from adhering to different criteria of adequacy. This situation encourages an interpretation of "formal" and "material" as indicators of divergent criteria that accompany different philosophical methodologies. I conclude that one way to negotiate between conflicting

criteria is to adopt a pluralist stance toward philosophical theories of scientific reasoning.

FREEDOM FROM AUTONOMY

ERIC L. CHWANG, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO—BOULDER

One very popular deontological explanation for the wrongness of some actions appeals to respect for autonomy. In this paper I argue that freedom is better suited to play this role than autonomy is, where an autonomous choice (person) is both free and rational. In other words, to the extent that autonomy can explain—in a non-consequentialist way—why an action is wrong, the related but distinct concept of freedom provides a better non-consequentialist explanation. The argument subdivides into cases (restriction with no benefit, restriction on one to benefit another, and paternalistic restriction) and argues that respect for freedom coupled with consequentialist sympathies better explain our moral intuitions in every case than respect for a non-consequentialist autonomy does.

FREGE VERSUS DEDEKIND: ON THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF LOGICISM

ERICH RECK, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—RIVERSIDE

When thinking about logicism in the philosophy of mathematics, the two representatives that typically come to mind are Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege. However, in the late nineteenth century Frege's contemporary Richard Dedekind played an equally important role in this connection. After illustrating that role in terms of Dedekind's early reception, the sense in which he can be seen as another main logicist is analyzed (building on earlier work by Howard Stein, José Ferreirós, and myself). This will lead to a further comparison of Frege's and Dedekind's approaches, and especially of their views about the nature of logic, partly based on their responses to each other. It will also require a clarification of what the purpose of logicism should be taken to be, while observing how views about this issue have changed over time.

FRIENDSHIP AND ENLIGHTENMENT IN KANT

BRIAN WATKINS, DUKE UNIVERSITY

Kant claims, on the one hand, that friendship is a privileged site for self-disclosure while, on the other hand, he warns that friends should not become excessively familiar with each other. Some have argued that this tension is a result of the difference between the kind of friendship Kant thinks we can achieve and the ideal. By contrast, I argue that, for Kant, we have achieved the best kind of friendship not when we find someone with whom to share everything, but, instead, when we find someone with whom we can discuss those things that are actually worth revealing, namely, what we think when we think for ourselves. In other words, the best kind of friends are those who feel free to use their reason and participate together in what Kant calls enlightenment.

FROM THOUGHT TO ACTION

JONATHAN DANCY, *UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS–AUSTIN AND UNIVERSITY OF READING*

In this paper I consider the nature of practical reasoning, with special attention to the various arguments that are supposed to show that the conclusion of such reasoning cannot be action and must be either belief or intention.

G. A. COHEN AND THE LOGIC OF EGALITARIAN CONGRUENCE

DAVID RONDEL, *TRENT UNIVERSITY*

In this paper I argue that G. A. Cohen's argument against Rawls's "lax" interpretation of the difference principle depends for its intelligibility on the ability to distinguish—with reasonable but perhaps not perfect precision—between those situations in which what Nancy Rosenblum has called "the logic of congruence" is validly invoked and those in which it is not. More importantly, I will be suggesting that the philosophical shape of Cohen's critique makes it impossible for him to supply the required criterion, and that the methodological "intuitionism" he claims to be committed to is at odds with his larger argument against the Rawlsian interpretation of the difference principle.

GENETIC TESTING, PARENTING, AND MORAL IDENTITY: A RESPONSE TO JEFF

McMAHAN

WILLIAM P. KABASENCHE, *WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY*

Prenatal or pre-implantation genetic testing offer prospective parents a significant amount of insight into and control over what children they will gestate and give birth to. Jeff McMahan has argued for what I will call the Parity Claim—that the evaluative perspectives of those who would prefer no child to a disabled one and those who would prefer a disabled child to no child are on a par. I argue against the Parity Claim by showing that parental identity consistent with the latter perspective better positions parents to achieve childrearing goods in any parenting context. Parents who are prepared to care for a disabled child are also prepared to care for any child who might become disabled throughout his or her life. And parents who move from the first to the second evaluative perspective are, I argue, making moral progress. But the reverse is not true.

GENUINE EMPIRICAL METAPHYSICS

TYLER HILDEBRAND, *UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO–BOULDER*

David Hume believed that the practice of metaphysics was impossible. He was a skeptic about genuine metaphysics, the discipline concerned with discovering the nature of the world itself. Skeptics of genuine metaphysics are generally inclined to accept the following dichotomy: either genuine metaphysics is possible and we possess synthetic a priori reasoning, or genuine metaphysics is impossible. This, however, is a false dichotomy. This essay argues that genuine metaphysics does not

require synthetic a priori reasoning by defending a method of practicing genuine empirical metaphysics. The basic idea behind the method is that a properly constrained method of defining theories ensures that logical and analytical conclusions (features of our language or concepts) apply to the world itself. The two most crucial components of the theory are the Ramsey/Carnap/Lewis method of defining theoretical terms and Carnap's logical interpretation of probability.

GRASSROOTS ORGANIZING FOR COMPENSATION EQUITY

JILL GORDON, COLBY COLLEGE

Overview of organizing efforts on my own campus aimed at equity for women with respect to salary, endowed or distinguished chairs, other forms of material compensation, and public visibility in institutional publications, both print and electronic. I will discuss strategies and tactics that we used, both effective and ineffective.

GROTIUS AND ARISTOTLE: THE JUSTICE OF TAKING TOO LITTLE

ANDREW BLOM, CENTRAL MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY

The influential theory of international justice that Hugo Grotius developed in his 1625 work, *The Rights of War and Peace*, evolved, I argue, out of Grotius' engagement with a certain reading of Aristotle's account of justice. The account of justice that troubles Grotius conceives of justice as a mean between taking too much and taking too little. While such a conception turns out to be problematic as a reading of Aristotle, the criticisms that Grotius levies against it reveal significant features of his own conception of justice. I argue that we can best understand the implications of Grotius' mature conception by considering the ends to which he had deployed the Aristotelian notion in his own earlier work on international justice. Grotius came to perceive that his earlier understanding of justice too easily ruled out the sorts of humanitarian concerns that could have a moderating effect on the recourse to war.

GROUNDING AND ENTAILMENT

ELIJAH CHUDNOFF, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI

Recent work on the grounding or "in virtue of" relation has given us reason to think it is a *sui generis* non-causal dependence relation, and that substitutes, such as supervenience, cannot do the same work it can do in structuring philosophical inquiry. A common assumption is that grounds entail, suffice for, or necessitate, what they ground: if P (wholly) grounds Q, then P entails Q. I challenge this assumption. I argue that the most popular reasoning in favor of it provides no independent support for it, and that there are good reasons to reject it. I briefly consider an epistemological application of this rejection.

GROUNDING EXPLANATIONS

LOUIS H. DE ROSSET, UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT

A compelling idea holds that reality has a layered structure. We often disagree about what inhabits the bottom layer, or even if there is one; but we agree that higher up we find chemical, biological, geological, psychological, sociological, and economic entities. How is the intuitive idea of layered structure to be understood? A plausible view holds that layered structure is to be explicated by appeal grounding explanations. Grounding explanations tell us what obtains in virtue of what. Unfortunately, the use of grounding explanations to articulate the layered conception faces a problem, which I call the collapse. The collapse turns on the question of how to ground the facts stated by the explanations themselves. In this paper I sketch a way to ground explanations that avoids the collapse. Briefly, the suggestion is that the fact stated by a grounding explanation is grounded in its explanans.

GROUNDING THE LUCK OBJECTION

NEAL TOGNAZZINI, COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY

Many object to libertarianism by arguing that it manages to solve one problem of luck (the threat of determinism) only by falling prey to another (the threat from indeterminism). According to this objection, there is something freedom-undermining about the very circumstances that the libertarian thinks are required for freedom. However, it has proved difficult to articulate precisely what about these circumstances is supposed to undermine freedom—the absence of certain sorts of explanations has perhaps been the most common complaint. In this paper, however, I argue that recent work on the metaphysics of ontological dependence actually provides the resources for formulating the luck objection in its strongest form.

HEIDEGGER'S NAME FOR DASEIN'S BEING: "EXISTENCE" OR "CARE"?

JOSHUA L. TEPLY, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

According to the early Heidegger, different kinds of entities have different kinds of being. While it is clear that one of these kinds of being is had exclusively by human beings, the kind of entity Heidegger calls "Dasein," it is not clear what name Heidegger gives to this kind of being. While "existence" (*Existenz*) is a popular suggestion in the literature, there is much textual evidence to support the view that it is "care" (*Sorge*). In this paper I examine the evidence for and against these two positions and come down in favor of the latter. I argue that all of the passages in which Heidegger appears to say that "existence" is the name for Dasein's being are ambiguous and can be read as saying that "existence" is the name for one of the structures of Dasein's being.

HIGHER-ORDER PERCEPTION AND ARISTOTLE'S USE OF "SUNAISTHANESTHAI" IN NICOMACHEAN ETHICS IX.9

ANTHONY CARRERAS, RICE UNIVERSITY

The primary concern of *Nicomachean Ethics* IX.9 is the aporia regarding self-sufficiency and friendship—the question of whether the happy person will need friends or not. Aristotle offers three different arguments for why the happy person will need friends: the argument from self-awareness (1169b29-1170a4), the argument from pleasure (1170a4-12), and the argument from nature (1170a13-b13). Though Aristotle is not entirely explicit about this, he seems to give preference to the third argument, the argument from nature, which will be the primary focus of this paper. It is that argument that closes the chapter and provides the basis for Aristotle's final verdict that "anyone who is to be happy will need friends who are good" (1170b16). In addition, that the argument appeals to nature is an indication that Aristotle sees it as closer to the truth. It is part of my aim in this paper, however, to show that the argument from nature has great value independent of the aporia regarding self-sufficiency and friendship. I demonstrate that a careful reconstruction of that argument shows that it contains an important appeal to, and sheds important light on, Aristotle's vexing claim that true friends are a single soul (*mia psychē*). This turns out to be significant, for it shows that Aristotle is caught up in trying to resolve not only the aporia regarding self-sufficiency and friendship, but another regarding the relation between self-regarding and other-regarding motives when they coexist in the virtuous agent.

HOW ASSURANCE-BASED ACCOUNTS OF PROMISING CAN SOLVE THEIR CIRCULARITY PROBLEM

CHARLIE KURTH, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—SAN DIEGO

Assurance-based accounts of promises are appealing because they give central place to the assurance that the promisor's promise provides to the promisee. But the standard versions (e.g., Scanlon 1998) are viciously circular. In this essay, I argue that the circularity problem results from too narrow an understanding of how promises assure—one that focuses exclusively on what the promisor does. Moreover, I demonstrate that the circularity problem can be avoided once we recognize the importance of the interaction that occurs between promisor and promisee—and, in particular, the special role that the promisee plays.

HOW INTERNALISM CANNOT BE SAVED FROM THE PSYCHOPATH

PETER BRIAN BARRY, SAGINAW VALLEY STATE UNIVERSITY

The psychopath is one of the more common putative examples wielded by opponents of various meta-ethical theses to refute their target. We are told that the possibility of psychopaths, if not their very existence, refutes various forms of moral rationalism, non-cognitivism, and, perhaps, internalism. Jeanette Kennett and Cordelia Fine present an empirically informed defense of internalism against the threat of the psychopath. They

suggest at least two different strategies to defend internalism: one appeals to the affective deficiencies of psychopaths, and the other to their cognitive deficiencies. I shall have something to say about the former strategy but my main concern will be with considering the latter. Ultimately, I conclude that Kennett and Fine's cognitivist defense of internalism is not successful, and ruminate about just which meta-ethicists ought to fear the psychopath.

IMAGINATION AND THE EXPERIENCE OF OBJECTIVITY

JENNIFER CHURCH, VASSAR COLLEGE

Perception requires that we experience something as objective, as independent from any particular way it may appear. In order for such independence to be evident from within a given experience, we must actively imagine alternative presentations of the same thing. (Potential imagining is not enough.) Understanding the active role of imagining helps to explain some otherwise puzzling aspects of causal perception, moral perception, and the perception of logical truths.

IMMIGRATION AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

CHRISTOPHER HEATH WELLMAN, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS

In this essay, I appeal to freedom of association to construct a presumptive case in favor of a state's right to set its own immigration policy and then defend this *prima facie* case against formidable arguments on behalf of open borders. I ultimately conclude that, even if egalitarians are right that those of us in wealthy societies have demanding duties of global distributive justice, and even if libertarians are correct that individuals have rights both to freedom of movement and to control their private property, legitimate states are entitled to reject all potential immigrants, including those desperately seeking asylum from corrupt governments.

IN DEFENSE OF CONSISTENCY CHECKS

MARK E. WUNDERLICH, UNION COLLEGE

Kornblith (1989) and Goldman (1999) use the alleged impossibility of checking one's beliefs for coherence in an attack on the coherence theories of Bonjour (1985) and Lehrer (1990), among others. These theories, they observe, require that the features that make a belief justified be accessible to the believing subject. These theories also make the consistency of the subject's collection of beliefs a necessary condition for—or at least a contributor to—the justification of that subject's beliefs. Kornblith claims that a result from Cherniak (1986) shows that these two elements of theories of justification cannot be combined. It is apparently a physical impossibility for us to do what coherence theories would require that we do. I argue that one version of the attack is misguided, and that consistency checks can be defended against more sophisticated versions as well.

IN DEFENSE OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COGNITION AND MERE ASSOCIATION

CAMERON BUCKNER, INDIANA UNIVERSITY–BLOOMINGTON

Several high-profile critics have recently called for the ouster of the distinction between cognition and mere association from comparative psychology. Against these critics, I argue that “cognition” and “mere association” function there as mutually exclusive kind terms. These kinds can be characterized by reflecting upon the empirical tests that psychologists currently perform to differentiate between cognition and mere association. An analysis of these tests evinces a family resemblance of properties, centered on the notion of behavioral flexibility, which comparative psychologists attribute to cognition. An investigation into the neural bases of this flexibility may finally place the distinction on firm metaphysical foundations.

INDETERMINACY OF COMPATIBILIST COUNTERFACTUALS IN CONSEQUENTIALIST THEORIES OF RIGHT

SEAN DRYSDALE WALSH, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA–DULUTH

This paper concerns a metaphysical issue about the application of the study of counterfactuals to the study of ethics. Many consequentialists claim that it is a virtue of their view that there is always a determinate metaphysical fact about which of our options would maximize utility, even if we do not always know which of those options it is. In this paper I challenge this metaphysical claim. I argue that on standard variants of David Lewis’s theory of counterfactuals, there could be no such metaphysical facts about what maximizes utility in deterministic worlds. On Lewis’s theory of counterfactuals, I argue, the “similarity of worlds” relation is too coarse-grained (imprecise and vague) to allow for such metaphysical facts. Lewis’s own way of precisifying coarse-grained counterfactuals using “interest” is relativistic in a way that is unacceptable for most consequentialists, who wish to avoid ethical relativism.

INDIVIDUAL, SOCIAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL VIRTUE

GUY AXTELL, RADFORD UNIVERSITY

This paper examines recent research on individual, social, and institutional virtues and vices; the aim is to explore and make proposals concerning their inter-relationships, as well as to highlight central questions for future research with the study of each. More specifically, the paper will focus on how these studies can be approached in a systematic way such that it contributes to greater convergence between virtue theory, feminist epistemology, and social epistemology.

INESCAPABILITY AND AUTHORITY

STAN HUSI, RICE UNIVERSITY

Neo-Kantian attempts to ground normativity in agency and its constitutive standards face the Agency-Shmagency objection: Why should one be an

agent? Why believe agency is itself a normatively relevant condition and reasons-providing? For agency to lend authority to anything it must already have it, but does it? In response, proponents of agency-based accounts—Korsgaard, Velleman, and Ferrero among others—have appealed to what they consider the unique inescapability of agency. They claim that the norms constitutive of agency are authoritative and reasons-providing because we have no choice but to be agents. This essay contests the normative significance of inescapability and its capacity to explain the authority of agency-constitutive norms, granting for the sake of argument that there are agency-constitutive norms and that agency is inescapable. Agency's authoritative status cannot be established by showing it to be inescapable.

INTUITION AND JUDGMENT: HOW NOT TO THINK ABOUT THE SINGULARITY OF INTUITION (AND THE GENERALITY OF CONCEPTS) IN KANT

THOMAS LAND, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

According to a widely held view, a Kantian intuition functions like a singular term. I argue that this view is false. Its apparent plausibility, both textual and philosophical, rests on attributing to Kant a Fregean conception of judgment. I show that Kant does not hold a Fregean conception of judgment and argue that, as a consequence, intuition cannot be understood on analogy with singular terms.

INTUITIVE JUSTICE: THOUGHTS ON NEUTRALIZING LUCK

JEFF CERVANTEZ, UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE

This paper provides a measure of intuitive support for luck egalitarianism. Particularly, it supports the fundamental idea behind the luck egalitarian project—viz. the intuition that justice requires neutralizing the bad consequences of morally arbitrary disparities. I claim this intuition is especially relevant when inequalities present a significant disadvantage to someone, simply on account of bad luck. While arguing this point, I interact with a formidable challenge to the luck-neutralizing project presented by Susan Hurley. Hurley claims that neutralizing luck cannot provide a basis for justice. She provides two main reasons for this: the egalitarian fallacy and the responsibility regress. I conclude that both of these challenges fail to undermine the intuition that justice requires neutralizing bad luck. In the end, there's reason to think neutralizing bad luck makes a state more just than it would be otherwise.

IS OCKHAM'S MENTAL LANGUAGE A LANGUAGE OF THOUGHT?

ERIC HAGEDORN, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

A number of prominent medievalists have claimed that the theory of mental language, which was promulgated by Ockham in the early fourteenth century and discussed and modified by Scholastic philosophers for the following three centuries, is in fact extraordinarily similar to Fodor's *Language of Thought*, so similar it can be said without blushing that Fodor's

and Ockham's theories are "variants of a single picture." In this paper, I discuss three difficulties for this interpretation of Ockham: Ockham's hesitancy concerning the existence of real mental syntax, his idiosyncratic account of the propositional attitudes, and finally the problems that Ockham intends his theory to solve.

IS SCIENTIFIC THEORY CHANGE SIMILAR TO EARLY COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT?

GOPNIK ON SCIENCE AND CHILDHOOD

TIM FULLER, OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

I offer a sustained and two-part critique of Alison Gopnik's position that early cognitive development is highly similar to scientific theory change. In the first part, I criticize the "strong" thesis that scientific inference and early cognitive development are subserved by the very same mental mechanisms. I contend that Gopnik fails to distinguish among several different types of theories of scientific inference—including population-level, normative, competence, and performance theories—and that the strong thesis fails to hold for any of them. In the second part, I argue that even a weaker analogy between childhood cognitive development and scientific inference has severe limitations. In particular, I maintain that scientific inference is centrally subserved by cross-domain processing while early cognitive development is not. The hope is that the inadequacies in Gopnik's position are instructive. For one, they suggest a tighter analogy between adult quotidian cognition and scientific theory formation and confirmation.

IS THERE A HIERARCHY OF INDIRECT SENSES AND REFERENCES?

KAI VON FINTEL, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

TERENCE PARSONS, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—LOS ANGELES

Frege argues that embedding a phrase in an indirect context produces an indirect sense and an indirect reference (its customary sense). His argument assumes that a that-clause is syntactically the same as the sentence that it contains. Once we see a that-clause as a complex expression containing a sentence as a part, we can hold that no expression ever changes sense or reference; the that-clause refers to the sense of the sentence that it contains and has a sense of its own, which is determined by the sense of the contained sentence. A semantic theory is sketched in which no expression changes sense or reference and in which there are no "levels" of senses. Further assumptions allow one to reintroduce a hierarchy of senses of the sort that Frege envisaged, with a semantics having a Fregean structure. The additional apparatus, however, plays no additional role in the theory.

KANT ON BEAUTY AND MORALITY CIRCA 1784: ON THE GENESIS OF THE THIRD CRITIQUE

ALEX RUEGER, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

While Kant throughout the 1770s had regarded judgments of taste as having merely empirical generality, I present evidence that in 1784 Kant, for the first time, accorded them the status of being “universal and necessary.” Such judgments need a “deduction” and although he had assembled many of the ingredients of the aesthetic theory of the *Critique of Judgment* (1790) already in notes and lectures during the 1770s, it was only in 1784 that he used these tools to justify the pleasure of taste’s claim to universality and necessity. He thereby granted this pleasure a status that up to then he had given only to moral satisfaction. The reasons for this change in Kant’s aesthetic views lie, I argue, in the important revisions he made to his theory of moral incentives at the time he wrote the *Groundwork* (1784).

KANT ON THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

IAN PROOPS, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS–AUSTIN

Kant’s criticisms of the ontological argument are, I argue, directed against a specifically Wolffian version of the Cartesian argument. They are: (a) that it is contradictory to bring the concept of a thing’s existence into a concept, if one would think of that thing merely in terms of its possibility (A 597/B 625); (b) if (waiving this objection) one *were* allowed to do that, one would in any case have committed “a mere tautology” (ibid.); and (c) that *being* is not a real predicate (A 598/ B 626). Since criticism (b) is usually taken to be successful but unoriginal, the paper focuses on the original but problematic criticisms (a) and (c). I argue that although each of these criticisms is ultimately unsuccessful, they fail for rather subtle and interesting reasons. In the course of making this case I offer a novel account of Kant’s notion of a real predicate.

KANT’S CONCEPTION OF AUTONOMY IN TWO OBJECTIONS TO METAETHICAL CONSTITUTIVISM

PAUL TULIPANA, GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY

This paper suggests that two recent objections to metaethical constitutivist views in the Kantian vein can be traced back to the conception of autonomy that those constitutivist theories employ. On this conception, autonomy is conceived both as a metaphysical fact about agents, and, for that reason, as a constitutive norm that categorically applies to them. I suggest that David Enoch’s shmagent objection can be understood as the complaint that autonomy as a metaphysical fact does not entail autonomy as a law, and that Shah and Hussain’s no-metaethics objection can be understood as the complaint that if autonomy as a metaphysical fact entails autonomy as a law, Kantians have not told us why. This diagnosis suggests that it is open to those sympathetic to Kant’s project to concede that these objections hold given a certain conception of agency, but need not therefore despair of the Kantian moral desiderata.

KANT'S TWO CONCEPTS OF VIRTUE*JEPPE VON PLATZ, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA*

In this essay I argue that there are two connected but distinct concepts of virtue at work in Kant's moral philosophy. The first is virtue as an ideal of moral character, the second is virtue as the degree to which a person has achieved the ideal. I further argue that these correspond to two of three modalities of the central concept of Kant's moral philosophy: freedom as moral self-determination. Humanity, I maintain, is the capacity (or possibility) of moral self-determination. The ideal of virtue is the ideal of complete (or necessary) moral self-determination. And the degree to which an agent has achieved the ideal of virtue is the degree to which she has achieved moral self-determination (her actual moral self-determination).

KIM AND SHOEMAKER ON CAUSAL INHERITANCE*JUSTIN TIEHEN, UNIVERSITY OF PUGET SOUND*

What is the relation between the causal powers of a particular instance of a mental property and the causal powers of its physical realizer? According to Jaegwon Kim's causal inheritance principle, if a mental property *M* is realized in a system at time *t* in virtue of the physical realization base *P*, then the causal powers of that *M*-instance are identical with the causal powers of the realizing *P*-instance. Here Kim is opposed by Sydney Shoemaker, who in connection with his subset model of realization holds that mental property instances have fewer causal powers than Kim's principle entails. In this paper I defend Kim's view against Shoemaker's, arguing that the subset model of realization has intolerable consequences that can be avoided by accepting causal inheritance.

KNOW-WHO AND TESTIMONY MEDIATED ACQUAINTANCE*MICHAEL R. HICKS, BROOKLYN COLLEGE*

According to David Braun, to know who so-and-so is is to know an answer to the question, Who is so-and-so? At first glance his account appears to complement a contemporary trend towards skepticism about testimony-mediated acquaintance. However, in order to alleviate a discomfort Braun notes with his context-free account of know-who we need a (relatively) robust notion of testimony-mediated acquaintance, incompatible with that skepticism.

KNOWLEDGE FOR WHOM? THE QUESTION OF "SIGNIFICANCE" IN FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY*HEIDI GRASSWICK, MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE*

Many epistemologists have rejected the idea that the accumulation of knowledge (or truths) per se is the goal of knowledge-seeking. Rather, they have recognized that it is really significant knowledge that we are after when we engage in epistemic pursuits (Anderson 1995; Kitcher 2001). Arguments to this effect have been used to explain how and why contextual

interests necessarily play a role in our knowledge endeavors. In the case of feminist epistemology, many have asked the question “Knowledge for whom?” as a way of articulating the need to take a knower’s situatedness into account. The question itself suggests a rejection of the assumption that knowledge, in its objectivity, always serves the interests of everyone. This paper investigates the degree to which framing differences in knowers as differences in what knowers take to be significant knowledge can assist feminist epistemologists in understanding knowledge as both objective and situated.

KNOWLEDGE IS SEXY

ALEXIS MOURENZA, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA–SANTA CRUZ

NICHOLAS D. SMITH, LEWIS & CLARK COLLEGE

In this paper, we do not take up Plantinga’s positive probabilistic argument for preferring supernaturalism to naturalism. Instead, we review the arguments for and against a defense of naturalized epistemology in terms of survival, and then offer a rather different account of why human evolution supports the reliability of our cognitive equipment. The view for which we will argue is that philosophers’ appeals to the processes of natural selection that are adaptive in terms of survival have provided an incomplete picture of what naturalists have available to them to make the sort of defense Plantinga claims cannot be made. To supplement this picture, we provide evidence from what Darwin called “sexual selection” and also what others now call “social selection” to provide a more complete picture of why it is reasonable to suppose that evolution has supplied human beings and many other animals highly reliable and also veridical cognitive processes.

KNOWLEDGE-FREE DECISION THEORY

DUSTIN LOCKE, CLAREMONT MCKENNA COLLEGE

This paper defends what I call “knowledge-free decision theory.” According to this view, whether an act is rational has nothing to do with what the agent who performs the act knows. In tension with this view, some philosophers have recently tried to connect practical reasons with knowledge. John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley have argued that it is appropriate for S to treat P as a reason only if S knows that P. John Hyman and Peter Unger have argued that P is S’s reason only if S knows that P. Combined with the plausible assumption that an act is rational only if it is performed for the right kinds of reasons, these alleged connections spell trouble for knowledge-free decision theory. Interestingly, while several philosophers have argued against Hawthorne and Stanley’s thesis, Unger and Hyman’s thesis has received little criticism. Here I offer a refutation of Unger and Hyman’s thesis.

KORSGAARD, KANT, AND ANIMALS: A RESPONSE

MARK SHELTON, CENTRAL MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY

In this paper I defend Kant's conception of indirect duties to animals against Korsgaard's argument that a conception of direct duties to animals would be better. It is commonly thought, and Korsgaard seems to share the sentiment, that the concept of "indirect duty" implies a merely secondary and therefore less serious or stringent duty, providing part of the motivation for those who hold that duties to nonhuman animals can be equally serious and stringent to understand such duties as direct duties. I maintain, however, that Kant's distinction between direct and indirect duty is primarily technical, having to do with how the determination of a nonrational animal's interests (Kant would say "will") takes place in moral deliberation. I argue that this technical distinction does not imply less serious duties, but does make a moral difference in the application of rights and principles to cases involving nonrational parties.

LEWIS VERSUS KRIPKE: THE DEBATE OVER THE RIGIDITY OF "PAIN"

PAUL R. AUDI, UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA—OMAHA

Kripke's argument against materialism exploits the idea that terms for sensations are rigid designators. David Lewis gave an argument that such terms, in fact, are non-rigid. That argument trades on the idea that, while it is easy to tell (i.e., we can know through introspection) whether or not we are having a given sensation, it is not easy to tell what the neural realizer of that sensation is. I give a precise statement of Lewis's argument, and indicate briefly how its premises might be rejected. I then argue that, in fact, Lewis's point about introspection tells strongly against his own view. The view that terms for sensations are non-rigid cannot do justice to the extent of our epistemic access to those sensations, or to our ability to name and reliably re-identify them.

LIFE AFTER DEATH: MAKING SENSE OF GRIEF

INGRID V. ALBRECHT, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS—URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

We commonly assume that grief is sadness experienced upon a loss. Dan Moller makes this assumption in a recent article. He then concludes, from empirical surveys, that we are more resilient to the loss of a particular person than we might have thought, and more replaceable in our relationships than we might have hoped. On my account, in contrast, our relationships with particular other people orient us: they give us a sense of our personal, particular selves, and an understanding of our place in the world. I suggest that "grief" is the appropriate description of our response when a loss disrupts that orientation. Moller is right that grief involves sadness, and total devastation is an extreme case. But recognizing that it concerns our practical orientation will make better sense of certain common elements of grief, including the pathologies that grief is liable to, namely, hopelessness and despair.

LOGICAL FORMS, INDETERMINACY, AND THE SUBJECTIVE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN KANT

SEUNG-KEE LEE, *DREW UNIVERSITY*

The relation between logic and psychology is recognized to be an important albeit difficult topic for understanding Kant's aims and argumentation in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. One aspect of this relation is represented by Kant's famous claim in the Transcendental Deduction of the *Critique* that self-consciousness is a condition for the possibility of cognition. One problem associated with this claim is what Henry Allison calls "the problem of subjective unity of consciousness," namely, that Kant never clarifies what "subjective unity" is. Having shown that Kant links this "unity" with an indeterminate (as opposed to determinate) way in which the logical forms of judgment are employed, I argue that "subjective unity of consciousness" is that form of consciousness in which the subject is aware of an indeterminate relation of representations or a relation in which a representation is not a specific or a determinate instance of a more general one.

LOSING GRIP ON THE WORLD: FROM ILLUSION TO SENSE-DATA

DEREK BROWN, *BRANDON UNIVERSITY*

The claim that perceptual illusions can motivate the existence of sense-data is familiar and controversial. My aim, through the lenses of sense-data and intentionalist approaches to illusions, is to carve out a subclass of illusions that are up to the task, and a subclass that are not. It follows that when we engage the former we are not simply incorrectly perceiving the world outside ourselves, we are directly perceiving a subjective entity: one's grip on the external world has been marginalized—not fully lost, but once removed. However, admitting that various illusions do not give evidence for sense-data considerably limits the power of the Argument from Illusion and brings out its distinctness from the Argument from Perceptual Relativity.

LYING AND CONTENT I

ELIOT MICHAELSON, *UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—LOS ANGELES*

I approach the topic of semantic content not, as has been standard in recent literature, by arguing for or against its bearing a particular set of formal properties—truth-conditionality, determinacy, or compositionality—but by looking for other properties which it might plausibly exhibit. In particular, I explore the suggestion that semantic content is what we are fundamentally responsible for having put forward, or what we cannot disclaim without contradiction. This property is potentially of interest since, unlike the properties more standardly attributed to semantic content, endorsing it doesn't seem to presuppose significant commitments in other philosophical domains. It therefore offers the potential to move this debate forward without first settling a myriad of other philosophical disputes. I use this suggestion to motivate a "Lying Test" for semantic content and

demonstrate the potential of this test to deliver some interesting, and surprising, semantic results.

LYING, DECEIVING, AND DEGREES OF BELIEF

JULIA STAFFEL, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Traditionally, lies have often been taken to involve an intention to deceive by definition. This claim has recently been called into question by philosophers like Don Fallis, Thomas Carson, and Roy Sorensen, who argue that there are many examples of lies that are not meant to deceive their addressee. Although I agree that there are some examples of non-deceptive lies, I argue that many supposedly non-deceptive lies are in fact deceptive, given a more plausible notion of deception. I show this by focusing on two classes of supposedly non-deceptive lies, which Sorensen calls “knowledge-lies” and “bald-faced lies.”

MANAGING WOMEN AND MEN OF THE FACULTY: REFLECTIONS OF AN OUTGOING DEAN

JANET MCCRACKEN, LAKE FOREST COLLEGE

2010-11 is my sixth and last year as Provost and Dean of Faculty at the small Midwestern liberal arts college where I have been teaching philosophy since I defended my Ph.D. at Texas-Austin in 1993. Receiving my BA at the tail end of second-wave feminism (I graduated in 1982), I have been working, hiring, and managing faculty under the regime, such as it is, of the nebulous “third wave.” In a conversation with several other women deans in my consortium, we found ourselves uniformly answering, “no” to the question, “Do you feel, as dean, that you’re representing women?” Reflecting on some particular, enlightening, experiences, I will address what I see as the current interactions between gender and academic work life at my college. Are women faculty members less likely to negotiate with me than men? Do I perceive a difference in teaching quality? Student evaluations? Research expectations? Work-life balance?

MATURITY AND SELF-PRESENTATION

SVETLANA BEGGS, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—RIVERSIDE

In a well-known essay, “Lost Innocence,” Herbert Morris argues that to lose the innocent state of mind requires coming to know, through experience, concepts of good and evil. Thus, lost innocence carries with it a realization of our vulnerability in the face of potentially hostile motives of other human beings. I propose an alternative paradigm. David Velleman’s work on shame and rational agency nudges us to consider shedding of innocence as acquisition of thick social know-how, enabling a competent self-presenting agency.

MIDLING CREDENCE AND SUSPENDED JUDGMENT

JANE FRIEDMAN, OXFORD UNIVERSITY

There has been a good deal written recently about the relationship between full (flat-out, coarse-grained) belief and (partial, fine-grained) degrees of belief. There has been some, but far less discussion of the analogous relationship between suspended judgment (or the state of agnosticism) and degrees of belief. In this paper I intend to add to that small discussion. I want to show that being in a state of suspended judgment is not just a matter of having a “middling” credence (and in particular that middling credences are not necessary for suspended judgment), and that, in the end, suspension looks compatible with nearly any degree of belief.

MIGHT THE METHODOLOGY OF BIOSTATISTICS BE TELLING US SOMETHING IMPORTANT ABOUT SEMANTICS?

JOAN WEINER, INDIANA UNIVERSITY–BLOOMINGTON

To judge from the philosophical literature on vagueness, it is widely assumed that facts about the methodology of empirical research need not be included among the data to which our philosophical discussions of vague predicates must answer. I will be arguing that this assumption is false—that a number of views about the semantics of vague predicates conflict with accepted and unexceptional scientific methodology. In particular, I will argue that certain assumptions about meaning need to be abandoned if we are to have a semantic theory that fits the methodology of biostatistics.

MORAL THEORIZING ON THE GROUND

RICHMOND CAMPBELL, DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY

VICTOR KUMAR, UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

According to a dual process model of moral cognition, two cognitive systems guide moral evaluation: a specialized, emotion-driven, intuitive system and a general-purpose, deliberative, reasoning system. The current application of the dual process model fails to capture a species of moral reasoning familiar to ethicists and legal theorists, that exemplifies a norm of consistency, treating like cases alike, what we call “moral consistency reasoning” (MCR). Empirical investigation may tell us something more about just what MCR is such that it influences our moral attitudes—no less when philosophers engage in it. On our integrated dual process model, the intuitive and reasoning systems work together to detect moral inconsistency and elicit moral change. Whereas Greene offers a debunking psychological account of Kantian moral theorizing, we offer instead a friendlier account of a pattern of moral theorizing common to utilitarians and deontologists.

MYSTICISM IN PLATO AND PLOTINUS

DAVID J. YOUNT, *MESA COMMUNITY COLLEGE*

Surprisingly, most scholars (in English) hold that Plato and Plotinus are mystics of some sort. However, an appreciable (though still a minority) number of Plato scholars hold that he is not best read as a mystic. My paper argues that, given that Plotinus is nearly unanimously taken to be a mystic, if I can show that Plato and Plotinus describe the same ultimate experience (of knowing/seeing the One/Good), then Plato is best read as a mystic as well. To support my thesis, I will show that (1) a precise definition of mysticism is not necessary for this project (given the assumption that Plotinus is a mystic); (2) Plotinus is best read as a mystic; (3) my opponents' claims can be addressed; and (4) Plato is best read as a mystic, given the textual evidence.

NO CHANCE FOR NOTHING?

NEIL A. MANSON, *UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI*

Why is there something rather than nothing? This paper addresses Peter van Inwagen's argument that the proper answer to this question is that the probability of there being nothing is zero. After restating van Inwagen's argument, the author makes the case that the premises of van Inwagen's argument coupled with two very obvious metaphysical principles form an inconsistent set. The conclusion reached is that the concept of probability cannot coherently be applied to the actualization of one amongst the set of all possible worlds. If there is some explanation of why there is something rather than nothing, it is not that the probability of there being nothing is zero.

OBJECTIVITY WITHOUT FALSEHOOD: DISAGREEMENT, REFERENCE MAGNETISM, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SYSTEMATIC ERROR

TIM SUNDELL, *UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY*

Lewisian "reference magnetism" has been defended as a theory of linguistic content determination in recent work by, among others, Weatherson and Sider. Two of the chief advantages claimed for the view are its capacity to make sense of systematic error in speakers' use of their words, and its capacity to distinguish clearly between verbal and substantive disagreements. I argue that, with respect to systematic error, the reference magnet view delivers less plausible results than has been recognized. In response, I suggest an alternative view that, while it delivers more plausible results in the case of systematic error, distinguishes between verbal and substantive disagreements just as effectively as the reference magnet view. Finally, I suggest that my alternative view embeds more easily within a unified account of the methodology of linguistics, and thus allows for a view of semantics that is preferable generally.

ON FREGE'S SUPPOSED HIERARCHY OF SENSES

NICHOLAS GEORGALIS, EAST CAROLINA UNIVERSITY

It is widely held that Frege is committed to the existence of an infinite hierarchy of independent indirect senses. I argue that this is false. The apparent plausibility of this view is based on misapplication of Frege's theory, abetted by the complete neglect of two crucial passages in Frege.

ON THE INTRINSIC EVIL OF DEATH

JASON RAIBLEY, CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY—LONG BEACH

This paper responds to two, related Epicurean arguments against the evil of death. The first argument is that, since death involves the absence of all sensation, dying never leads to anything that is intrinsically bad. Some philosophers have responded to this argument by expanding their conception of extrinsic value and arguing that dying is extrinsically bad because it deprives its victim of future pleasures. This paper argues that, using a more holistic conative theory of well-being, we can establish that death is intrinsically bad for the one who dies. The paper then responds to a second Epicurean argument based on the idea that there is no time at which death is bad for the one who dies. The term, "death," can refer to either the state of being dead, in which case Epicurus's argument is sound but uninteresting, or the process of dying, in which case Epicurus's argument is unsound.

ON WHY LIARS, DRUNKS, AND SQUASH PLAYERS SHOULD EMULATE VIRTUOUS PEOPLE

IAN STONER, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA—TWIN CITIES

The exemplar model of right action in virtue ethics holds that an act is right iff it is what a virtuous person would do. Though defended by many advocates of virtue ethics, the exemplar model has been the target of several well-known counterexamples, among them Robert Johnson's mendacious man, Gilbert Harman's weak-willed socialite, and John Doris's hotheaded squash player. I argue that these counterexamples fail for one of three reasons. (1) Some trade on a confusion between ends and means; these examples only threaten an untenable interpretation of the exemplar model. (2) Others elide the morally relevant features of a situation that elicit a characteristic response from virtuous people; as a result, we fail to give the morally relevant features of the situation due weight. (3) Others exploit our willingness to tolerate immoral behavior in strangers in order to keep the peace.

OVERDETERMINATION AND COUNTERFACTUAL SENSITIVITY

SARA BERNSTEIN, DUKE UNIVERSITY

I show that the counterfactual structure of the world is richer than previously thought. I introduce a novel class of events that are insensitive to the additive force of multiple causes. They do not covary counterfactually

with the multiplicity or force of their causes. They are to be contrasted with sensitive effects, which counterfactually covary according to the number and sorts of causes they have.

PERCEIVED COLORS AND PERCEIVED LOCATIONS: PROBLEMS FOR COLOR PROJECTIVISM

PETER ROSS, CALIFORNIA STATE POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY—POMONA

Color subjectivists claim that, despite appearances to the contrary, the world external to the mind is colorless. However, in giving an account of color perception, subjectivists about the nature of perceived color must address the nature of perceived spatial location as well. The general question I'll pose is whether there is a theory of color perception that can plausibly coordinate a subjective metaphysics of perceived color with a metaphysics of perceived location. The focus here is on so-called projectivist theories of perception, in which perceived colors are said to be projected onto external physical locations. I'll conclude that the projectivist theories of color perception are untenable.

PERCEIVING WITH COMPENSATORY DEVICES: QUASI-VISION OR NEW SENSORY MODALITY?

MALIKA AUVRAY, CENTRE NATIONALE DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE

Sensory substitution devices provide through an unusual sensory modality (the substituting modality, e.g., audition) the kind of information that is normally accessed through another sensory modality (the substituted modality, e.g., vision). Various kinds of devices have been developed, tested, and shown to allow their users to behave to some degree as if they possessed the substituted sensory organ. These systems thus question the usual taxonomy of our sensory modalities. Through a set of behavioral and theoretical studies, the question of which sensory modality the acquired perception belongs to will be addressed. Though certain results might be taken to point to the conclusion that perception with sensory substitution devices belong to the substituted modality, overall evidence leads to an alternative view. According to it, the experience after sensory substitution is a transformation, extension, or augmentation of our perceptual capacities, rather than something equivalent or reducible to an already existing sensory modality.

PERSONS AND BODIES

JAPA PALLIKATHAYIL, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

On Kant's view, property rights in the state of nature involve certain defects and these defects render them merely provisional. Conclusive property rights can only be established through political institutions and this consideration grounds the duty to establish those institutions. Although Kant treats bodily rights as largely unproblematic in the state of nature, I will argue that bodily rights can be defective in many of the ways that property rights can be. These defects in our bodily rights alone are sufficient

to ground a duty to establish political institutions. In arguing for this view, I will not be arguing that our rights to our bodies just are property rights. Important differences remain, which have surprising consequences. I will argue that the Kantian view cannot legitimize directly selling or even donating parts of our bodies to others. But this conclusion is ultimately not as counterintuitive as it might first seem.

PERSONS, ANIMALS, AND PERSISTENCE CONDITIONS

KEVIN W. SHARPE, ST. CLOUD STATE UNIVERSITY

Animalism is the view that human persons, such as you and I, are human animals—biological organisms that belong to the species *Homo sapiens*. While so much may seem obvious, many opponents of animalism object that it is inconsistent with any plausible account of the persistence conditions of persons. The idea, in brief, is that the persistence conditions of persons differ from those of animals. Since nothing can have different persistence conditions than itself, it follows that human persons are not animals. In this paper, I show why this argument fails.

POLITICAL LIBERALISM, MARRIAGE, AND THE FAMILY: A REPLY TO BRAKE

CHRISTIE HARTLEY, GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY

LORI WATSON, UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO

Elizabeth Brake argues that political liberals can and must recognize minimal marriage to support the social bases of adult caring relationships, which she claims are social primary goods, and she says that the recognition of a more robust form of marriage cannot be supported by political liberals, given their conception of public reason and liberal neutrality. Against Brake, we claim the social bases of adult caring relationships can be provided without legal marriage. However, we argue that given certain conditions in a politically liberal society, public reason may support the legal recognition of a more robust form of marriage than minimal marriage because of its connection to the rearing of children as future citizens or because it can help protect the fundamental interests of citizens in freely chosen associations.

PRIDE AS A VIRTUE: LEARNING FROM ARISTOTLE AND AYN RAND

ALLAN GOTTHELF, UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

In this paper I discuss pride as a trait of character and a principle of action. I draw significantly on the analyses by Aristotle and Rand, and endorse and defend their shared thesis that pride is a central moral virtue. In the course of this defense I will explore the value of self-esteem to a human life, and the connection between the virtue of pride and this value of self-esteem. That will position us to examine the roots of the historically frequent attack on pride as a great vice. I will conclude with a brief account of the way in which pride is a precondition both of Aristotelian character-friendship and of a genuine romantic love.

PRITCHARD, SAFETY, VALUE

DANIEL IMMERMANN, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

In the forthcoming book, *The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations*, Duncan Pritchard argues that by combining virtue-theoretic conditions on knowledge with a safety condition on knowledge, we can get a good account of knowledge. In my paper, I criticize Pritchard's account, arguing that adding a safety condition is a liability for the view, and that virtue-theorists are better off without it. Firstly, the safety condition has problems handling both Gettier cases and cases of environmental luck. Secondly, by incorporating a safety condition, Pritchard fails to take advantage of the virtue theorist's explanation of the value of knowledge.

PROPER FUNCTIONS AND THE NATURAL AND DIVINE DESIGNERS

ERIC R. KRAEMER, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-LA CROSSE

In the 2008 book co-authored with Michael Tooley, *Knowledge of God*, Alvin Plantinga continues his defense of supernaturalism by honing improved versions of a well-considered set of objections to its currently dominant alternative, naturalism. In particular, Plantinga argues that naturalism cannot adequately accommodate teleology. In this paper I focus on this objection. I begin by showing why the teleology objection is important for naturalistic philosophers. I then how show Plantinga's own proposed deistic solution to the teleology problem falls prey to the same objections that Plantinga raises for naturalists. Given that both supernaturalist and naturalist accounts of teleology are inadequate, a neutral alternative is needed. I defend an alternative general approach to teleology which accommodates both supernaturalists and naturalists, and has the additional advantage of providing an account of teleological functions which unifies the many different kinds of function claims.

PROPERTY THEORIES OF BELIEF AND DEGREES OF BELIEF

JOEL PUST, UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE

According to property attribution theories of belief (such as those defended by David Lewis, Barbara Davidson, and others), belief is not a relation between a person and a proposition. Rather, to have a belief of any sort is to attribute or self-attribute a property. I argue that, contrary to some of their proponents, property attribution theories cannot plausibly account for degrees of belief and so they should be rejected.

PROPOSITIONS AND JUDGMENTS IN LOCKE AND ARNAULD: A MONSTROUS AND UNHOLY UNION?

JENNIFER S. MARUSIC, BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY

Philosophers have accused Locke of holding an account of proposition formation that simply conflates the formation of a proposition with the judgment that a proposition is true, and that this has obviously absurd consequences. Indeed, a loose chronicle of the role of the proposition in

modern philosophy runs as follows: Most of the Early Moderns conflated the formation of a thought with propositional content with endorsement of that content and simply failed to see the disastrous implications of this. Is this story accurate or merely a myth, as Walter Ott has argued? I claim that the story comes close to the truth: Locke and Arnauld do hold that to form a propositional thought is to endorse that things are a certain way. Yet what seems to be a simple confusion is actually a view about how we form propositions: the view purports to explain proposition formation in terms of judgment.

RE-CONCEIVING IDENTITIES: A PRAGMATIST ONTOLOGY OF “GROUPS” FOR A
CRITICAL FEMINIST POLITICS

AMRITA BANERJEE, UNIVERSITY OF OREGON

A feminist politics of sameness based on “common oppression” has come under severe criticism. To avoid its assimilatory tendencies, third wave feminists tend to call for a politics of location that emphasizes the specificity of group identities. However, regressive versions of identity politics are not unusual in the current political landscape. In this scenario, there is a need for rethinking the bases for identity politics rather than dismissing it completely given the bleak history of colonialism with its aggressive assimilatory agenda. For a postcolonial feminist politics that is truly decolonizing, we need alternative conceptions of “borders” and “identity” that neither embrace cultural essentialism nor end up endorsing a borderless and aggressively assimilationist politics. Inspired by philosophical pragmatism (particularly the works of Josiah Royce and Mary Parker Follett), this paper seeks to develop an alternative paradigm for thinking about these concepts in order to facilitate a more dynamic identity politics.

RECONSIDERING WHAT IT IS TO PAY ATTENTION: HEIDEGGER AND LETTING-BE-NESS

S. WEST GURLEY, SAM HOUSTON STATE UNIVERSITY

Contemporary scientific investigations into the topic of attention have taken as self-evidently true the idea that attending is an intentional act, characterized by a kind of aboutness that continental philosophers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century attempted to elucidate. While it might be the case that in order to track the movement of a person’s attentional directedness, one may need to presuppose that attention is an intentional modification. This paper shows that such presuppositions are parasitic upon a conception of reality as fundamentally divided into subjects and objects and that we do not receive an understanding of what it is, truly, to pay attention when we do so. Relying on Heidegger’s critique of technology and some of the remarkable insights of Simone Weil, I offer an alternative way to think about what it is to pay attention.

REID ON AESTHETIC RESPONSE AND THE PERCEPTION OF BEAUTY

LAURENT JAFFRO, UNIVERSITÉ PARIS I PANTHÉON-SORBONNE

The paper deals with the “Essay on Taste” in Reid’s *Intellectual Powers* (1785) and makes three points: (1) about the nature of aesthetic perception; (2) about the content of aesthetic perception, i.e., the objective side of beauty, which Reid terms “excellence”; (3) about the location of beauty in the forms of nature or works of art. The main claim is that “pneumatology” is the key to the understanding of Reid’s account of aesthetic perception.

REIDIAN INTERNALISM

DANIEL M. JOHNSON, BAYLOR UNIVERSITY

Thomas Reid is the paradigm epistemological externalist. The great strength of (and major motivation for) his epistemological views, which remains the great strength of contemporary externalism, is their ability to resist the skeptical challenge. However, there has arisen in recent years a strong family of arguments against externalism in favor of evidentialist internalism, which threatens the viability of a Reidian response to skepticism. An independently motivated alteration to Reid’s theory of perception results, I’ll argue, in a neo-Reidian theory of perception which can both preserve a fundamentally Reidian response to the skeptic and accommodate evidentialism. The result is a kind of Reidian internalism which navigates a *via media* between the Scylla of the most powerful arguments against externalism (the case for evidentialism) and the Charybdis of some of the most powerful arguments against internalism (derived mainly from elements of skeptical challenges).

RELATIONAL-SYSTEM NATURAL KINDS AND THE FUNCTION OF ANALOGY

THEODORE BACH, UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT

Natural kinds are stable, mind-independent structures that support inductive practices. I claim that an important type of natural kind supports induction because kind-members exhibit a stable higher-order relational structure. For example, atoms and solar systems share certain likenesses because each exemplify the higher-order relational structure of a central force system—a type of relational-system natural kind of which atoms and solar systems are members. I argue that relational-system natural kinds are needed to explain the recent empirical finding that relational schema concepts have significant epistemic value. I further argue that analogical cognition—the cognitive process through which we can abstract relational commonalities—functions so as to develop relational concepts that describe relational-system natural kinds. These considerations bring together recent theoretical work in the philosophy of science and recent empirical work in the cognitive sciences. They also provide a new and naturalistically accommodating interpretation of the function of analogical cognition.

REPRESENTATIONAL CONTENT AND PERCEPTUAL ORGANIZATION: ON A
COUNTEREXAMPLE TO INTENTIONALISM

RENÉ JAGNOW, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA

At a minimum, intentionalism is the thesis that the phenomenal character of an experience supervenes on its representational content such that two experiences can differ in phenomenal character only if they differ in representational content. Intentionalism can therefore be falsified by means of a counterexample consisting of two experiences that have the same representational content but differ in phenomenal character. Recently, Bernhard Nickel has presented an interesting counterexample consisting of two visual experiences of a 3 x 3 grid of straight lines, and Bence Nanay has argued that we can reject this counterexample by appeal to the thesis that perceptual contents are always sensitive to attention. In this paper, I will first show that Nanay's response does not succeed in rejecting Nickel's counterexample to intentionalism and then provide an alternative response based on the phenomenon of figure/ground organization.

RETRIBUTIVE PREPUNISHMENT

JOSEPH Q. ADAMS, RICE UNIVERSITY

This paper argues that many of our most important theories of retributivism—classified as Balancing Act Retributivism (BAR)—are unwittingly committed to the radical thesis that prepunishment, or punishment before an offense, is morally permissible. A retributive theory is a member of BAR just in case it says that punishment is morally justified because it balances against an injustice (however characterized) where this balancing is required in order to preserve a morally important equilibrium (however characterized). BAR includes Kant, Herbert Morris, George Sher, Jean Hampton, and others. The innocent commitment to balancing against injustice—and a fortiori to diachronic justice—makes BAR indifferent, *ceteris paribus*, with respect to when we punish. Indifference alone is some reason to permit prepunishment, but there's even more: under certain conditions (e.g., when we cannot apprehend the offender afterward) BAR requires prepunishment as sometimes the best way, sometimes the only way, to secure justice.

ROTATION WITHOUT CHANGE IN THE *STATESMAN*

BRIAN PRINCE, RICE UNIVERSITY

In Plato's *Statesman*, the Visitor tells a myth in which the universe rotates sometimes in one direction, at other times in the opposite direction. The reason he offers for the reversal implies two surprising metaphysical assumptions. First, he is thinking of the mind of the god who guides the universe as engaging, literally, in spatial rotation. This is because his comparison of the universe's rotation with "the most divine things" is best read as a comparison with the god or gods, rather than with the Forms. Second, he is treating rotation in one direction as a way of not changing at

all. Otherwise, the Visitor has failed to give a reason that the universe has to reverse its direction of rotation.

SARAH KOFMAN ON *ECCE HOMO*: OR, HOW *THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA* BECAME A FABLE OF HITLERISM

THOMAS STEINBUCH, INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR

Nietzsche's *Ecce Homo* is a marginalized work among his writings, despite the importance he attributed to it. Sarah Kofman's 1993-94 two-volume commentary, *Explosions* I and II, reads Nietzsche as a proto-Nazi, marginalizing it further. Her approach is nowhere better represented than in her commentary on Chapter I, Why I Am So Wise, section eight. Through her analysis of this text and its selection from *On the Rabble* from *Zarathustra*, Kofman is able to impugn the value, not only of *Ecce*, but of the *Zarathustra*-project as a whole. Documenting her position in the original French, I reverse her judgment, consulting a wide range of Nietzsche's texts, including original translations of variant texts from *Ecce* and *Zarathustra*. The upshot of my criticism is that her project in *Explosions* is misguided, traceable back to her commentary on Wise 1 and her Freudian reading of Nietzsche's psychological situation as he states it there.

SAVING FOR RETIREMENT WITHOUT HARMING OTHERS

STEVEN J. DASKAL, NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY

In this paper I discuss moral issues raised by 401(k) retirement plans. I argue that participation in 401(k) plans is strongly encouraged by the following three factors: (1) the lack of adequate public provision of retirement support, (2) the tax-advantaged status of such plans, and (3) the availability of matching contributions from employers. Given that most 401(k) plans fail to offer adequate socially responsible investment options, these factors constitute significant pressure to commit indirect harm by owning stock in companies that engage in harmful behavior. In order to eliminate this pressure, I argue that the federal government ought to require 401(k) plans to include a range of socially responsible investment options, that corporations ought to incorporate such options into their 401(k) plans with or without a government mandate, and that individuals ought to take advantage of such options when available and advocate for them when unavailable.

SCIENTIFIC REALISM DEFENDED

GERALD DOPPELT, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—SAN DIEGO

I defend a realist commitment to the truth of our most empirically successful current scientific theories on the ground that it provides the best explanation of their success and that of falsified predecessors. I argue that this Best Current Theory Realism (BCTR) is superior to preservative realism (PR) and structural realism (SR). I show that PR and SR rest on the implausible assumption that the success of outdated theories requires the realist to hold that these theories possessed true components. PR is undone

by the fact that past theories succeeded even though their ontological claims about unobservables are false. SR argues that the realist is only committed to the truth of the mathematical equations of the outdated theory, to explain its success. I argue that such mathematical equations are too bare-bones thin to explain the predictive/explanatory success of outdated theories. I conclude that BCTR can meet these objections to PR and SR.

SELF-IDENTIFICATION AND A PUZZLE ABOUT MENTAL OWNERSHIP

TONY CHENG, CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK—GRADUATE CENTER

Immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) has long been intuitive but controversial. Recently, Caleb Liang and Timothy Lane (2009) invoke empirical studies to argue against IEM. I think the case they elaborate on—“somatoparaphrenia”—does put much pressure on IEM, but rather than abandoning it altogether, I use this pathology as a tool to sharpen our understanding of IEM. Patients of somatoparaphrenia have a sense of alienation from certain part(s) of their bodies. This is at odds with IEM. To reconcile the tension, I improve our formulation of IEM by modifying those from Sydney Shoemaker, David Rosenthal, and James Pryor. Contrary to the received view that Shoemaker’s thesis is a contemporary version of Wittgenstein’s one appeared in the *Blue Book*, I argue that somatoparaphrenia helps us see that Wittgenstein’s version is actually preferable. I also use cases such as “dental fear” and “extreme empathy” to strengthen my case.

SELF-LOVE IN THE ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS

JERRY GREEN, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS—AUSTIN

The *Nicomachean Ethics* is nearly universally given pride of place in Aristotle’s ethical corpus. I argue there is at least one topic in Aristotle’s ethics where this is a mistake. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle presents self-love as the paradigm form of friendship, using it to explain how love of others occurs and why it is an important component of eudaimonia. But self-love has some theoretical problems, one of which is that it cannot be reciprocated the way Aristotle argues friendship requires. In the *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle addresses this worry, and uses it to motivate a modified view from that of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. This change is difficult to explain if the *Nicomachean Ethics* were Aristotle’s last word on the subject, but makes perfect sense if the *Eudemian Ethics* were the revised version. This suggests we should follow Aristotle in turning to the *Eudemian Ethics* for Aristotle’s considered view.

SEMANTIC DEFECT IN CONTEXT

JAMES R. SHAW, UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

There is an increasingly common objection to views allowing some expressions to only contingently express truth-evaluable propositions. The objection is that those views cannot make sense of the coherent beliefs

and intentions speakers have when accidentally using those expressions in defective contexts. I show why no version of this objection is successful, in part by developing systematic ways to work from the semantics of defective utterances to the coherent attitudes of speakers issuing them.

SEMANTIC MODELING AND PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS: A DEFENSE OF STALNAKER'S ACCOUNT OF CONDITIONALS AS A GENERAL THEORY OF CONDITIONAL REASONING

VANESSA LEHAN-STREISEL, YORK UNIVERSITY

Though an examination of empirical results from psychologists is not commonly found in the philosophical literature on logic, psychologists do not seem to have trouble incorporating philosophical logic into their own theories. I examine the arguments of empirical psychologists on Stalnaker's theory of conditionals and argue that their criticisms are misplaced. Stalnaker's account of conditionals shares similar elements with the mental models theory proposed by Johnson-Laird et al and the probabilistic approach outlined by Oaksford and Chater. Most notably, this account combines the beneficial elements of both theories, a probabilistic analysis and a method of semantic modeling, making Stalnaker's account of conditionals remarkably similar to the alternative mental models theory proposed by Schroyens and Schaeken. Given the broad empirical support for the alternative mental models theory, Stalnaker's account of conditionals is the most promising candidate for use as a general description of conditional reasoning.

SHIFTS OF ATTENTION AND THE CONTENT OF PERCEPTION

ADRIENNE PRETTYMAN, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

Chalmers (2004), Wu (2010), and Block (2010) have independently argued that the effect of attention on the content of perception raises a challenge for representationalism. Covert shifts of attention seem to involve a change in the phenomenal character of perception, without a corresponding change in representational content. In this paper, I show that the challenge fails because the arguments provided do not rule out a change in representational content. I argue that the strongest version of the challenge dissolves once we reject the "Sandwich Model" of perception, on which perception, thought and action are in principle dissociable (Hurley 2002). I end by proposing a different model, on which representational content depends on a subject's ongoing thought and action.

SOPHISTICATED JOINT ATTENTION AND INTERSUBJECTIVE EXPLANATION

RAY RENNARD, UNIVERSITY OF THE PACIFIC

Humans are capable of sophisticated forms of joint attention, which include attention to abstract objects and to phenomena removed in space and in time. One of the more sophisticated forms of joint attention involves the attribution of attitudes to an individual in the context of an intersubjective explanation of behavior. Whereas individual acts of "mind reading" serve the predictive and explanatory purposes of an individual, intersubjective

explanations serve additional social functions and are, therefore, sensitive to factors that do not arise at the individual level. The act of communicating an intersubjective psychological explanation produces a shared cognitive environment that may include, *inter alia*, a subset of the intersection of the cognitive systems of the participants. I sketch an account of intersubjective attitude ascription—situated within the relevance theoretical approach to communication—that is sensitive to the myriad cognitive and social factors at play in intersubjective explanations of behavior.

SUICIDE TERRORISM AND THE HOBBSIAN SOVEREIGN

JEREMY ANDERSON, DEPAUW UNIVERSITY

In separate papers, Williams and Koukal argue that Hobbes's political philosophy is seriously deficient because it is incapable of addressing the problem of suicide terrorism. They maintain that because Hobbes believes fear of death is paramount he holds that rule can be maintained by means of physical force alone, and therefore Hobbes cannot account for and cannot counter attackers who are willing to die. I argue that the critics are mistaken. Hobbes is aware sovereigns may face opponents who are willing to die, and in response he maintains that physical force must not be a sovereign's sole means of ruling. The picture of Hobbesian sovereignty which emerges from rebutting the critics is more nuanced and less unattractive than is widely appreciated.

SURPRISE EXAMS ARE CONDITIONALLY POSSIBLE

ALEX BAIA, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS–AUSTIN

I offer a solution to the paradox of the surprise exam. I claim that surprise exams are conditionally possible: It is possible to have a surprise exam, but the existence of this possibility is conditional on there being a possibility of having an unsurprising exam. I proceed as follows: First, I briefly overview the paradox. Second, I describe the conditional possibility solution. Third, I diagnose the reasoning—here called The Elimination Argument—which leads to the paradoxical conclusion that surprise exams are impossible. Fourth, I close by considering a variant of the surprise exam that involves self-defeating belief.

SYNTHETIC A PRIORI INFALLIBILITY

GLEN HOFFMANN, RYERSON UNIVERSITY

On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified, *i.e.*, justified to a degree that is truth entailing and falsity precluding. In this paper, I examine the second thesis of rationalist infallibilism. Focusing on what seems to be the only potentially plausible species of synthetic a priori infallibility, I argue against the possibility of the infallible a priori justification of so-called self justifying propositions.

TEACHING RESEARCH ETHICS ACROSS DISCIPLINES

MARK GREENE, UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE

Explicit attention to ethics is increasingly important in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). This interest is partly driven by the demands of congress and funding agencies, but it also reflects the commitment to ethics of many working in STEM fields. The challenge is to develop practical ethics training that is philosophically competent and that also has credibility among working scientists. The Responsibility and Integrity in Science and Engineering (RAISE) program at the University of Delaware responds to the challenge with an innovative approach to research ethics training. A research ethics class, team taught by philosophy and science faculty, is offered to STEM grad students. The RAISE program teaches the teachers; preparing and funding participants to provide ethics outreach for their disciplinary peers. This talk will reflect on the lessons of the RAISE program, with special mention of the role of the philosopher in the room.

TELEOLOGICAL EXPLANATION IN ARISTOTLE'S METEOROLOGICA

MARGARET SCHARLE, REED COLLEGE

Commentators agree that Aristotle's biological works reflect *Physics 2's* theoretical commitment to the explanatory priority of final over efficient causation. In this paper I argue that the *Meteorologica* also reflects this priority. The teleological process of animals' perpetual generation serves as the explanatory touchstone of the biological works. We find it in Aristotle's frequent slogan "man is generated from man" (*Parts of Animals* 640a25-27, *Physics* 193b8, 194b13). I argue that the sun-directed elemental cycles of transformation and locomotion (for example, the seasonal evaporation and condensation cycle) play the teleological role in the *Meteorologica* that animal generation plays in the biological works.

THE BARCAN FORMULA(E) FOR DETERMINACY

JON ERLING LITLAND, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

I discuss the Barcan Formula for an operator "it is (metaphysically) determinate that." I argue that the Barcan Formula in the form $\neg D\neg\exists x\varphi \rightarrow \exists x\neg D\neg\varphi$ is not valid, but that the following form is: $\forall xD\varphi \rightarrow D\forall x\neg\neg\varphi$. In order to accommodate this, classical logic is given up in favor of intuitionistic logic. I develop a novel model theory for intuitionistic logic with a determinacy operator. The theory is applied to debates about composition.

THE CERTAINTY OF BACONIAN FORMS

DANIEL SCHWARTZ, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-SAN DIEGO

There is no question that Francis Bacon holds that his inductive method can achieve "certainty." As Bacon is often read, however, he holds that a good natural philosopher temporarily holds off on claiming anything for certain—until the sixth and final part of his *Great Instauration*, the stage

during which we arrive at knowledge of formal causes. In this paper, I argue that this focus on part six is misplaced. Although Bacon does say that forms must be certain, he is using that word in a technical sense derived from his reading of Aristotle in Latin translation, where the term *akribeia* was translated with the Latin *certitudo*. He is not referring to epistemic certainty. This argument casts some doubt on the characterization of Bacon as a temporary skeptic.

THE DIS-ASSEMBLAGE OF GENETIC MEANING: COUNTERING THE BIO-NORMATIVE
VALUATION OF GENETIC RELATEDNESS: A STRATEGY FOR QUEER POLITICS?

KIMBERLY LEIGHTON, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Queer theorists such as Lee Edelman (2004) have argued that the pursuit of a queer politics within the framework of reproduction is a self-dooming project. In response to his call to refuse “reproductive futurism,” however, Jaspir Puar (2007) has countered that Edelman’s critique “recenters the very child-privileging, future-oriented politics he seeks to refuse.” While I agree that we must not make reproduction the central target of queer strategies, the family does continue (and will continue in the U.S. and elsewhere) to be the site of the naturalization of identity logic through its reiteration of the realness of genetic relatedness. Consequently this site of ontological reproduction must still be a focus of queer analysis. Using the recent work of Ladelle McWhorter (2009) together with Puar, I suggest how a dis-assembling of genetic kinship can destabilize not only the centrality of family, but the racial logic of normative history.

THE DOMAIN RELATIVITY OF NORMS OF STRENGTH OF WILL

ALIDA LIBERMAN, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

I argue for a norm of rational strength of will (or *enkrasia*) stating that if you believe that you rationally ought to ?, then you (subjectively) rationally ought to intend to ?, and are necessarily subjectively irrational if you do not. I propose a parallel norm of moral *enkrasia*—that if you believe you morally ought to ?, then you (subjectively) morally ought to intend to ?, and are necessarily subjectively immoral if you do not; likewise for prudential *enkrasia*. I explain why we need norms of *enkrasia* to be effective agents, and why this general framework will encompass a parallel norm of *enkrasia* in other normative domains. Finally, I conclude that my proposal puts pressure on views that cannot accommodate the domain-relativity, discussing the view of John Broome and noting the relevance my view has for the debate over the logical scope of *enkrasia* as a conditional requirement.

THE EDUCATION OF AMOUR-PROPRE

TY LANDRUM, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

Rousseau’s interpreters commonly suppose that the education of amour-propre is supposed to tame the desire for differential recognition, such that the educated citizen is content to be recognized as an equally valued

member of the political body. In my view, this is a serious mistake and one that obscures what is most interesting in Rousseau's vision of democratic politics. Taking departure from Frederick Neuhouser (who continues the interpretive trend of Nicholas Dent, John Rawls, Joshua Cohen, et al.), I argue that Rousseau's innovative solution to the problem of integrating the citizen's desire for recognition into political life is not (as Neuhouser and company would have it) to deprive that desire of concern for the radically singular aspects of the individual self. Instead, Rousseau aims to show that the desire to be recognized as an incomparably singular being is essential to the very possibility of moral freedom.

THE INDEPENDENCE REQUIREMENT FOR ROBUST EVIDENCE

TARUN MENON, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—SAN DIEGO

JACOB STEGENGA, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—SAN DIEGO

Robustness: a belief is better supported with multiple kinds of independent evidence for the belief. We investigate the notion of independence required for robustness. Most philosophers of science who make such arguments rely on a notion of ontic independence (OI)—when the multiple lines of evidence depend on different materials, assumptions, or theories. We formulate a probabilistic criterion of independence (PI) and prove that evidence that meets this criterion is collectively more confirmatory than its individual pieces. Some seem to assume that OI entails PI. However, we argue that OI does not entail PI, since OI focuses solely on the independence of the techniques by which the evidence is gathered rather than the relationship between the evidence and a hypothesis. We show that OI evidence can collectively confirm a hypothesis to a lower degree than any of the individual pieces, so OI alone cannot be sufficient for robustness arguments.

THE INTENTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS OF CONVENTION

MARIJA JANKOVIC, INDIANA UNIVERSITY—BLOOMINGTON

A convention is an arbitrary, social, practice. In this paper, I aim to explicate the social nature of convention. In part 1, I compare two cases of coordinated behavior, only one of which can give rise to a convention. I take the contrast between the two examples to show that there is an interesting connection between the concepts of convention and agreement, and in subsequent discussion I aim to elucidate this connection. I lay out David Lewis's (1969) account of convention as a foil against which to develop my alternative account (1.1), give some reasons for my account and explain in more detail some of the crucial notions it appeals to (1.2), and give the full analysis (1.3). In part 2, I argue that Lewis's account is inadequate because it is both too weak and too strong, and because it does not account for conventions which are not actual regularities.

THE IS-UGHT CORRELATION IN NEO-CONFUCIAN QI-NATURALISM: HOW
NORMATIVE FACTS EXIST IN NATURAL STATES OF QI

JEELOO LIU, CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY–FULLERTON

This paper attempts to reconstruct the ontology of qi in the framework of contemporary ontological naturalism. The three philosophers selected for this study are three Neo-Confucians of Ming Dynasty: Luo Qinsu (1465-1547), Wang Tingxiang (1474-1544), and Wang Fuzhi (1619-1692). In particular, one issue that will be addressed in this paper is how value and normativity can be derived from the way the world is. Under analysis, there are two sets of normative facts that Neo-Confucians assert in the realm of qi. The first set of normative facts lie the internal logic of the development of qi, which they call Principle (Li). The second set of normative facts are manifested in the inherent attributes such as creation, nourishment, harmony, impartiality in the effect of qi and natural phenomena. This second set of normative facts, which are called “dao,” lay the foundation for human ethics.

THE MORAL ASYMMETRY OF PRAISE AND BLAME

CHELSEA HARAMIA, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO–BOULDER

What if feelings of desert are not justified? Determinism challenges their intuitive strength, and many have wondered how we should we proceed if responsibility and desert are not theoretically sound. In this paper, I aim to point out that, when answering this question, an important moral consideration has been largely overlooked—a consideration of unjustified harm. I argue that when we blame people we unjustifiably harm them, but this does not follow with respect to praise. While conceding the theoretical significance of the claim that we lose all desert under deterministic conditions, I point out that we need not adopt it wholesale. Instead, we are perfectly capable of positive, desert-based reactions that do not jeopardize our interests in being morally good agents. However, negative, desert-based reactions are in fact morally bad acts and ought to be avoided for important ethical reasons.

THE NON-TRANSITIVITY OF METAPHYSICAL EXPLANATION

KELLY G. TROGDON, LINGNAN UNIVERSITY

Consider the locution “grounding,” along with its variants “in virtue of,” “priority,” “metaphysical explanation,” and so on. Familiar claims include: *Socrates* is grounded in *Socrates*; mental properties are instantiated in virtue of physical properties; the categorical is prior to the dispositional; wholes are metaphysically explained by their parts; and so on. There is a burgeoning literature on grounding, and one point of dispute concerns the structural principles that characterize it. In this talk I argue that grounding is non-transitive, contrary to what many assume. My argument appeals to the idea that the subject matters of the enabling conditions at issue in chains of grounding explanation are sometimes orthogonal.

THE PECULIAR PHOTOGRAPHIC CHARACTER OF DOCUMENTARIES

MARINA FOLESCU, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

In his recent book, Kendall Walton (2008) revisits his earlier position on the interaction between the transparent and the representational character of photographs, in order to tie some loose ends. However, his treatment of documentary photographs remains problematic. Walton claims that even documentary photographs are representational and this means that imagination is the main faculty essentially involved in the appreciation of documentary photographs. Whereas, it seems clear to me that documentary photographs are supposed to trigger the formation of beliefs in their viewers, rather than imaginings. In this paper, I identify the source of this problem and offer an alternative analysis, that emphasizes the intuitive distinction between pictures that are works of fiction and those that aren't.

THE PHYSICAL REALIZATIONS OF MIND

JAMES BLACKMON, SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY

The human brain is a scattered material object commonly held to be the thing that has, realizes, or instantiates conscious properties or states. Using a thought experiment, I show that this view leads to practical absurdities. If we are to avoid these absurdities, we must reject the view that it is the material of the brain that alone instantiates consciousness and embrace a theory (perhaps yet a physicalist theory) that accounts for things or features of the world that are strictly not material. I suggest that the most plausible alternative is to acknowledge the apparently essential role played by energy transfer unmediated by matter.

THE POWER TO DO THE IMPOSSIBLE

BRANDON CAREY, UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER

Several recent arguments purport to show that omnipotence is incompatible with the possession of certain necessary properties. These arguments appeal to one of two plausible but false principles about the nature of power: (i) that if it is metaphysically impossible for a being to actualize a state of affairs, then that being does not have the power to actualize that state of affairs, or (ii) that if it is impossible given some contingent facts about the world that a being actualize a state of affairs, then that being does not have the power to actualize that state of affairs. I pose several problems for both principles, thereby undermining the plausibility of these arguments. I then suggest an alternate way of evaluating a being's power that allows for a being to have the power to do something even if the being has necessary properties which make doing that thing impossible.

THE PRIORITY AND POSTERIORITY OF RIGHT

JON GARTHOFF, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

In this essay I articulate two pairs of theses about the relationship between the right and the good and I sketch an account of morality that systematically

vindicates these four theses, despite a nearly universal consensus that they are not all true. In the first half I elucidate and motivate the four theses and I explain why leading ethical theorists maintain that at least one of them is false. In the second half I outline an account of the relationship between the right and the good that satisfies all four theses. The principal aim of the essay is to show that the view I sketch is promising and deserves investigation as a rival to more familiar theories. There is considerable value, furthermore, in formulating and juxtaposing these theses, since this provides a taxonomy of ethical theories and explains the characteristic theoretical virtues and vices of different families of theories.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONSEQUENTIALISM

SEAN AAS, BROWN UNIVERSITY

The vast majority of moral theories can, it seems, be represented in a consequentialist form. Some conclude from this that there is no significant difference between consequentialist and non-consequentialist views. This paper explains why that conclusion is mistaken. Though there are thin senses of “right” and “good”—“choiceworthy” and “promotable,” respectively—on which it is all but analytic that any action-guiding moral theory is consequentialist, there are also senses of these terms on which this may well not be the case. These thicker senses encode information about reasons for various attitudes, as well as reasons for action. The consequentializing dialectic leaves it entirely open whether consequentialisms posed in these terms can make interesting and substantive claims about the relationship between these different sorts of reasons. The possibility of consequentializing thus has little to do with the real significance of the consequentialism/non-consequentialism distinction.

THE SKEPTICAL CHALLENGES OF HUME AND BERKELEY: CAN THEY BE ANSWERED?

MICHAEL TOOLEY, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO—BOULDER

Hume argued that no beliefs can be justified by induction, while Berkeley argued that belief in a mind-independent external world cannot be justified. Can these skeptical contentions be refuted? I shall argue that various present-day attempts to do so are unsound, but that there are promising avenues. Thus, in the case of skepticism about induction, everything turns, I shall contend, upon whether the only coherent account of laws of nature is one that equates laws with certain cosmic regularities, or whether, on the contrary, a governing law conception is coherent, according to which non-probabilistic laws are, near enough, atomic states of affairs that entail corresponding regularities. If governing laws are impossible, then inductive skepticism is correct. But if governing laws are possible, then inductive skepticism can be refuted. Finally, what about skepticism concerning a mind-independent world? That is a tougher challenge, but I shall suggest one line of attack.

THE T-SCHEMA ARGUMENT AGAINST REALISM

PAUL SAKA, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS–PAN AMERICAN

According to the disquotational T-schema, the sentence “snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white. But this entails that snow is white only if the sentence “snow is white” exists. Assuming naturalism, then, it follows that facts about the external world depend on the existence of speakers; metaphysical realism and semantic realism are jointly inconsistent. I shall argue that this argument survives in good part when the disquotational T-schema is reformulated in terms of statements, beliefs, that-clauses, and propositions, and it survives when it is reformulated with Tarskian and Davidsonian punctilio. Consequently some important theories of truth bear on the question of metaphysical realism, contra Alston, Devitt, Goldman, Horwich, Kirkham, Searle, Tennant, et al.

THERE IS NO EASY BOOTSTRAPPING PROBLEM

PETER KUNG, POMONA COLLEGE

MASAHIRO YAMADA, CLAREMONT GRADUATE UNIVERSITY

Some epistemological views accept that certain belief-forming mechanisms can deliver justified beliefs even if the subject lacks justification to believe that the mechanism is reliable. The bootstrapping objection charges that such views make it too easy to acquire justified belief that these belief-forming mechanisms are reliable by inductive reasoning. We offer a novel way to diffuse this charge. An independently plausible constraint on inductive reasoning is also available to those epistemological views targeted by bootstrapping argument. The constraint arises from consideration of clear cases of bad inductive reasoning and does not require commitment to potentially controversial epistemological views.

TOWARD A PRAGMATIC CONCEPTION OF MENTAL DISORDER

ABIGAIL GOSSELIN, REGIS UNIVERSITY

There is much debate about how we should conceive of mental disorder, in particular whether and in what sense disorder is thought to be “real.” Essentialists argue that disorders are natural kinds, categories that reflect natural and essential differences in human mental functioning. Constructivists argue that disorders are social constructions, practical categories that reflect contingent social and historical values. While these models appear dichotomous, they share a realist view of causation which assumes that mental disorders are only “real” if they have the right kinds of causes. Epistemological limitations suggest a contrary approach, however, which is anti-realist and pragmatic, looking not at the causes of disorder but at the states which it describes, i.e. the nature and severity of the dysfunction and harm that are experienced. Developing a robust account of human functioning would better allow us to understand, assess, and treat mental disorder.

 TRUTH AND KNOWLEDGE IN LOGIC AND MATHEMATICS

VOLKER HALBACH, OXFORD UNIVERSITY

GILA SHER, UNIVERSITY CALIFORNIA–SAN DIEGO

In this talk I develop an account of truth and knowledge for logic and mathematic. The underlying methodology is a synthesis of holistic and foundational principles, logical and mathematical truth are based on indirect correspondence, and logical and mathematical knowledge is quasi-apriori (as opposed to being either empirical or purely-apriori).

TRUTH: THE WORST OF ALL GOODS

CHASE B. WRENN, UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA–TUSCALOOSA

Some intrinsic goods are not as good as other intrinsic goods. It therefore makes sense to wonder if there is a worst intrinsic good. This paper argues that true belief is a prime candidate for the title “Worst of All Goods.” The intrinsic value of truth, I argue, does not outweigh the intrinsic value of anything else we care about. So, if truth is an intrinsic good at all, its intrinsic goodness is utterly minimal.

TYE ON THE PHENOMENAL CONCEPT STRATEGY

ESA DIAZ-LEON, UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

The Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) claims that there is an alternative explanation of the epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths, which does not involve an ontological gap between them. In this paper my main aim is to defend the PCS from some recent criticisms offered by Michael Tye (2009). Tye’s main critique of the PCS, in a nutshell, goes as follows: “The phenomenal-concept strategy is in deep trouble. No one has yet managed to produce a plausible account of phenomenal concepts that gives them the features they must have in order to do the work needed to defend physicalism” (55-56). In response, I will argue, first, that Tye’s general characterization of the goals of the PCS is misguided, and secondly, that his more specific objections to two influential accounts of phenomenal concepts, namely, the recognitional account and the quotational account, can be solved.

 UNITY IN ARISTOTLE’S *METAPHYSICS* H.6

EVAN KEELING, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

In this essay I argue that the central problem at issue in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* H.6 is the unity of forms and that Aristotle solves this problem in just the way he solves the problem of the unity of composites—by hylomorphism. I also discuss the matter-form relationship in H.6, arguing that they have a correlative nature as the matter of the form and the form of the matter.

VALUE INCOMPARABILITY AND INDETERMINACY

CRISTIAN CONSTANTINESCU, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

The paper examines two competing accounts of value incomparability presented in the recent literature. According to one account, developed most famously by Joseph Raz, incomparability means determinate failure of the three classic value relations (better than, worse than, and equally good): two items are incomparable if and only if (i) it is false that a is better than b, (ii) it is false that a is worse than b, and (iii) it is false that a and b are equally good. Most philosophers have followed Raz in adopting this account of incomparability. Recently, however, John Broome has advocated an alternative view, on which value incomparability is explained not in terms of determinate failure of the trichotomy of value relations, but in terms of vagueness. The paper aims to defend Broome's view by warding off an objection recently put forward by Erik Carlson.

VERIDICAL IDEALIZATIONS

ROY SORENSEN, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS

Idealization looks like a counterexample to scientific realism. How could scientists be aiming at the truth if they deliberately falsify the data (by ignoring friction, scale effects, and so on)? Veridical idealizations are used to show that idealization involves indifference to truth rather than falsification. This indifference suggests that the key speech act is supposition rather than assertion (even of an attenuated sort such as temporally indirect, relative or pretend assertion). The underlying reasoning is indirect proof (conditional proof or *reductio ad absurdum*) rather than direct proof (in which all premises are asserted).

VIRTUES OF CREATIVITY AND PRODUCTIVITY, MORAL THEORY, AND HUMAN NATURE

CHRISTINE SWANTON, UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND

In this paper I show the centrality of virtuous creativity and productivity in a life of virtue. Certain tendencies in moral theory have downplayed creativity and productivity as ethically central, including Aristotle's distinction between action and production, and his relegating the latter to secondary status. Drawing on insights of Nietzsche, Rand, and the philosopher-psychologist Otto Rank who was greatly influenced by Nietzsche, and for whom creativity is central to self love and thereby to healthy love of other, I show that the creative productive life is central to human nature, and the healthy development of the self. However not all creativity is virtuous: some forms of what Rank calls "creative will" are unproductive, destructive, and expressive of self contempt. An account of creative and productive virtues is required for what might be called an "ethics of creativity."

WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR AN OPTIMISM INDUCTION FROM THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE?

K. BRAD WRAY, *STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK—OSWEGO*

I examine Nola's recently developed optimistic induction over the history of science, an induction that is meant to offer support for scientific realism. I argue that it fails to provide compelling support for the continuity of reference that realism presupposes. Further, I argue that anti-realism is based on an optimistic view about the prospects of future science. Thus, even given very optimistic assumptions about the future of science, I argue that we have reason to believe that our current best theories probably misrepresent the world in significant ways.

WHAT CAN PLEASURE TELL US ABOUT THE GOOD?

CHRISTIANA OLFERT, *TUFTS UNIVERSITY*

In many respects, Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* is a text that struggles to find the proper place for pleasure in our lives. This extends to the role of pleasure in how we think—especially how we think about the good. But according to Aristotle, does pleasure influence our thinking for better or for worse? Recent scholarly work focuses on his more pessimistic comments: he suggests that pleasure is deceptive, illusory, and otherwise interferes with our practical reasoning. I argue for a more optimistic view, which begins with Aristotle's claim that pleasure is an appearance of goodness; that is, experiences of pleasure present pleasant things to us as good. Furthermore, I argue, it is possible for these appearances to be correct. Contrary to what some scholars have thought, then, Aristotle allows that pleasure can be a starting-point for learning about the good, and about what makes our lives go well.

WHAT IS DECEPTIVE LYING?

DON FALLIS, *UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA*

According to a popular definition, you lie if you say something that you believe is false with the intent to deceive about what you say. However, there are two respects in which this definition fails to capture the phenomenon that is of interest to moral philosophers. First, this definition does not count as lies in cases where you intend to deceive your audience about your believing what you say rather than about what you say. Second, it handles inconsistently cases where you say something because you know that your audience does not trust you and will likely conclude that you believe something else. I propose a new definition of lying that handles both doxastic misdirection cases and double bluffing cases correctly. Basically, you lie if you say something that you believe is false with the intention of deceiving someone about something on which you have invited him to trust you.

WHAT'S LUCK GOT TO DO WITH IT?

CHRISTOPHER EVAN FRANKLIN, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—RIVERSIDE

Libertarianism has, seemingly, always been in disrepute among philosophers. While throughout history philosophers have offered different reasons for their dissatisfaction with libertarianism, one worry is recurring: namely a worry about luck. To many, it seems that if our choices and actions are undetermined, then we cannot control them in a way that allows for freedom and responsibility. In this paper I argue that Robert Kane's important formulation of libertarianism actually generates an acute worry about luck. In particular, the location and role of indeterminism in Kane's theory renders indeterminism a threat, rather than a help to freedom and responsibility. I offer a careful analysis of Kane's theory and diagnosis of what went wrong. I then reformulate libertarianism to avoid the worries embedded in Kane's theory and show how my reformulation avoids two prominent versions of the luck argument, as presented by Ishtiyaque Haji and Peter van Inwagen.

WHAT, ME WORRY: COHIBITATION AND THE PROBLEM OF THE MANY

H. E. BABER, UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO

Rebecca Roache suggests that David Lewis's response to Parfit in defense of the view, that identity is what matters for survival fails because, given the character of personnel involved in branching cases, we cannot infer that what matters for their survival is what matters for us. According to Roach, since the survival of individuals involved in fission cases is guaranteed through fission, they cannot be concerned about their survival in the same sense that we, whose survival is not guaranteed, worry about our futures. And so, she claims, what matters for our survival is not what matters for them. I argue however that given the criterion for individuating persons and the account of self-interested concern she assumes, both ordinary people and those destined to undergo fission are in the same boat. Our survival, like theirs, is in one sense guaranteed, but neither we nor they should be sanguine about that.

WHY CARE FOR THE SEVERELY DISABLED? A CRITIQUE OF MACINTYRE'S ACCOUNT

GREGORY S. POORE, BAYLOR UNIVERSITY

In *Rational Dependent Animals*, Alasdair MacIntyre attempts to ground the virtues in a biological account of humans. Drawing from this attempt, he also tries to answer the question of why we should care for the severely disabled. MacIntyre's difficulty in answering this question begins with the fact that his communities of practices do not naturally include the severely disabled within their membership and care. In response to this difficulty, he provides four reasons why we should care for the severely disabled. I argue that three of MacIntyre's answers to this question are inadequate, and that his fourth answer is incomplete, although it does point in a promising direction. Drawing from Wendell Berry, whose work MacIntyre admires, I conclude with a few suggestions for a more satisfactory account of why we should care for the severely disabled.

WHY PARITY ARGUMENTS CANNOT SAVE NORMATIVE REALISM

TRAVIS N. RIEDER, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

Many philosophers reject moral realism because they believe that it requires an objectionable ontology. In response, realists have formed various “companions in guilt” strategies, which attempt to show that the supposedly objectionable features of moral realism are required by other, acceptable views. One recent version of this argument, by Terence Cuneo, works by positing parity between the epistemic and practical domains, and then claiming that, because of this parity, whatever objectionable features moral realism has must be had by its sister position, epistemic realism. But, the argument goes, we shouldn’t thereby embrace epistemic antirealism; so we shouldn’t embrace practical antirealism either. In this paper, I will argue that The Parity Argument fails. It does not fail because of a disanalogy between the epistemic and practical domain; rather, it fails because we should reject epistemic realism as well. The assumption that epistemic realism is on more sure footing is unwarranted.

PLACEMENT SERVICE INFORMATION

Lindsay Palkovitz will be the Coordinator for the APA Placement Service at the 2011 Pacific Division Meeting. Questions concerning the Service should be directed to Lindsay at The American Philosophical Association, University of Delaware, 31 Amstel Avenue, Newark, DE 19716. She can also be reached by telephone at (302) 831-4298, fax: (302) 831-8690, or email: lindspal@udel.edu.

APA PLACEMENT SERVICE GENERAL HOURS OF OPERATION:

Wednesday, April 20: Placement Information, 11:00 a.m. – 8:00 p.m.,
Indigo Foyer West

Thursday, April 21: Placement Information, 8:30 a.m. – 8:00 p.m.,
Indigo Foyer West
Placement Interviewing, 8:30 a.m. – 8:00 p.m.,
Aqua 305, Aqua 307, Aqua 309

Friday, April 22: Placement Information, 8:30 a.m. – 5:00 p.m.,
Indigo Foyer West
Placement Interviewing, 8:30 a.m. – 5:00 p.m.,
Aqua 305, Aqua 307, Aqua 309

Saturday, April 23: Placement Information, 8:30 a.m. – 1:00 p.m.,
Indigo Foyer West
Placement Interviewing, 8:30 a.m. – 1:00 p.m.,
Aqua 305, Aqua 307, Aqua 309

APA PLACEMENT SERVICE LOCATIONS

The Placement Services will be located in Indigo Foyer West and Aqua 305, Aqua 307, and Aqua 309 of the Hilton San Diego Bayfront Hotel as outlined below. For your convenience, maps of the hotel appear at the back of this issue.

JOB CANDIDATES – INDIGO FOYER WEST

1. Candidate Numbers will be assigned at the Placement Desk.
 2. The location of a Job Interview will be available from the Placement staff, or posted on the bulletin board at the information desk.
 3. Additional “Request for Interview” forms will be available at the Placement Desk.
 4. APA Membership Applications will be available at the APA Meeting Registration Desk.
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5. Information and instructions for using the Service will be available at the Placement desk (also see following pages), and posted on the information bulletin board.
6. The mailboxes for Job Candidates will be located at the Placement Desk.
7. A complete set of Job Postings will be available at the Placement Desk.
8. A message for the APA Placement Ombudsperson can be left at the Placement Desk.

INTERVIEWERS – INDIGO FOYER WEST

1. **Interviewers check in here**—as soon as possible upon arrival.
2. Payments for **On-Site Interviewing Departments** will be received here.
3. Space will be provided here for interviewers to check their files.
4. “Request for Interview” forms received from job candidates that have been reviewed by interviewers **should be returned** here.
5. A list of interviewing table assignments will be posted on the Placement Information Bulletin Board.

INTERVIEWING AREA – AQUA 305, AQUA 307, AND AQUA 309

1. APA Interviewing Tables will be located here.
2. In the event that additional space for interviewing is needed, we will post the additional location on the Placement Information Bulletin Board.

INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOB CANDIDATES

REQUIREMENTS FOR USING THE PLACEMENT SERVICE

1. You **must be an APA member** in order to use the Service. Placement is a benefit of membership for candidates, and there is no additional charge to use this service. Membership applications are available on the APA web site (www.apaonline.org) or by contacting the APA National Office (302) 831-1112, or at the Membership/Registration desk at the Meeting.
 2. You **MUST REGISTER** for the **MEETING** in order to use the Service.
 - If you **register in advance** for the meeting and indicate that you will be a candidate (an advance registration form is located at the back of this issue), a candidate number will be assigned in the National Office and will appear on the back of your badge. You **must** pick up your badge from the APA Registration staff prior to using the Placement service.
 - If you register on-site for the meeting, present your badge to the Placement Staff, who will be available to assign you a candidate number in the “Placement Service” line.
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WHAT TO BRING WITH YOU

1. Your copies of recent issues of *Jobs For Philosophers*.
2. Several copies of your curriculum vitae. If you run out of CVs at the meeting, the hotel has a copy center located in the Business Center.

HOW TO USE THE PLACEMENT SERVICE

After you have picked up your registration materials from the APA Registration staff, you are ready to use the Service. If you do not yet have a candidate number on the back of your badge, please go to the job candidates' area in Indigo Foyer West to receive one.

JOB CANDIDATES' AREA – INDIGO FOYER WEST

Here you will find a file folder (mailbox) with your candidate number on it. All communications addressed to you during the meeting will be placed there. Your folder contains:

1. "Request for Interview" forms. Additional forms will be available from the Placement staff. **Be sure that your Placement Number appears at the top of all forms.**
2. A "Locator" form for you to list your name and hotel address. Please do not remove this form from your folder. This is used only in the event that we need to contact you during the meeting.

JOB POSTINGS

New jobs (not having appeared in the *Jobs for Philosophers*) will be posted on a bulletin board in the Placement Service Area. You should check this board regularly for new postings. Each ad should contain instructions on how to apply.

INSTITUTIONS THAT HAVE CHECKED IN WITH PLACEMENT

The names of institutions that have registered to use the Service will be posted on the bulletin board (updated regularly) in *alphabetical order*. Each listing will indicate the following:

1. If the listing institution has checked in with Placement.
2. If the institution is accepting interview requests at the meeting.
3. The relevant *JFP* for the institution's opening(s).
4. Where the institution plans on interviewing (Table with number assignment).
5. Miscellaneous notes deemed appropriate by the Placement staff or the institution.

SUBMITTING AN INTERVIEW REQUEST FORM

Complete the *top* portion of the "Request for Interview" form and attach a copy of your CV. **Be sure that your candidate number appears at the top of all forms.** After you have completed the necessary information,

place your request form and CV in the box marked *Requests for Interviews* which will be prominently displayed on the Placement Service Desk. Your "Request" will be forwarded to the institution by a staff member.

INTERVIEWS

After your "Request" has been reviewed by a representative from the institution, the form will be returned to your file folder with the institution's response appearing on the *bottom* of the form. Check your file folder often so that you can be certain to receive your messages promptly.

By **1:00 p.m. on April 23**, all "Requests" submitted by you should have been returned to your file folder, and you should remove them at that time. Occasionally, an institution may retain applications to review at a later date. If you applied for a job that had been posted and the institution did not check in with the Service during the meeting, it is suggested that you contact the institution by mail.

INTERVIEWING LOCATIONS

Some departments will be conducting interviews at tables in Aqua 305, Aqua 307, and Aqua 309. Each institution using a table for interviewing will be assigned a table number. The table numbers assigned to institutions will be posted on the bulletin board in the Placement Service Area.

ADVICE FOR JOB APPLICANTS

The APA Committee on Career Opportunities offers the following advice for job applicants: The schedule for those seeking jobs and those Departments offering positions is difficult for all concerned. From the point of view of Departments, any publication date for *Jobs for Philosophers* is a compromise between the competing demands imposed by the need to get funding for positions, so the later the better, and by the need to have time to process applications, so the sooner the better. From the point of view of job applicants, there are also competing demands: the sooner it is published, the more time to apply, but the later it is published, the more opportunities will be available. There is no easy solution to this problem, but you can ease your difficulties somewhat by being prepared when the *JFP* is published. You should have your curriculum vitae ready to put in an envelope, a generic draft of a letter of application ready to be fine-tuned for particular job opportunities, and the rest of your file ready for mailing. This means talking to those who are to write letters of recommendation long before the *JFP* is due to arrive, preparing material about your teaching capacities, and selecting a writing sample for those Departments that request it. Applications should be complete, as well as clearly organized. It is to your advantage to send in your application as soon as possible after an ad appears.

INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR INTERVIEWERS

REQUIREMENTS FOR USING THE PLACEMENT SERVICE

1. It is expected that **all individual interviewers will register for the meeting** either by using the registration form found in the back of this issue or by stopping at the APA Registration Desk (Indigo Foyer West) to register on-site prior to using the Placement Service.
2. All **Departments (not individuals)** planning to interview at the meeting should complete the Placement Service advance registration form found on our web site, <http://www.apaonline.org/divisions/pacific/index.aspx> or at the end of this section.

Upon receipt of an advance registration form additional information pertaining to the Placement Service will be sent to the attention of the contact person listed on the form. In the event that we send Placement forms either via email or mail, please be sure to complete these and return them to our office **at your earliest opportunity**. Not doing so may cause your materials to arrive after the Staff has already left the office to travel to the meeting. In this case, we **must** have you fill out the forms again on site. If time does not allow sending them to us, please bring them with you and turn them in at the Placement Desk.

CHECKING IN WITH THE SERVICE

Before you begin to interview candidates, please check in with the Placement Staff (Indigo Foyer West). We will need to know that you have arrived on site for candidates inquiring about your institution. Additional information will be requested from you (or confirmed if your department pre-registered) at this time as well.

Some institutions accept interview requests at the meeting; some of these job notices may have appeared in *Jobs for Philosophers* while others are unpublished positions. A new, unpublished position will be assigned an AD# and posted on the bulletin board in the Placement Service area. If you are bringing such a job notice with you to the meeting, please provide the Placement Staff with **four** copies of the notice for the position you are advertising. Such a position announcement should be typed on *one side only* in a good size and easy to read font, and be as brief as possible. Only positions that have **not** appeared in *Jobs for Philosophers* will be posted. If you would like a position that has been posted at this meeting to appear on our website immediately following the meeting, or in the issue of *Jobs for Philosophers*, you need to submit this ad immediately, following the close of the meeting via our website, <https://member.apaonline.org/formredirect.aspx?p=JFP>. If you need assistance with this, contact the APA National Office.

Some institutions interview by prearrangement after placing an advertisement in *Jobs for Philosophers* and then contacting candidates prior to the meeting. When you arrange an interview with candidates, please inform them that they **must be APA Members in order to use the Service and they must register for the meeting in order to use the Service**.

If you plan to conduct job interviews anywhere other than at the interviewing tables/suites we have provided, please let us know your plans because candidates often come to us to ask questions about the location/time (etc.) of their interviews, and we need to have complete, up-to-date information in order to help them (and you).

Departments using a **Suite** for interviewing will need to complete an interview schedule form at the time they check in with the Service. Doing so enables the Service to notify the candidates you wish to interview of your interviewing location. **Be assured that only those candidates listed on your interview schedule will be told the location of your hotel room, unless you have directed us to give this information to all candidates who ask.** Departments interviewing at tables **DO NOT** need to complete this form.

N.B.: If you are conducting interviews in a hotel room, please be aware of the following policy statement adopted by the APA Board of Officers at its November 2004 meeting:

“Departments should not conduct Job Interviews in non-suite hotel rooms. Candidates who are subject to such interviews can appeal to the APA and are guaranteed anonymity.” (Originally published in *Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association*, Vol. 78, No. 5, pp. 23, 119.)

APA INTERVIEWING TABLES

The Placement Service provides numbered tables for interviewing purposes; you will receive your table number assignment when you check in. These table number assignments will also be posted on the Placement Service Bulletin Board. Should additional space for interviewing tables be necessary, this location will be posted as well.

INSTITUTION FILE FOLDER (MAILBOX)

There will be a file folder bearing the name of your institution located in the Candidates' Area in Indigo Foyer West. Requests for interviews from candidates will be placed in this file folder.

REVIEWING INTERVIEW REQUESTS

When a candidate requests an interview with your institution, you should receive her/his curriculum vitae attached to a “Request for Interview” form. The bottom of this form is to be completed by you and returned to Placement staff. If an interview is granted, space is provided on this form to list the time, date, and location of the interview. If you are *unable to interview a candidate*, space for this response is also provided on the form. Any request you receive in an envelope contains confidential material and should be destroyed rather than returned to the candidate. As a matter of professional courtesy, *all requests should receive a response*. When a candidate receives a “Request” form back without a response, he or she is likely to assume that the material *has not been reviewed* and might return this to you via our service or contact your institution by mail.

Each candidate is assigned a numbered file folder to facilitate prompt communication between interviewers and candidates. Materials that you wish to transmit to a registered candidate should be handed in to the Placement Service staff located in Indigo Foyer West, and will be delivered to the candidate by our staff.

APA STATEMENT ON PLACEMENT PRACTICES

The APA Committee on the Status and Future of the Profession reminds you of its Statement on Placement Practices: The APA discourages the nomination by graduate departments of job seekers for positions in philosophy, and the submission of their dossiers in response to announcements of positions, without their knowledge or interest. This may seriously mislead those who are conducting searches, and may have unfortunate consequences both for them and for genuinely interested applicants. Graduate departments using a nomination procedure or submitting dossiers on behalf of job seekers should either attest explicitly that the candidate wishes to be considered for the positions in question, or (preferably) ensure that the job seekers themselves submit personal letters of application for these positions. Departments conducting searches are encouraged to recommend or require explicitly (in their position announcements) that each candidate, to be assessed of full consideration, should submit a personal letter of application for and interest in the announced position.

A Placement Ombudsperson will be available at the meeting. Please see the Placement Service Staff if you would like to contact the Ombudsperson.

Placement Service Registration for Interviewing Departments
APA 2011 Pacific Division Meeting
Hilton Bayfront Hotel – San Diego, CA, April 20 – 23, 2011

Only one form is required for each interviewing department. Once completed, this can be faxed to (302) 831-8690.

Institution: _____ Department: _____

Contact: _____ Phone: _____

Address: _____

City, State, Zip: _____ Email: _____

All persons conducting interviews should be registered** for the Pacific Division Meeting as well as the department being registered with the Placement Service.

**Registered members of the department who will be conducting interviews:

Our department will:

_____ need interviewing table(s) Quantity of Tables _____

–or–

_____ conduct interviews in a hotel suite (you must contact Linda Smallbrook to reserve a suite)

Our department will:

_____ provide suite # and list of prearranged candidates to whom suite information may be given

–or–

_____ bring suite # and allow service to give to anyone who requests it

Our department will:

_____ conduct prearranged interviews only

–or–

_____ accept interview requests on-site

Please list the JFP issue(s) (if any) in which this job was advertised: _____

Registration Fees (Please Check One): _____ Pre-Registration, By April 1: \$50.00

_____ *Regular Registration, After April 1: \$75.00

Credit Card Type: (Circle One) VISA / MASTERCARD

Credit Card #:

Exp. Date: /

Last 3 Digits on back of card:

Name on Card: _____ Phone #: _____

Signature: _____ Email: _____

***Check #: _____ Check Date: _____ Check Amount _____

***Payable to: The American Philosophical Association. The APA only accepts checks drawn on U.S. banks in U.S. funds, or Int'l. Money Orders in U.S. funds. There is a \$30 charge for all returned checks. **If PAYMENT is not received in our office by April 1, 2011 you MUST pay the on-site fee! Please mail form and payment to: Attn: Placement Services, The American Philosophical Association, 31 Amstel Avenue, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716.

PAPER SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

Online Paper Submissions: Papers may be submitted either electronically or in hard copy by mail. For electronic submissions, follow the instructions on the APA web site. For hard copy submissions, mail to: Lindsay Palkovitz, ATTN: [Eastern, Pacific, or Central] Division Papers, The American Philosophical Association, University of Delaware, 31 Amstel Avenue, Newark, DE 19716, (302) 831-4298. Papers in any area are welcome. All papers are blind reviewed. Author's name, institution, or references pertaining to the identity of the author must be removed from the paper, abstract, notes, and bibliography. Papers containing such identifying references will be rejected. Submitted papers are not returned to authors. Papers not accepted by one Division may be re-submitted for consideration to another Division. In submitting papers, authors warrant that those papers are entirely their own work or the joint work of the authors identified in the cover letter, and that, where appropriate, acknowledgement of the contributions of others has been made.

Graduate Student Travel Stipends and Awards: Papers to be considered for Graduate Student Travel Stipends/Awards must meet the criteria specified by each Division. For more information, visit the following address: www.apaonline.org/divisions/stipends/travelstipendsandprizes/index.aspx.

GUIDELINES FOR ALL THREE DIVISIONS

(*Guidelines 6, 7, 9, and 10 only apply to authors who are submitting papers in hard copy.)

1. Authors must be members in good standing of the APA.
 2. 1 copy of the paper.
 3. 1 copy of the abstract.
 4. Colloquium papers are limited to 3,000 words.
 5. Abstracts for colloquium papers are limited to 150 words.
 - *6. Title or cover page, which must include: a) title; b) word counts for all papers and abstracts; c) author's contact information; d) the Division the paper is to be submitted for. ***If you are submitting your paper on-line, please exclude this information from your submission.***
 - *7. Papers must be typed on one side of page, double spaced, 1-inch margins on all sides, all pages numbered, 10-12 pt. font.
 8. No more than one submission by the same author for the same Division will be considered.
-

- *9. Indicate name of Division on outside lower left side of the envelope containing the paper.
- *10. Include a self-addressed stamped envelope to the National Office if you wish the receipt of your paper to be acknowledged.
 - 11. Any paper which is under consideration for publication elsewhere will be considered, provided that it will not appear in print until after the Divisional meeting is held. If this is the case, indicate when and where the paper is expected to be published.
 - 12. Papers are not accepted by e-mail.
 - 13. Authors are advised to provide accurate email addresses as part of their contact information because they may be contacted by email, sometimes under urgent circumstances. Authors who expect to relocate between the date of submission and the date of the meeting should arrange for email forwarding, or else provide both current and new email addresses with their contact information.
 - 14. No one who is scheduled to appear in an invited session on the Main Program of a meeting may also present a submitted paper as part of that same Main Program. Because of this policy, members who have already agreed to participate in invited sessions on the Main Program of a meeting are asked not to submit papers for that same meeting. Please note that this does not concern sessions organized by APA Committees or by affiliated groups.

EASTERN DIVISION:

Meeting is held December 27-30.

Selections are announced in May or June.

Papers accepted by either the Central Division or the Pacific Division may not be presented at any subsequent meeting of the Eastern Division.

Papers exceeding 3,000 words will not be considered as colloquium papers.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper.

Any paper submitted without an abstract will not be considered. Any paper whose abstract is deemed unacceptable by the Program Committee will not be accepted. No revised abstract submitted after the paper's acceptance will be published in the *Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association* without the approval of the Program Committee.

PACIFIC DIVISION:

Meeting is usually held in March or April.

Selections are announced in January.

A paper that has been on the Main Program at a past APA meeting (any division), or will be on the Main Program at a future Central or Eastern Division meeting, cannot be presented as a Main Program colloquium/symposium paper at the Pacific Division meeting.

All abstracts are not to exceed 150 words. For dual submissions (colloquium and symposium) only one abstract is required and should not exceed 150 words.

Submissions for consideration as colloquium papers must not exceed 3,000 words.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper. (This will be considered a single submission.)

In submitting a paper, its authors grant to The American Philosophical Association the nonexclusive worldwide right to publish the paper's abstract in the *Proceedings of The American Philosophical Association* and on the APA and Pacific Division web sites, in the event that the paper is accepted. Its authors also grant to The American Philosophical Association the nonexclusive worldwide right to post a preprint of the paper, in the form in which it was submitted, on the Pacific Division web site, for up to four months prior to the meeting for which the paper is accepted. The Division will not publish a preprint provided that the authors so notify the Pacific Division at the time the paper is accepted.

CENTRAL DIVISION:

Meeting is usually held in February or March.

Selections are announced in September, or before when possible.

Papers exceeding 3,000 words will not be considered as colloquium papers.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper.

The Central Division will not include a paper on its meeting program if that paper (1) has already been presented or is scheduled for presentation on the Main Program of another APA Divisional meeting or (2) has been accepted for publication and will have actually been published prior to the Central Division meeting in question. If a paper is accepted for presentation and the Program Committee subsequently learns that it will have been published prior to the meeting, then that paper will be withdrawn from the meeting program.

MINUTES OF THE 2010 PACIFIC DIVISION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

WESTIN ST. FRANCIS HOTEL, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 31, 2010

Present: Heather Battaly, Michael Bratman, Nancy Cartwright, Rebecca Copenhaver, Dominic McIver Lopes, Ned Markosian, Michael Tooley, Julie Van Camp.

Guest: Joseph Campbell.

Regrets: Stewart Cohen.

CALL TO ORDER: The meeting came to order at 4:00 p.m. with President Michael Bratman in the chair *pro tempore*.

ELECTION OF THE CHAIR: Julie van Camp was elected chair of the Executive Committee and she immediately assumed the chair.

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA: The agenda was adopted.

APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES: The minutes were approved as printed in the February 2010 *Proceedings*.

BUSINESS ARISING FROM THE MINUTES: There was no business arising from the minutes.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-TREASURER: The Division's assets continue to exceed the recommended cushion by a modest amount following a modest surplus for the 2008-9 fiscal year. Registration at the 2009 meeting in Vancouver was within norms for meetings outside San Francisco. The 2010 meeting program includes 995 participants in fifty-two invited sessions, fifty-three refereed sessions, fifteen APA committee sessions, and seventy-seven group sessions. As a result of Local 2 of Unite Here's boycott of the conference hotel, thirty-eight sessions, representing about fifteen percent of the program, moved off site. The process of moving these sessions went smoothly with the kind cooperation of David Kim and Gerard Kuperus at the University of San Francisco.

APPOINTMENT OF THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE: Julia Annas, Michael Bratman, and Ann Garry were appointed to the 2010-11 Nominating Committee, with Professor Bratman to serve as chair.

REPORT OF THE PROGRAM CHAIR: Rebecca Copenhaver reported that the Program Committee refereed 451 papers, down from 2009 but in keeping with norms in the past five years. Of these papers, 133 were

accepted, for an overall acceptance rate of thirty percent, also in keeping with five-year norms. The Executive Committee applauded Professor Copenhagen's leadership of the Program Committee.

APPOINTMENTS TO THE PROGRAM COMMITTEE: A list of candidates for appointment to the Program Committee was approved.

APPOINTMENT OF THE PROGRAM CHAIR: The Committee approved a list of candidates for appointment to chair of the Program Committee.

FUTURE MEETING SITES: At its 2009 meeting, the Committee had directed the Secretary-Treasurer to investigate Portland, Seattle, and San Francisco as potential meeting sites for 2012 and 2013. The Committee discussed whether or not the Division should contemplate future meetings in San Francisco. On one hand, the city is popular with potential conference participants and offers outstanding facilities. On the other hand, San Francisco is often the first major market in the United States where hotel labor contracts expire, and so it is at risk of recurring labor disputes. The Committee authorized the Secretary-Treasurer to negotiate with hotels to allow the Division the option of rescheduling a booking well in advance, when it is not assured at that time that there will be a labor contract in place on the booked dates. This will reduce the risk of meeting when a labor dispute is possible.

ADVANCED AND ON-SITE REGISTRATION FEES: It was agreed that, beginning with the 2011 meeting, on-site registration fees will be \$90 for members, \$120 for non-members, and \$15 for student members. Advanced registration fees remain unchanged at \$60 for members, \$90 for non-members, and \$10 for student members. It was also agreed that the fee for pre-college teachers and students will be \$10 in advance and \$15 on site.

PREPRINT PERMISSIONS POLICY: The Division's policy has been that authors of refereed papers must inform the Division in writing at the time their paper is accepted if they do not consent to allow a preprint of their paper to be posted on the Division's web site prior to the annual meeting. This policy has worked effectively and the Committee agreed that no changes are needed at this time.

APPROVAL OF THE AGENDA OF THE BUSINESS MEETING: The agenda of the Business Meeting was approved.

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO FUNDING REQUEST: In response to a request from the University of San Francisco, the Committee authorized funding in the amount of \$1000 to subsidize the cost of receptions for sessions that were originally scheduled as part of the 2010 annual meeting and that moved off-site.

MINICONFERENCE PROPOSALS: Three miniconference proposals were discussed and the Committee authorized funding for a miniconference to be held in 2011 on Experimental Epistemology.

PAPERLESS COMMUNICATIONS: The Committee agreed that the Division should seek ways to reduce the carbon footprint of its communications

without inhibiting the flow of information. As a start, members who receive a mailed copy of the issue of the *Proceedings* which contains the Division's meeting program will no longer receive a duplicate copy at conference registration. The Committee also agreed to recommend to the APA Board of Officers that a committee be charged with investigating ways to reduce the carbon footprint of the Association's print communications while improving electronic communications.

NEW BUSINESS: It was proposed that the Division conduct a pilot of refereed poster sessions, to allow for the presentation of high quality research for which a poster is an appropriate medium of communication. An ad hoc committee comprised of the Secretary-Treasurer and the 2010, 2011, and 2012 program chairs was charged to design a pilot for 2011 or 2012.

ADJOURNMENT: The meeting adjourned at 7:10 p.m.

Respectfully submitted,

Dominic McIver Lopes, Secretary-Treasurer

MINUTES OF THE 2010 PACIFIC DIVISION BUSINESS MEETING

WESTIN ST. FRANCIS HOTEL, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
THURSDAY, APRIL 1, 2010

CALL TO ORDER: President Michael Bratman called the meeting to order at 12:04 p.m.

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA: The agenda was adopted.

APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES: The minutes were approved as printed in the February 2010 *Proceedings*.

BUSINESS ARISING FROM THE MINUTES: There was no business arising from the minutes.

ANNOUNCEMENTS: A moment of silence was observed following a reading of the names of APA members who had passed away since the last meeting.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-TREASURER: The Secretary-Treasurer summarized his report to the Executive Committee (see the Executive Committee Minutes). He then thanked Rebecca Copenhaver and the 2010 Program Committee for assembling a strong strong and diverse program, expressing special thanks to Eric Hutton, Sherri Irvin, Robin Jeshion, Mark McPherran, Charles Siewert, and Iain Thomson on the completion of three-year terms as members of the Committee. He also thanked Michelle Pham, Anita Silvers, Linda Smallbrook, and the APA staff for their help with the meeting, David Kim and Gerard Kuperus for smoothly coordinating sessions that moved off site to the University of San Francisco, and Nancy Cartwright and Stewart Cohen for their service on the Executive Committee. These expressions of gratitude were endorsed with a round of applause.

REPORT OF THE PACIFIC DIVISION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE: Julie Van Camp, Chair of the Executive Committee, reported the Committee's actions (see the Executive Committee Minutes).

REPORT OF THE APA BOARD OF OFFICERS: David Schrader, Executive Director of the Association, reported the actions of the Board of Officers taken at its annual meeting in November 2009 (see the Board Minutes in the May 2010 *Proceedings*). In particular, he reported that as a result of the resolution of the 2009 Business Meeting of the Pacific Division and the Secretary-Treasurer's efforts to bring petitions concerning the Statement on Nondiscrimination to the official attention of the Association, he referred

the matter to the Standing Committees on Inclusiveness in the Profession and the Status and Future of the Profession, charging them to consult with the Committees on the Defense of the Professional Rights of Philosophers and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender People in the Profession. These committees made a recommendation to the Board, which subsequently adopted the following Statement on Nondiscrimination:

The American Philosophical Association rejects as unethical all forms of discrimination based on race, color, religion, political convictions, national origin, sex, disability, sexual orientation, gender identification or age, whether in graduate admissions, appointments, retention, promotion and tenure, manuscript evaluation, salary determination, or other professional activities in which APA members characteristically participate. This includes both discrimination on the basis of status and discrimination on the basis of conduct integrally connected to that status, where “integrally connected” means (a) the conduct is a normal and predictable expression of the status (e.g., sexual conduct expressive of a sexual orientation), or (b) the conduct is something that only a person with that status could engage in (e.g., pregnancy), or (c) the proscription of that conduct is historically and routinely connected with invidious discrimination against the status (e.g., interracial marriage). At the same time, the APA recognizes the special commitments and roles of institutions with a religious affiliation; and it is not inconsistent with the APA’s position against discrimination to adopt religious affiliation as a criterion in graduate admissions or employment policies when this is directly related to the school’s religious affiliation or purpose, so long as these policies are made known to members of the philosophical community and so long as the criteria for such religious affiliation do not discriminate against persons according to the other attributes listed in this statement. Advertisers in *Jobs for Philosophers* are expected to comply with this fundamental commitment of the APA, which is not to be taken to preclude explicitly stated affirmative action initiatives.

Institutions will be asked to indicate compliance with this Statement when they purchase ad space in *Jobs for Philosophers*. If they do not indicate compliance, a flag will automatically be added to the ad to show that the the institution has not indicated that it complies with the APA Nondiscrimination Statement. In addition, the APA will fully investigate any complaints about institutions that may not be in compliance with the Nondiscrimination Statement. A separate flag will be used to mark ads taken out by any institution that is found not to be in compliance, and this flag will state that, following a full investigation, the APA has determined that the institution is not in compliance with the APA Statement on Nondiscrimination.

REPORT OF THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE AND ELECTION OF OFFICERS: In the absence of the chair of the Nominating Committee, the Secretary-Treasurer reported that the Committee had nominated Alison Wylie for office as Vice-President and Alastair Norcross for office

as Member at Large. There were no nominations by petition. A motion to elect the nominees carried unanimously.

DISCUSSION OF SITE SELECTION PRACTICES: The Secretary-Treasurer presented the proposal of the Executive Committee to avoid meetings in hotels where a labor dispute may develop (see the Executive Committee Minutes). There was also a discussion of whether the Division might formulate and publish a policy to determine what should happen in the event that a future meeting hotel is subject to a labor dispute.

ADJOURNMENT: The meeting adjourned at 12:54 p.m.

Respectfully submitted,

Dominic McIver Lopes, Secretary-Treasurer

REPORT OF THE 2010-11 NOMINATING COMMITTEE

Michael Bratman (Chair), Julia Annas, Ann Garry, and Dominic McIver Lopes (*ex officio*) served as the 2010-11 Nominating Committee. They have nominated the following APA Pacific Division members for terms beginning July 1, 2010: for Vice President: John M. Fischer, for Representative to the Board: Manuel Vargas, and for Member at Large: Jean Roberts.

Respectfully submitted,
Michael Bratman, Chair

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE BYLAWS OF THE PACIFIC DIVISION

The APA will soon have facilities for secure electronic ballots. The use of these ballots would realize significant cost savings and reduce the Pacific Division's carbon footprint. Therefore, the Executive Committee proposes the following amendment to the Bylaws of the Pacific Division. If it is enacted, the effect of this amendment will be to allow for voting by electronic ballot in deciding elections, resolutions on matters of public policy, future amendments to the Bylaws, and any other question that may be put to a ballot. The proposed amendment will be presented for discussion and amendment at the 2011 Business Meeting. It will then be submitted by postal ballot to members of the APA with Pacific Division affiliation.

Proposed Amendment to the Bylaws:

6. Mail Ballots

Throughout these Bylaws the phrase "mail ballot" shall denote either a postal or electronic ballot.

The current Bylaws are available at apa-pacific.org/governance.

MINICONFERENCES CALL FOR PROPOSALS

The Pacific Division invites proposals for one-day miniconferences to be held in conjunction with its annual meeting in 2012. The Division will provide a venue and support of up to \$5000 to defray direct expenses of the miniconference.

The purpose of this program is to provide opportunities for collective exploration of important philosophical topics in more depth than is offered by the usual meeting schedule. Past miniconferences are listed at apa-pacific.org/minis.

Proposals should include (1) a list of the organizing committee's members, (2) a description of the topic of the miniconference that explains its timeliness, significance, and anticipated impact, (3) a list of potential and committed speakers, (4) plans for publicizing the miniconference, and (5) a brief budget indicating what contribution the Pacific Division is asked to make. Proposals that budget expenditures aimed to attract an audience or maximize impact are more likely to be successful. Miniconference organizing committees are expected to include at least one member of the Pacific Division. APA Committees are not eligible to apply.

Proposals should be submitted by email to the Secretary-Treasurer no later than March 14 for adjudication by the Division's Executive Committee at the next Annual Meeting. A number of considerations enter into the Committee's decision—these include but are not limited to the availability of resources, the timeliness, significance, and potential impact of the miniconference, the selection of speakers, the experience of the organizers, and the use of the budget to attract an audience. The decision of the Executive Committee is final.

Information about the Pacific Division's annual meeting, including future meeting sites and dates, is available on the Division's web site at apa-pacific.org. For more information about the miniconference program, please contact the Secretary-Treasurer, Dominic McIver Lopes, at dom.lopes@ubc.ca.

LIST OF ADVERTISERS AND BOOK EXHIBITORS

A complete list of book exhibitors will be available online (www.apaonline.org) and at the Pacific Division Meeting.

DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-215)

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-212)

PERSEUS BOOKS GROUP (A-216)

PHILOSOPHER'S INFORMATION CENTER (A-217)

PHILOSOPHY DOCUMENTATION CENTER (A-OUTSIDE BACK COVER)

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-220)

ROUTLEDGE PUBLISHERS (A-213)

SUNY PRESS (A-INSIDE FRONT COVER)

WADSWORTH CENGAGE LEARNING (A-214)

WILEY-BLACKWELL (A-218-219)

FORMS

ADVANCE REGISTRATION FORM

HOTEL RESERVATION INFORMATION

PACIFIC 2011

ADVANCE REGISTRATION FORM

APRIL 20 – 23, 2011, THE HILTON SAN DIEGO BAYFRONT, SAN DIEGO, CA 92101

Fax this form with your credit card payment to Linda Smallbrook (302-831-3372). No cover sheet is needed. Or, if you prefer, mail this form with your payment to Linda Smallbrook, APA, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716. Payment must accompany your form.

The APA complies with the Americans with Disabilities Act. Registrants requesting reasonable accommodation to participate in the Pacific Division meeting should contact the Secretary-Treasurer with a request as early as possible, and no later than April 1, 2011.

Please print legibly. **This information is used for your name badge.**

Name: _____

Affiliation: _____

Street Address: _____

City, State, Zip: _____

Email: _____ Phone: _____

Advance Registration Fees (**Received by April 4, 2011** at the National Office)

- _____ \$10.00 APA Student Members
- _____ \$60.00 APA Regular, International & Emeritus Members
- _____ \$90.00 Nonmembers

We cannot process any advanced registrations at the National Office past the April 4th deadline. After that date you will need to register in San Diego and at higher rates: \$90 for regular/international/emeritus, \$120 for nonmembers, and \$15 for student members.

Placement Registration

Interviewers should also complete the Placement Registration Form. **Candidates** should check the space below if planning to use the service. Candidates **must** be a member of the APA in order to use the Placement Service. Placement is a free service for all current APA members.

_____ I will be a job candidate.

___ 1) **Check* (Payable to APA)**

***The APA can only accept checks drawn on a U.S. bank, in U.S. Dollars.**

___ 2) Visa MasterCard Exp. Date

Last 3 digits on back of card

- - -

Name as it appears on Card: _____

Signature of Authorization: _____

Email: _____ Phone #: _____

**AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
2011 PACIFIC DIVISION MEETING
APRIL 20 – 23, 2011
HOTEL RESERVATION INFORMATION
THE HILTON SAN DIEGO BAYFRONT, 1 PARK BOULEVARD,
SAN DIEGO, CA 92101
PHONE 619 564 3333**

The room rate for members, nonmembers, and students is \$179.00. The tax rate for our meeting is 10.5%. Check-in time is 3 pm and check-out is noon. Please be sure to let the hotel know if you are physically challenged and will need special accommodations. Rooms are available on a first-come, first-served basis and subject to availability. Reservations must be made by March 21st in order to be assured the APA rate.

The hotel prefers that we make our reservations online. Please use the following link:

http://www.hilton.com/en/hi/groups/personalized/SANCCHH-APHA-20110419/index.jhtml?WT.mc_id=POG

For those persons who are unable to make reservations online, please call the hotel (619 564 3333) to make your reservations.

APA REGISTRATION POLICY

It is the policy of the APA that all persons attending sessions, including those who are participating as speakers, commentators or session chairs, are required to register for each meeting they attend. In addition, we have always recommended that all participants wear their APA badges during session hours to identify themselves as registered participants. In an effort better to enforce this policy we have begun a system of checking meeting attendees, randomly and anyone whom we suspect might not be registered, for proof of registration. If you are asked to provide proof of registration and are unable to do so, you will be asked to register immediately in order to enable you to attend sessions. Registration fees help subsidize every divisional meeting. Without that income we will be unable to ensure the quality and excellence of our meetings which you have come to expect. We thank you for your continued cooperation.
