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Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies

Chang-Seong Hong, Editor

Fall 2008

Volume 08, Number 1

FROM THE GUEST EDITOR

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Some time ago, a colleague alerted me to a discussion about Chinese philosophy on the *Leiter Reports* blog.¹ The discussion there centered around perceptions that there is a “crisis” in Chinese philosophy in the United States and the difficulties faced by students who wish to enter the field but find relatively few choices in selecting graduate programs. It occurred to me that an organized effort to assess the state of the field in the U.S. would be useful and that is what this issue of the *Newsletter* aspires to provide. While the essays collected here are diverse in their interests and orientations, each undertakes to assess the state of the field, with a particular focus on the opportunities for graduate study in Chinese philosophy.

As many of our authors observe, a key measure of the health of the field is its sustainability. Like any area of philosophy, it is not enough that there be talented scholars producing research and “moving the field forward.” There must also be reliable graduate programs through which new generations of scholars can arise. We require, in short, not simply good work but the promise of more to come. Thus, while there are surely other important gauges by which we might evaluate state of the field, the focus of this issue is on opportunities for Ph.D. study of Chinese philosophy. It is in this sense forward-looking, aimed at evaluating not simply where the field is, but where it may go.

It is perhaps necessary at the outset to articulate the limitations of the discussion offered here. Both the scholarship in Chinese philosophy and the scholars working in the field come to it from diverse quarters. Many scholars publishing in the field are professionally placed in disciplines outside philosophy. Likewise, much work in Chinese philosophy is, of course, produced outside the boundaries of the United States. The field is by no means confined by disciplinary or geographical boundaries. However, this issue of the *Newsletter* must be understood to treat the field in a somewhat artificially narrowed fashion, looking principally to the discipline of philosophy and to departments in the United States. While this narrow focus is deliberate and self-conscious, it may be necessary to explain its rationale.

In corresponding with colleagues about this issue and in the *Leiter Reports* blog discussion, one source of worry that emerged was that while Chinese philosophy may be flourishing as an intellectual endeavor, it may do so elsewhere, outside the discipline of philosophy and outside the United States. Impressive philosophy programs have developed in Hong Kong and Singapore, impressive scholars are located in Religious Studies and East Asian programs throughout the U.S., but these

developments have served, for some at least, to emphasize the contraction of offerings in U.S. philosophy departments. In short, there is a concern, among some at least, that the health of the field *qua* intellectual endeavor has come apart from the health of the field *qua* professional disciplinary domain in the United States. In order to address this local and particular aspect of the field, the scholars invited to write for this issue of the *Newsletter* are all placed in, or spent their careers in, U.S. philosophy departments.

The *Newsletter* is divided into three sections. The first and largest section consists in essays solicited from a variety of specialists in Chinese philosophy who currently hold or have recently held positions in U.S. philosophy departments. Some of our contributors have long worked in the field and watched its progress over long careers; others are newer to the field and offer insight derived from recent experiences with both graduate study and the job market. All are actively engaged, in a variety of ways, with promoting the study of Chinese philosophy in the United States.

The second section of the *Newsletter* offers two essays from faculty well placed to address the field from an external vantage point, Hugh Benson (University of Oklahoma) and Leslie Francis (University of Utah). Both Professor Benson and Professor Francis chair departments that, while predominantly Western in orientation, include scholars of Chinese philosophy among their faculty. They were invited to speak to their departments' experience with Chinese philosophy in their graduate curricula and offer their reflections regarding the inclusion of Chinese philosophy in the wider profession.

The third section contains empirical data on the situation of Chinese philosophy in the United States. Here we provide data assembled to give definite shape and context to the reflections included in the essays. The material provided here both outlines the opportunities for Ph.D. study presently available in U.S. philosophy departments and gives a snapshot of recent hiring patterns.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to those who assisted in assembling this issue. Chang-Seong-Hong, Chair of the Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies, provided very helpful advisory assistance; Roger Ames, Philip J. Ivanhoe, and Steve Angle all provided valuable advice regarding how to structure the discussion and organize the data collected here. I am also grateful to the editors at The Chinese University Press for their permission to reprint an excerpt from Professor Donald Munro's new work and to the staff at The American Philosophical Association for their assistance in producing this issue and in gathering the data from *Jobs for Philosophers* included here.

While we would surely need multiple issues of the *Newsletter* to provide a truly comprehensive review, the material gathered here, it is hoped, will prove a helpful marker for those in the field and those considering entering it.

Endnotes

1. This discussion may be accessed at: http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2006/12/the_situation_f.html.

PART I: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE FIELD

Does Michigan Matter?

Stephen C. Angle
Wesleyan University

When I went off to graduate school, specialists in Chinese philosophy taught in philosophy departments at four significant graduate programs: University of Michigan, University of California at Berkeley, Stanford University, and University of Hawai'i. Today, of those four programs, only Hawai'i—which, in contrast to the other three, has not been viewed as a strong broad-based graduate program¹—still has specialists in Chinese philosophy. My question here is: Does this matter, and if so, to whom?

First of all, it matters to prospective graduate students. In saying this, I do not mean to slight the Hawai'i program, which has trained many excellent teachers and scholars. I also recognize that there are several options that a student might consider today. To see why it matters that Michigan, Berkeley, and Stanford have dropped out of the game, let us consider these other options briefly:

1. New U.S. philosophy Ph.D. programs with specialists (e.g., DePaul University, University of Oklahoma, University of Oregon, University of Utah)
2. U.S. philosophy Ph.D. programs with faculty who, despite not having graduate training in Chinese philosophy, have developed strong research and teaching interests in it (e.g., Duke University, University of Connecticut)
3. U.S. Ph.D. programs outside of philosophy (e.g., East Asian Languages and Civilizations or Religious Studies) with faculty centrally interested in the Chinese philosophical/religious tradition (e.g., Harvard University, Indiana University, University of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University, etc.)
4. A U.S. philosophy Ph.D. program with no faculty strongly interested in Chinese philosophy, but having a specialist as an outside member of one's dissertation committee (anywhere, in principle)
5. A non-U.S. philosophy Ph.D. program with specialists (e.g., Chinese University of Hong Kong, National University of Singapore, Peking University, etc.)

Next, let us think about what an aspiring student would want to get out of his or her graduate training:

- A. Broad foundation in the Chinese philosophical traditions—texts, commentaries, and secondary literature
- B. Deep understanding of at least one time period or tradition, including engagement with Chinese (and perhaps Japanese or Korean) scholarship
- C. Strong linguistic and sinological training
- D. Broad foundation in relevant history of Western philosophy

- E. Deep understanding of relevant area(s) of philosophical research cognate with one's interests in the Chinese tradition
- F. Original and insightful dissertation project
- G. Excellent teaching skills

Certainly it is a tall order to acquire A through G. But there is actually one more thing that a student wants, namely:

- H. Prospective employers (especially U.S. philosophy departments) recognize that the student has acquired A through G

How well do institutions of types 1 through 5 fare in preparing students, by the criteria A through H?

Let me immediately acknowledge that there is nothing uniquely magical about being employed by a philosophy department. For many people, it may make most sense and be most attractive to aim at other disciplines instead. But I do think that there is something distinctive and valuable about the project of philosophy, and so I empathize with those students who desire a career teaching Chinese philosophy in a philosophy department. For them, I submit that it is difficult for any of options 1 through 5 to be as good at meeting our desiderata as would a top U.S. philosophy Ph.D. program with one (or more) specialists. The reasons are various and mostly obvious. I will comment here only on the importance of D and E, and on their relation to H. I take it that a key goal of those doing research on Chinese philosophy today is (or should be) to engage our colleagues whose research is on historical or contemporary issues in Western philosophy in constructive dialogue. We should be striving to learn from them, and they from us. We should be challenging one another. This is a crucial ingredient in philosophical development, whether that development is accounted in terms of better interpretations of past traditions or more meaningful work on contemporary issues. To be sure, there is much more involved in either of these projects than dialogue, but dialogue is important. Therefore, D and E would be important even if they were not also instrumental to achieving H. As it stands, learning D and E at a strong graduate program tends to result both in learning D and E well, and in having this strength recognized (i.e., H).

So, it matters for prospective students that top graduate programs in the U.S. no longer have specialists in Chinese philosophy.

I have just asserted that not only the study of Chinese philosophy but also the study of Western philosophy would be better off if scholars of each tradition were in dialogue with one another. This may be controversial but I believe it to be common sense: our philosophical work is enhanced by challenges from different traditions pursuing similar-enough questions, and once we start looking, we see that there are many, many areas in which various traditions are similar enough. It is, of course, critical to avoid reading one's own concerns into another tradition; the role of comparative work varies, depending on whether one's main project is historical interpretation or contemporary philosophical analysis and construction. But in most cases there is room for constructive stimulus from comparative perspectives.²

If this is so, then it is not just potential students of Chinese philosophy to whom it matters that specialists in Chinese philosophy no longer teach at places like Michigan, Berkeley, and Stanford. It matters to the faculty at these schools, it matters to their students no matter what their area of focus, and it matters to all those who are influenced by the writing and lecturing of scholars at these prominent institutions. My claim is not that cross-tradition dialogue and stimulus is impossible without specialists in Chinese philosophy at prominent graduate

institutions. It is starting to happen in spite of the obstacles created by such a lack. But there can be no question that this (hopefully inevitable) progress would be accelerated if more scholars and students at schools like Michigan, Stanford, and Berkeley rubbed shoulders with specialists in Chinese philosophy.

Endnotes

1. For whatever it is worth, Hawai'i does not rank among the top sixty programs according to the "Philosophical Gourmet Report" (<http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com>).
2. Two examples of Western philosophers being stimulated by Chinese traditions might be helpful. In his "The Way of the Wanton" (available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1006893>), J. David Velleman draws significantly on *Zhuangzi* in order to further develop ideas of Harry Frankfurt. Paul Woodruff's *Reverence: Renewing a Forgotten Virtue* (Oxford, 2001) is importantly informed by his understanding of early Confucianism, especially concerning the relation between ritual and reverence.

A State-of-the-Art Reflection on Chinese Philosophy

Roger T. Ames
University of Hawai'i

I would like to join the discussion over the "crisis" in Chinese philosophy in America by appealing to the Chinese expression for "crisis"—*weiji*, literally, a correlation of "danger-opportunity." The insight captured in this term is that a "crisis" is potentially a real danger; but at the same time, it presents an opportunity to someone who can turn it to advantage. I would like to focus my comments on the "opportunity" side of this familiar expression.

Let me begin by observing that there are more jobs in Chinese philosophy being advertised today than a decade ago—that is, more by a power of ten. Chinese philosophy is on a roll. And most of these jobs are in philosophy departments. The exponential rise of China economically and politically has not gone unnoticed in America and, as we all know, culture follows wealth. China is "hot" in American education, and the pressure for a more nuanced and sophisticated understanding of this tradition is coming from below (students), from above (administrations), and from outside the walls of those philosophy departments that would continue to understand philosophy as essentially an Anglo-European profession.

Just as culture follows wealth, supply follows demand. While some of the recent graduates from the University of Hawai'i have found replacement positions—positions that were previously defined as Chinese philosophy—an important number are filling new faculty lines. And I suspect that this positive trend will continue to grow as the interest in Chinese language and culture continues to expand.

Do students who ultimately want to find employment teaching Chinese philosophy in the U.S. have to graduate from philosophy departments in the U.S.? I do believe that we have to locate the study of Chinese philosophy within the discipline of philosophy proper: "Comparative philosophy" will have worked its magic when this geographically rather than philosophically determined term has become obsolete. I think that students who have strong Western philosophical training do Chinese philosophy better, and I also believe that Western philosophy students who have strong Chinese philosophical training will do Western philosophy better. The post-Darwinian revolution in Western philosophy has produced an internal critique under the

banners of hermeneutics, post-structuralism, deconstructionism, pragmatism, phenomenology, existentialism, and so on, that has opened the door for an increasingly important exchange between these two worlds—an exchange that will transform and enrich them both, and that will in the fullness of time make the notion of "exchange" itself an old vocabulary.

Chinese philosophy in the U.S. took a dramatic turn in 1989 when many P.R.C. graduate students studying in America were granted asylum here. Many of these students had undergraduate and graduate degrees from China's finest institutions, and were pursuing a Ph.D. within the context of an established American philosophy program. Two decades later, these American Ph.D.'s have now become an important resource in institutions across the country for training a new generation of Chinese philosophers and have raised the bar on both proficiency in language and in philosophical training. What they have also done is closed a gap, making education at and degrees from Chinese institutions a desirable if not a necessary part of the Ph.D. process. While in the old days Chinese philosophy in America had little to do with Chinese philosophy in China, the demand for new Ph.D.'s is that they have the language skills and the personal experience that locates them within an increasingly inclusive conversation. The presumption that the prestige of a Ph.D. from an American institution is a necessary condition for securing a good position is giving way to an appreciation of what is available within the context of China itself. Indeed, if I were at the beginning of my career, I would take the opportunity of being trained in China and of finding a lifetime position in China as a very important option. I would certainly include Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan in this possibility, but would perhaps be even more interested in the exciting opportunities increasingly available on the mainland.

Do I think that the evaporation of the positions at the elite institutions such as Stanford University, University of Michigan, and University of California at Berkeley signal a danger to the future of Chinese philosophy in America? Certainly it is bad news. But it is not a fair gauge of what is going on in the country as a whole. Such news is offset at least in some degree by increasing opportunities for those who in their lifetimes will do more to transform the discipline of philosophy itself than any generation that has come before. Such is the nature of our current "crisis."

Three Questions about the Crisis in Chinese Philosophy

Bryan W Van Norden
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The primary question we have been invited to address is whether there is a crisis in the field of Chinese philosophy. In many ways, the field is quite healthy. But I would say that there is a crisis in one respect: the training of graduate students in Chinese philosophy by top analytic departments. In this essay, I shall survey what the state of the field is, examine why this situation has developed, and discuss where the field should go from here.

What?

When I went to graduate school, two of the top ten analytic departments had specialists in Chinese philosophy: the University of Michigan (Donald Munro) and Stanford University (David S. Nivison). After the University of California at Berkeley hired Kwong-loi Shun, there was a brief period when three top analytic departments could train graduate students. However,

for various personal and political reasons, none of these programs currently has a specialist in Chinese philosophy or any plans to hire one.

Suppose a student wanted to get a doctorate in Chinese philosophy. What would her choices be? Brian Leiter's "Philosophical Gourmet Report" is a ranking of doctoral programs that is controversial and has been accused of a bias in favor of analytic as opposed to continental programs. (This is somewhat ironic, since Leiter is himself a Nietzsche scholar.) However, it provides a consensus-of-the-field on at least the approximate rankings of programs. There are currently no schools in the top twenty-five of the "Gourmet Report" with faculty who have a research interest in Chinese philosophy. This is a stunning fact in itself. If we go down through the top fifty programs, there are four philosophy departments with one faculty member each who has a research interest in Chinese philosophy. However, none of the faculty at any of these top fifty programs can read Classical Chinese. I respect these scholars very much, and they have produced some genuinely outstanding work. However, imagine if you wished to become a specialist on Plato or Aristotle but could not find a doctoral supervisor to work with who could read Classical Greek.

In order to work in a philosophy department with someone who can read Classical Chinese, one must move outside the "ranked programs." Among these, the philosophy departments at the University of Hawai'i, University of Hong Kong and University of Utah are ranked as "Top Programs" by the "Gourmet Report." Hawai'i has several faculty working in this area, of whom Roger Ames probably has the highest visibility. Ames, who has been influenced by the work of Richard Rorty among others, takes a broadly continental approach. Consequently, Hawai'i seems like a strong choice if one wishes to study Chinese philosophy from that perspective.

In contrast, Eric L. Hutton, at the University of Utah, approaches Chinese philosophy from the perspective of analytic ethics and history of philosophy. Trained in ancient Greek, Sinology, and both Western and Chinese philosophy at Stanford and Harvard University, Hutton has already supervised one Ph.D.¹

We were asked to focus on the study of Chinese philosophy in the U.S., but it is appropriate to discuss universities in Hong Kong since English will typically be their primary language of instruction. Chad Hansen is the best-known scholar working on Chinese philosophy at the University of Hong Kong, although Michael Martin also works in that department. Hansen is avowedly analytic in his approach, with a special interest in the ancient Chinese philosophy of language. Hansen's scholarship has inspired both fervent admiration and floccinaucinihilipilification.

The "Gourmet Report" lists as "Also Strong" in Chinese philosophy Duke University (27th), the University of California at Riverside (31st), the University of Connecticut at Storrs (ranked 48th), and the University of Oregon. David Wong, at Duke, has a well-established reputation in "mainstream" analytic ethics, and seeks to synthesize that work with his study of Chinese philosophy. Eric Schwitzgebel, at Riverside, primarily works on the analytic philosophy of mind, but he has also published on Chinese ethics and epistemology. Students at Riverside can work simultaneously with Lisa Raphals, of Riverside's Department of Comparative Literature. Raphals is an accomplished scholar of Chinese thought who works with texts in the original Chinese. Joel Kupperman, at Connecticut, writes on Chinese philosophy in a style that is analytic, but with a broad historic and humanistic sensibility. Erin Cline, at Oregon, also reads Classical Chinese. She has a particular interest in the ways that Confucianism might inform a Rawlsian political philosophy.

Finally, although not mentioned by the "Gourmet Report," doctoral students may wish to consider the State University of New York at Buffalo, the University of Oklahoma, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, the City University of Hong Kong, and the National University of Singapore. Jiyuan Yu, at SUNY Buffalo, is an expert in both ancient Western and Chinese philosophy. Amy Olberding, who teaches at Oklahoma, has published on Chinese approaches to mortality, and also has a developing interest in issues of character and virtue in Confucianism. The faculty of the Chinese University includes Kwong-loi Shun, a former student of Nivison who researches Confucianism from the perspective of analytic ethics, and Chris Fraser, a former student of Chad Hansen who specializes in the Chinese philosophy of language. Among the faculty at the City University of Hong Kong is Philip J. Ivanhoe, whose historically informed work on Confucian ethics has influenced that of many people discussed here (as well as my own). The National University of Singapore has a number of scholars working on Chinese philosophy from a variety of perspectives, including former students of Ames, Shun, and Ivanhoe.

After reading all this, one might still wonder why it is worth labeling this state of affairs a "crisis." There *are* institutions where one can get a doctorate in Chinese philosophy, and there are outstanding scholars at universities that are not ranked among the top twenty-five. But the current situation is problematic for several reasons. First, the absence of specialists in Chinese philosophy at what are conventionally regarded as the top programs helps to perpetuate the ignorance about this field and ethnocentric dismissal of it among other philosophers. Second, there is more to a graduate education than one's primary advisor. The overall quality of the faculty at an institution as well as the excellence of one's fellow graduate students are important factors in one's education.

Why?

I think four factors are responsible for the current paucity of doctoral programs in Chinese philosophy. The fundamental cause is ignorance. Most U.S. philosophers simply don't know anything about Chinese philosophy. If they do have any familiarity with Chinese thought, it is probably from the *Analects of Kongzi* (Confucius), the *Daodejing* (attributed to Laozi), or the *Yijing* (*I Ching*, or *Classic of Changes*). In my opinion, of all the ancient classics, these three works are the least accessible to contemporary philosophers, especially those in the analytic tradition. Without a great deal of effort and assistance in understanding their background and influence, it would be easy to walk away from these works thinking that Chinese "philosophy" is nothing but shallow platitudes and pseudo-profound word-salad. (I suspect this is why at least one of my undergraduate professors baldly asserted that "there is no such thing as Chinese philosophy.")

Ignorance about Chinese philosophy contributes to the second major cause of the current situation: inertia. Chinese philosophy has not traditionally been part of the curriculum in U.S. philosophy departments. If a position becomes open, it simply won't occur to most philosophers to look for someone in Chinese philosophy to fill it. Nor will it occur to them to ask their dean for a new billet in Chinese philosophy.

The third factor is chauvinistic ethnocentrism, which takes both subtle and explicit forms. I am fortunate in now being in a department that values my area of specialization. However, I recall an occasion at another institution where I brought up Chinese philosophy in the context of a general philosophical discussion and was greeted only with an indulgent chuckle, as if I had just noted the similarity between Hume's *Treatise* and *Winnie the Pooh*. On another occasion, the only question a leading analytic epistemologist had about my presentation was,

“Did Chinese philosophers have sleeves? In all the pictures I’ve seen they wear gowns.” During a job interview, I was asked a rambling question that concluded with, “I guess what I’m saying is, it’s like Chinese philosophers are playing AAA-baseball, while we’re playing pro-baseball. Wouldn’t you agree?” Finally, a student informed me that, long after I was hired by a particular institution, one of my colleagues began her history of Western philosophy course by stressing that *all* philosophy has its roots in ancient Greece.

Those of us knowledgeable about Chinese philosophy will probably agree about the three preceding problems. However, I think it is also important to consider a fourth factor: We need to make sure that the work published in Chinese philosophy would meet the standards of the best “mainstream” philosophers. Even if more philosophers are open-minded enough to make the effort to engage with Chinese philosophy, nothing will change if what they read seems mediocre to them.

There are three standards that anyone working on the history of philosophy should meet. (1) You should be intimately familiar with the primary texts. If you specialize in a particular text, you should be able to paraphrase all of it, and recite parts of it from memory. (2) You should know the secondary literature on your topic. If you don’t know it, you should do a search for it and then read it. (3) You should be able to summarize alternative interpretations and give an argument for why you reject them. Your summary of opposing positions should not be a caricature, and your counter-argument should be an actual *argument*, not just a dismissal.

These are currently the minimum standards expected of those working on Western philosophy. Scholars working on Chinese philosophy should all be held to the same standards.

Whither?

Besides holding ourselves to the highest academic standards, what can we do to address the crisis in the field of Chinese philosophy? One possibility is for promising students to pursue degrees in departments of Chinese language, religious studies, or history. Among the important figures in the study of Chinese thought who have taken this track are Mark Csikszentmihalyi (Ph.D. in Asian Languages, Stanford), Paul Goldin (Ph.D. in East Asian Languages and Civilizations, Harvard), Philip Ivanhoe (Ph.D. in Religious Studies, Stanford), Lisa Raphals (Ph.D. from the Committee on Social Thought, Chicago), Edward Slingerland (Ph.D. in Religious Studies, Stanford), and Aaron Stalnaker (Ph.D. in Religious Studies, Brown). The disadvantage of this alternative route is that only philosophy programs train *philosophers*, as opposed to Sinologists, social historians, or students of religion. This is not to deny that these other fields are important and have much to offer to the study of Chinese philosophy. However, they are not the same. This is reflected in the fact that none of the people I just named currently teaches in a philosophy department (although all are at institutions that grant doctorates).

I have mentioned the possibility of studying Chinese philosophy in the English-speaking world outside the U.S. Those who are fluent in modern Chinese could also study at a university in Taiwan or the People’s Republic. Conversely, many Chinese with degrees from institutions in those countries speak English fluently enough to teach in the U.S. However, my sense (having visited both countries) is that the overall quality of philosophical training there is not on a par with at least the top institutions in the U.S. (Nonetheless, I would strongly recommend to anyone pursuing a degree in Chinese philosophy that she spend at least one year studying in China.)

Yet another alternative is what we might call “infiltration.” Graduate students with an Area of Specialization in Chinese

philosophy can have a second AOS in a more “mainstream” field, such as Western ethics. (In fact, I think this is a good idea simply for pedagogic reasons.) They can then market themselves to some departments solely in their mainstream AOS. My personal opinion is that it is legitimate for graduate students to tailor their application letters and curricula vitae for different jobs. In addition, a dissertation title such as “Morality in Politics” is much better for this purpose than “Hanfeizi’s Critique of Confucianism.” The difficulty with this approach is that, in general, the top-ranked philosophy departments only hire from the other top-ranked departments. So the lack of specialists in Chinese philosophy at these institutions becomes a self-perpetuating cycle.

I think the most viable step to improve the availability and quality of graduate study in Chinese philosophy would be for faculty at top philosophy programs in the U.S. to ask for billets in this area. (This seems to me a more practical strategy than expecting them to convert positions from Western philosophy when current faculty retire or resign.) Given the great geo-political importance of China in the modern world, the visibility and political self-awareness of Chinese-American students on college campuses, the growing interest among the general undergraduate population in Chinese thought, and the paucity of other institutions that cover this field, it should be comparatively easy to make a strong case. It may also be possible to solicit external funds for endowed chairs from individuals or institutions in “Greater China.” As long as these do not come with any political strings attached, there is no particular reason to refuse them.

If appealing to our colleagues’ good will and open-mindedness fails to generate support for this project, perhaps we can appeal to their appetite for prestige. Any top program that made a credible appointment in this area would immediately become *the* world center for the study of Chinese philosophy. And, as I suggested, a university administration may be more receptive to a plea in this area because of the current world situation and opportunities for outside funding.

Conclusion

In summary, we are in a crisis and it will not be easy to get out of it. However, keeping things in historical perspective should give us hope. There was a debate at the University of Paris a while ago over whether a particular kind of “foreign” philosophy should be taught. Although many of the top philosophers supported this broadening of the curriculum, many others opposed it on the grounds that the “new” philosophy didn’t fit in with what was already being taught, and wasn’t of very high quality anyway. Things got so intense that students actually rioted over the issue. This new, foreign philosophy was that of Aristotle, and the debate took place in the thirteenth century. The reformers won, and European philosophy was much richer because of it. Let us hope that someday we are as amazed at the resistance to incorporating Chinese philosophy into the curriculum as we are at the old opposition to taking Aristotelianism seriously.

Endnotes

1. Hutton’s curriculum vitae may be found online at <http://www.philosophy.utah.edu/faculty/hutton/CV.pdf>. He will stand for tenure in the 2008-2009 academic year.

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Van Norden, Bryan W. Letter to the Editor: *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 74:2 (November 2000): 102-03 (In this letter, I argue that the Eastern Division Program Committee should schedule a main program event on Chinese philosophy each year.)

Van Norden, Bryan W. *Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. (This book critically discusses many of the authors referred to in this essay.)

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A Case for Chinese Philosophy

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I have spent a good deal of my time defending the philosophical merits of the Chinese thinkers. Although I am utterly convinced of their merits, I have nevertheless come across a number of academic philosophers who, by all appearances, simply can't be persuaded that those thinkers are indeed worthy of philosophical analysis, or at any rate that North American philosophy departments have any business teaching them. The case that I make here is addressed specifically to those philosophers—the ones who won't budge. My particular concern is whether graduate students who are interested in teaching Chinese thought have sufficient opportunities to study it rigorously. I should stress that I am most interested in whether graduate programs in philosophy should *provide* their students with the resources to study Chinese philosophy, not whether they should require or offer incentives to encourage such study. The latter questions are less urgent, for there are already more than enough graduate students who want to study and teach Chinese philosophy, and by all indications there are more to come.

My first point is relatively simple. Whatever one might say about the great Chinese thinkers of the past, one would be very hard pressed to show that the *present day* work of specialists in Chinese philosophy is un-philosophical. This is a point that tends to get overlooked, no doubt because those of us who work on the great Confucians, Daoists, and Buddhists are so confident that they stand up to philosophical scrutiny. But it is a point that should be noted all the same. Specialists in the field today are developing distinctly Confucian accounts of moral virtue, bringing Buddhist insights to bear on contemporary metaphysics, and debating the compatibility of Chinese moral doctrines with modern rights theory. In the course of doing this, they are making undeniably philosophical arguments, and (for those who think that philosophy is a self-conscious engagement with the tradition of Socrates or Plato) they are relentlessly contesting and building on the arguments and conclusions of major Western thinkers. Western-trained philosophers who take part in these debates, moreover, have few doubts that they are doing philosophy. Contemporary work on Chinese philosophy thus consistently passes the "I know it when I see it" test as well. And, by the way, philosophers working primarily in the Chinese tradition know it when they see it, too, and in my experience the feeling is usually mutual: they also think that the works of Aristotle and Davidson are recognizably continuous with those of Mengzi and Zhu Xi.

My second point requires more work. To give a brief preview, it is that doubters don't need a knock-down, drag-out argument for the philosophical merits of Chinese philosophy in order to conclude that it deserves greater representation in philosophy departments. They most likely already accept that a wide array of thinkers should be taught in philosophy

departments, even when those thinkers are—by the lights of various individuals among them—of questionable value. And there are good reasons for this acceptance, varying from healthy skepticism and openness to persuasion to treating the philosophical judgments of others with due respect, not to mention sustaining the health and intellectual integrity of the discipline. All of these concerns apply as much to the Chinese tradition as they do to some of the more controversial figures and subfields in contemporary philosophy. But with regard to the Chinese thinkers they apply with considerably more force, as they are so profoundly under-represented compared to these more controversial elements of academic philosophy, and yet so much more a part of contemporary philosophical life.

Allow me to make more vivid the degree to which Chinese philosophy is under-represented in present day philosophy departments, and particularly in the departments that are responsible for training the next generation of philosophers. Of all of the U.S. and Canadian Ph.D. programs listed on the “overall rankings” page of Brian Leiter’s “Philosophical Gourmet Report,” there are only three specialists in Chinese thought whose primary appointment is in philosophy. In contrast, on my conservative but admittedly imperfect count, these same programs have ninety-nine full-time faculty who specialize in Kant (a ratio of 33 to 1), and fifty-eight full-time faculty who specialize in medieval philosophy (a ratio of about 19 to 1).¹ It’s a safe bet that these programs assign to graduate students several times more readings on Aquinas alone than on the entire (roughly 2,500 years) of Chinese thought. In fact, given the staggering proportions of medievalists to Sinologists, it is likely that graduate students get more exposure to many of the lesser-knowns in medieval philosophy. If you combine all of the two and a half millennia of Confucians, neo-Confucians, Mohists, Daoists, Legalists, and Buddhists, in all probability there will be fewer graduate students with a foundation in any of these thinkers than in Anselm or Duns Scotus. Anselm is an excellent philosopher, to be sure, but no single figure of his historical stature—no matter how insightful—can match the breadth and import of all of the Chinese thinkers combined.

One doesn’t need a robust defense of the philosophical merits of the Chinese thinkers in order to conclude that this is a profound disservice to the profession. Insofar as philosophy should take some account of social issues, Chinese moral and political thought alone is a behemoth too large to ignore. Far more philosophers of the next generation are going to be asked to teach the Chinese thinkers than will be asked to teach Anselm. Their classrooms will have several times more students who more closely identify with Confucian and Buddhist thinkers than with Duns Scotus. Philosophers working in ethics and political philosophy will be called upon regularly to answer Confucian and Buddhist challenges to their views. A significant part of academic philosophy’s integrity is lost if it cannot offer its own characteristically philosophical answers to the questions that these traditions raise.

Some might think that not ideological considerations but *pragmatic* ones make Chinese philosophy a poor fit with contemporary North American philosophy departments. Perhaps some would say that students are less prepared to study Confucianism than they are to study the ancient Greeks (although I highly doubt this). Or, more charitably, perhaps some think that the skill set that philosophy departments teach better prepares students to dissect the views and arguments of Plato, say, than those of Mengzi (Mencius) or Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu). If these claims are right, then it might seem that all parties are better served if the graduate students interested in Zhuangzi seek their training in a religious studies or East Asian studies program than from philosophy departments.

I have two responses to this, one on behalf of the field of Chinese philosophy and the other on behalf of the discipline as a whole. First, on behalf of the field, the evidence for the advantages of philosophical training is already in. The conclusions are unsurprising: there are some things that specialists in religion and area studies do well, and there are other things that philosophers do well. As one would expect, the philosophers working in Chinese thought are good at formulating and reframing arguments, and most attend to the fine-grained conceptual distinctions that much of the non-philosophical literature overlooks. Scholars of religion and conventional Sinologists tend to focus more on the historical and sociological aspects of the tradition. All disciplinary elements of the field draw upon one another regularly, and across those elements the specialists with philosophical training are among the most authoritative. In this, as in the study of most multifaceted traditions, good scholarship depends on a division of labor, one in which philosophers play an indispensable part.

Second, on behalf of the discipline more broadly, I concede that we could do more to make our research accessible to others. My impression is that there is much more accessible research out there than the average North American philosopher assumes, but in any case there is work yet to be done. More to the point, however, is the simple observation that *academic* philosophy could well miss its chance to lay claim to a substantial piece of contemporary philosophical life. Philosophical discourse at all levels is now global, and debates about such things as Confucian rights are now part of a high-profile dialogue that draws upon Mengzi and Rawls alike. Whether or not you think Mengzi is ready for the task, his tradition is now (or will soon be) as much a part of the intellectual landscape as Christianity or liberalism. Academic philosophy’s health and continuity depends upon its ability to grapple with such features of the landscape. Our discipline ignores them at its own risk.²

Some seem to think that we should further ponder the philosophical merits of the Chinese thinkers, but these ponderings are notoriously inconclusive, and I do not think the world will wait for the philosophy departments of North America to resolve them. Moreover, philosophy has not waited to resolve such questions before insinuating itself into other major intellectual and ideological forces in the past, whether those forces be Christianity or Newtonian physics. And this is almost always for the best. If it had indeed waited then it would not live up to its name.

Endnotes

1. See <http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com/overall.asp>. In the interest of transparency I should explain how I arrived at these numbers. I counted only full-time, tenured or tenure-track faculty who appeared to be eligible for thesis supervision. I used as my guideline the interests mentioned in the programs’ faculty listings, and when none were identified then I turned to “research areas” or “areas of specialization” listed on the available faculty home pages and CV’s. For my purposes a person counts as a Kant specialist if she lists Kant or Kantian ethics/aesthetics/etc. as a research interest. Self-described scholars of 18th Century philosophy or other less specific fields were not counted. This survey covered a total of seventy-one Ph.D. programs.
2. Shortly after the United States’ second war with Iraq, there was a lively and sustained discussion of the injustice of this action in light of Confucian just war theory. This is one of many boats that North American philosophers missed, despite the fact that much of it was taking place right beneath our noses. Thanks to Philip J. Ivanhoe for reminding me of this example.

Taking Stock: A State-of-the-Field Impression

Maryul Im

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Two years ago, I was struck by the possibility of an impending crisis in doctoral-level training for Chinese philosophy. Thanks to Brian Leiter's posting of my concerns on his *Leiter Reports* blog, those who shared my concerns continued the discussion at a variety of levels. The invitation extended by Amy Olberding to contribute to this newsletter provides an excellent opportunity for me not only to take stock of my impressions of the state of the field two years thence, but also to discuss some important aspects of graduate training in Chinese philosophy that have come up in relevant discussions with colleagues since. Two caveats: First, I don't pretend to know enough about the field of South Asian, or Indian, philosophy to have any informed impressions about "Asian" philosophy or "non-Western" philosophy; my comments here are limited to what I can say with relative confidence about Chinese philosophy specifically. Second, much of what I have to say is by way of impressions based on personal experience and conversation; so I'm sure there are empirical issues that I end up taking for granted which could and should be investigated better.

As far as I can tell, not much has changed with regard to the state of the field, at least institutionally speaking. A vacuum still exists here where very high-profile scholars have left their positions at the most highly regarded philosophy programs, either through retirement or lateral moves ultimately to Hong Kong (more about Hong Kong below). In that sense, the aspects of the field that concern me have not changed in the past two years, nor has there been any word, official or otherwise, that it will in the near future. The lone stalwart in terms of a Ph.D. program in philosophy, with high-profile scholars solidly in the field of Chinese philosophy (Roger Ames and Chung-ying Cheng), remains the University of Hawai'i. If not for Hawai'i there would be no *well-established* Chinese philosophy program right now, period. By "well-established" I mean one that has a relatively long track record of having productive faculty and training successful scholars in the field, and hence having an associated, high reputation. I should qualify this by saying that I'm thinking only of the past thirty to forty years or so. In the course of conversation with others in the field, live and in blogs, I've faced two, related objections to what I have claimed about the field.

On the one hand, some have objected that there couldn't really be a crisis-level problem here since, by my accounting there really only ever were three such programs—Hawai'i, Stanford, and Michigan. But, in fact, I think that makes the loss of two of them much more prominent; and gaining back one or both of them would have proportionally significant impact.

On the other hand, some have objected more strongly, from the other direction: there couldn't really be a crisis because there have always been, and continue to be, numerous well-established Ph.D. programs in the English-speaking world in Asian literature, history, language, or other disciplines; and training in Chinese philosophy may be gained at them. Likewise, as others have chimed in, there are numerous Ph.D. level programs in the Chinese-speaking world that are well-established in my sense, though perhaps they either do not have or do not produce scholars who publish primarily, if at all, in English. But it is *Chinese* philosophy after all, so why should I privilege English language scholarship? This is a formidable objection, or set of objections. I will not be able to respond to it to everyone's satisfaction because the objection brings up

issues about methodological and disciplinary differences that are not really appropriate to "resolve" as much as to let such differences exist. There are also sociologically contingent facts about philosophical inquiry and English, or European languages more generally, that are not necessarily binding but that are difficult to overcome. So, I'll say what I can; I think the objection forces me to make certain concessions and qualifications but for the most part I stand by my impression of the vacuum at the top of my field.

It may seem parochial or imperialistic to think that scholarly training in Chinese philosophy has been centered in the United States, in philosophy departments more specifically. I don't desire either of those epithets so I remain open to discussion that may change my mind. But my belief is based on what I, and some others with whom I've discussed this, regard as two important contemporary aspects of "the field" as we conceive it.

First, although Chinese philosophical literature may be approached from any number of disciplinary interests, a *distinctively philosophical* approach takes "truth-directed" engagement with the claims, tacit assumptions, and theories found in the literature to be primary. So, historical, linguistic, or cultural accuracy and plausibility of the interpretation one gives is important, but aiming for them is undertaken for the sake of the further activity of philosophical evaluation, assessment, or some philosophical *use* of the views one interprets. Such use may take the form, for example, of adoption, perhaps in some suitably modified form, of an ethical, political, or metaphysical view. Or, one may use the understanding of a view that is not a contemporary option but that is internally coherent to gain some kind of understanding of the situated nature of a corresponding contemporary philosophical view; that kind of distancing *via* comparison might produce improvements to how one thinks about a contemporary view. Or, perhaps there are other philosophical uses in the offing. Minimally, a philosophical approach aims to provide a truth-assessable account of the literal meanings of the sentences in the text for some philosophical purpose or other. These are generally the approaches that have been taken by scholars trained at Hawai'i, Stanford, and Michigan in the philosophy programs there.

However, unless I have been meeting all the wrong people at AAS meetings, scholars in other disciplines by and large do not find this sort of engagement with the literature interesting. Based on personal experience, I expect many to have mild to strong disdain for it ("Surely you don't take any of Mencius's arguments *seriously*, do you?" I've had one prominent historian say to me). Because of this disciplinary difference, *philosophical* study of Chinese philosophy in, for example, the East Asian Languages and Cultures program at Columbia University will be very difficult to pursue with much enthusiasm on the part of the faculty currently active therein. Secondly, general philosophical training at a graduate level will also be very difficult to gain in such a department. Finally, it will be that much more difficult to gain employment within a philosophy department with such a degree and with the sorts of letters of recommendation one is likely to acquire. There may be exceptions and of course difficulties can be overcome; nonetheless, I think these considerations speak loudly on behalf of at least half of my claim—that study of Chinese philosophy has been and probably will continue to be centered, if at all, in philosophy departments.

But why think that the other half of the claim is true—that it has been centered in philosophy departments *in the U.S.* rather than, say, in China or Japan (which has produced some of the best sinological work on philosophical texts)? This is a more complicated issue and I make the following points

with varying levels of confidence. I am fairly confident that the aforementioned philosophical approach to the texts has nearly exclusively been written in English language publications. That is no accident; the style of analysis is one drawn from the approach favored by English-speaking philosophers who specialize in the history of Western philosophy, particularly of Ancient Greek philosophy. There is a similar approach that is more prevalent in the contemporary Chinese-speaking world but that differs in important ways. It is the approach to the Chinese classics that takes certain commentarial traditions and their favored interpretations of the texts as canonical, and that takes itself to be a continuation of the commentarial tradition in some measure. This approach—call it the “Chinese classicist” approach—also takes the interpreted views of the classic texts seriously and is engaged with them on the literal level. But the Chinese classicist approach is very tradition-bound and sometimes reverential in its exegesis of some of the texts and hence involves aspects of scholastic theology (for lack of better analogy) that distinguish it from the style of the philosophical approach in the English-speaking world. That is not at all to discount the high quality of philological work that the classicist approach has produced. But to generalize (far too grossly), philosophical approaches to Chinese philosophy in the Chinese-speaking world have either been continuous with such classicism or have joined the approach of the English-speaking world. One should also not ignore the significance of the fact that the academic study of Chinese philosophy in the PRC has had to struggle since the early twentieth century with ideological purges of China’s ancient traditions at varying levels of intensity. So I think it is safe to say that academic study of Chinese philosophy that is recognizably *philosophical* to the broader contemporary philosophical community shifted its center to the West, in particular to the U.S., during the twentieth century. (There are probably less charitable narratives about this shift—involving for example, the putative invention of Chinese philosophy by Western “Orientalists” in the pejorative sense. That doesn’t affect in any obvious way what I’m saying about the state of the field.)

To conclude, let me change topic slightly and speak briefly about Hong Kong, which has rather suddenly become the location for another potential “re-centering” of scholarship in Chinese philosophy. Three of the most prominent active, senior scholars in the field are now in Hong Kong: Chad Hansen (who has spent the larger portion of his career there), P.J. Ivanhoe, and Kwong-loi Shun. Mandatory retirement has removed Hansen from his official institutional affiliation with the philosophy department of Hong Kong University but he remains in Hong Kong. Ivanhoe’s position is with the City University of Hong Kong. Shun’s position is in the philosophy department of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. There are a few things worth dwelling on here. Hong Kong University will be replacing Hansen. There is a Ph.D. program in philosophy there that has recently produced excellent, philosophically trained scholars in Chinese philosophy. Likewise, at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, there is a Ph.D. program in philosophy that has the faculty to provide some of the best advising in Chinese philosophy in the world. There is also an embarrassment of riches as far as the number of scholars at other institutions in Hong Kong who publish actively in the field. On top of this, there is the relatively close proximity of National University of Singapore, which has recently made a significant push to fill multiple positions in Chinese philosophy, and which already has a number of scholars who have published widely in it. It also has a Ph.D. program in philosophy. All of this has resulted in a flurry of major conferences in Hong Kong in the past two years that have featured topics and speakers who work in comparative philosophy. So, the Chinese philosophy community at large

between Hong Kong and Singapore has the potential to provide scholars as well as graduate students of Chinese philosophy a major set of valuable instruction, feedback, references, and networking.

The Hong Kong and Singapore related phenomena along with the continuing strength of the philosophy program at Hawai’i in placing its graduate students at institutions of higher learning show, I think, an overall healthy state of the field despite what continues to be a relative paucity of options for graduate training in it. Perhaps that points us toward optimism that new sources of philosophical training and scholarship in Chinese philosophy are on the rise and we can leave behind the vacuum left at the old institutional centers.

Professor Donald Munro on the State of Chinese Philosophy

Editor’s Note

In October and November of 2006 Professor Donald Munro sat for interviews with Professors CHEUNG Chan-fai and LIU Xiaogan. Professor Cheung is Chair and Professor of the Department of Philosophy, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. LIU Xiaogan is Professor in the Department of Philosophy, and the Director of the Research Centre for Chinese Philosophy and Culture, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Professor Munro taught for many years in the Philosophy Department at the University of Michigan and trained many scholars working in the field today. Since his retirement, he continues to live in Ann Arbor, where he participates in the Programs of Culture and Cognition, and Evolution and Human Development in the Department of Psychology. On three occasions he has given lectures or taught a graduate seminar at The Chinese University. He and his wife also stay in a rustic cabin in northern Michigan that they built themselves. His new book, *Workable Guidelines for Public and Private Choices – Ethics in Action* (The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2008), includes his extended discussions with Professors Cheung and Liu. In the excerpts presented here, Professor Munro responds specifically to queries that bear on the state of the field in Chinese philosophy.

The excerpts below first appeared in Munro, Donald J., *Ethics in Action: Workable Guidelines for Private and Public Choices*, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2008 (ISBN: 9789629963804), and are reprinted here with permission. The *APA Newsletter* and the APA Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies are grateful to the Chinese University of Hong Kong Press and Professor Munro for allowing us to reprint this material.

“Experiences with Tang Junyi and His Legacy”

Interview by CHEUNG Chan-fai

The Development of Chinese Philosophy

Professor Cheung: So let us come back to your academic career. I think, up till now in America, the analytical tradition is still the dominating force in American universities, especially in philosophy departments. Chinese philosophy is not taught in philosophy departments, but in departments of religion or Asian studies. I still feel a prejudice against Chinese philosophy in the Western philosophical field. Particularly, recent publications like *Wittgenstein and the Future of Philosophy* by some MIT people are still stressing that everything is analytical philosophy, as if other philosophies are not philosophy at all. I can imagine that at the beginning, it should be very difficult for you to start a serious academic study in Chinese philosophy in your department.

Professor Munro: I think your overall description applies to the 50s, 60s, 70s, and early 80s. But I do not think that it is a fair description today.

Cheung: I am glad to hear that.

Munro: Not today. More true in the past. Do you know who Charles L. Stevenson is, the main formulator of emotive ethics? He was a famous American analytical philosopher in ethics... back in the 40s, 50s, and 60s. Here is my little story. My father, Thomas Munro, was in aesthetics, and his philosophical training came from John Dewey. He was a museum curator as well as an aesthete. One of my father's books was called *The Arts and Their Interrelations*. It is a large book, and has lots of concrete examples from the arts in Asia, and Europe, and Africa in it. This person Stevenson, a respected colleague and friend, was once in my house and picked up that book and looked at it. And he said, "Don, you really must know something if you are going to write a book like this." Forty years ago, that was an analytical philosopher talking. Analytical philosophers examined arguments and many did not seem to care about content. That was the way it was when I was a graduate student in philosophy. That's one reason I moved to the Department of Chinese and Japanese at Columbia. It was true when I went to Michigan in the 60s, it was true in the 70s, but by the 80s things were changing. Then a philosopher of science came out of a physics background. The people who teach ethics, such as Alan Gibbard and Peter Railton, know some of the sciences. They know the social sciences very well, so when they speak about ethics, they know what social scientists say about people who make moral rules in societies and how they use moral codes. The people in aesthetics know the art world. There was a shift into content. It does not mean that the analytic method is gone. It remains part of what the philosophers do. But there are still differences. The philosophy department people told me that they have great difficulties in finding somebody to replace me, because I have both philosophical training and sinological training, and many of the philosophy people they interviewed have philosophical training but maybe only two years of Chinese. They do not have sinological training. So that's why there is such a conflict in hiring someone, a conflict between philosophy and Asian Languages. Asian Languages wants a sinologist, and Philosophy wants a philosopher with an analytic perspective. So that is the core of the problem.

But, you know, I am optimistic given the number of graduate students. There are Chinese philosophy programs in many universities now, certainly not all from the philosophy departments, but the people teaching them have some philosophical background and are using philosophical methodologies in teaching.

Did you meet Brook Ziporyn? He was here in the CUHK for the Conference on Wang Bi and Guo Xiang. You know, there are people like Brook Ziporyn; he is one of my former students. A brilliant sinologist, he teaches in the Department of Religion at Northwestern University, but he has some philosophical training. So one should not only look in philosophy departments.

Cheung: So you are optimistic about Chinese philosophy. Not just for the academic world, and not just for the United States, do you think that Chinese philosophy is playing a more important role in contemporary philosophy?

Munro: I think it can, when it is approached in a right way. If people doing Chinese philosophy do only a textual presentation, in other words, if they say Xunzi uses X type of argument and these Chinese terms on this page, that page, and maybe that page, then people in the audience who come from philosophy departments or other departments, or from an educated general public, are going to be bored. And they would say, "We don't want this, it is too boring! What do we care?" Languages and

Cultures department people would say, "Oh! That is very interesting" because they know the texts. So a person has to present philosophical findings accessible to a broad audience. You must identify a human problem or question. This is not difficult for people in the Tang Junyi heritage. Present the human problem. Do not just present the textual problem. That is not of interest to people outside of sinology.

Cheung: It does happen not only to Chinese philosophy, but also sometimes to Western philosophy too, especially the German philosophy. There has been a lot of textual analysis on the works of Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger. That might be useful for some experts, but not useful for constructing a meaningful philosophical dialog regarding issues of human concern.

The Concept of Man

Cheung: Let us talk about your three books on the Chinese concept of man. Definitely there is no one in the Western academic world who has done so much on this topic like you. And do you find that this concept of man is a kind of philosophical anthropology done for Chinese philosophy? What implications do you find for Chinese concepts of man on discussions of human nature in general?

Munro: There are two ways I can put that. One is what I teach my own students about the assumptions about human nature found in many Chinese and Western works and about being sensitive to the existence of those assumptions. My own students have gone out in many universities in Asia and in America. Another way of talking about this, practically, is about what impact it has on my own university and in other branches of learning. There, I think, the impact has been interesting. I have been invited for the past ten years to participate in faculty seminars run by people from biology and psychology and to give presentations. That has led to my serving on doctoral dissertations in other departments (for example, in psychology). When I read the works of these former students, now established scholars, and of other scholars in psychology and in psychiatry, I can see the impact of what they have learned about Chinese culture and cognition, views of human nature, and the Chinese treatment of mental activities. One of the leading psychologists at Berkeley is an example of that. His doctoral dissertation, on which I served, is widely read by psychologists in the United States and in China. I was also asked to write for a psychology journal.

Psychologists are interested in the influence of culture on how we know, and I can bring examples from the influences of Chinese culture on cognition to the discussion. One of the things that I was able to identify is the tendency in many Chinese writings to identify a polarity and then to seek a middle position that is somehow harmonious between the two poles. It is very different from the Heraclitean legacy in the West in which the principal emphasis is on the poles. In the Chinese case, the emphasis is on what will introduce a compromise or a harmony between the poles. Psychologists can draw on this work and talk about how in Chinese culture people are culturally trained to look for ways to avoid polarisation and rather to look for some conflict-avoiding middle-grounds. And Chinese texts discuss *zhong* ("middle") and *zhongyong* (the "middle-way"). We do not have comparable texts at the center of traditional Western philosophy.

Cheung: How about Aristotle?

Munro: Yes, that is true. I think you are right. But I do not think that it has the prominence that *zhongyong* has culturally in China.

The other things I can bring to those faculty seminars of biologists, psychologists, and primatologists (people studying apes and other mammals) are examples from the early Chinese texts of certain human social instincts and emotions. Today

biologists and neuroscientists study these same activities using current technology. I can point to textual references in the early Chinese texts, such as the idea that morality begins in the parent-child relationship. *Xiao* (filial piety) is the root of *ren* (humanity, humaneness, benevolence). And I am able to give them examples from China on that. So the practical impact right now would be in the psychology field most directly.

“Challenges and Arguments”

Interview by LIU Xiaogan

Philosophy and Natural Science: Are They Mutually Exclusive?

Professor Liu: Let us begin with your latest [2005] book, *A Chinese Ethics for the New Century*.¹

In recent years you have introduced the findings of evolutionary psychology and the neurosciences to support two of your beliefs: those findings are relevant to contemporary ethics, and also so are Confucian theories about kin-centered relationships. You go on from there and construct “two-realm (or two-tier) utilitarianism.” But some philosophers are worried that natural science will further dominate the field of philosophy. And it happened. After the emergence of Newton’s physics, metaphysics was attacked in Western philosophical studies. Then the sciences, especially physics, took over some topics from the field of traditional metaphysics. And now my colleagues are worried about that. Should science take up more territory from philosophical studies? What is your response to this kind of worry?

Munro: My response is to ask who feels this threat, and I will answer my own question. I think that many of those who believe that drawing facts from new science is a threat are in the analytic methodology field. And my answer to them is they have many contributions to offer, in terms of making us aware of the importance of precise argument, consistency, clarity of meaning of the terms that we use, and many issues concerning language. These are all very positive contributions of analytic philosophers. At the same time, they have a narrow definition of philosophy or narrow assumptions about what it is. They made these themselves. That school emerged in the 1930s, especially as part of what is called the Vienna School or logical positivism. Their model was physics, and they wanted philosophy to be as open to precision as is physics.

I believe that philosophy and physics are very different fields, and although philosophy may draw on physics and on its methodology, there is far more to philosophy than what the positivists or the analytic philosophers think about. As for their narrow definition of philosophy, they ignore the entire 2,500-year history of philosophy in the West from the Greeks down to the present day, and in countries like China. The Greeks drew on all existing knowledge. Plato drew on the pre-Socratics, such as Heraclites and Parmenides; he also drew on the scientific observations of the day which you can see in his dialogue *Timaeus*. And he certainly drew on the mathematics of the day. One of his models was Euclid, from whom we derive in part the idea that the basic truths are intuitive, and we deduce the others from them in a mathematical way. Well, from that time, in my own country during much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, philosophy was equally broad, often drawing on other fields. For example, William James, one of the founders of pragmatism, was a psychologist who was trained as a psychologist. John Dewey was trained as a psychologist and as a philosopher both. So what I am saying with these examples is that, if the analytic philosophers want to define the field of philosophy very narrowly, and feel threatened by scientific facts, that’s their business. But no one else in the world has to accept their position. They can define philosophy, if they want, as the

art of tying shoelaces. But nobody has to pay any attention to it. So that is my position. I would simply say: Who cares what you think? Take a narrow sense, but I do not have to buy it.

Now, we go from the critique of those who feel threatened to a more positive position: Part of what I do in drawing on the most recent cognitive sciences, evolutionary biology, and evolutionary psychology already has an established category in ethics. It is called “meta-ethics.” Meta-ethics, among other things, deals with the characteristics of moral choice, moral attitudes, moral intuitions, and moral properties. That probably encompasses at least 50 percent of what I do. So there is nothing bizarre about doing meta-ethics. What I do in addition to standard meta-ethics is some evaluations in terms of a commonplace type of ethics—normative ethics. I am what it’s called an ethical naturalist. An ethical naturalist believes that there are objective moral properties.

Liu: You said that you are an ethical naturalist. Do you mean that you are so since your early study when you wrote your book or in recent years?

Munro: No, I am referring only to the book, *A Chinese Ethics for the New Century*, and to the book derived from my Tang Visiting Professorship.

Liu: I see.

Munro: I do not believe that I can apply factual information without having an ethical standard. And my ethical standard is what you correctly called “two-realm utilitarianism.” It is that which permits me to make normative judgments. For me, that standard has been influenced by information from neuroscience, biology, cognitive psychology, and philosophical Confucianism. So in the end I cover two grounds: meta-ethics, and I venture into the evaluative realm, when I discuss my standard, two-realm utilitarianism.

The final thing that I would say is philosophers will never lose their importance because they ask the questions important to human life. Most physicists or natural scientists do not have the interest or training to know what those important questions are, because as individuals they are very narrowly focused, often only in subfields of their own scientific disciplines. Philosophy, if done right, may draw on all relevant available knowledge. So it is synthetic to some degree.

Liu: You also combine a study of traditional Chinese theories with practical issues in China today. I think that it is the feature of your work since your first book. How do you deal with the difficulty of tying together ideas across ancient and modern ages?

Munro: Yes, that is certainly true. I do that. Again, there are several reasons. One of them is that I do not believe that all wisdom and insights are new. To emphasize only the new is taking a suggestion from the commercial advertisements, in which the advertisers assume that no one will buy soap or cereal unless it is “new.” Knowledge is not like that. Knowledge gradually accumulates, and we build on the efforts and wisdom of early generations. So because I do not believe that only modern people have important ideas, I am happy to go back and see if there are important insights as far back as the Pre-Qin. And I find that they do have very important insights. So I would say, “Yes, maybe they are old, but they are also wise.” So, it is one reason why I am open about this and believe in it.

Another reason I do it is because there has not been, in the West, any serious counterpart of state Confucianism, in which for long time periods the state adopts an ideology, the Confucian belief-system that lasts from Han Wudi into the early twentieth century (with the exception of the Six-Dynasties period and Buddhist, Daoist periods). To say this means that the central

government maintains control over what the elites think. It does so by controlling what they must study if they want the privilege of wealth, and *guanxi*-connections for their family members. If you are a man or a boy and want that kind of fame, wealth, and protection for your family, it is a good idea to study for the examinations. The government, starting in the Northern Song also began to establish some government-run schools, and the government controlled the curriculum. At a later time, as in the Ming even if the government was not paying for private schools, private schools (run by a lineage group, for example) often took as their model the curriculum in the state schools. So this means that there is some continuity of official teachings coming down with the government enforcement and reward systems. That means that each new generation of elites can have a memory of what the thinking was hundreds of years before. That is what I would call a vehicle or a transmission of early ideas or early texts down into the early twentieth century. If somebody says, "what is your proof for that legacy," I would once again say, just look at important twentieth century philosophical figures (except for Cai Yuanpei and Hu Shi); they are people who inherited a great deal of the Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming traditions, and they acknowledge it. Sun Yat-sen was a great admirer of Wang Yangming, so was Jiang Jieshi.

Liu: Can I take your position as to emphasize the continuity of cultural development?

Munro: Yes, though not exclusively.

Liu: For me, a distinguished feature of your first book is that it is a good combination of a sinological approach and philosophical analysis. I think you did it perfectly. But for the younger generation, they want to publish books before they can combine sinology and philosophy.

So, some people may think that philosophical analysis, such as the approach of analytical philosophy or pragmatism, is perhaps not necessary for the study of Chinese philosophical texts. Other people may think that, well, we are philosophers, we read philosophical works, we philosophize on Confucian theories, we do not need to be historians or sinologists. So it seems that for them there are difficulties in combining philosophy and sinology. Some may think that it is not necessary or practical. Personally, I think it is good to combine them together. But it is so difficult to achieve the goal. What is your suggestion or opinion about that?

Munro: I agree with your position. I think to combine sinology and philosophy is the way I would always encourage my students to go. My answer to your question would be different if I were talking to American graduate students or Chinese graduate students. In the American case, I would say to them, you must get to the point where you can read the pre-Qin philosophers in the original *wenyan* editions, not relying on translations or other people's scholarship. That is how you may get close to the original meanings. You should take courses with someone either in your own university or in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Beijing or Shanghai. It is essential to take courses in reading the texts. The situation would be different in East Asia, because perhaps the students would already have some backgrounds.

The other thing that I would say to American and European students is, if you must choose a Ph.D. field, it is better if you choose a Ph.D. in philosophy. You may have to look for a university that offers it. But it is best if you choose this way. A future audience of philosophers would be open and not prejudiced against you. And I think you would have a bigger audience if you have philosophical training. It is not absolutely necessarily, but if you can choose, that would be my preference. If you cannot choose, then remember that there are plenty of jobs available in the departments of Asian languages and

cultures, of history, or of religion, where you can continue to practice the study of Chinese philosophy. It is just a matter of emphasis and what is practically available.

But you know, in the end, there is another factor which is not philosophical, not sinological, but it is a third dimension. I am going to deal with this when answering your questions on general issues of methodology. But I am bringing it up here now. It is important for graduate students or young scholars to ask the right humanistic questions. There are plenty of philosophers who do not ask important humanistic questions. They say instead what Donald Davidson's position was on a certain topic, and then they give their critique of Donald Davidson. Their articles are almost always so boring that they would put the outsiders to sleep and cause the audience who come to listen to leave.

Similarly, sinologists, including those who have philosophical training, sometimes do not ask the important question. They will say, in this passage Xunzi says this, but in these passages he says this, but when we look at this commentary, we find this character would be interpreted in this way. And they go on like this, and you find out about matters of sinological concern. But nowhere do they ever ask the big humanistic questions of the *Xunzi*. Firstly, what are the important or major questions facing the advancement of human knowledge? You ask, what does this text do to advance our knowledge? That is the first big question. Secondly, what does this text tell us that is relevant to human joy and suffering?

The first question about the advancement of knowledge probably will involve some relevance to other disciplines, as in how a Chinese text can contribute to other disciplines. For the big problems that human beings in the past and future encounter, I believe in the interrelated nature of knowledge. And as a humanist, I am interested in the importance for human joy and suffering. And these are what I regard as the three dimensions of well educated young students in our field: philosophy, sinology, and an awareness of the importance of humanistic questions.

On Methodology

Liu: The third point is very important.

More and more young scholars come to study Confucianism and Daoism with different backgrounds. In the United States, Laozi, Zhuangzi, Confucius, and Mengzi have been taught in Departments of Philosophy, East Asian Studies, and History. There are different approaches. Somehow it is very good. It is divergent, giving new inspirations to the discipline. But at the same time, even in the Chinese academic circles, we have lost the standard or the common sense of what type of paper is good. According to some "trendy" theories, like postmodernism, pragmatism, popularized hermeneutics, there is no standard or there is no need for any common standards to evaluate a paper or a research. This has caused some confusion or difficulties for professors to give good training to students. What is your response to these phenomena?

Munro: My attitude would be that scholars must be smart enough to recognize trends. These trends come and go. Sometimes there are useful findings that the trends leave behind. But it is very dangerous to commit yourself only to one trend, because if the trend is later found to be weak, then your reputation may go into decline along with the trend. I think that is certainly true of the trend of postmodernism. One trend of postmodernism is following certain French thinkers. It does not accept any general propositions or universals, any universal statements that you can make. They say that so-called universal facts are all dependent on the mental state of the person making them, and as well as on the historical time.

I have a critique of this perspective. It is in *A Chinese Ethics for the New Century*, in my analysis of the book by Lionel Jensen.² His position follows the postmodernist perspective to some degree in saying that there is no such a thing as “Confucianism.” My chapter is called “Yes, There Is a Core Confucianism Out There.” (It is Chapter 9) On page 111, I quote Jensen as saying, “Ideology is inscribed in every discourse.” Then I say, “This...is not the case. There are physical facts about the world that are not so inscribed. These include the statement, ‘people die.’ ” That is not related to my psychological attitude nor history...and “the speed of light is X.” And then I go on to show certain common features of Confucianism and of pre-Qin period that are found in almost all civilized societies.

So I do not think a scholar should be afraid of hurting the feelings of the anti-essentialists. There are kinds of standards that we can use to identify what theories are relative to time and place, and what is common to all human societies because our DNA, as everybody knows now, is 99 percent identical. Not only our DNA, but we all also experience joy and suffering, love, sympathy, empathy, pride and shame. So I guess that would be my reply.

Liu: I appreciate your research works which are based on the texts. At the same time, I can find their relevance to modern society and modern human beings. I think that is good. I appreciate that very much. That should be the mainstream in Chinese philosophical studies. But I wonder how one can defend it. Someone may argue that this is not a philosophical approach to emphasize the relevance of traditional texts to modern society and the well-being of humankind. They think this is an approach for historians, not philosophers.

Munro: I will give you a partial explanation to it. I think Western philosophy (excluding the positivistic movements in the 1930s and their modern descendents), has generally been synthetic, drawing information from a variety of fields and then asking the big philosophical questions, and using the evidence from all those fields to try to give the best possible answers. So I would refer to our long legacy of doing that. In drawing such information, we are not doing anything strange; we are doing what philosophers have done for centuries.

Second, we can ask better questions of the modern information if we know something about how people have dealt with similar issues in the past. Filiality is not a value or a concept widely discussed in the West. But perhaps Westerners can ask why this has been prominent for 2,500 years in China. Maybe traditional Chinese thinkers discovered something interesting about social relationships. Then later scholars can use that information to ask questions of the new biological material. That would help us formulate better questions. One such question might be: Does a group derive any strength from the fact that individuals keep track of who their kinfolk are through honoring elders or deceased ancestors?

And finally I would refer to my comment that not all our knowledge is new. We may find important evidence, important hypotheses in the past. One example I used in my book *A Chinese Ethics for the New Century* is the long history in China of the idea of learning through imitation. In the West we did not focus on learning through imitation until probably the 1970s. China has a 2,500 year history of talking about it, about the usefulness of establishing positive and negative models. Because such models are concrete, people can identify with them. They could be used in teaching. So if you pay no attention to the early materials, you would lose the insights about learning through imitation. And I must say, on that point, that the recent discovery of “mirror neurons” by the Italian brain scientists give the scientific bases for learning through imitation. So you

combine new sciences with ancient examples and discoveries, and think about their relevance to philosophical problems.

Endnotes

1. Donald J. Munro. *A Chinese Ethics for the New Century: The Ch'ien Mu Lectures in History and Culture, and Other Essays on Science and Confucian Ethics* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2005).
2. Lionel Jensen. *Manufacturing Confucianism: Chinese Traditions and Universal Civilizations* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997).

The State of Chinese Philosophy in the U.S.

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We should not neglect the good news. Right now, there is significant representation of Chinese philosophy in American colleges that have primarily an undergraduate teaching mission. There are many very good philosophers in this group. Some of them are well qualified to be teaching graduate students in this field, but all of them are doing some quite valuable work in teaching Chinese philosophy to a broad and diverse undergraduate constituency. Furthermore, some students at excellent undergraduate institutions will go on to become philosophy graduate students. Whether they intend to specialize in Chinese philosophy or not, they will constitute a constituency for Chinese philosophy courses when these are given.

There is a (slowly) growing number of people who do Chinese philosophy at graduate institutions. It is true that the University of California at Berkeley, Stanford University, and University of Michigan philosophy departments have lost and not replaced some of the best people in Chinese philosophy. The situation some years ago in which Chinese philosophy was represented in these departments came about through a set of circumstances that can be very difficult to sustain over time: joint appointments with East Asian studies or Religion programs or departments, and, in one case, the appointment of an ethics specialist who also happened to do Chinese philosophy. With respect to the joint appointments, it is almost always more difficult to satisfy two masters, so when the occupant of a joint chair leaves, it is not at all assured that the philosophy department will remain one of the joint appointers of a successor. With respect to appointments of people who happen to do Chinese philosophy but were hired primarily because of something else they do, there is no assurance that the next people filling those positions will also do Chinese philosophy. To interpret the loss of Chinese philosophy specialists at Berkeley, Stanford, and Michigan as signaling a loss of interest in Chinese philosophy is to simplify a complex situation.

Philosophy is among the most conservative of disciplines, perhaps bested only by Classical Studies. Awareness of significant philosophical traditions other than those dominant in Western Europe, the United Kingdom, and the United States barely registers in the minds of most philosophers in the U.S. and U.K. Though philosophy in the U.S. comes late to the awareness that there might be cultural traditions of thought that rival in interest and substance its own traditions, it is in a better position to articulate clearly and with good arguments what is to be gained from looking to those other traditions. This articulation is taking place, slowly. The situation here in the U.S., I think, is more promising than the one in the U.K., but even here, there is good reason to expect this process to take place slowly.

Genuine, consolidated change will take place as philosophy departments recognize the value of Chinese philosophy and

directly seek positions in that field and without the aid of joint appointments. Realistically, this will come about when some of those who do Chinese philosophy can do so in a manner that speaks to Anglophone philosophy (I do not mean to imply and do not believe that this is the only good way to do Chinese philosophy), and when Anglophone philosophy reciprocally widens its receptiveness to different approaches. To take just a few recent examples, consider Joel Kupperman's substantial body of work that integrates thought from Chinese philosophy and other Asian philosophy with the major Western work on character, the good life, and virtue ethics; Stephen Angle's work on the development of the concept of rights in Chinese thought; Bryan Van Norden's and Jiyuan Yu's recent and important books on Confucianism as a virtue ethic; Michael Slote's interest in Mengzi and his belief that there are important parallels between Mengzi's approach and that of Hume and latter day sentimentalist descendents of Hume such as himself; and some of my work in which I draw upon Mengzi, Xunzi, and Zhuangzi in developing a theory of morality in the same ways I draw upon Aristotle and Hume. More of this will happen, but we shouldn't underestimate the time this will take.

David Nivison at Stanford was one of the first to write about Chinese philosophy in a way that connected it to issues in Anglophone moral philosophy and moral psychology. P.J. Ivanhoe and Kwong-loi Shun were his students, and came to teach others at Stanford, Berkeley, and Michigan, and people in this third generation are now teachers themselves in graduate programs or in excellent undergraduate institutions. Edward Slingerland (a student of Ivanhoe's) is now in the Philosophy Department at the University of British Columbia. Eric Hutton (another student of Ivanhoe's) is at the University of Utah. Loy Hui Chieh (a student of Shun's) is at the National University of Singapore. I have no doubt that Ivanhoe and Shun will produce more scholars in Chinese philosophy from their posts in Hong Kong. There is significant strength in Chinese philosophy at the National University of Singapore with Alan Chan, Sor Hoon Tan, as well as Loy. Jiyuan Yu is at the State University of New York, Buffalo; Joel Kupperman at the University of Connecticut; Chris Fraser (a student of Chad Hansen's) at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Roger Ames and Cheng Chung-Ying at Hawai'i and Chad Hansen at the University of Hong Kong have been steady anchors in this process of growth over generations of graduate students. Since arriving at Duke, I have one graduate student whose major fields of research specialization include Chinese philosophy: Hagop Sarkissian. In seeking a job this year, he was offered and accepted a tenure track position at Baruch College, CUNY. It's a position that will enable him to teach graduate courses in Chinese philosophy. I have had other terrific students who have acquired Chinese philosophy as a competence and who can be expected to influence generations of students to come.

Over the long term, which is the temporal perspective that much Chinese philosophy encourages us to take, after all, Chinese philosophy promises to take an increasingly important place in American philosophy, but this will take place only if we do the hard work of making connections.

PART II: PERSPECTIVES FROM HIRING DEPARTMENTS

One Perspective on Chinese Philosophy in a Ph.D. Program

Hugh Benson
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Let me begin by saying something about the perspective from which I approach Chinese philosophy. I am trained in ancient Greek philosophy, having received my Ph.D. from a primarily analytic department. I have been a faculty member of a primarily analytic department for over twenty years. At University of Oklahoma, we have a remarkably successful Ph.D. program, which, unfortunately, is not in the top fifty or so graduate programs according to the most recent "Philosophical Gourmet Report." I have been chair of this department for over a decade and have worked very hard at maintaining and improving its quality. Because of our "Gourmet" ranking we are particularly concerned about the placement of our graduate students. I have serious doubts about the justification of graduate programs that are unable to place their students, and I am happy to say we have been remarkably successful in this regard (although I am currently looking for some wood on which to knock). Approximately eight years ago, I applied for, and we were fortunate enough to win, a grant from the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation to hire a specialist in Chinese philosophy. I confess that this was motivated more by the availability of the opportunity than any deep-seated belief on our part that the department had a glaring gap in Chinese philosophy. We have since had two people in this position. The first left after three years for another position. The second, I am happy to say, is still with us. I should also say, as will no doubt become evident in what follows, that I have no expertise and indeed very little familiarity with the subject matter of Chinese philosophy. I regret that I have not taken the opportunity to learn more about it than I have from my colleagues. For that I have no one to blame but myself. I say all this at the beginning because I am sure it informs everything else that I have to say. So take what follows for what it is worth.

I address first what seems the most fundamental issue: the demand for Chinese philosophy and the profession's possible responses to that demand. After addressing this wider picture, I describe practical considerations that may arise in departments seeking to include Chinese philosophy in their graduate curricula. Finally, I speak more broadly about how it seems to me that Chinese philosophy will best be integrated into the wider discipline. Throughout my remarks, I rely on my own field, Greek philosophy, which I take to offer a helpful precedent and analogue to the situation currently faced by my colleagues in Chinese philosophy.

It seems to me that one of the missions of a responsible Ph.D. program in philosophy is to train and prepare the next generation of academic philosophers—the next generation of professors of philosophy. Consequently, Ph.D. programs must be aware of the needs and interests of the colleges and universities at which that next generation will be teaching and researching. Often those needs and interests are a function of the needs and interests of the Ph.D. programs themselves, but from time to time other needs and interests arise. For whatever reason, about which I could only speculate, currently a number of colleges and universities appear interested in hiring faculty in

the area of Chinese philosophy. This current interest, however, does not seem to have arisen or been stimulated by a similar interest in the Ph.D. programs that typically prepare the next generation of faculty, although I suspect that this is a rather gross over-simplification. In any case, there is both need and interest, and responsible Ph.D. programs need to examine how they will respond.

It seems to me that we have roughly three options.

First, we can continue to train the next generation of faculty in whatever areas we are currently doing so. We simply assume that the bright and talented philosophers who emerge will be able, with sufficient preparation time, to teach Chinese philosophy (and presumably anything else needed). Something like this approach might have been taken by a number of Ph.D. programs a few generations back, for example, in ancient (Greek and Roman) philosophy. Implicit in this approach is an assumption that reasonably adequate teaching may be had simply by relying on essentially self-taught professors who will employ their general philosophical acumen to prepare courses in an unfamiliar, specialized area.

Second, we can cede the task of preparing specialists in Chinese philosophy to the quite spare number of Ph.D. programs that choose to specialize in that area. To my knowledge this sort of tactic was never adopted for the field of ancient philosophy. While in recent decades some programs have indeed chosen to create a niche in ancient philosophy, with specialized joint programs with Classical Studies, this has never been at the expense of pursuing quality programs in philosophy more broadly conceived. Indeed, it seems to me that some of the best places in the world to pursue a specialization in ancient philosophy are equally the best places in the world to pursue a philosophy Ph.D. more generally. The closest one comes to this second tactic of self-consciously narrowing a department's focus, I suppose, are those programs that have chosen to focus primarily in what I will loosely describe as Continental philosophy or analytic philosophy.

Finally, we can attempt to integrate the training of Chinese philosophy into already existing programs. When positions become available, we can hire specialists in Chinese philosophy to help train the next generation of philosophy faculty. Or, more ambitiously, we can, as my department did, actively seek to create new positions to fulfill this purpose. Something like this is the approach that almost every graduate program since the fifties or sixties has adopted with respect to ancient philosophy.

It seems to me that the first approach undervalues Chinese philosophy, as it did ancient philosophy back in the day. And, doing so has serious costs. One of the reasons responsible Ph.D. programs take seriously the training of the next generation of philosophy faculty is to ensure that what undergraduate (and to some extent graduate) students are learning is correct. They value quality graduate education in part because they value quality undergraduate education. Consequently, Ph.D. programs should take seriously their responsibilities to the undergraduate philosophy students across the country. They should do their best to ensure that the graduate students they place in institutions across the country (and beyond) know what they are talking about and can provide first-rate education. I do not look forward to the next generation of graduate students entering our Ph.D. program with misconceptions and false beliefs about Chinese philosophy, whether those misconceptions and false beliefs are favorable to Chinese philosophy or not. My impression, from discussing this with my colleagues, is that misconceptions about Chinese philosophy, while sometimes quite "friendly" to the subject, are nonetheless often of particularly pernicious sorts, playing into stereotypes that have long compromised Western

efforts to approach Asian philosophy responsibly. If anything then, the burden here to protect the quality of teaching may be greater than in other domains of philosophy.

The second approach, however, in my view overvalues Chinese philosophy. It is as though we are to suppose that one cannot be adequately trained in Chinese philosophy if one has to devote time to Russell and Frege, Hegel and Heidegger, Kripke and Davidson, or Derrida and Habermas. It is difficult to know why this should be the case. It is not true of any other sub-discipline in philosophy that I am aware of. But one suspects that there is an assumption to the effect that one does not have sufficient time to squander it outside the Chinese philosophical tradition or one runs the risk of being corrupted by the questions and values discussed outside this tradition. This may be justified by appeal to the enormous gap between the traditions of Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy. I myself am rather skeptical about the plausibility of this justification. Indeed, I worry that the more one emphasizes the gap between the two traditions, the less plausible it becomes to include Chinese philosophy in philosophy departments. It is not, I take it, an orthographic accident that the writings of Confucius, Plato, and Rawls are called "philosophical." Whatever the intellectual arguments for this approach, as a practical matter, it is a non-starter. Few of our graduate students will be lucky (or unlucky) enough to acquire positions in which they will only be working in the sub-field in which they specialized as a graduate student. They will almost certainly be expected and want to teach and work outside of that specialization. And again, if we are going to take seriously undergraduate education, we will want to ensure that those Ph.D. students are well-prepared to work and teach outside their specialization. Moreover, they will be interacting with colleagues who are familiar with Russell and Frege, Hegel and Heidegger, Kripke and Davidson, or Derrida and Habermas, and they will presumably want to interact with those colleagues at more than a superficial level. To attempt to meet the current needs for and interests in Chinese philosophy by ceding the task to a few specialized departments runs the risk of putting those graduate students at a competitive disadvantage when they seek employment and isolating them in their own departments when they do win jobs.

Consequently, it seems to me that the wise and prudent approach to meeting the needs and interests of colleges and universities for Chinese philosophy is for Ph.D. programs to integrate the specialization of Chinese philosophy into their existing programs. This is the approach our department has taken and it has been generally successful.

I do not mean to suggest that every Ph.D. program in the country needs to have a specialist in Chinese philosophy. If resources were unlimited, I suppose I might advocate such a thing but I would also advocate that every Ph.D. program needs to have approximately twenty-five to thirty faculty on staff with every major sub-discipline (whatever these are) covered and a handful of niches. Since resources are not unlimited, I will not advocate any such thing. Instead, I would encourage departments to consider a specialist in Chinese philosophy as one of the many needs that must be weighed off against one another in light of various departmental considerations. Whether the department needs a specialist in Chinese philosophy rather than a Kant specialist, or a specialist in ancient philosophy (God forbid!), or an aesthetician, or a philosopher of mind are questions that require individual and specific considerations. My suggestion is only to include Chinese philosophy into the conversation.

If one accepts the basic proposition that it is to the profession's good to include Chinese philosophy among our "mainstream" areas of study and training there may remain

concerns about what this may practically entail. So let me briefly address two distinct sets of considerations, one concerning the Ph.D.-granting department's responsibilities in making such a move and one concerning practical or perceived obstacles a department may face in trying to make a hire.

I do not wish to suggest that integrating Chinese philosophy into a graduate program in order to permit graduate students to specialize in Chinese philosophy is without special considerations. I do not suggest, for example, that we ought to encourage students who fail to have, or are unwilling to acquire, the necessary language skills to pursue such a specialization simply because the job prospects are bright. Professing to specialize in Chinese philosophy without classical Chinese is even less reasonable than specializing in ancient Greek philosophy without knowledge of ancient Greek. (While there may be exceptions, we cannot of course prudently aim to train students to be the "exceptional" or rare case.) And the cause of education, whether at the undergraduate or graduate level, or the cause of Chinese philosophy as a discipline will hardly be improved by a proliferation of amateurs. So, just as we presently do for ancient, we will need to provide the relevant language training that Ph.D. students in the field will need.

While granting that there are special considerations (and perhaps more than I identify), I hasten to add that I think there is additionally some value to the wider graduate student body in having a Chinese philosophy specialist. Just as we do in all other areas of philosophy, we can here advocate the value of Ph.D. students acquiring a competency, as opposed to a specialty, in Chinese philosophy. Given that hiring departments are at least sometimes interested in having courses in Chinese philosophy while not perhaps motivated to seek a specialist in it, there appears to be some market for Ph.D. students who can legitimately claim a teaching competence in the field. However, this is again a need and interest we cannot rightly answer unless our Ph.D. students are developing their competency by way of responsible training with a specialist in the field. While many students with a competence in ancient do not have ancient Greek, we nonetheless recognize that the worth of their competency importantly relies on their having trained with a dedicated specialist. Thus, placing specialists in Chinese philosophy in Ph.D. granting programs will enable students without the relevant language skills to acquire Chinese philosophy as a competence and this too may go some way toward meeting the current needs and interests.

What is essential, it seems to me, is that students who choose to pursue work in Chinese philosophy receive a first rate education and training in the sub-field as well as in the discipline as whole. There are no short cuts. I don't suppose that this is in any way peculiar to Chinese philosophy. Students who want to pursue work in the philosophy of language or the philosophy of physics need the same thing. But for fields that are in the process of becoming mainstreamed it seems particularly important. It seems to me that ancient philosophy established its bona fides a handful of decades ago when its practitioners established themselves as no less expert in philosophy than in their classical studies. This tradition of having a sort of dual expertise has been carried on in the number of joint programs in ancient philosophy at some of the best graduate philosophy programs in the country. Someone enmeshed in Aristotle's ethics who has had courses with Christine Korsgaard or Alan Gibbard, or someone enmeshed in Plato's theory of Forms who has had courses with Jerry Fodor or Alvin Plantinga, or someone enmeshed in Stoic epistemology who has had courses with Jonathan Dancy or Ernest Sosa has a plausible claim to expertise in ancient... *philosophy*. Students of Aristotle or Plato or the Stoics who haven't at least had courses devoted in part

to the work of these contemporary philosophers are hard pressed to establish their philosophical credentials. I realize that my analytic bias and perhaps my age is on display with these examples. But the point is meant to be a more general one. Specializations such as ancient philosophy and Chinese philosophy are like dual degrees. They require expertise in their respective historical areas as well as in contemporary philosophy. Ph.D. programs that choose to integrate Chinese philosophy into their programs will serve their students well by keeping this in mind.

One of the major obstacles faced by those who choose to integrate Chinese philosophy into their programs is the hiring process. The search committee looking for a specialist in Chinese philosophy is not likely to be composed of individuals with much familiarity, let alone expertise, in the field. Many of the senior faculty who are most likely to fill search committees are also just those least likely to have encountered Chinese philosophy in the course of their educational training. However, in our own case, we found that, as with any other unfamiliar area, we could take a few simple steps to increase the effectiveness and confidence of our search procedure. These entailed, for example, attending talks in Chinese philosophy at APA meetings, speaking and corresponding with a few established scholars in the field, and acquainting ourselves with the major training centers from which our applicants would likely come.

Despite our success in the searches we conducted, I cannot help but sound one caution based on our experience. This caution is in some measure directed jointly at hiring committees and job candidates. Because hiring committees lack familiarity with Chinese philosophy, this sometimes has the consequence of encouraging comparative job talks and comparative questions. The candidate may find herself seeking to answer, in her formal presentation or in discussion, questions such as, How is this like Aristotle in the *NE*? Or, how is this like Descartes in the *Meditations*? While I have been advocating the dual expertise thesis, I generally do not think these kinds of papers and questions are helpful. The candidate who speaks outside her area of expertise in order to speak to what her audience will find more familiar is put at a serious disadvantage. This is true whether she initiates the comparative questions or the search committee does. She risks being evaluated on an expertise of Aristotle or Descartes, which she does not profess, because the committee is not in a position to evaluate her Chinese expertise and will look, perhaps uncomfortably closely, to her presentation of what they do know. The candidate almost never does well in these circumstances for her training lies elsewhere. I am inclined to think that the candidate's philosophical expertise emerges from the method by which she approaches the text she is studying, the questions she addresses to the text, the objections she considers, and the responses she offers. It is these the candidate should seek to demonstrate in her presentation and these the committee should solicit from her. The relevant features of her acquaintance with the wider field will manifest there.

I suspect some will object to my comparison of expertise in Chinese philosophy with expertise in ancient (Greek and Roman) philosophy. It will be pointed out that ancient philosophy is in the same tradition as contemporary philosophy (whether in the analytic or continental traditions). Indeed, it will be pointed out by some that it is the originator of that tradition. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect a specialist in ancient philosophy to acquire an expertise in ancient as well as contemporary philosophy. But to ask this of the Chinese philosophy specialist is like asking a Shakespeare scholar to also be a cognitive scientist. If this is true, I think it would be too bad, but, moreover, I wonder why Chinese philosophy in

this case should be housed in philosophy departments. It really would be its own discipline, I guess. But, in fact, I doubt that it is true. In my experience, which is admittedly limited, when a specialist in Chinese philosophy engages a philosophical text like the *Analects*, she is doing much the same thing I am doing when I engage Aristotle's *De Anima*. I can approach the *De Anima* as a linguist, a philologist, a historian, or as a philosopher. No doubt I should approach the text in all these ways, but my interest—as specialist in ancient philosophy—is primarily philosophical, and for that reason I am and should be interested in Korsgaard, and Plantinga, and Sosa, or whoever it may be. And that seems to me precisely what my colleagues in Chinese philosophy are doing.

Finally, I should say that while I have approached the question of why Ph.D. programs in philosophy should integrate Chinese philosophy into their programs primarily from the perspective of their mission of training and preparing the next generation of college and university professors in light of the current need and desire of those institutions for Chinese philosophy, it seems to me that Ph.D. programs also have a mission to advance philosophical understanding. I believe that the more Chinese philosophy becomes integrated in quality graduate programs, the more we will begin to see the similarities between Chinese philosophy and contemporary Western philosophy rather than the differences. Or, perhaps better, we will begin to see the similarities through the differences. We will begin to see Chinese philosophy and contemporary Western philosophy not as distinct disciplines, but, rather, we will begin to see more clearly what philosophy is. We will begin to see why Chinese philosophy, ancient philosophy, philosophy of physics, and aesthetics are all members of the discipline of philosophy, and that, I think, will lead to a deeper understanding and appreciation for the nature of philosophy.

I Cannot Imagine Our Department without Asian Philosophy

Leslie P. Francis
University of Utah

In the philosophy department at the University of Utah, we are fortunate to have two specialists in Asian philosophy. These philosophers not only teach their fields—ancient Chinese philosophy and Indian philosophy—to our graduate and undergraduate students but also enrich immensely our students' abilities to understand work in other areas of philosophy. The inclusion of specialists in Asian philosophy has been a longstanding feature of our department, one that I cannot imagine doing without.

Let me give several examples of how our department is enriched by our specialists in Asian philosophy. One of our specialists in Asian philosophy, Eric Hutton, also works on comparative virtue theory. We are thus able to offer our ethics students—and our students in applied ethics—a breadth of thinking about virtue theory that might be unavailable elsewhere. This opportunity to combine study of Asian philosophy with the fields of practical reason, ethics, and applied ethics has been a particular help in attracting talented students to our department. Our other Asian philosophy specialist, Deen Chatterjee, is also a specialist on issues in global justice; for our students in political philosophy, bioethics, and environmental ethics, having a specialist on global justice as well as its linkages to Indian philosophy is superb.

Several of us in the department, like many contemporary moral and political philosophers, have been influenced by the work of John Rawls. Rawls' method of achieving "reflective equilibrium" between "considered judgments" and the principles that underlie them did not, as Rawls presented it, take explicit account of any of the "considered judgments" of non-Western cultures in trying to achieve "reflective equilibrium." To that extent, there is a mismatch between Rawlsian prescriptions and method: Rawlsians either need to realize that their prescriptions really are best justified for the West, and not other cultures, or they need to adjust their method to include the "considered judgments" of non-Western cultures. Since the former is limiting to say the least, then the only way they will achieve the latter is by including as conversation partners people who work on non-Western philosophy, which means hiring such scholars as faculty and including such courses in undergraduate and graduate programs. On our faculty, Ron Mallon's work showing how intuitions about cases may differ across cultures also points to the need for this work. Psychologists have long realized that one cannot understand the human mind by studying just one culture, and it is now that philosophers, thanks to the influence of experimental philosophy, may finally begin to catch up on this score.

Many philosophy departments—our own included—value social justice. One form this ideal takes in practice has been in diversity hiring when possible. However, the diversity in hiring has largely been limited to gender and race. It might be argued, though, that for the sake of social justice, diversity considerations should apply to cultures, too. It seems to send a mixed message to hire people of different races, but then not teach anything except Anglo-American, Ancient Greek, and European continental philosophy. Having specialists in Asian philosophy—as well as, of course, in African philosophy, Latin American philosophy, and Native American philosophy—is a way to express a commitment to social justice.

We also believe that the opportunity to study Asian philosophy is a help for our students in the job market. Of course, we are able to train Ph.D.s who can list specialties in Asian philosophy—and our students in Asian philosophy are able to teach courses in the basics in Western philosophy, too. But it is helpful to our non-specialist students as well. Our students in applied ethics, for example, can bring a dimension that students from other programs often cannot. Business ethics is a field in much demand, certainly in business schools but also in philosophy departments that teach courses taken by students interested in business. Given emerging markets in Asia, the ability to offer a dimension of interest and work in Asian philosophy has been very helpful to our students in business ethics. Cross-cultural philosophical interests are also a help for our students in other areas of applied ethics, such as medical ethics and environmental ethics.

Finally, "interdisciplinary" is a big buzzword among universities today, and something that deans, provosts, and presidents are pushing for. Philosophers working on Asian Philosophy are particularly well suited to interdisciplinary projects, since their work has cross-overs with language departments, history departments, and religious studies departments, among many others. Burgeoning Asian studies programs are very popular among students, and for our philosophy department anyway, a great source of talented double majors. Our university will also be offering an MA. in Asian studies, which we expect will be a good combination for philosophy Ph.D. students interested both in Asian philosophy and in fields such as business ethics. On the most practical level, our budget is importantly dependent on student credit hours, and the draw of our courses in Asian philosophy has been no small contributor to our ongoing success with enrollments.

PART III: DATA ON THE PROFESSION

Ph.D. Granting Programs in the United States with Faculty Specializing in Asian Philosophy

Compiled December 2007 by Amy Olberding

This list was compiled in the following way. I surveyed the faculty lists of all of the Ph.D. granting departments listed at the foot of this document. While this list does not represent all of the Ph.D. granting programs in the United States, it is a beginning. (It includes, for example, all of the departments included in the overall U.S. rankings and specialty rankings in Asian philosophy from the “Philosophical Gourmet Report.”) To conduct the survey, I employed the faculty lists given on each department’s website and so it must be understood that my information is accurate and up-to-date only insofar as each department’s website is.

I here list only departments that have faculty who list Asian and/or comparative philosophy among their Areas of Specialization (AOS). Representations of faculty specialties are

given as they appear on each department’s website. Students seeking a graduate program should of course consult with individual departments and prospective advisors regarding their interests and the target program’s ability to meet their needs.

There are at least some institutions listed here that have faculty publishing in Asian philosophy but placed in other departments. I have omitted these except where such scholars are formally identified as affiliates of the institution’s philosophy department. Students using this list to consider graduate programs should of course be aware that some scholars working in other disciplines (e.g., Religious Studies or East Asian Languages and Civilizations) may have informal agreements with philosophy programs. Unfortunately, these are not reflected on this list and thus students should actively pursue inquiries in this regard when considering a program. I have also omitted listings of faculty who hold emeritus status.

This list includes only Ph.D. granting institutions. There are a number of departments with MA. programs in Philosophy, not listed here, that have faculty working in Asian and comparative philosophy.

Department	Faculty Specializing in Asian Philosophy
Boston University	Robert Neville , AOS: metaphysics, philosophy of religion, philosophical theology, ethics, political theory, American philosophy, modern philosophy, comparative philosophy
DePaul University	Mary Jeanne Larrabee , AOS: phenomenology, Husserl studies, feminism, Asian philosophy, and gender studies Franklin Perkins , AOS: early modern philosophy, Chinese philosophy, and the history of philosophy more broadly
Duke University	David Wong , AOS: ethics, Chinese philosophy, moral psychology
Indiana University	Adjunct faculty with primary appointment in East Asian Languages and Cultures: Robert Eno , AOS: Chinese philosophy, early Chinese history
Northwestern University	Affiliated Faculty with primary appointment in Religion: Brook Ziporyn , AOS: Chinese Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism
Purdue University	Donald W Mitchell , AOS: India, religion and philosophy
Southern Illinois University	Douglas Berger , AOS: Classical and contemporary Brahminical and Indian Buddhist philosophies, classical Chinese philosophy, cross-cultural philosophical hermeneutics
State University of New York, Buffalo	Jiyuan Yu , AOS: Greek Philosophy, Chinese Philosophy, Metaphysics, and Ethics
University of California, Riverside	Eric Schwitzgebel , AOS: philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind, cognitive development, philosophy of science, classical Chinese philosophy, epistemology, metaphilosophy Cooperating faculty with a primary appointment in Chinese and Comparative Literature: Lisa Raphals , AOS: early China and classical Greece, comparative philosophy
University of Connecticut	Joel Kupperman , AOS: ethics and aesthetics, with a strong interest in classic Asian philosophy

University of Hawai'i	<p>Roger T. Ames, AOS: Chinese philosophy (Confucianism and Daoism), comparative philosophy, American philosophy</p> <p>Arindam Chakrabarti, AOS: Indian philosophy, metaphysics, philosophy of language, comparative philosophy</p> <p>CHENG Chung-ying, AOS: Neo-Confucianism, classical Chinese philosophy, comparative philosophy, philosophy of logic and language, theory of knowledge, philosophical hermeneutics, metaphysics</p> <p>Steve Odin, AOS: Japanese philosophy, comparative philosophy, American philosophy, systematic metaphysics, phenomenology, aesthetics</p> <p>Graham Parkes, AOS: comparative philosophy (continental European, Chinese, and Japanese), philosophy of depth psychology, philosophy of literature and film</p> <p>Roy W Perrett, AOS: Buddhist philosophy, Indian philosophy, moral and political philosophy, metaphysics, philosophy of religion</p> <p>Mary Tiles, AOS: philosophy and history of mathematics, science and technology in China and Europe, contemporary French philosophy of science, logic, and philosophy of language</p>
University of Iowa	<p>James Duerlinger, AOS: Greek philosophy, philosophy of religion, and Buddhist philosophy</p>
University of Massachusetts, Amherst	<p>Associated 5-college faculty with an appointment at Smith College: Jay Garfield, AOS: philosophy of mind, foundations of cognitive science, logic, philosophy of language, Buddhist philosophy, cross-cultural hermeneutics, theoretical and applied ethics and epistemology</p>
University of Missouri, Columbia	<p>Bina Gupta, AOS: Indian epistemology, Indian metaphysics, comparative philosophy</p>
University of New Mexico	<p>John Bussanich, AOS: Greek philosophy, comparative philosophy & mysticism (ancient western and Indian traditions)</p> <p>Richard Hayes, AOS: history of Indian Buddhist scholasticism in the context of Indian philosophy; Buddhist logic and epistemology; history of metaphysics in India; Buddhist psychology and Jungian analytic psychology; Sanskrit grammar and Indian philosophies of language</p> <p>John Taber, AOS: classical Indian philosophy, 19th century German philosophy</p>
University of Oklahoma	<p>Amy Olberding, AOS: Chinese philosophy; philosophical approaches to death and mourning ethics</p>
University of Oregon	<p>Erin Cline, AOS: Chinese philosophy, moral psychology, comparative philosophy, political philosophy</p>
University of Texas, Austin	<p>Stephen Phillips, AOS: Indian philosophy, epistemology, ethics, philosophy of religion, Wittgenstein</p> <p>Kathleen Higgins, AOS: Nietzsche, Schopenhauer; aesthetics, philosophy of music, non-Western philosophy</p>
University of Utah	<p>Eric Hutton, AOS: Chinese philosophy, ethics</p>

Departments surveyed for this report:

Arizona State University
Baylor University
Boston University
Brown University
Carnegie Mellon University
City University of New York Graduate Center
Columbia University
Cornell University
DePaul University
Duke University
Emory University
Florida State University
Georgetown University
Harvard University
Indiana University
Johns Hopkins University
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
New York University
Northwestern University
Ohio State University
Princeton University
Purdue University
Rice University
Rutgers University
Southern Illinois University
Saint Louis University
Stanford University
Syracuse University
Temple University
Tulane University
University of Arizona
University of California, Berkeley
University of California, Davis
University of California, Irvine
University of California, Los Angeles
University of California, Riverside
University of California, San Diego
University of California, Santa Barbara
University of California, Santa Cruz
University of Chicago
University of Colorado
University of Connecticut
University of Florida
University of Georgia
University of Hawai'i
University of Illinois, Chicago
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
University of Iowa
University of Maryland
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

University of Miami
University of Michigan
University of Minnesota, Twin Cities
University of Missouri, Columbia
University of New Mexico
University of North Carolina
University of Notre Dame
University of Oklahoma
University of Oregon
University of Pennsylvania
University of Pittsburgh
University of Rochester
University of South Carolina
University of South Florida
University of Southern California
University of Texas, Austin
University of Utah
University of Virginia
University of Washington, Seattle
University of Wisconsin
Vanderbilt University
Washington University, Saint Louis
Yale University

Job Postings in Chinese, Asian, and Non-Western Philosophy, 2003 – 2008

Compiled March 2008 by Amy Olberding

The following data was collected from the APA's publication *Jobs for Philosophers (JFP)*. The survey reflects all U.S. postings listed in this publication from October 2003 (vol. 159) through February 2008 (vol. 177).¹ This survey, it should be noted, is a beginning effort at data collection. It does not, for example, include postings that may have appeared in other professional outlets, nor does it include postings for jobs outside the United States.

Job data was compiled in the following way. Total job posting numbers were provided by the editors of *JFP*. For detailed information on postings, each volume of *JFP*, excluding web-only advertisements, was searched using the keywords "Chinese," "non-Western," and "Asian." Any job posting employing one or more of these keywords as a hiring search criterion or desideratum is included in the data. Multiple postings from a single hiring department within one academic hiring cycle are counted only once.

Many postings included in this data identify multiple areas of interest to the hiring department. Comparably few identify specialization or competence in Asian, Chinese, or non-Western philosophy as an exclusive interest (and these are clearly indicated in Table 3 below). The numbers given here thus indicate postings reflective of *some interest* in hiring in Chinese, Asian, or non-Western philosophy and are unlikely to reflect the number of *jobs awarded* to candidates in these areas.

Table 1 presents the most general pictures of job postings. It gives total numbers of job postings listed in *JFP* for the period covered, as well as the postings containing the search keywords.

	2003-2004 <i>JFP</i> , vols. 159-162	2004-2005 <i>JFP</i> , vols. 163-166	2005-2006 <i>JFP</i> , vols. 167-170	2006-2007 <i>JFP</i> , vols. 171-174	2007-2008 <i>JFP</i> , vols. 175-177	Five Year Totals
Keyword Postings	26	24	30	24	20	124
Total Postings	398	443	503	463	408	2215
Percentages	6%	5%	6%	5%	5%	5.6%

Table 2 identifies job posting data according to the areas of interest specified in the postings. Because the keywords employed in gathering data are of variable specificity, I here divide the postings according to keyword. Each posting is counted only once even where multiple keywords are used. For example, some postings specifying “non-Western philosophy” additionally give “Asian” as an example. In such cases, I have listed the posting under the broader category given.

	2003-2004 <i>JFP</i> , vols. 159-162	2004-2005 <i>JFP</i> , vols. 163-166	2005-2006 <i>JFP</i> , vols. 167-170	2006-2007 <i>JFP</i> , vols. 171-174	2007-2008 <i>JFP</i> , vols. 175-177	Five Year Totals
Chinese	2	–	2	1	1	6
East Asian	1	3	–	–	1	5
Asian	13	8	15	13	6	55
Non-Western	10	13	13	10	12	58
Total	26	24	30	24	20	124

Table 3 The data is here divided along two domains. First, I identify each posting department according to the highest degree it awards: B.A., M.A., or Ph.D. Information on departments and degrees awarded was gathered from epistemelinks.com. I additionally separate postings for non-tenure track jobs. I here omit postings for community colleges. Over the five-year period surveyed, only one community college posting included a specified keyword. Second, there are perhaps significant differences in the level of interest expressed in these postings. In order to capture a rough measure of this, I have divided the data into the categories listed below.

AOS-E (Area of Specialization – Exclusive): indicates job postings in which Asian, Chinese, or non-Western philosophy is the *sole* Area of Specialization listed.

AOS (Area of Specialization): indicates job postings in which Asian, Chinese, or non-Western philosophy is one of multiple Areas of Specialization listed.

AOC (Area of Competency): indicates job postings in which Asian, Chinese, or non-Western philosophy is listed as an Area of Competency, typically as one of multiple desirable AOC’s.

Other: indicates job postings in which Asian, Chinese, or non-Western philosophy is listed as “desirable” or a “teaching need” independently of the hiring department’s desired AOS and AOC.

Hiring Department Classifications	2003-2004 <i>JFP</i> , vols. 159-162	2004-2005 <i>JFP</i> , vols. 163-166	2005-2006 <i>JFP</i> , vols. 167-170	2006-2007 <i>JFP</i> , vols. 171-174	2007-2008 <i>JFP</i> , vols. 175-177	Five Year Totals
PhD granting	AOS-E: 1	AOC: 3	AOS-E: 2	Other: 2		AOS-E: 3 AOS: 0 AOC: 3 Other: 2
MA granting	Other: 1		AOS-E: 1 Other: 1	AOC: 1	AOS-E: 2 AOS: 1 AOC: 1 Other: 1	AOS-E: 3 AOS: 1 AOC: 2 Other: 3
BA granting	AOS-E: 2 AOS: 4 AOC: 5 Other: 8	AOS-E: 1 AOS: 4 AOC: 4 Other: 9	AOS-E: 4 AOS: 4 AOC: 8 Other: 5	AOS-E: 7 AOS: 3 AOC: 6 Other: 3	AOS-E: 1 AOS: 2 AOC: 1 Other: 8	AOS-E: 15 AOS: 17 AOC: 24 Other: 33
Non tenure-track positions	AOS-E: 1 AOS: 1 AOC: 1 Other: 2	AOC: 1 Other: 2	AOS-E: 1 AOS: 1 Other: 3	AOC: 1 Other: 1	AOS: 1 AOC: 1	AOS-E: 2 AOS: 3 AOC: 4 Other: 8
Annual Totals	AOS-E: 4 AOS: 5 AOC: 6 Other: 11	AOS-E: 1 AOS: 4 AOC: 8 Other: 11	AOS-E: 8 AOS: 5 AOC: 8 Other: 9	AOS-E: 7 AOS: 3 AOC: 8 Other: 6	AOS-E: 3 AOS: 4 AOC: 3 Other: 9	AOS-E: 23 AOS: 21 AOC: 33 Other: 46

Endnotes

1. The May 2008 *JFP* (vol. 178) was not available when this data was compiled and is excluded here.