

February 2008
Volume 81, Issue 4

Proceedings and Addresses

of The American Philosophical Association



apa

THE AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Central Division Program

The American Philosophical
Association
Central Division

One Hundred Fifth
Annual Meeting



Palmer House Hilton Hotel
Chicago, IL

April 16 - 19, 2008

Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association

Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association (ISSN 0065-972X) is published five times each year and is distributed to members of the APA as a benefit of membership and to libraries, departments, and institutions for \$75 per year. It is published by The American Philosophical Association, 31 Amstel Ave., University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716. Periodicals Postage Paid at Newark, DE and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to *Proceedings and Addresses*, The American Philosophical Association, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716.

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Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association, the major publication of The American Philosophical Association, is published five times each academic year in the months of September, November, January, February, and May.

Each annual volume contains the programs for the meetings of the three Divisions; the membership list; Presidential Addresses; news of the Association, its Divisions and Committees, and announcements of interest to philosophers. Other items of interest to the community of philosophers may be included by decision of the Editor or the APA Board of Officers.

Microfilm copies are available through National Archive Publishing Company, Periodicals/Acquisitions Dept., P.O. Box 998, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-0998. ([HTTP://WWW.NAPUBCO.COM](http://www.napubco.com)). Certain back issues may be obtained from the APA.

All correspondence should be sent to the APA, 31 Amstel Avenue, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716, directed to the appropriate staff member as follows: Erin Shepherd for inquiries and publication copy concerning programs of the Divisional meetings, general issues of the *Proceedings*, announcements, awards to members and advertising; Janet Sample for membership information, address changes, and memorial minutes; and the Executive Director for letters to the editor.

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ISSN 0065-972X

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LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY-TREASURER

To All Members of the Association:

You are cordially invited to attend the one hundred fifth Annual Meeting of the Central Division at the Palmer House Hilton Hotel, Chicago, Illinois, April 16-19, 2008. This year's program committee has organized an extensive array of thirty Colloquium sessions, fourteen invited Symposia, and five Author Meets Critics sessions. Our program also includes twelve special sessions organized by Committees of the APA and over seventy affiliated group sessions. This year, the Central Division has adopted the practice of considering submitted Symposium sessions long followed by the Eastern and Pacific Divisions, and our program includes four submitted Symposia in addition to the fourteen invited ones.

This issue of the *Proceedings* contains a complete convention program, including scheduled group meetings. At the back of this issue, you will find a hotel reservation form, a meeting registration form, a form for reserving tables at the receptions, and maps of the hotel's location and meeting rooms. Also included are information forms concerning the 2009 meeting and the 2008-2009 Nominating Committee, for your use if you have suggestions for future meetings or wish to offer your services to the Division.

1. HOTEL INFORMATION

Most Central Division members will already be familiar with the Palmer House Hilton, a frequent location of Central (and Western) Division meetings for many decades. The Palmer House is located in the Chicago Loop, a short walk from Symphony Center and the Chicago Art Institute, among many other local attractions.

Hotel reservations should be made directly with the hotel in one of the following ways:

- *By mail:* Use the form printed in this issue of the *Proceedings*.
 - *By telephone:* Call the Palmer House reservations department directly at 1-877-865-5321. Explain that you are attending The American Philosophical Association meeting. If you are a graduate student member, please indicate that you want the graduate student rate (NOTE: the National Office staff will confirm the graduate student status of all those requesting the graduate student rate).
 - *Through the Internet:* Use the following URL: http://www.hilton.com/en/hi/groups/private_groups/chiphhh_amp/index.jhtml. Please note that *reservations at the special graduate student rate cannot be made through this online link*. Graduate students must instead call 1-877-865-5231 or use the printed form.
-

To be assured of a room at the special convention rate, you should **act promptly**. Our convention block of rooms will be maintained by the hotel only until **March 18, 2008**. After that time, any unused rooms in the block will be released to other guests, and convention registrants may be unable to obtain the special rates or appropriate rooms. April is an extremely busy time for conventions in Chicago, and hotel rooms go fast.

•**Chicago Airports:** Chicago is served by O'Hare International and Chicago Midway airports. Virtually all airlines fly to O'Hare, and many also fly to Midway, which has the advantages of being closer to the Loop and somewhat less crowded.

•**Ground Transportation from O'Hare and Midway:** The most economical way to reach the hotel is the **Chicago Transit Authority** trains (fare \$1.75 as of Jan. 1, 2006). From O'Hare, take the **CTA Blue Line** from the station between Terminals 2 and 3 (follow the signs for "Trains to City"). Get off at the Monroe/Dearborn station and go east on Monroe to the hotel entrance between State and Wabash. Travel time is about forty-five minutes, and trains run every ten minutes (with reduced schedules Sunday and late at night). From Midway, the **CTA Orange Line** runs every ten minutes and will take you to the Loop in about half an hour (get off at the Adams/Wabash stop). The hotel entrance is on the west side of Wabash. A **map of the downtown area CTA routes and stations** is available at <http://www.transitchicago.com/maps/maps/F2003D.html>.

•**Airport shuttle buses** to the loop are (at this writing) \$17.50 one way from O'Hare, \$17.50 one way from Midway. Buses go directly to Loop hotels, including the Palmer House. Allow an hour from Midway, an hour and a half from O'Hare; (time varies considerably, especially with heavy traffic). Buses leave every ten to fifteen minutes, and return buses leave the Palmer House every half hour from the Monroe Street side. You can make advance reservations (and get a coupon for \$2 off) at <http://www.airportexpress.com/>.

•**Taxi fare** is \$35-\$40 from O'Hare, \$25 from Midway. For two or more passengers, flat-rate ride sharing fares are available (\$19 per passenger from O'Hare, \$15 per passenger from Midway). Travel time to/from O'Hare ranges from half an hour in light traffic to an hour or more in heavy traffic (on Friday afternoon, it can exceed two hours). If you're in a hurry, a taxi is usually the fastest way to go except when traffic is at its worst, when the CTA is probably fastest (provided that you are traveling with one very small suitcase).

•**Accessible transportation:** The CTA stations at both Midway and O'Hare are wheelchair-accessible, but not all stations in the Loop area have elevators. The closest Blue Line stop to the Palmer House with an elevator is Jackson, two long blocks from the Palmer House at Jackson and State Streets. In the Loop area, the Orange Line from Midway is on elevated tracks. The closest elevator-equipped Orange Line station is Van Buren, another long block south of the Jackson station. Call the Elevator Status Hotline at 1-888-968-7282 and press 5 to check for elevator service problems (TTY 1-888-282-8891). All CTA buses have lifts or ramps. Contact

the RTA Travel Information Center at 312-836-7000 for updated information. Maps and other information are available at <http://www.transitchicago.com/maps/accessible.html>, and a brochure on accessibility is available at <http://www.transitchicago.com/downloads/brochures/ada.pdf> (text version <http://www.transitchicago.com/welcome/ada.txt>).

•**Driving to Chicago:** See http://www.hilton.com/en/hi/hotels/maps_directions.jhtml?ctyhocn=CHIPHHH for maps and driving directions to the Palmer House. Valet parking is \$38 per day, self-parking \$30 per day for hotel guests.

•**Amtrak:** Amtrak trains arrive at Union Station, which is about ten blocks (some long) west on Canal between Adams and Jackson, across the Chicago River. The 151 bus goes to the hotel area (stop at State and Adams). A taxi to the Palmer House is under \$10. Consult <http://www.amtrak.com> for schedules and fares.

2. ACCESS TO MEETING ROOMS IN THE PALMER HOUSE

Meeting rooms are located on floors 3-5 of the Palmer House. (The Empire Room is directly accessible from the hotel lobby by a short stairway and has its own elevator). Please note that *there are two banks of elevators* and that *not all floors are accessible from both banks*. The main elevators, located at the back of the hotel lobby, go to all sleeping room floors. A second bank of elevators, the State Street elevators, is located to the right of the main elevators in the lobby, towards the State Street side of the hotel. These elevators go only as far as the 10th floor. All elevators go to the lobby, the street level, and the 6th floor. For meeting rooms on the 3rd, 4th, and 5th floors, the situation is more complicated: see the explanation below (note in particular that the 3rd floor is divided into two parts, each served by only one of the banks of elevators). In the meeting program, the room for each session is followed by the floor and by an indication of which elevators can be used to access this room: 'M' for the main elevators, 'S' for the State Street elevators. If it is necessary to change from one bank of elevators to the other, this can be done at the street, lobby, and 6th floor levels.

Third Floor Meeting Rooms. The majority of the meeting rooms for this meeting are on the 3rd floor, as is the registration area, the book exhibits, and the placement center. However, the 3rd floor is divided into two sections that are at different elevations. Registration, the Book Exhibits, and the Placement Center are all in the Lower Exhibit Hall, which is on the lower part of the 3rd floor. This part is accessible only by the State Street elevators or by escalator from the lobby. All other 3rd-floor meeting rooms are on the upper side of the floor, which is connected to the lower part by a short stairway. This part is accessible only via the main elevators. In brief: to reach the Lower Exhibit Hall, take the State Street elevators or the escalators from the lobby. To reach the 3rd-floor meeting rooms, take the main elevators.

Fourth and Fifth Floors. The 4th floor is accessible only by the main elevators or by escalator and stairway from the lower part of the 3rd floor. The meeting rooms on the 5th floor are accessible only by the State Street

elevators or by stairway from the 4th floor.

3. MEETING REGISTRATION

Rates for registration are as follows:

APA Members	\$50
Non-Members	\$60
Student members	\$10

The Central Division rebates \$10 of the Member's and Non-Member's fee to the APA national office to support the general costs of the APA. All remaining registration income is used to support the expenses of the meeting and the operations of the Central Division. You may pre-register for the meeting by using the pre-registration information form found at the back of this issue. The deadline for pre-registration is **April 7, 2008**. Payment is accepted by cash, check, or credit card.

Registration includes admission to the reception on Thursday evening; non-registrants who wish to attend this reception may purchase tickets at the Registration Desk, or at the door of the reception, for \$10. **Please note that all persons attending the convention are expected to register (this includes invited participants and participants in Group Meetings).** Registration fees are vital to the conduct of APA conventions, since convention revenues are the only source of income for the Divisions.

4. PLACEMENT SERVICE

The Placement Center will open for business at 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday, April 16, and continue in operation through Noon, Saturday, April 19 (see the Program for specific times). Job seekers are urged to pre-register for Placement by submitting the pre-registration form provided in this issue. Since many job interviews are pre-arranged on the basis of advertisements in *Jobs for Philosophers (JFP)*, and since the Placement Center will not post notices of positions that have already been advertised in *JFP*, job seekers are advised to obtain copies of *JFP* in advance of the meeting and to bring them to the meeting. (*JFP* is available to APA members upon request, at no extra charge. Requests should be addressed to the APA National Office, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716.)

Policy on Interviews in Sleeping Rooms. At its 1994 meeting the APA Board of Officers adopted the policy of prohibiting job interviews in sleeping rooms at Divisional meetings. We ask your cooperation in implementing this policy. Interviews in the living rooms of suites are, of course, permissible under this policy, and interviewing departments may also make use of the Placement Center interview area in Salon 2 (within the Lower Exhibit Hall on the 3rd floor: use State Street elevators).

5. BOOK EXHIBITS

The publishers' book exhibits will be open 9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m. on Thursday and Friday and 9:00 a.m.-Noon on Saturday.

6. RECEPTIONS

The reception on Thursday, April 17, will begin at 8:30 p.m. Complimentary beer and soft drinks are provided at this reception, which is open only to those who have either registered for the convention or purchased special tickets for the reception (available for \$10 both at the registration desk and at the door of the reception). The Presidential Reception on Friday, April 18, will begin at 9:00 p.m. Tickets are not required for admission to the Friday reception, and refreshments are available on a cash-bar basis. Departments that wish to reserve a numbered table at the two receptions may do so for a fee of \$25 (see the form at the back of this issue of the *Proceedings*).

7. BUSINESS MEETING

The annual Business Meeting of the Central Division will be held Friday, April 18, at 12:15 p.m. Please note that only APA members who are affiliates of the Central Division have voting rights at this meeting. Regular items of business include reports from Divisional and National officers and committees and the nomination of officers for 2008-2009. The 2008 Nominating Committee will present a slate of nominees for the positions of Vice President, Member of the Executive Committee, and the four members of the 2008 Nominating Committee. The Report of the Nominating Committee will be posted in the registration area 24 hours prior to the Business Meeting. Nominations from the floor are also accepted if proposed by a group of ten members. In accordance with Divisional rules, voting for candidates will be by mail ballot.

The Minutes of the 2007 Executive Committee Meeting and draft minutes of the 2007 Business Meeting are published in this issue of the *Proceedings*, pp. 147-149.

8. PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

President James P. Sterba will present the 2008 Presidential Address, "Completing the Kantian Project: From Rationality to Equality," at 5:00 p.m. on Friday. He will be introduced by Peter van Inwagen, Vice President of the Central Division. President Sterba has decided to include time for questions from the audience at the end of his presidential address. Microphones will be available at several locations in the room for those wishing to pose questions.

9. JOHN DEWEY LECTURE

At its 2004 meeting, the Executive Committee of the Central Division accepted a generous offer from the John Dewey Foundation to fund a John Dewey Lecture at each annual meeting. The John Dewey Lecture is given by a prominent and senior American philosopher who is invited to reflect, broadly and in an autobiographical spirit, on philosophy in America. The Central Division is pleased to announce that the 2008 John Dewey Lecture, entitled "Unnatural Lotteries and Diversity in Philosophy," will be given by Claudia Card on Thursday, April 17, at 1:30 p.m. (Session I-A). The lecture will be introduced by Alison M. Jaggar. A reception, hosted by the John

Dewey Foundation, will follow.

10. GRADUATE STUDENT TRAVEL STIPEND RECIPIENTS

As in past years, the Central Division Executive Committee awards stipends of \$300 each to help defray the travel expenses of graduate students whose papers are accepted for the program. Starting with the 2006 program, the Executive Committee has decided to provide a stipend for every graduate student whose paper is accepted. The Executive and Program Committees are pleased to announce the names of the twenty-four winners of stipends for this year:

Mark Piper (Saint Louis University): “Hursthouse’s Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics, the Slide into Consequentialism, and the Problem of Instrumentally Successful Vice.” Paper 1 in Session IV-H, ‘Virtue Ethics’ (Saturday, 9:00 a.m.)

Tracie Mahaffey (Florida State University): “The Experience of Authorship and Automatic Action.” Paper 3 in Session III-G, ‘Action, Agency, and Responsibility’ (Friday, 1:45 p.m.)

Matthew Pianalto (University of Arkansas): “Moral Realism and Ways of Life.” Paper 2 in Session IV-K, ‘Moral Realism and Moral Responsibility’ (Saturday, 9:00 a.m.)

Sarah Kenehan (University of Tennessee/Bern University): “General Circulation Models and Severe Tests.” Paper 1 in Session II-I, ‘Philosophy of Science’ (Friday, 9:00 a.m.)

Luke Gelinas (University of Toronto): “Is Agent-Based Virtue Ethics Circular?” Paper 2 in Session IV-H, ‘Virtue Ethics’ (Saturday, 9:00 a.m.)

Kelly Trogdon (University of Massachusetts): “Physicalism and Sparse Ontology.” Paper 3 in Session IV-J, ‘Physicalism and Realization’ (Saturday, 9:00 a.m.)

Eunjung Kim (University of Washington): “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus and the Moral Enforceability of Human Rights.” Paper 3 in Session III-F, ‘Political Philosophy’ (Friday, 1:45 p.m.)

Joel Velasco (University of Wisconsin–Madison): “The Biological Species Concept and Evolutionary History.” Paper 3 in Session II-I, ‘Philosophy of Science’ (Friday 9:00 a.m.)

Christina Conroy (University of California–Irvine): “On an Alleged Refutation of Actually-Rigidified Descriptivism.” Paper 3 in Session II-K, ‘Descriptions and Substitution’ (Friday, 9:00 a.m.)

Frank Pupa (The Graduate School and University Center–City University of New York): “Descriptions, Understanding, and Anaphoric Chains: Russell’s New Challenge.” Paper 1 in Session II-K, ‘Descriptions and Substitution’ (Friday, 9:00 a.m.)

Jeremy Garrett (Rice University): “History, Tradition, and the Normative Foundations of Civil Marriage.” Paper 3 in Session I-F, ‘Issues in Sexual Ethics’ (Thursday, 1:30 p.m.)

Ephraim Glick (Massachusetts Institute of Technology): “What is the Problem of Intentional Identity?” Paper 3 in Session I-G, ‘Philosophy of Language’ (Thursday, 1:30 p.m.)

Daniel M. Johnson (Baylor University): “Making Co-instantiation Primitive: Consequences for the Bundle Theory’s Commitment to the Identity of Indiscernibles.” Paper 1 in Session V-G, ‘Metaphysics and Physics’ (Saturday, 2:30 p.m.)

Brett Fulkerson-Smith (University of Kentucky): “On the Apodictic Proof of Kant’s Revolutionary Hypothesis.” Paper 1 in Session V-I, ‘Kant’ (Saturday, 2:30 p.m.)

Emil Badici (University of Florida): “The Liar Paradox and the Inclosure Schema.” Paper 2 in Session I-G, ‘Philosophy of Language’ (Thursday, 1:30 p.m.)

Leo Iacono (University of Nebraska–Lincoln): “Warranted Assertability Maneuvers and the Rules of Assertion.” Paper 1 in Session I-I, ‘Epistemology I’ (Thursday, 1:30 p.m.)

David Bronstein (Oxford University/University of Toronto): “Understanding Meno’s Paradox in Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* I 1.” Paper 3 in Session II-G, ‘Ancient Philosophy: Epistemology and Metaphysics’ (Friday, 9:00 a.m.)

Matthew Brophy (Minnesota State University–Mankato): “Moral Judgments: Etiologies and Credibility.” Paper 3 in Session IV-K, ‘Moral Realism and Moral Responsibility’ (Saturday, 9:00 a.m.)

Michael Dean Hartsock (University of Missouri–Columbia): “Omissions as Causes.” Paper 1 in Session III-G, ‘Action, Agency, and Responsibility’ (Friday, 1:45 p.m.)

Simon Rippon (Harvard University): “In Defense of the Wide-Scope Instrumental Principle.” Paper 1 in Session III-H, ‘Metaethics’ (Friday, 1:45 p.m.)

Felipe De Brigard (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill) and **Eric Mandelbaum** (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill): “Neuroscience and Responsibility.” Paper 2 in Session III-G, ‘Action, Agency, and Responsibility’ (Friday, 1:45 p.m.)

Russell Jones (University of Oklahoma): “Bivalence and Contradictory Pairs in Aristotle’s *De Interpretatione* 9.” Paper 1 in Session II-G, ‘Ancient Philosophy: Epistemology and Metaphysics’ (Friday, 9:00 a.m.)

Jeffrey Dunn (University of Massachusetts): “Counterfactual Dependence, Thermodynamics, and the Special Sciences.” Paper 3 in Session V-G, ‘Metaphysics and Physics’ (Saturday, 2:30 p.m.)

Japa Pallikkathayil (Harvard University): “Consent and the Formula of Humanity.” Submitted Symposium paper in Session IV-E (Saturday, 9:00 a.m.)

11. 2009 PROGRAM COMMITTEE

Vice President Peter van Inwagen has appointed the following Program Committee for the 2009 Central Division Meeting:

Timothy O'Connor (Indiana University–Bloomington), *Chair*

Carla Bagnoli (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)

Jeffrey E. Brower (Purdue University)

E.J. Coffman (University of Tennessee)

Peggy DesAutels (University of Dayton)

Dan Kaufman (University of Colorado)

Robert Koons (University of Texas–Austin)

Edward Minar (University of Arkansas)

Robert Rupert (University of Colorado–Boulder)

Sally Sedgwick (University of Illinois–Chicago)

Robin Smith (Texas A&M University)

Christina Van Dyke (Calvin College)

Helga Varden (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)

Peter B.M. Vranas (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

12. CALL FOR PAPERS, 2009

The Program Committee for 2009 invites APA members to submit papers for presentation at the one hundred sixth annual meeting, to be held in Chicago, at the Palmer House Hilton hotel, February 18-21, 2009. **Please see the addendum to the Minutes of the 2007 Executive Committee Meeting on pp. 155-157 concerning the shift to earlier dates for this meeting.** The deadline for submission is **June 1, 2008**. For additional details on how and where to submit papers for consideration, see the section on Paper Submission Guidelines later in this issue of the *Proceedings*.

13. PARTICIPATION

APA members who wish to be considered as commentators or session chairs for the 2009 meeting should use the Program Information Form provided later in this issue of the *Proceedings*. The following resolution of the Central Division, adopted at the 1980 Business Meeting, will be of interest to prospective participants:

“The APA is the sole professional organization that serves and represents all American philosophers. To give better effect to the foregoing statement, the Executive Committee of the Central Division publicly affirms its desire that the composition of its officers, committees, and programs reflect the diversity of its membership in such respects as methodology, problem area, and type of employment or institutional affiliation.”

14. NOMINATIONS

The Central Division Executive Committee also invites suggestions from Central Division affiliates about appropriate candidates for Central Division offices. If you would like to propose anyone for consideration, please see the instructions in this issue of the *Proceedings*.

15. PROGRAM INFORMATION

The Program of the meeting, including the main sessions organized by the APA and group sessions organized by affiliated groups, forms part of this issue. Abstracts of invited and contributed papers are also included. A limited number of copies of the Program will also be available at registration. A world-wide-web version of the Program is also available at the APA's web site, <http://www.udel.edu/apa/> (this site also includes pointers to additional sources of information on the Internet about the Chicago area). The web version may be updated periodically, as necessary, to incorporate late changes in the Program.

16. SPECIAL THANKS FROM THE SECRETARY-TREASURER

I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the generous support of Texas A&M University for the Central Division office.

On behalf of the Executive and Program Committees, I extend to every member of The American Philosophical Association an invitation to take part in our One Hundred Fifth Annual Meeting.

Robin Smith

Secretary-Treasurer, APA Central Division

CENTRAL DIVISION OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES, 2007-2008

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, 2007-2008

President: James P. Sterba

Vice President: Peter van Inwagen

Past President: Ted Cohen

Divisional Representative: Marilyn Friedman

Secretary-Treasurer: Robin Smith

Term 2005-2008: Charlotte Brown

Term 2006-2009: Lisa Downing

Term 2007-2010: Richard Kraut

PROGRAM COMMITTEE, 2008

Ann E. Cudd, *Chair*

Cornelius Delaney

Sanford Goldberg

Tomis Kapitan

Michelle Kosch

Thomas D. Senior

Robin Smith, *ex officio*

Nancy E. Snow

James P. Sterba

Anita Superson

Mariam Thalos

Thomas M. Tuozzo

Julie Ward

NOMINATING COMMITTEE, 2007-2008

Ted Cohen, *Chair*

Hugh J. McCann

Marya Schechtman

Lisa Shabel

Rachel E. Zuckert

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

CENTRAL DIVISION ONE HUNDRED FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM

APRIL 16-19, 2008
PALMER HOUSE HILTON HOTEL

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 16

PLACEMENT INTERVIEW AREA

5:00-10:00 p.m.

PLACEMENT SERVICE

5:00-10:00 p.m.

REGISTRATION

5:00-10:00 p.m.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

7:00-11:00 p.m.

THURSDAY, APRIL 17

BOOK EXHIBITS

9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m.

GROUP AND COMMITTEE SESSIONS, THURSDAY MORNING

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

Session GI: 9:00 a.m.-Noon

GI-1: Midwest Society for Women in Philosophy

GI-2: William James Society

GI-3: Philosophy of Time Society

- GI-4:* Society for Student Philosophers
GI-5: Society for the Metaphysics of Science
GI-6: Society for the Philosophy of History
GI-7: Philosophy of Religion Group
GI-8: Radical Philosophy Association
GI-9: Association of Chinese Philosophers in America
GI-10: History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society
GI-11: American Society for Philosophy, Counseling, and
 Psychotherapy
GI-12: Bertrand Russell Society
GI-13: Max Scheler Society

PLACEMENT INTERVIEW AREA

9:00 a.m.-7:00 p.m.

PLACEMENT SERVICE

9:00 a.m.-7:00 p.m.

REGISTRATION

9:00 a.m.-7:00 p.m.

GROUP AND COMMITTEE SESSIONS, THURSDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

Session GII: 5:15-7:15 p.m.

- GII-1:* International Society for Environmental Ethics
GII-2: Society of Christian Philosophers
GII-3: Joint Session: Committee on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
 Transgender People in the Profession and the Society for
 Lesbian and Gay Philosophy
GII-4: Society for the Philosophical Study of Education
GII-5: Committee on Institutional Cooperation
GII-6: International Berkeley Society
GII-7: American Society for Value Inquiry
GII-8: Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy
GII-9: Hume Society
GII-10: Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual
 Arts

Session GIII: 7:30-10:30 p.m.*GIII-1:* Hegel Society of America*GIII-2:* Karl Jaspers Society of North America*GIII-3:* Society for the Philosophy of Creativity*GIII-4:* Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts*GIII-5:* American Society for Value Inquiry*GIII-6:* Conference of Philosophical Societies*GIII-7:* Society for Analytical Feminism*GIII-8:* Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy*GIII-9:* Concerned Philosophers for Peace*GIII-10:* Society for the Metaphysics of Science*GIII-11:* Society for Student Philosophers*GIII-12:* Society for Arab, Persian, and Islamic Philosophy*GIII-13:* Society for the Philosophic Study of Genocide and the Holocaust*GIII-14:* Society for the Study of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Philosophy**I-A. Invited Session: The John Dewey Lecture***1:30-4:30 p.m.*

Chair: Alison M. Jaggar (University of Colorado)

Speaker: Claudia Card (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
“Unnatural Lotteries and Diversity in Philosophy”*A reception sponsored by the John Dewey Foundation will follow the lecture.***I-B. Symposium: Is Terrorism Ever Justifiable?***1:30-4:30 p.m.*

Chair: Raja Halwani (School of the Art Institute of Chicago)

Speakers: Omar Dahbour (City University of New York)
Nicholas Fotion (Emory University)

Virginia Held (City University of New York Graduate School and Hunter College)

Commentator: Lionel K. McPherson (Tufts University)

I-C. Symposium: On Natural Kinds: From Metaphysics to Phylogenesis*1:30-4:30 p.m.*

Chair: Lorraine Code (York University)

Speakers: Charlotte Witt (University of New Hampshire)
“Aristotle on Defective Kinds”

Giorgio Pini (Fordham University)

“Natural Kinds in the Later Middle Ages: The Case of Duns Scotus”

Joseph LaPorte (Hope College)

I-D. Author Meets Critics: Lisa H. Schwartzman, *Challenging Liberalism: Feminism as Political Critique*

1:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: Christian Miller (Wake Forest University)

Critics: Charles Mills (Northwestern University)

Elizabeth Secor Anderson (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)

Theresa W. Tobin (Marquette University)

Author: Lisa H. Schwartzman (Michigan State University)

I-E. Symposium: Libertarianism: For and Against

1:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: Carl Cohen (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)

Speakers: Tibor Machan (Chapman University)

John Christman (Pennsylvania State University)

Commentator: Tara Smith (University of Texas–Austin)

I-F. Colloquium: Issues in Sexual Ethics

1:30-4:30 p.m.

1:30-2:30 p.m.

Chair: Mark Sheldon (Northwestern University)

Speaker: Amy E. White (Ohio University–Zanesville)

“How Do You Like Your Eggs? The Morality of an Internet Market in Human Ova”

Commentator: Inmaculada De Melo-Martin (Weill Medical College, Cornell University)

2:30-3:30 p.m.

Chair: Nathan Nobis (Morehouse College)

Speaker: Kurt Liebegott (Purdue University)

“Why the Responsibility Objection to Thomson’s Abortion Argument Must Fail”

Commentator: Bertha Alvarez Manninen (Arizona State University at the West Campus)

3:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: Daniel A. Campana (University of La Verne)

Speaker: Jeremy Garrett (Rice University)
 “History, Tradition, and the Normative Foundations of
 Civil Marriage”

****Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner****

Commentator: Christine Overall (Queen’s University)

I-G. Colloquium: Philosophy of Language

1:30-4:30 p.m.

1:30-2:30 p.m.

Chair: Timothy McCarthy (University of Illinois–Urbana-
 Champaign)

Speaker: Paul Saka (University of Houston)
 “Speaking of the Unspeakable”

Commentator: Michael Kremer (University of Chicago)

2:30-3:30 p.m.

Chair: Harry Deutsch (Illinois State University)

Speaker: Emil Badici (University of Florida)
 “The Liar Paradox and the Inclosure Schema”

****Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner****

Commentator: Graham Priest (University of Melbourne)

3:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: Sanford Goldberg (Northwestern University)

Speaker: Ephraim Glick (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
 “What is the Problem of Intentional Identity?”

****Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner****

Commentator: Walter Edelberg (University of Illinois–Chicago)

I-H. Colloquium: Ancient Philosophy: Ethics

1:30-4:30 p.m.

1:30-2:30 p.m.

Chair: Corinne M. Painter (Washtenaw Community College)

Speaker: Travis L. Butler (Iowa State University)
 “Metaphysics and Ethics in Plato’s *Republic*”

Commentator: Franco V. Trivigno (Marquette University)

2:30-3:30 p.m.

Chair: S. Evan Kreider (University of Wisconsin–Fox Valley)

Speaker: May Sim (College of the Holy Cross)
 “Whose Aristotle? Which Stagirite?”

Commentator: Thornton C. Lockwood (Boston University)

3:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: Sharon E. Sytsma (Northern Illinois University)

Speaker: Anne Margaret Baxley (Washington University in St. Louis)

“Courage, Fear of Death, and the Silencing of Competing Reasons”

Commentator: Noell Birondo (Pomona College)

I-I. Colloquium: Epistemology I

1:30-4:30 p.m.

1:30-2:30 p.m.

Chair: Carl Ehrett (Northwestern University)

Speaker: Leo Iacono (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)

“Warranted Assertability Maneuvers and the Rules of Assertion”

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner

Commentator: Otávio A. Bueno (University of Miami)

2:30-3:30 p.m.

Chair: Michael J. Shaffer (St. Cloud State University)

Speaker: Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay (Montana State University)

“The Duhem-Quine Thesis”

Commentator: Christopher Pincock (Purdue University)

3:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: Benjamin Bayer (Loyola University of Chicago)

Speaker: William Roche (Texas Christian University)

“Coherentism and Truth”

Commentator: Richard Fumerton (University of Iowa)

I-J. Colloquium: Properties and Modality

1:30-4:30 p.m.

1:30-2:30 p.m.

Chair: Gillian Russell (Washington University in St. Louis)

Speaker: Chris Tillman (University of Manitoba)

“Necessarily, Everything Necessarily Exists”

Commentator: Scott Berman (Saint Louis University)

2:30-3:30 p.m.

Chair: Angel Pinillos (Arizona State University)

Speaker: Allen Gehring (Indiana University–Bloomington)

“Essentialism versus Essentialism: A Reply from a Naive Essentialist”

Commentator: Alicia Finch (Northern Illinois University)

3:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: Nick Treanor (University of Toronto)

Speaker: Carrie Figdor (University of Iowa)
 “Intrinsically/Extrinsically”

Commentator: Matthew Roberts (Whitworth University)

I-K. Colloquium: Responsibility and Autonomy

1:30-4:30 p.m.

1:30-2:30 p.m.

Chair: Julie Kirsch (Marymount University)

Speaker: Mikhail Valdman (Virginia Commonwealth University)

“Autonomy and History”

Commentator: Carol Hay (Bryn Mawr College)

2:30-3:30 p.m.

Chair: Anne Barnhill (New York University)

Speaker: Justin P. McBrayer (University of Missouri)

“Moral Responsibility, Coercion, and Guidance Control”

Commentator: Bradford Cokelet (Middlebury College)

3:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: Joseph Quinn Olechnowicz (Florida State University)

Speaker: Peter Brian Barry (Saginaw Valley State University)

“Saving Strawson”

Commentator: Kathryn J. Norlock (St. Mary’s College of Maryland)

I-L. Special Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies: Ethics and Classical Chinese Philosophy

1:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: Susan Blake (Indiana University)

Speakers: Yang Xiao (Kenyon College)

“Practical Wisdom as Moral Heuristics in Early Chinese Philosophy”

Steven F. Geisz (University of Tampa)

“Deliberation, Ritual, and Equality”

Brian J. Bruya (Eastern Michigan University)

“Between Reason and Reflex: Elements of a Nondeliberative Ethics”

Tongdong Bai (Xavier University)

“A Defense of a Decent (Confucian) People: A Criticism of Rawls’s Law of Peoples”

**I-M. Special Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on
Philosophy and Medicine: Physicians at War: The Dual
Loyalties Challenge**

1:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: Kevin McDonnell (Saint Mary's College, University of Notre Dame)

Speakers: Fritz Allhoff (Western Michigan University/Australian National University)

"Physicians at War: The Dual-Loyalties Challenge"

Michael Davis (Illinois Institute of Technology)

"No Dual Loyalty: The Profession of Medicine Comes First"

Matthew Wynia (American Medical Association Institute for Ethics)

"Consequentialism and Harsh Interrogations: Dual Loyalties Aren't Really the Issue"

Marcus Adams (Western Michigan University)

"Triage Priorities, Ethical Obligations, and Military Physicians"

Justin List (Stritch School of Medicine, Loyola University Chicago)

"Professional Duties When Lives Are at Stake: Can Physicians Practice Medical Neutrality While Being Political Activists in Armed Conflicts Settings?"

RECEPTION

8:30 p.m.-Midnight

FRIDAY, APRIL 18

BOOK EXHIBITS

9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m.

PLACEMENT INTERVIEW AREA

9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m.

PLACEMENT SERVICE

9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m.

REGISTRATION

9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m.

II-A. Symposium: Leibniz's Three-Tiered Ontology*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

- Chair: Laurence Carlin (University of Wisconsin–Oshkosh)
 Speakers: Jan Cover (Purdue University)
 Glenn A. Hartz (Ohio State University)
 Alan Nelson (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
 Timothy Crockett (Marquette University)

II-B. Symposium: Cheshire Calhoun's *Setting the Moral Compass**9:00 a.m.-Noon*

- Chair: Anita Superson (University of Kentucky)
 Speakers: Cheshire Calhoun (Arizona State University)
 Marcia Baron (Indiana University–Bloomington)
 Robin Dillon (Lehigh University)
 Michele Moody-Adams (Cornell University)

II-C. Author Meets Critics: Duncan Pritchard, *Epistemic Luck**9:00 a.m.-Noon*

- Chair: Mylan Engel, Jr. (Northern Illinois University)
 Critics: Ernest Sosa (Rutgers University)
 Linda Zagzebski (University of Oklahoma)
 Jonathan L. Kvanvig (Baylor University)
 Author: Duncan Pritchard (University of Stirling)

II-D. Author Meets Critics: Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit, *Disadvantage**9:00 a.m.-Noon*

- Chair: Charles Mills (Northwestern University)
 Critics: Richard J. Arneson (University of California–San Diego)
 Lawrence Becker (Hollins University)
 Martha Nussbaum (University of Chicago)
 Authors: Jonathan Wolff (University College London)
 Avner de-Shalit (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

II-E. Symposium: The Innocent Eye: Seeing-As without Concepts*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

- Chair: Marya Schechtman (University of Illinois–Chicago)
 Speaker: Nicoletta Orlandi (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
 Commentators: Teresa Britton (Eastern Illinois University)
 Robert Rupert (University of Colorado–Boulder)

II-F. Colloquium: Kantian Ethics*9:00 a.m.-Noon**9:00-10:00 a.m.*

Chair: Mark Decker (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)

Speaker: Scott E. Forschler (Northland Community and Technical College)

“Kantian and Consequentialist Ethics: The Gap Can Be Bridged”

Commentator: Rebecca Stangl (University of Virginia)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Gary Lewis (University of Connecticut)

Speaker: Michael J. Cholbi (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)

“Kantian Rigorism and Defensive Deception”

Commentator: Jake Noland (Virginia Commonwealth University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Jacob M. Held (University of Central Arkansas)

Speaker: Benjamin S. Yost (Harvard University)

“Kant’s Justification of the Death Penalty Reconsidered”

Commentator: Joseph M. Grcic (Indiana State University)

II-G. Colloquium: Ancient Philosophy: Epistemology and Metaphysics*9:00 a.m.-Noon**9:00-10:00 a.m.*

Chair: Martin Henn (University of Wisconsin–Whitewater)

Speaker: Russell Jones (University of Oklahoma)

“Bivalence and Contradictory Pairs in Aristotle’s *De Interpretatione* 9”***Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner***

Commentator: Dean A. Kowalski (University of Wisconsin–Waukesha)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Alan Kim (Hamilton College)

Speaker: Naomi Reshotko (University of Denver)

“Is There an Intermediate Position between Knowing and Not Knowing? The Wax Block in Plato’s *Theaetetus*”

Commentator: Yancy Hughes Dominick (Seattle University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Elizabeth A. Hoppe (Lewis University)

Speaker: David Bronstein (Oxford University/University of Toronto)

“Understanding Meno’s Paradox in Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* I.1”

****Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner****

Commentator: Owen Goldin (Marquette University)

II-H. Colloquium: Agency and the Self

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: John Rowan (Purdue University–Calumet)

Speaker: Patricia A. Marino (University of Waterloo)
“Affective Evaluative Inconsistency and the Fragmented Self”

Commentator: Eugene Heath (State University of New York–New Paltz)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Steven W. Patterson (Marygrove College)

Speaker: Marc A. Cohen (George Washington University)
“Extending Charles Taylor’s Moral Psychology: Self-Interpretation, Desire and Rational Agency”

Commentator: Charles Starkey (Clemson University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: James Petrik (Ohio University)

Speaker: Kevin Toh (Indiana University–Bloomington)
“Agency and Enervation”

Commentator: David W. Shoemaker (Bowling Green State University)

II-I. Colloquium: Philosophy of Science

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Derek D. Turner (Connecticut College)

Speaker: Sarah Kenehan (University of Tennessee/Bern University)
“General Circulation Models and Severe Tests”

****Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner****

Commentator: Susan Vineberg (Wayne State University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Nick Huggett (University of Illinois–Chicago)

Speaker: David W. Harker (East Tennessee State University)
“Explaining Past Scientific Successes Realistically (and without being Whiggish)”

Commentator: Geoffrey A. Gorham (St. Olaf College)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Angie Harris (University of Utah)

Speaker: Joel Velasco (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
 “The Biological Species Concept and Evolutionary History”

****Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner****

Commentator: Matt Haber (University of Utah)

II-J. Colloquium: All about Objects

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Bruce P. Dutra (Mott Community College)

Speaker: Daniel Korman (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)
 “Ordinary Objects without Overdetermination”

Commentator: Tom Riley (Clarke College)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Adam C. Podlaskowski (University of Connecticut)

Speaker: Thomas Sattig (Tulane University)
 “Coincidence and Cardinality”

Commentator: Lawrence B. Lombard (Wayne State University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Ashley McDowell (Kalamazoo College)

Speaker: Cody S. Gilmore (University of California–Davis)
 “An Argument Against Plenitude”

Commentator: Dana Lynne Goswick (University of California–Davis)

II-K. Colloquium: Descriptions and Substitution

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Peter W. Hanks (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)

Speaker: Frank Pupa (The Graduate School and University Center–City University of New York)
 “Descriptions, Understanding, and Anaphoric Chains: Russell’s New Challenge”

****Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner****

Commentator: Gregory Landini (University of Iowa)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Mark Criley (Illinois Wesleyan University)

Speaker: Paolo Bonardi (University of Geneva and University of Sheffield)

“Kaplan on Quine’s Theorem”

Commentator: Michael McKinsey (Wayne State University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Heimir Geirsson (Iowa State University)

Speaker: Christina Conroy (University of California–Irvine)
“On an Alleged Refutation of Actually-Rigidified Descriptivism”

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner

Commentator: Michael Liston (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)

**II-L. Special Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of Women: Reflections on Being a Woman
Philosophy Student: Lessons for the Profession**

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Erin McKenna (Pacific Luthern University)

Speakers: Christina Gould (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)

Sina Kramer (DePaul University)

Aisha Raees (Southern Illinois University)

Katie Padgett Walsh (Northwestern University)

II-M. Special Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on Hispanics: German Philosophy in the Americas

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Sean Kirkland (DePaul University)

Speakers: Claus Dierksmeier (Stonehill College)

Omar Rivera (University of Wisconsin–LaCrosse)

Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert (DePaul University)

GROUP AND COMMITTEE SESSIONS, FRIDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

Session GIV: 7:00-10:00 p.m.

GIV-1: American Association of Philosophy Teachers

GIV-2: North American Society for Social Philosophy

GIV-3: Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy

GIV-4: Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World

GIV-5: Society for the Philosophical Study of Education

GIV-6: International Society of Chinese Philosophy

GIV-7: Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking

GIV-8: Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy

GIV-9: Society for the Study of Process Philosophies

GIV-10: Søren Kierkegaard Society

GIV-11: North American Kant Society

GIV-12: Society for Business Ethics

GIV-13: Max Scheler Society

BUSINESS MEETING

2:15-1:30 p.m.

III-A. Symposium: Autonomy and Women's Bodies

1:45-4:45 p.m.

Chair: Patricia A. Marino (University of Waterloo)

Speakers: Amy Mullin (University of Toronto–Mississauga)
“Wanted Pregnancies and Women's Autonomy”

Susan Brison (Dartmouth College)

Margaret Little (Georgetown University)

III-B. Symposium: Envisioning an Anti-Racist Future

1:45-4:45 p.m.

Chair: Clevis Headley (Florida Atlantic University)

Speakers: Michael J. Monahan (Marquette University)

Lucius T. Outlaw (Vanderbilt University)

Linda Martín Alcoff (Syracuse University)

III-C. Symposium: Formal Epistemology, Prospects and Challenges

1:45-4:45 p.m.

Chair: Gregory Wheeler (CENTRIA AI Center, New University of Lisbon)

Speakers: Vincent F. Hendricks (Roskilde University)
“Plethoric Formal Epistemology”

Horacio Arló-Costa (Carnegie-Mellon University)

“Formal Epistemology, New Philosophical Directions”

Branden Fitelson (University of California–Berkeley)

III-D. Symposium: Sententialism and Higher-Order Attitude Attributions

1:45-4:45 p.m.

Chair: Rod Bertolet (Purdue University)

Speaker: Kirk Ludwig (University of Florida)

Commentators: Stephen Schiffer (New York University)

James Higginbotham (University of Southern California)

III-E. Colloquium: Early Modern Philosophy*1:45-4:45 p.m.**1:45-2:45 p.m.*

Chair: Jordi Cat (Indiana University)

Speaker: Bradley L. Sickler (Ouachita Baptist University)
"Kant and Newton on Forces and the Nature of Matter"

Commentator: K. David Yandell (Loyola University Chicago)

2:45-3:45 p.m.

Chair: Steven Nadler (University of Wisconsin)

Speakers: Glenn A. Hartz (Ohio State University) and Patrick K. Lewtas (American University of Beirut)
"Two New Cartesian Circles"

Commentator: David R. Cuning (University of Iowa)

3:45-4:45 p.m.

Chair: Mark Waymack (Loyola University Chicago)

Speaker: Mark D. Collier (University of Minnesota–Morris)
"Hume's Causal Psychology and the Limits of Associationism"

Commentator: Anastasia Panagopoulos (University of Minnesota)

III-F. Colloquium: Political Philosophy*1:45-4:45 p.m.**1:45-2:45 p.m.*

Chair: Bernard Jackson (Washington and Lee University)

Speaker: Sonia Sikka (University of Ottawa)
"Liberalism, Multiculturalism and the Hardening of Religious Identity"

Commentator: Robert Talisse (Vanderbilt University)

2:45-3:45 p.m.

Chair: Jeremy Green (Western Michigan University)

Speaker: Melissa Yates (Northwestern University)
"Respecting Religious Citizens as Reasoners"

Commentator: Jeremy Neill (Saint Louis University)

3:45-4:45 p.m.

Chair: Bill Martin (DePaul University)

Speaker: Eunjung Kim (University of Washington)
"The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus and the Moral Enforceability of Human Rights"***Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner***

Commentator: Derrick Darby (University of Kansas)

III-G. Colloquium: Action, Agency, and Responsibility*1:45-4:45 p.m.**1:45-2:45 p.m.*

Chair: Paul Mueller (Loyola University of Chicago)

Speaker: Michael Dean Hartssock (University of Missouri–Columbia)

“Omissions as Causes”

****Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner****

Commentator: Evan Fales (University of Iowa)

2:45-3:45 p.m.

Chair: Carl Gillett (Northern Illinois University)

Speakers: Felipe De Brigard (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill) and Eric Mandelbaum (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

“Neuroscience and Responsibility”

****Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner****

Commentator: Thomas Nadelhoffer (Dickinson College)

3:45-4:45 p.m.

Chair: Charles Koziol (City University of New York Graduate Center)

Speaker: Tracie Mahaffey (Florida State University)

“The Experience of Authorship and Automatic Action”

****Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner****

Commentator: Neil Delaney (Georgetown University)

III-H. Colloquium: Metaethics*1:45-4:45 p.m.**1:45-2:45 p.m.*

Chair: Jonathon David Jones (Wayne State University)

Speaker: Simon Rippon (Harvard University)

“In Defense of the Wide-Scope Instrumental Principle”

****Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner****

Commentator: Ralph Wedgwood (Oxford University)

2:45-3:45 p.m.

Chair: Daniel Groll (University of Chicago)

Speaker: Mark N. Jensen (Hope College)

“Can Group Agents Be Autonomous?”

Commentator: Jonathan F. Garthoff (Northwestern University)

3:45-4:45 p.m.

Chair: Uri Leibowitz (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)

Speaker: Mark LeBar (Ohio University)

“McKeever and Ridge on Practical Reasoning”

Commentator: Sean D. McKeever (Davidson College)

III-I. Colloquium: Continental Philosophy and Kierkegaard

1:45-4:45 p.m.

1:45-2:45 p.m.

Chair: Dean F. Moyar (Johns Hopkins University)

Speaker: David T. Vessey (University of Chicago)

“On a Recent Husserlian Criticism of Gadamer’s
Account of the Subject”

Commentator: Lauren Swayne Barthold (Gordon College)

2:45-3:45 p.m.

Chair: Matthew Shockey (Indiana University–South Bend)

Speaker: Joseph K. Schear (California Polytechnic State
University–San Luis Obispo)

“Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl’s Theory of
Meaning”

Commentator: Corey McCall (Elmira College)

3:45-4:45 p.m.

Chair: Kenneth Itzkowitz (Marietta College)

Speaker: R. Zachary Manis (Southwest Baptist University)

“Kierkegaard on the Problem of Abraham”

Commentator: Noel S. Adams (Marquette University)

III-J. Colloquium: Issues in Perception

1:45-4:45 p.m.

1:45-2:45 p.m.

Chair: Robert Stalnaker (Massachusetts Institute of
Technology)

Speaker: Derek H. Brown (Brandon University)

“Demonstratives and Indirect Perception”

Commentator: Cara Spencer (Howard University)

2:45-3:45 p.m.

Chair: David Hilbert (University of Illinois–Chicago)

Speaker: Wayne W. Wu (Ohio State University)

“Attention and Its Phenomenology”

Commentator: James R. Genone (University of California–Berkeley)

3:45-4:45 p.m.

Chair: Joseph Thomas Tolliver (University of Arizona)

Speaker: Robert E. Briscoe (Loyola University New Orleans)
"Visual Shape Perception and Bodily Action"

Commentator: Alex Byrne (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

III-K. Special Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on International Cooperation: Is There an African Analytic Philosophy: A Discussion of Intuitions across Cultures

1:45-4:45 p.m.

Chair: Albert Casullo (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)

Speaker: Barry Hallen (Morehouse College)
"Folk Psychology, Experimental Philosophy, African Philosophy"

Commentator: Jonathan Weinberg (Indiana University–Bloomington)

Speaker: Kola Abimbola (University of Leicester)
"Reason and Culture: The Roles of Nomological Structures in Human Reasoning"

III-L. Special Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on Public Philosophy

1:45-4:45 p.m.

III-M. Joint Session Sponsored by the Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges and the American Association of Philosophy Teachers: Evaluation of Teaching Demonstrations

1:45-4:45 p.m.

Chair: Bill Hartmann (St. Louis Community College–Forest Park College)

APA Panelists: Colleen Burns (Harper College)

Holly Graff (Oakton Community College)

David Zacker (Elgin Community College)

Donna Werner (St. Louis Community College–Meramec College)

AAPT Panelists: Betsy Newell Decyk (California State University–Long Beach)

Donna Engelmann (Alverno College)

A key component of the interview for community colleges and four year teaching institutions is the teaching demonstration. In hopes of improving interview performance, the co-sponsors are soliciting job candidates to present 15-20 minute demonstrations of their choosing or a topic assigned by the committee. This three hour session will conduct presentations and feedback for the first two hours and then an hour of general discussion. Space will be limited. Prospective presenters should contact Bill Hartmann (APA): bhartmann@stlcc.edu or Betsy Decyk (AAPT): bdecyk@csulb.edu

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS*5:00-6:15 p.m.*

Introduction: Peter van Inwagen

Speaker: James P. Sterba

“Completing the Kantian Project: From Rationality to Equality”

*A question period will follow the Presidential Address.***PRESIDENTIAL RECEPTION***9:00 p.m.-Midnight***SATURDAY, APRIL 19****BOOK EXHIBITS***9:00 a.m.-Noon***GROUP AND COMMITTEE SESSIONS, SATURDAY MORNING**

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

10:00 a.m.-3:00 p.m.*GV-14: Journal of the History of Philosophy***PLACEMENT INTERVIEW AREA***9:00 a.m.-3:00 p.m.***PLACEMENT QUIET INTERVIEW SPACE***9:00 a.m.-3:00 p.m.***PLACEMENT SERVICE***9:00 a.m.-Noon***REGISTRATION***9:00 a.m.-Noon***IV-A. Symposium: Academic Freedom: Ideals and Illusions***9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Robert Audi (University of Notre Dame)

Speakers: Ward Churchill ((Formerly University of Colorado))

Ellen Schrecker (Yeshiva University)

John K. Wilson (College Freedom Institute–Chicago)

IV-B. Symposium: Privacy, Community and Culture*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

- Chair: Scott A. Anderson (University of British Columbia)
 Speakers: Anita L. Allen (University of Pennsylvania Law School)
 Leslie Francis (University of Utah)
 Geoffrey Brennan (Australian National University)
 Chandran Kukathas (London School of Economics)

IV-C. Symposium: The Philosophical Feminism of Simone de Beauvoir*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

- Chair: Margaret A. Simons (Southern Illinois University-Edwardsville)
 Speakers: Sara Heinamaa (University of Helsinki)
 Karen Vintges (University of Amsterdam)
 Nancy Bauer (Tufts University)

IV-D. Author Meets Critics: Robert Stainton, *Words and Thoughts**9:00 a.m.-Noon*

- Chair: Jason Merchant (University of Chicago)
 Critics: Anne Bezuidenhout (University of South Carolina)
 Philip A. Robbins (Washington University in St. Louis)
 Zoltán Szabó (Yale University)
 Author: Robert Stainton (University of Western Ontario)

IV-E. Symposium: Consent and the Formula of Humanity*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

- Chair: James Reid (Metropolitan State College of Denver)
 Speaker: Japa Pallikkathayil (Harvard University)
 Commentators: Tamra Frei (Michigan State University)
 David Sussman (University of Illinois-Urbana-Champaign)

IV-F. Colloquium: Decision Theory*9:00 a.m.-Noon**9:00-10:00 a.m.*

- Chair: Barry M. Ward (University of Arkansas)
 Speaker: Don T. Fallis (University of Arizona)
 "Resolving Horgan's Strengthened Two Envelope Paradox"
 Commentator: Terence Horgan (University of Arizona)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Jennifer Caseldine-Bracht (Indiana University-Purdue University-Fort Wayne)

Speaker: Dale Dorsey (University of Alberta)
"Welfare and the Status-Quo Bias"

Commentator: Kimberley Brownlee (University of Manchester)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Irwin Goldstein (Davidson College)

Speaker: David K. Chan (University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point)
"Denying Incomparability"

Commentator: Ruth Chang (Rutgers University)

IV-G. Colloquium: Epistemology III

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Sarah Black Jones (Northern Michigan University)

Speaker: Michael A. Rescorla (University of California-Santa Barbara)
"The Dialectical Regress of Justifications"

Commentator: Juan Comesaña (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Matthew Mullins (Northwestern University)

Speaker: E.J. Coffman (University of Tennessee)
"Reliability and Warranted Assertion"

Commentator: Patrick Rysiew (University of Victoria)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: A. Minh Nguyen (Eastern Kentucky University)

Speaker: Ted L. Poston (University of South Alabama)
"Know How to Be Gettiered?"

Commentator: Marc A. Alspector-Kelly (Western Michigan University)

IV-H. Colloquium: Virtue Ethics

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: William O. Stephens (Creighton University)

Speaker: Mark Piper (Saint Louis University)
"Hursthouse's Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics, the Slide into Consequentialism, and the Problem of Instrumentally Successful Vice"

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner

Commentator: John Elia (Wilson College)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Larry J. Waggle (Illinois State University)

Speaker: Luke Gelinas (University of Toronto)

“Is Agent-Based Virtue Ethics Circular?”

****Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner****

Commentator: Jason R. Kawall (Colgate University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Thomas M. Tuozzo (University of Kansas)

Speaker: Macalester C. Bell (Columbia University)

“Globalist Attitudes and Special Relations”

Commentator: Amy Coplan (California State University–Fullerton)

IV-I. Colloquium: Egalitarianism and Global Inequality

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Marcus Adams (Western Michigan University)

Speaker: Idil Boran (York University)

“The Paradox of Resources: Global Inequalities and Resource Distribution”

Commentator: Gillian Brock (University of Auckland)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Marilyn Nissim-Sabat (Lewis University)

Speaker: Todd C. Calder (University of Victoria)

“Shared Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Restitution”

Commentator: Tracy A. Edwards (Michigan State University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Margaret Atherton (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)

Speaker: Martin O’Neill (University of Manchester)

“What Should Egalitarians Believe?—Beyond Telic and Deontic Egalitarianism”

Commentator: Rodney C. Roberts (East Carolina University)

IV-J. Colloquium: Physicalism and Realization

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Thomas D. Senior (University of Arkansas)

Speaker: Douglas Keaton (University of Cincinnati)

“And Never the Twain Shall Meet: A Critique of Carl Gillett’s Dimensioned Realization”

Commentator: Eric M. Funkhouser (University of Arkansas)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Fritz McDonald (Oakland University)

Speaker: Jared G. Bates (Hanover College)

“Kim on the Explanatory Argument for Physicalism”

Commentator: Gerald Vision (Temple University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Mark B. Couch (Seton Hall University)

Speaker: Kelly Trogdon (University of Massachusetts)

“Physicalism and Sparse Ontology”

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner

Commentator: Ronald Loeffler (Grand Valley State University)

IV-K. Colloquium: Moral Realism and Moral Responsibility

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: B. Scot Rousse (Northwestern University)

Speaker: William Rehg (Saint Louis University)

“Moral Realism and Autonomy in Discourse Ethics”

Commentator: Cristina Lafont (Northwestern University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Mark P. Jenkins (Johns Hopkins University)

Speaker: Matthew Pianalto (University of Arkansas)

“Moral Realism and Ways of Life”

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner

Commentator: Andrew M. Cullison (State University of New York–Fredonia)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Katie Padgett Walsh (Northwestern University)

Speaker: Matthew Brophy (Minnesota State University–Mankato)

“Moral Judgments: Etiologies and Credibility”

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner

Commentator: Michael W. Austin (Eastern Kentucky University)

IV-L. Special Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on International Cooperation: Contemporary Philosophy of Mind in Latin America and Spain

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: David Sosa (University of Texas–Austin)

Speaker: Diana Pérez (Universidad de Buenos Aires)

- Commentator: Peter Simons (University of Leeds)
 Chair: Marcelo H. Sabatés (Kansas State University)
 Speaker: David Pineda (Universidad de Girona)
 Commentator: Robert Stalnaker (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
 Chair: Susana Nuccetelli (St. Cloud State University)
 Speaker: Ángeles Eraña (Universidad Autónoma de Mexico)
 Commentator: John Heil (Trinity University)

IV-M. Special Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on Black Philosophers: Philosophical Readings/Interpretations of bell hooks

9:00 a.m.-Noon

- Chair: George Yancy (Duquesne University)
 Speakers: Maria D. Davidson (University of Oklahoma)
 “bell hooks and the Move from Marginalized Other to Radical Black Subject”
 Kathryn T. Gines (Vanderbilt University)
 “Black Looks: Objectification, Subjectivity, and ‘Looking Back’”
 Donna D. Marcano (Trinity College)
 “bell hooks, Black Feminism, and Philosophy”

SATURDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING, APRIL 19

GROUP AND COMMITTEE SESSIONS, SATURDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

Session GV: 12:15-2:15 p.m.

- GV-1:* American Society for Aesthetics
GV-2: International Association for the Philosophy of Sport
GV-3: International Society for Environmental Ethics
GV-4: Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World
GV-5: Society for the Philosophy of History
GV-6: Society for the Philosophical Study of Marxism
GV-7: Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy
GV-8: Society for the Study of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Philosophy
GV-9: Society for Empirical Ethics
GV-10: North American Nietzsche Society
GV-11: North American Kant Society

GV-12: Joint Session: Josiah Royce Society and the Personalist Discussion Group

GV-13: Society for Philosophy and Technology

V-A. Symposium: What Are Variables?

2:30-5:30 p.m., Crystal Room (3rd Floor (M))

Chair: Tomis Kapitan (Northern Illinois University)

Speakers: George Bealer (Yale University)

Kit Fine (New York University)

Joshua Dever (University of Texas–Austin)

V-B. Symposium: Responsibility for Resisting Oppression

2:30-5:30 p.m.

Chair: Ann E. Cudd (University of Kansas)

Speakers: Bernard Boxill (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

Thomas E. Hill, Jr. (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

Jean Harvey (University of Guelph)

Commentator: Sarah Buss (University of Michigan)

V-C. Author Meets Critics: Jean-Louis Dessalles, *Why We Talk*

2:30-5:30 p.m.

Chair: Walter Edelberg (University of Illinois–Chicago)

Critics: Jason McKenzie Alexander (London School of Economics)

Fiona Cowie (California Institute of Technology)

Edouard Machery (University of Pittsburgh)

Author: Jean-Louis Dessalles (École Nationale Supérieure des Télécommunications)

V-D. Symposium: Sculpting Character: Aristotle's Voluntary as Affectability

2:30-5:30 p.m.

Chair: George Anagnostopoulos (University of California–San Diego)

Speaker: Audrey L. Anton (The Ohio State University)

Commentators: Paula L. Gottlieb (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

Lawrence J. Jost (University of Cincinnati)

V-E. Colloquium: Finks and Zombies*2:30-5:30 p.m.**2:30-3:30 p.m.*

Chair: Hugh J. McCann (Texas A&M University)

Speaker: Charles M. Hermes (University of Texas–Arlington)
“Finks, Masks, Mimics, and Freedom”

Commentator: Kevan Edwards (University of Kansas)

3:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: Joseph Owens (University of Minnesota)

Speaker: Gualtiero Piccinini (University of Missouri–St. Louis)
“Access Denied to Zombies”

Commentator: Stephen Biggs (University of Toronto)

V-F. Colloquium: Epistemology II*2:30-5:30 p.m.**2:30-3:30 p.m.*

Chair: Anthony Gillies (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)

Speaker: Nicholaos Jones (The Ohio State University)
“Belief Revision and Coherence without Foundations”

Commentator: Joseph Moore (Amherst College)

3:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: Michael B. Horton (University of South Alabama–Mobile)

Speaker: Jay M. Newhard (John Carroll University)
“Circularity in Ordinary Language Arguments for Epistemic Contextualism”

Commentator: Baron Reed (Northwestern University)

4:30-5:30 p.m.

Chair: Jennifer Woodward (University of Kentucky)

Speaker: Jennifer Nagel (University of Toronto)
“Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Thinking about Error”

Commentator: Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern University)

V-G. Colloquium: Metaphysics and Physics*2:30-5:30 p.m.**2:30-3:30 p.m.*

Chair: Albert Casullo (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)

Speaker: Daniel M. Johnson (Baylor University)
“Making Co-instantiation Primitive: Consequences for

the Bundle Theory's Commitment to the Identity of Indiscernibles"

****Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner****

Commentator: Charlie Tanksley (University of Virginia)

3:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: Robin Smith (Texas A&M University)

Speaker: Mark Wheeler (San Diego State University)

"Aristotle on the Signification of Natural Kind Terms:
Narrow or Wide Content?"

Commentator: Herbert Granger (Wayne State University)

4:30-5:30 p.m.

Chair: Kevin Davey (University of Chicago)

Speaker: Jeffrey Dunn (University of Massachusetts)

"Counterfactual Dependence, Thermodynamics, and
the Special Sciences"

****Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner****

Commentator: Valia Allori (Northern Illinois University)

V-H. Colloquium: Issues in Ethical Theory

2:30-5:30 p.m.

2:30-3:30 p.m.

Chair: Julie McDonald (Saint Joseph's University)

Speaker: Lisa S. Rivera (University of Massachusetts–Boston)

"Worthy Lives"

Commentator: Susanne E. Foster (Marquette University)

3:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: Monica L. Gerrek (University of Kansas)

Speaker: Daniel J. Callcut (University of North Florida)

"Mill, Sentimentalism, and the Problem of Moral
Authority"

Commentator: Margaret A. Crouch (Eastern Michigan University)

4:30-5:30 p.m.

Chair: Anthony J. Rudd (St. Olaf College)

Speaker: Charles Huenemann (Utah State University)

"Valuing from Life's Perspective"

Commentator: Daw-Nay Evans (DePaul University)

V-I. Colloquium: Kant

2:30-5:30 p.m.

2:30-3:30 p.m.

Chair: Adrian Switzer (Emory University)

Speaker: Brett Fulkerson-Smith (University of Kentucky)
 “On the Apodictic Proof of Kant’s Revolutionary Hypothesis”

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner

Commentator: Claudia Schmidt (Marquette University)

3:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: Russell Ford (Elmhurst College)

Speaker: Bryan Hall (Indiana University Southeast)
 “A Dilemma for Kant’s Theory of Substance”

Commentator: Clinton Tolley (University of California–San Diego)

4:30-5:30 p.m.

Chair: Christopher Johns (Saint Xavier University (Chicago))

Speaker: Helga Varden (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)

“Kant’s Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy”

Commentator: Kyla Ebels Duggan (Northwestern University)

V-J. Colloquium: Representation

2:30-5:30 p.m.

2:30-3:30 p.m.

Chair: Mitchell S. Green (University of Virginia)

Speaker: James John (University of Toronto)
 “Thau on Qualia and Representational Content”

Commentator: Brie Gertler (University of Virginia)

3:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: Sean J. Allen-Hermanson (Florida International University)

Speaker: Daniel L. Corbett (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)
 “Teleofunctionalism and the Swampman”

Commentator: Jack C. Lyons (University of Arkansas)

4:30-5:30 p.m.

Chair: Marian David (University of Notre Dame)

Speaker: Clayton Littlejohn (Dedman College)
 “On the Coherence of Inversion”

Commentator: Amy Kind (Claremont McKenna College)

GROUP MEETING PROGRAM

GROUP SESSION GI: THURSDAY, APRIL 17, 9:00 A.M.-NOON

GI-1. Midwest Society for Women in Philosophy

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: The International Eye: Race, Representation, and Reason

Chair: Jana McAuliffe (DePaul University)

Speakers: Meryl Altman (DePauw University)

“Beauvoir and Blackness”

Penelope Ingram (University of Texas–Arlington)

“Bodies, Veils, and the Ethics of Representation”

Namita Goswami (DePaul University)

“What’s Postcolonial about Spivak? Native Informants and the Critique of Postcolonial Reason”

GI-2. William James Society

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: William James as Social and Political Philosopher

Chair: Peter Hare (University at Buffalo)

Speakers: John Kaag (Harvard University)

“A Call to Arms? William James on Militarism and Political Unity”

Colin Koopman (University of California–Santa Cruz)

“Pragmatism’s Pluralism”

Andrew F. Smith (State University of New York–Stony Brook)

“Communication and Conviction: James’s Contribution to Deliberative Democracy”

Commentator: Noelle McAfee (George Mason University)

GI-3. Philosophy of Time Society

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: L. Nathan Oaklander (University of Michigan–Flint)

Speaker: Timothy W. Schoettle (Messiah College)

“Whatever Happened to John McTaggart?”

Commentator: M. Joshua Mozersky (Queen’s University (Ontario))

Speaker: Kris N. McDaniel (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)
“Ways of Being and Time”

Commentator: James Harrington (Loyola University)

Speaker: Bradford Skow (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
“Why Does Time Pass?”

GI-4. Society for Student Philosophers

9:00 a.m.–Noon

Chair: Matthew Congdon (New School for Social Research)

Speakers: Matthew Congdon (New School for Social Research)
“Phronesis and Justice: Rewriting the Law in
Aristotle’s Sociality”

Adam Glover (University of Kentucky)
“Aquinas and Marion on Naming God”

Andrew Huddleston (Princeton University)
“The Consolations of Art: Transfiguration and the
Promise of Theodicy”

Chad Vance (University of Colorado–Boulder)
“Atoms without Inanity: The Problem of Individuation
for Atomism in the 17th Century”

GI-5. Society for the Metaphysics of Science

9:00 a.m.–Noon

Topic: Metaphysics, Science, and the Social World

Speakers: Edouard Machery (University of Pittsburgh)
“The Folk Concept of Race”

Robert A. Wilson (University of Alberta)
“Normalcy and Sociality”

GI-6. Society for the Philosophy of History

9:00 a.m.–Noon

GI-7. Philosophy of Religion Group

9:00 a.m.–Noon

Chair: Jeffrey H. Green (University of Notre Dame)

Speakers: Jonathan Matheson (University of Rochester)
“Skeptical Theism and Having Evidence”

Bradley N. Seeman (Taylor University)
“Moral Objectivity, Internal Reasons, and God’s
Prescriptive Voice”

Jacob W. Evans (Wheaton College)
“A Critique of John Hick’s Pluralistic Hypothesis as a
Viable Approach within the Theology of Religions”

GI-8. Radical Philosophy Association*9:00 a.m.-Noon***Topic: Heterogeneity in Theory and Practice: On Ideology and Identity**

Chair: Sarah Hansen (Vanderbilt University)

Speakers: Matt Whitt (Vanderbilt University)

“The Borders of Subjection: Political Identity and Post-Territorial Sovereignty”

Rohan Quinby (Massey University)

“Negri and the Contemporary City: Subject, Production and Resistance”

Michelle Switzer (Whittier College)

“Pluralist Explanation: Reclaiming the Theory of Ideology”

Elan Liss Ohayon (University of Toronto)

“Sustainable Cultures: Heterogeneity and Autonomy in Social Networks”

GI-9. Association of Chinese Philosophers in America*9:00 a.m.-Noon***Topic: Virtue, Human Nature, and Moral Development**

Chair: Tongdong Bai (Xavier University)

Speaker: Robin Wang (Loyola Marymount University)

“Is There a Virtuous Body? Qi and One’s Ethical Life”

Commentator: Kelly Clark (Calvin College)

Speaker: John Ramsey (University of California–Riverside)

“Xunzi on Human Nature and Its Development”

Commentator: Franklin T. Perkins (DePaul University)

Speaker: Ta-Lun (Linus) Huang (University of California–Riverside)

“Moral Psychology and Moral Development of Xunzi”

Commentator: Tongdong Bai (Xavier University)

GI-10. History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society*9:00 a.m.-Noon***Topic: Twardowski and Polish Analytic Philosophy**

Chair: Sandra Lapointe (Kansas State University)

Speakers: Robin Rollinger (University of Salzburg)

“Twardowski as a Student of Brentano”

Peter Simons (University of Leeds)

“Twardowski on Truth”

Ryan Hickerson (Western Oregon University)
 “Twardowski and Representationalism”

Arianna Betti (Free University of Amsterdam)
 “Twardowski and the Discovery of States of Affairs”

GI-11. American Society for Philosophy, Counseling, and Psychotherapy

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Samuel Zinaich (The Institute for Critical Thinking)

Speaker: Matt G. Kushner (University of Minnesota–
 Minneapolis)
 “Stoicism in the Roots and Practice of Cognitive-
 Behavioral Therapy: From Aurelius to Ellis and
 Beyond”

Commentator: Samuel Zinaich (The Institute for Critical Thinking)

Speaker: Michael Grosso (University of Virginia Health System)
 “William James on Immortality Exemplar of
 Philosophical Practice”

Commentator: Amy E. White (Ohio University–Zanesville)

Speaker: Nan-Nan Lee (St. Xavier University at Chicago)
 “Philosophical Counseling or Psychodynamic
 Psychotherapy: Philosophical Assumptions and
 Implications”

Commentator: Carolyn Jones (Purdue University–Calumet)

GI-12. Bertrand Russell Society

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Michael Garral (Lehman College–City University of
 New York)

Speaker: Montgomery Link (Suffolk University)
 “Russell and Wittgenstein on Logic and Mathematics
 in their August [1919] Correspondence”

Commentator: Rosalind Carey (Lehman College–City University of
 New York)

Speaker: Kevin C. Klement (University of Massachusetts–
 Amherst)
 “Re-reading A.J. Ayer’s Russell and Moore: The
 Analytic Heritage”

Commentator: John Ongley (Edinboro University)

Speaker: Michael Garral (Lehman College–City University of
 New York)
 “Russell v. Hume, Atheist or Agnostic”

Commentator: To be announced

GI-13. Max Scheler Society*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

- Speakers: Raymond Henker (Northeastern Illinois University)
 “Scheler and Kant: The Categorical Imperative, Ethics of Values, and the Influence of *Einführung*”
- Eric Mohr (Duquesne University)
 “Is the ‘Body-Subject’ a Person?: A Schelerian Critique of *Phenomenology of Perception*”
- Gregory B. Sadler (Ball State University–Indiana State Prison)
 “Virtue Epistemology and Moral Conditions of Knowledge: Contributions from Phenomenology”
- Eugene Kelly (New York Institute of Technology)
 “Phenomenological and Metaphysical Buddhism in Scheler”

GROUP SESSION GII: THURSDAY, APRIL 17, 5:15-7:15 P.M.**GII-1. International Society for Environmental Ethics: Ronald L. Sandler, *Character and Environment: A Virtue-Oriented Approach to Environmental Ethics****5:15-7:15 p.m.*

- Speaker: Allen Thompson (Clemson University)
- Critics: William B. Bradley (Syracuse University)
 Katie McShane (North Carolina State University)
- Author: Ronald L. Sandler (Northeastern University)

GII-2. Society of Christian Philosophers*5:15-7:15 p.m.***Topic: The Kenneth Konyndyk Memorial Lectures**

- Chair: Bruce Ellis Benson (Wheaton College)
- Speakers: John D. Caputo (Syracuse University)
 “The Weakness of God”
- R. William Hasker (Huntington University)
 “The Openness of God”

GII-3. Joint Session Sponsored by the Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy and the APA Committee on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender People in the Profession*5:15-7:15 p.m.*

- Chair: Raja Halwani (School of the Art Institute of Chicago)
- Speakers: John Corvino (Wayne State University)
 “Hume, Homosexuality, and the Challenge of Relativism”

Richard Nunan (Philosophy and Religious Studies,
College of Charleston)

“Channeling Augustine: John Paul II’s Theology
of the Body and the Emergence of Homoerotic
Kantianism”

Christine Pierce (North Carolina State University)

“Heteronormativity and (Sartre on) Anti-Semitism”

GII-4. Society for the Philosophical Study of Education

5:15-7:15 p.m.

Topic: Logic, Method, and Critical Thinking

GII-5. Committee on Institutional Cooperation

5:15-7:15 p.m.

GII-6. International Berkeley Society

5:15-7:15 p.m.

Chair: Margaret Atherton (University of Wisconsin–
Milwaukee)

Speaker: Georges Dicker (State University of New York–College
at Brockport)

“Another Whack at Berkeley: A Critical Analysis of
Principles 1-7”

Commentator: John Troyer (University of Connecticut)

Speaker: Richard J. Brook (Bloomsburg University)

“Berkeley, the Space of Our Lives and the Space of
Physics”

Commentator: Shoshanna Brassfield (Colgate University)

GII-7. American Society for Value Inquiry

5:15-7:15 p.m.

Topic: Virtue Ethics

Chair: G. John M. Abbarno (D’Youville College)

Speakers: Judith Andre (Michigan State University)

“Cosmopolitan Virtue: On Becoming Citizens of the
World”

Frank Scott McElreath (Peace College)

“Virtue Ethics and Action-Guiding Objections”

GII-8. Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy

5:15-7:15 p.m.

**Topic: Reason and Validity in Indian and Buddhist
Epistemologies**

Chair: J.N. Mohanty (Temple University)

- Speakers: Bina Gupta (University of Missouri–Columbia)
 “The Place of Reason in Advaita Vedanta”
- Matthew Kapstein (University of Chicago Divinity School)
 “A Fly on the Monastery Wall: Debates on the Cognitive Object in Some Newly Discovered Tibetan Pramana Texts”
- Sara McClintock (Emory University)
 “Buddhist Epistemology and the Bugaboo of True Belief”
- Christopher G. Framarin (University of Calgary)
 “Cittavrttinirodha: The Restraint and Cessation of Mental Events in the Yogasutra”

GII-9. Hume Society

5:15-7:15 p.m.

Topic: Hume on Skepticism and Moral Distinctions

Chair: Karánn Durland (Austin College)

- Speaker: Brian Ribeiro (University of Tennessee–Chattanooga)
 “Hume’s Changing Views on the ‘Durability’ of Skepticism”
 “Hume on the ‘Reality’ of Moral Distinctions”

GII-10. Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts: Thomas E. Wartenberg, *Thinking On Screen: Film as Philosophy*

5:15-7:15 p.m.

Chair: Anne Eaton (University of Illinois–Chicago)

- Critics: Richard Eldridge (Swarthmore College)
 Cynthia Freeland (University of Houston)
 Andrew R. Light (University of Washington)

Author: Thomas E. Wartenberg (Mount Holyoke College)

GROUP SESSION GIII: THURSDAY, APRIL 17, 7:30-10:30 P.M.

GIII-1. Hegel Society of America

7:30-10:30 p.m.

Topic: Hegel and Kant’s Third Critique

Chair: Philip Grier (Dickinson College)

- Speakers: Angelica Nuzzo (City University of New York)
 John McCumber (University of California–Los Angeles)
 Sally Sedgwick (University of Illinois–Chicago)

GIII-2. Karl Jaspers Society of North America*7:30-10:30 p.m.***Topic: Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychopathology**

Chair: Andrew Gluck (Independent Scholar)

Speakers: Richard Feist (Saint Paul University–Ottawa)
“Jaspers and Whitehead: Experience as the Source
for Philosophical Concepts”

Gregory J. Walters (Saint Paul University–Ottawa)

“Alcoholism, Depression, and the Heredity-
Environment Question: A Comparison of the DSM-
IV-TR and Jaspers’s General Psychopathology”

Hugh Kelly (New York University)

“Judgment: Imagination, Creativity, and Delusion”

GIII-3. Society for the Philosophy of Creativity*7:30-10:30 p.m.*

Chair: John Cogan (Eckerd College)

Speaker: Donald Crosby (Colorado State University)
“Causality, Time, and Creativity: The Crucial Role of
Novelty”Commentators: Pete A.Y. Gunter (University of North Texas)
Stephen H. Bickham (Mansfield University)**GIII-4. Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary
Visual Arts***7:30-10:30 p.m.*

Chair: Ingvild Torsen (Florida International University)

Speakers: Mark R. Huston (Schoolcraft College)
“The Conversation, Film, and Philosophy”Robin M. James (University of North Carolina–
Charlotte)

“Good Girl Gone Bad”

William C. Pamerleau (University of Pittsburgh–
Greensburg)“Existential Religiosity in the Films of Ingmar
Bergman”

Kevin Stoehr (Boston University)

“Film Makers as Philosophers of Film”

GIII-5. American Society for Value Inquiry*7:30-10:30 p.m.***Topic: Values and Justice**

Chair: Frank Scott McElreath (Peace College)

- Speakers: Thomas Magnell (Drew University)
 “Social Justice and Individual Responsibility”
 Carlo Felice (State University of New York–Geneseo)
 “A Just Society”

GIII-6. Conference of Philosophical Societies

7:30-10:30 p.m.

- Chair: G. John M. Abbarno (D’Youville College)
 Speakers: G. John M. Abbarno (D’Youville College)
 David Schrader (APA Executive Director)

GIII-7. Society for Analytical Feminism

7:30-10:30 p.m.

- Chair: Sharon Crasnow (Riverside Community College–
 Norco Campus)
 Speaker: Asha Bhandary (University of Connecticut)
 “Dependency in Justice: Kittay’s Critique of Rawls”
 Commentator: Sarit Smila (Washington University in St. Louis)
 Speaker: Susanne Sreedhar (Boston University)
 “Thomas Hobbes as Feminist?”
 Commentator: Tamela Ice (Kansas City Community College)
 Speaker: Amanda Roth (University of Michigan)
 “‘But You Don’t Respect Me’: Second Personal
 Respect and Gendered Perception”
 Commentator: Tamra Frei (Michigan State University)

The session will be followed by a brief business meeting.

GIII-8. Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy

7:30-10:30 p.m.

Topic: Topics in Asian and Comparative Philosophy

- Chair: Marthe Chandler (DePauw University)
 Speakers: Daniel Stephens (University of Hong Kong)
 “On the Value of Comparative Philosophy in a Rortian
 Reading of Rorty”
 Bongrae Seok (Alvernia College)
 “Confucian Error: Emotion in Confucian Moral
 Philosophy and Contemporary Moral Psychology”
 Marthe Chandler (DePauw University)
 “How Should I Feel about a Foreign Religion?
 Buddhist Art in the Northern Wei”
 Eric S. Nelson (University of Massachusetts–Lowell)
 “Perplexing Words: Language and the Unsayable in
 Heidegger and Chan Buddhism”

GIII-9. Concerned Philosophers for Peace*7:30-10:30 p.m.*

Chair: Harry van der Linden (Butler University)

Speakers: Jan Narveson (University of Waterloo)

“Security Measures: How Much Buck for (Saving the Bang?)”

Greg Moses (Independent Scholar)

“Spinoza’s World and M.L. King, Jr.: On the Ethics of Transforming All Our Sorrows into Joys”

Tracy Nicholls (Lewis University)

“Peace, Politics, and Enlightenment”

GIII-10. Society for the Metaphysics of Science*7:30-10:30 p.m.*

Speakers: Gualtiero Piccinini (University of Missouri–St. Louis)

“Mechanistic Functionalism”

Ronald Endicott (North Carolina State University)

“Improving Nonreductive Functionalism by Taking Mechanisms Seriously: Causal versus Total Nomic Roles”

Carl Gillett (Northern Illinois University)

“The Third Way for Functionalists”

GIII-11. Society for Student Philosophers*7:30-10:30 p.m.*

Chair: Ryan Pflum (Western Michigan University)

Speakers: Ryan Pflum (Western Michigan University)

“Testimony and Epistemic Priority”

Michael F. Martin (Ohio State University)

“Rehabilitating the Ability Hypothesis”

Errol Lord (University of Nebraska—Lincoln)

“On Maximal Rationality”

Jordan Kiper (Colorado State University)

“Quantum Mechanics, Quantum Minds, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness”

GIII-12. Society for Arab, Persian, and Islamic Philosophy*7:30-10:30 p.m.***Topic: Reflections on Academic Freedom**

Chair: Raja Halwani (School of the Art Institute of Chicago)

Speakers: Mehrene Larudee (DePaul University)

“Academic Freedom, Truth, and Power”

Mark Lance (Georgetown University)

“Freedom and Alienation: The Role of Academics in a Time of Political Crisis”

GIII-13. Society for the Philosophic Study of Genocide and the Holocaust*7:30-10:30 p.m.*

Chair: André Mineau (University of Quebec–Rimouski)

Speakers: Colleen Murphy (Texas A&M University)

“The Role of Trust in Political Reconciliation”

Matthew Nesvet (Chicago)

“Rousseau after Auschwitz”

André Mineau (University of Quebec–Rimouski)

“The Wehrmacht in the Soviet Union: Ethics and the Jews”

GIII-14. Society for the Study of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Philosophy*7:30-10:30 p.m.***Topic: Yogacara Philosophy in Tibet**

Speakers: Marie Friquegnon (William Paterson University)

“How Does the Cittamatra View on the Relative Level Function as a Path to Enlightenment in Santaraksita’s Philosophy?”

Douglas Duckworth (Florida State University)

“Buddha-Nature and the Two Truths”

Dan McNamara (University of Chicago Divinity School)

“‘What Else Remains’ in Dharmakaya: Alaya-Vijnana and Asraya-Paravrtti in Vasubandhu’s Soteriology”

Toy Tung (John Jay College–City University of New York)

“Longchenpa’s View of the Mind Only School”

GIII-15. Association for the Development of Philosophy Teaching*7:30-10:30 p.m.***Topic: Refuting Postmodernism****GROUP SESSION GIV: FRIDAY, APRIL 18, 7:00-10:00 P.M.****GIV-1. American Association of Philosophy Teachers***7:00-10:00 p.m.***Topic: Teaching Kant to Undergraduate Students**

Chair: Adrienne McEvoy (Mansfield University)

Speakers: Jeanine M. Grenberg (St. Olaf College)

"Kant's Ethics for Majors and Non-Majors"

Robert Hanna (University of Colorado–Boulder)

"Back to Kant: Teaching the First Critique as Contemporary Philosophy"

Nils Rauhut (Coastal Carolina University)

"Are There Necessary Conditions for the Possibility of Teaching Kant to Undergraduate Students?"

George MacDonald Ross (University of Leeds)

"Translating the Critique of Pure Reason for Undergraduate Students"

GIV-2. North American Society for Social Philosophy*7:00-10:00 p.m.***Topic: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy**

Chair: Lisa H. Schwartzman (Michigan State University)

Speakers: Paul H. Benson (University of Dayton)

"Desiderata for Feminist Accounts of Personal Autonomy"

Carolyn McLeod (University of Western Ontario)

"Serious Harm or Mere Inconvenience? Denying Women Emergency Contraception"

Diana Tietjens Meyers (University of Connecticut)

"Affect, Corporeity, and Practical Intelligence"

Marina Oshana (University of Florida)

"A Commitment to Autonomy is a Commitment to Feminism"

GIV-3. Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy*7:00-10:00 p.m.***Topic: Ancient Moral Psychology**

Chair: Deborah Modrak (University of Rochester)

- Speakers: Dylan Futter (Fordham University)
 “Elenchus and Belief-Formation”
- Courtney E. Oakes (Saint Louis University)
 “The Interpersonal Dimensions of the Personal
 Sphere: The Need for a Supplement to Plato’s
 Developmental Psychology”
- Myrna Gabbe (University of Dayton)
 “Themistius and His Many Intellects”

GIV-4. Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World

7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic: Desire and Morality

- Chair: David K. Chan (University of Wisconsin–Stevens
 Point)
- Speakers: Lorraine L. Besser-Jones (University of Waterloo)
 “The Efficacy and Plausibility of Aristotelian and
 Kantian Accounts of Moral Motivation: Is It Really
 Better to Enjoy What We Do?”
- Danielle Bromwich (University of Toronto)
 “Belief, Desire and Motivation”
- Michelle Maiese (Emmanuel College)
 “Changing What We Value”
- Tyler Stephen Paytas (University of Missouri–St. Louis)
 “Acknowledged Desire Fulfillment Theory”

GIV-5. Society for the Philosophical Study of Education

7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic: Ethics In and Beyond the Classroom

GIV-6. International Society of Chinese Philosophy

7:00-10:00 p.m.

- Chair: Kelly Clark (Calvin College)
- Speaker: Ryan T. Nichols (California State University–Fullerton)
 “Confucius, Impartiality, and Evolution”
- Commentators: Brian J. Bruya (Eastern Michigan University)
 Michael Bradie (Bowling Green State University)
 Susan Blake (Indiana University)

GIV-7. Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking

7:00-10:00 p.m.

- Panel Discussion: “Computer-Assisted Argument Mapping”
- Panelists: Maralee Harrell (Carnegie Mellon University)
 Andrew Norman (Carnegie Mellon University)

Douglas Walton (University of Winnipeg)
 Mark Daly (California State University–Northridge)
 Claudia Alvarez Ortiz (University of Melbourne)

Panel Discussion: “The Perils and Promises of Teaching Critical Thinking Online”

Panelists: Geoffrey Frasz (Community College of Southern Nevada)

Jerry Voltura (University of Alaska–Anchorage)

Michael Malone (Northern Arizona University)

David Hitchcock (McMaster University)

GIV-8. Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy

7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic: Issues of Pluralism, Gender, and Literature in Pragmatism

Chair: Roger Ward (Georgetown College)

Speaker: Colin Koopman (University of California–Santa Cruz)
 “Pragmatist Public Pluralism through William James, John Dewey, and Nancy Fraser”

Commentator: Stuart Rosenbaum (Baylor University)

Speaker: Adam Glover (University of Kentucky)
 “Rorty Goes to Puerto Rico”

Commentator: Douglas R. Anderson (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)

Speaker: Stacey Ake (Drexel University)
 “Gender as Joker, or Playing the Hand You’re Dealt”

Commentator: Erin McKenna (Pacific Luthern University)

GIV-9. Society for the Study of Process Philosophies

7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic: Whitehead’s Empiricism: How Radical?

Speakers: George Allan (Dickinson College)
 “Transforming Whitehead’s Eternal Objects into Transient Empirical Possibilities”

Gary L. Herstein (Muskingum College)
 “Irreducible Extension in the Unity of Whitehead’s Thought”

Commentator: Randall E. Auxier (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)

GIV-10. Søren Kierkegaard Society

7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic: Kierkegaard and German Idealism

Chair: Daniel M. Johnson (Baylor University)

- Speakers: Ulrich Knappe (University of Copenhagen)
 “To Kant and Kierkegaard’s Conceptions of Theoretical Truth” (Keynote Address)
- Antony Aumann (Indiana University)
 “Kierkegaard’s Case for the Irrelevance of Philosophy”
- Shannon Nason (Purdue University)
 “Contradiction, Opposition, and Mediation in Hegel and Kierkegaard”
- Michael Matthis (Lamar University)
 “Autonomy and Heteronomy: Kant and Kierkegaard and Freedom”
- Commentator: Noel S. Adams (Marquette University)

GIV-11. North American Kant Society: Rachel E. Zuckert, *Kant on Beauty and Biology: An Interpretation of the Critique of Judgement*

7:00-10:00 p.m.

- Chair: Michelle Grier (University of San Diego)
- Critics: Paul Guyer (University of Pennsylvania)
 John Zammito (Rice University)
- Author: Rachel E. Zuckert (Northwestern University)

GIV-12. Society for Business Ethics

7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic: Do Philosophers Have Something Unique to Contribute to Business Ethics?

- Chair: Mollie Painter-Morland (DePaul University)
- Speakers: Patricia Werhane (University of Virginia)
 Christopher Michaelson (New York University)
 Stephen Meinster (DePaul University)
 Paul Harper (University of Virginia)
 Sina Kramer (DePaul University)

GIV-13. Max Scheler Society

7:00-10:00 p.m.

- Speakers: Michael Gabel (Universität Erfurt)
 (Keynote Address)
- Manfred Frings (DePaul University)
 “What Is the Meaning of Saying that the Place of the Human Is ‘Outside’ the Cosmos?”

Christina Gould (Southern Illinois University–
Carbondale)

“Toward an Irreplaceable Solidarity: Accepting the
Uniqueness of the Other”

Zachary Davis (St. John’s University)

“Erotic Solidarity: Scheler’s Environmental Ethic”

GROUP SESSION GV: SATURDAY, APRIL 19, 12:15-2:15 P.M.

GV-1. American Society for Aesthetics

12:15-2:15 p.m.

Chair: Angela Curran (Carleton College)

Speaker: Carl Plantinga (Film Studies, Calvin College)

Commentators: Cynthia Freeland (University of Houston)

Aaron Smuts (Temple University)

GV-2. International Association for the Philosophy of Sport

12:15-2:15 p.m.

Topic: Philosophy of Sport

Chair: Jeffrey P. Fry (Ball State University)

Speakers: Michael W. Austin (Eastern Kentucky University)
“Magnanimity, Modafinil, and Moral Theory”

Heather Reid (Morningside College)

“Sport as Philosophy”

Nicholas Dixon (Alma College)

“Trash Talking as Irrelevant to Athletic Excellence:
Response to Summers”

Jeffrey P. Fry (Ball State University)

“Underdogs, Upsets, and Overachievers”

GV-3. International Society for Environmental Ethics

12:15-2:15 p.m.

Speakers: Jen Everett (DePauw University)

“Sustainability in Higher Education: Philosophical
Implications”

Robert Figueroa (University of North Texas)

“Relocating Environmental Heritage: Cultural
Sustainability and Environmental Refugees”

GV-4. Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World

12:15-2:15 p.m.

Topic: Double Effect and War

Chair: William O. Stephens (Creighton University)

- Speakers: Joseph Boyle (University of Toronto)
 “Discriminating among ‘Indiscriminate’ War Acts:
 Intended Damage, Unacceptable Side Effects and
 Rationalizing Descriptions of Targets”
- David Rodin (Oxford University)
 “Double Effect and Proportionality”
- David K. Chan (University of Wisconsin–Stevens
 Point)
 “Who Uses the Doctrine of Double Effect?”

GV-5. Society for the Philosophy of History

12:15-2:15 p.m.

GV-6. Society for the Philosophical Study of Marxism

12:15-2:15 p.m.

Topic: Globalization, Capital, and World Poverty

Chair: Forrest Perry (Vanderbilt University)

- Speakers: David Schweickart (Loyola University Chicago)
 “Global Poverty: Alternative Perspectives on What We
 Should Do—And Why”
- Howard Engelskirchen (Iowa State University)
 “Transforming Property”
- Tony Smith (Iowa State University)
 “Technology and Globalization: A New Stage in World
 History?”

GV-7. Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy

12:15-2:15 p.m.

Topic: New Books in the Field: *Remastering Morals with Aristotle and Confucius* (Cambridge, 2007) by May Sim

- Critics: Peimin Ni (Grand Valley State University)
 Virginia Osborn (Belmont University)
 Alasdair Macintyre (University of Notre Dame)
- Author: May Sim (College of the Holy Cross)

GV-8. Society for the Study of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Philosophy

12:15-2:15 p.m.

Topic: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Karma

- Speakers: Owen Flanagan (Duke University)
 “Karma Naturalized”
- Philip Richman (Independent Scholar)
 “Western Interpretations of Karma in Buddhism”

Joe Loizzo (Columbia University)
 “Personal Agency across Generations: Evolutionary Psychology or Religious Belief”

GV-9. Society for Empirical Ethics

12:15-2:15 p.m.

Topic: Moral Cognition

Chair: Jennifer Cole Wright (University of Wyoming)

Speakers: Darcia Narvaez (University of Notre Dame)
 “Triune Ethics: A Theory of Multiple Moral Motivations”

John Mikhail (Georgetown University)

“Moral Grammar: Clarifications, Objections, Replies”

Geoffrey Goodwin (Princeton University)

“The Perceived Objectivity of Ethical Beliefs”

GV-10. North American Nietzsche Society

12:15-2:15 p.m.

Chair: James Conant (University of Chicago)

Speakers: Anthony K. Jensen (Xavier University)
 “Philology and Genealogy”

Henrik Rydenfelt (University of Helsinki)

“Valuation and the Will to Power: Nietzsche’s Ethics with Ontology”

GV-11. North American Kant Society

12:15-2:15 p.m.

Topic: Kant and Cosmopolitanism

Chair: Michelle Grier (University of San Diego)

Speakers: Sharon Anderson-Gold (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute)
 “A Cosmopolitan Peace”

Helga Varden (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)

“Kant on Global Justice”

Katrin Flikschuh (London School of Economics)

“(Recipient of the Mary Gregor Prize)”

GV-12. Joint Session Sponsored by Josiah Royce Society, Personalist Discussion Group

12:15-2:15 p.m.

Chair: Randall E. Auxier (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)

- Speakers: Jacquelyn Ann Kegley (California State University–
Bakersfield)
“Race as a Factor in the Personal and Social Narrative
of the Contextual Human Person”
- Tommy J. Curry (Southern Illinois University–
Carbondale)
“The Lil’ White Man Who Could: Josiah Royce’s
Anti-Black Racism as Cultural Perpetuation of White
Supremacy”
- Commentator: Dwayne Tunstall (Grand Valley State University)

GV-13. Society for Philosophy and Technology

12:15-2:15 p.m.

GV-14. *Journal of the History of Philosophy*

10:00 a.m.-3:00 p.m.

MAIN AND GROUP MEETING PARTICIPANTS

A

ABBARNO, G. John M. (D'Youville College)	GII-7 Thu PM, GIII-6 Thu PM
ABIMBOLA, Kola (University of Leicester)	III-K Fri PM
ADAMS, Marcus (Western Michigan University)	I-M Thu PM, IV-I Sat AM
ADAMS, Noel S. (Marquette University)	III-I Fri PM, GIV-10 Fri PM
AKE, Stacey (Drexel University)	GIV-8 Fri PM
ALCOFF, Linda Martín (Syracuse University)	III-B Fri PM
ALEXANDER, Jason McKenzie (London School of Economics)	V-C Sat PM
ALLAN, George (Dickinson College)	GIV-9 Fri PM
ALLEN, Anita L. (University of Pennsylvania Law School)	IV-B Sat AM
ALLEN-HERMANSON, Sean J. (Florida International University) ...	V-J Sat PM
ALLHOFF, Fritz (Western Michigan University/Australian National University)	I-M Thu PM
ALLORI, Valia (Northern Illinois University)	V-G Sat PM
ALSPECTOR-KELLY, Marc A. (Western Michigan University)	IV-G Sat AM
ALTMAN, Meryl (DePauw University)	GI-1 Thu AM
ALVAREZ MANNINEN, Bertha (Arizona State University at the West Campus)	I-F Thu PM
ALVAREZ ORTIZ, Claudia (University of Melbourne)	GIV-7 Fri PM
ANAGNOSTOPOULOS, George (University of California–San Diego)	V-D Sat PM
ANDERSON, Douglas R. (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)	GIV-8 Fri PM
ANDERSON, Elizabeth Secor (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)	I-D Thu PM
ANDERSON, Scott A. (University of British Columbia)	IV-B Sat AM
ANDERSON-GOLD, Sharon (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute)	GV-11 Sat PM
ANDRE, Judith (Michigan State University)	GII-7 Thu PM
ANTON, Audrey L. (The Ohio State University)	V-D Sat PM
ARLÓ-COSTA, Horacio (Carnegie-Mellon University)	III-C Fri PM
ARNESON, Richard J. (University of California–San Diego)	II-D Fri AM

ATHERTON, Margaret (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)	IV-I Sat AM, GII-6 Thu PM
AUDI, Robert (University of Notre Dame)	IV-A Sat AM
AUMANN, Antony (Indiana University)	GIV-10 Fri PM
AUSTIN, Michael W. (Eastern Kentucky University)	IV-K Sat AM, GV-2 Sat PM
AUXIER, Randall E. (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)	GIV-9 Fri PM, GV-12 Sat PM

B

BADICI, Emil (University of Florida)	I-G Thu PM
BAI, Tongdong (Xavier University)	I-L Thu PM, GI-9 Thu AM
BANDYOPADHYAY, Prasanta S. (Montana State University)	I-I Thu PM
BARNHILL, Anne (New York University)	I-K Thu PM
BARON, Marcia (Indiana University–Bloomington)	II-B Fri AM
BARRY, Peter Brian (Saginaw Valley State University)	I-K Thu PM
BARTHOLD, Lauren Swayne (Gordon College)	III-I Fri PM
BATES, Jared G. (Hanover College)	IV-J Sat AM
BAUER, Nancy (Tufts University)	IV-C Sat AM
BAXLEY, Anne Margaret (Washington University in St. Louis)	I-H Thu PM
BAYER, Benjamin (Loyola University of Chicago)	I-I Thu PM
BEALER, George (Yale University)	V-A Sat PM
BECKER, Lawrence (Hollins University)	II-D Fri AM
BELL, Macalester C. (Columbia University)	IV-H Sat AM
BENSON, Bruce Ellis (Wheaton College)	GII-2 Thu PM
BENSON, Paul H. (University of Dayton)	GIV-2 Fri PM
BERMAN, Scott (Saint Louis University)	I-J Thu PM
BERTOLET, Rod (Purdue University)	III-D Fri PM
BESSER-JONES, Lorraine L. (University of Waterloo)	GIV-4 Fri PM
BETTI, Arianna (Free University of Amsterdam)	GI-10 Thu AM
BEZUIDENHOUT, Anne (University of South Carolina)	IV-D Sat AM
BHANDARY, Asha (University of Connecticut)	GIII-7 Thu PM
BICKHAM, Stephen H. (Mansfield University)	GIII-3 Thu PM
BIGGS, Stephen (University of Toronto)	V-E Sat PM
BIRONDO, Noell (Pomona College)	I-H Thu PM
BLAKE, Susan (Indiana University)	I-L Thu PM, GIV-6 Fri PM
BONARDI, Paolo (University of Geneva and University of Sheffield)	II-K Fri AM
BORAN, Idil (York University)	IV-I Sat AM
BOXILL, Bernard (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	V-B Sat PM
BOYLE, Joseph (University of Toronto)	GV-4 Sat PM
BRADIE, Michael (Bowling Green State University)	GIV-6 Fri PM

BRADLEY, William B. (Syracuse University)	GII-1 Thu PM
BRASSFIELD, Shoshanna (Colgate University).....	GII-6 Thu PM
BRENNAN, Geoffrey (Australian National University).....	IV-B Sat AM
BRISCOE, Robert E. (Loyola University New Orleans)	III-J Fri PM
BRISON, Susan (Dartmouth College)	III-A Fri PM
BRITTON, Teresa (Eastern Illinois University)	II-E Fri AM
BROCK, Gillian (University of Auckland)	IV-I Sat AM
BROMWICH, Danielle (University of Toronto).....	GIV-4 Fri PM
BRONSTEIN, David (Oxford University/University of Toronto)	II-G Fri AM
BROOK, Richard J. (Bloomsburg University).....	GII-6 Thu PM
BROPHY, Matthew (Minnesota State University–Mankato).....	IV-K Sat AM
BROWN, Derek H. (Brandon University)	III-J Fri PM
BROWNLEE, Kimberley (University of Manchester)	IV-F Sat AM
BRUYA, Brian J. (Eastern Michigan University)	I-L Thu PM, GIV-6 Fri PM
BUENO, Otávio A. (University of Miami)	I-I Thu PM
BURNS, Colleen (Harper College)	III-M Fri PM
BUSS, Sarah (University of Michigan).....	V-B Sat PM
BUTLER, Travis L. (Iowa State University)	I-H Thu PM
BYRNE, Alex (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)	III-J Fri PM

C

CALDER, Todd C. (University of Victoria).....	IV-I Sat AM
CALHOUN, Cheshire (Arizona State University).....	II-B Fri AM
CALLCUT, Daniel J. (University of North Florida).....	V-H Sat PM
CAMPANA, Daniel A. (University of La Verne).....	I-F Thu PM
CAPUTO, John D. (Syracuse University)	GII-2 Thu PM
CARD, Claudia (University of Wisconsin–Madison).....	I-A Thu PM
CAREY, Rosalind (Lehman College–City University of New York)	GI-12 Thu AM
CARLIN, Laurence (University of Wisconsin–Oshkosh)	II-A Fri AM
CASELDINE-BRACHT, Jennifer (Indiana University-Purdue University–Fort Wayne).....	IV-F Sat AM
CASULLO, Albert (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)	III-K Fri PM, V-G Sat PM
CAT, Jordi (Indiana University)	III-E Fri PM
CHAN, David K. (University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point)	IV-F Sat AM, GIV-4 Fri PM, GV-4 Sat PM
CHANDLER, Marthe (DePauw University).....	GIII-8 Thu PM
CHANG, Ruth (Rutgers University).....	IV-F Sat AM
CHOLBI, Michael J. (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)	II-F Fri AM
CHRISTMAN, John (Pennsylvania State University)	I-E Thu PM

CHURCHILL, Ward (Formerly University of Colorado)	IV-A Sat AM
CLARK, Kelly (Calvin College).....	GI-9 Thu AM, GIV-6 Fri PM
CODE, Lorraine (York University)	I-C Thu PM
COFFMAN, E.J. (University of Tennessee)	IV-G Sat AM
COGAN, John (Eckerd College)	GIII-3 Thu PM
COHEN, Carl (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)	I-E Thu PM
COHEN, Marc A. (George Washington University).....	II-H Fri AM
COKELET, Bradford (Middlebury College).....	I-K Thu PM
COLLIER, Mark D. (University of Minnesota–Morris)	III-E Fri PM
COMESAÑA, Juan (University of Wisconsin–Madison)	IV-G Sat AM
CONANT, James (University of Chicago)	GV-10 Sat PM
CONGDON, Matthew (New School for Social Research)	GI-4 Thu AM
CONROY, Christina (University of California–Irvine).....	II-K Fri AM
COPLAN, Amy (California State University–Fullerton)	IV-H Sat AM
CORBETT, Daniel L. (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)	V-J Sat PM
CORVINO, John (Wayne State University)	GII-3 Thu PM
COUCH, Mark B. (Seton Hall University).....	IV-J Sat AM
COVER, Jan (Purdue University)	II-A Fri AM
COWIE, Fiona (California Institute of Technology).....	V-C Sat PM
CRASNOW, Sharon (Riverside Community College–Norco Campus)	GIII-7 Thu PM
CRILEY, Mark (Illinois Wesleyan University)	II-K Fri AM
CROCKETT, Timothy (Marquette University).....	II-A Fri AM
CROSBY, Donald (Colorado State University)	GIII-3 Thu PM
CROUCH, Margaret A. (Eastern Michigan University)	V-H Sat PM
CUDD, Ann E. (University of Kansas).....	V-B Sat PM
CULLISON, Andrew M. (State University of New York–Fredonia)	IV-K Sat AM
CUNNING, David R. (University of Iowa)	III-E Fri PM
CURRAN, Angela (Carleton College)	GV-1 Sat PM
CURRY, Tommy J. (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)	GV-12 Sat PM

D

DAHBOUR, Omar (City University of New York)	I-B Thu PM
DALY, Mark (California State University–Northridge)	GIV-7 Fri PM
DARBY, Derrick (University of Kansas)	III-F Fri PM
DAVEY, Kevin (University of Chicago).....	V-G Sat PM
DAVID, Marian (University of Notre Dame)	V-J Sat PM
DAVIDSON, Maria D. (University of Oklahoma).....	IV-M Sat AM
DAVIS, Michael (Illinois Institute of Technology).....	I-M Thu PM
DAVIS, Zachary (St. John's University)	GIV-13 Fri PM

DE BRIGARD, Felipe (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	III-G Fri PM
DE MELO-MARTIN, Inmaculada (Weill Medical College, Cornell University)	I-F Thu PM
DE-SHALIT, Avner (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)	II-D Fri AM
DECKER, Mark (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)	II-F Fri AM
DECYK, Betsy Newell (California State University–Long Beach)	III-M Fri PM
DELANEY, Neil (Georgetown University)	III-G Fri PM
DESSALLES, Jean-Louis (École Nationale Supérieure des Télécommunications)	V-C Sat PM
DEUTSCH, Harry (Illinois State University)	I-G Thu PM
DEVER, Joshua (University of Texas–Austin)	V-A Sat PM
DICKER, Georges (State University of New York–College at Brockport)	GII-6 Thu PM
DIERKSMEIER, Claus (Stonehill College)	II-M Fri AM
DILLON, Robin (Lehigh University)	II-B Fri AM
DIXON, Nicholas (Alma College)	GV-2 Sat PM
DOMINICK, Yancy Hughes (Seattle University)	II-G Fri AM
DORSEY, Dale (University of Alberta)	IV-F Sat AM
DUCKWORTH, Douglas (Florida State University)	GIII-14 Thu PM
DUNN, Jeffrey (University of Massachusetts)	V-G Sat PM
DURLAND, Karán (Austin College)	GII-9 Thu PM
DUTRA, Bruce P. (Mott Community College)	II-J Fri AM

E

EATON, Anne (University of Illinois–Chicago)	GII-10 Thu PM
EBELS DUGGAN, Kyla (Northwestern University)	V-I Sat PM
EDELBERG, Walter (University of Illinois–Chicago)	I-G Thu PM, V-C Sat PM
EDWARDS, Kevan (University of Kansas)	V-E Sat PM
EDWARDS, Tracy A. (Michigan State University)	IV-I Sat AM
EHRETT, Carl (Northwestern University)	I-I Thu PM
ELDRIDGE, Richard (Swarthmore College)	GII-10 Thu PM
ELIA, John (Wilson College)	IV-H Sat AM
ENDICOTT, Ronald (North Carolina State University)	GIII-10 Thu PM
ENGEL, JR., Mylan (Northern Illinois University)	II-C Fri AM
ENGELMANN, Donna (Alverno College)	III-M Fri PM
ENGELSKIRCHEN, Howard (Iowa State University)	GV-6 Sat PM
ERAÑA, Ángeles (Universidad Autónoma de Mexico)	IV-L Sat AM
EVANS, Daw-Nay (DePaul University)	V-H Sat PM
EVANS, Jacob W. (Wheaton College)	GI-7 Thu AM
EVERETT, Jen (DePauw University)	GV-3 Sat PM

F

FALES, Evan (University of Iowa)	III-G Fri PM
FALLIS, Don T. (University of Arizona).....	IV-F Sat AM
FEIST, Richard (Saint Paul University–Ottawa).....	GIII-2 Thu PM
FELICE, Carlo (State University of New York–Geneseo)	GIII-5 Thu PM
FIGDOR, Carrie (University of Iowa)	I-J Thu PM
FIGUEROA, Robert (University of North Texas).....	GV-3 Sat PM
FINCH, Alicia (Northern Illinois University)	I-J Thu PM
FINE, Kit (New York University).....	V-A Sat PM
FITELSON, Branden (University of California–Berkeley)	III-C Fri PM
FLANAGAN, Owen (Duke University).....	GV-8 Sat PM
FLIKSCHUH, Katrin (London School of Economics).....	GV-11 Sat PM
FORD, Russell (Elmhurst College)	V-I Sat PM
FORSCHLER, Scott E. (Northland Community and Technical College)	II-F Fri AM
FOSTER, Susanne E. (Marquette University)	V-H Sat PM
FOTION, Nicholas (Emory University).....	I-B Thu PM
FRAMARIN, Christopher G. (University of Calgary).....	GII-8 Thu PM
FRANCIS, Leslie (University of Utah).....	IV-B Sat AM
FRASZ, Geoffrey (Community College of Southern Nevada) ...	GIV-7 Fri PM
FREELAND, Cynthia (University of Houston)....	GII-10 Thu PM, GV-1 Sat PM
FREI, Tamra (Michigan State University).....	IV-E Sat AM, GIII-7 Thu PM
FRINGS, Manfred (DePaul University)	GIV-13 Fri PM
FRIQUEGNON, Marie (William Paterson University)	GIII-14 Thu PM
FRY, Jeffrey P. (Ball State University).....	GV-2 Sat PM
FULKERSON-SMITH, Brett (University of Kentucky).....	V-I Sat PM
FUMERTON, Richard (University of Iowa)	I-I Thu PM
FUNKHOUSER, Eric M. (University of Arkansas)	IV-J Sat AM
FUTTER, Dylan (Fordham University).....	GIV-3 Fri PM

G

GABBE, Myrna (University of Dayton)	GIV-3 Fri PM
GABEL, Michael (Universität Erfurht)	GIV-13 Fri PM
GARRAL, Michael (Lehman College–City University of New York)	GI-12 Thu AM
GARRETT, Jeremy (Rice University)	I-F Thu PM
GARTHOFF, Jonathan F. (Northwestern University)	III-H Fri PM
GEHRING, Allen (Indiana University–Bloomington)	I-J Thu PM
GEIRSSON, Heimir (Iowa State University).....	II-K Fri AM
GEISZ, Steven F. (University of Tampa)	I-L Thu PM
GELINAS, Luke (University of Toronto)	IV-H Sat AM

GENONE, James R. (University of California–Berkeley).....	III-J Fri PM
GERREK, Monica L. (University of Kansas).....	V-H Sat PM
GERTLER, Brie (University of Virginia)	V-J Sat PM
GILLET, Carl (Northern Illinois University).....	III-G Fri PM, GIII-10 Thu PM
GILLIES, Anthony (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)	V-F Sat PM
GILMORE, Cody S. (University of California–Davis).....	II-J Fri AM
GINES, Kathryn T. (Vanderbilt University)	IV-M Sat AM
GLICK, Ephraim (Massachusetts Institute of Technology).....	I-G Thu PM
GLOVER, Adam (University of Kentucky)	GI-4 Thu AM, GIV-8 Fri PM
GLUCK, Andrew (Independent Scholar).....	GIII-2 Thu PM
GOLDBERG, Sanford (Northwestern University)	I-G Thu PM
GOLDIN, Owen (Marquette University).....	II-G Fri AM
GOLDSTEIN, Irwin (Davidson College)	IV-F Sat AM
GOODWIN, Geoffrey (Princeton University).....	GV-9 Sat PM
GORHAM, Geoffrey A. (St. Olaf College).....	II-I Fri AM
GOSWAMI, Namita (DePaul University)	GI-1 Thu AM
GOSWICK, Dana Lynne (University of California–Davis)	II-J Fri AM
GOTTLIEB, Paula L. (University of Wisconsin–Madison)	V-D Sat PM
GOULD, Christina (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)	II-L Fri AM
GRAFF, Holly (Oakton Community College).....	III-M Fri PM
GRANGER, Herbert (Wayne State University).....	V-G Sat PM
GRCIC, Joseph M. (Indiana State University).....	II-F Fri AM
GREEN, Jeffrey H. (University of Notre Dame)	GI-7 Thu AM
GREEN, Jeremy (Western Michigan University).....	III-F Fri PM
GREEN, Mitchell S. (University of Virginia)	V-J Sat PM
GRENBERG, Jeanine M. (St. Olaf College).....	GIV-1 Fri PM
GRIER, Michelle (University of San Diego)	GIV-11 Fri PM, GV-11 Sat PM
GRIER, Philip (Dickinson College).....	GIII-1 Thu PM
GROLL, Daniel (University of Chicago).....	III-H Fri PM
GROSSO, Michael (University of Virginia Health System).....	GI-11 Thu AM
GUNTER, Pete A. Y. (University of North Texas)	GIII-3 Thu PM
GUPTA, Bina (University of Missouri–Columbia)	GII-8 Thu PM
GUYER, Paul (University of Pennsylvania)	GIV-11 Fri PM

H

HABER, Matt (University of Utah).....	II-I Fri AM
HALL, Bryan (Indiana University Southeast)	V-I Sat PM
HALLEN, Barry (Morehouse College).....	III-K Fri PM
HALWANI, Raja (School of the Art Institute of Chicago)	I-B Thu PM, GII-3 Thu PM, GIII-12 Thu PM
HANKS, Peter W. (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)	II-K Fri AM

HANNA, Robert (University of Colorado–Boulder)	GIV-1 Fri PM
HANSEN, Sarah (Vanderbilt University)	GI-8 Thu AM
HARE, Peter (University at Buffalo)	GI-2 Thu AM
HARKER, David W. (East Tennessee State University)	II-1 Fri AM
HARPER, Paul (University of Virginia)	GIV-12 Fri PM
HARRELL, Maralee (Carnegie Mellon University)	GIV-7 Fri PM
HARRINGTON, James (Loyola University)	GI-3 Thu AM
HARRIS, Angie (University of Utah)	II-1 Fri AM
HARTSOCK, Michael Dean (University of Missouri–Columbia)	III-G Fri PM
HARTZ, Glenn A. (Ohio State University)	II-A Fri AM, III-E Fri PM
HARVEY, Jean (University of Guelph)	V-B Sat PM
HASKER, R. William (Huntington University)	GII-2 Thu PM
HAY, Carol (Bryn Mawr College)	I-K Thu PM
HEADLEY, Clevis (Florida Atlantic University)	III-B Fri PM
HEATH, Eugene (State University of New York–New Paltz)	II-H Fri AM
HEIL, John (Trinity University)	IV-L Sat AM
HEINAMAA, Sara (University of Helsinki)	IV-C Sat AM
HELD, Jacob M. (University of Central Arkansas)	II-F Fri AM
HELD, Virginia (City University of New York Graduate School and Hunter College)	I-B Thu PM
HENDRICKS, Vincent F. (Roskilde University)	III-C Fri PM
HENKER, Raymond (Northeastern Illinois University)	GI-13 Thu AM
HENN, Martin (University of Wisconsin–Whitewater)	II-G Fri AM
HERMES, Charles M. (University of Texas–Arlington)	V-E Sat PM
HERSTEIN, Gary L. (Muskingum College)	GIV-9 Fri PM
HICKERSON, Ryan (Western Oregon University)	GI-10 Thu AM
HIGGINBOTHAM, James (University of Southern California)	III-D Fri PM
HILBERT, David (University of Illinois–Chicago)	III-J Fri PM
HILL, JR., Thomas E. (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	V-B Sat PM
HITCHCOCK, David (McMaster University)	GIV-7 Fri PM
HOPPE, Elizabeth A. (Lewis University)	II-G Fri AM
HORGAN, Terence (University of Arizona)	IV-F Sat AM
HORTON, Michael B. (University of South Alabama–Mobile)	V-F Sat PM
HUANG, Ta-Lun (Linus) (University of California–Riverside)	GI-9 Thu AM
HUDDLESTON, Andrew (Princeton University)	GI-4 Thu AM
HUENEMANN, Charles (Utah State University)	V-H Sat PM
HUGGETT, Nick (University of Illinois–Chicago)	II-1 Fri AM
HUSTON, Mark R. (Schoolcraft College)	GIII-4 Thu PM

I

IACONO, Leo (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)	I-1 Thu PM
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ICE, Tamela (Kansas City Community College) GIII-7 Thu PM
 INGRAM, Penelope (University of Texas–Arlington)..... GI-1 Thu AM
 ITZKOWITZ, Kenneth (Marietta College)..... III-I Fri PM

J

JACKSON, Bernard (Washington and Lee University)..... III-F Fri PM
 JAGGAR, Alison M. (University of Colorado)..... I-A Thu PM
 JAMES, Robin M. (University of North Carolina–Charlotte).... GIII-4 Thu PM
 JENKINS, Mark P. (Johns Hopkins University) IV-K Sat AM
 JENSEN, Anthony K. (Xavier University)..... GV-10 Sat PM
 JENSEN, Mark N. (Hope College)..... III-H Fri PM
 JOHN, James (University of Toronto) V-J Sat PM
 JOHNS, Christopher (Saint Xavier University (Chicago)) V-I Sat PM
 JOHNSON, Daniel M. (Baylor University) V-G Sat PM, GIV-10 Fri PM
 JONES, Carolyn (Purdue University Calumet) GI-11 Thu AM
 JONES, Jonathon David (Wayne State University) III-H Fri PM
 JONES, Nicholaos (The Ohio State University)..... V-F Sat PM
 JONES, Russell (University of Oklahoma)..... II-G Fri AM
 JONES, Sarah Black (Northern Michigan University)..... IV-G Sat AM
 JOST, Lawrence J. (University of Cincinnati)..... V-D Sat PM

K

KAAG, John (Harvard University)..... GI-2 Thu AM
 KAPITAN, Tomis (Northern Illinois University) V-A Sat PM
 KAPSTEIN, Matthew (University of Chicago Divinity School) GII-8 Thu PM
 KAWALL, Jason R. (Colgate University) IV-H Sat AM
 KEATON, Douglas (University of Cincinnati) IV-J Sat AM
 KEGLEY, Jacquelyn Ann (California State University–Bakersfield)
 GV-12 Sat PM
 KELLY, Hugh (New York University)..... GIII-2 Thu PM
 KELLY, Hugh (New York University)..... GIII-2 Thu PM
 KENEHAN, Sarah (University of Tennessee/Bern University) II-I Fri AM
 KIM, Alan (Hamilton College)..... II-G Fri AM
 KIM, Eunjung (University of Washington) III-F Fri PM
 KIND, Amy (Claremont McKenna College)..... V-J Sat PM
 KIPER, Jordan (Colorado State University) GIII-11 Thu PM
 KIRKLAND, Sean (DePaul University)..... II-M Fri AM
 KIRSCH, Julie (Marymount University)..... I-K Thu PM
 KLEMENT, Kevin C. (University of Massachusetts–Amherst).... GI-12 Thu AM
 KNAPPE, Ulrich (University of Copenhagen)..... GIV-10 Fri PM
 KOOPMAN, Colin (University of California–Santa Cruz)
 GI-2 Thu AM, GIV-8 Fri PM

KORMAN, Daniel (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)II-J Fri AM
 KOWALSKI, Dean A. (University of Wisconsin–Waukesha)II-G Fri AM
 KOZIOL, Charles (City University of New York–Graduate Center)
III-G Fri PM
 KRAMER, Sina (DePaul University) II-L Fri AM, GIV-12 Fri PM
 KREIDER, S. Evan (University of Wisconsin–Fox Valley)I-H Thu PM
 KREMER, Michael (University of Chicago)..... I-G Thu PM
 KUKATHAS, Chandran (London School of Economics)IV-B Sat AM
 KUSHNER, Matt G. (University of Minnesota–Minneapolis).... GI-11 Thu AM
 KVANVIG, Jonathan L. (Baylor University) II-C Fri AM

L

LACKEY, Jennifer (Northwestern University)..... V-F Sat PM
 LAFONT, Cristina (Northwestern University).....IV-K Sat AM
 LANCE, Mark (Georgetown University)..... GIII-12 Thu PM
 LANDINI, Gregory (University of Iowa) II-K Fri AM
 LAPOINTE, Sandra (Kansas State University) GI-10 Thu AM
 LAPORTE, Joseph (Hope College).....I-C Thu PM
 LARUDEE, Mehrene (DePaul University) GIII-12 Thu PM
 LEBAR, Mark (Ohio University)III-H Fri PM
 LEE, Nan-Nan (St. Xavier University–Chicago) GI-11 Thu AM
 LEIBOWITZ, Uri (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)III-H Fri PM
 LEVVIS, Gary (University of Connecticut) II-F Fri AM
 LEWTAS, Patrick K. (American University of Beirut) III-E Fri PM
 LIEBEGOTT, Kurt (Purdue University) I-F Thu PM
 LIGHT, Andrew R. (University of Washington) GII-10 Thu PM
 LINK, Montgomery (Suffolk University)..... GI-12 Thu AM
 LIST, Justin (Stritch School of Medicine, Loyola University Chicago)
 I-M Thu PM
 LISTON, Michael (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)..... II-K Fri AM
 LITTLE, Margaret (Georgetown University) III-A Fri PM
 LITTLEJOHN, Clayton (Dedman College).....V-J Sat PM
 LOCKWOOD, Thornton C. (Boston University)I-H Thu PM
 LOEFFLER, Ronald (Grand Valley State University)IV-J Sat AM
 LOIZZO, Joe (Columbia University).....GV-8 Sat PM
 LOMBARD, Lawrence B. (Wayne State University)II-J Fri AM
 LORD, Errol (University of Nebraska–Lincoln) GIII-11 Thu PM
 LUDWIG, Kirk (University of Florida)..... III-D Fri PM
 LYONS, Jack C. (University of Arkansas)V-J Sat PM

M

MACHAN, Tibor (Chapman University) I-E Thu PM

MACHERY, Edouard (University of Pittsburgh)	V-C Sat PM, GI-5 Thu AM
MACINTYRE, Alasdair (University of Notre Dame).....	GV-7 Sat PM
MAGNELL, Thomas (Drew University)	GIII-5 Thu PM
MAHAFFEY, Tracie (Florida State University)	III-G Fri PM
MAIESE, Michelle (Emmanuel College)	GIV-4 Fri PM
MALONE, Michael (Northern Arizona University)	GIV-7 Fri PM
MANDELBAUM, Eric (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill) ...	III-G Fri PM
MANIS, R. Zachary (Southwest Baptist University)	III-I Fri PM
MARCANO, Donna D. (Trinity College)	IV-M Sat AM
MARINO, Patricia A. (University of Waterloo)	II-H Fri AM, III Fri PM
MARTIN, Bill (DePaul University).....	III-F Fri PM
MARTIN, Michael F. (Ohio State University).....	GIII-11 Thu PM
MATHESON, Jonathan (University of Rochester)	GI-7 Thu AM
MATTHIS, Michael (Lamar University)	GIV-10 Fri PM
MCAFEE, Noelle (George Mason University)	GI-2 Thu AM
MCAULIFFE, Jana (DePaul University)	GI-1 Thu AM
MCBRAYER, Justin P. (University of Missouri)	I-K Thu PM
MCCALL, Corey (Elmira College).....	III-I Fri PM
MCCANN, Hugh J. (Texas A&M University)	V-E Sat PM
MCCARTHY, Timothy (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)	
.....	I-G Thu PM
MCCLINTOCK, Sara (Emory University).....	GII-8 Thu PM
MCCUMBER, John (University of California–Los Angeles)	GIII-1 Thu PM
MCDANIEL, Kris N. (University of Massachusetts–Amherst).....	GI-3 Thu AM
MCDONALD, Fritz (Oakland University)	IV-J Sat AM
MCDONALD, Julie (Saint Joseph’s University)	V-H Sat PM
MCDONNELL, Kevin (Saint Mary’s College, University of Notre Dame)	
.....	I-M Thu PM
MCDOWELL, Ashley (Kalamazoo College)	II-J Fri AM
MCELREATH, Frank Scott (Peace College)	GII-7 Thu PM, GIII-5 Thu PM
MCEVOY, Adrienne (Mansfield University).....	GIV-1 Fri PM
MCKEEVER, Sean D. (Davidson College)	III-H Fri PM
MCKENNA, Erin (Pacific Luthern University)	II-L Fri AM, GIV-8 Fri PM
MCKINSEY, Michael (Wayne State University)	II-K Fri AM
MCLEOD, Carolyn (University of Western Ontario)	GIV-2 Fri PM
MCNAMARA, Dan (University of Chicago Divinity School)....	GIII-14 Thu PM
MCPHERSON, Lionel K. (Tufts University)	I-B Thu PM
MCSHANE, Katie (North Carolina State University)	GII-1 Thu PM
MEINSTER, Stephen (DePaul University)	GIV-12 Fri PM
MERCHANT, Jason (University of Chicago).....	IV-D Sat AM
MEYERS, Diana Tietjens (University of Connecticut).....	GIV-2 Fri PM

MICHAELSON, Christopher (New York University)	GIV-12 Fri PM
MIKHAIL, John (Georgetown University)	GV-9 Sat PM
MILLER, Christian (Wake Forest University)	I-D Thu PM
MILLS, Charles (Northwestern University).....	I-D Thu PM, II-D Fri AM
MILLÁN-ZAIBERT, Elizabeth (DePaul University)	II-M Fri AM
MINEAU, André (University of Quebec–Rimouski)	GIII-13 Thu PM
MODRAK, Deborah (University of Rochester)	GIV-3 Fri PM
MOHANTY, J.N. (Temple University)	GII-8 Thu PM
MOHR, Eric (Duquesne University)	GI-13 Thu AM
MONAHAN, Michael J. (Marquette University)	III-B Fri PM
MOODY-ADAMS, Michele (Cornell University)	II-B Fri AM
MOORE, Joseph (Amherst College).....	V-F Sat PM
MOSES, Greg (Independent Scholar)	GIII-9 Thu PM
MOYAR, Dean F. (Johns Hopkins University).....	III-I Fri PM
MOZERSKY, M. Joshua (Queen’s University (Ontario)).....	GI-3 Thu AM
MUELLER, Paul (Loyola University of Chicago)	III-G Fri PM
MULLIN, Amy (University of Toronto–Mississauga)	III-A Fri PM
MULLINS, Matthew (Northwestern University)	IV-G Sat AM
MURPHY, Colleen (Texas A&M University)	GIII-13 Thu PM

N

NADELHOFFER, Thomas (Dickinson College).....	III-G Fri PM
NADLER, Steven (University of Wisconsin)	III-E Fri PM
NAGEL, Jennifer (University of Toronto)	V-F Sat PM
NARVAEZ, Darcia (University of Notre Dame).....	GV-9 Sat PM
NARVESON, Jan (University of Waterloo)	GIII-9 Thu PM
NASON, Shannon (Purdue University)	GIV-10 Fri PM
NEILL, Jeremy (Saint Louis University)	III-F Fri PM
NELSON, Alan (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill).....	II-A Fri AM
NELSON, Eric S. (University of Massachusetts–Lowell)	GIII-8 Thu PM
NESVET, Matthew (Chicago)	GIII-13 Thu PM
NEWHARD, Jay M. (John Carroll University)	V-F Sat PM
NGUYEN, A. Minh (Eastern Kentucky University)	IV-G Sat AM
NI, Peimin (Grand Valley State University)	GV-7 Sat PM
NICHOLLS, Tracy (Lewis University)	GIII-9 Thu PM
NICHOLS, Ryan T. (California State University–Fullerton).....	GIV-6 Fri PM
NISSIM-SABAT, Marilyn (Lewis University).....	IV-I Sat AM
NOBIS, Nathan (Morehouse College).....	I-F Thu PM
NOLAND, Jake (Virginia Commonwealth University)	II-F Fri AM
NORLOCK, Kathryn J. (St. Mary’s College of Maryland).....	I-K Thu PM
NORMAN, Andrew (Carnegie Mellon University).....	GIV-7 Fri PM

NUCCETELLI, Susana (St. Cloud State University).....	IV-L Sat AM
NUNAN, Richard (Philosophy and Religious Studies, College of Charleston)	GII-3 Thu PM
NUSSBAUM, Martha (University of Chicago)	II-D Fri AM
NUZZO, Angelica (City University of New York)	GIII-1 Thu PM

O

O'NEILL, Martin (University of Manchester)	IV-1 Sat AM
OAKES, Courtney E. (Saint Louis University)	GIV-3 Fri PM
OAKLANDER, L. Nathan (University of Michigan–Flint)	GI-3 Thu AM
OHAYON, Elan Liss (University of Toronto).....	GI-8 Thu AM
OLECHNOWICZ, Joseph Quinn (Florida State University)	I-K Thu PM
ONGLEY, John (Edinboro University)	GI-12 Thu AM
ORLANDI, Nicoletta (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill).....	II-E Fri AM
OSBORN, Virginia (Belmont University).....	GV-7 Sat PM
OSHANA, Marina (University of Florida)	GIV-2 Fri PM
OUTLAW, Lucius T. (Vanderbilt University)	III-B Fri PM
OVERALL, Christine (Queen's University)	I-F Thu PM
OWENS, Joseph (University of Minnesota).....	V-E Sat PM

P

PADGETT WALSH, Katie (Northwestern University) II-L Fri AM, IV-K Sat AM
PAINTER, Corinne M. (Washtenaw Community College)	I-H Thu PM
PAINTER-MORLAND, Mollie (DePaul University)	GIV-12 Fri PM
PALLIKKATHAYIL, Japa (Harvard University)	IV-E Sat AM
PAMERLEAU, William C. (University of Pittsburgh–Greensburg) GIII-4 Thu PM
PANAGOPOULOS, Anastasia (University of Minnesota).....	III-E Fri PM
PATTERSON, Steven W. (Marygrove College).....	II-H Fri AM
PAYTAS, Tyler Stephen (University of Missouri–St. Louis)	GIV-4 Fri PM
PERKINS, Franklin T. (DePaul University).....	GI-9 Thu AM
PERRY, Forrest (Vanderbilt University).....	GV-6 Sat PM
PETRIK, James (Ohio University).....	II-H Fri AM
PFLUM, Ryan (Western Michigan University)	GIII-11 Thu PM
PIANALTO, Matthew (University of Arkansas).....	IV-K Sat AM
PICCININI, Gualtiero (University of Missouri–St. Louis) V-E Sat PM, GIII-10 Thu PM
PIERCE, Christine (North Carolina State University)	GII-3 Thu PM
PINCOCK, Christopher (Purdue University).....	I-I Thu PM
PINEDA, David (Universidad de Girona)	IV-L Sat AM
PINI, Giorgio (Fordham University).....	I-C Thu PM

PINILLOS, Angel (Arizona State University)	I-J Thu PM
PIPER, Mark (Saint Louis University)	IV-H Sat AM
PLANTINGA, Carl (Film Studies, Calvin College)	GV-1 Sat PM
PODLASKOWSKI, Adam C. (University of Connecticut)	II-J Fri AM
POSTON, Ted L. (University of South Alabama)	IV-G Sat AM
PRIEST, Graham (University of Melbourne)	I-G Thu PM
PRITCHARD, Duncan (University of Stirling)	II-C Fri AM
PUPA, Frank (The Graduate School and University Center–City University of New York)	II-K Fri AM
PÉREZ, Diana (Universidad de Buenos Aires)	IV-L Sat AM

Q

QUINBY, Rohan (Massey University)	GI-8 Thu AM
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R

RAEES, Aisha (Southern Illinois University)	II-L Fri AM
RAMSEY, John (University of California–Riverside)	GI-9 Thu AM
RAUHUT, Nils (Coastal Carolina University)	GIV-1 Fri PM
REED, Baron (Northwestern University)	V-F Sat PM
REHG, William (St. Louis University)	IV-K Sat AM
REID, Heather (Morningside College)	GV-2 Sat PM
REID, James (Metropolitan State College of Denver)	IV-E Sat AM
RESCORLA, Michael A. (University of California–Santa Barbara)	IV-G Sat AM
RESHOTKO, Naomi (University of Denver)	II-G Fri AM
RIBEIRO, Brian (University of Tennessee–Chattanooga)	GII-9 Thu PM
RICHMAN, Philip (Independent Scholar)	GV-8 Sat PM
RILEY, Tom (Clarke College)	II-J Fri AM
RIPPON, Simon (Harvard University)	III-H Fri PM
RIVERA, Lisa S. (University of Massachusetts–Boston)	V-H Sat PM
RIVERA, Omar (University of Wisconsin–LaCrosse)	II-M Fri AM
ROBBINS, Philip A. (Washington University in St. Louis)	IV-D Sat AM
ROBERTS, Matthew (Whitworth University)	I-J Thu PM
ROBERTS, Rodney C. (East Carolina University)	IV-I Sat AM
ROCHE, William (Texas Christian University)	I-I Thu PM
RODIN, David (Oxford University)	GV-4 Sat PM
ROLLINGER, Robin (University of Salzburg)	GI-10 Thu AM
ROSENBAUM, Stuart (Baylor University)	GIV-8 Fri PM
ROSS, George MacDonald (University of Leeds)	GIV-1 Fri PM
ROTH, Amanda (University of Michigan)	GIII-7 Thu PM
ROUSSE, B. Scot (Northwestern University)	IV-K Sat AM
ROWAN, John (Purdue University–Calumet)	II-H Fri AM

RUDD, Anthony J. (St. Olaf College)	V-H Sat PM
RUPERT, Robert (University of Colorado–Boulder)	II-E Fri AM
RUSSELL, Gillian (Washington University in St. Louis).....	I-J Thu PM
RYDENFELT, Henrik (University of Helsinki).....	GV-10 Sat PM
RYSIEW, Patrick (University of Victoria)	IV-G Sat AM

S

SABATÉS, Marcelo H. (Kansas State University).....	IV-L Sat AM
SADLER, Gregory B. (Ball State University–Indiana State Prison)	GI-13 Thu AM
SAKA, Paul (University of Houston)	I-G Thu PM
SANDLER, Ronald L. (Northeastern University)	GII-1 Thu PM
SATTIG, Thomas (Tulane University)	II-J Fri AM
SCHEAR, Joseph K. (California Polytechnic State University–San Luis Obispo)	III-I Fri PM
SCHECHEMAN, Marya (University of Illinois–Chicago)	II-E Fri AM
SCHIFFER, Stephen (New York University).....	III-D Fri PM
SCHMIDT, Claudia (Marquette University)	V-I Sat PM
SCHOETTLE, Timothy W. (Messiah College)	GI-3 Thu AM
SCHRADER, David (APA Executive Director)	GIII-6 Thu PM
SCHRECKER, Ellen (Yeshiva University).....	IV-A Sat AM
SCHWARTZMAN, Lisa H. (Michigan State University)	I-D Thu PM, GIV-2 Fri PM
SCHWEICKART, David (Loyola University Chicago).....	GV-6 Sat PM
SEDGWICK, Sally (University of Illinois–Chicago).....	GIII-1 Thu PM
SEEMAN, Bradley N. (Taylor University)	GI-7 Thu AM
SENROR, Thomas D. (University of Arkansas)	IV-J Sat AM
SEOK, Bongrae (Alvernia College).....	GIII-8 Thu PM
SHAFFER, Michael J. (St. Cloud State University)	I-I Thu PM
SHELDON, Mark (Northwestern University)	I-F Thu PM
SHOCKEY, Matthew (Indiana University–South Bend)	III-I Fri PM
SHOEMAKER, David W. (Bowling Green State University)	II-H Fri AM
SICKLER, Bradley L. (Ouachita Baptist University)	III-E Fri PM
SIKKA, Sonia (University of Ottawa).....	III-F Fri PM
SIM, May (College of the Holy Cross)	I-H Thu PM, GV-7 Sat PM
SIMONS, Margaret A. (Southern Illinois University–Edwardsville)	IV-C Sat AM
SIMONS, Peter (University of Leeds)	IV-L Sat AM, GI-10 Thu AM
SKOW, Bradford (Massachusetts Institute of Technology).....	GI-3 Thu AM
SMILA, Sarit (Washington University in St. Louis).....	GIII-7 Thu PM
SMITH, Andrew F. (State University of New York–Stony Brook)	GI-2 Thu AM

SMITH, Robin (Texas A&M University).....	V-G Sat PM
SMITH, Tara (University of Texas–Austin).....	I-E Thu PM
SMITH, Tony (Iowa State University)	GV-6 Sat PM
SMUTS, Aaron (Temple University).....	GV-1 Sat PM
SOSA, David (University of Texas–Austin).....	IV-L Sat AM
SOSA, Ernest (Rutgers University).....	II-C Fri AM
SPENCER, Cara (Howard University)	III-J Fri PM
SREEDHAR, Susanne (Boston University).....	GIII-7 Thu PM
STANTON, Robert (University of Western Ontario)	IV-D Sat AM
STALNAKER, Robert (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)	III-J Fri PM, IV-L Sat AM
STANGL, Rebecca (University of Virginia)	II-F Fri AM
STARKEY, Charles (Clemson University)	II-H Fri AM
STEPHENS, Daniel (University of Hong Kong).....	GIII-8 Thu PM
STEPHENS, William O. (Creighton University)	IV-H Sat AM, GV-4 Sat PM
STERBA, James P. (University of Notre Dame)....	Presidential Address Fri PM
STOEHR, Kevin (Boston University).....	GIII-4 Thu PM
SUPERSON, Anita (University of Kentucky)	II-B Fri AM
SUSSMAN, David (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)	IV-E Sat AM
SWITZER, Adrian (Emory University)	V-I Sat PM
SWITZER, Michelle (Whittier College)	GI-8 Thu AM
SYTSMA, Sharon E. (Northern Illinois University)	I-H Thu PM
SZABÓ, Zoltán (Yale University)	IV-D Sat AM

T

TALISSE, Robert (Vanderbilt University)	III-F Fri PM
TANKSLEY, Charlie (University of Virginia)	V-G Sat PM
THOMPSON, Allen (Clemson University)	GII-1 Thu PM
TILLMAN, Chris (University of Manitoba).....	I-J Thu PM
TOBIN, Theresa W. (Marquette University).....	I-D Thu PM
TOH, Kevin (Indiana University–Bloomington)	II-H Fri AM
TOLLEY, Clinton (University of California–San Diego).....	V-I Sat PM
TOLLIVER, Joseph Thomas (University of Arizona)	III-J Fri PM
TORSEN, Ingvild (Florida International University).....	GIII-4 Thu PM
TREANOR, Nick (University of Toronto)	I-J Thu PM
TRIVIGNO, Franco V. (Marquette University).....	I-H Thu PM
TROGDON, Kelly (University of Massachusetts)	IV-J Sat AM
TROYER, John (University of Connecticut).....	GII-6 Thu PM
TUNG, Toy (John Jay College–City University of New York) ...	GIII-14 Thu PM
TUNSTALL, Dwayne (Grand Valley State University)	GV-12 Sat PM
TUOZZO, Thomas M. (University of Kansas).....	IV-H Sat AM

- TURNER, Derek D. (Connecticut College) II-I Fri AM
- V**
- VALDMAN, Mikhail (Virginia Commonwealth University) I-K Thu PM
- VAN DER LINDEN, Harry (Butler University) GIII-9 Thu PM
- VAN INWAGEN, Peter (University of Notre Dame)
..... Presidential Address Introduction Fri PM
- VANCE, Chad (University of Colorado–Boulder) GI-4 Thu AM
- VARDEN, Helga (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)
..... V-I Sat PM, GV-11 Sat PM
- VELASCO, Joel (University of Wisconsin–Madison) II-I Fri AM
- VESSEY, David T. (University of Chicago) III-I Fri PM
- VINEBERG, Susan (Wayne State University) II-I Fri AM
- VINTGES, Karen (University of Amsterdam) IV-C Sat AM
- VISION, Gerald (Temple University) IV-J Sat AM
- VOLTURA, Jerry (University of Alaska–Anchorage) GIV-7 Fri PM
- W**
- WAGGLE, Larry J. (Illinois State University) IV-H Sat AM
- WALTERS, Gregory J. (Saint Paul University–Ottawa) GIII-2 Thu PM
- WALTON, Douglas (University of Winnipeg) GIV-7 Fri PM
- WANG, Robin (Loyola Marymount University) GI-9 Thu AM
- WARD, Barry M. (University of Arkansas) IV-F Sat AM
- WARD, Roger (Georgetown College) GIV-8 Fri PM
- WARTENBERG, Thomas E. (Mount Holyoke College) GII-10 Thu PM
- WAYMACK, Mark (Loyola University Chicago) III-E Fri PM
- WEDGWOOD, Ralph (Oxford University) III-H Fri PM
- WEINBERG, Jonathan (Indiana University–Bloomington) III-K Fri PM
- WERHANE, Patricia (University of Virginia) GIV-12 Fri PM
- WERNER, Donna (St. Louis Community College-Meramec College)
..... III-M Fri PM
- WHEELER, Gregory (CENTRIA AI Center, New University of Lisbon)
..... III-C Fri PM
- WHEELER, Mark (San Diego State University) V-G Sat PM
- WHITE, Amy E. (Ohio University–Zanesville) I-F Thu PM, GI-11 Thu AM
- WHITT, Matt (Vanderbilt University) GI-8 Thu AM
- WILSON, John K. (College Freedom Institute–Chicago) IV-A Sat AM
- WILSON, Robert A. (University of Alberta) GI-5 Thu AM
- WITT, Charlotte (University of New Hampshire) I-C Thu PM
- WOLFF, Jonathan (University College London) II-D Fri AM
- WOODWARD, Jennifer (University of Kentucky) V-F Sat PM
- WRIGHT, Jennifer Cole (University of Wyoming) GV-9 Sat PM

WU, Wayne W. (Ohio State University)	III-J Fri PM
WYNIA, Matthew (American Medical Association Institute for Ethics)	I-M Thu PM

X

XIAO, Yang (Kenyon College)	I-L Thu PM
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Y

YANCY, George (Duquesne University)	IV-M Sat AM
YANDELL, K. David (Loyola University Chicago)	III-E Fri PM
YATES, Melissa (Northwestern University)	III-F Fri PM
YOST, Benjamin S. (Harvard University)	II-F Fri AM

Z

ZACKER, David (Elgin Community College)	III-M Fri PM
ZAGZEBSKI, Linda (University of Oklahoma)	II-C Fri AM
ZAMMITO, John (Rice University)	GIV-11 Fri PM
ZINAICH, Samuel (The Institute for Critical Thinking)	GI-11 Thu AM
ZUCKERT, Rachel E. (Northwestern University)	GIV-11 Fri PM

ABSTRACTS OF COLLOQUIUM PAPERS

THE LIAR PARADOX AND THE INCLOSURE SCHEMA (I-G)

EMIL BADICI (UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA)

In *Beyond the Limits of Thought* [2002], Graham Priest argues that logical and semantic paradoxes have the same underlying structure (which he calls the Inclosure Schema). He also argues that, in conjunction with the Principle of Uniform Solution (same kind of paradox, same kind of solution), this is sufficient to “sink virtually all orthodox solutions to the paradoxes,” because the orthodox solutions to the paradoxes are not uniform. I argue that Priest fails to provide a non-question-begging method to sink virtually all orthodox solutions, and that the Inclosure Schema cannot be the structure that underlies the Liar paradox. Moreover, Ramsey was right in thinking that logical and semantic paradoxes are paradoxes of different kinds.

THE DUHEM-QUINE THESIS (I-I)

PRASANTA S. BANDYOPADHYAY (MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY)

There are two versions of the Duhem-Quine thesis: (i) confirmation holism and (ii) evidence holism. After disentangling the notions of confirmation and belief from that of evidence, I propose two Bayesian accounts to address these two versions of the Duhem-Quine thesis. I further distinguish confirmation holism and evidence holism into two respective sub-varieties. I argue that none of the versions of the Duhem-Quine thesis is tenable.

SAVING STRAWSON (I-K)

PETER BRIAN BARRY (SAGINAW VALLEY STATE UNIVERSITY)

The discussion offered by Peter Strawson in his seminal “Freedom and Resentment” is typically taken to suggest that Strawson identifies being a morally responsible agent with being an apt candidate for the exercise of the reactive attitudes. So understood, an agent is exempt from moral responsibility if she is not an apt candidate. Even sympathetic commentators have observed that Strawson appears committed to allowing that being an evil person is an exempting condition and that evil persons are therefore not apt candidates for the reactive attitudes nor are morally responsible. After identifying just why exempting evil persons from moral responsibility is problematic for Strawson, I consider and reject a modification of Strawson’s account. I then suggest that the proper Strawsonian response is to reject an implausible account of evil personhood that underlies the objection that Strawson must exempt evil persons.

KIM ON THE EXPLANATORY ARGUMENT FOR PHYSICALISM (IV-J)

JARED G. BATES (HANOVER COLLEGE)

The explanatory argument for physicalism argues that physicalist type-identities give the best explanation of psychophysical correlations. Kim (2005) levels four major objections against the explanatory argument for physicalism, including that psychophysical identities cannot explain (let alone best explain) psychophysical correlations. I will reconstruct and assess all of Kim's objections. The result is a defense of the explanatory argument for physicalism.

COURAGE, FEAR OF DEATH, AND THE SILENCING OF COMPETING REASONS (I-H)

ANNE MARGARET BAXLEY (WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS)

Contemporary virtue theorists have fastened onto the fact that Aristotle and other classical virtue theorists accept a crucial difference between the person who merely acts rightly and the person who is wholehearted in what she does. But what accounts for the fact that both the continent and the virtuous person act in accordance with their best judgment, yet only one experiences conflict, temptation, and struggle? One promising answer, most closely associated with John McDowell, is that the requirements of virtue "silence" competing reasons for action. McDowell has argued that Aristotle's contrast between virtue and continence requires the silencing thesis. But the silencing interpretation is not compelling. Aristotle does not think that virtue always silences concerns that are sacrificed by virtuous action, for he thinks that courage fails to silence the fear of death.

GLOBALIST ATTITUDES AND SPECIAL RELATIONS (IV-H)

MACALESTER C. BELL (COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY)

Some attitudes take persons, or more specifically, a person's moral character as their object. Shame, contempt, disdain, disgust and admiration all have this feature. But insofar as these attitudes are concerned with global assessments of character, they are seen as especially troubling. Objectors have complained that these attitudes associated with global assessments of character (henceforth "globalist attitudes") can never fit their objects, and thus can never be warranted. In this paper, I will argue that those who dismiss all globalist attitudes in this way are misguided. Specifically, I will argue that this objection depends upon a mistaken view about how we ought to assess character traits. Once we recognize that our special relations can affect our character judgments, we ought to conclude that our globalist attitudes can, in many cases, fit their objects and thus should not be summarily dismissed as unfitting.

KAPLAN ON QUINE'S THEOREM (II-K)

PAOLO BONARDI (UNIVERSITY OF GENEVA AND UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD)

The so-called Quine's Theorem states that in a sentence, if a given position, occupied by a singular term, is not open to substitution, then that position cannot be occupied by a variable bound to an initially placed quantifier. A

presumed counter-instance to this theorem has been put forward by David Kaplan in his article “Opacity.” The purpose of my paper is to illustrate Kaplan’s counter-instance to the theorem and to prove that it fails.

THE PARADOX OF RESOURCES: GLOBAL INEQUALITIES AND RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION (IV-I)

IDIL BORAN (YORK UNIVERSITY)

Some cosmopolitans defend a system of global distributive justice, which prescribes an egalitarian redistribution of natural resource wealth between countries. Their argument relies on the claim that inequalities in natural resource distribution are responsible for inequalities in wealth between nations. This paper argues that this proposal is false and proposes to revise some of the standard assumptions about global justice accordingly. The analysis begins with the explanation of the resource thesis, the claim that resource endowment is an economic asset for a country, followed by the normative proposal to address inequalities through resource-based redistribution. An objection is then raised in light of recent studies in economics, which disclose economic problems associated with resource endowment in developing countries. The philosophical implications of these findings are discussed and lessons are derived for normative debates on global justice.

VISUAL SHAPE PERCEPTION AND BODILY ACTION (III-J)

ROBERT E. BRISCOE (LOYOLA UNIVERSITY NEW ORLEANS)

In this paper, I examine the proposal—central to Alva Noë’s recent “enactive” account of visual perception—that in order to see an object’s 3D shape it is necessary to possess sensorimotor knowledge of the way the object’s 2D, perspectival-shape would vary with variation in one’s point of view. Noë’s proposal, I argue, mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception, i.e., our ability to see the orientation of an object’s visible surfaces in depth, to volumetric object recognition, i.e., our ability to identify the object’s volumetric shape from any of indefinitely many different possible perspectives on the object. I then try to show that this error is symptomatic of a much broader confusion about the role of bodily action in spatially contentful visual perception.

UNDERSTANDING MENO’S PARADOX IN ARISTOTLE’S *POSTERIOR ANALYTICS* I.1 (II-G)

DAVID BRONSTEIN (OXFORD UNIVERSITY/UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO)

This paper presents a close reading of Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* I 1, focusing on the middle third of the chapter (71a17-30). Here Aristotle introduces a peculiar sort of learning, draws a distinction between two ways of knowing in order to explain it (“knowing universally” and “knowing without qualification”), and suggests that this distinction also solves a version of Meno’s paradox. Commentators have had difficulty understanding the connection between what Aristotle calls “the problem in the *Meno*” and Meno’s paradox as it appears in Plato’s dialogue. In addition, commentators

have had difficulty connecting Aristotle's distinction between knowing universally and knowing without qualification to his version of the paradox. This paper aims to solve these difficulties by presenting an interpretation of knowing universally and knowing without qualification, one that helps bring to light what exactly Aristotle means when he alludes to "the problem in the *Meno*."

MORAL JUDGMENTS: ETIOLOGIES AND CREDIBILITY (IV-K)

MATTHEW BROPHY (MINNESOTA STATE UNIVERSITY—MANKATO)

The interplay between moral intuitions and principles is a vital part of moral methodology. In fact, most ethical theorists exhibit deference to moral intuitions: Neo-Kantians are troubled by the Inquiring Murderer; utilitarianism by the Framed Innocent Man; virtue ethics by the Mafioso; and so forth. We seem to recognize that even if we have a map of moral principles, without the compass of moral intuitions, our ability to navigate the moral landscape would be lost. Principles without intuitions are empty, and intuitions without principles are blind. Our moral intuitions, however, are sometimes mistaken. Upon what basis can the credibility of a moral judgment be determined? In this paper, I examine how the credibility of an intuition can be determined by examining its "etiology." The etiology of a moral intuition is its causal origin, which includes sociological, psychological, and biological factors, some of which might impugn its credibility.

DEMONSTRATIVES AND INDIRECT PERCEPTION (III-J)

DEREK H. BROWN (BRANDON UNIVERSITY)

I develop an account of demonstrative reference involving indirect perception and use that account to respond to A.D. Smith's (*The Problem of Perception*, 2003) recent argument against indirect realism. The groundwork for my solution emerges from considering normal cases of indirect perception (e.g., seeing something depicted on a television) and examining the role this indirectness plays in assertive utterances such as "That is an *x*." I argue that in normal perception indirectness routinely if not typically plays a justificatory role in such judgments, and not a semantic one, and that the same can be said of such judgements when considered within the indirect realist framework. The denial of this, on my analysis, is essential to Smith's criticism. The discussion is extended to include scenarios involving the sorts of misconceptions Smith employs.

METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS IN PLATO'S *REPUBLIC* (I-H)

TRAVIS L. BUTLER (IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY)

In *Platonic Ethics: Old and New* Julia Annas argues that the metaphysics of forms proper to the *Republic* does not serve as a foundation for the eudaimonist ethical theory presented therein. The ethics and metaphysics are parts of the same whole, but there is no hierarchy between them. Here I argue that Plato is ambivalent between the construal of eudaimonism that requires purification and separation, and the construal that requires

harmony and cooperative functioning. My contention is that he settles on the latter in the *Republic* in part because of his commitment to the metaphysical claim that forms are powers productive of genuine value in the sensible world. Thus, metaphysics is foundational to ethics in the strong sense that Plato settles on one understanding of what his ethics means on the basis of the details of the theory of forms in the *Republic*.

SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, STRUCTURAL INJUSTICE, AND RESTITUTION (IV-I)

TODD C. CALDER (UNIVERSITY OF VICTORIA)

This paper explores the grounds of shared responsibility for injustices brought about by structural features of our society. The paper focuses on what the law of restitution can tell us about our shared responsibility for structural injustices.

MILL, SENTIMENTALISM, AND THE PROBLEM OF MORAL AUTHORITY (V-H)

DANIEL J. CALLCUT (UNIVERSITY OF NORTH FLORIDA)

Mill's aim in Chapter 3 of *Utilitarianism* is to show that his revisionary moral theory can preserve the kind of authority typically and traditionally associated with moral demands. One of his main targets is the idea that if people come to believe that morality is rooted in human sentiment then they will feel less bound by moral obligation on those occasions when moral demands clash with something they want. Chapter 3 emphasizes two main claims: 1) The main motivation to ethical action comes from feelings and not from beliefs, and 2) Ethical feelings are highly malleable. However, these two claims, intended to help form a significant rebuttal to the worry that a utilitarian conception of morality might undermine moral authority, can be combined to raise powerful skeptical concerns. I explain how Mill evades the skepticism, and why contemporary fellow travelers might be in worse shape to deal with the worry.

DENYING INCOMPARABILITY (IV-F)

DAVID K. CHAN (UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-STEVENS POINT)

My paper critiques the comparability requirement that practical reason is limited by the possibility of comparing alternatives. I describe methods of reasoning that are compatible with choice between incomparable options, and discuss a mistake about intention that supports the view that comparing alternatives is the only way to choose rationally. I then explain how a model of rational choice that prescribes the comparison of alternatives invents unacceptable concepts to make comparability possible. Finally, I criticize the assumption of the unity of practical reason that requires that prudential and moral choices are both made by comparing alternatives. It turns out that moral conflicts that are intractable for those who reason with a method of comparison may be resolvable by using moral reasoning that does not involve the comparison of alternatives in terms of a comprehensive value. Making room for such forms of reasoning is preferable to denying incomparability.

KANTIAN RIGORISM AND DEFENSIVE DECEPTION (II-F)*MICHAEL J. CHOLBI (CALIFORNIA STATE POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY–POMONA)*

Tamar Schapiro has recently attempted to show that defensive deception (e.g., lying to prevent a murder) is allowable on Kantian grounds. Her attempt appeals to the notion that the murderer's intentions indicate that he is not complying with the reciprocal standpoint characteristic of the Kingdom of Ends. The murderer's non-compliance makes it impossible to be honest in the spirit required by the Kingdom of Ends, thus rendering deception excusable in such circumstances. I argue here that (a) Schapiro's attempt fails because it also excuses other more morally dubious defensive actions, and (b) a satisfactory Kantian account of defensive deception must instead show that such deception is uniquely justified by appealing to the instrumental relation that such deception bears to a moral duty applicable in conditions of moral emergency.

RELIABILITY AND WARRANTED ASSERTION (IV-G)*E.J. COFFMAN (UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE)*

Say that you "warrantedly assert" P iff your assertion that P meets whatever epistemic rules govern assertion. Accounts of "warranted assertability" tell us when you're positioned to warrantedly assert P. 'Lenient' accounts of warranted assertability allow that you could warrantedly assert propositions you don't know. Unlike much recent work, this paper focuses on lenient accounts of warranted assertability, arguing that one largely neglected such account—the Would-Be Knowledge Account (WKA)—seriously competes with its much more prominent rivals: the Rational Credibility Account (RCA) and the Justified Belief Account (JBA). After some preliminary remarks that help motivate my project, I lay out the three accounts, noting a way in which RCA and JBA are superior to WKA. I then revive WKA by highlighting an overlooked datum for theories of warranted assertability, and showing that only WKA accommodates it. I close by answering a pressing objection to my case for WKA.

EXTENDING CHARLES TAYLOR'S MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: SELF-INTERPRETATION, DESIRE AND RATIONAL AGENCY (II-H)*MARC A. COHEN (GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY)*

My goal in this paper is to develop a moral psychology of desire taking Charles Taylor's account of self-interpretation as a starting point. I argue that Timothy D. Wilson's work on the "adaptive unconscious" provides empirical support for Taylor as I extend and develop his view. The result is a characterization of rational agency that does not depend on direct (meaning, non-inferential) first-person access to mental states. This point about rational agency is presented in response to criticisms advanced against Taylor by Richard Moran, who assumes that rational agency requires direct access to one's mental states. Separate from Moran's positive account, this requirement—this assumption—is un-motivated, and it conflicts with the empirical research on the subject.

HUME'S CAUSAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LIMITS OF ASSOCIATIONISM (III-E)

MARK D. COLLIER (UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA—MORRIS)

One might think that Hume endorses the radical claim that causal psychology can be fully explained in terms of nothing but custom and habit. Associative learning does, of course, play a major role in the cognitive psychology of the *Treatise*. But Hume recognizes that associationism cannot provide a complete account of causal thought, since his own capacity to conduct an experimental science of human nature implies that human beings are more than creatures of habit. Hume's official position is that human causal reasoning lies beyond the limits of associationism.

ON AN ALLEGED REFUTATION OF ACTUALLY-RIGIDIFIED DESCRIPTIVISM (II-K)

CHRISTINA CONROY (UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—IRVINE)

In *Beyond Rigidity*, Scott Soames defends Kripke's modal argument against the rigidified-description theory of names by presenting a deductive argument meant to prove that since names and rigidified definite descriptions cannot be substituted in all belief contexts the two cannot have the same content. Soames's argument relies on a Kaplanesque semantic theory which requires that the actual world figure as a constituent of any belief about an actual F. Given that there are beliefs that occur in non-modal contexts in which the actual world does not figure and given that Soames's semantics cannot account for these beliefs, I propose an emendation of Kaplan's semantic theory in which not only the naked extension of singular terms can figure directly in propositions, but the naked extension of predicates can do so as well thereby accounting for such beliefs and undermining Soames's defense.

TELEOFUNCTIONALISM AND THE SWAMPMAN (V-J)

DANIEL L. CORBETT (UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA—LINCOLN)

Opponents of teleofunctionalism have used the Swampman objection in attempt to show that it is current dispositions rather than historical functions that determine whether a creature has beliefs and desires. I propose a response to this objection which is at odds with teleofunctionalism, but which nonetheless incorporates a key insight of that theory into its dispositional rival. Dispositional analysis of a system—determining what dispositions it has—requires that we compare the actual system with an idealized system. I propose that teleofunctional considerations provide the appropriate idealized system which we use when deciding if a person, or a Swampman, has dispositions requisite for beliefs and desires. Thus, while being an intentional agent requires having the right dispositions, having the right dispositions involves being sufficiently similar to an historical (biological) ideal. Swampman, on this proposal, has belief and desires because he approximates a creature which with the appropriate teleological functions.

NEUROSCIENCE AND RESPONSIBILITY (III-G)

*FELIPE DE BRIGARD (UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA—CHAPEL HILL)**ERIC MANDELBAUM (UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA—CHAPEL HILL)*

People think that the more we get to know about the unavoidable neural underpinnings of our behaviors, the less likely we will be to hold people responsible for their actions. Thus, some think that as neuroscience gains insight into the neurological causes of actions, people will cease to view others as morally responsible for their actions. In the following study we probe the folk to see how they reason about actions that are caused by an agent who suffers from a neurological or psychological illness. What we found was quite surprising: the folk are no more likely to view a neurological illness as a mitigating factor than they are to view a psychological illness as a mitigating factor. Additionally, we found that the folk seem to ignore the etiology of the behavior and will hold agent's responsible even when the agent's actions are determined by factors outside of their control.

WELFARE AND THE STATUS-QUO BIAS (IV-F)

DALE DORSEY (UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA)

Preferences display a status-quo bias. This bias is particularly evident in cases of "sour grapes" or "adaptive preferences," in which an agent, disappointed at being unable to achieve *x* rather than *y*, switches her preferences and comes to prefer *y* to *x*. In this paper, I argue that the status-quo bias is troubling for a wide spectrum of theories of welfare, including not simply familiar desiderative accounts, but also theories that have been deployed as solutions to phenomena like sour grapes (including so-called "objective" theories and theories that propose an "autonomy" constraint on an agent's preferences). I then sketch an alternative theory of welfare that can accomplish two goals: first, to take seriously an agent's preferences when it comes to well-being; second, to avoid the status-quo bias.

COUNTERFACTUAL DEPENDENCE, THERMODYNAMICS, AND THE SPECIAL SCIENCES (V-G)

JEFFREY DUNN (UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS)

David Lewis (1986b) gives an attractive and familiar account of counterfactual dependence in the standard context. This account has recently been challenged by a counterexample from Adam Elga (2000). In this paper, I attempt to formulate a Lewisian response to Elga's counterexample. The strategy is to add an extra criterion to Lewis's similarity metric, which determines the comparative similarity of worlds. This extra criterion instructs us to take special science laws into consideration as well as fundamental laws. I argue that the Second Law of Thermodynamics should be seen as a special science law, and also give a brief account of what Lewisian special science laws should look like. If successful, this proposal blocks Elga's counterexample.

RESOLVING HORGAN'S STRENGTHENED TWO ENVELOPE PARADOX (IV-F)

DON T. FALLIS (UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA)

The two envelope paradox is not really all that paradoxical. The fact that (a) one envelope contains twice as much money as the other does not imply that (b) the other envelope is equally likely to contain twice or half as much money as your envelope. And (b) is what is behind the familiar reasoning that the other envelope has a greater expected utility than your envelope. But Terry Horgan (2000) has suggested a strengthened version that really is paradoxical: You are reliably told that, if you were to open either envelope, you would think that the other envelope is equally likely to contain twice or half as much money. The familiar reasoning now seems eminently reasonable, but it still does not make any sense to prefer the other envelope. I suggest a way to resolve this paradox that is inspired by Peter Vallentyne's (2000) "correction" to standard decision theory.

INTRINSICALLY/EXTRINSICALLY (I-J)

CARRIE FIGDOR (UNIVERSITY OF IOWA)

We regularly distinguish between the properties a thing has in and of itself and those it has at least partly depending on its environment. Unfortunately, this description of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction equivocates between two distinctions that require distinct explanations. I show that the intuitions used to motivate an account of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties—the I/E distinction—actually motivate an account of the distinction between ways in which things have properties—the I-ly/E-ly distinction. I then argue that standard ways of drawing the I/E distinction, based on logical independence, are inadequate to explain the I-ly/E-ly distinction. I offer a new account in which empirical knowledge and explanatory purposes play an essential role in determining the relevant notion of independence. I also propose a model of the relation between the distinctions that explains how intrinsic properties can be had extrinsically and extrinsic properties had intrinsically.

KANTIAN AND CONSEQUENTIALIST ETHICS: THE GAP CAN BE BRIDGED (II-F)

SCOTT E. FORSCHLER (NORTHLAND COMMUNITY AND TECHNICAL COLLEGE)

Richard Hare argues that the fundamental assumptions of Kant's ethical system should have led Kant to utilitarianism, and that Hare's own work provides the derivation which Kant failed to discover because he was misled into adopting rigorist, deontological norms. Several authors, including Jens Timmermann, have argued contra Hare that the gap between Kantian and utilitarian/consequentialist ethics is fundamental and cannot be bridged. I show that Timmermann's claims rely on a systematic failure to separate normative and meta-ethical aspects of each view, and that Hare's attempt to bridge the gap between Kantian and consequentialist ethics is immune to Timmermann's criticisms. I close by suggesting that the term "Kantian ethics" is often misleading, and should typically be qualified as "Kantian rationalism" or "Kantian deontology," in order to avoid confusions of the sort Timmermann falls into.

ON THE APODICTIC PROOF OF KANT'S REVOLUTIONARY HYPOTHESIS (V-I)

BRETT FULKERSON-SMITH (UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY)

According to Kant in the new Preface to the *Critique*, the hypothesis that what can be known about objects as appearances is only what can be put into them by the knower or that objects as appearances conform to human cognition is “proved not hypothetically but rather apodictically from the constitution of our representations of space and time and from the elementary concepts of the understanding” (Bxxii). But how does the constitution of our representations of space and time and the elementary concepts of the understanding apodictically prove Kant’s revolutionary hypothesis? Based upon Kant’s lectures on logic, this paper suggests that Kant’s hypothesis is apodictically proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic just in case the necessary requirements for the apodictic proof of a hypothesis expressed in his lectures on logic are satisfied therein.

HISTORY, TRADITION, AND THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF CIVIL MARRIAGE (I-F)

JEREMY GARRETT (RICE UNIVERSITY)

On what has become known as the traditional account, marriage is a lifelong, multipurpose association between two, and only two, persons—one male and one female. According to many, the state has good reason to recognize, and exclusively to support, this form of union. In this paper, I will critically examine one familiar strand of defense for traditional civil marriage—namely, that strand which locates intrinsic value in the historical pedigree of tradition itself, rather than in the philosophical caliber of some inherent, ahistorical property of lifelong, monogamous, heterosexual unions. My criticism will take the form of a general tripartite argument that seriously weakens, if not incapacitates, any historical argument for an institution like traditional civil marriage. After developing the three layers of the argument, I will bring it to bear on two influential historical defenses of this type: Burke’s argument from accumulated wisdom and Hayek’s empiricist evolutionary argument.

ESSENTIALISM VERSUS ESSENTIALISM: A REPLY FROM A NAIVE ESSENTIALIST (I-J)

ALLEN GEHRING (INDIANA UNIVERSITY–BLOOMINGTON)

In “Essentialism versus Essentialism” Michael Della Rocca argues that the grounds that justify accepting essentialism also undercut its justification. I argue that the essentialist has at least two lines of response. The first hinges on showing how his argument undercuts the purpose he is trying to accomplish in deploying it. The second fills in the details of a way to develop essentialism that draws on some recent research in cognitive science. With these lines of response I conclude by explaining how the essentialist has an edge in this debate.

IS AGENT-BASED VIRTUE ETHICS CIRCULAR? (IV-H)

LUKE GELINAS (UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO)

One recent objection to Michael Slote's agent-based virtue ethics, due to Ramon Das, is that agent-basing cannot non-circularly account for the value of interior states without assuming an agent-independent standard of act-evaluation. Since agent-basing denies any such standard, this is a problem. The objection, however, makes a tendentious assumption: that the value of a disposition to perform acts expressive of good inner states necessarily depends on the value of those acts. I point out that Das has given us no reason to accept this claim, and that there might be views of virtue on which we are warranted to reject it. Thus, even if the disposition to act in certain ways is constitutive of good inner states, it doesn't follow that the value of those states is derivative on the value of those acts.

AN ARGUMENT AGAINST PLENITUDE (II-J)

CODY S. GILMORE (UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—DAVIS)

Coincidentalism is the view that it is possible for distinct objects to coincide mereologically throughout their careers. Plenitude, roughly stated, is the view that necessarily, every matter-filled spacetime region contains a great many objects that coincide in this way. Recently, Karen Bennett and John Hawthorne have argued that the most plausible form of coincidentalism is one that affirms Plenitude. In this paper I argue that Plenitude is false, for it conflicts with some straightforward truths about simples and the behavior of the part-whole relation.

WHAT IS THE PROBLEM OF INTENTIONAL IDENTITY? (I-G)

EPHRAIM GLICK (MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY)

I discuss a puzzle due to Peter Geach that is based on the following sentence: Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob thinks she (the same witch) killed Cob's sow. In clarifying the problem and the possible approaches to it, I reject the standard treatment of the puzzle as one to be dealt with by formal machinery.

A DILEMMA FOR KANT'S THEORY OF SUBSTANCE (V-I)

BRYAN HALL (INDIANA UNIVERSITY SOUTHEAST)

This paper poses a dilemma for applying the category of substance given Kant's different conceptions of substance in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Briefly stated, if the category of substance applies to an omnipresent and sempiternal substance, then although this would ensure that all experiences of empirical objects take place in a common spatiotemporal framework, one could not individuate these empirical objects and experience their alterations. If the category of substance applies to ordinary empirical objects, however, then although one could individuate these substances and experience their alterations, the category would not pick out a common spatiotemporal framework for these experiences. I will argue that this dilemma can be overcome by

examining the development of Kant's conception of substance in his final work, the *Opus postumum*.

EXPLAINING PAST SCIENTIFIC SUCCESSES REALISTICALLY (AND WITHOUT BEING WHIGGISH) (II-I)

DAVID W. HARKER (EAST TENNESSEE STATE UNIVERSITY)

The most popular argument for scientific realism remains the inference to best explanation from a theory's success to its approximate truth. Recently however, and in response to the antirealist's objection from the history of science, realists have refined the argument. Rather than target entire theories, it is suggested we argue instead for the approximate truth of only certain parts of theories. Despite an initial and apparent plausibility, the selective realist strategy faces compelling and important objections. In this paper I argue that by adopting a comparative sense of success, the strategy has at least a chance of working.

OMISSIONS AS CAUSES (III-G)

MICHAEL DEAN HARTSOCK (UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI—COLUMBIA)

Imagine a man who happens upon a drowning child he could easily save. He does nothing and the child dies. Intuitively, his negligence is a cause of her death. But his is a sin of omission, and traditional accounts of causation consider causation by omission incoherent. Against tradition, I will argue for genuinism, the view that omissions are genuinely causal. I reconstruct and rebut two recent arguments against genuinism offered by Phil Dowe. Each argument assumes that there is a robust distinction between positive events (things that do happen) and negative events (things that don't happen). I argue that this distinction cannot be maintained, at least on certain accounts of causation. The moral is that only descriptions of states of affairs, not states of affairs themselves, are positive or negative. As such, so-called negative events are just as genuinely causal as straightforwardly positive events.

TWO NEW CARTESIAN CIRCLES (III-E)

GLENN A. HARTZ (OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY)

PATRICK K. LEWTAS (AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT)

Like the Traditional Circle first noted by Arnauld, the ones envisioned here affect arguments for God's existence in Descartes's *Meditations*. But that circle raises a problem internal to the *Meditations* itself. These new ones—the "Global Circle" and the "Euthyphro Circle"—are difficulties for those arguments which emanate from other metaphysical beliefs Descartes held at the same time. Descartes's "divine voluntarism" makes his *Meditations* project circular in ways that have not been noticed. The new circles are virulent and pervasive. Every argument that falls afoul of the Traditional Circle falls afoul of these new circles, and every argument that escapes the Traditional Circle is nevertheless caught by the new ones. With divine voluntarism already in place, the *Meditations* project had no chance because the demon who takes over for God is a "voluntarist demon."

FINKS, MASKS, MIMICS, AND FREEDOM (V-E)

CHARLES M. HERMES (UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS–ARLINGTON)

Many theorists used to believe that agents' abilities and dispositional properties could both be explicated in terms of a single counterfactual conditional. Counterexamples to these approaches have led most theorists to abandon both of these projects. Nevertheless, it might appear that both failures are intimately connected. If they are, then a dispositional account of agents' abilities seems promising. Recently, Michael Smith, Kadri Vihvelin, and Michael Fara have developed dispositional compatibilism, which grounds free will and agents' abilities in terms of dispositional properties. Their position, however, only seems attractive when theorists ignore problems that have developed for Lewis's account of dispositions. By exploring how agents' abilities operate in masking and mimicking scenarios, I demonstrate that dispositional compatibilism fails. Nevertheless, the key insight of dispositional compatibilism is that discovering how the dispositional literature dovetails with the free will and action literature is an extraordinarily fruitful project.

VALUING FROM LIFE'S PERSPECTIVE (V-H)

CHARLES HUENEMANN (UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY)

Nietzsche launches powerful critiques of traditional moral values on the basis of "life's perspectives and objectives." But what does this mean? Several recent commentators have tried to provide an explanation by ascribing to Nietzsche a will-to-power metaphysic, but there are solid reasons for thinking that Nietzsche did not intend to provide any comprehensive metaphysical system. This paper explains "life's perspectives" by showing how to construct a theoretical entity ("Life") that has a perspective and can do the philosophical work Nietzsche requires. Moreover, it shows why employing such a construct, as a heuristic, does not lead to ascribing a robust metaphysical system to Nietzsche.

WARRANTED ASSERTABILITY MANEUVERS AND THE RULES OF ASSERTION (I-I)

LEO IACONO (UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA–LINCOLN)

In responding to the cases that motivate epistemic contextualism, invariantists sometimes use a warranted assertability maneuver (WAM), according to which our intuitions about the truth-values of the assertions involved in the cases are sensitive to the conditions under which the assertions are conversationally proper rather than to their literal truth-conditions. I argue that an invariantist WAM against one contextualist case, Stewart Cohen's airport case, cannot succeed. Such a WAM is inconsistent with the knowledge account of assertion, according to which assertion is governed by the rule: Assert that p only if you know that p . Although the knowledge account of assertion is well supported by diverse linguistic evidence, it has recently been argued that other, weaker rules suffice to account for the supporting evidence. The rules that have been proposed, however, are also inconsistent with an invariantist WAM against the airport case.

CAN GROUP AGENTS BE AUTONOMOUS? (III-H)

MARK N. JENSEN (HOPE COLLEGE)

Philip Pettit has recently argued that we are justified in holding group agents responsible for some action even when we are not justified in holding any individual member responsible. As a condition for responsibility, Pettit argues that group agents must be autonomous. The argument of this paper is that no group satisfies this condition because no group agent is autonomous. At issue are the implications of the discursive dilemma and associated impossibility theorems which show that group agents make judgments which cannot be an aggregating function of individual member's judgments. Pettit is mistaken in thinking that autonomy emerges here; a better reading shows that group agency fails with respect to this class of judgments. This result has implications for social and political theory, not the least of which is the surprising importance of individual members who act qua individual rather than qua member in sustaining their group's activities.

THAU ON QUALIA AND REPRESENTATIONAL CONTENT (V-J)

JAMES JOHN (UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO)

Thau (2002) presents an intriguing argument against the qualia theory (QT). According to QT, conscious perceptual experiences owe their "phenomenal characters"—what it's like to have them—to their possession of non-representational "qualia." Thau's argument fails. One problem is that it equivocates on the expression "the way things seem." Another problem is that it begs the question against QT. A third, more serious problem is that there are two forms QT can take, and Thau's argument, even if cogent and sound, only applies to one of them. But there is another form of QT that is immune to Thau's criticisms. One upshot is that QT is much more plausible than representationalist critics like Thau have recognized.

MAKING CO-INSTANTIATION PRIMITIVE: CONSEQUENCES FOR THE BUNDLE THEORY'S COMMITMENT TO THE IDENTITY OF INDISCERNIBLES (V-G)

DANIEL M. JOHNSON (BAYLOR UNIVERSITY)

The most significant objection to the bundle theory of particulars is the argument from the falsity of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII). I offer a defense of bundle theory from the PII objection, a defense which turns on an analysis of the relation of "co-instantiation." I argue that co-instantiation should be regarded as a necessary condition for the formation of a bundle and, furthermore, that it should be regarded as primitive (ontologically unanalyzable). I then clarify what is involved in making an entity primitive and argue that, as a direct consequence of making co-instantiation primitive, the bundle theory avoids the PII objection. I conclude by discussing the implications for what bundle theorists say about the structure of particulars.

BELIEF REVISION AND COHERENCE WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS (V-F)

NICHOLAOS JONES (*THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY*)

Sven Ove Hansson and Erik Olsson argue that, because AGM theory represents belief states as logically closed, it is inconsistent with what they call Classical Coherentism. They conclude that any theory of belief revision that is compatible with Classical Coherentism should use only a subset of the elements of a belief state in representing that state. But there is an alternative, namely, restricting the support relations with respect to which the representation of belief states are logically closed, in a way that does not require giving epistemic priority to a subset of elements in belief states.

BIVALENCE AND CONTRADICTIONARY PAIRS IN ARISTOTLE'S *DE INTERPRETATIONE* 9 (II-G)

RUSSELL JONES (*UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA*)

According to the most traditional view of *De Interpretatione* 9, Aristotle denies the fatalist conclusion that the future is fixed by denying bivalence. The argument structure of the chapter is a reductio: Bivalence is assumed, and the absurd fatalist conclusion follows. Whitaker argues that Aristotle accepts bivalence, but rejects: [RCP] Of every contradictory pair, one member is true and the other false. I argue that both of these interpretations are flawed, but that important insights from each should be preserved. I then offer a fresh interpretation of the chapter that shows that RCP is the refutand of the argument, and that Aristotle explains the failure of RCP with respect to future contingents by the failure of bivalence for future contingents. Unlike other interpretations, my interpretation is consistent with the text of chapter 9, with the larger context of *De Interpretatione*, and with central principles of Aristotelian philosophy.

AND NEVER THE TWAIN SHALL MEET: A CRITIQUE OF CARL GILLETT'S DIMENSIONED REALIZATION (IV-J)

DOUGLAS KEATON (*UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI*)

Carl Gillett's "dimensioned realization" is an attempt to reconcile disparate accounts of the realization relation: those used by metaphysicians of mind and those used by philosophers of science. I show that the attempt fails because the resulting defined relation is a disjunction of two wholly disparate relations. I use this as an example to point to a larger issue: failures in the discipline to agree on the meanings of terms such as "order" and resulting attempts to assimilate inassimilable fields of philosophical inquiry. Metaphysics of mind and philosophy of science are not the same thing.

GENERAL CIRCULATION MODELS AND SEVERE TESTS (II-I)

SARAH KENEHAN (*UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE/BERN UNIVERSITY*)

In this paper, I address two concerns commonly cited as reasons for not using GCM-generated predictions as a basis for policy decisions: first, since the models are based on an incomplete representation of the climate

system, then model-generated predictions are necessarily unreliable; and second, since the tests of GCMs fail to adhere to the criterion of use-novelty, then the corroboration of model-generated projections carries very little weight. In employing Mayo's conception of severe tests, I show that these supposed problems are misplaced. As such, these concerns are not conclusive objections against the use of these models in policymaking.

THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS AND THE MORAL ENFORCEABILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS (III-F)

EUNJUNG KIM (UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON)

The idea of an overlapping consensus has assumed an important role in defending universalism about human rights. The common understanding of an overlapping consensus on human rights norms is that it establishes the acceptability of the norms from diverse cultural and religious perspectives. This paper argues that an overlapping consensus on human rights norms fails to establish acceptability, and further, acceptability is not necessary to defend the universal application of human rights norms. An overlapping consensus on human rights norms, however, demonstrates that the universal application of the norms is not motivated by a biased interest in promoting parochial set of values. This paper argues that the moral enforceability of human rights norms depends on the impartiality of the enforcer rather than the acceptability by the individuals against whom the norms are enforced.

ORDINARY OBJECTS WITHOUT OVERDETERMINATION (II-J)

DANIEL KORMAN (UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS—URBANA—CHAMPAIGN)

Trenton Merricks takes the causal-exclusion arguments in the philosophy of mind and puts them to work in eliminating baseballs and other medium-sized dry goods. The dominant response has been that the overdetermination of an event by a thing and its parts is unobjectionable. I show that the argument can be resisted without incurring a commitment to systematic overdetermination, by postulating a division of causal labor: events at the macroscopic level are typically caused by macroscopic objects while events at the microscopic level are typically caused by microscopic items. I supply independent motivation for postulating such a division of causal labor and answer Merricks's objections to this sort of response.

McKEEVER AND RIDGE ON PRACTICAL REASONING (III-H)

MARK LEBAR (OHIO UNIVERSITY)

In *Principled Ethics*, Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge argue for the mistakeness of a variety of "particularist" challenges to the deployment of principles in morality and moral philosophy. They argue instead that our best conception of morality is as essentially involving principles, that philosophical attempts to understand morality are right to invoke principles. Here I argue that their view cannot make sense of the idea that we act in light of our moral reasoning. If McKeever and Ridge are right, a certain

very deep and strong skepticism about the motivating power of moral reasoning must follow. If we have reason to reject such skepticism, then we have reason to think McKeever and Ridge have not fully captured the story of moral reasoning.

WHY THE RESPONSIBILITY OBJECTION TO THOMSON'S ABORTION ARGUMENT MUST FAIL (I-F)

KURT LIEBEGOTT (PURDUE UNIVERSITY)

This paper examines one of the most prominent objections to Judith Jarvis Thomson's "A Defense of Abortion." The Responsibility Objection holds that Thomson's arguments do not apply to most pregnancies because the pregnant woman has a moral responsibility for the fetus's need for her body if it resulted from consensual intercourse. Abortion violates this moral responsibility, and is thereby an unjust killing and a violation of the fetus's right to life, so abortion is immoral in most cases contrary to Thomson's arguments. The abortion literature argues over whether or not a pregnant woman does in fact have such a moral responsibility. This paper gives a new and different argument that, even if we assume that a pregnant woman does have such a moral responsibility, it does not follow that abortion is immoral. Rather, the Responsibility Objection is found to beg the question and thus fails to challenge Thomson's arguments.

ON THE COHERENCE OF INVERSION (V-J)

CLAYTON LITTLEJOHN (DEDMAN COLLEGE)

In this paper, I shall examine a recent attempt to demonstrate the impossibility of behaviorally undetectable spectrum inversion. After showing that the impossibility proof proves far too much, I shall locate where the demonstration goes wrong. In turn, I shall explain why someone attracted to functionalist and representationalist assumptions might rightly remain agnostic about the possibility of inversion.

THE EXPERIENCE OF AUTHORSHIP AND AUTOMATIC ACTION (III-G)

TRACIE MAHAFFEY (FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY)

My goal is to show that there is a category of actions, not preceded by report-level conscious proximal intentions, but for which individuals still feel a sense of authorship. I argue that automatic actions are a problem for Daniel Wegner's view that conscious will is an illusion because Wegner does not make a distinction between automatic and automatistic actions. If Wegner is willing to admit there is a sense of authorship with regards to automatic actions, no matter how diminished, then he must revise his view to accommodate these cases. If report-level proximal intentions are required for the experience of the conscious will, then there cannot be an experience of conscious will in these cases. If the experience of conscious will is not required for the experience of authorship, then the close connection between these two phenomena—the experience of conscious will and the feeling of authorship—is severed.

KIERKEGAARD ON THE PROBLEM OF ABRAHAM (III-I)

R. ZACHARY MANIS (SOUTHWEST BAPTIST UNIVERSITY)

A significant challenge faces any ethic that endorses the view that divine commands are sufficient to impose moral obligations; in this paper, I focus on Kierkegaard's ethic, in particular. The challenge to be addressed is the "modernized" problem of Abraham, popularized especially by Kierkegaard's *Fear and Trembling*: the dilemma that an agent faces when a being claiming to be God issues a command to the agent that, by the agent's own lights, seems not to be the kind of command that a loving God would issue. I argue that Kierkegaard regards this scenario as never resulting (in the actual world) in an agent's falling into dire moral error solely on account of her non-culpable misinterpreting of God's will and/or failure to discern correctly whether a perceived moral imperative truly is divine in origin. I then try to show why this view is not as implausible as it may initially seem.

AFFECTIVE EVALUATIVE INCONSISTENCY AND THE FRAGMENTED SELF (II-H)

PATRICIA A. MARINO (UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO)

Is there anything irrational, or self-undermining, about having "inconsistent" attitudes of endorsement? In this paper, I argue that, contra the claims of Harry Frankfurt and Charles Taylor, the answer is "No." The proper characterization of what I call "affective evaluative inconsistency," involves not logical form (endorsing A and not-A), but rather the co-possibility of what is endorsed; attitudes of endorsement are inconsistent when there is no possible world in which what is endorsed can co-exist. Essentially conflicting endorsements, I show, are no worse for an agent than contingently conflicting ones, which are common and no threat to rationality or well-being. Partly based on reflections about a conflicted mother, who endorses staying at home and having a career, I argue that affective evaluative inconsistency does not render a person unable to act, does not make a person's actions ineffective because of vacillation, and does not undermine a person's autonomy.

MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, COERCION, AND GUIDANCE CONTROL (I-K)

JUSTIN P. McBRAYER (UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI)

Semi-compatibilism is the view that moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism. I argue that John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's semi-compatibilist account of moral responsibility is false because it has false implications in cases in which an agent acts under a coercive threat. Fischer and Ravizza argue that as long as an agent exercises what they call guidance control over an action, then the agent is morally responsible for the action. However, since guidance control is consistent with very strong cases of coercion, this poses a problem for their account. Either we give up the intuitive claim that coercive threats can affect moral responsibility or we deny that guidance control is sufficient for moral responsibility.

KNOWLEDGE ASCRIPTIONS AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THINKING ABOUT ERROR (V-F)

JENNIFER NAGEL (*UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO*)

When skeptical possibilities are raised, it is common to feel some temptation to retract mundane knowledge ascriptions. Non-skeptical invariantists argue that it would be a mistake to give in to this temptation, but they do not deny that we feel it, and need to explain why. The standard explanation—advanced by Williamson and Hawthorne, for example—appeals to the availability heuristic: after overexposure to epistemological horror stories involving brains in vats and tricky lighting we come to overestimate the risk of failing to know, just as overexposure to violent television programming can lead one to overestimate the frequency of homicide. I argue that there are both empirical and philosophical problems with this explanation, and offer a rival account of what happens to us psychologically when possibilities of error are raised, an account involving a switch from associative to deliberate reasoning.

CIRCULARITY IN ORDINARY LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS FOR EPISTEMIC CONTEXTUALISM (V-F)

JAY M. NEWHARD (*JOHN CARROLL UNIVERSITY*)

During the past three decades or so, a number of philosophers have argued that the knowledge predicate is a context-sensitive expression and have suggested various accounts of the contextual features to which it is sensitive. Context-sensitive accounts of the knowledge predicate were originally motivated by the response they provide to skeptical paradox and other important epistemic puzzles; more recently they have been motivated by ordinary language considerations. While the principal version of the skepticism-based argument for contextualism is a fully abductive argument, the ordinary language arguments are partly abductive arguments which rely implicitly on further deductive reasoning to support the contextualist thesis. In this paper I examine the ordinary language arguments for the contextualist thesis, and argue that these arguments are circular.

WHAT SHOULD EGALITARIANS BELIEVE?—BEYOND TELIC AND DEONTIC EGALITARIANISM (IV-I)

MARTIN O'NEILL (*UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER*)

This paper is concerned to clear up a number of possible confusions in egalitarian thought. I begin by showing that the most plausible forms of egalitarianism do not fit straightforwardly on either side of the distinction between Telic and Deontic egalitarianism. I then argue that the question of the scope of egalitarian principles cannot be answered in the abstract, but instead depends on giving a prior account of the different ways in which inequality can be bad. In doing so, I defend a version of Non-Intrinsic egalitarianism which manages to secure the distinctiveness of equality as a political value. This political conception of equality may nevertheless have a very broad scope, extending beyond the bounds of any particular society.

MORAL REALISM AND WAYS OF LIFE (IV-K)

MATTHEW PIANALTO (UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS)

This paper examines Walter Sinnott-Armstrong's claim that a person's commitment to a way of life is a relevant factor in deciding what it is true that the agent ought to do in a moral dilemma. Sinnott-Armstrong argues that his view shows that extreme universal moral realism, which claims that facts about the agent make no contribution to the truth of what an agent ought to do, is false. I use Sinnott-Armstrong's as a starting point to consider how a different kind of moral realism can account for the relevance of ways of life, and argue that they can be regarded as "realistic factors" in moral deliberation because they are grounded in morally permissible commitments which serve to shape the agent's perspective on his or her situation, rather than serving as additional reasons the agent weighs in his or her decision.

HURSTHOUSE'S NEO-ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUE ETHICS, THE SLIDE INTO
CONSEQUENTIALISM, AND THE PROBLEM OF INSTRUMENTALLY SUCCESSFUL VICE
(IV-H)

MARK PIPER (SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY)

In this paper I present criticism of Rosalind Hursthouse's neo-Aristotelian naturalistic virtue ethics as elaborated in her book *On Virtue Ethics*. I argue that her theory is vulnerable to the charge of partially collapsing into a form of consequentialism that falls prey to a powerful objection to that theory: the problem of instrumentally successful action (or, in the present case, the problem of instrumentally successful vice). I consider several possible responses from Hursthouse and argue that they are inadequate. As a result, Hursthouse must either accept the likelihood that highly morally counterintuitive traits can, for some persons or circumstances, be virtues; or, she must defend the implausible notions that human nature and flourishing are more or less invariable. As both of these options are undesirable, it may be best to reject Hursthouse's form of neo-Aristotelianism altogether.

KNOW HOW TO BE GETTIERED? (IV-G)

TED L. POSTON (UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH ALABAMA)

Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson's influential article "Knowing How" argues that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that. One objection to their view is that knowledge-how is significantly different from knowledge-that because Gettier cases afflict the latter but not the former. Stanley and Williamson argue that this objection fails. Their reasons, however, are not adequate. Moreover, I sketch a plausible argument that knowledge-how is not susceptible to Gettier cases. This suggests a significant distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how.

DESCRIPTIONS, UNDERSTANDING, AND ANAPHORIC CHAINS: RUSSELL'S NEW CHALLENGE (II-K)

FRANK PUPA (*THE GRADUATE SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY CENTER—CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK*)

Almost without exception, opponents to Russell's theory of descriptions challenge the theory on truth-theoretic grounds. In this paper, I issue a challenge on a different ground: understandability. Russell's theory of descriptions, when coupled with Russell's theory of understanding, generates what I label the 'anaphoric chain problem'. This problem, I argue, forces the thoughtful theorist to reject Russell's theory of descriptions in favor of a non-Russellian rival. The paper begins, in §1, with a brief presentation of Russell's theories of descriptions and understanding. In §2, I introduce anaphoric chains; I also provide a Russellian account of anaphoric chains containing descriptions. Finally, in §3, I introduce the anaphoric chain problem. After this introduction, I demonstrate that Russell's theory of descriptions fails on understanding-theoretic grounds. I close with a non-Russellian account of the problem at hand.

MORAL REALISM AND AUTONOMY IN DISCOURSE ETHICS (IV-K)

WILLIAM REHG (*SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY*)

Is Kantian constructivism compatible with a robust moral realism in which moral facts are independent of rational consent? Although some Kantians accept a weak "procedural realism," Habermas understands his discourse-ethical constructivism as an antirealist view, incompatible with robust moral realism. In this paper I examine Cristina Lafont's objection that discourse ethics must be interpreted in robust realist terms. This objection gets a foothold partly because of ambiguities in Habermas's discourse ethics. To clarify the debate, I propose a clearly antirealist reformulation of the discourse-ethical moral principle. Realists must therefore show how their position differs from the proposed reformulation. I conclude that one can adopt Lafont's realist discourse ethics only if one regards autonomy as one first-order value among others. Although autonomy thereby loses its metaethical significance for moral ontology, the realist strategy has some advantages.

THE DIALECTICAL REGRESS OF JUSTIFICATIONS (IV-G)

MICHAEL A. RESCORLA (*UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—SANTA BARBARA*)

Dialectical egalitarianism holds that every asserted proposition requires defense when challenged by an interlocutor. This view apparently generates a vicious "regress of justifications," since an interlocutor can challenge the premises through which a speaker defends her original assertion, and so on ad infinitum. To halt the regress, dialectical foundationalists such as Adler, Brandom, Leite, and Williams propose that some propositions require no defense in light of mere requests for justification. I argue that the putative regress is not worrisome and that egalitarianism can handle it quite satisfactorily. I also defend a positive view that combines an anti-

foundationalist conception of dialectical interaction with a foundationalist conception of epistemic justification.

IS THERE AN INTERMEDIATE POSITION BETWEEN KNOWING AND NOT KNOWING? THE WAX BLOCK IN PLATO'S *THEAETETUS* (II-G)

NAOMI RESHOTKO (UNIVERSITY OF DENVER)

Plato has trouble accounting for false belief at *Theaetetus* 187d-200c because he treats knowledge as all or nothing. Plato succeeds only with the wax block model (191a-195b), wherein he considers learning and forgetting (191c-e). This modest success might lead us to conclude that learning and forgetting constitute something in between knowing and not knowing. While Plato's one successful account of false belief does hinge on the notion of a third epistemological relationship, it does not hinge upon one that is between knowing and not knowing. Plato develops a new epistemological position that occupies the ignorance horn of the knowing and not-knowing dilemma. Plato finds belief compatible with ignorance by identifying a positive relationship that we can have with an object concerning which we are ignorant.

IN DEFENSE OF THE WIDE-SCOPE INSTRUMENTAL PRINCIPLE (III-H)

SIMON RIPPON (HARVARD UNIVERSITY)

If people always have reason to take the known, necessary means to the ends that they intend, then it appears that intending even an irrational end must give a person a perfectly good reason to take the means to it. I argue that this is not so, utilizing a wide-scope interpretation of the instrumental principle of the kind suggested by Broome and Wallace. Raz argues in "The Myth of Instrumental Rationality" that even the wide-scope interpretation of the instrumental principle entails that when people intend an end, they have reason to take the means to it. I refute Raz's argument by arguing against a flawed logical principle it uses, and explain why wide-scope instrumental reasons entail narrow-scope reasons only in conjunction with additional normative premises. I conclude by explaining some advantages of understanding instrumental reasons as wide-scope reasons.

WORTHY LIVES (V-H)

LISA S. RIVERA (UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS-BOSTON)

Susan Wolf's paper "Meaning and Morality" draws our attention to the fact that Williams's objection to Kantian morality is primarily a concern about a possible conflict between morality and that which gives our life meaning. I argue that the force of Williams's objection requires a more precise understanding of meaning as dependent on our intention to make our lives themselves worthwhile. It is not meaning simpliciter that makes Williams's objection persuasive but rather meaning as arising out of our positive evaluation of the value of our lives as a whole. This type of meaning has a normative element: it involves a person's deep-seated commitment to make her actions consistent with ends that confer worth on her life itself.

The more significant conflict with morality lies in the conflict between the normative force of moral requirements and the normative force of the need to have a life that is itself worthwhile.

COHERENTISM AND TRUTH (I-I)

WILLIAM ROCHE (TEXAS CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY)

It has recently been argued that coherentist justification is not truth-conducive and that coherentism thus is false. Erik Olsson argues in this fashion. So too does Tomoji Shogenji. I join Olsson and Shogenji in arguing that coherentist justification is not truth-conducive. I also argue, though, that neither Olsson's argument nor Shogenji's argument succeeds in showing this, and that, moreover, the fact that coherentist justification is not truth-conducive might not be at all detrimental to coherentism.

SPEAKING OF THE UNSPEAKABLE (I-G)

PAUL SAKA (UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON)

Paradoxes of self-reference include the Berry ("the smallest number not nameable in under nineteen syllables") and the Non-denoter (the phrase N: "N, which does not denote"). The Non-denoter, which is analogous to the Liar, goes straight to the heart of the matter. The Berry, at root the same problem, arguably reveals that paradox arises without pathological self-reference. Available proposals for treating paradoxes of reference include denying that the Berry is meaningful, distinguishing between canonical number coding and colloquial descriptions of numbers, and regarding "denote" as a covert indexical. I argue that these approaches are inadequate, and that we need to internalize the reference relation in the manner of cognitive linguistics.

COINCIDENCE AND CARDINALITY (II-J)

THOMAS SATTIG (TULANE UNIVERSITY)

Coincidentalism is the view that distinct material things can be composed of the same microphysical simples at the same time. The existence of distinct coincidents is incompatible with any microphysical criterion of identity over time of material composites. This incompatibility constitutes a problem for the coincidentalist only if the coincidentalist needs a microphysical criterion of identity over time. What does the coincidentalist need such a criterion for? I will show that the coincidentalist needs such a criterion for an explanation of cardinal supervenience, of the thesis that facts concerning how many composite material things exist supervene on facts about microphysical simples.

HEIDEGGER'S CRITIQUE OF HUSSERL'S THEORY OF MEANING (III-I)

JOSEPH K. SCHEAR (CALIFORNIA POLYTECHNIC STATE UNIVERSITY—SAN LUIS OBISPO)

In his *Logical Investigations*, Husserl endorsed a form of platonism about propositional meanings, against the various forms of psychologism circulating at the turn of the 20th century. A platonist about meaning holds

that propositions exist prior to and independently of the acts and processes of thinking subjects. By contrast, a theory of meaning is psychologistic if it claims, or entails, that meanings are products of, or somehow essentially dependent on, the particular acts and processes of thinking subjects. In his *Being and Time* period, Heidegger attacked Husserl's platonism about meaning. The aim of the paper is to assess one key prong of this attack. I argue that Husserl's theory of meaning emerges from Heidegger's criticism unscathed. However, I conclude by offering an interpretive hypothesis about how one might read the failed objection in a more charitable light; that is, as marking Heidegger's existential phenomenology as an extension of, rather than a departure from, the anti-psychologistic agenda of the original "Husserlian" breakthrough.

KANT AND NEWTON ON FORCES AND THE NATURE OF MATTER (III-E)

BRADLEY L. SICKLER (*OUACHITA BAPTIST UNIVERSITY*)

So important was Newton's influence on Kant that Ernan McMullin labels Kant "the greatest Newtonian philosopher of them all." McMullin claims, "The *Principia* evidently played a fundamental role in the shaping not only of Kant's philosophy of science, but of his entire philosophical system. Without it to serve as a paradigm... it seems doubtful whether Kant's transcendental turn would ever have taken place..." Gravity and inertia are the forces most often associated with Newton, and Kant's concept of force (especially gravity) is often treated as merely a regurgitation of Newton. Despite superficial appearances, however, those two forces will serve well as examples of Kant's departure from Newtonian doctrine, for the two men conceived of force quite differently. We will see that their deep differences about force can be traced to a more fundamental disagreement—one about the nature of matter itself.

LIBERALISM, MULTICULTURALISM AND THE HARDENING OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY (III-F)

SONIA SIKKA (*UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA*)

Liberalism, as a political paradigm, is committed to maintaining a stance of neutrality towards religion(s), along with other comprehensive systems of belief. Multiculturalism is premised on the view that the political policies of internally diverse nations should respect the beliefs and practices of the various cultural, ethnic and religious groups of which those nations are composed. Sometimes synthesized, sometimes standing in tension, these two political frameworks share the common goal of preventing religious and communal conflict while respecting diversity. Although this goal is, in principle, laudable, I argue that liberal and multiculturalist forms of public reasoning also encourage religious and cultural communities to regard their "identities" as consisting of fixed bundles of beliefs and practices. This conception diminishes critical reflection and movement, with potentially dangerous consequences both for the health of religion and for social stability.

WHOSE ARISTOTLE? WHICH STAGIRITE? (I-H)

MAY SIM (COLLEGE OF THE HOLY CROSS)

I examine MacIntyre's analysis of *phronêsis* in his "Rival Aristotles: Aristotle Against Some Modern Aristotelians." MacIntyre is right to recognize the relevance of knowledge of both universals and particulars in Aristotle's *phronêsis*, and also right that a theoretical knowledge of the ultimate good for human beings (UGHB hereafter) alone cannot make one practically wise. But I question his claim that theoretical knowledge of UGHB need only be used in the *phronimos*' justification of actions and not in his practical deliberations about actions. I also question his view that Aristotle's Ethics and Politics can correct a politician's theory and practice outside of, but contemporaneous with Aristotle's polis if he had been given a good upbringing. I show that MacIntyre is mistaken in these two uses of the knowledge of UGHB for Aristotle. His view not only contradicts Aristotle's but also his own account of Aristotelian *phronêsis*.

NECESSARILY, EVERYTHING NECESSARILY EXISTS (I-J)

CHRIS TILLMAN (UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA)

This paper presents and defends a brief version of the well-known argument for the conclusion that necessarily, everything necessarily exists, along with analogous arguments for similar temporal and spatial conclusions. The paper argues that the conclusions should be accepted; when properly interpreted, they do not require that anything that exists is a member of the domain of every world/time/place. Rather, the modal conclusion, properly understood, amounts to the claim that anything is one of (absolutely) everything (on the assumption that absolutely everything is actual). The final section of the paper applies the interpretation to resolve a related problem for Lewisian modal realism discussed by Divers and Parsons.

AGENCY AND ENERVATION (II-H)

KEVIN TOH (INDIANA UNIVERSITY-BLOOMINGTON)

Harry Frankfurt has proposed that we conceive an agent as identifying with a first-order conative attitude when there is a reflectively-maintained absence of conflict among his higher-order attitudes that pick out that first-order attitude as the motivationally efficacious attitude. Michael Bratman has objected to this conception of identification by arguing that an agent can be in such a psychological state as the result of enervation, exhaustion, or depression. I argue that this objection is based on a failure to distinguish two problems about human agency. Bratman has actually recognized the distinction between the two problems in a recent article, but has reiterated his objection against Frankfurt's proposal. I argue that a clear understanding of the two problems shows not only that Frankfurt's proposal is not vulnerable to Bratman's arguments, but also that Bratman's own conception of identification based on what he calls "self-governing policies" is problematic.

PHYSICALISM AND SPARSE ONTOLOGY (IV-J)*KELLY TROGDON (UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS)*

A major stumbling block for non-reductive physicalism is Jaegwon Kim's disjunctive property objection. In this paper I bring certain issues in sparse ontology to bear on the objection, in particular the theses Jonathan Schaffer calls priority monism and priority pluralism. Priority pluralism (or something close to it, anyway) is a common ontological background assumption, so in the first part of the paper I consider whether the disjunctive property objection applies with equal force to non-reductive physicalism on the assumption that priority monism is instead true. I ultimately conclude that non-reductive physicalism still faces a comparable problem. In the second part, I argue, surprisingly enough, that Kim's preferred response to his objection, local reductionism, may work better in the monist framework than the pluralist one. I conclude that issues in sparse ontology, therefore, are more relevant to physicalism than one may have thought.

AUTONOMY AND HISTORY (I-K)*MIKHAIL VALDMAN (VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY)*

A popular view among autonomy theorists is that facts about the history of a person's desires—how they were formed or acquired—matter crucially to her autonomy. I argue that while one's personal history matters to one's autonomy, how one's desires were formed or acquired does not. I argue that a desire's autonomy lies not in how it was formed or acquired, but rather in whether its bearer actively engaged with it in a way that made it his own.

KANT'S NON-ABSOLUTIST CONCEPTION OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY (V-I)*HELGA VARDEN (UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS—URBANA—CHAMPAIGN)*

One of the great appeals of voluntarism is that it presents itself as the only possible alternative to an absolutist conception of political legitimacy. Many Kant interpreters accept this dichotomy and consequently argue that a fundamental problem with Kant's non-voluntarist theory of political obligations is its complementary absolutist conception of political legitimacy. I argue that this construal of Kant's texts is mistaken since Kant's non-voluntarist conception of political obligations is complemented not by an absolutist, but by a liberal republican conception of political legitimacy. By putting forward this liberal republican alternative to absolutism or voluntarism, Kant shows that the dichotomy is false, that there are institutional conditions on political legitimacy, and that the rights of the state are not reducible to the rights of individuals. Appreciating these features of Kant's position, I propose, is especially important in order to capture his account of economic justice.

THE BIOLOGICAL SPECIES CONCEPT AND EVOLUTIONARY HISTORY (II-I)

JOEL VELASCO (*UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON*)

Many phylogenetic systematists have criticized the Biological Species Concept (BSC) because it distorts evolutionary history. While defenses against this particular charge have been attempted, I argue that they are unsuccessful. In addition, the criticism of the BSC discussed in this literature pinpoints only one way in which the BSC distorts history. The underlying problem can be used to generate additional cases that present more serious objections. These objections to the BSC also straightforwardly apply to other species concepts that are not explicitly concerned with evolutionary history. What is missing from much of the discussion in the literature is the fact that the Tree of Life, which represents phylogenetic history, is independent of our choice of species concept. Since representing evolutionary history is of primary importance to taxonomy, these problems lead to the conclusion that the BSC, along with these other species concepts, are unacceptable.

ON A RECENT HUSSERLIAN CRITICISM OF GADAMER'S ACCOUNT OF THE SUBJECT (III-I)

DAVID T. VESSEY (*UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO*)

Rudolf Bernet recently criticized Gadamer's account of the subject at play as a model case of the flawed legacy of Heidegger's critique of subjectivity. According to Bernet, "the stakes are nothing less than Gadamer's entire philosophical." We have then—twenty years after Derrida's criticisms of Gadamer and forty years after Habermas's criticisms—the third systematic criticism of philosophical hermeneutics, this time from the perspective of Husserlian phenomenology. Bernet argues that Gadamer's account of a "minimal subject" misses the extent to which an individual can use his or her judgment to actively shape the world. I respond to Bernet's reading of Gadamer highlighting how, for Gadamer, the subject is active and reflective, even in the play of dialogue, as well as how Gadamer's general account of play as an alternative to subjective accounts of constitution differs from his specific account of the play in the experience of a work of art.

ARISTOTLE ON THE SIGNIFICATION OF NATURAL KIND TERMS: NARROW OR WIDE CONTENT? (V-G)

MARK WHEELER (*SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY*)

Do natural kind terms denote natural kinds solely because of the narrow content of the thoughts they conventionally signify, according to Aristotle, or is wide content involved? Since wide content may be generated in many ways, given the full range of Aristotle's semantic theory, this is a complicated question. I will limit myself here to arguing that, for Aristotle, a natural kind term denotes a natural kind independently of the efficient causal history of the thought with which the term is conventionally associated.

HOW DO YOU LIKE YOUR EGGS? THE MORALITY OF AN INTERNET MARKET IN HUMAN OVA (I-F)

AMY E. WHITE (OHIO UNIVERSITY—ZANESVILLE)

The Internet market in ova has come about because of advances in fertility treatments and increased demand for human eggs. For many women, especially older women, using an egg from another woman significantly increases the chances of pregnancy. On the Internet, it is clear that a market exists in the sale, as opposed to the donation, of human gametes. However, it remains common practice to refer to the procurement of human ova as egg donation even if the donors are handsomely compensated for their so-called donation. On the Internet, eggs can be shopped for much like other merchandise. At the extreme, Internet sites such as Ron's Angels allow models to auction their eggs to the highest bidder. Potential parents hoping to have a beautiful child may pay up to \$150,000 for eggs from one of Ron's Angels' vendors. Many arguments have been made that selling and purchasing eggs from Internet vendors is immoral.

ATTENTION AND ITS PHENOMENOLOGY (III-J)

WAYNE W. WU (OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY)

At a party, you are involved in conversation when suddenly your name is voiced elsewhere: that conversation captures your attention while yours recedes. This cocktail party effect has an analog in vision where shifts of attention lead to shifts of salience. In both cases, the attended object seems more prominent, standing out against others. This contribution of attention to consciousness, what I call phenomenal salience, is captured by the spotlight and zoom lens metaphors deployed in psychology. What is its basis? Focusing on vision, I examine whether salience amounts to how the attended object is represented. By posing a counterexample to representationalism, I show that it cannot account for phenomenal salience solely by visual content. Focusing on attention as an action, I argue that salience is not a purely perceptual phenomenon but derives also from non-perceptual representational capacities enabled by agency. The common metaphors are misleading as to attention's phenomenology.

RESPECTING RELIGIOUS CITIZENS AS REASONERS (III-F)

MELISSA YATES (NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY)

My aim in this paper is to advance an argument against the politically liberal account of public deliberation. I begin with a discussion of the absence of the concept of 'respect' from John Rawls's *Political Liberalism* in order to underscore problems this poses for his response to objections from religious theorists. Rawls and other political liberals claim that the best way to protect religious freedom is to exclude religious matters from the public sphere; I contend that this approach fails to respect religious citizens as reasoners, since religious claims like all cognitive commitments are improved when they are subjected to public scrutiny. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of the concept of respect for reasoners for

theories of public deliberation and I argue that including religious reasons in political debates is not only permitted but recommended.

KANT'S JUSTIFICATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY RECONSIDERED (II-F)

BENJAMIN S. YOST (HARVARD UNIVERSITY)

Critics claim that Kant's enthusiastic embrace of the death penalty is incompatible with, or at least not required by, the principles of his practical philosophy. I will argue that Kant has a strong justification of capital punishment. To do so, I will sketch an interpretation of Kant's view that meets the three most common objections to it. The first objection charges Kant with inconsistency, stating that he has no reason to apply a flexible version of the *ius talionis* to rape while applying a strict version to murder. The second claims that the death penalty is impermissible because it infringes on a person's inviolable right to life. The third holds that execution violates human dignity. To address the third—and most important—concern, I will argue that motives of honor, as Kant describes it, would drive a rational person to endorse her own execution, were she to commit murder.

ABSTRACTS OF INVITED AND SYMPOSIUM PAPERS

SCULPTING CHARACTER: ARISTOTLE'S VOLUNTARY AS AFFECTABILITY (V-D)

AUDREY L. ANTON (*THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY*)

Most scholars find two criteria for distinguishing that which is voluntary from that which is not in Aristotle's corpus: agency and knowledge. That is, for something to be voluntary it must issue from the agent under consideration and the agent must have adequate knowledge of the particulars involved. While Aristotle certainly suggests these criteria, he also clarifies several exceptions to these rules. Scholars rarely try to reconcile these exceptions with the two principles, and for good reason; to do so would result in contradiction. Still, there is reason to believe that Aristotle's view was too coherent and precise to require admitting exceptions. In this paper, I explore the possibility that these criteria are suggestions for how to evaluate feelings and actions based on a more fundamental feature of the voluntary. I argue that there is a third fundamental consideration Aristotle had in mind that is constitutive of the voluntary. I suggest that Aristotle's theory of the voluntary is one concerned with whether an agent's character may be positively affected by praise and blame. That is, whatever is voluntary is that which, if praised or blamed, could positively contribute to the development, alteration, or strength of character. This account implies that emotions may be voluntary. This implication seems to be a virtue of the proposed account, since Aristotle explicitly begins his third book of *Nicomachean Ethics* with a declaration that both emotions and actions receive praise and blame when they are voluntary. Despite this comment, the majority of secondary literature addressing the voluntary focuses exclusively on actions. It is my contention that failure to recognize emotions as voluntary can lead (and has led) to an incomplete picture of Aristotle's notion of the voluntary. After arguing for this interpretation, I reevaluate the examples previously considered "exceptions," finding their original volitional category assignments to align precisely with my suggestion.

FORMAL EPISTEMOLOGY, NEW PHILOSOPHICAL DIRECTIONS (III-C)

HORACIO ARLÓ-COSTA (*CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIVERSITY*)

The techniques of formal epistemology have been traditionally used in order to tackle old and new epistemological problems. Indeed, formal epistemology has been concerned with some familiar questions: what is the nature of knowledge and belief? What are their relationships? How do we change opinions and values? But there are philosophical problems (and

philosophical positions) that appear and only make sense in the context of a given formal epistemology. For example, when Richard Jeffrey proposes that probability should be the only epistemological primitive notion and that we should eliminate all other doxastic and epistemological notions, he is introducing a philosophical position that does not exist without the previous introduction of a suitably formalized notion of probability and probability change. Moreover, the issue of the philosophical adequacy of a formal epistemology is also a kind of novel philosophical problem that only arises in the context of the formal theory. In this talk I will survey some of these novel philosophical problems. In particular, I will discuss the limitations of radical probabilism, the prospects of a bounded notion of rationality (of the sort proposed by Herb Simon) and the philosophical adequacy of some formal accounts of belief fixation and belief change. Formal theories used in the context of a particular formal epistemology are just instruments that make possible certain types of philosophical theorizing. Different uses of the same tools, or the use of different tools to analyze the same problem usually generates a multiplicity of philosophical points of view regarding some well-known philosophical problems. The dialogue between these philosophical positions might shed additional light on the problems themselves. I will close my talk with a comparison of two very different epistemological positions regarding the problem of how to represent belief change.

PLETHORIC FORMAL EPISTEMOLOGY (III-C)

VINCENT F. HENDRICKS (ROSKILDE UNIVERSITY)

Ian Hacking once noted that the hallmark of any fertile research program is plethora—the ability of the program to produce new and interesting phenomena. Formal epistemology is coming of age now, has a life of its own and is certainly a fertile research program in the plethoric sense.

Formal epistemology is a composite held together by a large toolbox of methods drawn from logic, mathematics, computer science, economics, social science, linguistics and cognitive psychology to mention but a few. One may be seduced into buying the idea that although the discipline is held together technically it is not in any philosophically interesting sense held together conceptually. Buying this idea is going to leave one with buyer's regret.

It turns out that crucial philosophical concepts like

- Active Agency
- Reliability Analysis
- First vs. Third Person Perspectives on Inquiry

are unilaterally shared by approaches ranging from belief revision theory, dynamic epistemic logic, Bayesianism to formal learning theory.

Why, how and where to go—this talk will attempt to say.

SENTENTIALISM AND HIGHER-ORDER ATTITUDE ATTRIBUTIONS (III-D)*KIRK LUDWIG (UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA)*

Stephen Schiffer has recently offered a clever objection to sententialist theories of attitude reports that focuses on higher-order attitude attributions. In a nutshell, the objection is that someone could know the content of the sententialist analysis of, for example, 'Galileo believed that the earth moves', without know what Galileo believed. Curiously, however, the difficulty Schiffer raises for sententialists is equally a problem for propositionalists, and any solution available to the propositionalist is equally available to the sententialist. This shows that there are unexplored difficulties in our understanding of the notion of knowing what someone believes: for it shows that this cannot be captured simply by way of relating someone to a proposition that relates the believer to any object as such, whether it has its "content" essentially or not.

WANTED PREGNANCIES AND WOMEN'S AUTONOMY (III-A)*AMY MULLIN (UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO-MISSISSAUGA)*

I understand autonomy as the ability to act in ways that are meaningful to one's self. We are only capable of autonomy when we have various resources, personal and social. We need the ability to recognize our emotions, the ability to deliberate about the means of achieving our goals, the ability to make commitments and care about some things or people, the ability to control impulses that conflict with what we care about, the capacity to perceive salient aspects of our environment and to acquire and evaluate relevant information, access to information, the ability the ability to imagine alternatives, access to trusted and trustworthy others, self-trust, and an environment that makes it possible to predict with some degree of certainty the outcomes of various courses of action. While unwanted pregnancies can clearly threaten women's autonomy, wanted pregnancies can too. (1) They may lack adequate information (about the changes they may experience and the moral decisions they may be required to make). (2) They may find it difficult to imagine alternatives to the dominant model of pregnancy as only about and for the developing fetus. (3) They may lack access to trusted and trustworthy others who care about them and their goals and priorities (pregnancy significantly increases a woman's chance of being physically abused, and those with whom she is in relation will often see the interests of the fetus as trumping hers). (4) Pregnancy is a time of considerable change and risk, making it difficult for women to assess the likely outcomes of their desires and actions.

Therefore if pregnancy is not to diminish autonomy, women need more than freedom from nonconsensual sex, access to birth control, and availability of abortion. We must also consider how to support the autonomy of women experiencing wanted pregnancies.

THE INNOCENT EYE: SEEING-AS WITHOUT CONCEPTS (II-E)

NICOLETTA ORLANDI (UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA—CHAPEL HILL)

Can one see one thing as another without possessing a concept of it? The answer to this question is intuitively negative. This is because seeing X as F is usually taken to consist in the application of the concept “F” to X. Nearly by definition, then, one cannot see X as F without possessing a concept of F. Contrary to this line of reasoning, I think that the question of whether we can see X as F without possessing a concept of F is an open and partially empirical question. Seeing X as F involves seeing X in a certain way, namely as F, and whether concepts are required in order for someone to see something in a certain way is an open question. So, in this paper I argue against the idea of understanding seeing-as in terms of the application of concepts to something given. I propose an alternative theory of seeing-as according to which seeing-as involves seeing something in a way that is driven by what visible features of a figure or object one pays attention to. I show that this alternative is well supported by the evidence but it avoids implausible views of visual content. Adopting this alternative makes the question of whether one can see one thing as another without possessing a concept of it into an open question and it suggests how the question can be answered affirmatively.

CONSENT AND THE FORMULA OF HUMANITY (IV-E)

JAPA PALLIKATHAYIL (HARVARD UNIVERSITY)

Kant famously argued that one ought never to treat others merely as a means. It is unclear, however, what exactly treating someone merely as a means comes to. In this paper, I explore one prominent approach to explicating this idea. This approach, advanced by Christine Korsgaard and Onora O’Neill, suggests that one treats another merely as a means if one treats the other in a way the other could not possibly consent to being treated. Call this the “possible consent interpretation.” In Section I, I argue that the possible consent interpretation involves attributing to Kant an implausible view, one that we have good evidence he did not espouse. In Section II, I argue that Korsgaard’s attempt to address the implausibility of the view being attributed to Kant is inadequate. In Section III, I argue that when the motivation behind the possible consent interpretation is made clear, the view has implausible implications that have thus far gone unnoticed. These implications suggest that the possible consent interpretation articulates a view that is fundamentally misguided. Finally, I offer a suggestion regarding how we might go about trying to develop an alternate interpretation.

NATURAL KINDS IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES: THE CASE OF DUNS SCOTUS (I-C)

GIORGIO PINI (FORDHAM UNIVERSITY)

Later medieval authors commonly assumed that things fall into different kinds, which they called “essences” or “quiddities.” They also maintained that our classificatory concepts mirror these essences or quiddities,

at least in some important respects. There was considerable debate, however, about how to fill out the details of this picture. In this paper, I will focus on some of the main positions discussed between the thirteenth and fourteenth century, with particular attention devoted to the thought of John Duns Scotus (1266-1308). Specifically, I will consider three questions. First, what is the ontological status of the essences into which the world is divided? Second, what is the relationship between those essences and the classificatory concepts by which we describe the world? Third, what do general terms such as “human being” and “horse” mean? Ideas in our mind or essences in the world? In considering these two questions, Scotus and his contemporaries were deeply aware of the limitations of our cognition. Since all our knowledge is based on information coming from the senses, and since only accidents can be sensed, it follows that a thing’s essence is beyond the grasp of what we can sense and so, to a certain extent, beyond the grasp of what we can know. But Scotus and his contemporaries also insisted on the necessity to give certainty to our scientific knowledge notwithstanding our cognitive limitations. It is in these later medieval debates that the basis for the distinction between nominal and real essence was posited. As a result, later medieval thinkers may turn out to be much closer to early modern thought than it is usually thought.

ARISTOTLE ON DEFECTIVE KINDS (I-C)

CHARLOTTE WITT (UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE)

Over the past twenty years a new appreciation of Aristotle’s biological writing, which comprises some 25 percent of his extant corpus, has emerged. With that new appreciation has come a reinterpretation of the conceptual structure and metaphysical commitments of Aristotelian biology. The traditional taxonomic view of Aristotle’s biology that emphasized the notions of species, genus and differentia has been reconsidered, raising new questions about the compatibility between the biology and both Aristotle’s theory of scientific understanding and his metaphysics. I propose an interpretation of kinds in Aristotle’s biology that is grounded in a teleological metaphysics of biological individuals. Interpreted in this way Aristotle’s biology is compatible with a plausible reading of his metaphysics of substance. I also develop the view that Aristotelian kinds are strongly normative by considering his discussion of female animals and defective kinds. By strongly normative I mean that an individual belongs to the kind if that individual is subject to the norms that govern the kind, and an individual is subject to the norms that govern the kind if the norms are explanatory in relation to that individual.

SPECIAL SESSIONS SPONSORED BY APA COMMITTEES

THURSDAY, APRIL 17

Ethics and Classical Chinese Philosophy (I-L)

Sponsored by the Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies

1:30-4:30 p.m.

Physicians at War: The Dual Loyalties Challenge (I-M)

Sponsored by the Committee on Philosophy and Medicine

1:30-4:30 p.m.

FRIDAY, APRIL 18

Reflections on Being a Woman Philosophy Student: Lessons for the Profession (II-L)

Sponsored by the Committee on the Status of Women

9:00 a.m.-Noon

German Philosophy in the Americas (II-M)

Sponsored by the Committee on Hispanics

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Is There an African Analytic Philosophy: A Discussion of Intuitions across Cultures (III-K)

Sponsored by the Committee on International Cooperation

1:45-4:45 p.m.

(Topic to be announced) (III-L)

Sponsored by the Committee on Public Philosophy

1:45-4:45 p.m.

Evaluation of Teaching Demonstrations (III-M)

Sponsored by the Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges

1:45-4:45 p.m.

SATURDAY, APRIL 19**Contemporary Philosophy of Mind in Latin America and Spain (IV-L)**

Sponsored by the Committee on International Cooperation

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Philosophical Readings/Interpretations of bell hooks (IV-M)

Sponsored by the Committee on Black Philosophers

9:00 a.m.-Noon

GROUP SESSIONS

Sessions sponsored by affiliated groups are listed below in alphabetical order of sponsoring group. Sessions sponsored jointly by more than one group are listed once for each sponsor.

A

American Association of Philosophy Teachers, *Fri, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

American Society for Aesthetics, *Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.*

American Society for Philosophy, Counseling, and Psychotherapy, *Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

American Society for Value Inquiry, *Thu, 5:15-7:15 p.m.*

American Society for Value Inquiry, *Thu, 7:30-10:30 p.m.*

Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking, *Fri, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

Association for the Development of Philosophy Teaching, *Thu, 7:30-10:30 p.m.*

Association of Chinese Philosophers in America, *Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

B

Bertrand Russell Society, *Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

C

Committee on Institutional Cooperation, *Thu, 5:15-7:15 p.m.*

Concerned Philosophers for Peace, *Thu, 7:30-10:30 p.m.*

Conference of Philosophical Societies, *Thu, 7:30-10:30 p.m.*

H

Hegel Society of America, *Thu, 7:30-10:30 p.m.*

History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society, *Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Hume Society, *Thu, 5:15-7:15 p.m.*

I

International Association for the Philosophy of Sport, *Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.*

International Berkeley Society, *Thu, 5:15-7:15 p.m.*

International Society for Environmental Ethics, *Thu, 5:15-7:15 p.m.*

International Society for Environmental Ethics, *Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.*

International Society of Chinese Philosophy, *Fri, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

J

Josiah Royce Society, *Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.*

Journal of the History of Philosophy, *Sat, 10:00 a.m.-3:00 p.m.*

K

Karl Jaspers Society of North America, *Thu*, 7:30-10:30 p.m.

M

Max Scheler Society, *Thu*, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

Max Scheler Society, *Fri*, 7:00-10:00 p.m.

Midwest Society for Women in Philosophy, *Thu*, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

N

North American Kant Society, *Fri*, 7:00-10:00 p.m.

North American Kant Society, *Sat*, 12:15-2:15 p.m.

North American Nietzsche Society, *Sat*, 12:15-2:15 p.m.

North American Society for Social Philosophy, *Fri*, 7:00-10:00 p.m.

P

Personalist Discussion Group, *Sat*, 12:15-2:15 p.m.

Philosophy of Religion Group, *Thu*, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

Philosophy of Time Society, *Thu*, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

R

Radical Philosophy Association, *Thu*, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

S

Society for Analytical Feminism, *Thu*, 7:30-10:30 p.m.

Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy, *Fri*, 7:00-10:00 p.m.

Society for Arab, Persian, and Islamic Philosophy, *Thu*, 7:30-10:30 p.m.

Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, *Thu*, 5:15-7:15 p.m.

Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, *Thu*, 7:30-10:30 p.m.

Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, *Sat*, 12:15-2:15 p.m.

Society for Business Ethics, *Fri*, 7:00-10:00 p.m.

Society for Empirical Ethics, *Sat*, 12:15-2:15 p.m.

Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy, *Thu*, 5:15-7:15 p.m.

Society for Philosophy and Technology, *Sat*, 12:15-2:15 p.m.

Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World, *Fri*, 7:00-10:00 p.m.

Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World, *Sat*, 12:15-2:15 p.m.

Society for Student Philosophers, *Thu*, 9:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.

Society for Student Philosophers, *Thu*, 7:30-10:30 p.m.

Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, *Fri*, 7:00-10:00 p.m.

Society for the Metaphysics of Science, *Thu*, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

Society for the Metaphysics of Science, *Thu*, 7:30-10:30 p.m.

Society for the Philosophic Study of Genocide and the Holocaust, *Thu*,
7:30-10:30 p.m.

Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts, *Thu*,
5:15-7:15 p.m.

Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts, *Thu*, 7:30-10:30 p.m.

Society for the Philosophical Study of Education, *Thu*, 5:15-7:15 p.m.

Society for the Philosophical Study of Education, *Fri*, 7:00-10:00 p.m.

Society for the Philosophical Study of Marxism, *Sat*, 12:15-2:15 p.m.

Society for the Philosophy of Creativity, *Thu*, 7:30-10:30 p.m.

Society for the Philosophy of History, *Thu*, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

Society for the Philosophy of History, *Sat*, 12:15-2:15 p.m.

Society for the Study of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Philosophy, *Thu*, 7:30-10:30 p.m.

Society for the Study of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Philosophy, *Sat*, 12:15-2:15 p.m.

Society for the Study of Process Philosophies, *Fri*, 7:00-10:00 p.m.

Society of Christian Philosophers, *Thu*, 5:15-7:15 p.m.

Søren Kierkegaard Society, *Fri*, 7:00-10:00 p.m.

W

William James Society, *Thu*, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

APA PLACEMENT SERVICE INFORMATION

Lindsay Palkovitz will be the Coordinator for the APA Placement Service at the 2008 Central Division Meeting. Questions concerning the Service should be directed to Lindsay at the American Philosophical Association, University of Delaware, 31 Amstel Avenue, Newark, DE 19716. She can also be reached by telephone at (302) 831-4298, fax: (302) 831-8690, or email: lindspal@udel.edu.

APA PLACEMENT SERVICE GENERAL HOURS OF OPERATION:

Wednesday, April 16: Placement Information, 5:00 – 10:00 p.m.,

Placement Interviewing, 5:00 – 10:00 p.m.,

Thursday, April 17: Placement Information, 9:00 a.m. – 7:00 p.m.,

Placement Interviewing, 9:00 a.m. – 7:00 p.m.,

Friday, April 18: Placement Information, 9:00 a.m. – 5:00 p.m.,

Placement Interviewing, 9:00 a.m. – 5:00 p.m.,

Saturday, April 19: Placement Information, 9:00 a.m. – Noon,

Placement Interviewing, 9:00 a.m. – Noon,

APA PLACEMENT SERVICE LOCATIONS

The Placement Services will be located in The Palmer House Hilton Hotel as outlined below. For your convenience, maps of the hotel appear at the back of this issue.

JOB CANDIDATES

1. Candidate Numbers will be assigned at the Placement Desk.
 2. The location of a Job Interview will be available from the Placement staff, or posted on the bulletin board at the information desk.
 3. Additional “Request for Interview” forms will be available at the Placement Desk.
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4. APA Membership Applications will be available at the APA Meeting Registration Desk.
5. Information and instructions for using the Service will be available at the Placement desk (also see following pages), and posted on the information bulletin board.
6. The mailboxes for Job Candidates will be located at the Placement Desk.
7. A complete set of Job Postings will be available at the Placement Desk.
8. A message for the APA Placement Ombudsperson can be left at the Placement Desk.

INTERVIEWERS

1. **Interviewers check in here**—as soon as possible upon arrival.
2. Payments for **On-Site Interviewing Departments** will be received here.
3. Space will be provided here for interviewers to check their files.
4. “Request for Interview” forms received from job candidates that have been reviewed by interviewers **should be returned** here.
5. A list of interviewing table assignments will be posted on the Placement Information Bulletin Board.

INTERVIEWING AREA

1. APA Interviewing Tables will be located here.
2. In the event that additional space for interviewing is needed, we will post the additional location on the Placement Information Bulletin Board.

INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOB CANDIDATES

REQUIREMENTS FOR USING THE PLACEMENT SERVICE

1. You **must be an APA member** in order to use the Service. Placement is a benefit of membership for candidates, and there is no additional charge to use this service. Membership applications are available on the APA web site (www.apaonline.org) or by contacting the APA National Office (302) 831-1112, or at the Membership/Registration desk at the Meeting.
 2. You **MUST REGISTER** for the **MEETING** in order to use the Service.
 - If you **register in advance** for the meeting and indicate that you will be a candidate (an advance registration form is located at the back of this issue), a candidate number will be assigned in the National Office and will appear on the back of your badge. You **must** pick up your badge from the APA Registration staff prior to using the Placement service.
 - If you register on-site for the meeting, present your badge to the Placement Staff, who will be available to assign you a candidate number in the “Placement Service” line.
-

WHAT TO BRING WITH YOU

1. Your copies of recent issues of *Jobs For Philosophers*.
2. Several copies of your curriculum vitae. If you run out of CVs at the meeting, the hotel has a copy center located in the Business Center.

HOW TO USE THE PLACEMENT SERVICE

After you have picked up your registration materials from the APA Registration staff, you are ready to use the Service. If you do not yet have a candidate number on the back of your badge, please go to the job candidates' area to receive one.

JOB CANDIDATES' AREA

Here you will find a file folder (mailbox) with your candidate number on it. All communications addressed to you during the meeting will be placed there. Your folder contains:

1. "Request for Interview" forms. Additional forms will be available from the Placement staff. **Be sure that your Placement Number appears at the top of all forms.**
2. A "Locator" form for you to list your name and hotel address. Please do not remove this form from your folder. This is used only in the event that we need to contact you during the meeting.

JOB POSTINGS

New jobs (not having appeared in the *Jobs for Philosophers*) will be posted on a bulletin board in the Placement Service Area. You should check this board regularly for new postings. Each ad should contain instructions on how to apply.

INSTITUTIONS THAT HAVE CHECKED IN WITH PLACEMENT

The names of institutions that have registered to use the Service will be posted on the bulletin board (updated regularly) in *alphabetical order*. Each listing will indicate the following:

1. If the listing institution has checked in with Placement.
2. If the institution is accepting interview requests at the meeting.
3. The relevant *JFP* for the institution's opening(s).
4. Where the institution plans on interviewing (Table with number assignment).
5. Miscellaneous notes deemed appropriate by the Placement staff or the institution.

SUBMITTING AN INTERVIEW REQUEST FORM

Complete the *top* portion of the "Request for Interview" form and attach a copy of your CV. **Be sure that your candidate number appears at the top of all forms.** After you have completed the necessary information,

place your request form and CV in the box marked *Requests for Interviews* which will be prominently displayed on the Placement Service Desk. Your "Request" will be forwarded to the institution by a staff member.

INTERVIEWS

After your "Request" has been reviewed by a representative from the institution, the form will be returned to your file folder with the institution's response appearing on the *bottom* of the form. Check your file folder often so that you can be certain to receive your messages promptly.

By **Noon on April 19**, all "Requests" submitted by you should have been returned to your file folder, and you should remove them at that time. Occasionally, an institution may retain applications to review at a later date. If you applied for a job that had been posted and the institution did not check in with the Service during the meeting, it is suggested that you contact the institution by mail.

INTERVIEWING LOCATIONS

Some departments will be conducting interviews at tables. Other interviewing table locations will be posted if additional space is required. Each institution using a table for interviewing will be assigned a table number. The table numbers assigned to institutions will be posted on the bulletin board in the Placement Service Area.

ADVICE FOR JOB APPLICANTS

The APA Committee on Career Opportunities offers the following advice for job applicants: The schedule for those seeking jobs and those Departments offering positions is difficult for all concerned. From the point of view of Departments, any publication date for *Jobs for Philosophers* is a compromise between the competing demands imposed by the need to get funding for positions, so the later the better, and by the need to have time to process applications, so the sooner the better. From the point of view of job applicants, there are also competing demands: the sooner it is published, the more time to apply, but the later it is published, the more opportunities will be available. There is no easy solution to this problem, but you can ease your difficulties somewhat by being prepared when the *JFP* is published. You should have your curriculum vitae ready to put in an envelope, a generic draft of a letter of application ready to be fine-tuned for particular job opportunities, and the rest of your file ready for mailing. This means talking to those who are to write letters of recommendation long before the *JFP* is due to arrive, preparing material about your teaching capacities, and selecting a writing sample for those Departments that request it. Applications should be complete, as well as clearly organized. It is to your advantage to send in your application as soon as possible after an ad appears.

INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR INTERVIEWERS

REQUIREMENTS FOR USING THE PLACEMENT SERVICE

1. It is expected that **all individual interviewers will register for the meeting** either by using the registration form found in the back of this issue or by stopping at the APA Registration Desk to register on-site prior to using the Placement Service.
2. All **Departments (not individuals)** planning to interview at the meeting should complete the Placement Service advance registration form found on our web site, www.apaonline.org/apa/divisions/central or at the end of this section.

Upon receipt of an advance registration form additional information pertaining to the Placement Service will be sent to the attention of the contact person listed on the form. In the event that we send Placement forms either via email or mail, please be sure to complete these and return them to our office **at your earliest opportunity**. Not doing so may cause your materials to arrive after the Staff has already left the office to travel to the meeting. In this case, we **must** have you fill out the forms again on site. If time does not allow sending them to us, please bring them with you and turn them in at the Placement Desk.

CHECKING IN WITH THE SERVICE

Before you begin to interview candidates, please check in with the Placement Staff. We will need to know that you have arrived on site for candidates inquiring about your institution. Additional information will be requested from you (or confirmed if your department pre-registered) at this time as well.

Some institutions accept interview requests at the meeting; some of these job notices may have appeared in *Jobs for Philosophers* while others are unpublished positions. A new, unpublished position will be assigned an AD# and posted on the bulletin board in the Placement Service area. If you are bringing such a job notice with you to the meeting, please provide the Placement Staff with **four** copies of the notice for the position you are advertising. Such a position announcement should be typed on *one side only* in a good size and easy to read font, and be as brief as possible. Only positions that have **not** appeared in *Jobs for Philosophers* will be posted. If you would like a position that has been posted at this meeting to appear on our website immediately following the meeting, or in the issue of *Jobs for Philosophers*, you need to submit this ad immediately, following the close of the meeting via our website, www.apa.udel.edu/apa/publications/jfp/advertise.asp. If you need assistance with this, contact the APA National Office.

Some institutions interview by prearrangement after placing an advertisement in *Jobs for Philosophers* and then contacting candidates prior to the meeting. When you arrange an interview with candidates, please inform them that they **must be APA Members in order to use the Service and they must register for the meeting in order to use the Service**.

If you plan to conduct job interviews anywhere other than at the interviewing tables/suites we have provided, please let us know your plans because candidates often come to us to ask questions about the location/time (etc.) of their interviews, and we need to have complete, up-to-date information in order to help them (and you).

Departments using a **Suite** for interviewing will need to complete an interview schedule form at the time they check in with the Service. Doing so enables the Service to notify the candidates you wish to interview of your interviewing location. **Be assured that only those candidates listed on your interview schedule will be told the location of your hotel room, unless you have directed us to give this information to all candidates who ask.** Departments interviewing at tables **DO NOT** need to complete this form.

N.B.: If you are conducting interviews in a hotel room, please be aware of the following policy statement adopted by the APA Board of Officers at its November 2004 meeting:

“Departments should not conduct Job Interviews in non-suite hotel rooms. Candidates who are subject to such interviews can appeal to the APA and are guaranteed anonymity.” (Originally published in *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, Vol. 78, No. 5, pp. 23, 119.)

APA INTERVIEWING TABLES

The Placement Service provides numbered tables for interviewing purposes; you will receive your table number assignment when you check in. These table number assignments will also be posted on the Placement Service Bulletin Board. Should additional space for interviewing tables be necessary, this location will be posted as well.

INSTITUTION FILE FOLDER (MAILBOX)

There will be a file folder bearing the name of your institution located in the Interviewer’s Area. Requests for interviews from candidates will be placed in this file folder.

REVIEWING INTERVIEW REQUESTS

When a candidate requests an interview with your institution, you should receive her/his curriculum vitae attached to a “Request for Interview” form. The bottom of this form is to be completed by you and returned to Placement staff. If an interview is granted, space is provided on this form to list the time, date, and location of the interview. If you are *unable to interview a candidate*, space for this response is also provided on the form. Any request you receive in an envelope contains confidential material and should be destroyed rather than returned to the candidate. As a matter of professional courtesy, *all requests should receive a response*. When a candidate receives a “Request” form back without a response, he or she is likely to assume that the material *has not been reviewed* and might return this to you via our service or contact your institution by mail.

Each candidate is assigned a numbered file folder to facilitate prompt communication between interviewers and candidates. Materials that you wish to transmit to a registered candidate should be handed in to the Placement Service staff, and will be delivered to the candidate by our staff.

APA STATEMENT ON PLACEMENT PRACTICES

The APA Committee on the Status and Future of the Profession reminds you of its Statement on Placement Practices: The APA discourages the nomination by graduate departments of job seekers for positions in philosophy, and the submission of their dossiers in response to announcements of positions, without their knowledge or interest. This may seriously mislead those who are conducting searches, and may have unfortunate consequences both for them and for genuinely interested applicants. Graduate departments using a nomination procedure or submitting dossiers on behalf of job seekers should either attest explicitly that the candidate wishes to be considered for the positions in question, or (preferably) ensure that the job seekers themselves submit personal letters of application for these positions. Departments conducting searches are encouraged to recommend or require explicitly (in their position announcements) that each candidate, to be assessed of full consideration, should submit a personal letter of application for and interest in the announced position.

A Placement Ombudsperson will be available at the meeting. Please see the Placement Service Staff if you would like to contact the Ombudsperson.

**PLACEMENT SERVICE
 REGISTRATION FOR INTERVIEWING DEPARTMENTS
 APA 2008 CENTRAL DIVISION MEETING
 THE PALMER HOUSE HILTON, CHICAGO, IL.
 APRIL 17-20, 2008**

Only **one** form is required for each interviewing **department**.

Institution: _____ Department: _____
 Contact: _____ Phone: _____
 City, State: _____ Email: _____

All persons conducting interviews should be **registered**** for the **Central Division Meeting as well as** the department being **registered** with the **Placement Service**.

****Registered** members of the department who will be conducting interviews:

Our department will: (Please Indicate Quantity of Tables)
 need interviewing _____ table(s)

Our department will: (Please Check)
 ___ conduct prearranged interviews **only**
 -or-
 ___ accept interview requests on-site

Position advertised where? (Check All Applicable)
 JFP issue number in which your ad ran: _____

Fees: (Please Check One)

_____ **Pre-Registration, By March 21:** \$50.00

_____ ***Regular Registration, After March 21:** \$75.00

Credit Card Type: (Circle One) VISA / MASTERCARD

Credit Card #:

Exp. Date / Last 3 digits on back of card:

(can be faxed to (302) 831-8690)

Name on Card: _____ Phone #: _____

Signature: _____ Email: _____

***Check #: _____ Check Date: _____ Check Amount _____

Payable to: The American Philosophical Association. The APA only accepts checks drawn on U.S. banks in U.S. funds, or Int'l. Money Orders in U.S. funds. There is a \$30 charge for all returned checks. *If PAYMENT is not received in our office by March 21, 2008, you MUST pay the on-site fee!** Please mail form and payment to: Attn: Lindsay Palkovitz, Placement, The American Philosophical Association, 31 Amstel Avenue, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716

APA PLACEMENT BROCHURE

This brochure offers some advice to those seeking jobs in philosophy. Like all advice it is to be taken with a grain of salt. It is based on the collective wisdom of the APA's Committee on Academic Careers and Placement in Fall 2004 (Larry May [chair], Andrew Light, Frank Ryan, Abby Wilkerson, Melissa Zinkin, Nancy Holland, Rebecca Copenhaver, Mark Timmons, David Tuncellito). Collective wisdom is probably somewhat less controversial than collective punishment, but more controversial than almost everything else. Nonetheless, we hope that some of what we recommend will prove helpful to some of you, some of the time. Job seeking is one of the most difficult things that people can engage in. Anything that reduces that difficulty has value.

1. WHEN TO START THINKING ABOUT JOBS

It is never too early to start thinking about the job market. During your first years in graduate school you should be thinking about which papers your teachers have liked. After the end of term, take the paper back to the professor who liked it and ask two questions:

What can I do to improve this paper and make it marketable for a conference or for publication?

Which conference or journal would be best suited for a paper like mine?

You don't need to do a lot of this. One or two of your best essays, sent first to a conference and then to a journal, will do nicely. Only send out your very best work to conferences, for that is what you want to be remembered for.

In addition, in these early years in graduate school, you should try to put together a good assortment of courses that you have TAed for or taught independently. You should try to TA for all of the major introductory courses (introduction to philosophy, ethics, logic and critical thinking) as well as some specialized or advanced courses in your areas of specialization and competence. At some universities, such as the large state schools, the trick will be to limit your teaching so that you can get good writing done. At other schools, you may have to be creative to get enough teaching experience (try contacting small colleges and community colleges in your area). Most importantly, keep your teaching evaluations from these courses. Or if course evaluations do not routinely have students evaluate TAs, design your own and administer it during the last week of classes (then have a departmental secretary collect and hold them for you until grades are turned in so students don't think you will retaliate against them).

A note of caution: Given the current and foreseeable demand for low-paid adjunct courses it can be very tempting to take on a large amount of adjunct teaching. Given the large number of graduate students seeking such teaching it can also be very tempting to take every course that is offered to you in order to ensure your place in the adjunct pool. The result sometimes can be a vicious cycle of taking more and more low-paid adjunct teaching that can impede your ability to finish your dissertation.

All other things being equal, and they hardly ever are, you could also use the early years in graduate school to get a bit (but only a bit) of service or administrative experience. The easiest here is to volunteer for a departmental committee, like the colloquium or admissions committee. If there are opportunities to work with an actual administrator, especially a Dean or higher, on a special project, you should jump at the opportunity since a letter from said administrator will make you look more attractive to administrators who will hire you down the road. Do not (repeat: do not) spend much time at this. Service is clearly a very distant third-place, after research and teaching, for the vast majority of jobs. No one gets hired on the basis of service, standing alone, unless you want to be hired into an administrative job. Remember too that one should be cautious about spending too much time on departmental or campus politics. Indeed, try to stay out of departmental politics altogether, which can come back to bite you. You are a transient in graduate school, and should not treat this as a permanent position.

It is a good idea to join the APA as soon as you can—the rates for student members are very low. And make sure to check the box on the application form saying that you would like to receive the publication called: *Jobs for Philosophers* (it's free—but you have to check the box to get it). Once you get this publication, you can scan through it and think to yourself: Do any of these jobs sound interesting to me? What do I need to do to stand the best chance of getting the job I like the most? Note whether there are any such jobs. If not, consider another career. If so, notice what combinations of things employers are looking for (for example, notice that most jobs in philosophy of science or mind also want someone who can teach logic; and most jobs in ethical theory or political philosophy also want someone who can teach applied ethics).

Another good source of experience and professional contacts can be found in the numerous smaller specialized societies organized around particular sub-fields of philosophy, affinity groups, or particular periods or figures, such as the Society for Women in Philosophy, the International Society for Environmental Ethics, or the Society for Realist/Antirealist Discussion. Such organizations can be invaluable for helping to establish you in the field and providing a set of interlocutors who can improve your work. One of the best ways to find such organizations is to survey the Group Meetings listings in the program for each divisional APA conference.

In general, use the early years in graduate school to learn as much philosophy as you can. Also, begin to develop a specialty in philosophy, and perhaps also begin to develop a competence outside of philosophy,

such as political science or computer science (although for certain jobs you might not want to highlight this). Use these early years to figure out if you really want to spend your life in a philosophy department, and to begin to get a sense of what it means to be a “professional” philosopher. While it is very romantic to want to be a philosopher, like being a poet one does not live by thoughts and words alone. The way to support yourself is by getting a job as a member of a profession, and our profession, as odd as it may sound, is teaching and publishing in philosophy, which is not especially romantic, but is better than many other jobs we know.

2. WHEN TO GO INTO THE “MARKET”

One of the most important decisions you will make is when to go into the philosophy job market. This is especially important because many graduate students go in too early and waste years of their lives. The job market process is a nearly full-time job. So if you go in early and you don’t have enough of your dissertation done, you can find yourself six months later with no job prospects and no more done on your dissertation than when you started. Do this a couple of years and you nearly place yourself out of the market by being too long in graduate school—taking too long to finish a dissertation is almost always seen as a bad sign of how long it will take you to finish anything else.

So, when is it optimal to go into the job market? While this varies a bit, the best time is when you are nearly done with your dissertation. “Nearly done” is a relative term. If you have a five-chapter dissertation, “nearly done” can mean four chapters drafted and approved by your committee, and the other chapter at least begun. Or it can mean, all five chapters drafted and some fairly minor revisions needed. At bare minimum, you need three of those five chapters done by early September. The main reason for this is that you need your dissertation committee chair to say, in a letter he or she will write in late September, “Yes, Jones will be done and ready to start undistracted in the Fall.” But this is not enough, since everyone’s committee chair will say that, or else your application process is simply a waste of time. In addition, the committee chair must offer evidence to back up this claim, such as, that all five chapters are drafted and only need minor revisions, or some such. Optimally, the letter from your committee chair will say: “We have set December 8th as the defense date.” This is optimal because by the time you get to the Eastern Division meetings in late December, folks will know whether you are really done or not. January defense dates are good as well, because departments will be making hiring decisions by late January or early February, typically.

In normal years there are a lot more applicants for jobs in philosophy than there are jobs. So, employers are looking for reasons to throw out applications. The first cut at most schools is “whether the candidate is done, or will be done by September.” Unless you can make a strong case for this, and your dissertation committee chair can back you up, you are unlikely to make the first cut, and hence likely to have wasted six months or more. Don’t delude yourself. It normally takes two months of relatively

uninterrupted work to draft a good chapter, so it will take six months of very hard work to draft more than half of a dissertation, depending on your other commitments. If you haven't started seriously writing your dissertation by March, you don't stand much of a chance of being more than halfway done by September. But also don't wait too long. While the national average is seven years from BA to completion of the Ph.D., if after completing your coursework you take longer than three years to write the dissertation, potential employers will start to wonder whether this is a sign that you will not be able to write enough in your probationary period to be able to get tenure. So, our best advice is not to go into the market until you are done with the dissertation, or at very least "nearly done."

3. THE SYSTEM

In America in philosophy, the majority of jobs are advertised in *Jobs for Philosophers* in October and November and then first interviews (a half hour to an hour in length) are conducted at the APA Eastern Division meetings between Christmas and New Year's day. If you make it through the convention, then two or three people will be flown to campus for a two-day intensive interview, where you will meet all of the faculty members and present a professional paper, or teach a class, and increasingly both. There are also jobs advertised after New Year's day, although far fewer than before New Year's. These jobs will typically have their first interviews at the Pacific or Central Division meetings in late March or late April respectively. But many of these jobs will not be tenure track, but instead they are rather late announcements for temporary positions of one or more years. Some schools will do first interviews by phone, but these are still very rare. If you are seriously on the market, you should plan to go to the APA Eastern Division meetings and apply to jobs out of the October and November *JFPs*, and then keep applying throughout the year.

Many graduate students go to their first APA meeting when they go on the job market. While certainly understandable due to financial constraints, we strongly advise you to attend a meeting of the APA prior to going on the market. In particular, going to an Eastern APA meeting may help you avoid the "shell shock" of going to one of these meetings only when it "counts." We would also hope that attending these meetings without the pressure of being on the market will help you see the positive aspects of these conferences, especially the ability to reconnect with friends in the field and make new friends that you otherwise might not see in the academic year. Also, reading a paper or being a commentator might help get you a job in the following years.

4. THE "VITA"

One of the main ways to tell whether you are ready to go on the market is whether you can put together a respectable vita by early September. A vita is simply an academic resume, but it is not really very simple at all. You should show your vita to various faculty members and put it through the kind of drafting process that you would use for a term paper. For most applicants, the vita should be two to three pages long, with three to four

pages for dissertation abstract and summary of teaching evaluations as supplements to the vita.

- a) Address – list your departmental and home addresses and phone numbers. Also list where you can be reached right up to the beginning of the Eastern APA convention (December 27).
 - b) Area of specialization – this is optimally two or three areas of philosophy that you are especially qualified in. The dissertation is the primary, often only, basis for proof of a specialization. To figure out what would be good combinations of specialization, consult back issues of *Jobs for Philosophers* and then make sure that your dissertation really does cover those areas.
 - c) Area of competence – this is optimally four or five areas of philosophy that you are ready to offer courses in, different from your specialized areas. The best way to demonstrate this is in terms of what you have taught or TAed.
 - d) Publications or conference presentations – this could be one area of the vita or several, depending on what you have accomplished. Do not pad your vita with very minor things (or optimally, list them under a separate category for minor publications). Try to list the most significant first—they don't need to be in chronological order. Make sure to indicate whether something was peer refereed.
 - e) Teaching experience – list TA experience in a separate category from autonomous teaching. List the dates and places of the experience.
 - f) Special honors and awards – list whatever seems relevant to a job search in philosophy. Mainly focus on things you earned in graduate school.
 - g) Recommendation writers – list the names of all of those who will write letters for you and the addresses and phone numbers for them. This list should include all three (or four) members of your primary dissertation committee, as well as someone who will write specifically about your teaching—preferably someone who has good first-hand experience of it. And it is sometimes an especially good thing to be able to have someone write for you who is not a faculty member at your department or school. Those letters are more believable since the reputation of the recommendation writer is not tied up with whether you get a job or not. For example, if you give a conference paper and have a commentator who liked the paper, ask that person to write a letter for you; act similarly for a paper you have written about a prominent philosopher who has read your work and appreciated it, but such letters are limited in scope. It often is a good idea to give to prospective letter writers a letter from you that indicates what things optimally you'd like them to cover in the recommendation, and give them lots of time—ask them by Sept. 1.
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- h) List of graduate courses taken: list all courses (including those you audited) along with the name of the professor and the semester taken. It is often a good idea to group these by subject areas rather than merely to present them chronologically. **DO NOT LIST GRADES**—no one cares anymore.
- i) Summary of selected course evaluations: on no more than two sheets of paper, list five or six sets of teaching evaluations, displayed in graphic form that is easy to read
- j) Dissertation abstract—on one or two sheets of paper give a detailed description of the arguments of the dissertation. Provide a summary paragraph and long paragraphs on each chapter. [NOTE: if you can't easily provide this abstract then you are definitely not ready to go on the market.]

It is hard to stress enough how important it is to get the vita just right. The trick is not to pad the vita and yet to list all of the important stuff about your fledgling professional life.

On a more mundane subject, normal white paper and average size typeface work best. This is why you need lots of feedback and redraftings to get it right. If you have any questions about how you “appear” through the vita, ask people you can trust to give you frank advice, and then, with several such pieces of advice, make a decision about how you want to “appear.”

Do not waste your time applying for jobs that list an AOS different from the ones you list on the vita.

5. THE COVER LETTER

The cover letter for each job application should basically be a one-page attempt to demonstrate that you fit the job description. This means that you should highlight aspects of the vita that demonstrate your qualifications for the things mentioned in the job ad. You should have a paragraph on teaching and a paragraph on research, at bare minimum.

The cover letter is sometimes the only thing that members of a hiring committee read, so take your time with it and try to convey as much information as you can in a page or so without being excessively wordy or using terms and expressions that may be esoteric to a particular sub-field of philosophy—keep in mind that most people reading this letter will not be working in the specialty area in which you work. It is not a problem to go over one page in length, but remember that folks may not read the second page.

If at all possible, put the cover letter on departmental stationary. If you already have a job, this is easy. But if you are still in graduate school, most departments will let you use departmental stationary. If your department secretary complains about the cost of letterhead stock, merely ask for one sheet, and then photocopy it and print your covering letter on the photocopied departmental letterhead.

6. THE WRITING SAMPLE

You will need to supply at least one writing sample with each application. It is commonly thought that the writing sample should come from the dissertation. If it does not, people may wonder whether the dissertation is indeed almost done. You should take a chapter from the dissertation and make it a free-standing 25-page paper. If you have a paper that has been accepted for publication, you should include this as well; but especially if it is not from the dissertation, this should be included in addition to, not instead of, the dissertation chapter.

In all cases, the writing sample should be your very best work. After all, someone may actually read it and base the whole interview on it. How embarrassing it will be for you if you really don't think that thesis is defensible anymore. Writing samples should be very carefully edited for typos and infelicities of style, since this is the only piece of your work members of a hiring committee are likely to see. You should never send out a writing sample that has not been seen, and critiqued, by several people in your field, even if these are only fellow graduate students. Do not assume that even if people have seen earlier drafts of the writing sample, say when it was merely a chapter, that is good enough. As with everything else you send out for the purposes of getting a job, only send things out that others have looked at for you in advance. [Note: Your writing sample should not be the same as the professional paper you deliver on campus, lest folks think that you only have one good idea.]

7. WHICH SCHOOLS TO APPLY TO

Our standard advice is that if you are serious about the job market you should be able to apply to 30-80 jobs before Christmas. Of course, it is a waste of everyone's time to apply to jobs that you are not qualified for, or for which you do not have the right AOS. But so many jobs list open specializations, or merely list courses to be taught, that it shouldn't be hard to find quite a number of jobs that one is qualified for out of the 300-plus advertised in the October and November issues of *Jobs for Philosophers*.

Many students decide to do a more limited search. In order to accomplish this goal they try to determine which departments are most likely to hire them, and then only apply to those schools. For instance, if someone really wants to teach applied ethics, then one often applies only to jobs that list applied ethics as an AOS, rather than also to jobs that list ethical theory or political philosophy as specializations. In deciding whether to pursue this strategy, you should realize that departments often change their minds about precisely what they want. If you do a limited search, still apply to as many jobs as you can from those that you are qualified for. Remember that you don't have to take every job that is offered, but unless you get an offer from somewhere you won't get a job at all.

8. PREPARING FOR THE INTERVIEW

Before going to the APA Eastern convention for the first round of job interviews, everyone should first have a mock interview. If this is not a

regular feature of your graduate program, mock interviews are easy to organize on your own. Merely find two or three faculty members, give them a copy of your vita a few minutes in advance (to make it seem like the real thing) and have them sit in a room with you for an hour and role-play.

The first half of the interview should be about research, and it should begin with someone asking you to describe your dissertation in about ten minutes. The “Spiel” should be memorized and well-rehearsed in front of a mirror. Of course, you will rarely get through ten minutes before questions start flying. And that’s good—since the whole point of an interview is to have a conversation where three things are learned: how good a philosopher you are, what kind of a teacher you are likely to be, and whether you will be a good conversationalist as a colleague. Since you won’t normally be allowed to finish the “Spiel” front-load it with the most interesting ideas.

The second half of the mock interview, like most of the real interviews you will face, should be focused on teaching. You should come prepared to discuss in detail how you would teach courses that would naturally fall out of your areas of specialization and competence. Be prepared to explain what you think students should get out of a given course in order to motivate your teaching approach. Prepare elaborately for these mock interviews, as well as for the real one, and bring sample syllabi for a host of courses you are likely to be asked to teach.

At the mock interview, those mocking you should put on different hats, preferably trying to simulate folks who will indeed interview you. For that reason, wait to do this until early to middle December so it is likely that you will have started to hear from schools. Also, ask the mockers to be brutally frank with you. A lot of what goes wrong in interviews is easy to fix if you know about it in advance. It is easy to redo your “Spiel.” And, if you bite your thumb or scratch your rear end, this can easily be corrected once you know it. If you look distracted, you can sit up straight and then lean forward. If you look too intense or nervous, you can slide down in the chair and slump a little. If you look too buttoned-up, unbutton; if you look too laid-back, button-up, etc.

When you get interviews, go onto the departmental web site and look at the courses that would naturally fall into your specialization and competence. It is also a good idea to try to get a sense of what type of school it is. And if this is a “plum” job for you, you might want to read some things that people in the department, especially those in your area, have written.

At nearly every real interview, you will be asked if you have any questions for them, so make that part of the mock interview as well. If you don’t know this you can be flummoxed by this question—so have one or two questions, ideally based on your knowledge of the department and the curriculum, e.g.: “Are your 400 level courses only upper level undergraduate courses or are there both graduate students and undergraduate students in these courses?” Don’t be too provocative here and generally stay away from salary issues.

Very often you will be asked what your “next” project will be, now that you are nearing the end of your dissertation—you don’t have to have a super-detailed answer to this, but you should have some answer. Don’t try to make something up on the spur of the moment. A good strategy is to work up a project that spins off the dissertation, perhaps writing the chapter you never got to, or that is a natural follow-up to the dissertation. That way you can still talk about stuff you know something about.

9. WHAT TO WEAR

The best advice about what to wear is to wear what will make you comfortable. Men don’t need to wear a suit, nor do women. Jackets are pretty much required though. Don’t wear a loud tie or a loud scarf. You don’t want to be remembered later as that person with the weird thing on—much better to be remembered for what you said—the person who had a really interesting response to Smith’s hard question, for instance. Ties for men are not strictly required; but more men wear them than not, so... Women, as is true for men, can certainly wear pants, as long as they look professional, and indeed you might prefer them. In general, dress comfortably—the placement process will be uncomfortable enough as it is.

10. GENERAL CONVENTION ADVICE

If you can afford it, plan to spend two or three nights at the hotel where the convention occurs. And best not to have a roommate, unless it is someone you really trust. Things will be stressful enough without having anywhere to escape to (and watch cartoons, or the weather channel, or whatever relaxes you) between interviews. Also, for two of the evenings there will be receptions (still called “smokers” by most attendees, even though there hasn’t been any smoke or fire for many years) in the evening, often going on till late hours, and it is best not to have to navigate mass transit after midnight.

Generally, drink little if any alcohol during the convention. And try to stay away from folks who have been drinking and have interviewed you. Aside from this advice, though, there is nothing wrong with trying to find folks who interviewed you later in the day at the “smokers.” Many a job has been secured with an extra effort at finding and conversing with folks where you effectively get a second interview to only one for your competitors. Of course, don’t make a pest out of yourself. Look sheepish as you approach them, and ask if it is OK to continue the conversation that was begun earlier. Many departments make finding them at the smoker easy by reserving a table in the large hall where these events occur. When you enter the hall the APA will provide a list of the numbered tables that have been reserved by various departments. When departments have reserved a table they are signaling in part that they are encouraging candidates to stop by for a chat after the interview, so you should plan on coming by.

11. APRES CONVENTION

After the convention go back home and prepare a campus job talk. Better yet, you should have had such a talk already planned out in October. In any event, you should not delay doing this since you might get a call only a few days after the meetings asking you to fly out for a campus visit. Almost everyone wants either a formal or informal paper, and you should get one ready right away just in case. It is also a good idea to go over the convention with your placement director or mentor and see if follow-up e-mails might be warranted. Also try to set up a mock job talk—round up your friends and stray faculty members and make them sit down for an hour with you while you do a dress rehearsal.

If you get a job offer and still haven't heard from a school you prefer, call them up. Nothing is lost here. If they don't want you, and they have any manners at all, then they'll let you down gently. But the worst thing is if they do want you but are merely being slow and you don't give them enough notice about a deadline for another job.

12. LATE BREAKING JOBS AND PERSISTENCE

Keep yourself open to the possibility that nothing will happen as a result of the first round of job interviews. Keep sending out applications until you are sure you'll be employed. This is psychologically hard to do, but it is necessary. Many of our students have gotten jobs in the second or third round, after the competition has diminished a bit. Those jobs are no less desirable, often, than those that interview at the Eastern. And always remember, you don't have to stay in the same position forever.

As was briefly mentioned above, some jobs that are advertised in the Fall, and comparatively more advertised in the Spring, are not tenure-track but limited term appointments for a year or more. These jobs can be important stepping-stones to a good tenure-track job. While many if not most of these limited term positions are for sabbatical replacements and so not renewable, some can become gateways for permanent positions at the same institution. In addition, having letters of reference from members of a department who have gotten to know you as a colleague, rather than as a grad student, can be very valuable in helping you to land a tenure-track job.

It is also increasingly common for departments to advertise full time postdoctoral fellowships of one to three years. You might even consider looking for and taking one of these positions rather than initially seeking a tenure-track job. Most postdocs do not teach full loads and will allow you to build a strong record of publications. Helpful hint: Many postdoctoral positions are not advertised in *Jobs for Philosophers* when they are part of a college or university's on-going "society of fellows" program or part of an established research center. Those interested in such positions should consult the job listings in the *Chronicle of Higher Education* and individual university web-sites.

13. PROBLEMS

If problems (of harassment, intimidation, or general annoyance) occur, talk to the APA staff or to the ombudsperson for the meetings, normally a friendly member of the very APA committee that wrote this brochure, and hence someone who cares about you. It is simply unacceptable for any job candidate to be made to feel uncomfortable because of comments about physical appearance, and certainly about sex or race. There is no reason not to complain, and the members of our committee who attend every APA meeting will not treat such complaints lightly.

If you are disabled, your right to full access in every aspect of the placement process *ought* to be extended without question or repercussion, just as you should be able freely to disclose your disability status. The APA is now beginning to address these problems, as are many institutions. In the meantime, candidates must not hesitate to request necessary accommodations, yet still have to strategize about disclosure or access requests. At the campus visit stage, wheelchair-accessible spaces cannot be assumed, yet are probably one of the simpler accommodations for most institutions, which may not be prepared to provide interpreter services or assume the travel costs of assistants. Candidates should carefully think through how they will negotiate these issues. Currently, the APA will provide a quiet interview room for candidates or interviewers for whom the large common interviewing area is inaccessible for reasons of disability such as, but not limited to, deafness, hearing impairment, cognitive impairments, or speech impairments. Contact the placement service if you need this provision. Additional concerns related to access or ableist bias in the placement process may be taken up with the placement ombudsperson through the APA placement service.

PAPER SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

Online Paper Submissions: Papers may be submitted either electronically or in hard copy by mail. For electronic submissions, follow the instructions on the APA web site. For hard copy submissions, mail to: Lindsay Palkovitz, ATTN: [Eastern, Pacific, or Central] Division Papers, The American Philosophical Association, University of Delaware, 31 Amstel Avenue, Newark, DE 19716, (302) 831-4298. Papers in any area are welcome. All papers are blind reviewed. Author's name, institution, or references pertaining to the identity of the author should be omitted from the paper, abstract, notes, and bibliography. Submitted papers are not returned to authors. Papers not accepted by one Division may be re-submitted for consideration to another Division. In submitting papers, authors warrant that those papers are entirely their own work or the joint work of the authors identified in the cover letter, and that, where appropriate, acknowledgement of the contributions of others has been made.

Graduate Student Travel Stipends and Awards: Papers to be considered for Graduate Student Travel Stipends/Awards must meet the criteria specified by each Division. For more information, visit the following address: www.apa.udel.edu/apa/divisions/stipends.

GUIDELINES FOR ALL THREE DIVISIONS

(*Guidelines 6, 7, 9, and 10 only apply to authors who are submitting papers in hard copy.)

1. Authors must be members in good standing of the APA.
 2. 1 copy of the paper.
 3. 1 copy of the abstract.
 4. Colloquium papers are limited to 3,000 words.
 5. Abstracts for colloquium papers are limited to 150 words.
 - *6. Title or cover page, which must include: a) title; b) word counts for all papers and abstracts; c) author's contact information; d) the Division the paper is to be submitted for.
 - *7. Papers must be typed on one side of page, double spaced, 1-inch margins on all sides, all pages numbered, 10-12 pt. font.
 8. No more than one submission by the same author for the same Division will be considered.
 - *9. Indicate name of Division on outside lower left side of the envelope containing the paper.
 - *10. Include a self-addressed stamped envelope to the National Office if you wish the receipt of your paper to be acknowledged.
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11. Any paper which is under consideration for publication elsewhere will be considered, provided that it will not appear in print until after the Divisional meeting is held. If this is the case, indicate when and where the paper is expected to be published.
12. Papers are not accepted by e-mail.
13. Authors are advised to provide accurate email addresses as part of their contact information because they may be contacted by email, sometimes under urgent circumstances. Authors who expect to relocate between the date of submission and the date of the meeting should arrange for email forwarding, or else provide both current and new email addresses with their contact information.

EASTERN DIVISION:

Meeting is held December 27-30.

Selections are announced in May or June.

Papers accepted by either the Central Division or the Pacific Division may not be presented at any subsequent meeting of the Eastern Division.

Papers exceeding 3,000 words will not be considered as colloquium papers.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper.

Any paper submitted without an abstract will not be considered. Any paper whose abstract is deemed unacceptable by the Program Committee will not be accepted. No revised abstract submitted after the paper's acceptance will be published in the *Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association* without the approval of the Program Committee.

PACIFIC DIVISION:

Meeting is usually held at the end of March, but starting in 2009 will move to April.

Selections are announced in January.

A paper that has been on the Main Program at a past APA meeting (any division), or will be on the Main Program at a future Central or Eastern Division meeting, cannot be presented as a Main Program colloquium/symposium paper at the Pacific Division meeting.

Submissions for consideration as colloquium papers must not exceed 3,000 words.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper. (This will be considered a single submission.)

CENTRAL DIVISION:

Meeting has usually been held at the end of April, but starting in 2009 will be held in February.

Selections are announced in January, or before when possible.

Papers exceeding 3,000 words will not be considered as colloquium papers.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper.

The Central Division will not include a paper on its meeting program if that paper has already been presented or is scheduled for presentation on the Main Program of another APA Divisional meeting.

DRAFT MINUTES OF THE 2007 CENTRAL DIVISION BUSINESS MEETING

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
CENTRAL DIVISION
DRAFT MINUTES: 2007 BUSINESS MEETING

PALMER HOUSE HILTON HOTEL, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
WABASH PARLOR
FRIDAY, APRIL 20, 2007

1. **Call to Order.** President Ted Cohen called the meeting to order at 12:15 p.m. and appointed Larry May parliamentarian for the meeting.
2. **Approval of Minutes.** The draft Minutes of the 2006 meeting, as printed in *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA*, Vol. 80 #4 (February 2007), pp. 155-157, were approved without correction.
3. **Report on the 2007 Executive Committee Meeting.** Secretary-Treasurer Robin Smith reported on the actions of the 2007 Executive Committee. [See the draft Minutes of the 2007 Executive Committee meeting published immediately following these Minutes.]
4. **Report of the Nominating Committee.** Past President Eleonore Stump presented the Report of the 2006-2007 Nominating Committee, as printed in *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA*, Vol. 80 #4 (February 2007), p. 163. President Ted Cohen noted that the Division's Bylaws allow additional nominations to be added from the floor by any group of ten members present and asked if there were such nominations forthcoming. None were proposed. The list of nominees as prepared by the Nominating Committee is therefore to be sent to mail ballot.
5. **Reports from the Board of Officers, the National Office, APA Committees.**
6. **Recognition of Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winners.** President Karl Ameriks read the names of those who had received Graduate Student Travel Stipend Awards, as printed on pages 11-12 of the *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA*, Vol. 80 #4 (February 2007).
7. **New Business.** No items were introduced under New Business.
8. **Memorial.** President Ted Cohen read the names of those members of the Association who had died since the last meeting of the Central Division:

William H. Aiken, Jr.

R.E. Allen
Barbara Albertson
Henry A. Alexander
John Arthur
Norman Bernstein
Russell Blackwood
Helen M. Cartwright
Laurence L. Cassidy
Sibyl S. Cohen
Alan A. Cooley
James A. Diefenbeck *
Ellery Eells
Ned S. Garvin
Rob Gildert
Carl F.H. Henry
Thomas E. Hill, Sr.
Daniel Kading
Edwin G. Lawrence
Constance Leibowitz
Edward H. Madden
Don E. Marietta, Jr.
Richard V. Mason
Arthur R. Miller
D.Z. Phillips
Dale M. Riepe
James Rizik
Eugene E. Ryan
Ernest Schwarcz
Hubert R.G. Schwyzer
Hans Seigfried
Paul L. Shiman
Surjit Singh
John-Christian Smith VI
Timothy D. Sullivan
Eldon L. Stevens

Theodore E. Uehling, Jr.

Reinhard Ulrich

Allan B. Wolter

Iris M. Young

William Zaferson

* James A. Diefenbeck died in 7/05. The APA was notified 6/06.

9. Adjournment. The meeting was adjourned at 1:36 p.m.

Respectfully submitted,

Robin Smith, Secretary-Treasurer

APA Central Division

DRAFT MINUTES OF THE 2007 CENTRAL DIVISION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
CENTRAL DIVISION
DRAFT MINUTES OF THE 2007 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

PALMER HOUSE HILTON HOTEL, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
CRESTHILL ROOM
APRIL 18, 2007

Present: Members Charlotte Brown, Ted Cohen, Marilyn Friedman, Peter van Inwagen, Robin Smith, James P. Sterba, Eleonore Stump, Joan Weiner;
Visitor: Executive Director David Schrader

1. President Ted Cohen called the meeting to order at 7:15 p.m.
 2. Draft minutes of the 2006 meeting, as printed on pp. 159-161 of the February 2007 *APA Proceedings*, were approved as printed.
 3. The agenda for the meeting was approved.
 4. Executive Director David Schrader reported briefly on activities in the National Office during the preceding year. He said that the National Office expects to bring the APA's new electronic data system on-line July 1, 2007, and enumerated some of the advantages this would bring to the Association. He also mentioned his participation in the efforts of the National Humanities Alliance in working for increased support for the National Endowment for the Humanities. In response to questions about the capabilities of the new data system, he said that it would permit more effective tracking of such things as job statistics that are of interest to several APA committees, including the Committee on the Status of Women.
 5. Past President Eleonore Stump presented the report of the Nominating Committee (which is printed on pp. 163-164 of the February 2007 issue of the *APA Proceedings*). In discussion, Vice President James Sterba asked whether having two nominees for Vice President from the same university was an issue, recalling a similar case in a prior year when one nominee had withdrawn on discovering he was one of two nominees from his institution. The Executive Committee discussed the procedures for determining nominees. President Cohen moved
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the following:

“That the Nominating Committee distribute the list of nominees to all nominees as soon as that list is established,”

This was approved unanimously.

6. Secretary-Treasurer Robin Smith reported on the activities of the 2008 Program Committee, chaired by Ann Cudd (the members of the Program Committee are listed on p. 8 of this issue of the *Proceedings*).
7. Secretary-Treasurer Robin Smith presented the financial report for 2006-07 and the proposed budget for 2007-08. The report for 06-07, which is necessarily an estimate since income and expenses for the 2007 meeting will not be known until after the meeting, projects higher registration income but lower book exhibit income than budgeted, and anticipates a significant increase in audiovisual charges; overall, the projection for the current year is for income \$1,000 above the budget and expenses \$4,500 greater than budgeted.

The proposed budget for 2007-08 assumes income at 2007 levels, with an increase in exhibit income predicated on increasing the rate charged to exhibitors. Budgeted expenses are decreased because of lower anticipated program committee expenses and a lower budget for audiovisual expenses. The Executive Committee discussed the matter of audiovisual charges at length. Smith explained that most of the cost is labor charges, which are determined by union agreements affecting all hotels in the city and depend in part on the number of rooms using projection equipment simultaneously (an increase in requests for LCD projectors is the main factor behind the current year's increase). The Executive Committee agreed (1) that a deadline for audiovisual requests well in advance of the meeting should be established (four to six weeks), with requests after that date to be rejected except in unusual circumstances; (2) that all program participants should be made thoroughly aware of the high costs of audiovisual equipment, especially LCD projectors, and asked not to make such requests unless they are genuinely necessary for a presentation. The Executive Committee also endorsed Executive Director Schrader's proposal that the three Secretary-Treasurers work out common language to be added to the paper submission forms informing those who submit papers that electronic projection equipment is not provided automatically and that requests must be submitted by a specific deadline.

Past President Stump and Divisional Representative Friedman noted that the proposed budget contained incorrect figures for the Division's contributions to the PIKSI project. These will be corrected for the APA's annual audit.

8. The Executive Committee discussed at some length possible meeting sites for 2009 and beyond. Secretary-Treasurer Smith reported that dates in Chicago for 2010 were very likely not going to be available. As a result, the Executive Committee instructed the Secretary-Treasurer
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to proceed with developing a contract proposal with the Palmer House for 2009 and to explore contract possibilities for 2010 in Cincinnati, New Orleans, and St. Louis.

9. The Executive Committee approved the agenda for the Business Meeting as printed on pp. 147-149 of this issue of the *Proceedings*.
10. The meeting adjourned at 9:30 p.m.

Respectfully submitted,

Robin Smith

Secretary-Treasurer, APA Central Division

SUPPLEMENT TO THE MINUTES OF THE 2007 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

CHANGE OF MEETING DATES TO FEBRUARY

Following its 2007 meeting, the Executive Committee was presented with an offer from the Palmer House for a multi-year contract, at significantly reduced rates, if the Division moves its meeting dates to February. Such a change carries with it obvious costs, most prominently the difficulties of winter weather in northern locations such as Chicago, but it also brings significant benefits to the Division and to the APA, including reduced room rates, moving the Central Division farther from the Pacific Division's meeting times (a major issue for the National Office, which must staff both meetings), and avoidance of conflicts with Easter and Passover. After negotiating with the Palmer House and conducting an email poll on April 24 of all Central Division members for whom the APA had email addresses (80 percent of the total members), the Executive Committee decided by mail ballot to adopt this change of dates. Beginning in 2010, the contract institutionalizes the Central Division's past practice of meeting in Chicago in alternate years.

Below is the text of an email message sent to Central Division affiliates in May 2007 giving the background and details of this process.

The Executive Committee of the APA Central Division wishes to announce to members that it has approved a change of meeting time to late February for the years 2009 through 2012:

2009: Feb. 19-21, Chicago

2010: Feb. 18-20, Chicago

2011: Feb. 17-19, location to be determined

2012: Feb. 17-19, Chicago

2013: Feb. 17-19, location to be determined

In 2011 and 2013, our plan is to meet somewhere other than Chicago, yet to be determined (cities under consideration include Cincinnati, New Orleans, and St. Louis).

The Executive Committee made this decision because of (1) chronic problems with meeting rates at our current time of late April, (2) difficulties in avoiding conflicts with Pacific Division meetings and with the dates of Easter and Passover (which it is Divisional policy to avoid as meeting dates), and (3) substantial fiscal advantages in the move. A major incentive was an offer from the Palmer House Hilton in Chicago for a multi-year

contract providing substantial concessions to the Division, including: a lower room rate in 2009 than our rate for 2007; a graduate student room rate fixed at \$129 through 2012; and credits towards audiovisual costs and other meeting expenses totaling as much as \$20,000 per year. The Central Division has chronically had fiscal difficulties, and these incentives will help us to reverse that, which we must do if the Central Division meeting is to continue.

If the financial benefits of the change of dates measure up to our expectations, the Division expects to have annual surpluses, rather than annual deficits. While it would be unwise to plan for the spending of money we do not yet have, the Division's goal is not to accumulate cash but rather to use its revenues to support annual meetings and other activities that benefit our members. These could include increased graduate student travel stipends, other support for travel to meetings or services to members, the establishment of Divisional prizes in support of philosophy, or modifications of meeting registration fees.

Since the change of dates is a major departure from past practice, we conducted an email poll of Central Division members on this question between April 22 and April 28. This was an opinion poll, not a formal vote. Nevertheless, the results show strong support for the proposal. Messages were sent to all the 1601 Central Division members for whom the National Office has a recorded email address (this is over 80% of all Central Division members). The response was as follows:

Total CD members	1977 (according to APA National Office)
Messages sent	1601 (email addresses provided by National Office)
Responses:	
Yes	602 (86.9%)
No	87 (12.6%)
Undecided	4 (0.6%)
Total responses	693
Bad addresses, etc.	79 (estimated)

The total number of messages sent, 1601, was 80% of the total number of Central Division members. The total number of responses, 693, is much greater than the total number of votes in any of the last five APA Central presidential elections (2006: 338; 2005: 443; 2004: 481; 2003: 520; 2002: 443). The response was over 7 to 1 in favor of the change of dates.

The Executive Committee also discussed this change with the Chair and the Vice Chair of the Board of Officers and with the Executive Director of the Association, all of whom saw this as on balance a good idea. In general, the National Office has indicated strong support for this change and expects that it will not have a major impact on the operations of the Placement Service. Modifications will be needed in the schedule of publication of the APA Proceedings (most likely a December issue for the Central Division program instead of the current February issue), but again the National Office does not see any problem with this.

There are of course costs as well as benefits to this change, most prominently the elimination of a late-April job market meeting and the winter weather of February. In our opinion, neither consequence is sufficient to override the benefits of the change to the Division and the extremely strong sentiment of members in favor of the change.

There is no denying that a move to February will eliminate a placement opportunity for some departments. However, according to the National Office, the number of departments interviewing at the Central Division meeting has been declining steadily in recent years. This may be the result of changes in the way departments carry out searches, especially for late-opening positions. Consequently, this does not appear to us to be a sufficient reason alone for continuing to bear the costs of trying to run a meeting in April.

There is also no doubt that February is a colder month than April, but many academic organizations nevertheless do meet during winter months, including February, and in cities where February is cold, such as Chicago (the Modern Language Association's 2007 meeting, for example, is December 27-30 in Chicago). Winter weather does have an impact on air travel, but the same is true of spring weather, when thunderstorms and severe weather are actually more likely in the midwest.

The Executive Committee made a similar, though less substantial, decision in 2003, when we changed the deadline for submission of Colloquium papers from September 1 to July 1. The principal reason for making this change was to alleviate the problems caused for the National Office by having the deadlines for the Pacific and Central Divisions both fall on September 1. At the time, some members predicted that the July 1 deadline would prove to be unworkable: no one would submit a paper during the summer and program committees would be unable to work during the summer. In fact, none of these problems has materialized, and the switch to July 1 has been a clear success.

Finally, we should emphasize that this change is in the nature of a trial. While we believe that the benefits outweigh the costs, we will monitor the results, and especially the reactions of our members, carefully. If it turns out that February is not on the whole a good time to meet, then we can revise our plans for future years. Our expectation, however, is that this change will in the end be good for the Central Division and for the APA.

RESULTS OF THE 2007 APA CENTRAL DIVISION ELECTIONS

In the May-June 2007 Central Division mail ballot, the following Central Division members were elected to Divisional offices:

- Peter van Inwagen was elected Vice President for 2007-2008 (and thus President for 2008-2009).
 - Richard Kraut was elected Member-at-Large of the Executive Committee for the term 2007-2010.
 - Lisa Downing was elected Member-at-Large of the Executive Committee for the term 2007-2009, filling the balance of Peter van Inwagen's term.
 - Robin Smith was elected Secretary-Treasurer for the term 2007-2010.
 - Hugh J. McCann, Jr., Marya Schechtmann, Lisa Shabel, and Rachel Zuckert were elected to the 2007-2008 Nominating Committee).
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LIST OF BOOK EXHIBITORS

A complete list of book exhibitors will be available online (www.apaonline.org) and at the Central Division Meeting.

LIST OF ADVERTISERS

BANCROFT PRESS (A-179)

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-174)

DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-176)

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-164-165)

PARMENIDES PUBLISHING (A-175)

PENN STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-177)

PHILOSOPHY DOCUMENTATION CENTER (A-OUTSIDE BACK COVER)

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-180)

PROMETHEUS BOOKS (A-172-173)

ROUTLEDGE (A-166-167)

SUNY PRESS (A-INSIDE FRONT COVER)

THE MIT PRESS (A-178)

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS (A-168-170)

WADSWORTH, THOMSON (A-171)

APA REGISTRATION POLICY

It is the policy of the APA that all persons attending sessions, including those who are participating as speakers, commentators, or session chairs, are required to register for each meeting they attend. In addition, we have always recommended that all participants wear their APA badges during session hours to identify themselves as registered participants. In an effort better to enforce this policy we have begun a system of checking meeting attendees, randomly and anyone whom we suspect might not be registered, for proof of registration. If you are asked to provide proof of registration and are unable to do so, you will be asked to register immediately in order to enable you to attend sessions. Registration fees help subsidize every divisional meeting. Without that income we will be unable to ensure the quality and excellence of our meetings which you have come to expect. We thank you for your continued cooperation.

RESTAURANTS WITHIN A FIVE-MINUTE WALK

Price per entree: \$ = \$5-\$10 \$\$ = \$10-\$15
 \$\$\$ = \$15-\$25 \$\$\$\$ = \$25 and up

17 West at the Berghoff, 17 W. Adams (German) (\$\$) 427-6549 Exit State Street Door. Make a left. Walk a half block to Adams. Turn right on Adams. Berghoff is at the southeast corner of Dearborn and Adams. (Closed on Sundays)

Ada's Deli, 14 S. Wabash (Casual American) (\$) 214-4282 *Open late*. Exit Wabash St. Turn left and proceed one block on Wabash to 14 S. Wabash.

Atwood Café, 1 W. Washington (Continental) (\$\$) 368-1900 *Reservations accepted*. Exit State St. door. Make a right. Walk two blocks to Washington. The Atwood Café is located on the Southwest corner of State and Washington.

Beef & Brandy, 127 S. State (Diner) (\$) 372- 3451 *All day breakfast*. Exit State Street Door. Make a left. Beef and Brandy is next to the Palmer House Hilton.

Berghoff Cafe, 17 West Adams, downstairs (German) (\$) 427-6549 Exit State Street Door. Make a left. Walk a half block to Adams. Turn right on Adams. Berghoff is at the southeast corner of Dearborn and Adams. Self-service. Lunch only, 11:00-2:30, Monday-Friday.

Exchequer Pub, 226 S. Wabash (Pizza/Burgers/Ribs) (\$\$) 939-5633 *Reservations accepted*. Exit Wabash Door. Make a right. Walk two blocks on Wabash. Exchequer Pub is on the right side of Wabash.

Giordano's, 236 S. Wabash (Chicago-style Pizza) (\$\$) 939-4646 *No reservations accepted*. Exit Wabash Door. Make a right. Walk one block on Wabash. Giordano's is on the right side of Wabash.

Grillroom, 33 W. Monroe (Steaks/Seafood) (\$\$\$) 960-0000 *Reservations accepted*. Exit Monroe Door. Make a left. Walk one block and the Grillroom will be on left. Across from Shubert.

Heaven on Seven, 111 N. Wabash (Cajun) (\$) (cash only) 263-6443 **Breakfast/lunch only*. Exit Wabash Door. Make a left. Walk two and a half blocks. Heaven on Seven is on the right side of Wabash. (Closed on Sundays)

Italian Village, 71 W. Monroe (Italian) (\$\$-\$\$\$) 332-7005 *Reservations accepted*. Exit Monroe Door. Make a left. Walk one and a half blocks on Monroe. Italian Village is on the left side.

Miller's Pub, 134 S. Wabash (Burgers, Salads, Ribs) (\$\$) 645-5377 *Reservations accepted*. Exit Wabash Door. Make a right. Miller's Pub is next door to the Palmer House Hilton.

Nick's Fishmarket, 51 S. Clark (Seafood/Steaks) (\$\$\$\$) 621-0200 *Reservations requested*. Exit Monroe Door. Make a left. Walk two and a half blocks on Monroe to Clark. Make a right on Clark. Entrance is on the right. (Closed most Sundays)

Rhapsody, 65 E. Adams (American/European) (\$\$\$) 786-9911 *Reservations requested*. Exit Wabash Door. Make a right and go to Adams St. Make a left at Adams. Rhapsody is on the right side of Adams between Wabash and Michigan.

Russian Tea Time, 77 E. Adams (Russian/Vegetarian) 360-0000 *Reservations requested*. Exit Wabash Door. Make a right and go to Adams St. Make a left at Adams. Russian Tea Time is on your right in the middle of the block.

Trattoria #10, 10 N. Dearborn (Northern Italian) (\$\$\$) 984-1718 *Reservations requested*. Exit Monroe door. Make a left. Walk one and a half blocks on Monroe. At Dearborn, make a right. Walk one and a half blocks. Trattoria #10 is on the left side of Dearborn. (Closed on Sundays)

HOTEL DIAGRAMS



