FROM THE EDITOR
Margaret A. Crouch

ABOUT THE NEWSLETTER

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

NEWS FROM THE CSW

ARTICLES
Saray Ayala
Philosophy and the Non-Native Speaker Condition
Megan M. Burke
Specters of Violence

BOOK REVIEWS
Shelley M. Park: Mothering Queerly, Queering Motherhood
Reviewed by Sarah LaChance Adams

Sarah LaChance Adams: Mad Mothers, Bad Mothers, and What a “Good” Mother Would Do: The Ethics of Ambivalence
Reviewed by Dana Belu

Clara Fischer: Gendered Readings of Change: A Feminist-Pragmatist Approach
Reviewed by Marilyn Fischer

Catriona Mackenzie, Wendy Rogers, and Susan Dodds (eds.): Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy
Reviewed by Erinn Gilson

Margaret R. Holmgren: Forgiveness and Retribution: Responding to Wrongdoing
Reviewed by Hailey Huget

Susanne Lettow (ed.): Reproduction, Race, and Gender in Philosophy and the Early Life Sciences
Reviewed by Mark William Westmoreland

ANNOUNCEMENTS

CONTRIBUTORS
FROM THE EDITOR

Margaret A. Crouch
EASTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY

The issue of the newsletter includes two articles and a significant number of book reviews. My thanks to all those who submitted articles, reviewed books, and to those who acted as reviewers of submissions for this issue.

Saray Ayala writes on a topic that has not received much attention in her essay “Philosophy and the Non-Native Speaker Condition.” Ayala demonstrates that biases against accented English by native English speakers have the same sorts of effects on perceptions of philosophers’ competence as biases against gender or ethnicity. Furthermore, there are also implicit biases against those who speak accented English. In addition to the harms to the individual that can result from such biases, Ayala argues that there are also harms to philosophy. Because the views of those with accented English receive less credibility from their audience, the content of their work may not have the influence it could otherwise have on the discipline of philosophy. This impoverishes philosophy, not only because the views of individuals are not taken up, but also because there are reasons to think that different languages might offer different intuitions and perspectives. Ayala’s essay is a wonderful introduction to this topic. She provides important empirical data, as well as suggestions for how to eliminate the effects of this bias. The recent newsletter on diversity in philosophy offered additional ways of correcting for bias against non-native English speakers.

Megan M. Burke’s Specters of Violence explores the idea that sexual violence haunts the lived experience of women and girls, and how this haunting presence affects, in particular, how they experience freedom. Burke provides a profound analysis of “the existential harm of rape culture and how rape culture is integral to the production of feminine subjectivity.” In her conclusion, she offers suggestions for getting rid of these specters. For anyone who has experienced gendered or sexual violence, she provides a way of understanding why one feels as one does, and what it means for how one lives one’s life. She also offers hope.

ABOUT THE NEWSLETTER ON FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY

The Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy is sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of Women (CSW). The newsletter is designed to provide an introduction to recent philosophical work that addresses issues of gender. None of the varied philosophical views presented by authors of newsletter articles necessarily reflect the views of any or all of the members of the Committee on the Status of Women, including the editor(s) of the newsletter, nor does the committee advocate any particular type of feminist philosophy. We advocate only that serious philosophical attention be given to issues of gender and that claims of gender bias in philosophy receive full and fair consideration.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES AND INFORMATION

1. Purpose: The purpose of the newsletter is to publish information about the status of women in philosophy and to make the resources of feminist philosophy more widely available. The newsletter contains discussions of recent developments in feminist philosophy and related work in other disciplines, literature overviews and book reviews, suggestions for eliminating gender bias in the traditional philosophy curriculum, and reflections on feminist pedagogy. It also informs the profession about the work of the APA Committee on the Status of Women. Articles submitted to the newsletter should be limited to ten double-spaced pages and must follow the APA guidelines for gender-neutral language. Please submit essays electronically to the editor. All manuscripts should be prepared for anonymous review. Each submission shall be sent to two reviewers. Reviews will be shared with authors. References should follow The Chicago Manual of Style.

2. Book Reviews and Reviewers: If you have published a book that is appropriate for review in the newsletter, please have your publisher send us a copy of your book. Each call for papers also includes a list of books for possible review. To volunteer to review books (or some particular book), please send the editor a CV and letter of interest, including mention of your areas of research and teaching.
3. Where to Send Things: Please send all articles, comments, suggestions, books, and other communications to the editor, Dr. Margaret A. Crouch, at mrcrouch@emich.edu.

4. Submission Deadlines: Submissions for spring issues are due by the preceding November 1; submissions for fall issues are due by the preceding April 1.

NEWS FROM THE COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN

NEW EDITOR FOR THE NEWSLETTER ON FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY

Margaret Crouch, who has for many years served the newsletter well and faithfully, is stepping down as editor of the APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy after the fall 2015 issue. Beginning with the spring 2016 issue, the new editor will be Serena Parekh (Northeastern University).

DIVERSITY CONFERENCE

Plans for the Diversity Conference, to be held May 28 to May 30, 2015, at Villanova University, are now complete. The unusually rich program, sponsored jointly by Hypatia and CSW, can be found at http://www1.villanova.edu/villanova/arts/sci/hypatiaconference/program.html.

Additional features of the conference include professional workshops on publishing feminist philosophy, a workshop on sexual harassment and bystander training, and the APA/CSW site visit training workshop (May 31). Modest travel grants are available for presenters who could not otherwise attend. Many thanks to those of you who gave so generously to make the conference and training programs possible.

SITE VISIT PROGRAM

Now in its second year, the Site Visit Program continues to do its important work. The directors of the program are reminding all parties to these visits that Site Visitors are not Title IX Investigators, as a confusion over this has caused a problem in the past. Two site visits were conducted in the fall of 2014 and two more are scheduled for spring 2015. The directors of the program are Carla Fehr, Peggy DesAutels, and Sally Haslanger, and CSW has just approved the addition of an associate director.

CSW WEBSITE

The CSW website, at http://www.apaonlinecsw.org/, continues to feature bimonthly profiles of women philosophers. Links to excellent resources include one to a database on teaching with articles and readings, another to the crowd-sourced directory of women philosophers, and one to the APA ombudsperson for nondiscrimination, who will receive complaints of discrimination and, where possible, serve as a resource to APA members regarding such complaints.

TASK FORCE ON INCLUSIVENESS

The CSW, in response to a suggestion from Kathryn Pogin, has asked the Task Force on Inclusiveness to recommend that the APA adopt a general policy against bullying. Such incidents often occur via social media sites, philosophy blogs, and so on, where victims cannot readily control what is said about them, and CSW endorsed the thought that bullying and harassment in all forms merit the APA’s concern.

CSW SESSIONS AT APA MEETINGS

The CSW-sponsored sessions at APA meetings held in 2014-2015 were well attended and well received.

Eastern Division: Informational Session on the Site Visit Program

Sally Haslanger
Valerie Hardcastle

Central Division: Best Practices in Publishing

Kieran Healey
“Gender and Citation Patterns in Generalist Philosophy Journals, 1993–2013”

Sally Scholz
“Referees, Gender Neutrality, and Diversity in Publishing Feminist Philosophy”

Colin Allen
“Editorial Strategies Concerning the Participation of Women at the SEP”

Due to faulty communication between the Pacific Division program coordinators and CSW, the Pacific Division session on how to do a climate survey was not scheduled. Steps have been taken to prevent this problem in the future.

ARTICLES

Philosophy and the Non-Native Speaker Condition

Saray Ayala
SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY

INTRODUCTION

In this note, my aim is to point out a phenomenon that has not received much attention; a phenomenon that, in my opinion, should not be overlooked in the professional practice of philosophy, especially within feminist efforts for social justice. I am referring to the way in which a non-native speaker of English interacts with the practice of philosophy.1 There is evidence that non-native speakers are often perceived in prejudiced ways. Such prejudiced perception causes harm and, more importantly, constitutes wrongdoing. As in other cases of prejudiced perception and biased behavior, it would be pretentious and misguided to expect philosophers and the philosophy profession to be free from this vice. There are good reasons to think that this prejudiced perception is bad not only for the persons who...
are perceived in such a way, but also for the profession, for it might make us miss important things that could improve philosophy in general. I claim we should be more sensitive to this phenomenon, both out of concern for justice, and for the sake of doing better philosophy.

1. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON BIASED PERCEPTION OF NON-NATIVE SPEAKERS

Many of us might recognize the following scenario: at a philosophy conference at which English is the main or only official language (a very common thing nowadays in many countries, including those with an official language other than English), a presenter starts giving a talk, and the audience notices that the speaker’s English is accented. At the beginning they might find it difficult to understand what the speaker is saying, which can be frustrating. However, unless the speaker’s command of English is extremely poor, in less than a minute of exposure their perceptual system is likely to adapt to the speaker’s accented pronunciation completely, eliminating the initial decrease in processing speed (Clarke and Garrett 2004) and allowing them to engage fully with the content of the talk. Nevertheless, by then, part of the audience might disregard the speaker as incompetent and stop attending to the talk.

This scenario does not paint an unrealistically pessimistic picture. A large body of research in psychology shows that non-native accent can have profound detrimental effects on perception of abilities and competence. Non-native speakers are generally perceived as less credible and skilled (Brown, Giles, and Thakerar 1985; Giles 1973), as having lower status (Nesdaale and Rooney 1996; Ryan and Carranza 1977), as being less intelligent (Bradac 1990; Lindemann 2003), and as being less competent (Boyd 2003). Similar to the gender bias that Steinpress, Anders, & Ritzke (1999) found in evaluations of the curriculum vitae of female versus male applicants, Huang, Frideger, and Pearce (2013) documented a bias against non-native speakers in evaluations of applicants for a managerial position. Participants examined resumes and listened to recorded interviews with fictitious candidates speaking English with native or non-native accent. The resumes were the same across conditions, and interviews followed identical scripts. The only difference was the applicant’s accent. Strikingly, participants were significantly more likely to recommend hiring the native speaker than the non-native speaker. This effect held regardless of the perceived race of the candidate (half of the resumes included a photograph of an Asian male, who “spoke” either with a native accent or Japanese accent during the interview; the other half of the resumes showed a photograph of a white male who “spoke” either with a native or Russian accent during the interview). Another line of research suggests that one does not even need to embrace an explicit bias against accented English or foreigners to exhibit such biased treatment. As happens with gender and racial biases, prejudiced perception might be a result of implicit bias. Pantos and Perkins (2012) measured explicit and implicit attitudes of graduate and undergraduate students in the United States towards the U.S. accent and foreign accents using the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al. 1998) and self-reports. Unsurprisingly, explicit and implicit attitudes to accented speech diverged: while participants reported a pro-foreign attitude, their implicit attitude favored the U.S. accent.

It is important to mention that accent is not necessarily correlated with a deficient command of the language. Accent is importantly different from language competence and fluency. Speaking with a non-native accent might simply consist of keeping the phonology (including intonation) of one’s native language while having a perfect command of the second language (Giles 1970). This raises a question of how justified “accent penalties” are for otherwise proficient speakers.

A number of studies make it evident that a non-negligible part of the problem stems from biased perception, rather than from direct communication impediments caused by accented speech. For example, Rubin and colleagues demonstrated that even when listeners wrongly believe that the speaker is a non-native, they start reporting hearing highly accented speech, and their listening comprehension drops significantly (Rubin 2002). Listeners’ attitudes to accented speech appear to play an important role. Lindemann (2002; reviewed in Lindemann 2011) measured attitudes of native-speaking U.S. college students towards Korean-accented English; the students were subsequently paired with Korean-accented speakers who had to communicate how to draw a route on a map without using gestures. Both the perception of the success of the communication and the success itself (measured by how accurately the native speaker listener drew the route on the map following the non-native speaker’s instructions) were influenced by native speakers’ attitudes towards their non-native partners. Participants with positive attitudes were more likely to succeed on the task than participants with negative attitudes, even though both groups received instructions from the same Korean-accented speakers. Most strikingly, even though most of the participants with negative attitudes did succeed on the task, none of them rated the communication as successful. Clearly something in common is going on in all of these cases: it is not the accent causing trouble, but the participants’ beliefs about it.

Going back to our initial scenario, of course people in the audience at the philosophy conference who chose to “tune out” and/or judged the non-native speaker presenter as incompetent might have been responding to the presenter’s lack of communicative skills, rather than their accent. Although this is definitely a possibility, the research reviewed above suggests that instead of assuming that the audience had good reasons for their judgment, it could be illuminating to consider the possibility that they might have done so due to (possibly implicit) bias against non-native speech.

The prejudiced perception of non-native speakers has many real consequences. Documented disadvantages range from discrimination in employment (in the form of lower earnings (Davila, Bohara, and Saenz 1993) and lower-status positions (Bradac and Wisegarver 1984)), to discrimination in housing (Zhao, Ondrich, and Yinger 2006). Frumkin (2007) suggests that non-native accent
could even deflate credibility granted to eyewitnesses (see Gluszek and Dovidio 2010 for a review). What could biased perception be doing to non-native philosophers?

2. ACCENT, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE

Accent is one of the first cues that listeners get about a speaker’s social identity. According to the Linguistic Stereotyping hypothesis (Bradac, Cargile, and Hallett 2001), accent carries information about the speaker that might activate stereotypes about non-native speakers in general (e.g., stereotypes about immigrants, see Lindemann 2003; Ryan 1983), or about a specific group the speaker is assumed to belong to (Giles, Williams, Mackie, and Rosselli 1995; Irvine and Gal 2000; Lindemann 2003; Nesdale and Rooney 1996), or both (Hosoda et al. 2007). For example, Hispanic-accented English may activate stereotypes associated with the Hispanic identity or with the very category of immigrants, or both.4

In contrast to clearly morally problematic practices of profiling speakers on the basis of race, ethnicity, sex, gender, sexual orientation, ability, or class, accent provides a surreptitious way to profile speakers that is generally seen as less morally problematic (Lippi-Green 1997). One illustration of this phenomenon can be found in jokes and comments about someone’s accent: in contrast to equivalent comments about, e.g., race, many accent-related comments are generally considered appropriate. But given the association between perceived accent and assumed social identity, accent perception is interestingly and problematically related to forms of injustice associated with social identity. Accent might be a mediator for some kinds of identity discrimination (e.g., discrimination based on immigration status, or on membership in other socially marked groups associated with certain accents or language styles). The negative perception of non-native speakers, in particular attributing to them deflated levels of credibility, sets the stage for a particular kind of injustice of special relevance to the philosophy profession, i.e., epistemic injustice.

Systematically attributing a deflated level of credibility to a speaker as a consequence of a prejudiced perception of his or her identity can be understood as a case of persistent testimonial injustice, a subcategory of epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007). Independently of the bad consequences this might have, it is wrong to systematically dismiss the strength of someone’s claims on the basis of their perceived social identity. The speaker (e.g., the non-native presenter in our example, or a non-native-speaking instructor teaching a class) is systematically granted insufficient credibility, and is excluded from the community of epistemic trust, that is, from the community of knowers and knowledge-providers.5 I rely on Miranda Fricker’s analysis of the harms of testimonial injustice, and specifically on her distinction between a primary and a secondary harm (ibid., chapter 2, section 2.3). Independently of the secondary harms that this exclusion might cause to the non-native speaker (e.g., reducing their chances to get a job given their perceived incompetence at an interview; increasing the chances of getting negative student evaluations due to the students’ impression of instructor’s lacking skills;6 and as a predictable consequence of the above, making them lose confidence in their intellectual abilities), a primary harm is the very harm of the non-native speaker being wronged in their capacity as a giver of knowledge. And this is bad enough, even if no other damage follows.

Being discarded on the grounds of being unable to transmit knowledge is bad in all domains, but perhaps especially bad in philosophy, where there’s no recourse to data from an experiment that could support the soundness of one’s reasoning. Compared to data-based disciplines, in philosophy the credibility of a speaker relies more strongly on how convincing they sound. If you are not granted a minimal starting level of credibility (if you are excluded from the very beginning from the community of bearers of philosophical knowledge), your intervention will likely sound less convincing than it would have been had you started from a higher position on the credibility scale. If we accept the results of the aforementioned research, perceived convincingness is positively correlated with perceived nativeness of speech. When a speaker can only rely on how convincing they sound, rather than on external resources lending credibility to their intervention, a non-native speaker has to work extra to make a contribution that would be seen as valuable.

There are other particularities of the philosophy discipline that amplify the effects of prejudiced perception of non-native speakers. In philosophy, language is not only a tool to analyze problems and a means of expression, as it is in other disciplines, neither is it just a platform to sell your ideas, as it happens in business. In philosophy, language is often the subject matter itself. It is reasonable to think that if the perceived quality of your work tracks, among other things, your perceived command of a language, a non-native-speaking philosopher working on language is under special scrutiny. The research showing that judgments about a speaker’s language proficiency are affected by listeners’ negative attitudes towards non-native accent and non-native speakers (Kang and Rubin 2009; Lindemann 2003) suggests this scrutiny might be an unfair extra demand due to bias against non-native accent, and not (always) the result of an unbiased evaluation of the speaker’s actual command of the language. In addition to the above, an eloquent expression of an argument or criticism is a sine qua non to be considered a good philosopher. If your accent or your command of English adds noise to your intervention and promotes prejudiced perception, your standing as a philosopher is jeopardized.

We might still resist the idea that a non-native accent is really what explains audience’s negative judgment about the (apparently incompetent) speaker in our example. Academics don’t care about other academics’ personal particularities, and look solely at their research and the quality of their ideas. However, when it comes to implicit biases, academics do not fare any better than non-academics (see, e.g., Steinpreis et al. 1999; Wenneras and Wold, 1997; Trix and Psenka 2003). Even though philosophers are trained in critical thinking, it does not prevent us from exhibiting sex/gender, race, ability, class, or nationality biases, to name
but a few, given that we also have ideologies, unconscious processes, and live in a society with strong schemas around sex/gender, race, ability, class, and nationality that guide our behavior and beliefs, not only at home but also at work. Philosophical practice is not at all free of the biggest evils of our society. Different kinds of discrimination abound in our departments, mostly unrecognized and often difficult to pin down. Thus, it seems we have good reasons to expect prejudiced perception of non-native speakers to be also present in the philosophical practice.

Complicating the story, philosophers who are non-native speakers of English are often affiliated with or received their B.A. or Ph.D. education in little-known schools. The fact that many of us are completely unfamiliar with these institutions might make us skeptical about their reputation. In the era of information, one might wonder, why haven’t I heard already about this school? Perhaps because there is nothing interesting to hear about, one might reason, relying on the recognition heuristic. Whether we are aware of it or not, we are likely to react to unknown institutions with caution, starting with a default approach of suspicion. As if, somehow, there is a burden on the philosopher associated with such an institution to prove that they are philosophically trustworthy, something we do not demand from a person affiliated with a well-known school or who received their education there. If, back in our example, the name tag of the presenter with an accent reads “Harvard,” our patience with the speaker’s accent will probably stretch, even if only a little bit, for the institution’s reputation functions as a warranty of competence and the promise that our time won’t be wasted. If, however, we read the name of some unknown university, our patience probably shrinks. Now we don’t have additional reasons to trust the speaker’s capacities and everything is left to the quality of their intervention, which, if I am right, is distorted by our perception of their accent. Now the standard is higher: it must be a superb intervention to override the effects of their accent and suspicious affiliation. In spite of knowing that competent philosophers are everywhere, not only in a few well-known institutions, we fall victims to the “big name” effect.7 It is, therefore, difficult to distinguish between the effects of association with foreign, small, or unknown institutions, and the effects of perceived non-native accent, for our doubts about the capacities of non-native philosophers might go hand in hand, at least sometimes, with our doubts about their (past or current) schools’ reputation. These effects might reinforce each other, or alleviate one another. Even when the big name effect boosts a philosopher’s perceived competence, the non-native effect can still play a role, perhaps weakening the perceived competence brought about by their affiliation, or even cancelling it out.

So far I have only considered spoken English and perceived non-nativeness via detection of an accent. But it seems reasonable to think that when a philosopher’s written English reveals their non-native condition (not only due to grammatical mistakes, but also, and more importantly, to a unique or peculiar use of words, or lack of idiomatic expressions), the quality of their philosophical work might be undervalued by referees and editors, and by job and grant committee members. Written work appears to be even more susceptible to unfair judgment of quality, compared to spoken interventions, for when a written text somehow violates the expectations of the reader (due to some peculiar use of a verb or adjective, for example, or to some unusual grammatical structure), the likely immediate reaction is to become suspicious of its content. In a conversation, we can still ask the speaker or use cues other than the spoken words themselves to alleviate the feeling of uncertainty and suspiciousness. In a written text, however, there is no chance for clarification or compensation of that initial impression. And again, philosophy is especially vulnerable to these effects, given the role that clarity plays in our standards of what good philosophy is. If wording of a philosophical text raises doubts, it is likely going to be attributed to the low content quality and the author’s lack of philosophical competence. As we explain in more detail below, clarity demands by themselves should not, however, result in any disadvantage for non-native speakers.

3. DO WE HAVE A NON-NATIVE SPEAKER PROBLEM IN PHILOSOPHY?

Whether or not we accept that non-native speakers are perceived in prejudiced ways in our profession, there are good reasons to look into the question. Recent data on the most cited philosophers and works in the philosophical community show an imbalance that calls for an explanation. Given that there are more people in the world with English as a second language than native speakers of English, and given the reasonable hypothesis that this is also the case for the philosophical community, it is at least surprising to find out that, according to these data, philosophers who are non-native speakers comprise a very (very!) small minority among the most cited contemporary authors. In a blog entry titled “Analytic Philosophy and the English Language,” Gabriele Contessa reports counts based on Eric Schwitzgebel’s (2010) list: out of the top 100 authors most cited in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, only six philosophers are non-native speakers of English. We get similar numbers when we look at the most cited philosophy works. A list posted by Kieran Healy (2013), and also analyzed by Gabriele Contessa, shows that out of the 500 most cited works published between 1993 and 2013 in four of the top general philosophy journals (Philosophical Review, Journal of Philosophy, Noûs, and Mind), only 5.8 percent are authored by non-native speakers. What is going on here?

It seems possible to explain the aforementioned imbalance between native and non-native-speaking authors by appealing to writing style. It is needless to say that native language gives one more freedom and control over their written style. We are also likely to write in a more enchanting way when we write in our native language(s) (although we all know of a few remarkable cases of authors with exceptional style in a non-native language). And it makes sense to think that stylistic considerations play a big role in editors’ and referees’ decisions to reject or accept a paper for publication. Thus, it could be the case that non-native speakers, with their perhaps “less stylish” writing, get rejected more often, even when content-wise their written work is equally valuable to a text with a better style written by a native speaker. This could also be the case for
general readers’ perception of the work’s quality and their willingness to engage with it. Thus, stylistic considerations might explain why there is an underrepresentation of non-native speakers in the lists we mentioned above. If so, it is not clear that this should count as an unfair disadvantage (perhaps, rather, an unfortunate one).

I suspect, however, that there is something else, besides stylistic considerations, that contributes to this imbalance. The writing style (a property of the author) interacts with expectations of the reader. When these expectations are violated by idiosyncratic and peculiar ways of expression (a likely product of combining eloquence in one’s native language with doing all of one’s professional academic writing in English), the reader can be taken aback. What could be taken as a virtue in a work of literature may interfere with the perceived flow of a philosophical text. Importantly, for this to happen we don’t even have to assume any prejudice on the part of the reader; mere unfamiliarity with the style and low predictability of the text can do the job. In this case, it is worth wondering if this should count as a morally relevant disadvantage for non-native speakers, and as demanding adjustment from both parties.

It is important to acknowledge that in the absence of data on how many non-native speakers actually submit works to those journals, we can’t make any strong claims about the origins of imbalance. But even if the relative rates of acceptance did not differ for native versus non-native speakers, the fact of underrepresentation of non-natives would still call for an explanation. It may help to draw a parallel with other cases of underrepresentation, for example, of women in science and technology careers, or, even closer to home, in the philosophy profession. Most would agree that low numbers of women applying for graduate degrees in these disciplines do not straightforwardly reflect women’s preferences and/or skills. Factors like a lack of encouragement and support, implicit bias, stereotype threat, and structural constrains limiting women’s choices throughout their lives play a big role and explain much of the underrepresentation we observe (see Antony 2012). Similarly, given the research on existing prejudices and discrimination against non-native speakers, we can, and should, consider the possibility that the non-native speaker condition might be a dimension of discrimination.

In thinking about all this, at some point we arrive at the question of whether or not English is the appropriate, or an appropriate language to do philosophy. Or a more modest and interesting question: In which ways is the kind of philosophy we do (in English) constrained in unrecognized ways by the English language? I am not saying that it is necessarily bad if most of our philosophy were specific to the English language. I do want to say that it is bad if that were the case and we don’t recognize it, for then many of us are doing bad philosophy (i.e., many of us would be doing English-constrained philosophy that aspires to be universal).

It is true that when we do philosophy, our arguments often rely on our intuitions about expressions in English, i.e., whether or not an expression is widely used, whether it sounds awkward, whether it makes sense or not to say something in one way or another. It could be the case that when analyzing a concept, both as individual philosophers and as a community, we are not tackling the (universal) concept itself but how that concept behaves in English. Thus, our conclusions about the concept are importantly restricted to the English language, in a way that we might not recognize. Contessa offers an example suggesting that treatment of knowledge-how as a form of knowledge-that might be a result of such English-constrained reasoning. In languages that descend from Latin, such as Spanish or Italian, there are two different lineages of words for the concept of knowledge (coming from the Latin “sapere” and “cognoscere”), and only one of them is used to express knowledge-how. Thus, native speakers of Spanish or Italian could propose a different relationship between knowledge-how and knowledge-that which may or may not map well on the Anglophone’s treatment. Other linguistic differences potentially relevant for philosophical diversity abound: the distinction between Spanish “ser” (used with permanent properties) and “estar” (used with temporary properties) collapses in English into “to be” that features prominently in a wide range of philosophical discussions of object properties (and in Portuguese there is still a third option, “ficar,” that also gets translated as “to be”). Whenever we refer to naturally or unnaturally sounding statements in support of our philosophical claims, we either must assume universality of such judgments, or we may need to admit that we are talking about “naturalness for English-speaking philosophers” and restrict our claims accordingly. From the existence of these differences it does not follow that the philosophy we are doing, discussing, and publishing in English is necessarily constrained to the English language and fails to be universal (e.g., making accurate translations and testing our English-shaped intuitions against intuitions shaped by other languages should bridge the gap and solve the problem). It does follow, however, that we should be aware of the possibility.

Another interesting question that would be worth exploring is how these differences among languages affect the kind of philosophy that non-native speakers do. It is true that many non-native philosophers not only discuss their work in English and publish in English but probably, depending on different contextual factors, also think in English. But likely for many it was not like that from the very beginning. If you are a non-native speaker of English, at some point in your career you stop reading translations into your native language and discussing philosophical arguments in your native language, and start reading English texts, attending philosophical events in English and writing, and discussing in English. I wonder if in adopting English as the language of their philosophical practice, non-native philosophers leave behind some intuitions and ways of reasoning that were perhaps shaped by their native language, and adopt new ones. And if so, are these new ways a blueprint of other native speakers’ intuitions and reasoning styles, or a hybrid of their previous native language-shaped ways and the new English-shaped ones? It seems that the market of philosophical ideas can only benefit from a variety of reasoning styles. Even if we do not accept the strong claim that different languages carry with them different
conceptual schemas that carve the world at different joints, we can still hold that our intuitions about how much sense an expression in English makes or how to understand a particular English sentence might be nevertheless affected by the languages we speak, and in particular by whether or not English is our native language. For example, a native speaker of English may have different intuitions about appropriateness of providing both teleological and mechanistic explanations in response to the “why”-question compared to a native-speaker of Spanish accustomed to selecting among different explanation-requests, “¿Para qué” (for what) and “¿Por qué” (due to what).

If it is the case that different languages bring with them a broad variety of intuitions that can serve as analytical tools in our philosophical work, then non-native philosophers could enrich philosophy. This cannot happen if, however, non-native philosophers, for whatever reason, have little or no influence in the philosophical practice.

Finally, we can ask: When we do philosophy in English, is linguistic competence a part of philosophical competence, or, rather, a prerequisite for expressing philosophical competence? Perhaps from the standpoint of some native speakers, it is the former. That is, you cannot be a good philosopher if you cannot communicate your ideas in a clear way, and clarity in communication requires linguistic competence. This alone does not have to create a problem for non-native speakers. As we already mentioned, accent does not necessarily conflict with clarity, and it is not a reliable indicator of poor linguistic competence. What can be problematic is how much weight is tacitly given to accent in our judgments of a speaker’s linguistic competence and fluency, and how much accent and other linguistic peculiarities proper of non-native speakers authors distort, via explicit or implicit negative attitudes towards accented English, listeners’ comprehension (or their impression of comprehension, as Lindemann’s (2002) results suggest). If readers’ and listeners’ expectations are tailored to a standard English language and violations of those expectations lead to negative judgments of a speaker’s clarity and linguistic competence (even though those violations wouldn’t conflict with clarity in case of an ideal unbiased audience on the receiving end), then we must accept that the measure of what a good philosopher is has a strong bias against many people, not only with a foreign accent but also with other non-foreign accents and styles (e.g., regional accents).

Another question to raise about this belief (i.e., that linguistic competence is part of philosophical competence) has to do with its origin. Is it postulated a priori? Or is it a conclusion based on generalization of one’s interactions with non-native speakers who didn’t cause a good impression? Could this impression be a result of prejudiced perception? If so, perhaps we need to reconsider our opinion about the role of linguistic competence.

4. CONCLUSION AND PRELIMINARY PROPOSAL FOR ACTION

If, as suggested by the results in Huang et al. (2013), in the business sphere non-native entrepreneurs hit a glass ceiling because their ideas receive less financial support and they are less likely to be promoted to executive levels than native competitors, could non-native philosophers be facing similar barriers in their profession?

There are good reasons (and some supporting research) to think that philosophers who are non-native speakers of English might be subject to some kind of testimonial injustice, both in their spoken and written contributions. There is also data suggesting that they are underrepresented in the main publications. If a philosopher’s philosophical competence and actual philosophical influence (measured by citation rates but also in a more general sense, by engagement of others with their work) is undermined by their perceived status as a non-native speaker, we can say that together with other kinds of discrimination (like the ones related to sex/gender and race/ethnicity) there is a non-native speaker problem corrupting much of our philosophical practice (at least in those philosophical communities in which English is nowadays the main language to do philosophy). The non-native speaker problem results in a community of practitioners that excludes several groups of people, including non-native speakers. This vice is not only bad for those who are excluded, but also for the philosophical enterprise itself, for we are excluding many voices from the pool of contributions that count as worth engaging and discussing, and this impoverishes the range and variety of considered ideas.

Discrimination based on accent is difficult to resist and fight, in part due to a lack of public awareness, and in no less part due to a lack of institutional and legal tools to fight it. In the United States, for example, even though the law prohibits discrimination based on national origin, it does not say anything about accent, which often leaves victims of this kind of discrimination helpless in proving their case (Matsuda 1991; Nguyen 1993; Lippi-Green 1994). Recognizing the “accent dimension” as a dimension of discrimination at the institutional level (different from, although intersecting with dimensions of ethnicity, race, sex, gender, ability, class, sexual orientation, and age) will help improve our personal and professional good practices.

Acknowledging the “non-native condition” problem should motivate us philosophers to seek ways to improve the situation. I emphasize improvement as opposed to either seeking who or what to blame, or establishing a discrimination hierarchy. There is no benefit for anyone if we get stuck in victimizing or playing the “Oppression Olympics.” Although writing and presenting your work in a non-native language is often expensive in several senses (e.g., it takes longer to write, you need to ask natives for proof-reading, etc.), that would not by itself mean that the profession has a problem. The fact that professional philosophy excludes different groups of people constitutes the problem, and we should do something about it.

I propose, as part of the list of good practices for our profession, that we welcome exposure to foreign-accented speech (which will increase our capacity to quickly adapt to non-native philosophers speaking at conferences and in classrooms; Sidaras, Alexander, and Nygaard 2009), and maintain acute awareness of potential perception biases.
when we judge quality of work that reveals non-native use of language. The very first step towards developing good practices is to raise awareness about the "non-native condition" in philosophy. This piece is my own attempt to do just that, with the goal of improving not only diversity in the profession but also the quality of the philosophy we do.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to Nadya Vasilieva for discussions and insightful comments on earlier drafts of this work. I am also grateful to an anonymous referee for their helpful suggestions.

NOTES

1. Here I focus on the philosophical community that nowadays mostly works in English, as opposed to those that mostly work in other languages such as German, French, Chinese or others.


3. In Steinpreis, Anders, and Ritzke ("The Impact of Gender on the Review of the Curricula Vitae of Job Applicants," Sex Roles 41 [1999]: 509–28), participants (academic psychologists) were asked to evaluate a curriculum vitae of a fictitious job applicant and decide whether they would hire the candidate. The CVs were identical with the exception of the applicant’s name: it was either a name typically given to men or to women. This manipulation of participants’ beliefs about the gender of the applicant revealed a clear gender bias: the evaluations of applicants’ teaching, research, and service record were higher for men than women with identical records. Men were also more likely to get hired than women (when the CV was an average of an applicant in the field).

4. And according to the Reverse Linguistic Stereotyping hypothesis (Kebabjian and Rubin, "Reverse Linguistic Stereotyping: Measuring the Effect of Listener Expectations on Speech Evaluation," Journal of Language and Social Psychology 28, no. 4 [2009]: 441–56), the identification of a speaker as a member of a group can distort listeners' perceptions of speaker's speech style and language proficiency. For example, categorizing a speaker as an immigrant or foreigner, or as a member of a more specific group (e.g., of Hispanic origin), might in turn distort perception of their speech. The studies reviewed in section one provide support for these claims.

5. Miranda Fricker already pointed out the possibility of non-native speakers being subjected to testimonial injustice. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford University Press, 2007), 17.


7. The reputation of these well-known schools is in general justified, but it is also often boosted for no good reason, by the mere functioning of the recognition heuristic we apply every time we think of institutions. The more we ignore and refuse to use and remember the names of foreign or small universities, the more weight we give to the few big-name schools, and the less likely other universities are to join the group of recognizable names.

8. This violation of readers’ and listeners’ expectations due to a peculiar usage of language is not necessarily something bad. Quite the opposite, it can on occasion be a source of literary pleasure, the pleasure of discovering richness of expression in new combinations of words. In the context of professional philosophy, however, these potentially enriching peculiar usages can be interpreted as interfering with content.

9. Depending on the kind of philosophy you do, there is a higher or lesser pressure to transfer to the English language (e.g., if you want to publish, to be accepted into conferences, to have your work discussed). I am particularly concerned with the philosophical community working in English, in which the pressure is pretty high.

10. How problematic this might be depends, of course, on what we mean by "in a clear way," it is problematic if we require native accent as a requisite for clarity.


12. In addition to existing awareness-raising resources, such as the new blog "What Is It Like To Be a Foreigner in Academia?" (https://beingaforeignerinacademia.wordpress.com) and Gabriele Contessa’s online report.

REFERENCES


Specters of Violence

Megan M. Burke
UNIVERSITY OF OREGON

In Lynn Phillips’s book, Flirting With Danger, published in 2000, Andrea, a twenty-year-old, mixed race woman says the following:

I remember it was really scary, like you hear about these scary old perverts hiding in the bushes who leap out and abduct little girls. We were too young to know about the sexual stuff, but we knew something really awful could happen to little girls like us. So we used to make up these scary stories, sort of like ghost stories, about these crazy-looking guys in trench coats with peg-legs or eye-patches who would steal little girls and kill them or something. We’d all get really scared, and then we’d laugh at each other for being scared, and then we’d tell another story. In a way, it was kind of way of letting off steam, I guess, because I know we were all really scared.¹

What does it mean for Andrea to refer to these stories about rape as ghost stories? How is the ghost an appropriate figure for understanding how sexual violence operates in the daily lives of girls and women? By taking seriously the affective and disciplinary dimensions of ghosts, which I understand to be haunting, I here consider how the relationship between freedom and feminine existence is haunted by sexual violence. Whereas Andrea’s use of ghost stories is a way to cope with sexual violence, I want to draw attention to what is suggested by this narrative practice more generally about how women and girls are ordinarily terrified by the possibility or threat of rape, and what this does to their lived experience of freedom. To understand such ordinary terror as a haunting is, following Jacques Derrida, to address how rape is often a present absence, a temporality marked by its contradiction of being here and also invisible, that is constitutive of the present lived experience of feminine subjectivity. To be haunted by the possibility of sexual violence is, in part, what makes one a woman. The way rape lurks in the background of our present moments and spatial possibilities is central to the meaning of being a woman. It produces the actuality of a subjectivity that lives alongside physical and ontological injury. I call this reality of sexual violence in women’s and girls’ lives spectral violence because of the way it frequents and organizes our subjective actualities and disrupts our freedom while, as Andrea shows us, holding the status of a specter to come. It is simultaneously here and not here as not yet. And for those whom the specter has manifested as an already, it is a terror that is forever lurking.

Feminist scholars have documented the centrality of rape in the production and experience of femininity and the feminine body.² Many of these analyses argue that feminine bodily habits are acquired and anchored into the subjective life of women from such a young age that we understand and accept our bodies as endangered by or vulnerable to sexual violence. Here, I expand on these accounts of the relationship between rape and femininity, affirming that the threat of rape is a central mechanism in the production of feminine existence. But whereas many of the existing discussions take up or at least lend themselves nicely to a spatial phenomenon of feminine existence and sexual violence by focusing on the effects of the threat of rape to bodily comportment or one’s capacity to move in the world, I want instead to focus on how sexual violence temporally constrains configurations of gender and women’s experience of freedom. To do so, I suggest that the threat of rape is efficacious as a disciplinary force of gender subordination because of its temporal structure, spectrality. From Derrida we learn that the productive effect of a specter is a result of its present absence, and it is this temporality that I pay careful attention to here. Such spectrality confines the present and future actuality of feminine existence through its haunting. Given that the notion of femininity ordinarily conjures up a meaning solely related to a certain kind of gender presentation, here I use the notions of feminine existence and feminine subjectivity to demarcate not simply feminine women, but to frame a subjectivity marked by its difference from a masculine, autonomous one. Although there is an important and oppressive relationship between femininity as ordinarily understood and feminine subjectivity, which is central to my account throughout this project, one need not appear feminine as traditionally conceived by racialized, cisgender heteronormative standards in order for feminine subjectivity to actualize. This is central to understanding how the specter of rape produces feminine existence for different kinds of women and girls, albeit in different ways. I acknowledge that transgender women and cisgender and trans*women of color are subject to a frequency of rape that white cisgender women are not. I consider rape for all kinds of women, as spectral violence, to be a normalization of terror, which may be more brutal for some, that lingers between visibility and invisibility, presence and absence. Accordingly, sexual violence remains temporally intimate insofar as it is proximal to the production and lived experience of feminine subjectivity, but it is, at the same time, spectral because it is ordinarily hidden from the lived present of gendered life.

Importantly, when we take seriously Andrea’s ghost stories as stories, we understand that it is produced through social, cultural, and historical stories and myths about rape. This means that Andrea and her friends are not willy-nilly making up stories of rape, but are prereflectively drawing on other narratives about rape. Accordingly, there are other ghosts that dis-appear in this lived present of the specter of rape, namely, the specters of racism, more specifically the lecherous black man and the hypersexualized, inviolable black woman, genocidal specters of colonial conquest, and, as Andrea suggests, even specters of dysmorphic bodies. Such a family of ghosts suggests the specter of rape keeps deadly company that is integral to the efficacy of the specter of rape in its production of femininity.

Although sexual violence is a productive force in organizing and fixing the lived present, it also actualizes relationships to the past and future. In The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir suggests that becoming a woman is characterized by particular experiences of the past, present, and future.
For her, what makes one a woman is a social, economic, and political situation that produces the impossibility for transcendence. In Beauvoir’s account, the economy and experience of heterosexual pleasure and women’s sexual initiation is founded upon a severing of the past and a foreclosure of the future. Feminine subjectivity is thus what Beauvoir calls an eternal present. However, critiques of gender as racialized demand that we take seriously how temporality actualizes differently for women of color. For example, Maria Lugones’s critique of gender as a product of coloniality suggests, I think, that the colonial sexual conquest of black women places them as anterior to categorization as human and thus to gender. This colonial difference produced through gender also institutes dimorphic and dichotomous conceptions of sex and gender, thereby making the exclusion of trans*, intersex, and gender non-conforming individuals and cisgender privilege a part of the colonial legacy. What this means about Beauvoir’s account of feminine subjectivity as an eternal present is that Beauvoir’s account addresses the temporal structure of white womanhood as confined to the present. Such a colonial difference means that rape as spectral violence does not produce the same lived present for all women, though it does not negate the reality that it functions as a means of subordination.

Such spectrality is also, however, at work in the maintenance of normative configurations of gender. In Bodies that Matter, Judith Butler brings attention to the significance of spectrality to the constitution of gender subjectivity. For Butler, abject, unlivable bodies come to haunt the domain of intelligible genders. These specters become the constitutive outside, which are really interior to, the domain of intelligible and, therefore, for Butler, heteronormative configurations of gender. C. J. Pascoe concretizes Butler’s notion of the specter in the critical account of masculinity in Dude, You’re a Fag. Pascoe accounts for the use of fag as a gendered insult that disciplines boys into masculinity. Fag is deployed in such a way that boys police their behaviors so as to resist the permanent adherence of fag identity. To me, what is most interesting about Pascoe’s account of the specter of the fag is not that it confirms Butler’s insight about the work of specters in the production of normative genders, although it does this, but that the specter of the fag works because the specter serves as both a threat and reality of violence in order to produce heteronormative or successful masculinity. What it means to live as a fag—to be subject to ontological and physical humiliation, shame, and nonexistence—makes successful masculinity a requisite for social intelligibility. Successful masculinity is haunted by the possibility of its impossibility—the fag—such that it is in the repudiation of the specter, as Pascoe shows, that masculinity is achieved. This suggests that masculinity, like femininity, is also organized and reified, though in a different way, through spectral violence.

Therefore, in addition to accounting for rape as a specter of femininity, it is necessary to keep in mind how spectral violence comes to generate, symbolically and physically, the (hetero)normative binary configuration of gender. In pointing this out, I do not mean to reify sexualized violence or power as gender itself, and I am not suggesting that sexual violence is the only specter of gender, but I am suggesting that such violence plays an integral role in the sedimentation of the present presence of racialized hetero-genders. Accordingly, my discussion is situated at the boundaries of feminist phenomenology and feminist poststructuralism in order to think through how disciplinary power is lived at the “level” of the individual. I take this as an extension of the previous claims made by feminist scholars about the productive force of violence in gendered life. Before I account for the specter of rape, I will first elaborate on what specters do by turning to Derrida, Gayatri Spivak, Butler, and Pascoe. Then I return to Andrea’s provocation of rape as a ghost story. Lastly, after suggesting that spectral violence confines gendered life, I briefly discuss the limits and challenges that exist in relation to taking up and producing alternative experiences of gender and subjectivity as a result of such confinement.

SPECTERS AND THE GENDERED SUBJECT

In Specters of Marx, Derrida suggests the present is always haunted by a non-present presence or a present absence. He offers up the notion of hauntology, as a play on and deconstruction of ontology, to suggest that being is somehow a haunted state. From Derrida, we learn that a specter, a present absence, is constitutive of a present presence. This rejection of the certainty of the ontological foundation of the present of being suggests that what is here is never a pure presence. Hauntology claims that what is here is a product of what is beyond. “A specter is both visible and invisible, both phenomenal and nonphenomenal: a trace that marks the present with its absence in advance.” There are thus certain others who are beyond being. These ghosts or specters haunt the being-there (Dasein) of human life, but they do so, Derrida tells us, as visible invisibles. He writes,

“There is no Dasein of the specter, but there is no Dasein without the uncanniness, without the strange familiarity (Unheimlichkeit) of some specter . . . . The specter, as its name indicates, is the frequency of a certain visibility. But the visibility of the invisible. And visibility, by its essence, is not seen, which is why it remains epekeina tes osias, beyond the phenomenon or beyond being.”

Specters are thus otherworldly because they are beyond being and the present. They are not here, but they are also not absent. This is why Derrida suggests that specters are untimely. They are not now; they are to come. As such, specters haunt where “To haunt does not mean to be present.” A specter is thus what lurks in the periphery of the perceived and felt present. It is what one thinks one sees or even what one feels observed by, thereby affectively structuring the now.

Although, for Derrida, a specter threatens the present with its potential arrival, thereby making vulnerable the very present it haunts, in its exclusion as not being-there, being-there comes to life. As simultaneously beyond and a part of the present, a specter lurks in the shadows of time to make possible what is present. Importantly, this means specters have material effects. They are productive in their invisible visibility insofar as being haunted institutes the reality or present we live. Our lives are ghost stories; we
and our present moments are generated by what lurks in the shadows of the present.

To concretize this claim, let us consider one of the most frightening ghost stories of our time. D. W. Griffith’s film adaption of Thomas Dixon’s The Clansman: An Historical Romance of the Ku Klux Klan, The Birth of a Nation. The film exemplifies the specter of (sexualized) racism that haunts our present. Its representation of black men as rapists as a way to justify the white terrorism of the Ku Klux Klan, interestingly represented as visible ghosts in the film, is telling of a founding but ordinarily invisible violence in the production of America and American identity. Moreover, the ghost story of the rapeability of white women at the hands of lecherous black men, which, as I will discuss shortly, obscures the current reality of sexual violence, is generative of normative femininity as white and productive of the myth of heroic white masculinity. This, of course, is all performed by the white actors in the film drawing our attention to the specter of white supremacist myth-making in the production of the racist American imaginary. The presence of this story, however, in the film draws our attention to another important layer of spectrality: the absence of black women. Our collective consciousness is haunted by its inability to see the harm of their absence.

Gayatri Spivak offers an important critique of Derrida’s conception of haunting in this regard. For Spivak, Derrida presents a how-to-mourn-your-father book in his analysis of the haunting of communism. “Woman is nowhere,” she writes.9 Spivak demands that we take seriously how even Derrida’s critique of ontology is always already haunted by its exclusion of women. But it is not just any women who bear the burden of this exclusion. Insofar as the subaltern woman is largely responsible for the production and maintenance of global capitalism, her invisibility in Derrida’s discussion of the specters of communism dislocates her from time. She is neither a present presence nor a present absence. Thus, as a response and challenge to the limit of Derrida’s conception of haunting, Spivak urges us to consider the constitutive place of subaltern women as an absence in the present absence of the present presence. Not only does this mean that Derrida’s emphasis on one ghost is inadequate but it also suggests that women of color are always subject to a deep reality of invisibility. More generally, this underscores that some bodies are farther removed visibly than others and that is generates by a multiplicity of what is beyond.

I am interested in what this productive haunting of the specter shows us about Butler’s claim about intelligible genders and the constitution of subjectivity. Butler suggests “that bodies only appear, only endure, only live within the productive constraints of certain highly gendered regulatory schemas.”10 What is important for Butler is that these regulatory schemas of gender produce a domain of intelligible genders through a domain that is beyond, that is abject. For Butler, this abject domain is the excluded and illegible domain that haunts the intelligible domain of gender as the limit of its possibility. That is, the abject domain is the specter of the impossibility of intelligible genders. The domain of intelligible genders, what is here, is haunted by and thus constituted through the specter of the abject or the domain of the unlivable. This point makes evident Butler’s Foucaultian conception of the subject as an effect of operations and institutions of power. More specifically, Butler understands gendered subjects to materialize as effects a heteronormative matrix of power. She thus uses the notion of the specters of the abject to account for gender intelligibility as an effect of a violent exclusion, which institutes a contingent construction of the meaning of gender. But as spectral, the abject also points to the non-present presence that produces the domain of the thinkable, livable, visible, gendered subjects. Constructed and materialized in this way, gender comes to distort and conceal not only its own production but also the reality of other possible or even actual configurations of gendered life. For this reason, gender comes to be understood in relationship to a heteronormative schema that is generated through spectrality. An integral part of the heteronormative matrix of gender is that it relies on the invisibility of its exclusions. This means that it is because of what is beyond and out of sight that we see and take up what is here and now. At the same time, the presence of the specters of the abject as productive of intelligible genders also haunts the stability of the regime of heterosexual genders, which is why, in seemingly Derridean manner, Butler finds the excluded domain to be a realm of subversive possibility.11

Most often, Butler refers to the specter of the abject as the constitutive outside or the constitutive constraint of the construction of normative gender that is truly inside of the hegemony of livable genders. The specter of abjection is not, however, a mere conceptual apparatus from which Butler makes a claim about gender intelligibility.12 Rather, it is evident that the specters are beings and bodies whom are beyond the being-thereness of subjectivity. They are a non-present presence that is a dreaded domain of identification. Somewhere between life and death, the abject is the “densely populated” realm of social life replete with bodies that are excluded from the status of the subject thereby living unlivability, which is necessary to the livability of recognizable gender subjectivity. It is the normative force of this exclusion that produces violence by erasure of what is beyond and unacceptable to the present presence. That is, gendered subjects appear as here only by repudiating what is not here. Hence, the threat of the specter is that it can disrupt the normative schema of gender. It haunts and lurks in the shadows of life, threatening what becomes a present presence. Because of this, those who occupy the domain of the abject are continuously excluded, erased, and pushed closer to non-existence.

Pascoe’s research on adolescent masculinity at River High, an American high school in California, is demonstrative of the reality and weight of a racialized specter in the concrete production of normative masculinity. What Pascoe unearthed in the production of adolescent masculinity at River High is the disciplinary mechanism of fag discourse. Fag talk and imitations are a practice of gender that deploys spectrality, namely, the specter of the fag, as a means of instituting and regulating the schema of acceptable and therefore intelligible masculinity. Fag, Pascoe shows, is the possibility of emasculation, of taking away one’s intelligibility. Importantly, the use of fag as a gendered epithet is efficacious because it calls up the reality of
the fag’s existence as beyond masculine subjectivity. As Pascoe notes, “the fag discourse functioned as a constant reiteration of the fag’s existence, affirming that the fag was out there, boys reminded themselves and each other that at any moment they could become fags if they were not sufficiently masculine.”13 The fag is thus the means by which the boys understood, in some way, the possibility of their own impossibility. Forcing a boy into the fag position is a way to challenge or even repudiate his status as a subject through his feminization. Given the hypersexualization of African American men in the United States, fag often transmuted into white, as a stand in for the feminization of a boy’s existence. It is this practice of feminization that produces the threat of impossibility or non-presence.

Pascoe draws attention to the specter as a populated zone of social life in her discussion of one student, Ricky, who is the fag not only because of his sexuality but also as a result of his non-normative gender identification and presentation. For Ricky, existing as the fag, rather than alongside the threat of becoming a fag, made his life at River High unlivable. The specter of the fag serves as an implied threat of non-existence, but existing as the fag creates a reality of non-existence such that as the embodiment of the fag, Ricky understood his life as structured by the reality of violence. Whereas those inside the domain of intelligible masculinity lived the threat of violence through the specter, Ricky lived the reality of the violence. He is that which is beyond subjectivity and, consequently, his life is always at risk. Ricky shows us that to embody the specter means to live in a paradoxically unlivable way.

What we gain from these accounts of spectrality is an understanding of the material and existential effects of ghosts in the production of the present of subjectivity and gender. Specters lurk all around us. They are the invisible visibles that produce what we perceive and experience as now, and acknowledging this generative quality of specters shows us that what is, is in reality, obscure. There is thus an opacity in our perceptual faith in and lived experience of the present. Moreover, we understand the disciplinary mechanism of the specter as the threat of non-existence. Existence relies on the repudiation of what troubles it, that is, existence relies on the erasure of the specter. There are also, as Pascoe and Butler suggest, living ghosts of the abject who live the harm of their present absence insofar as heteronormative gender intelligibility relies on erasure. Becoming the fag, like Ricky, meant the subjection to and not just the potential of physical and ontological violence. At the same time, becoming spectral, as Spivak shows of subaltern women, makes opaque the injury of colonial violence.

SPECTRAL VIOLENCE AND FEMININE SUBJECITY

In this section I think through Andrea’s ghost stories of rape by considering what it discloses about the relationship between the ambiguity of feminine subjectivity and rape as spectral violence. Feminist scholars have most often articulated the relationship between rape and feminine existence as an existential fear. For instance, in “Rape: The All-American Crime, Susan Griffin writes, “I have never been free of the fear of rape. From a very early age I, like most women, have thought of rape as part of my natural environment—something to be feared and prayed against like fire or lightning.”14 And in The Female Fear, Margaret Gordon and Stephanie Riger claim, “Most women experience fear of rape as a nagging, gnawing sense that something awful could happen, an angst that keeps them from doing things they want or need to do, or from doing them at the time or in the way they might otherwise do.”15 This idea of a female fear is often a sentiment shared by young women in my classrooms when talking about their experiences walking to their car or house at night while leaving a party, the library, or really, any other public space. They have a cell phone in one-hand and their keys ready-at-hand in the other, in attempt to fight and destroy the specter on their way to “safety,” which is, as statistics of sexual violence show, very often where the specter becomes real. The acknowledgement of this fear of rape is important to uncovering an affective dimension of femininity in a rape culture, but thinking, as Andrea invites us to do, of rape as a ghost helps underscore how rape haunts a woman’s sense of self as free. Taking seriously the hauntology of femininity allows us to make sense of the existential harm of rape culture and how rape culture is integral to the production of feminine subjectivity. Importantly, though, this female fear is often denied to transgender women. For instance, as Talia Mae Bettcher shows, trans* people, like Gwen Araujo, are understood as “deceivers,” which legitimizes transphobic violence and also serves to delegitimize the reality that trans* persons are survivors and victims of sexualized violence.16 Although rape haunts cisgender and transgender women differently, it still serves as a disciplinary mechanism of rendering ambiguous one’s claim to freedom. Understood spectrally, sexual violence is the invisible-visible that lurks around and disrupts a woman’s experience of her self as a free subject, thereby producing feminine existence as an ambiguous freedom and constraining what one’s life can become.

Thus, in what follows, I consider how rape is a specter that haunts women’s freedom, thereby operating as a disciplinary mechanism in the production of white, cisgender, heteronormative femininity and a lived experience of femininity as a project of existence coincident with an existential and physical burden of non-existence, and at the same time I understand this very production of feminine existence through the specter of rape to produce a double-burden of non-existence for transgender women and women of color because they are rarely, if ever, intelligible within the normative cultural framing of feminine subjectivity.

This ambiguity of feminine existence is what stands out in Beauvoir’s account of women’s situation in The Second Sex. For Beauvoir, human existence is characterized by its capacities for transcendence, the accomplishment of freedom through world-making activities, and the movement toward other freedoms, coincident with immanence or facticity. As she writes,

Every time transcendence lapses into immanence, there is a degradation of existence into ‘in-itself,’ of freedom into facticity . . . if this fall is inflicted
on the subject, it takes the form of frustration and oppression . . . what singularly defines the situation of woman is that being, like all humans, an autonomous freedom, she discovers and chooses herself in a world where men force her to assume herself as Other: an attempt made to freeze her as an object and doom her to immanence. 17

More concretely, this means existing in the world with no power to control it and instead developing capacities to date on ourselves as objects of beauty and male desire, to routinely engage in repetitive, uncreative labor, and so forth. What we can learn by reading Beauvoir is that women’s relegation to immanence is instituted and sustained through an invisible perversion of our transcendent capacities. That is, its material history and the sedimentation of women’s subordination in social and personal life operate as invisible visibles in order to efficaciously reproduce and naturalize our relegation to immanence and institute our ambiguous relationship to freedom. My suggestion is that the spectrality of sexual violence is integral to, but not solely responsible for, this relegation and to the perversion of women’s existential freedom, and it actualizes a deeply embodied sensing of our own ambiguity. Moreover, understanding rape as spectral violence accounts for how the material reality and weight of rape in girl’s and women’s lives becomes an absence in the present, making it difficult to perceive the ubiquity of actual sexual violence against girls and women. It tunes us in to how the specter of rape obscures the reality of sexual violence—of how it happens and who its perpetrators and survivors are.

Such spectral violence is produced through a racialized schema of compulsory heterosexuality. Adrienne Rich understands compulsory heterosexuality to be a political institution that normalizes and naturalizes heterosexuality by disempowering women through its enforcement of male identification, a mechanism that gives men sexual access to women. 18 This sexual access is enforced by denying women the authority to define their sexuality, by physically controlling women, by forcing men to sexualize women, by making women exchange objects in men’s sexual transactions, and by controlling women’s reproductive capacities. As men’s sexual access to women is naturalized in such a political economy, the sexually submissive, controlled, object of exchange is constitutive of intelligible femininity in the institution of compulsory heterosexuality. I follow Rich’s account here not to suggest that women are mere sexual objects of exchange for men, but that they must negotiate, whether through some combination of assuming and resisting, taking up or pushing back against, the conception of feminine existence as a sexual object put forth by the schema of compulsory heterosexuality.

Lugones, however, demands that we take seriously how such sexual domination is a means to institute the heterosexist colonial/modern gender system that casts a colonial difference between white and colonized women and institutes binary notions of sex and gender through the deployment of sexual violence. From this commitment, it is insufficient to characterize gender as only hetero-sexualized insofar as its sexualization occurs through colonial racialization. Understanding the category of woman as a colonial product underscores the way in which white femininity, although still regulated and controlled through sexual submission, is instituted through the sexual exploitation of colonized women as inferior to white women. This is the same system that promulgates the ghost of the lecherous black man, making white femininity worth protecting, paradoxically through heterosexist submission, and black womanhood worth violating through racist heterosexism. This demonization of colonized men and women can be seen as a strategy of white men to maintain control over white women. Moreover, this system of gender facilitates the domination and exploitation of black individuals insofar as it excludes them from gender intelligibility. Gender thus materializes as white, as a dichotomous binary, and at the expense of other configurations of subjective life. Following Lugones, we understand that our contemporary system of gender is a product of colonial, racialized sexual violence such that it is essential to bear in mind the colonial ghosts haunting and producing the specter of rape.

Given the normalization of sexual violence in this colonial, heterosexist schema of gendered subjectivity, men and women come to accept sexual harassment, abuse, and rape as an inevitable part of girl’s and women’s sexual lives, and become naively complicit with the racist narrative about black men and women found in The Birth of a Nation. 19 Such inevitability is compounded by the frequent encouragement and embodiment of racialized compulsory heterosexuality by girls and women as a means of attaining self-determination and entitlement, making it a provocative instrument of existence that obscures the injury of feminine subjectivity through a supposed sense of empowerment. As one of Phillips’s interviewees says about media representations of femininity, “Even though they said in one place, ‘You can be self-reliable and strong and independent,’ they’d still have the articles about how love is great and how it’s all really about relationships and men.” 20

In this brief example, the dependency on men is what renders ambiguous the claim to women’s independence and also underscores the lurking ghost of heteronormative dependency to women’s autonomy and intelligibility. Moreover, understanding rape spectrally helps explain why our culture fails to take seriously the prosecution of white men as rapists and black women as survivors or transgender persons as survivors of rape by cisgender persons, while committing to the all too ready assumption that the man ready to jump out at you behind the bushes is black. This ghost story of the lurking, lecherous black man implicit in the specter of rape makes invisible the reality that rape is often committed at home, by a family member, a loved one, an acquaintance, by someone of the same gender, or that the survivor is not a (cisgender) woman. Accordingly, the gravity and material history of sexual violence in the lives of girls and women is often trivialized, rather than understood as a deleterious product of a socially and culturally enforced system of racialized and sexualized power. 21 Of course, as Butler reminds us, there are abject bodies that are exterior to femininity that contribute to its intelligibility, but the constitutive “outside” of feminine subjectivity is not only a realm of abjection; it is also the production of successful femininity through the specter of rape. This suggests that, though often coincident...
with it, spectrality is not reducible to social abjection. In my 
view, spectral racialized sexual violence is used to create 
and regulate the intelligibility of femininity such that the 
specter of rape is an ontologically heavy instrument in 
the hegemony of heterosexual genders, meaning that it 
structures dimensions of our gendered existence and our 
self-understanding of ourselves as gendered persons in 
profound ways.23

Feminist phenomenologists emphasize how the threat and 
fear of rape become lodged in the lived body, such that 
they are formative to the appearance of a feminine body. This 
is often why women who have not been raped embody 
the truths and values of a rape culture. In racialized feminine 
gestures, like sitting compactly, moving without extension 
and ease in space, and so forth, the lurking ghost of rape 
dis-appears as a generative character in the actualization of 
a feminine body.23 This is sustained, however, not simply 
through a fear of rape but also by the overwhelming 
cultural persuasion and existential temptation for girls and 
women to understand such embodiment as empowerment 
for its success in arousing male desire or attaining 
muscle protection. Phillips's account of young women's 
sexuality reveals this entanglement of powerlessness 
and empowerment or danger and pleasure in the lives 
of young women. The reality of their sexual violability is 
*not simply externally imposed on an unwilling woman 
by a dominating male presence. Indeed, young women's 
own sense of power and pleasure may be fueled by their 
ability (however tentative) to stare down . . . the (hetero) 
sex as female victimization discourses and instead, to flirt 
with danger.*24 From this perspective, one's lived situation 
as a potential rape victim or sexual object becomes a way 
to stake a claim to one's sexuality and to one's subjective 
experience. It actualizes one's sense of self as gendered. 
Taking up the narrative of a woman as sexually violable 
becomes pleasurable, empowering, and even desirable 
for many of Phillips's interviewees. It makes one intelligible 
and empowered as a woman. This is meant to underscore 
the paradoxical subjectivity of the ideal of feminine 
intelligibility created through the specter. Sexual violability 
is both dangerous and pleasurable. Accordingly, feminine 
embodiment is produced through a kind of potential non­ 
existence, which often becomes, paradoxically, a claim to 
gender intelligibility. This claim is not meant to suggest 
that the specter only produces and works through feminine 
women or girls. Perhaps its telos is to do so, but importantly 
the specter of rape lurks over the lives of non-conforming 
and transgender women and girls as what might police 
them into intelligible femininity or punish them for their 
very resistance to or lack of cooperation with normative 
genders. It also, as I discuss in more detail below, lurks 
over the lives of women of color for failing to conform 
to white standards of feminine subjectivity. But in each 
manifestation of the specter of rape, the specter terrorizes 
one's existence as a present presence through the threat 
of impossibility.

Ordinarily, though, this production of feminine bodily 
comportment and feminine subjectivity through spectral 
violence is not a present presence. It is its absence that 
constitutes the lived present of femininity such that its 
disappearance from apprehension is of necessity. Such 
temporality is a result of the logic of the specter. The 
spectrality of sexual violence, that it is, following Derrida, 
not now, but always an event to come, creates the 
condition in which feminine subjectivity is always a site of 
uncertain freedom and possible sexual violation. The trace 
of this present absence lurks on the edges of a woman's 
subjective life, allowing for the continual deferral of a 
woman's claim to autonomy. This claim underscores 
the degree to which feminine existence and even its resistance 
is a project that is undertaken in the present absence of 
rape. The failure of our ordinary perception to capture 
the invisible ubiquity of rape does not, then, mean actual 
sexual violence is not constitutive of the feminine subject, 
but instead gestures to the importance of the spectrality 
of sexual violence to its actualization. The important work 
of the specter is its continual disruption, as a haunting, to 
the actuality of feminine existence as freedom. Thus, the 
ontological and physical burden of femininity is not that 
it is purely an oppressed or sexually objectified present 
presence, but rather that it is always under surveillance 
and continual disruption by the haunting of the specter of 
sexual violence. Feminists have long suggested that there 
is an inherent injury to women's sexual objectification, but 
my claim is that the deeper concern is the specter that 
lurks behind that objectification. This allows us to make 
sense of the trouble of rape culture, particularly in a world 
in which it appears as if women and girls have access to 
that which they have previously been denied. Take, for 
instance, the paradoxical prevalence and invisibility of rape 
on college campuses. In this case, the injustice occurs not 
through a present presence, but by the lurking present 
absence of the actuality and potential of sexual violence. 
The concern is both that women are raped on college 
campuses, but also that women are likely to be raped, to 
fear rape, and thus to be haunted by its invisible visibility. 
Of course, the actuality of rape is a disturbance to the 
feminist conscience, but it is the present absence—that we 
rarely perceive or hear rape culture, even when it looms 
at our side—that is the condition for a hostile climate to 
young women and the condition for its dismissal as a 
pressing problem. Importantly, the absence is important to 
the subjective experience of rape culture because rape is 
often a not-quite acknowledged fear. More concretely, 
a woman herself may dismiss and delegitimize her fear of 
rape. She may feel it around the edges of her agency, but 
dismiss its actuality because of the invisibility or because 
of the way the cultural ghost story of the specter is not at all 
how rape presents itself. The fact that such individualized 
dismissal goes hand in hand with the cultural dismissal of 
the presence of rape compounds the ontological weight of 
the specter. It is this spectral temporality of sexual violence 
that is deeply injurious.

This constitutive present absence uncovers a disjointed 
temporality at the heart of femininity. As Derrida shows, 
the return of the revenants implies a fear and apprehension 
of untimeliness inasmuch as there is always a trace of 
absence in the present. There is always an expectation for 
the return of present absences such that to live with the 
ghost of rape, to be existentially haunted by it, is to have an 
impossibility traced through the actuality of one's present. 
The invisibility of sexual violence at the heart of visibility 
discloses the terror that lurks alongside women's autonomy.
This is precisely what Andrea relates to us when she says, “it was really scary . . . we knew something really awful could happen to little girls like us . . . we were all really scared.”

When the specter of rape materializes, whether through story or in brute reality, the invisibility emerges, perhaps only for a fleeting moment, as a visible, exposing women’s lived situation as both subject and object, the very same situation produced by the specter’s ordinary invisibility. The specter of rape is a residual promise of the feminine subject’s non-existence at the heart of her existence. Importantly, it is not only the physical experience of rape that produces this ambiguity of feminine existence. It is, instead, that the specter of rape is always already a trace in the present. It is as if he is always already waiting to jump out of the bushes or attack you from behind as you walk down the street. The production of such a sentiment by The Birth of a Nation recruited and sustained participants in white supremacy, and in a disturbingly similar manner, this same sentiment disclosed in the ghost stories of young women like Andrea, enroll and reinstate their membership in intelligible femininity.

Thus, the lived reality faced by most women and girls is the paradox of understanding oneself as autonomous and even, in our current social and political climate empowered, while continually confronting and fighting off one’s impossibility. The way in which rape functions spectrally at the “level” of lived experience indicates how the material reality of pervasive sexual violence against women transforms into a specter as a way to produce and regulate feminine subjectivity as a part of racist, heterosexist, cis schema of gender. What makes femininity intelligible in the hegemony of normative genders is that to be a girl or woman is to be sexually violable, but in such a way that is absent to one’s lived present. But this lived reality is complicated or exacerbated by other lived social classifications like race, class, and gender presentation and identification. To be a poor woman, a black woman, a poor black woman, a transgender woman, a masculine woman, and so forth, is to also live this ambiguity of freedom, but more deeply burdened by cisgender, racist, and classist systems of power because they render one’s injuries inconceivable. This, for example, is precisely what Patricia Hill-Collins shows us in her discussion of the historical legacy of the jezebel image and its “modern ‘hoochie’ counterpart,” which render black women as sexually promiscuous.

Their alleged promiscuity marks black women’s sexuality as deviant and opposed to white women’s “normal” sexuality, and it is this very alleged sexual deviancy, which is part of the racist myth present in The Birth of a Nation, that subjects women of color more often to rape and often to rapes that are more brutal. Moreover, the specter of white supremacy, including its view of black men as rapists, often translates into black women remaining silent about being raped, thereby rendering the constitutive place of sexual violence in their lives invisible. What this means is that the specter of rape conspires with other deadly specters to maintain and actualize a legacy of racialized gender subordination.

Interestingly, this lived experience of sexual violence as a present absence also extends to the material and historical reality of sexual violence against women. While feminist scholars and activists have taken great efforts to make visible the ubiquity of sexual violence against women in patriarchal, racist, colonial, and heterosexist contexts, this reality is ordinarily invisible. This can help us understand why Columbia University student Emma Sulkowicz’s recent “Carry That Weight” campaign to give visibility to survivors of rape and the lack of just deserts for their rapists was shocking to the ordinary perceptual faith in college campuses as safe havens for the cultivation of young women’s agency. The exposure of the lie of college campuses as agency-cultivating spaces shows, in truth, that today’s “empowered” young woman is weighted down, slowed down by the reality of rape, and thus severed from her freedom because of sexual violence. And yet, even with this visibility, the invisibility of the history and reality of the deployment of sexual violence in the conquest of poor women, women of color, and transgender persons remains out of sight. Consequently, the logic of the specter is integral to the social and political oversight or minimization of the reality and history of sexual violence. The collective memory of the historical reality of sexual violence is repressed and forgotten in such a way that this reality traces into our present without visibility. And, the prevalence of the materialization of the specter as a ghost story of the man-behind-the-bushes makes opaque the reality that women of all kinds are survivors of sexual violence at the hands of family members, intimate partners, friends, and so forth. This reality becomes invisible through the cultural and historical stories that are told about the specter of rape. Such invisible traces continue the pervasiveness of sexual violence in girls’ and women’s lives without registering as constitutive of our present moments and subjectivity.

This suggests that such spectrality, to recall Butler, is “a densely populated zone.” The specter of rape is populated by a thick history and current reality of the bodies of girls and women who are survivors of rape, and yet perpetually fail to become visible as a densely populated zone of historical and contemporary social life. In this sense, if specters are generative of what is here through the repudiation of what is not here, then the invisibility of the reality of sexual violence and its survivors is key to maintenance of normative feminine subjectivity and its intelligibility.

ON DESTROYING THE SPECTERS
Ann Murphy offers an important provocation regarding the place of violence in the philosophical imaginary when she writes,

“The images of violence that figure with such prominence in contemporary theory are important to consider . . . since the philosophical imaginary profoundly . . . shapes our affective response to the world; it informs what we fear and hope, herald and condemn.”

Murphy wonders what the pervasive motif of violence does to philosophy, to a philosopher’s capacities for seeing, thinking, and feeling otherwise. She questions whether an unnoticed reification, naturalization, and even eroticization of violence occur when philosophical conceptions of subjectivity, identity, and sociality turn to an interrogation of violence. She prompts us to ask: Does the motif of violence excuse itself from critique? What is at stake when images and talk of violence grip the philosophical
imaginary in such a proliferating manner? What does it mean to think gendered life in relation to violence? Ultimately, what Murphy’s work underscores is the need for a more capacious philosophical imaginary. Perhaps what we need is to stop talking about violence so we can imagine identity and gender differently.

I take seriously that a continued focus on violence in the feminist imaginary can help constrain how gender materializes. But at the same time, it also seems that conjuring up the way specters of violence come to concretize gendered life today is a critical task insofar as these specters are generative of how we come to assume, resist, and negotiate the cultural imaginary of gender. Thus, my account does not intend to reify gender as violence, but instead is a diagnosis of the limits of our cultural imaginary and lived experience of gender. Spectral violence confines what is actual in terms of gender. In making this visible, in bringing the specters out of the shadows, the critical task is to destroy their productive status so that new imaginaries become real. Their destruction is integral to creating new imaginaries insofar as the imperceptibility of the specter is needed in order to dislocate the spectrality of sexual violence so as to destabilize the hegemony of normative configurations of gender shrinks a great deal. Thus, what is more closely aligned with Derrida on the very question of what “there is.” She writes, “But I also want to claim that the ontological claim can never capture its object, and this view makes me somewhat different from Foucault and aligns me temporarily with the Kantian tradition as it has been taken up by Derrida” (279). Butler continues, though briefly, to suggest that her claims to what “there is” gesture toward what cannot be captured. I understand this gesture, in some way, to relate to Derrida’s notion of hauntology. See Irene Costera Meijer and Baukje Prins, “How Bodies Come to Matter: An Interview with Judith Butler,” Signs 23. no. 2 (1998): 275–86.

Ultimately, then, to think of rape as a ghost story is to understand the spectrality of gender-based violence is a disciplinary mechanism in the lived experience of femininity. It is to understand how the specter of rape confines gendered life, through material and cultural stories about racialized sexual violence. Moreover, it is to understand how women's freedom and the simultaneity of our impossibility are produced through a specter of sexual violence. While Butler and Derrida both suggest that the possibility of justice (in the case of Derrida) or subversion (in the case of Butler) lies in the repudiated realm of the specter, my account of spectral violence and gender elicits a serious challenge to the transformative potential of this constitutive outside. I understand the contentious practices and gender performances of the abject domain that Butler turns to, what she terms critical queerness, as a means to rewrite the materialization of gender to be an important site of ontological and political promise. But, the arrival of the specters of the abject does not guarantee the destruction of the specter of violence as that which stabilizes and limits the potential for a queer future. If spectral violence inheres in the bodily existence of the subject, then it would seem that the potential of queer practices to proliferate and therefore destabilize the hegemony of normative configurations of gender shrinks a great deal. Thus, perhaps what is needed is a sustained feminist practice of ghostbusting in order to dislocate the spectrality of sexual violence so as to continually render it visible, destroying its invisibility. This ghostbusting would not be the recuperation of the specters, but their elimination. Insofar as the concealment sustains their presence, ghostbusting could create the condition in which girls like Andrea may no longer have to tell ghost stories.

NOTES


7. Derrida, Specters of Marx, 125.

8. Ibid., 202.


11. Interestingly, in "How Bodies Come to Matter: An Interview with Judith Butler," Butler suggests that she departs from Foucault and is more closely aligned with Derrida on the very question of what "there is." She writes, "But I also want to claim that the ontological claim can never capture its object, and this view makes me somewhat different from Foucault and aligns me temporarily with the Kantian tradition as it has been taken up by Derrida" (279). Butler continues, though briefly, to suggest that her claims to what "there is" gesture toward what cannot be captured. I understand this gesture, in some way, to relate to Derrida’s notion of hauntology. See Irene Costera Meijer and Baukje Prins, “How Bodies Come to Matter: An Interview with Judith Butler,” Signs 23. no. 2 (1998): 275–86.

12. I take this to also suggest that there is a commitment materiality in Butler’s work that has been largely criticized for its absence from feminist philosophers. See Bonnie Mann’s Women’s Liberation and the Sublime for a sustained criticism of Butler’s notion of the constitutive outside in relation to the question of materiality. Mann, Women’s Liberation and the Sublime: Feminism, Postmodernism, Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

13. Pascoe, Dude You’re a Fag, 60. Emphasis mine.


16. In fact, as Bettcher shows, this notion of the “deceiver” was used against Gwen Araujo by the murderer’s attorney to suggest that Araujo was justifiably killed because she sexually violated them. In this sense, it is not Araujo, as a transgender woman, who can be raped, but that she rapes others because she is transgender. What we understand from this point is an important difference of being trans*: you are not viewed as rapeable, but instead as always already the perpetrator. See Bettcher, “Evil Deceivers and Make-Believers: On Transphobic Violence and the Politics of Illusion,” Hypatia 22, no. 3 (2007): 43–65.


19. For the acceptance of rape and sexual harassment in women's lives, see Heather Hiavka, "Normalizing Sexual Violence: Young Women Account for Harassment and Abuse," Gender and Society 28 (2014); Bonnie Mann, "Creepers, Flirts, Heroes, and Allies: Four Theses on Men and Sexual Harassment", Peggy Orenstein,


21. Importantly, it also renders invisible and inconceivable that rape exists in lesbian, gay, and queer communities insofar as the conceptualization of rape is a heterosexual one.

22. Again, I do not understand the specter of rape to be the only instrument that helps produce gender. It is just one, very ubiquitous way that feminine subjectivity is actualized. Moreover, I use the phrase “ontologically heavy instrument” in reference to Bonnie Mann’s suggestion that gender is an “ontological weight.” In “The Gender Apparatus,” Mann suggests that “the individual subject . . . most often lives gender as both profoundly real and essential: to her self-understanding, to his sense of social location, to patterns of intersubjective belonging—which is to say lived gender collects ontological weight in the body and the person of the individual subject” (22). See Mann, “The Gender Apparatus: Torture and National Manhood in the U.S. ‘War on Terror,’” Radical Philosophy 168 (2011): 22–32.

23. See Cahill’s chapter “A Phenomenology of Fear” in Rethinking Rape for an extensive account of how the fear of rape produces feminine body comportment.


25. Ibid., 56.


27. Butler, Bodies That Matter, 3.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


BOOK REVIEWS

Mothering Queerly, Queering Motherhood


Reviewed by Sarah LaChance Adams
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN–SUPERIOR, SLACHANC@UWSUPER.EDU

Shelley Park’s Mothering Queerly, Queering Motherhood brings some critical new insights to philosophical scholarship on maternity. Her central concern is to challenge the notion that a child will have only one “real” mother. She takes us through a variety of social phenomena where we see this assumption manifested: custody battles, adoption policies, children’s literature, and, most personally, her struggles with her eldest adopted daughter. She further demonstrates how the “ideological doctrine” of monomaterialism is a joint manifestation of patriarchy, heteronormativity, capitalism, and Eurocentrism (7). Park’s argument is bolstered by turning our attention to non-normative maternal practices in adoptive, lesbian, blended, and polygamous families. This adds important new dimensions to a phenomenology of motherhood and strengthens the feminist critique of biological essentialism, demonstrating that some mothers will be more or less capable at different times.

This book is very much in the tradition of Sara Ruddick’s Maternal Thinking, and fleshes out some important dimensions to motherhood that have yet to be adequately explored. Park aptly demonstrates how non-normative maternal practice can give rise to unique and expansive thinking. Her experience of having an unexpected pregnancy shortly after adopting her first child gives her an instructive standpoint regarding these phenomena. While scholarship has stressed similarity between biological and
adoptive mothering, Park give us a strong account of the differences. Ruddick and Eva Kittay famously assert that all children, even biological children, must be adopted. They claim that any child may seem to be a stranger toward whom one has mixed feelings and that these feelings are not only the result of postpartum hormones. Moreover, they argue that deliberate commitment is involved in the care of children, not only empathy or instincts toward preserving one's genetic lineage. However, Park's insights demonstrate that there are critical differences between adoption and biological motherhood worth further exploration. For example, her pregnancy feels less planned, and therefore more of an interruption. Adoption had afforded her to make choices that are now out of her hands: a second adopted child would have given her the choice of race (biracial), gender (male), and timing (post-tenure) she had desired (41). On the other hand, the embodied aspects of pregnancy, childbirth, and postpartum depression make her aware of the intense labor of reproduction. This was something she had taken largely for granted when she had adopted a child. According to Park, adoption presents the opportunity to create a family in a manner that is expressive of personal and political choice, defying norms of compulsory motherhood, expressing concerns about overpopulation, or bringing greater diversity into their families. Among other advantages, adoptive mothers do not suffer the exhaustion, trauma, and pain of pregnancy, childbirth, and nursing (73). They do not risk the health complications of fertility treatments or other medical interventions (73). Yet adoption introduces the question in her mind and in her child's mind of whether or not she is to be considered the adopted child's "real mother."

Park's critique of our typical attitudes toward different types of mothering is especially courageous and insightful when she examines her own social location. As a white, middle class, (presumed to be) heterosexual, professional woman she often finds herself positioned by others as a "good" mother. Park, however, refuses to relax into this privileged position. She notes that as an adoptive mother in her position she is presented with "a menu of options" and the ability to reject some children over others (37). She finds herself in the place to expand "our family through the appropriation of a child who is the product of another woman's labor" (38). She has the luxury to take a summer off to spend with her new child and to support a stay-at-home father. She ponders women who are forced to give up their children due to poverty, social pressure, racism, heterosexism, and/or the lack of a support system. After her own experience of pregnancy and childbirth, Park begins to wonder about the birth mother of her adopted daughter "as a real person, rather than a mere ghostly presence" (42).

Park strongly rejects the notion that adoption is a form of gift giving especially in the context of neoliberalism, neocolonialism, and a narrowly middle-class notion of what good care entails. Parental rights may be terminated for a variety of reasons, including when the child frequently resides with kin outside of the nuclear family, even when this is common in the child's ethnic community (93). Children may also be removed due to a lack of "adequate care," including minimal square footage in the home, lack of indoor plumbing, and low family income (93). The dramatic reduction of support for poor families in the last thirty years has meant that a child might be removed from an impoverished family. Meanwhile, a middle class family would receive tax incentives upwards of $13,000 for adopting the same child (94). Adoption, under such circumstances, might be viewed like the acquisition of a foreclosed home that someone else could not afford to keep. Park even comes to consider adoption, in many cases, as "a form of legal kidnapping" (88).

Park realizes her further race, class, and age privilege when she finds herself empathizing with abusive, neglectful, and abandoning mothers (48). She understands that because of her race in particular she is much less likely to be the object of "maternal profiling" (48-56). That is, she is far less likely to be investigated for abuse or neglect. Moreover, if she were found guilty of such a crime, it would be likely attributed to mental illness rather than her being a "bad mother" (51).

Park's maternal thinking extends beyond critique as she invites us to consider marginalized approaches to motherhood. In particular, she investigates a variety of types of poly-maternalism including lesbian co-mothering, step-mothering, polygamous families, and shared mothering between adoptive and birth mothers. According to Park, if we believe that more than one woman can be a child's "real mother" this can allow for more flexibility within mother-child relationships (120). Sharing and shifting responsibilities between mothers also means that caring for a child doesn't have to be all or nothing (122). In the case of adoption, both birth and adoptive mothers can be affirmed as "real." Park argues that it is especially important not to dismiss the child's biological origin as irrelevant (which causes added difficulties in trans-racial and international adoption), forcing the child into an either/or mentality with regards to her "real family." Poly-maternalism also allows for more more inclusive attitudes toward lesbian families and families with step-mothers (120). Overall, Park invites us to think of families as queer assemblages that emphasize connectivity rather than genealogical reproduction (153-186). Such a family may be spread across two or more households without being either "broken" or completely "blended" (162).

Park resists any romanticizing impulse in her characterization of family life. She notes that family is not just a source of bonds but also of understanding oneself as different. "Far from the idyllic notion of home yearned for by social conservatives and critiqued by many feminist, queer, and other critical theorists, family may be the place wherein we are most directly challenged to remain open to the Other" (210). Rather than thinking our families are flawed if they do not offer us an "uncomplicated refuge" (216), Park demonstrates that there is a richness in intra-familial differences if we value engagement with these differences rather than ignore them (219-220). She advocates "reflective solidarity"—"a form of solidarity founded on respect for difference" (231) and on "shared responsibility for engaging difference" (233). Such an attitude of openness translates to maternal practices that may seem alien, such as those in polygamous families,
to give a more expansive view of what mothering might consist (219–251).

Given Park’s emphasis on queering motherhood, one aspect of her book remains perplexing to me. Her definition of “mothers” seems to include only those people who are unproblematically female-identified. Park sides with Ruddick when she argues that she does not want to “neuter” the term mothering by talking about men as mothers (62-63). I agree that social norms will lead male and female-identified individuals to have different experiences in caring for children. For this reason I agree that phenomenological accounts of motherhood and fatherhood must recognize these central differences. However, in our visions of what we can hope for I would like to see an even more inclusive idea. As a project that is intent on re-envisioning what family could mean, an examination of the role of fathers and other non-female-identified-nurturers is conspicuously absent. In my view, this ought to be part of her critique of patriarchy, “with its insistence that women bear responsibility for biological and social reproduction” (7).

Perhaps what I am asking for is outside the scope of Park’s intended project. However, it seems to be invited by her inquiry. She sides with Ruddick in that “maternal love resides in and is tested by what a mother actually does” (246). For Ruddick this transcends gender, and it is unclear why this is not the case for Park. It seems that queering gendered assumptions of maternal practice would be consistent with her belief that “emphasis on the practical dimension of love is an important antidote to the self-flagellation many mothers undertake when they discover that loving feelings toward their children do not arise instinctively or consistently” (246). Male nurturers do appear in the background of Park’s account. For example, her husband is a stay-at-home caregiver for a time, and Park’s own father is mentioned as an important nurturer in her own life. Park also introduces Dr. Seuss’s Horton, the male elephant, who cares for and hatches a mother bird’s egg through all manner of difficulties (139). While she notes Horton’s gender-transgression, male-nurturance is not thematized in the book. Ultimately, a gender-specific analysis makes sense insofar as we are considering gender as an imposed social location. However, radical and lasting change also requires thinking of nurturance beyond the gender binary.

Ultimately, this book’s vital contribution is to demonstrate that a careful investigation of poly-maternalism can undermine our assumptions about motherhood overall. Mothering strikes Park as a queer state that expands our thinking. She effectively challenges many essentialist and biologically based claims about mothering, inviting us to ask, “What happens when mothering occurs queerly? And what might examining queer forms of motherhood teach us about normative forms of mothering?” (57). Park encourages us to overcome our biases toward monomaternalism—assuming that only one woman can be a child’s “real mother”—and urges both cultural and policy changes. Perhaps Park’s most important lesson is that if we are to claim the title of “real” mother, then this prevents much-needed solidarity between ourselves and the other-mothers with whom we share the joys and trials of raising children. This insight should especially be noted by feminists who are critical of the institution of motherhood, but still find themselves in privileged positions. Perhaps concern over the maternal-mandate for women has kept us from adequately considering those whose maternal status is subject to doubt. In this, Park gives us an invaluable reminder that the marginalized often have a most insightful view on the center.

Mad Mothers, Bad Mothers, and What a “Good” Mother Would Do: The Ethics of Ambivalence


Reviewed by Dana S. Belu
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY AT DOMINGUEZ HILLS, DBELU@CSUDH.EDU

Mad Mothers, Bad Mothers, and What a “Good” Mother Would Do: The Ethics of Ambivalence, by Sarah LaChance Adams, is a rich contribution to the ethics of mothering and feminist phenomenology. It is elegantly written, thoroughly researched, and well argued. The book exposes the burdens that the myth of “the good mother,” as the source of unconditional love, continues to impose on mothers and the dangers that this poses for children. Working mostly within continental philosophy, LaChance Adams develops the concepts of maternal ambivalence and ambiguous intersubjectivity and proposes them as a new ethics, especially well suited for the mother-child relationship.

The book is divided into six chapters. The first three chapters present motherhood as a conflicted situation and offer a bold, interdisciplinary critique of traditional expectations of motherhood. These chapters can be seen to form a self-enclosed unit, well suited for an interdisciplinary audience who is interested in demystifying maternal stereotypes but may not necessarily be interested in existentialism or phenomenology.

The last three chapters, each one of which can be read on its own or in conjunction with the other two, dive into erudite, exegetical commentary on the philosophies of Emmanuel Levinas, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Simone de Beauvoir, respectively. This work is excellent for upper division and graduate classes in (existentialist) ethics and feminist phenomenology. LaChance Adams finds these philosophers to be significant because they “show that ambiguous intersubjectivity is the context of our ethical life” (12). This insight is foundational to her brand of maternal ambivalence, “described as the simultaneous and contradictory emotional responses of mothers toward their children—love and hate, anger and tenderness, pity and cruelty, satisfaction and rage” (36). This psychological and ethical description of maternal ambivalence is conditioned by what Heidegger’s phenomenology in Being and Time describes as an always already dominant disposition (Befindlichkeit) (36). So, maternal ambivalence wants
to describe maternal responses that are always already embedded in an ambivalent ontological disposition (Befindlichkeit) and mood (Stimmung).

In addition to an overview of individual chapters, the introductory chapter, “Mad Mothers, Bad Mothers, and What a ‘Good Mother’ Would Do,” captures the audience’s attention with a jarring example of a seemingly sane mother who deliberately kills her children. According to recent conservative estimates “in the United States, a mother kills a child once every three days” (2). Drawing on sociological and psychological research, LaChance Adams argues that many killer mothers cannot be classified as “bad mothers” because they’re not neglectful and they could not be classified as “mad mothers” because they’re mentally competent to stand trial. It could be made clearer whether killer mothers reveal an extreme expression or a repression of maternal ambivalence as the “simultaneous desires to nurture and violently reject [one’s] children” (4). It is clear, however, that this ambivalence is covered up by a social infatuation with the traditional image of the good mother who dutifully subordinates her needs to those of her children. LaChance Adams sees her book as offering “a more nuanced characterization of the mother-child relationship, one that highlights its conflicted nature.

Ethical ambivalence is morally productive insofar as it helps one to recognize the alterity of others, attend to the particularities of situation, and negotiate one’s own needs and desires with those of other people. The maternal example brings human interdependence into relief while also affirming our independence and often conflicting interests” (4-5).

The second chapter, “The Mother as Ethical Exemplar in Care Ethics,” succinctly discusses how the emphasis on personal relationships in care ethics expanded the domain of traditional ethics, previously organized around the autonomous and detached subject. Although its gendered and relational ontology provides a needed corrective to traditional ethics, Carol Gilligan’s care ethics overemphasizes relationality, even altruism, and thereby “ignores the need for personal flourishing” (24). It satisfies only one of the three requirements that LaChance Adams attributes to the ethics of maternal ambivalence, i.e., “the needs to care, to be cared for, and to maintain independence” (25).

The third and pivotal chapter, “Motherhood’s Janus Head,” undermines the essentializing myth of the good mother. It argues that numerous cases of maternal neglect and failure indicate that good maternal care is a contingent affair and cannot be taken for granted. The chapter illustrates the phenomenon of maternal ambivalence with gripping testimonials from mothers and pregnant women. It also addsucea rich array of sources from sociology, anthropology, feminist philosophy, history, and especially psychology to delineate the phenomenon of maternal ambivalence. The first-person testimonials are usually clear and intellectually complex, expressed in eloquent and controlled prose (28-29). These women seem emotionally mature and well educated. I would welcome more information about the background of these women, their age, class, race, and sexual orientation.

Readers may be shocked and surprised to discover that maternal feelings of rage, dislike, hatred of one’s children, and filicide are common and do not make a mother mean, wicked, or bad. The author underscores the unpopular truth that many biological and adoptive mothers intermittently desire to be done with pregnancy and/or with motherhood (48-49). In The Dialectic of Sex (1970), radical feminist Shulamith Firestone expresses a well known, unequivocally antinatalist position and one that can be seen to pave the way for LaChance Adams’s brand of maternal ambivalence.

LaChance Adams repeatedly emphasizes that many mothers are often torn between desiring intimacy and separation, satisfying their own needs and the needs of their children. She insightfully comments about what could be called the double nature of this rupture. It is interpersonal and intrapersonal. This double rupture “is not just a fissure between the mother and her child; it is a rupture within the woman herself, between her own competing desires, between equally valued parts of herself” (53). Drawing directly on the work of Iris Marion Young, Luce Irigaray, and Ann Maushart, LaChance Adams explains that this ethical split or maternal ambivalence is best illustrated in pregnancy, where the boundaries between self and other are fuzzy and must be continuously negotiated. However, she carefully notes that “the biological aspects of motherhood do not cause or explain ambivalence, but they are one more manifestation of the ambiguity between mother and child” (61). In turn, this ambiguity can be read as a manifestation of a general interpersonal ambiguity usually ignored by traditional ethics. What, then, is the relationship between maternal ambivalence and intersubjective ambiguity?

The remaining three chapters attempt to shed light on this question. Each is replete with lengthy and philosophically meticulous commentaries on the works of Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, and de Beauvoir, respectively. Levinas’s ethical emphasis on unconditional giving, an asymmetrical obligation that is especially binding on women (empirical or metaphorical), places his project at odds with promoting maternal ambivalence. Thus, chapter four, “Maternity as Vulnerability in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas,” is a puzzling choice, at least for this reader. The puzzle is further complicated by LaChance Adams’s affirmation that his ethics leaves no place for deliberation, a critical element in the practice of maternal ambivalence. Moreover, “he is relatively unconcerned with the devastation caused by the demands of the other. . . . He thinks that ethics is not really a struggle at all, that there should be no maternal ambivalence” (101). Just as she criticizes Nel Noddings’s ethical whitewashing of maternal conflict and deliberation (20) early in the book, she criticizes Levinas on similar grounds, yet engages his thought in great detail.

LaChance Adams wants to salvage the co-primordiality of the self and other, “our simultaneous proximity and distance” (108) to each other, from Levinas’s ethics. But affirming this co-primordiality implicitly affirms the infinite responsibility for the other that LaChance Adams earlier rejects as oppressive of women. The further coupling of Levinas’s co-primordial ethical temporality with Ruddick’s notion of adoption (97) as the deliberate choice to parent, a choice
that includes biological parents, does not convincingly support maternal ambivalence. LaChance Adams writes rather optimistically, “His philosophy could be amended by taking adoption as the paradigm example. This removes the assumption that mothers will be the automatic and natural caregivers. In this view, all children are strangers—orphans in need—and their care is not to be taken for granted by anyone” (108). But adoption demands moments of acute deliberation that exceed simply acquiescing to the claims and “face” of the other. Thus, it introduces the kind of egoic and deliberative work preempted by Levinas’s philosophy yet affirmed by Rozsika Parker. LaChance Adams repeatedly cites Parker’s work on maternal ambivalence and develops Parker’s insight that maternal ambivalence or the mother’s “recognition of her limitations” (178) is “an achievement that can ultimately enhance the mother’s responsibility to her child” (102). Yet, insofar as this achievement demands deliberation it remains at odds with Levinas’s ethics.

Chapter four, “Maternity as Dehiscence in the Flesh in the Philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty,” creatively describes pregnancy and mothering as a “case of dehiscence in the flesh” (110). Merleau-Ponty’s notion of flesh refers to a sensuous, pre-personal, and anonymous experience of continuity between “self, other and world” (117), a kind of “anonymous intersubjectivity [that] underlies all our interactions” (116). By using flesh to think about maternity, LaChance Adams focuses especially closely on the gaps, the moments of separation between mother and child, and defends Merleau-Ponty against feminist charges that his theory of intersubjectivity fails to respect alterity (125-30). She underscores this defense by arguing that a dialectical, Hegelian logic is at play throughout Merleau-Ponty’s thinking of the flesh. This “immanent logic of human experience” keeps identity and difference in play and highlights the relation between opposites (137) without synthesizing them into a totality. Furthermore, LaChance Adams’s appropriation of Merleau-Ponty, as an early advocate of (maternal) ambivalence, is clearly articulated in her notion of the “dialectic of dehiscence” (143). Among multiple instances, Merleau-Ponty’s famous example of pregnancy effectively shows that, from the woman’s perspective, the fetus is revealed as both subject and object because it is experienced as both self and other (147).

Overall, this chapter seems structurally important because it sheds more light, at least for this reader, on the relationship between maternal ambivalence and ambiguous intersubjectivity. It shows that the ontology of ambiguous intersubjectivity strongly implies an ethics of ambivalence, an ambivalence that is further concretized in the last chapter.

In “Maternity as Negotiating Mutual Transcendence in the Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir,” LaChance Adams focuses on Beauvoir’s account of motherhood as defined by an ongoing ethical struggle that is marked by “good failure” (188), the mother’s affirmation of her transcendence through choices that may not benefit everyone, including her child. For Beauvoir, “conflicts with others are both fundamental to and frustrate my own freedom. . . . Failure is entwined in the braid of ethical life” (185).

When it comes to motherhood, LaChance Adams softens the meaning of Beauvoir’s antinatalist comments. She surprisingly agrees with Beauvoir’s requirements for motherhood which seem so stringent (155/183) that few “young women” are likely to meet them, especially during their childbearing years. This stringency implies an antinatalist stance or a problematic reliance on the use of advanced reproductive technology.

LaChance Adams consistently interprets Beauvoir’s antinatalist stance as a sensible response to a patriarchal tradition that idealizes motherhood while it also sticks women with all of the messy, daily hardships of mothering. According to her, Beauvoir crafts an ethics of maternal authenticity that avoids flight into conformism or what could be called maternal seriousness (173). Moreover, the value of motherhood cannot be defined absolutely since it harbors “potentials to initiate both growth and devastation” (177). The potentials are not available a priori, but depend on a woman’s situation, a conglomeration of interconnected social factors and the woman’s ability to negotiate their force and relevance. The use of Beauvoir’s situated ethics perspicuously shows that the affirmation of maternal ambivalence requires profound social transformations.

I would be interested to learn more about the concrete social transformations that LaChance Adams thinks are most urgently needed for the practice of maternal ambivalence. I am also left wondering whether maternal ambivalence predominantly describes a gendered ontology or a psychological attitude? Moreover, are some groups of mothering men, women, and transsexuals more likely to experience maternal ambivalence than other groups? Finally, to what extent is maternal ambivalence a culturally specific phenomenon? I look forward to more work in this area from LaChance Adams whose present work, Mad Mothers, Bad Mothers, and What a “Good Mother Would Do: The Ethics of Ambivalence, is profound and enriching.

NOTES

Gendered Readings of Change: A Feminist-Pragmatist Approach


Reviewed by Marilyn Fischer
UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON, FISCHER@UDAYTON.EDU

Fischer casts a wide net in seeking a conception of change with which to understand feminist transformation of both self and social institutions. She explores metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, and political theories of change in developing a feminist-pragmatist approach. Writing clearly and carefully, Fischer employs her knowledge of relevant primary and secondary texts deftly. She has a particularly admirable ability to appreciate what various philosophers have to offer while honestly appraising and seeking remedies for weaknesses in their theories.

Part I, “Genealogical Reflections on Change,” contains three chapters. The first, “Women, Change, and the Birth of Philosophy,” sets up why a feminist account of change is needed. Fischer begins with Parmenides and the ambiguous role of the goddess in his poem, “On Nature.” She pairs this with analyses of the a-sexual birth of Athena as Athen’s creation myth, Pandora’s evil interventions into the harmonious all-male world, and Aristotle’s gendered account of reproduction. This gives strong support to Fischer’s claim that, in Greek myth and philosophy, women occupy a role she calls gendered (im)mutability. If change is illusory or bad, women are active agents responsible for evil. If change is good, women are passive and not fully human.

Chapter two, “Change in Dewey’s and Aristotle’s Metaphysics,” compares Dewey’s and Aristotle’s accounts of how the world exhibits both change and stability. For example, seasons and individuals undergo constant change, but they do so in fairly stable and predictable patterns. While fully acknowledging differences between Aristotle’s teleological hylomorphism and Dewey’s emphasis on non-teleological interaction among organisms and environment, Fischer is particularly struck by the two thinkers’ affinities. Both are naturalists and work out the relation between change and stability within nature, without appealing to the transcendent realm. Fischer concludes first, that Dewey’s account of change owes much to Aristotle, and second, that Dewey’s differences from Aristotle give an opening for using Dewey’s metaphysics toward construction of a feminist analysis of the self. The chapter itself contains little feminist analysis. If read as a compare and contrast essay, the chapter is very well done and supports the second conclusion. I am not convinced by Fischer’s first conclusion, however. Both philosophers were working within the scientific theories of their time. While Dewey had studied Aristotle, he wrote in an era when Darwin’s evolutionary theory served as the generative metaphor in every discipline. Dewey could well have developed his theory using the intellectual resources of his time. A different sort of argument is needed to show that affinities between Dewey and Aristotle indicate actual lineage and are more than interesting points of overlap.

Chapter three, “Change in Dewey’s and Aristotle’s Self,” examines Dewey’s and Aristotle’s ethics. Again, Fischer uses the many affinities between the two accounts to claim that Dewey’s ethics should be understood as Aristotelian. Both conceive of the self as inherently social, both find ethics and politics inseparable, and both conceive of character as formed via the development of habits. Fischer points out, however, that differences between the two views are crucial in making Dewey’s conception of the self a suitable starting point for constructing a feminist self. Aristotle places humans into a natural hierarchy, with all women and some men inferior to a class of elite, rational males. With Dewey’s interactionist view of the relation between self and environment, the self is more fluid. My reading of this chapter is the same as for chapter two. As a compare and contrast essay, it is very well done. However, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, theorists working within evolutionary paradigms commonly used the basic terms with which Dewey constructed his theory of the self. They often described society as an organism, considered morality as largely based on custom, and understood animal and human behavior in terms of habits. Because Fischer does not assess whether Dewey could have derived his conception of the self from within the evolutionary theorizing of his day, her claim that Dewey based much of his conception on Aristotle is unconvincing.

Part II, “Feminist-Pragmatist Reconstruction of Change” (chapters four and five), takes Dewey’s conception of the self, reconstructs it with a feminist lens, and uses that to address possibilities for feminist democratic change. Now there are many ways to structure a monograph, from a collection of separate articles that share common themes, to an integrated whole. I read the book as closer to the former. Linkage between the two parts depends on Fischer’s claim that Dewey to a significant extent drew his metaphysics and ethics from Aristotle. Had Fischer placed her presentation of Dewey’s conception of the self in Part II rather than Part I, Part II could be read separately. This is not a criticism as much as an observation about how the book is constructed.

Chapter four, “The Feminist-Pragmatist Self,” looks for a conception of the self that can account for the experience some women have of coming to feminist consciousness. They sometimes report that for a period of time everything seemed to be a jumbled confusion, and they emerged totally transformed. Fischer begins with Dewey’s model of the social self, formed in interaction with the environment. Habits formed as adaptations to the environment give stability, yet often are flexible enough to change. Fischer explicates coming to feminist consciousness in terms of substituting habits of perceiving situations through feminist lenses for non-feminist perceptual habits. The process is gradual, beginning with a few habits which then interact with and lead to change in more habits; hence the period of confusion. Fischer stresses the need for careful self-reflection, especially to bring unconscious non-feminist habits into conscious awareness. While what Fischer does
Forgiveness and Retribution: Responding to Wrongdoing


Reviewed by Hailey Huget
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, HEH26@GEORGETOWN.EDU

Margaret Holmgren’s Forgiveness and Retribution: Responding to Wrongdoing is a refreshingly bold attempt to argue for an unpopular, often marginalized position within the forgiveness literature: that unconditional forgiveness and self-forgiveness are always morally appropriate, even when an offender has not apologized. Holmgren presents the “paradigm of forgiveness” as a way of responding to wrongdoing that is opposed to “attitudinal retributivism,” which she characterizes as the idea that “enduring attitudes of resentment and self-condemnation are morally appropriate under certain circumstances” (5). Holmgren argues that such attitudes of resentment and self-condemnation are never appropriate.

In chapter one, Holmgren offers an outline of her project and provides an initial characterization of the attitudinal retributivist position that forms her target throughout the work. Attitudinal retributivists, on Holmgren’s account, argue that forgiveness is inappropriate or even blameworthy in circumstances where an offender has not apologized or repented. This is because granting forgiveness to an offender without his apology can demonstrate that the victim lacks self-respect, lacks respect for the offender, or lacks a general respect for the demands of morality (9). Holmgren then proceeds to argue that adopting an attitude of “unconditional genuine forgiveness” not only demonstrates self-respect, respect for the offender, and respect for morality, but meets these criteria more fully and completely than attitudinal retribulivism (9).

Holmgren characterizes unconditional genuine forgiveness as a virtue—which she defines as an ingrained, integrated attitude. In chapter two, Holmgren contrasts the attitude that forms the paradigm of forgiveness with those that form the paradigm of retribution and argues for the moral superiority of the attitude of forgiveness. For Holmgren, attitudes have a cognitive component, an affective component, and a motivational component (23). For an individual to possess the complete, integrated attitude of forgiveness, one must form the belief that the offender is a sentient being and moral agent who, as such, deserves respect and compassion (33); one must feel such kindness and compassion toward the offender; and one must actually desire that the offender flourish (34). While adopting the attitude of resentment involves withdrawing goodwill toward the offender until she either makes amends or some other conditions have been met, adopting the attitude of forgiveness involves no withdrawal of goodwill at any point.
Some of the most important argumentation in the book occurs in chapter three, where Holmgren promises to show how this attitude of forgiveness is in fact more consistent with self-respect, respect for morality, and respect for the offender than the retributivist paradigm and its corresponding attitude of resentment. Before adopting the attitude of forgiveness, a victim may need to engage in a process of “addressing the wrong,” which involves recovering one’s self-esteem (59), understanding that and why the act perpetrated against her was wrong (60), acknowledging her beliefs and feelings about the incident (60), possibly expressing those feelings and beliefs to the offender (61), and a series of other steps. Holmgren notes that, while a victim’s inability to acknowledge that the act in question was wrong—or a failure to recover one’s self-esteem—renders forgiveness inappropriate and premature, a process of addressing the wrong may not, in fact, be necessary for all victims. She asserts that “spiritual masters” like the Dalai Lama may not need to undergo such a process at all, given that they already have appropriate attitudes toward wrongdoing.

After addressing the wrong—if a victim needs to do so—the victim begins the process of adopting an attitude of forgiveness. Such an attitude is consistent with self-respect, respect for morality, and respect for the offender—while an attitude of resentment is not—for the following reasons. Some attitudinal retributivists argue that a victim should adopt an attitude of resentment toward unrepentant offenders in order to “protest the claim implicit in the act of wrongdoing” that the victim is somehow not deserving of respect or equal consideration (67). Holmgren argues, contra this idea, that this “assigns far too much power and importance to the offender’s problematic attitudes” and “fails to assign sufficient importance to [the victim’s] own assessment of her worth” (67). If a victim has completed the process of addressing the wrong, including the step that involves recognizing her own self-worth, there is no need for her to resent the offender as a way of protesting the claim implicit in his wrongdoing. Holmgren writes that “she must recognize for herself that the claim implicit in the act of wrongdoing is false” (68). Others may argue that an attitude of forgiveness, extended toward unrepentant offenders, fails to show respect for morality, or even indicates that the victim condones the wrong. Again Holmgren appeals to her notion of “addressing the wrong” in order to avoid this charge: the victim has already demonstrated, through that process, that she understands that and why the act was wrong.

Finally, Holmgren argues that adopting the attitude of forgiveness is the best way to show respect for the offender. Here she argues against attitudinal retributivists who believe that respecting the offender as a moral agent involves recognizing and resenting the offender’s “identification with the wrong act that he has chosen to commit and has not yet chosen to renounce” (77). In other words, we respect the offender by acknowledging that he was “the author of his own wrongful actions and attitudes” and resenting him for those actions and attitudes. However, Holmgren argues that it does not follow from this commitment that resenting the offender is morally appropriate. In fact, such resentment may not only objectify the offender but also may be conceptually incoherent. Holmgren argues that the attitudinal retributivist reduces the offender to a “conglomerate” of his actions and attitudes and then judges that conglomerate to be bad or unworthy. She writes:

A person is not in any sense the same thing as the attitudes he adopts or the actions he performs. If we hold that an individual is in some sense identical to the attitudes he currently holds, then the concepts of moral growth, moral agency, and moral responsibility are rendered incoherent. (87)

Holmgren then argues that it is imperative to distinguish an offender from his actions and attitudes and not view the offender as an agent as identical with those actions or attitudes. This will involve “separating the sinner from the sin,” so to speak, and adopting an attitude of forgiveness toward the sinner or offender in place of an attitude of resentment.

One major problem with this last defense, that Linda Radzik also raised in her review of the book (2012), is that it equivocates between the language of “identity” and “identified with.” Holmgren construes the attitudinal retributivist as conflating the offender’s status as a moral agent with their actions and attitudes. Unfortunately, this is an implausible and unfair construal of the attitudinal retributivist position. The retributivist will not want to say that the offender is literally identical with his or her problematic actions and attitudes; this would seem to claim something impossible, that a moral agent is not an agent at all but instead reducible to her actions and attitudes. Instead, by failing to apologize or repent, the retributivist argues that the offender identifies with those actions and attitudes in her capacity as a moral agent. If we understand the retributivist as arguing the latter, it becomes unclear how Holmgren has offered a satisfying argument against that position, and it is unclear how her view has an advantage over the retributivist with regard to maintaining respect for the offender.

One advantage of Holmgren’s account of the attitude of forgiveness that she advances in the first several chapters is that it provides a robust defense of the general intuition that certain people who forgive unconditionally—like the Dalai Lama or others—are morally praiseworthy in some sense or another. This intuition is often abandoned in conditional theories of forgiveness, where an offender must apologize or repent in some way or another in order for forgiveness to be appropriate and praiseworthy. For example, Charles Griswold argues that such unconditional forgiveness is not praiseworthy because it comes too close to excusing or condoning (2007, 66).

Yet, with that in mind, Holmgren’s account does not go into much detail with respect to how we should understand victims who fail to forgive either a repentant or an unrepentant offender. Are such individuals blameworthy, on Holmgren’s account? Holmgren suggests that individuals who never forgive an unrepentant offender are not blameworthy because maintaining resentment and similar feelings in those cases are “normal human reactions
to a difficult situation” (62). However, this claim may coexist uneasily with the rest of her account. Holmgren argues that forgiveness is always morally appropriate and resentment is never appropriate—because resentment demonstrates a lack of respect for the offender, morality, and the victim herself. Given this, Holmgren might have to conclude that adopting an attitude of resentment, insofar as it fails in these three measures, is in some sense blameworthy. If it is the case that Holmgren must conclude this in order to remain consistent, her account risks becoming deeply counter-intuitive in some cases. For example, if an agent becomes a victim of a horrendous crime or atrocity and the offender in question never apologizes, repents, or demonstrates a change of heart, it seems problematic to conclude that the victim is blameworthy for continuing to hold an attitude of resentment toward him. Holmgren would do well to offer an explanation either of how her view does not lead to this counter-intuitive conclusion or how this intuition is itself misguided.

In chapters four through eight, Holmgren broadens the scope of her discussion to consider topics like self-forgiveness, the viability of theories of desert and retribution, theories of public response to wrongdoing, and the concept of restorative justice. Her discussion is both wide-ranging and insightful; if anything is lacking, as Radzik also pointed out, it is her somewhat uncharitable approach to her opponents who advocate desert-based theories of justice.

One broad area in which Holmgren’s project might be criticized is its apparent inability to accommodate a politics of resistance. Lisa Tessman, who also approaches her criticism of Holmgren is its apparent inability to accommodate a politics of resistance. Tessman, Lisa. Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Tessman, also approaches her analysis of moral emotions and attitudes from a virtue-theoretic standpoint, argues persuasively that adopting a sustained attitude of moral anger or outrage may help enable and facilitate political resistance by oppressed groups against their oppressors (2005, 117). Tessman’s work raises the question of whether sympathetic attitudes—such as, perhaps, the attitude of forgiveness—ultimately end up simply reinforcing the status quo. Though Holmgren does not directly address the subject of political resistance and its attendant moral emotions in her work, it seems like a potentially interesting and important topic for her to consider—whether or not an attitude of forgiveness risks harming oppressed groups.

Ultimately, Holmgren’s work as a whole should be understood as something of a broad, programmatic statement of the paradigm of forgiveness and an articulation of what a commitment to such a paradigm would entail. As such, it often leaves major commitments of that paradigm unargued for, particularly various claims about the intrinsic worth of persons (12). The work, however, should not be faulted for this; it seems that her goal is simply to articulate a different way of responding to wrongdoing that stems from some widely shared commitments, as opposed to justifying those commitments themselves. As a programmatic statement of what a paradigm of forgiveness might look like, Holmgren’s effort is stimulating and uncompromising, if not without its flaws.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy

Reviewed by Erinn Gilson
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH FLORIDA, ERINNGILSON@GMAIL.COM

The essays contained in this volume make a valuable contribution to the growing scholarship on vulnerability. They bridge theoretical and applied issues, dealing both with concerns about how to theorize vulnerability in relation to autonomy, care, dependency, and other ethical frameworks, and with specific cases in which the lens of vulnerability can be used to analyze complex ethical issues. The editors’ introduction provides a useful reference point and sets the stage for a series of ongoing argumentative threads that run throughout the volume. The questions at the heart of the book include, How ought we to define and conceptualize vulnerability? What is the normative significance of vulnerability? Who should assume responsibility in relation to vulnerability and how should such responsibilities be met? In this review, I lay out the overarching argument of the volume, offer a synopsis of some of the central themes uniting the essays, and then comment on the volume overall.

In response to the first question, the editors outline a taxonomy of vulnerability that distinguishes three sources of vulnerability (inherent, situational, pathogenic) and two states of vulnerability (dispositional and occurrent) (8); this taxonomy recurs and is developed further in many of the essays. Inherent vulnerability is “intrinsic to the human condition”, situational vulnerability is “context specific”; and pathogenic vulnerability stems from abuse, injustice, or oppression (7–9).

The taxonomy is proposed in response to “a theoretical impasse” (83) in recent approaches to vulnerability, that is, the bifurcation in conceptions of vulnerability between a “universalist” ontological sense of vulnerability as a fundamental part of the human condition and the definition of vulnerability as “the contingent susceptibility of particular persons or groups” (6). The taxonomy is intended to ameliorate the seeming incompatibility between and problems with the two senses (see 68-69, 91-92). It is justified further as necessary for identifying vulnerable parties and “understanding the different duties involved in responding appropriately to different kinds of vulnerability” (8). Thus, its primary purpose is to clarify our moral reasoning about vulnerability and, consequently, improve practices of responsibility-taking.
A number of the essays work out the complex connections between vulnerability and autonomy—specifically, relational autonomy. Catriona Mackenzie’s essay makes a case for the compatibility of an ethics of vulnerability and relational autonomy, in contrast with the liberal understanding of autonomy that has been critiqued by those advancing a vulnerability approach (Fineman 2008). Mackenzie contends that without “the overall aim of fostering autonomy and promoting capabilities[,]” our attempts to meet our obligations to those who are vulnerable may be paternalist and exacerbate vulnerability rather than ameliorate it (40). She suggests that the capabilities approach and a vulnerability framework are “mutually informative” insofar as vulnerabilities are capability deficits (54), and so argues that a capabilities approach is the best framework for understanding the specific obligations entailed in responding to vulnerability. Although Susan Dodds’s contribution focuses on dependence as “a specific form of vulnerability” (182), “where a person relies on care” from others (188), her solution to some normative difficulties surrounding responsibility for vulnerable others also points to a concept of relational autonomy. Following Walker’s (2007) critique of Goodin (1985), Dodds calls attention to how the normative social assignment of responsibility for vulnerability (e.g., of biological parents for a child) can create pathogenic vulnerability, for instance, the dependence of care-givers themselves (see Kittay 1999). Like Mackenzie, she suggests autonomy should operate as a benchmark for assessing public policy responses to vulnerability: Do such interventions foster autonomy and so “avoid generating pathogenic forms of vulnerability” or not (201)?

Joel Anderson’s essay likewise theorizes the close relationship between vulnerability and autonomy, developing further the view that they cannot be defined simplistically in opposition to one another. Since autonomy requires interpersonal relationships with others, it also entails the related forms of vulnerability to these others. Anderson explicates two additional senses in which autonomy is relational: (1) agency is recognitionally secured and (2) the competence to participate in specific activities (e.g., linguistic communication) is socially ascribed (138-39). A price of enhanced autonomy capacities (that enable one to participate in such activities) via interpersonal social practices, and of the intertwining of vulnerability and autonomy in general, however, is vulnerability to social exclusion. There is an interesting dialogue and possible tension between these pieces. Whereas Mackenzie and Dodds regard autonomy as a normative criterion, Anderson recognizes the ambivalence of even relational autonomy as a normative notion: its irreducibly social quality and the exclusionary potential of social relations that both demand and enhance autonomy capacities suggest that autonomy itself can pathogenically generate greater “surplus” vulnerability (154). Since it contends that a conception of vulnerability is central to Kantian ethics, Paul Formosa’s piece is also essentially about autonomy. He argues that it is because our rational capacities are vulnerable, rather than invulnerable, that we have perfect (96) and imperfect (100) duties. Additionally, we have “more onerous” duties to those who are especially vulnerable (103).

Another group of essays turn their attention to the vulnerabilities of specific groups, including elderly people, disabled people, victims of injustice, and children. Three contributions focus on the vulnerability of children. Marilyn Friedman’s essay analyzes the nature of the moral responsibility of abused women who fail to protect their children from the abuser. She argues in a careful and qualified fashion that abused women’s own vulnerability excuses their failure to protect their children even as it usually neither exempts them from responsibility nor provides moral justification for failing to protect. Mianna Lotz and Amy Mullin also address children’s vulnerability to their parents. Mullin’s essay considers children’s emotional needs, arguing for a vulnerability-focused care theory as the best way to adjudicate between ways of meeting those needs, take the nuances of social context into account, and thus decrease the “pathogenic causes of vulnerabilities” of both children and their care-givers (269). Lotz’s contribution explores parents’ ability to inculcate their values in their children. Rather than basing limitations on parents’ ability to impose values on their children on a violation of the child’s “future-autonomy” (243), Lotz argues that parents’ normal power over their children creates conditions under which they can dominate their children through exclusionary values inculcation. The basic “privileges” parents enjoy vis-à-vis their children, such as priority, proximity, authority, and affective closeness (260-61), constitute normal forms of vulnerability. Thus, the injustice of exclusionary values inculcation lies in how “it exploits the inequality and privileges of the dependency relationship,” failing to recognize children’s vulnerability (262).

Janna Thompson’s account of temporal vulnerability also highlights an unavoidable, normal form of vulnerability: our vulnerability as temporal beings who are “subject to the changes that time brings” (163). She argues that only a diachronic view of time makes possible a coherent conception of intergenerational dependency and vulnerability, and thus intergenerational responsibilities. Relatedly, Rosemarie Tong’s piece argues for comprehensive responsibility for caring for elderly people in order to reduce their various vulnerabilities and the vulnerabilities of caregivers. Care-giving must be recognized as both a collective, public and a personal, private responsibility; however, such broad-scale recognition and the attendant shifts in public policy can only occur when men in addition to women are actively involved in the work of care-giving.

Jackie Leach Scully’s contribution on disability is noteworthy because of her attempt to move the debate about the relationship between autonomy and vulnerability in new directions. Scully challenges the clear line between “normal” and “special” vulnerabilities, and the related classification of disabled people as “specially vulnerable” (205). She identifies a new form of vulnerability—“ascribed global vulnerability” (209)—that refers to the attribution of a global type of vulnerability to disabled people based on their specific dependencies. Drawing on a relational view of autonomy, Scully suggests that dependence itself does not cause the loss of autonomy. Rather, social norms and conventions divide dependence into “permitted” or normal and “nonpermitted” or abnormal (217) and fail to support the latter, causing loss of autonomy. This
division, however, “is a political choice” (217), one that marginalizes and impairs those who are disabled. Scully’s conclusion suggests that “the theoretical lens of disability” reorients thinking about vulnerability in major ways (218): (1) it refocuses attention on the role structural and institutional processes and normative social perceptions have in dominant interpretations of vulnerabilities, and thus on how “societal responses” exacerbate vulnerability, and confound the distinctions between inherent and pathogenic vulnerabilities; (2) it highlights the necessity of “an enlarged concept of ontological vulnerability”; (3) it calls for a rejection of the division of vulnerability into ontological and special that construes the vulnerabilities of disabled people as exceptional, “anomalies that fall outside the accepted framework of everyday life” (218).

Scully’s call for a radical rethinking of the concept of vulnerability leads me to two concerns about the overarching argumentative threads of the volume: first, the significance of the “universalist” ontological sense of vulnerability is fairly attenuated. Though some accounts explicate complex features of a universal vulnerability such as its temporal dimension (Thompson), the dominant line of reasoning regards the dual definitions, universal and special, of vulnerability as hindering comprehension of both obligations to vulnerable others and the nature of appropriate responses. On Mackenzie’s view, ontological vulnerability is basically reduced to corporeality and is alleged to “obscure important distinctions between different sources and states of vulnerability” (38). Thus, although one of the editors’ main concerns is the irreconcilability of universal and special vulnerability, and the ensuing conceptual confusion, it seems as if they take the real problem to be the all-encompassing nature of a claim to universal, ontological vulnerability. In a very capable survey of the uses of the concept in bioethics in general as well as in research ethics, clinical ethics, and public health ethics, Wendy Rogers characterizes the situation as a “stalemate” (83). The proposed taxonomy is supposed to resolve this stalemate but in some ways seems to replicate the universal/special division of vulnerability in the distinction between inherent/situational or pathogenic sources. Though the taxonomy is certainly analytically useful, it has its limits: e.g., How do we distinguish situational and pathogenic vulnerabilities in meaningful ways when structural injustice is often sustained via normal behaviors and choices? (see Young 2011). The more precise vocabulary belies the complexity involved in accounting for the diverse ways vulnerability is experienced and generated. To understand this complexity better, what is needed is not just to separate analytically different dimensions of vulnerability but also to analyze their interrelation. For instance, we might wonder how denial of universal, ontological vulnerability impacts the ability to recognize and take responsibility for pathogenic vulnerabilities in one’s society (see Gilson 2014, 73–124; Gilson 2011; MacIntyre 1999), or investigate what kinds of attitudes and relationships toward shared ontological vulnerability are manifest in particular interventions in cases of especial vulnerability: Do they affirm vulnerability as a shared condition or, rather, treat those deemed vulnerable as exceptional (see Scully, Tong)? Or, assess whether and how it is possible to distinguish “normal” situational vulnerability from pathogenic vulnerability (as Scully does), or, further, “normal” nonharmful situational vulnerability from “normal” but harmful situational vulnerability (as Lotz’s argument suggests is needed).

Second, and relatedly, how vulnerability is defined has implications for its normative force. Too often, authors take the position that the ethical wrong related to vulnerability inheres in vulnerability itself, in particular, in the vulnerability called pathogenic and hence the normative implications are fairly standard: responsibility entails mitigating vulnerability, albeit in ways that are attentive to autonomy. Some contributions move consideration of the ethical wrong related to vulnerability in new directions. One of the virtues of Lotz’s contribution is that it challenges the all-too-common idea that vulnerability itself is harmful and suggests instead that the ethical wrong lies in the act of domination that exploits children’s vulnerability. Similarly, Anderson’s piece ties the wrong associated with vulnerability to an excessive risk of exclusion; such exclusion of others from social practices so as to affirm one’s own autonomy capacities is arguably a form of domination. Accordingly, the wrong lies in domination and exclusion, which are accomplished by exploiting vulnerability instead of attending to vulnerable others, rather than in vulnerability itself. These kinds of accounts identify the wrongs and harms associated with vulnerability more precisely, as does Debra Bergoffen’s recent work (2011) on vulnerability and rape in the context of war. For, Bergoffen, as for Butler, injustice lies in the inequitable distribution of a vulnerability that is shared in common. Such inequity, whether it is associated with gender or nationality or ethnicity, is the product of domination on the part of those who seek to eschew their own (ontological) vulnerability. Margaret Urban Walker’s consideration of moral vulnerability, the specific vulnerability of victims of injustice to having their moral “standing to call others to account denied, dismissed, or ignored in ways that call . . . [their] very status as full participants into question” (112), moves in a similar direction. Walker argues that the central aim of practices of reparative justice is to remedy this loss of moral standing by restoring to victims their status as participants in the social “relations of accountability” (117). Reparative justice should entail correcting the “moral invulnerability” (120) possessed by wrongdoers through their acknowledgment of the wrong and assumption of responsibility for it. Thus, the wrong associated with vulnerability has to do with how perpetrators of injustice achieve their moral invulnerability through the exclusion and marginalization of victims.

In sum, this volume covers important ground and certainly will be immensely valuable for scholars and teachers of ethics; indeed, it would be a valuable addition to undergraduate and graduate ethics courses. Nonetheless, I would have liked to see some aspects of the topic given more attention. For instance, though most of the essays are methodologically feminist and the issues of care and dependency are thoroughly addressed, more attention could have been devoted to the relationship between gender (and race, class, sexuality, and other salient social differences) and vulnerability. A final qualm concerns the limited methodological scope of the volume. Vulnerability
is a topic that has attracted both philosophically pluralist and interdisciplinary interest (Beattie and Schick 2013, Bergoffen 2011, Drichel 2013, Gilson 2014, Murphy 2012). The essays featured in this volume, however, do not reflect that development. In particular, even though Judith Butler's recent work (2004a, 2004b, 2009) has had enormous influence on scholarship about vulnerability, the editors dismiss it in a footnote, citing "her resistance to normative ethical inquiry" (3), and only one of the contributors cites Butler's work in a substantive fashion (Tong, 288-89). Yet, Butler's "resistance" to normative inquiry does not mean that her work has nothing interesting to say about normativity, ethics, feminism, and vulnerability. Rather, she offers a provocatively different perspective on normativity that would provide a valuable lens through which to view some of the issues raised in the volume (see Gilson 2014, 40–70).

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Reproduction, Race, and Gender in Philosophy and the Early Life Sciences


Reviewed by Mark William Westmoreland
VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY, MARK.WESTMORELAND@VILLANOVA.EDU

SURVIVING HEREDITY: REPRODUCTION, RACE, AND GENDER

Susanne Lettow's Reproduction, Race, and Gender in Philosophy and the Early Life Sciences, a recent addition to SUNY's Philosophy and Race series, is a philosophical excavation of sorts. The eleven chapters of the volume dig deep into the historicity of concepts involving reproduction, race, and gender in proximity to the year 1800. I, like many reviewers, face the issue of how to do justice to such a thoughtfully edited work and would like to be attentive to each contribution. I have chosen to make some general remarks about the scope of work as a whole, provide some explanation of each of the chapters, and conclude by listing a few pros and cons of the volume.

These eleven chapters will be of benefit to those doing genealogical work in the histories of the ideas of race and gender at the border of philosophy and science. This volume will satisfy the curiosity of both newcomers and those who are familiar with these histories by showing how these ideas co-emerged with one another and with the concept of reproduction. The focal point of part one is how the notions of procreation, generation, and reproduction held a central place in the newly made arena of the life sciences. While race and gender are clearly, albeit briefly, articulated here, it is not until the second part that they come into focus. Summarizing the chapters of the volume, Lettow writes, "Closely connected to ideas of crossbreeding, reproduction, and heredity, concepts of race and gender clearly resonate with each other, although meanings of race and gender disperse into various political-ethical discourses. Instead of a series of analogies [. . .] we find relations of resonance" (13). The fundamental concern of their investigations is the extent to which race and gender, reproduction and heredity, and life sciences and philosophies of nature co-constitutively emerged within larger discussions of epistemology and anthropology, and how these two were understood within the cultural-social-political matrix of modern Europe—particularly around 1800—and its colonizing of non-Europeans.

Following the introduction, Lettow begins the first half of the volume with an essay titled "Generation, Genealogy, and Time: The Concept of Reproduction from Histoire naturelle to Naturphilosophie." Lettow claims that around 1800 there was a shift in how reproduction was first being understood—first, as a singular act, and later as process on a supra-individual level. Lettow writes, "The intellectual concern with reproduction, genealogy, and the belonging of individuals to supra-individual entities like the species,
the sex, or the race also contributed to the emergence of a biopolitical gaze that addresses as subjugated to these new biosocial entities and to a new understanding of kinship relations” (24). Lettow looks at three clusters beginning with an account of Trembley’s experiments with polyps and then considers how La Mettrie, Maupertuis, and Buffon came to the view that reproduction is multiplication. Blumenbach, Herder, and Kielmeyer are taken up in the second cluster wherein the relation between the individual and species is understood with regard to heterogeneous models of temporality. In the third cluster of Schelling, Görres, and Hegel, the individual is subsumed into the larger whole of nature, time is homogenized, and sexual difference is fixed as a given structure of nature.

Florence Vienne, in “Organic Molecules, Parasites, Urthièrè: The Controversial Nature of Spermatic Animals, 1749–1841,” describes two opposing visions of reproduction: “One is based on the principles of universality, individual autonomy, and the functional equality of all organic elements, and one is centered on a hierarchical view of gender difference” (57). Vienne explains how the notion of gender was central to debates about such and the extent to which science both borrowed from and perpetuated hierarchical gender distinctions.

In “The Scientific Construction of Gender and Generation in the German Late Enlightenment and in German Romantic Naturphilosophie,” Peter Hanns Reill suggests, by paying special attention to Humboldt, Oken, and Carus, that the replacing of gender differences as mutually interactive with a male dominant gender hierarchy marks an unfortunate change in understanding biology from the Enlightenment to Naturphilosophie. While the Enlightenment may have elevated the human, Naturphilosophie had made its paragon the white European male whose “reason, imagination and willpower enabled him to pierce the veil of nature” (80).

Jocelyn Hollands’s “Zeugang/Fortpflanzung: Distinctions of Medium in the Discourse on Generation around 1800” provides an account of how the notions of procreation and generation, which “are indebted to different points of departure and serve different purposes” and yet were “joined at times to the point of indistinguishability,” participated within the larger Romantic “rejection of stable hierarchies and categories” (84, 83). According to Holland, the notion of procreation emphasizes the momentary creation of an individual from familial kin (i.e., biological parents), whereas generation is a broader process—one that incorporates procreation as a part—characterized by duration and a larger scale or continuum. In other words, procreation can be sensed directly in one individual while generation is a “medium not to be reduced to a physical substrate”; the latter involves the cycle of life and death across numerous individuals (97-98).

In “Treviranus’ Biology: Generation, Degeneration, and the Boundaries of Life,” Joan Steigerwald describes how Treviranus, despite the fact that he “did not establish a new discipline [...] founded no school, enlisted no group of researchers, and created no institutional basis for a new approach to the study of living organisms,” raised questions about the liminal spaces of natural science (105). Treviranus’s six-volume tome considers how viable matter and external conditions can give rise to living organisms. For him, biology is the history of physical life—of generation and degeneration—and the study of “the separation of the living and the lifeless that emerged as individual living organisms separated from the earth and formed into small self-enclosed worlds”—worlds that transform the material configuration of the world (119).

Part Two begins with Renato G. Mazzolini’s “Skin Color and the Origin of Physical Anthropology (1640–1850),” in which Mazzolini claims that late seventeenth- to early eighteenth-century research into human skin color, mostly by way of dissection, developed out of curiosity about black skin. Mazzolini also states that human classification based on skin color preceded the idea of race and that “prejudice against colored peoples was chronologically antecedent to the idea that there existed human types or races, for which it provided the constitutive matrix” (145). By the mid-eighteenth century, skin color along with geography, temperament, and culture formed the core characteristics for determining racial difference.

Sara Figal, in “The Caucasian Slave Race: Beautiful Circassians and the Hybrid Origin of European Identity,” describes how sexuality and aesthetics were synthesized in the production of whiteness and how “Caucasian,” à la Meiners and Blumenbach, developed out of a European allure with Circassian slave women. Figal admits that “from the vantage point of history, considering how racial theories were translated into arguments for European cultural and political hegemony throughout the world, this choice for the originary body of the Caucasian ideal seems preposterous” (165). And yet, Figal assures us that the Circassian slave women of the Caucasus were considered the most beautiful in the world and could improve the beauty of other races by race-mixed breeding.

In “Analogy of Analogy: Animals and Slaves in Mary Wollstonecraft’s Defense of Women’s Rights,” Penelope Deutscher writes, “For when the claim that women are like animals and slaves (not to mention children and savages), serves the interests of women’s claim to a better status, what links the analogy with the analogy of the analogy is the hinge of what may be named an indirect, aspirational, analogical subordination of those whom it would (according to these embedded subordinations) be degrading for women to be ‘like’” (204). The analogy of analogy refers to how “the slave is like an animal” was used to describe the subordination of women—“the woman is like a slave.” Wollstonecraft’s equivocation missed how slaves were indeed treated like animals for instrumental use, whereas women, while subordinate to men, were not viewed or treated like slaves or animals. In short, Deutscher’s challenge to Wollstonecraft’s rhetoric highlights the way in which it reinscribed animals and slaves to their subordinate status while at the same time it attempts to condemn the oppression faced by women.

Staffan Müller-Wille, in “Reproducing Difference: Race and Heredity from a longue durée Perspective,” suggests that heredity proceeds within historical events rather than within
natural kinds. Moreover, the notion of race, arguably, ought to be viewed as a consequence of variations in heredity rather than as a static marker of unchangeable human difference. The idea that there are three or four permanent races based on skin color remains popular despite its being debunked by scientists from biology to anthropology. Müller-Wille’s claim is that “the concept of heredity, when it entered biology in the early nineteenth century, did not refer to the fixity of species or the age-old observation that ‘like engenders like.’ It was geared toward a much more specific phenomenon—namely, that of ‘heritable variation’” (218). This, according to Müller-Wille, was most clearly illustrated through investigations into disease (medicine) and racial characteristics (anthropology).

Robert Bernasconi’s “Heredity and Hybridity in the Natural History of Kant, Girtanner, and Schelling during the 1790s” addresses a question in the history of science, namely, “Why did certain leading intellectuals of the 1790s adopt what can broadly be called the Kantian notion of race, when that notion was still largely being presented in the apparently discrepant terms of germs or seeds (Keime)?” (237). Kant’s account of inheritance attempts to resolve the tensions between epigenesis and preformationism and to explain how inherited, permanent racial differences could share the same source by maintaining the notion that an organism has the capacity to adapt to its environment in a way that is given in advance but not preformed.

The volume concludes with Alison Stone’s “Sexual Polarity in Schelling and Hegel.” Stone notes that, for both Schelling and Hegel, reproduction is marked by an indefinitely persisting sexual polarity—productivity and inhibition and concept and matter, respectively. Schelling suggests that “the two sexes seek to overcome their polar opposition by reproducing, but they only succeed in generating more finite, sexually differentiated individuals,” whereas Hegel “thinks that the sexes reproduce in the effort to realize the (conceptual) unity of their species, but that they only produce another finite, embodied individual” (259). Stone concludes with a proposal of why and how these contrasting views of sexual difference might be beneficial for contemporary feminist thought.

In conclusion, it remains unclear to me why the year 1800 has been singled out when it seems that there was a plethora of ideas that cross over several decades. Furthermore, many contributors treat the Enlightenment and Naturphilosophie as if there were a strict, discrete line of demarcation between them. If 1800 is an easy signifier, then all right. If it is meant to be taken with seriousness, then a stronger defense for it needs to be given.

Second, some terms are treated inconsistently, which is only a problem if this inconsistency is not explicitly addressed. For instance, “race” seems to fluctuate between skin color, phenotypes, geography, and culture, while “gender” often slides between notions of biological sex and social norms. Of course, from a historical perspective, these terms are messy and this is no fault of the contributors. Nevertheless, it would be helpful to have clarity of definition within each chapter.

Despite these criticisms, which I do not find to be significant, I found the volume well-written, well-organized, resourceful, and quite illuminating, especially with regard to how the notions of reproduction, race, and gender were developed in relation to one another, often in ways with which I was unfamiliar. It is a book that I will be returning to again while doing future research. And, like me, others working on these issues no doubt will want to pick up a copy. Lettow and the contributors deserve our thanks for such splendid work.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

EXPLORING COLLABORATIVE CONTESTATIONS AND DIVERSIFYING PHILOSOPHY, MAY 28–30, 2015

Hypatia and the APA Committee on the Status of Women have joined forces to offer an exciting conference event. Two conferences will be held in conjunction with one another, together with an array of workshops on everything from publishing in philosophy to bystander training.

Stay for an extra day to join us for the CSW Site Visit Training Program. To apply to be a participant in the Site Visit Training, see http://www.apaonlinecsw.org and click on “Site Visit Program.”

THE ASSOCIATION FOR FEMINIST ETHICS AND SOCIAL THEORY (FEAST)

Contested Terrains: Women of Color, Feminisms, and Geopolitics

October 1–4, 2015

Sheraton Sand Key Resort, Clearwater Beach, Florida

Keynote speakers:

Kimberlé Crenshaw, Distinguished Professor of Law at UCLA and Columbia and founder of the African-American Policy Forum. An international activist, Crenshaw is well known for her foundational scholarly work on intersectionality and critical race theory. Professor Crenshaw’s publications include Critical Race Theory (edited by Crenshaw et al., 1995) and Words that Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech and the First Amendment (with Matsuda et al., 1993). Her work on race and gender was influential in drafting the equality clause in the South African Constitution, and she helped facilitate the inclusion of gender in the U.N. World Conference on Racism Declaration. In the U.S., she served as a member of the National Science Foundation’s committee to research violence against women and assisted the legal team representing Anita Hill.

Sunera Thobani, Associate Professor at the Institute for Gender, Race, Sexuality and Social Justice at the University of British Columbia. A founding member of RACE (Researchers and Academics of Colour for Equity) and a
past president of Canada’s National Action Committee on the Status of Women, Thobani’s research focuses on critical race, postcolonial and feminist theory, globalization, citizenship, migration, Muslim women, the War on Terror, and media. Professor Thobani is the author of Exalted Subjects: Studies in the Making of Race and Nation in Canada (University of Toronto Press, 2007) and numerous other works. As a public intellectual, Thobani is well known for her vocal opposition to Canadian support of the U.S.-led invasion into Afghanistan.

**CALL FOR PAPERS**

Special Issue “Contested Terrains: Third World Women, Feminisms, and Geopolitics”

Volume 32 Issue 3, 2017

Guest Editors: Ranjoo Herr (Bentley University) and Shelley Park (University of Central Florida)

Hypatia seeks papers for a special issue on “Contested Terrains” featuring feminist scholarship that explores the varied geopolitical landscapes on which contestations about feminist theories and practices regarding Third World women are situated. The experiences and perspectives of Third World women have been frequently erased, distorted, and manipulated both by dominant feminist discourses and by dominant geopolitical discourses. Long after the proclaimed demise of second wave feminism in the academy, neoliberal feminist discourses continue to dominate within neocolonial geopolitical regimes. Conventional geopolitical discourses flatten the complexity of Third World women’s lives and ignore their diversely embodied, material, and psychic realities within nations by emphasizing conflicts and alliances between nation-states. We invite feminist analyses that rescale geopolitical landscapes, shifting our attention from the macroscopic perspectives of international affairs and globalization to the smaller scale connections between space and politics that play out at the level of Third World women’s intimate lives, community practices, and everyday tactics of survival and resistance. Papers that explore the ways in which race, ethnicity, class, gender, sexuality, disability, age, and other forms of difference intersect with issues of geopolitical location are encouraged.

This special issue starts from the premise that differences and disagreements among women have value. Thus, we encourage submissions that explore tensions among women—locally, regionally, nationally, and globally—as a potential source of productive feminist questioning, reflection, knowledge, and practice. At the same time, such tensions should not be romanticized; disagreements are experienced differently and disproportionately by diverse participants with varying issues at stake. Because the material and psychic consequences of disagreement are rarely distributed evenly across geopolitical terrains, contributors are encouraged to analyze the consequences—as well as the origins—of contestations between and among Third World and First World women.

We use the identifier “Third World women” here to center the perspectives of women of color who—whether living in the Third World or in the First World—contest the neocolonialism and cultural imperialism of the First World, including First World feminisms. However, contributions critically examining geopolitical divisions of the globe into “First” and “Third” worlds (or other conventional geopolitical mappings) are welcome. How best to describe the differing geopolitical contexts of different feminisms in the era of economic, political, and cultural globalization is—and should be—itself a site of contestation.

Possible topics may include:

- **Contested discursive terrains**: For example, the contested geopolitical partitionings of West-East; North/South; or First World/Third World and competing feminist understandings of globalization as embedded in theories of “Third World feminism,” “transnational feminism,” “women of color feminism,” “postcolonial feminism,” and “global feminism.”

- **Contested epistemological terrains**: For example, inequitable access to publishing resources, the privileging of written over oral traditions, and different understandings of cultural intelligibility.

- **Contested political terrains**: For example, the geopolitics of war, military occupations, nationalism, patriotism, terrorism, migration, border patrols, detention, and deportation; differing experiences of trauma and violence, security and danger.

- **Contested economic terrains**: For example, resource conflicts between and among women (and girls) situated differently as owners, sellers, consumers, workers, and commodities in various industries ranging from agriculture to technology to tourism.

- **Contested terrains of kinship**: For example, local and global disagreements among women concerning the ethics of polygamy, arranged marriages, transnational adoptions, and other familial forms.

- **Contested terrains of solidarity**: For example, the struggles that arise between women, locally and globally, with different ethico-political values or priorities; how allies often harm those they intend to help.

Submission deadline: December 1, 2015

Papers should be no more than 8,000 words, inclusive of notes and bibliography, prepared for anonymous review, and accompanied by an abstract of no more than 200 words. In addition to articles, we invite submissions for our Musings section. These should not exceed 3,000 words, including footnotes and references. All submissions will be subject to external review. For details please see Hypatia’s submission guidelines.
Please submit your paper to https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/hypa. When you submit, make sure to select “Contested Terrains” as your manuscript type, and also send an email to the guest editor(s) indicating the title of the paper you have submitted: Ranjoo S. Herr: rherr@bentley.edu, and Shelley Park: Shelley.Park@ucf.edu.

CONTRIBUTORS

Sarah LaChance Adams is assistant professor of philosophy at University of Wisconsin–Superior. She is author of Mad Mother, Bad Mothers, and What a "Good" Mother Would Do: The Ethics of Ambivalence (Columbia, 2014) and co-editor of Coming to Life: Philosophies of Pregnancy, Childbirth and Mothering (Fordham, 2013). She is currently co-editing an anthology on the philosophy of love and sex. She received her Ph.D. in philosophy from University of Oregon in 2011, and her MA in psychology from Seattle University in 2004. Her research interests include ethics, social justice, feminist philosophy, and nineteenth- and twentieth-century continental philosophy.

Saray Ayala teaches philosophy at San Francisco State University. Saray received a Ph.D. in philosophy from Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, and held a postdoctoral fellowship at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid combined with a research stay at MIT. Saray’s Ph.D. research focused on embodied cognition and the extended mind. As a postdoc, Saray could not resist exploring moral questions anymore. Saray’s current work applies conceptual tools from the philosophy of cognitive science and language to understand and explain episodes of discrimination and injustice.

Dana S. Belu is associate professor and chair of the philosophy department at California State University Dominguez Hills. She works at the intersection of phenomenology, philosophy of technology, and feminist philosophy. She has published articles on Heidegger’s philosophy, feminist phenomenology, and reproductive technology. Her article “Phenomenological Reflections on Childbirth in the Technological Age” is forthcoming in The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Technology (2016, ed. J. Pitt). She is a contributor to The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon (forthcoming, 2015, ed. M. Wrathall). She edited the special issue of Techné: Research in Philosophy & Technology Journal (vol. 16, no. 1, June 2012) on Feminism, Autonomy & Reproductive Technology. Her manuscript Heidegger, Feminism & Reproductive Technology is currently under revision.

Megan M. Burke is a doctoral student in philosophy at the University of Oregon. She joined the Department of Philosophy and Gender and Women’s Studies program at Oklahoma State University as an assistant professor for the 2015-2016 academic year. Her research is in feminist philosophy and continental philosophy.

Marilyn Fischer is professor of philosophy at the University of Dayton. She specializes in American pragmatism, and writes primarily on Jane Addams. In addition to several articles, she is the author of Ethical Decision Making in Fund Raising and On Addams. She co-edited Jane Addams and the Practice of Philosophy and a four-volume set of Addams’s writings on peace.

Erinn Cunniff Gilson is assistant professor of philosophy at the University of North Florida. She is the author of The Ethics of Vulnerability (Routledge, 2014). Her current research critically analyzes how vulnerability is distributed as a social condition and framed as a salient concept for understanding experience. She is especially interested in vulnerability in relation to food justice and ethics, feminist approaches to sexuality and sexual violence, racism and racial justice, and critiques of neoliberal values and subjectivity.

Hailey Huget is a Ph.D. student in philosophy at Georgetown University. She works on a variety of issues in ethics and bioethics, including forgiveness and moral repair, reactive attitudes, and moral status.

Mark William Westmoreland holds a doctoral fellowship in philosophy and theology at Villanova University. He is co-editor (with Andrea Pitts) of Beyond Bergson: Race, Gender, and Colonialism (under contract with SUNY Press). He has published on critical philosophy of race, political philosophy, and continental philosophy. Most of his work analyzes how the notion of race developed in relation to political policies and practices. Mark is currently completing a dissertation that explores the injustice of racial profiling from the perspective of the invisible and the hypervisible.