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of The American Philosophical Association



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THE AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Pacific Division Program

The American Philosophical
Association
Pacific Division

Eighty-First
Annual Meeting



The Westin St. Francis
San Francisco, CA

April 3 - 8, 2007

Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association

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Each annual volume contains the programs for the meetings of the three Divisions; the membership list; Presidential Addresses; news of the Association, its Divisions and Committees, and announcements of interest to philosophers. Other items of interest to the community of philosophers may be included by decision of the Editor or the APA Board of Officers.

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All correspondence should be sent to the APA, 31 Amstel Avenue, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716, directed to the appropriate staff member as follows: Erin Shepherd for inquiries and publication copy concerning programs of the Divisional meetings, general issues of the *Proceedings*, announcements, awards to members and advertising; Janet Sample for membership information, address changes, and memorial minutes; and the Executive Director for letters to the editor.

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LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY-TREASURER

To All Members of the Association:

The Executive Committee of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association cordially invites you to attend the 81st annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division. The meeting will be held at the Westin St. Francis in San Francisco, California, from Wednesday, April 4 through Sunday morning, April 8, 2007.

I. MEETING LOCATION AND SPECIAL ATTRACTIONS

The APA Pacific Division will meet at the St. Francis Hotel on Union Square in the heart of San Francisco.

The hotel is located on Powell Street, between Post and Geary, facing Union Square. The address is 335 Powell Street, San Francisco, California 94102-1875; telephone is 415-397-7000; and fax is 415-774-0124. One of the handful of classic and historic deluxe hotels in San Francisco, the Westin St. Francis has its own cable-car stop and a view overlooking Union Square. The St. Francis is the site of the high-end restaurant Mina. Mina is a two-star Michelin restaurant and also is the *Wine Spectator's* pick for best San Francisco restaurant. Securing your reservation in advance is advised. Call 415-397-9222 (give name and dates of meeting for convention rates) or go to the Pacific Division page on the APA website for a hotel reservation form. The St. Francis remains a favorite stop for afternoon tea, and the lobby bar, The Onyx, expands the locations where philosophers can enjoy each other's conversations.

The hotel is within walking distance of Chinatown, the theater district, Yerba Buena Center, and the Museum of Modern Art, and of several smaller museums, as well as dozens of San Francisco's finest restaurants and the new Westfield Center, the largest mall in the U.S. West. (See restaurant and attractions list in this *Proceedings*.) North Beach is a few minutes ride away on the cable car that stops in front of the hotel.

For those of you who are museum goers, the Museum of Modern Art, within easy walking distance from the hotel, has a major exhibition of Picasso and his influence on American artists scheduled during the APA meeting dates. And a short ride on the bus from the corner in front of the hotel down Geary Street, or a one-station ride on BART (two blocks away down Powell Street) brings you to the Civic Center—featuring the Symphony, the Ballet, and the home of the Asian Art Museum. During the APA meeting dates, the Asian Art Museum has special exhibitions of the paintings, sculptures, and other objects of the princely state of Mewar in India and of Japanese baskets and sculptures. The newly rebuilt deYoung Museum in Golden Gate Park also

invites a visit, not the least in order to join the debate about its architecture. The Palace of the Legion of Honor's extensive European and sculpture collection, and its world famous print collection, are always worth a visit. In addition to these large museums, San Francisco has many small ones, including at least five within easy walking distance of the hotel. (See the list of San Francisco museums and galleries in this *Proceedings*.)

For those aspiring to ascend speedily to the heights, five glass elevators zip up the 32-story tower in the Westin St. Francis at 1,000 feet per minute. Get in, press the 32 button, and soar upwards at about one floor per second as Coit Tower, the Financial District, and the Bay Bridge rush into view. The downward plummet is even more thrilling, especially for those who dare to press themselves against the glass and look down as they hurtle toward Union Square. (If this description doesn't appeal to you, ask for one of the hotel's plentiful supply of lower floor rooms.)

Plan to spend some extra days in San Francisco. A list of museums, galleries, theaters, concert halls, restaurants, and clubs can be found in this *Proceedings*. If you are interested in taking a day trip to the Wine Country or Monterey, or heading for skiing in Tahoe, call the concierge at the St. Francis for booking advice.

Reservations - A hotel reservation form can be found on the Pacific Division page of the APA website, and in this issue of the *Proceedings*. Reservations can be made by calling 415-397-7000. We urge you to make your reservations very early to assure that you obtain the APA convention rate of \$179 for a single or double room.

2. TRAVEL INFORMATION

Driving: (Dial 511 for latest traffic information) -

From the South: Take 101 North to 4th St. exit onto Bryant St. Continue 1 block and turn left onto 3rd St., which becomes Kearny St. Cross the Market St. intersection at Geary and turn left onto Geary. The St. Francis auto entrance is on Geary, just past Union Square on your right.

From the North across the Bay Bridge:

Take 101 South to Fremont St. exit, turn left on Fremont, turn left on Howard, turn right on Third St., Third St. becomes Kearny St. Then follow instructions above.

From the North across the Golden Gate Bridge:

Exit Lombard St. Turn right onto Van Ness, and left onto Bush. At Powell (just at the corner or Union Square), turn right, then turn right at Geary to find hotel's auto entrance.

Parking: Parking in the garage under Union Square costs \$25 per day. Drive down Geary—nearly to Van Ness—and you can find garages with a flat \$10 fee, but it's a long walk back.

By Air: From San Francisco Airport, numerous shuttles will take you to the hotel door. Check to find the most competitive price (around \$15), but be sure to ask when the van will leave (some wait till they are full) and whether

they take you directly downtown to Union Square without many earlier stops. Here is a list of shuttles, with phone numbers: Advanced Airport Shuttle (650-504-6641), Airport Express (415-775-5121), American Airporter Shuttle (800-282-7758 or 415-202-0733), Bay Shuttle (415-564-3400), Lorrie's Airport Shuttle (415-334-9000), M & M Luxury Shuttle (415-552-3200), Pacific Airport Shuttle (415-681-6318), Peter's Airport Shuttle (650-577-8858), Quake City Shuttle (415-255-4899 or 415-621-2831), San Francisco City Shuttle (888-850-7878), and SuperShuttle (415-558-8500). SuperShuttle has wheelchair-accessible vans, but these should be reserved in advance.

Taxis will get you downtown much more quickly, with a fare running around \$37. San Francisco has many wheelchair-accessible taxis. At SFO, locate any taxi dispatcher outside the lower (baggage) level and ask for a wheelchair taxi. One will be called from the taxi waiting area and should roll up within 5 minutes; no pre-arrangement or prior reservation is necessary.

You can BART to town as well. The SFO BART station is located on the Departures/Ticketing Level (Level 3) of the International Terminal, on the Boarding Area G side of the terminal near the Berman Reflection Room. BART is also easily accessed from any terminal by riding SFO's AirTrain to the Garage G/BART Station stop. There is no charge to board AirTrain. Take BART to the Powell Street Station in San Francisco and walk two short blocks to Union Square. BART also provides a direct connection from SFO to Caltrain at the Millbrae station. BART is wheelchair accessible and all travel information is provided both by loudspeaker announcement and electric billboard.

From Oakland Airport, you also can BART to San Francisco by taking an AirBART shuttle to the Coliseum/Oakland Airport BART station, and then the subway to the Powell Street Station in San Francisco. As at San Francisco Airport, there are numerous shuttles to San Francisco.

In the City: The Powell Street Cable Car stops in front of the hotel. MUNI Buses 2, 3, 4, and 38 do so as well. Two short blocks away at Powell and Market, BART will take you to various parts of the City and to the East Bay (Oakland and Berkeley). For detailed information about public transportation in San Francisco, including transit maps, check <http://www.511.org/>. You also can dial 511 on landline phones and on most cell phones to obtain public transit information.

3. CONVENTION REGISTRATION

The registration fee is \$10.00 for student members, \$50.00 for regular members, and \$60.00 for non-members of the APA who wish to attend more than a single session. Special tickets for \$10.00 will be available to non-members who wish to attend a single session or one of the receptions. Only those who are registered or have purchased the limited number of extra tickets may attend the scheduled sessions or receptions. Please be sure to wear your convention badge at all times to identify yourself as a registered participant.

A Pre-Registration form is included in the back of this issue of the *Proceedings*. People who are not now members of the APA may take advantage of the

lower registration fee by becoming members. Membership forms are available from the National Office, online at www.apaonline.org, and also will be available at the Convention Registration desk.

Mini-conferences on Philosophy and Wine and on Models of God, each organized independently under the Pacific Division's mini-conference program, are included in this year's regular registration fee.

4. PLACEMENT SERVICE

Only APA members are eligible to use the Placement services. Appointing officers and applicants are urged to make preparations for their part in the placement operation in advance of the meeting.

5. PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

The Presidential Address will be delivered by President Calvin Normore at 6:30 p.m. on Friday, April 4. Vice President Nicholas Smith will introduce President Normore.

7. RECEPTIONS AND SPECIAL EVENTS

Wednesday

Early arrivers can enjoy a continental breakfast before the start of the mini-conferences, Wednesday morning, April 4, 7:15-8:00 a.m.

There will be a reception for all convention attendees on Wednesday afternoon, April 4, 5:15-7:00 p.m.

There will be a reception and tutored wine tasting on Wednesday afternoon, April 4, 6:00-8:00 p.m. (The wine-tasting may require a special fee.)

Thursday

The Romanell Lecture will be delivered by Louis Loeb on Thursday afternoon, April 5, 4:00-6:00 p.m. The title of the Romanell Lecture is "The Naturalisms of Hume and Reid."

There will be a reception hosted by the Pacific Division Executive Committee so that APA members can meet the new APA Director, David Schrader, on Thursday afternoon, April 5, 5:30-8:00 p.m.

The Annual Reception will take place on Thursday evening, April 5, 9:00 p.m.-Midnight.

Friday

The winner of the Jean Hampton Prize, Eric Roark, will read his award-winning colloquium paper, "Is Michael Otsuka's Conception of Robust Self-Ownership Too Robust for a Left-Libertarian?" on Friday afternoon, April 6, at 1:00 p.m. The Jean Hampton Prize is awarded every other year by the University of Arizona Philosophy Department and the Pacific Division Program Committee for the best paper submitted for the program in the late Jean Hampton's fields of philosophical interest by a philosopher at an early career stage.

The John Dewey Lecture will be delivered by Keith Lehrer on Friday afternoon, April 6, 4:00-5:30 p.m. The John Dewey Lecture offers a major

philosopher the occasion for personal reflection on a lifetime of work as a teacher and scholar.

The John Dewey Foundation invites all attendees to a reception on Friday, April 6, 5:30-6:30 p.m., following the John Dewey Lecture. The Pacific Division Executive Committee is deeply grateful to the Board of the Dewey Foundation for funding the new series of John Dewey Lectures that will take place at all of the APA Division meetings. The John Dewey Foundation supports activities that embody the interests and outlook of John Dewey.

The Presidential Reception will take place following the Presidential Address, at 7:30 p.m.

Saturday

The Berger Prize, awarded every other year by the APA Committee on Law and Philosophy in memory of Pacific Division member Fred Berger for the best article on law by an APA member published in the past two years, has been won by Mark Greenberg for his article, "How Facts Make Law." A session on this article will take place on Saturday, April 7, at 1:00 p.m.

The APA Committee on Philosophy and Law invites all attendees to a reception on Saturday afternoon, April 7, 4:00-6:00 p.m., following the Berger Prize Session.

Sunday

The Pacific Division Executive Committee invites all attendees and their children to an Easter Egg Hunt and Reception held in honor of our president, Calvin Normore, 8:00-10:00 a.m. on Easter morning. (If you are coming with your children, please contact Secretary-Treasurer Anita Silvers at asilvers@sfsu.edu before the meeting with children's names, ages, and information about any food allergies, so we can be sure to have appropriate goodies for your children to find on the Easter Egg hunt.)

9. MINI-CONFERENCES

The Pacific Division Mini-Conference Program has supported the following mini-conferences in conjunction with annual meetings:

2004: Global Justice

2005: Philosophy of the Emotions

2005: Richard Rufus of Cornwall

2006: Scientific Images

2006: Secrecy

2007: Models of God

2007: Philosophy and Wine

The programs for the 2007 mini-conferences are included in this *Proceedings*.

Members are invited to apply for mini-conference support for future meetings. An RFP for the Mini-Conference program is included in this *Proceedings*.

10. BUSINESS MEETING AND VOTING MEMBERSHIP

The annual Business Meeting will be held from Noon to 1:00 p.m. on Thursday, April 5. There will be reports from the Divisional and National Officers, and a report from the Ad Hoc Committee appointed to consider specific areas of divisional bylaw revision. The report of the Ad Hoc Committee is included in this *Proceedings*.

According to the Association's By-Laws, regular membership is given by an act of the Executive Director on behalf of the Board of Officers. Each year the list of regular members that appears in the November *Proceedings* is used as the list of eligible voters for the three subsequent Divisional business meetings.

11. REPORT OF THE PACIFIC DIVISION NOMINATING COMMITTEE

Steven Reynolds (Chair), Jacqueline Taylor, and Mark Wheeler served as the 2006/07 Nominating Committee. They have nominated the following APA Pacific Division members for terms beginning July 1, 2007:

For Vice-President: Nancy Cartwright

For Executive Committee: Stewart Cohen

Brief biographies of, and statements by, these Pacific Division members are included in this *Proceedings*.

12. 2007 PROGRAM COMMITTEE AND PROGRAM

The Program Committee which prepared this year's program consists of George F. Schueler (Chair), Richard Arneson, Andrew Askland, Mohammad Azadpur, Kelly Becker, Christina Bellon, Sylvia Berryman, Christopher Bobnich, Craig Callender, Joseph Campbell, Jonathan Cohen, Rebecca Copenhaver, Dana Nelkin, Branden Fitelson, Peter Graham, Patricia Hanna, Bruce Hunter, Paul Hurley, Shaun Nichols, Philip Nickel, Mary Rorty, Ryan Nichols, Amy Schmitter, Eric Schwitzgebel, Peter Thielke, Mark Timmons, Andrea Woody, and Mark Wrathall.

Principal papers in Colloquia and Symposia were selected after blind review of all submitted papers. Participants in Invited Paper, Invited Symposia, Author Meets Critics, and Workshop meetings were invited by the Program Committee. Participants in meetings arranged by APA Committees were selected by those Committees.

13. 2008 PROGRAM

The Program Committee for the 82nd Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, invites contributions for the 2008 meeting. The deadline for submission is September 1, 2007. Each author may make only one submission. Please indicate that the paper is submitted for the 2008 Pacific Division Meeting. Because the Program Committee will blind-review all submissions, the names of the author and her/his institution should not appear in the paper in any way that defeats the operation of blind-reviewing.

The 2008 Program Committee also welcomes suggestions for topics and/or speakers of invited sessions. Recommendations (including self-nominations) for commentators and session chairs also are encouraged. These all should be sent to the 2008 Program Chair, Mark Wrathall, at 4085 JFSB, P.O. Box 26279, Provo, UT 84602, or faxed to him at 801-422-9742, or emailed to him at Mark_Wrathall@byu.edu.

When volunteering someone other than yourself, please be sure your nominee is willing to participate in the program. Nominations should reach the program committee by September 1, 2008, at the latest, and should include a short account of the individual's areas of specialization and record of scholarship.

14. ACCOMMODATING MEMBERS WITH MULTIPLE CHEMICAL SENSITIVITIES

To provide a welcoming environment for members with multiple chemical sensitivities, all members are requested to refrain from wearing scented products.

On behalf of the Executive and Program Committees of the APA Pacific Division, I extend to every member of the American Philosophical Association a warm invitation to take part in our eighty-first Annual Meeting.

Cordially yours,

Anita Silvers, Secretary-Treasurer

for the Executive Committee

Pacific Division, American Philosophical Association:

Joan MacGregor (Chair)

Fred Schueler

Sharon Lloyd

Nicholas Smith

Janet Levin

Allen Wood

Jeffrie Murphy

Calvin Normore

PACIFIC DIVISION COMMITTEES, 2006-2007

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Joan MacGregor (Chair)	Anita Silvers
Janet Levin	Fred Schueler
Sharon Lloyd	Nicholas Smith
Jeffrie Murphy	Allen Wood
Calvin Normore	

PROGRAM COMMITTEE

Fred Schueler (Chair)	Patricia Hanna
Richard Arneson	Bruce Hunter
Andrew Askland	Paul Hurley
Mohammad Azadpur	Ryan Nichols
Kelly Becker	Shaun Nichols
Christina Bellon	Phillip Nickel
Sylvia Berryman	Mary Rorty
Christopher Bobonich	Amy Schmitter
Craig Callender	Eric Schwitzgebel
Joseph Campbell	Peter Thielke
Jonathan Cohen	Mark Timmons
Rebecca Copenhaver	Andrea Woody
Branden Fitelson	Mark Wrathall
Peter Graham	

NOMINATING COMMITTEE

Steven Reynolds (Chair)
Jacqueline Taylor
Mark Wheeler

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

PACIFIC DIVISION EIGHTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM

APRIL 4 - 8, 2007

WESTIN ST. FRANCIS HOTEL, SAN FRANCISCO

MINI-CONFERENCE PROGRAMS

Attendance at all mini-conference events is included in the APA convention registration fee, with the exception of the "Philosophy and Wine" wine-tasting (for which there is an additional fee).

MI - MINI-CONFERENCE ON MODELS OF GOD

Organizing Committee: Jeanine Diller (Chair), Philip Clayton, John Cobb, Edwin Curley, Andrew Dell'Olio, C. Stephen Layman, Parimal Patil, Samuel Ruhmkorff, Charles Taliaferro.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 4 AND THURSDAY, APRIL 4, 2007

WEDNESDAY MORNING, APRIL 4

CONTINENTAL BREAKFAST

7:15-8:00 a.m.

MI-1. Mini-Conference on Models of God

8:00-9:45 a.m.

Topic: Models of God

Chair: Jeanine Diller (Independent Scholar)

Speaker: Ted Peters (Pacific Lutheran Theological Seminary)
"Models of God"

Commentator: Jim Taylor (Westmont College)

- Speaker: Jeremy Hustwit (Claremont Graduate University)
 “Can Models of God Compete? Testing the Strength of
 Religion’s Language-Reality Ties”
- Commentator: Samuel Ruhmkorff (Simon’s Rock College of Bard)

MI-2. Mini-Conference on Models of God

10:00-11:45 a.m.

- Topic: Challenges to Prevailing Models
 Chair: Andrew Dell’Olio (Hope College)
- Speaker: Klaas Kraay (Ryerson University)
 “Divine Unsurpassability”
- Commentator: Kate Moran (University of Pennsylvania)
- Speaker: Pamela Sue Anderson (University of Oxford)
 “Feminist Conceptions of God: Exploring
 Transcendence, Immanence, and Goodness”
- Commentator: Charles Taliaferro (St. Olaf College)

WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, APRIL 4

MI-3. Mini-Conference on Models of God

12:45-2:15 p.m.

- Topic: Panel on Process Theism
 Chair: Jeremy Hustwit (Claremont Graduate University)
- Panelists: Monica A. Coleman (Lutheran School of Theology–
 Chicago)
 Dan Dombrowski (Seattle University)
 Donald Wayne Viney (Pittsburg State University)
- Commentator: Delwin Brown (Pacific School of Religion)

MI-4. Mini-Conference on Models of God

2:30-5:15 p.m.

- Topic: Extant Novel Models of God
 Chair: John Bishop (University of Auckland)
- Speaker: Nancy Hudson (California University of Pennsylvania)
 “Environmentalism and Nicholas of Cusa’s Model of
 God”
- Commentator: Robert Gall (West Liberty State College)
- Speakers: Ford Turrell (Nashville State Community College)
 Donald Turner (Nashville State Community College)
 “The Non-existent God: Transcendence, Humanity,
 and Ethics in Emmanuel Levinas”
- Commentator: Daniel Murphy (St. Anselm College)
- Speaker: David Bradshaw (University of Kentucky)
 “The Concept of the Divine Energies”
- Commentator: Dan Dombrowski (Seattle University)

**RECEPTION FOR “MODELS OF GOD” MINI-CONFERENCE (ALL REGISTERED
APA PACIFIC DIVISION ATTENDEES ARE WELCOME)**

5:15-7:00 p.m.

WEDNESDAY EVENING, APRIL 4

**MI-5. Joint Meeting of Mini-Conference on Models of God and the
Society of Christian Philosophers**

7:00-8:30 p.m.

Speaker: Dallas Willard (University of Southern California)
“Intentionality and the Substance of the Self”

Commentator: Brian Treanor (Loyola Marymount University)

Speaker: Paul Moser (Loyola University of Chicago)
“Forgiveness as Cognitively Significant”

Commentator: Pamela Hieronymi (University of California–Los
Angeles)

MI-6. Mini-Conference on Models of God Keynote Address

8:30-10:00 p.m.

Chair: Charles Taliaferro (St. Olaf College)

Speaker: Wesley Wildman (Boston University)
“Behind, Between, and Beyond Anthropomorphic
Models of Ultimate Reality”

Commentator: Andrew Dell’Olio (Hope College)

THURSDAY, APRIL 5, 2007

THURSDAY MORNING, APRIL 4

MI-7. Mini-Conference on Models of God

8:30-10:30 a.m.

Topic: Panel on Open Theism

Chair: Luke Gelas (University of Toronto)

Panelists: David Basinger (Roberts Wesleyan College)

Alan Rhoda (University of Nevada)

Richard Rice (Loma Linda University)

David Woodruff (Huntington University)

MI-8. Mini-Conference on Models of God

10:45 a.m.-12:15 p.m.

Topic: Panel on Panentheism

Chair: Emily Bennett (Claremont Graduate University)

Panelists: Stephen Palmquist (Stanford University and Hong
Kong Baptist University)

Dong-Sik Park (Claremont Graduate University)
 Jeanyne Slettom (Claremont Graduate University)
 Commentator: Philip Clayton (Claremont School of Theology)

THURSDAY AFTERNOON, APRIL 4

MI-9. Mini-Conference on Models of God Keynote Address

2:30-3:30 p.m.

Chair: Samuel Ruhmkorff (Simon's Rock College of Bard)
 Speaker: John Bishop (University of Auckland)
 "How a Modest Fideism May Constrain Concepts of
 God: A Christian Alternative to Classical Theism"
 Commentator: Jeanine Diller (Independent Scholar)

MI-10. Mini-Conference on Models of God

3:45-5:15 p.m.

Topic: Plenary Discussion
 Chair: Philip Clayton (Claremont School of Theology)

MII - MINI-CONFERENCE ON PHILOSOPHY AND WINE

Organizing Committee: Kent Bach (Chair), Charles Grau, Adrienne Lehrer,
 Barry C. Smith, David Sosa

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 4, 2007

WEDNESDAY MORNING, APRIL 4

MII-1. Mini-Conference on Philosophy and Wine

9:30-10:45 a.m.

Topic: Wine Perception
 Chair: Kent Bach (San Francisco State University)
 "Welcome: Philosophy and Wine?"
 Speaker: Ann Noble (University of California–Davis)
 "Wine: Consistency of Perception, Variation in
 Interpretation"

MII-2. Mini-Conference on Philosophy and Wine

10:55-11:55 a.m.

Topic: Philosophy of Wine Perception
 Chair: David Sosa (University of Texas–Austin)
 Speakers: Mohan Matthen (University of Toronto)
 "Do We Taste the Wine?"
 Barry C. Smith (University of London)
 "Just What Can You Taste in a Wine?"

MII-3. Mini-Conference on Philosophy and Wine*Noon-1:00 p.m.*

Topic: Analyzing and Categorizing Wines

Chair: Fritz Allhoff (Western Michigan University)

Speakers: Kevin W. Sweeney (University of Tampa)
 “Analytic Tasting and Enjoying a Wine Overall”
 Jonathan Cohen (University of California–San Diego)
 “Wine, Categories, and Wine Categories”

WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, APRIL 4**MII-4. Mini-Conference on Philosophy and Wine***2:30-3:30 p.m.*

Topic: Evaluating Wines

Chair: Robert May (University of California–Davis)

Speakers: John Bender (Ohio University)
 “What the Wine Critic Tells Us”
 Michael Jubien (University of Florida)
 “Real Value in Wine”

MII-5. Mini-Conference on Philosophy and Wine*3:40-4:40 p.m.*

Topic: Aesthetics of Wine

Chair: Frank Lewis (University of Southern California)

Speakers: Christopher Grau (Florida International University)
 Doug MacLean (University of North Carolina)
 “Can Wine Be Beautiful?”
 Adrienne Lehrer (University of Arizona) and Keith
 Lehrer (University of Arizona)
 “Wine, Aesthetics, and Critical Communication”

WEDNESDAY EARLY EVENING, APRIL 4**MII-6. Mini-Conference on Philosophy and Wine***4:50-5:50 p.m.*

Closing Panel

Chair: Kent Bach (San Francisco State University)

Panelists: Gerald Asher (*Gourmet Magazine*)
 Paul Draper (Ridge Vineyards)
 Randall Grahm (Bonny Doon Vineyards)
 Ann Noble (University of California–Davis)

RECEPTION AND TUTORED TASTING

6:00-8:00 p.m.

White wines: Rajat Parr (Restaurant Michael)

Red wines: Paul Draper (Ridge Vineyards)

Commentators: Gerald Asher (Gourmet Magazine)

Ann Noble (University of California–Davis)

There is a fee to cover wine and wine service. Space is limited. To reserve a place at the tasting, please register asap using this form:

2007 Wine Tasting Mini-Conference Registration Forms (HTML)

MAIN PROGRAM

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 4, 2007

“MODELS OF GOD” CONTINENTAL BREAKFAST

7:15-8:00 a.m.

REGISTRATION

11:00 a.m.-8:00 p.m.

PLACEMENT INFORMATION

11:00 a.m.-9:00 p.m.

RECEPTION FOR “FACES OF GOD” MINI-CONFERENCE (ALL REGISTERED APA PACIFIC DIVISION ATTENDEES ARE WELCOME)

5:15-7:00 p.m.

RECEPTION AND TUTORED WINE TASTING FOR “PHILOSOPHY AND WINE” MINI-CONFERENCE

6:00-8:00 p.m.

There is a fee to cover wine and wine service. Space is limited. To reserve a place, please write, after February 1 and before March 15, to Kent Bach at kbach@sfsu.edu.

WEDNESDAY MORNING, APRIL 4

SESSION I — 9:00 A.M.-NOON (MODELS OF GOD MINI-CONFERENCE BEGINS AT 8:00 A.M. AND CONTINUES UNTIL 11:45 P.M.; PHILOSOPHY AND WINE MINI-CONFERENCE BEGINS AT 9:30 A.M. AND CONTINUES UNTIL 1:00 P.M.)

I-A. Author-Meets-Critics: Andrew Melnyk, *A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism*

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Terry Horgan (University of Arizona)

Critics: Joseph Levine (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)
Daniel Stoljar (Australian National University)

Author: Andrew Melnyk (University of Missouri–Columbia)

I-B. Author-Meets-Critics: James B. Freeman, *Acceptable Premises: An Epistemic Approach to an Informal Logic Problem*

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Maurice Finocchiaro (University of Nevada–Las Vegas)

Critics: Richard Feldman (University of Rochester)
Hans V. Hansen (University of Windsor)
Mark Weinstein (Montclair State University)

Author: James B. Freeman (City University of New York–Hunter College)

I-C. Author-Meets-Critics: Warren Farrell and James P. Sterba, *Does Feminism Discriminate Against Men? A Debate*

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Laurie Shrage (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)

Critics: Tom Digby (Springfield College)
Ellen Klein (U.S. State Department)

Authors: Warren Farrell (Independent Scholar)
James P. Sterba (University of Notre Dame)

I-D. Invited Symposium: *Autonomy and Advance Directives*

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Dana Nelkin (University of California–San Diego)

Speakers: Dennis McKerlie (University of Calgary)
“Alzheimer’s Patients and Life-Extending Medical Treatment”

Agnieszka Jaworska (Stanford University)
“Vanishing Persons and the Authority of the Former Self: Dilemmas in Alzheimer’s Disease”

Commentators: Sara Goering (University of Washington)
Julie Tannenbaum (National Institutes of Health)

I-E. Colloquium: *Appearances*

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: James Messina (University of California–San Diego)

Speaker: Robert Schroer (Arkansas State University)
“How the Transparency of Visual Experience Impacts Inverted Earth”

Commentator: Gurpreet Rattan (University of Toronto)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Joseph Keim Campbell (Washington State University)

Speaker: Kranti Saran (Harvard University)
 “Illusions Without Contents?”

Commentator: Bennett Barr (University of Washington)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Tony Bezsylko (University of California–Berkeley)

Speaker: René Jagnow (University of Georgia)
 “Disappearing Appearances: A Critique of Alva Noë’s
 Approach to Spatial Perceptual Content”

Commentator: Bharath Vallabha (Harvard University)

I-F. Colloquium: Language and Logic

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Francis Jeffry Pelletier (Simon Fraser University)

Speaker: Bernhard Nickel (Harvard University)
 “Generics and Plural Quantification”

Commentator: Agustin Rayo (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Neil Tennant (Ohio State University)

Speaker: Glen Hoffmann (Ryerson University)
 “Truth, Superassertability, and Conceivability”

Commentator: Cory Wright (University of California–San Diego)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Michael Caie (University of California–Berkeley)

Speaker: Charles Hermes (Florida State University)
 “Dispositional and Counterfactual Logic”

Commentator: Kenny Easwaran (University of California–Berkeley)

I-G. Colloquium: Mental Content

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Matthew Lockard (University of California–Los Angeles)

Speaker: Daniel Weiskopf (University of South Florida)
 “Empiricism and the Vehicles of Thought”

Commentator: Steven Reynolds (Arizona State University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Jason Baehr (Loyola Marymount University)

Speaker: Jussi Haukioja (University of Turku)
 “Externalism and Conceptual Analysis”

Commentator: Sanford Goldberg (University of Kentucky)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Paul Audi (Colgate University)

Speaker: Jason Ford (University of Minnesota–Duluth)
“Tye-Dyed Teleology and the Inverted Spectrum”

Commentator: Michael Tye (University of Texas–Austin)

I-H. Colloquium: Political Philosophy

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Andrew Jason Cohen (Georgia State University)

Speaker: Kevin Vallier (University of Arizona)
“Liberalism and Economic Growth”

Commentator: Bruce Landesman (University of Utah)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: J. Jeremy Wisnewski (Hartwick College)

Speaker: Alistair M. Macleod (Queen’s University)
“Is Consistency in the Application of Unjust Laws a
Form of Justice?”

Commentator: Robert Talisse (Vanderbilt University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Rachel Fern (California Polytechnic State University)

Speaker: Jeff Gauthier (University of Portland)
“Sexual Coercion and the Problem of Preemptive
Consent”

Commentator: Alan Wertheimer (National Institutes of Health)

I-I. Colloquium: Preferences and Values

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Matthew Baxter-Parrott (University of California–
Berkeley)

Speaker: Mariam Thalos (University of Utah)
“Allais-like Preference Reversals Are Everywhere”

Commentator: Susan Vineberg (Wayne State University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Gregory Pence (University of Alabama–Birmingham)

Speaker: Chris Heathwood (University of Colorado–Boulder)
“Fitting Attitudes and Welfare”

Commentator: Bana Bashour (City University of New York–Graduate
School)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Charles Young (Claremont Graduate University)

- Speaker: Nicolas Espinoza (Royal Institute of Technology)
 “Margins of Error in Value Comparisons”
 Commentator: Don Fallis (University of Arizona)

I-J. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on Blacks in Philosophy

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: Angela Davis, *Abolition Democracy*

- Commentators: Angela Davis (University of California–Santa Cruz)
 Lewis R. Gordon (Temple University)
 Douglas Kellner (University of California–Los Angeles)
 Eduardo Mendieta (State University of New York–Stony Brook)

I-MI-1 and 2 Mini-Conference on Models of God

8:00-9:45 a.m.

Topic: Models of God

10:00-11:45 a.m., *Georgian Room*

Topic: Challenges to Prevailing Models

(See Mini-Conference Program for details.)

I-MII-1, 2, and 3 Mini-Conference on Philosophy and Wine

9:30-10:45 a.m.

Topic: Wine Perception

10:55-11:55 a.m.

Topic: Philosophy of Wine Perception

Noon-1:00 p.m.

Topic: Analyzing and Categorizing Wines

(See Mini-Conference Program for details.)

WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, APRIL 4

SESSION II — 1:00-4:00 P.M. (MODELS OF GOD MINI-CONFERENCE BEGINS AT 12:45 P.M. AND CONTINUES UNTIL 5:15 P.M.; PHILOSOPHY AND WINE MINI-CONFERENCE BEGINS AT 2:30 P.M. AND CONTINUES UNTIL 5:50 P.M.)

II-A. Author-Meets-Critics: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, *Moral Skepticisms*

1:00-4:00 p.m.

- Chair: Margaret Walker (Arizona State University)
 Critics: Garrett Cullity (University of Adelaide)
 James Dreier (Brown University)
 David McNaughton (Florida State University)
 Author: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Dartmouth College)

II-B. Author-Meets-Critics: Harvey Brown, *Physical Relativity: Space-time Structure from a Dynamical Perspective*

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Steven Savitt (University of British Columbia)

Critics: Richard Healey (University of Arizona)

Lawrence Sklar (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)

Christopher Smeenk (University of California–Los Angeles)

Author: Harvey Brown (Oxford University)

II-C. Author-Meets-Critics: Hud Hudson, *The Metaphysics of Hyperspace*

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Kris McDaniel (Syracuse University)

Critics: Mark Heller (Syracuse University)

Josh Parsons (University of Otago)

Michael Rea (University of Notre Dame)

Author: Hud Hudson (Western Washington University)

II-D. Invited Symposium: Correspondence Theory of Truth

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Bruce Hunter (University of Alberta)

Speakers: Richard Fumerton (University of Iowa)

Andrew Newman (University of Nebraska–Omaha)

Gerald Vision (Temple University)

II-E. Invited Symposium: Demystifying Social Construction

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Steve Downes (University of Utah)

Speakers: Sally Haslanger (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

“Constructing the Social: Practices, Categories, Kinds”

Ron Mallon (University of Utah)

“Making Up Your Mind and Explaining Yourself: Social Construction and Human Kinds”

Alison Wylie (University of Washington)

“What Knowers Know Well: Identity Constructs, Social Location, and Standpoint Epistemology”

II-F. Invited Symposium: Descartes’s Metaphysics of Substance

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Alice Sowaal (San Francisco State University)

Speakers: Alan Nelson (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

“Attributes and the Perception of Substance”

Dan Kaufman (University of Colorado–Boulder)
 “Descartes’s Corporeal Substances: Annihilation,
 Separability, and Real Distinctions”

Commentator: Jorge Secada (University of Virginia)

II-G. Invited Symposium: Expanding Epistemology

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Jason Kawall (Colgate University)

Speakers: Guy Axtell (University of Nevada–Reno)
 “Expanding Epistemology: A Responsibility
 Approach”

Michael Williams (Johns Hopkins University)
 “Epistemology after Skepticism”

Robert Brandom (University of Pittsburgh)
 “On Knowing How and Knowing That”

Commentator: Miranda Fricker (Birkbeck College London)

II-H. Colloquium: Ethics

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Chair: Christian Coseru (College of Charleston)

Speaker: Anthony Rudd (St. Olaf College)
 “Narrative Unity: A Defence”

Commentator: John Davenport (Fordham University)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Pamela Hood (San Francisco State University)

Speaker: Michelle Maiese (Emmanuel College)
 “The Role of Emotion in Decision and Moral
 Evaluation”

Commentator: Svetlana Beggs (University of California–Riverside)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Nadeem J. Z. Hussain (Stanford University)

Speaker: Eric Moore (Longwood University)
 “Getting a Clue about Consequences: Counterfactual
 Semantics, Agent Ability, and the Epistemic Objection”

Commentator: Mark Schroeder (University of Southern California)

II-I. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on International Cooperation

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Topic: Philosophy in India: Metaethics

Chair: Arthur Falk (Western Michigan University)

Speakers: Ramesh C. Pradhan (University of Hyderabad)
 “How to Be a Moral Objectivist”

- Sharad Deshpande (University of Pune)
 “Is Indian Ethics Autonomous?”
- Bijoy Boruah (Indian Institute of Technology–Kanpur)
 “Moral Agency and Nominal Individuality”
- Commentators: Fritz Allhoff (Western Michigan University)
 Karin Brown (San Jose State University)
 William McBride (Purdue University)

II-MI-3 and 4. Mini-Conference on Models of God

12:45-2:15 p.m.

Topic: Panel on Process Theism

2:30-5:15 p.m.

Topic: Extant Novel Models of God

(See Mini-Conference Program for details.)

II-MII-4, 5, and 6. Mini-Conference on Philosophy and Wine

2:30-3:30 p.m.

Topic: Evaluating Wines

3:40-4:40 p.m.

Topic: Aesthetics of Wine

4:50-5:50 p.m.

Closing Panel

(See Mini-Conference Program for details.)

WEDNESDAY EARLY EVENING, APRIL 4

SESSION III — 4:00-6:00 P.M.

III-A. Author-Meets-Critics: David Levy and Sandra Peart, *The ‘Vanity of the Philosopher’*

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Brian Berkey (University of California–Berkeley)

Critics: Nicholas Capaldi (Loyola University–New Orleans)
 Andrew Terjesen (Washington and Lee University)

Authors: David Levy (George Mason University)
 Sandra Peart (Baldwin-Wallace College)

III-B. Author-Meets-Critics: Eric Olson, *The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology*

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Raymond Martin (Union College)

Critics: Lynne Rudder Baker (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)
 Ned Markosian (Western Washington University)

Dean Zimmerman (Rutgers University)
 Author: Eric Olson (University of Sheffield)

III-C. Invited Symposium: Situationism, Freedom, and Responsibility

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Sharon Skare (University of California–San Diego)
 Speakers: Dominic Murphy (California Institute of Technology)
 “From My Lai to Abu Ghraib: Atrocity, Normative Competence, and Excusing Conditions”
 Manuel Vargas (University of San Francisco)
 “Situationism and Blame”
 Commentators: Christian Miller (Wake Forest University)
 Matt Talbert (University of California–San Diego)

III-D. Colloquium: Personhood

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.

Chair: Carol Bayley (Catholic Healthcare West)
 Speaker: Timothy Mosteller (California Baptist University)
 “Teleology and Embryonic Personhood”
 Commentator: Kenneth Kipnis (University of Hawaii–Manoa)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Leslie Francis (University of Utah)
 Speaker: Melissa Yates (Northwestern University)
 “The Underdetermination of Political Conceptions of Personhood”
 Commentator: Gerald D. Doppelt (University of California–San Diego)

III-E. Colloquium: Philosophy of Art

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.

Chair: Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley (California State University–Bakersfield)
 Speaker: Anna Bergqvist (University of Reading)
 “Sibley and Defeasible Reasons: Holism about Reasons in Aesthetic Evaluations”
 Commentator: J. M. Fritzman (Lewis and Clark College)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Dominic McIver Lopes (University of British Columbia)
 Speaker: Alessandro Pignocchi (Institut Jean Nicod)
 “Motor Perception: A Third Way to Perceive Pictures?”
 Commentator: Tiger Roholt (Columbia University)

III-F. Colloquium: Philosophy of Religion*4:00-6:00 p.m.**4:00-5:00 p.m.*

Chair: Daniel Murphy (St. Anselm College)

Speaker: Glen Pettigrove (Massey University)
"The Paradox of Divine Forgiveness"

Commentator: Chris Callaway (Westmont College)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Benjamin Crowe (University of Utah)

Speaker: Klaas Kraay (Ryerson University)
"Why Theism Requires a Multiverse (And Why It Is
the Best of All Possible Worlds)"

Commentator: Adam Atchison (Claremont Graduate University)

III-G. Colloquium: Political Philosophy*4:00-6:00 p.m.**4:00-5:00 p.m.*Chair: Vijay Mascarenhas (Metropolitan State College of
Denver)Speaker: Waheed Hussain (University of Pennsylvania)
"A Challenge to Pettit's Republican Theory of Freedom"

Commentator: Mark Redhead (California State University–Fullerton)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Michael Strawser (University of Central Florida)

Speaker: Brian Thomas (University of North Carolina–Chapel
Hill)
"Clearing a Path Towards a Critical Theory of Social
Identity"

Commentator: Kenneth Faber (Vanderbilt University)

III-H. Symposium: Agency and Causation*4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Rebekah Rice (Whitworth College)

Speaker: Carolina Sartorio (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
"Omissions: An Exclusion Problem for Causalism"Commentators: Randolph Clarke (Florida State University)
Christopher Hitchcock (California Institute of
Technology)**III-I. Symposium: Hegel and Punishment***4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Andy Wallace (Sonoma State University)

Speaker: Christopher Yeomans (Kenyon College)
"Hegel on Retribution and Punishment"

Commentators: Michael Hardimon (University of California–San Diego)
Allen Wood (Stanford University)

III-J. Symposium: Know-how and Concept Possession

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Phyllis Rooney (Oakland University)

Speakers: John T. Bengson (University of Texas–Austin)
Marc Moffett (University of Wyoming)
“Know-how and Concept Possession”

Commentators: Kevin Falvey (University of California–Santa Barbara)
Aaron Zimmerman (University of California–Santa Barbara)

III-K. Symposium: Stem Cell Research and Abortion

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Cathy Gere (University of Chicago)

Speaker: Marin Gillis (University of Nevada–Reno)
“Parallels between the Ethics of Embryonic Stem Cell Research and Abortion”

Commentators: Rosamond Rhodes (Mount Sinai School of Medicine and City University of New York–Graduate Center)
Mary Anne Warren (Independent Scholar)

III-L. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Topic: Teaching Ethics

Chair: Daniel Palmer (Kent State University)

Speakers: Nina Rosenstand (San Diego Mesa College)
“Courage and Cowardice in Fact and Fiction: Talking about Values with College Students”
Harold Weiss (Northampton Community College)
“Teaching and Learning about Suicide in Undergraduate Philosophy Courses”

RECEPTION FOR “MODELS OF GOD” MINI-CONFERENCE (ALL REGISTERED APA PACIFIC DIVISION ATTENDEES ARE WELCOME)

5:15-7:00 p.m.

RECEPTION AND TUTORED WINE TASTING FOR “PHILOSOPHY AND WINE” MINI-CONFERENCE

6:00-8:00 p.m.

There is a fee to cover wine and wine service. Space is limited. To reserve a place at the tasting, please register asap using this form:

2007 Wine Tasting Mini-Conference Registration Forms (HTML)

GROUP MEETINGS, 6:00-8:00 P.M.

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy, Session 1

Society for Phenomenology and Analytic Philosophy

GROUP MEETINGS, 6:00-9:00 P.M.

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

Radical Philosophy Association, Session 1

Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy

Society for German Idealism, Session 1

Society for Iberian and Latin American Thought

Society for Realist/Antirealist Discussion, Session 1

Society for Student Philosophers, Session 1

Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 1

Western Phenomenology Conference

GROUP MEETING, 7:00-8:30 P.M.

Joint Meeting of Mini-Conference on Models of God and the Society of Christian Philosophers

GROUP MEETINGS, 8:00-10:00 P.M.

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

North American Wittgenstein Society, Session 1

THURSDAY, APRIL 5, 2007**PLACEMENT INFORMATION**

8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m.

PLACEMENT INTERVIEWING

8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m.

REGISTRATION

8:30 a.m.-8:00 p.m.

BOOK DISPLAYS

11:00 a.m.-5:30 p.m.

ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING

Noon-1:00 p.m.

RECEPTION TO WELCOME NEW APA EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

(All registered Pacific Division Meeting attendees are invited)

5:30-8:00 p.m.

ANNUAL RECEPTION

9:00-12:00 p.m.

THURSDAY MORNING, APRIL 5**SESSION IV — 9:00 A.M.-NOON (MODELS OF GOD MINI-CONFERENCE
BEGINS AT 8:30 A.M. AND CONTINUES UNTIL 12:15 P.M.)****IV-A. Author-Meets-Critics: Alvin Goldman, *Simulating Minds: The
Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading***

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Jonathan Ellis (University of California–Santa Cruz)

Critics: Alison Gopnik (University of California–Berkeley)

Christopher Hill (Brown University)

Susan L. Hurley (University of Bristol and All Souls
College)

Author: Alvin Goldman (Rutgers University)

**IV-B. Special Memorial Session: Ellery Eells: Gentleman and
Scholar**

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Malcolm Forster (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

Speakers: Charles Chihara (University of California–Berkeley)

“Eells and Inductive Support”

Brian Skyrms (University of California–Irvine)

“Eells on Rational Decision and Deliberation”

Christopher Hitchcock (California Institute of
Technology)

“Eells’s Views on Probabilistic Causation”

**IV-C. Invited Symposium: Knowledge and Science in Later
Medieval Philosophy**

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Michael Rota (University of St. Thomas–Minnesota)

Speakers: Scott MacDonald (Cornell University)

“Grosseteste and Aristotelian Science”

Martin Pickave (University of Toronto)

“Late Medieval Debates about the Scientific Status of
Metaphysics”

Robert Pasnau (University of Colorado–Boulder)

“Medieval Scientia and Early Modern Science”

IV-D. Invited Symposium: The Philosophy of Jaakko Hintikka*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Patrick Suppes (Stanford University)

Speakers: John Perry (Stanford University)

"Hintikka on Demonstratives"

Vincent F. Hendricks (Roskilde Universitetscenter)

Ernest LePore (Rutgers University)

"Information and Epistemology"

Judson Webb (Boston University)

"The Philosophy of Jaakko Hintikka"

Commentator: Jaakko Hintikka (Boston University)

IV-E. Colloquium: Early Modern Philosophy*9:00 a.m.-Noon**9:00-10:00 a.m.*

Chair: Talia Bettcher (California State University–Los Angeles)

Speaker: Matthew J. Kisner (University of South Carolina)

"Spinoza on the Intelligence of the Passions"

Commentator: Michael LeBuffe (Texas A&M University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Jennifer Smalligan (University of California–Berkeley)

Speaker: Donald L.M. Baxter (University of Connecticut)

"Hume, Distinctions of Reason, and Differential Resemblance"

Commentator: Lorne Falkenstein (University of Western Ontario)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Ginger Clausen (University of Texas–Austin)

Speaker: Georges Dicker (State University of New York–Brockport)

"Anti-Berkeley"

Commentator: Patrick Kenny (University of Rochester)

IV-F. Colloquium: Freedom and Responsibility*9:00 a.m.-Noon**9:00-10:00 a.m.*

Chair: Kenneth Lucey (University of Nevada–Reno)

Speaker: E. J. Coffman (University of Notre Dame)

"Luck and Standard Libertarianism"

Commentator: Neil Levy (University of Melbourne)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: David DeMoss (Pacific University)

Speakers: Felipe Leon (University of California–Riverside)

Neal A. Tognazzini (University of California–Riverside)
 “Why Frankfurt-Examples Don’t Need to Succeed to Succeed”

Commentator: Kevin Timpe (University of San Diego)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Mark Brasher (TransPacific Hawaii College)

Speaker: Frank Hindriks (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen)
 “The Freedom of Collective Agents”

Commentator: David K. Chan (University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point)

IV-G. Colloquium: Philosophy and Biology

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Nathan Westbrook (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: Sean Hermanson (Florida International University)
 “Blindsight in Monkeys, Lost and Perhaps Found”

Commentator: Teed Rockwell (Sonoma State University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Bonnie Paller (California State University–Northridge)

Speakers: Andre Ariew (University of Missouri–Columbia)
 Zachary J. Ernst (University of Missouri–Columbia)
 “Why Fitness Is Not a Propensity”

Commentator: Christopher Stephens (University of British Columbia)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Martin Thomson-Jones (Oberlin College)

Speaker: William A. Rottschaefer (Lewis and Clark College)
 “Are There Any Biological Explanations in
 Experimental Biology? Marcel Weber’s Account of
 Heteronomous Explanation in Experimental Biology”

Commentator: Matt Haber (University of Utah)

IV-H. Colloquium: Philosophy of Science

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Tarun Menon (University of California–San Diego)

Speaker: Bradford Skow (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)
 “Two Arguments Against the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis
 Theory”

Commentator: John Halpin (Oakland University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Ioan Muntean (University of California–San Diego)

Speaker: Andrew Wayne (University of Guelph)
 “Singular Limits, Explanation, and Emergence in
 Physics”

Commentator: Patrick McGivern (University of Alberta)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Shannon Vallor (Santa Clara University)

Speaker: K. Brad Wray (State University of New York–Oswego)
 “The Real Value of Prediction”

Commentator: David Harker (East Tennessee State University)

IV-I. Colloquium: Practical Reason

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: David Hunter (Ryerson University)

Speaker: Patricia Marino (University of Waterloo)
 “On Essentially Conflicting Desires”

Commentator: Timothy Schroeder (Ohio State University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Alan Goldman (College of William and Mary)

Speaker: Joshua Gert (Florida State University)
 “Generalism about Practical Reasons: A Defense
 from the Analogy with the Epistemic”

Commentator: Jacob Ross (University of Southern California)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Benjamin Vilhauer (William Paterson University)

Speaker: Jennifer Morton (Stanford University)
 “Practical Reasoning and the Varieties of Agency”

Commentator: Andrei Buckareff (Franklin and Marshall College)

IV-J. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on International Cooperation

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: Political Reconciliation and Transitional Justice

Speakers: Larry May (Washington University in St. Louis)
 “Genocide and Reconciliation with the Past”

Darrel Moellendorf (San Diego State University)
 “Reconciliation as a Political Value”

Daniel Herwitz (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)
 “Speaking of Reconciliation”

IV-K. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: Chinese Philosophy of Religion

Chair: Xiaomei Yang (Temple University)

Speakers: Philip J. Ivanhoe (City University of Hong Kong)
 “Heaven as a Source for Ethical Warrant in Early Confucianism”

Yang Xiao (Kenyon College)

“The Justifications and Sources of Ritual Action in the *Mozi* and the *Mencius*”

Erin Cline (University of Oregon)

“The Way, the Right, and the Good”

MI-7 and 8. Mini-Conference on Models of God

8:30-10:30 a.m.

Topic: Panel on Open Theism

10:45 a.m.-12:15 p.m.

Topic: Panel on Pantheism

(See Mini-Conference Program for details)

ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING

Noon-1:00 p.m.

THURSDAY AFTERNOON, APRIL 5

SESSION V — 1:00-4:00 P.M. (MODELS OF GOD MINI-CONFERENCE BEGINS AT 2:00 P.M. AND CONTINUES UNTIL 5:15 P.M.)

V-A. Author-Meets-Critics: Andrews Reath, *Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory: Selected Essays*

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Mark Timmons (University of Arizona)

Critics: Thomas Hill (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

Samuel Kerstein (University of Maryland–College Park)

Jens Timmermann (University of St. Andrews)

Author: Andrews Reath (University of California–Riverside)

V-B. Author-Meets-Critics: Graham Priest, *Doubt Truth to Be a Liar; In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent*

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Jeffrey Roland (Louisiana State University)

- Critics: JC Beall (University of Connecticut)
 Otávio Bueno (University of Miami)
 Hartry Field (New York University)
- Author: Graham Priest (University of Melbourne and
 University of St. Andrews)

V-C. Author-Meets-Critics: Frederick Beiser, *Schiller as Philosopher*

1:00-4:00 p.m.

- Chair: Ryan Hickerson (Western Oregon University)
- Critics: Anne Margaret Baxley (Washington University in St. Louis)
 Stephen Houlgate (Warwick University)
 Douglas Moggach (University of Ottawa)
- Author: Frederick Beiser (Syracuse University)

V-D. Author-Meets-Critics: Peter Carruthers, *The Architecture of the Mind: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought*

1:00-4:00 p.m.

- Chair: William P. Seeley (Franklin and Marshall College)
- Critics: Fiona Cowie (California Institute of Technology)
 Edouard Machery (University of Pittsburgh)
 Robert A. Wilson (University of Alberta)
- Author: Peter Carruthers (University of Maryland–College Park)

V-E. Invited Symposium: Kripke and After: Modal Arguments Against Materialism

1:00-4:00 p.m.

- Chair: Peter Kung (Pomona College)
- Speakers: David Papineau (King's College London)
 "Kripke's Argument is Ad Hominem, not Two-Dimensional"
 Alex Byrne (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
 "Possibility and Imagination"
 Stephen Yablo (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
 "Unexplained Modal Illusions"
- Commentator: Tyler Doggett (University of Vermont)

V-F. Colloquium: Ancient Philosophy

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

- Chair: James Butler (Berea College)

Speaker: Beverly Hinton (West Virginia University)
 “On Matter and Two Models of Change in Aristotle’s
Physics A”

Commentator: Casey Perin (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Mark McPherran (Simon Fraser University)

Speaker: Richard Mohr (University of Illinois–Urbana-
 Champaign)

“Some Identity Statements in Plato: An Old Puzzle in
 the *Sophist* and a New Sense of ‘To Be’”

Commentator: Dorothea Frede (University of California–Berkeley)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Antonio Chu (Metropolitan State College of Denver)

Speaker: Philip Corkum (University of Alberta)

“Aristotle on Mathematical Existence”

Commentator: John Mouracade (University of Alaska–Anchorage)

V-G. Colloquium: Bioethics

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Chair: Michelle Sandell (California State University–
 Sacramento)

Speaker: Ben Eggleston (University of Kansas)

“Genetic Discrimination in Health Insurance: An
 Ethical and Economic Analysis”

Commentator: Paul Menzel (Pacific Lutheran University)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Dawson Schultz (Gonzaga University)

Speaker: Richard Dees (University of Rochester)

“Better Brains, Better Selves? The Ethics of
 Neuroenhancements”

Commentator: James L. Nelson (Michigan State University)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Alison Jaggar (University of Colorado–Boulder)

Speaker: Suze Berkhout (University of British Columbia)

“Relational Autonomy and Human Capabilities”

Commentator: Jan Narveson (University of Waterloo)

V-H. Colloquium: Epistemology

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Chair: Hollibert Phillips (Whitman College)

Speaker: William S. Larkin (Southern Illinois University–
Edwardsville)

“Knowledge, Assertion, and Risk”

Commentator: Joseph Shieber (Lafayette College)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: David Boersema (Pacific University)

Speaker: Jamie Phillips (Clarion University)

“What Can a Drunk Really Know? Solving a Puzzle for
Pragmatism”

Commentator: Simon Evnine (University of Miami)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Isidora Stojanovic (Institut Jean Nicod)

Speaker: Heimir Geirsson (Iowa State University)

“Acquaintance and De Re Belief”

Commentator: Bernard Linsky (University of Alberta)

V-I. Colloquium: Kant

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Chair: Daniel Considine (University of Southern California)

Speaker: Steven M. Bayne (Fairfield University)

“Kant’s Critique of Leibniz on the Distinction
between Sensible and Intellectual Representations”

Commentator: Lucy Allais (University of Sussex)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Marc Bobro (Santa Barbara City College)

Speaker: Corey Dyck (Boston College)

“Connubium Rationis et Experientiae: Christian Wolff
on the Relation Between Empirical and Rational
Psychology”

Commentator: Brian Chance (University of Pennsylvania)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Samuel Henry (University of Chicago)

Speaker: Aaron Bunch (Washington State University)

“What Kant Means by ‘Objective Reality’ and Its
Bearing on the Transcendental Deductions”

Commentator: Katherine Dunlop (Stanford University)

V-J. Colloquium: Philosophy of Language

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Chair: Asta Sveinsdottir (San Francisco State University)

Speaker: Allan J. Hazlett (Brown University)

“The Myth of Factive Verbs”

Commentator: John Woods (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Chris Tillman (University of Manitoba)

Speaker: Jonathan M. Schaffer (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)

“The Least Discerning and Most Promiscuous Truthmaker”

Commentator: Ross Cameron (University of Leeds)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Charles Siewert (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: Ulrich Meyer (Colgate University)

“Modal Property Comprehension”

Commentator: Chris Swoyer (University of Oklahoma)

V-K. Colloquium: Philosophy of Science

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Chair: Alexandre V. Korolev (University of British Columbia)

Speaker: Angela Potochnik (Stanford University)

“Generality, Complexity, and Approaches to Explanation”

Commentator: Andrew Hamilton (Arizona State University)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Craig Callender (University of California–San Diego)

Speaker: Jill North (Yale University)

“The ‘Structure’ of Physics: A Case Study”

Commentator: Oliver Davis Johns (San Francisco State University)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Sharon Crasnow (Riverside Community College)

Speaker: Barry M. Ward (University of Arkansas–Fayetteville)

“Taking the Raven Paradox with a Grain of Salt”

Commentator: Greg Frost-Arnold (University of Nevada–Las Vegas)

VI-MI-9 and 10. Mini-Conference on Models of God

2:00-3:30 p.m.

Keynote Address: John Bishop (University of Auckland)

“How a Modest Fideism May Constrain Concepts of God: A Christian Alternative to Classical Theism”

3:45-5:15 p.m., Georgian Room

Topic: Plenary Discussion

THURSDAY EARLY EVENING, APRIL 5

SESSION VI — 4:00-6:00 P.M.

VI-A. Author-Meets-Critics: James A. Harris, *Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy*

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Rebecca Copenhaver (Lewis and Clark College)

Critics: Paul Guyer (University of Pennsylvania)

Gideon Yaffe (University of Southern California)

Author: James A. Harris (University of St. Andrews)

VI-B. Author-Meets-Critics: Gary Iseminger, *The Aesthetic Function of Art*

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Dabney Townsend (Armstrong Atlantic State University)

Critics: Noël Carroll (Temple University)

Andrew Kania (Trinity University)

Author: Gary Iseminger (Carleton College)

VI-C. Invited Paper: Terminological Disputes and Philosophical Progress

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: L. A. Paul (University of Arizona)

Speaker: David Chalmers (Australian National University)

“Terminological Disputes and Philosophical Progress”

Commentators: James Pryor (New York University)

VI-D. Invited Symposium: Action and Evaluation

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Fred Stoutland (St. Olaf College)

Speakers: Matthew Hanser (University of California–Santa Barbara)

“Action, Acting, and Acting Well”

Ulrike Heuer (University of Leeds)

“When Values Are Reasons”

Commentator: Andrew Eshleman (University of Arkansas–Little Rock)

VI-E. Invited Symposium: Ancient Greek Metaphysics

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Jeremy Kirby (Albion College)

Speakers: Frank Lewis (University of Southern California)

“What’s the Matter with Prime Matter?”

- Stephen Menn (McGill University)
 “On Socrates’s First Criticisms of the Physicists?”
- Commentators: Thomas Blackson (Arizona State University)
 Joel Martinez (Lewis and Clark College)

VI-F. Invited Symposium: Charity and Justice

4:00-6:00 p.m.

- Chair: Joshua Cohen (Stanford University)
- Speakers: Mathias Risse (Harvard University)
 “Justice, Charity, and the Un-Foundational Character
 of Human Rights”
- Judith Lichtenberg (University of Maryland–College
 Park)
 “The Realm of Charity and the Realm of Justice”
- Commentator: Matthew Noah Smith (Yale University)

VI-G. Invited Symposium: The Ethics of Neuroenhancement and Personhood

4:00-6:00 p.m.

- Chair: Mary V. Rorty (Stanford University)
- Speakers: Thomas Buller (University of Alaska–Anchorage)
 “Minds, Brains, and Agents”
- Walter Glannon (University of Calgary)
 “Psychopharmacological Enhancement”
- Eric Racine (Institut de Recherches Cliniques de
 Montréal)
 “Two Moral Tests for Cognitive Enhancement”

VI-H. Invited Symposium: The Philosophy of Philippa Foot

4:00-6:00 p.m.

- Chair: Stephen Brown (Briar Cliff College)
- Speakers: Candace Vogler (University of Chicago)
 “Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism”
- Michael Thompson (University of Pittsburgh)
 “The Philosophy of Philippa Foot”
- Commentator: Troy Jollimore (California State University–Chico)

VI-I. Colloquium: Descartes

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.

- Chair: Patricia Easton (Claremont Graduate University)
- Speaker: Rico Vitz (University of North Florida)
 “Descartes and the Question of Direct Doxastic
 Voluntarism”

Commentator: Andrew Youpa (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: John Carriero (University of California–Los Angeles)

Speaker: David L. Clemenson (University of St. Thomas–Minnesota)

“Descartes on Consciousness and Forms of Thought”

Commentator: Roger Florka (Ursinus College)

VI-J. Symposium: Causes

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Roberta L. Millstein (University of California–Davis)

Speaker: Kenneth Waters (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)
“Causes That Make a Difference”

Commentators: Jay Odenbaugh (Lewis and Clark College)
Michael Strevens (New York University)

VI-K. Symposium: The ‘Practical Contradiction’ Interpretation of the Categorical Imperative

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Philip Nickel (University of California–Irvine)

Speaker: Richard Galvin (Texas Christian University)
“The Practical Contradiction Interpretation Reconsidered”

Commentators: Kyla Ebels-Duggan (Northwestern University)
Ernesto Garcia (Syracuse University)

VI-L. Special Session Arranged By The APA Committee on Lectures, Publications, and Research: The Romanell Lecture

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Introduction: Don Garrett (New York University)

Speaker: Louis Loeb (University of Michigan)
“The Naturalisms of Hume and Reid”

RECEPTION TO WELCOME NEW APA EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

(All registered Pacific Division Meeting attendees are invited)

5:30-8:00 p.m.

ANNUAL RECEPTION

9:00 p.m.-Midnight

GROUP MEETINGS, 6:00-8:00 P.M.

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

American Association of Philosophy Teachers

Hume Society

Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs

Society for the Metaphysics of Science

GROUP MEETINGS, 6:00-9:00 P.M.

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 1

Concerned Philosophers for Peace

Kierkegaard Society

North American Nietzsche Society

North American Spinoza Society, Session 1

Society for Analytical Feminism

Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy and the APA Committee on the Status of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgendered People in the Profession

Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World, Session 1

Society for Student Philosophers, Session 2

William James Society

GROUP MEETINGS, 8:00-10:00 P.M.

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking

North American Wittgenstein Society, Session 2

Society for Systematic Philosophy, Session 1

Society for the Study of Philosophy and the Martial Arts

FRIDAY, APRIL 6, 2007

BREAKFAST MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN

7:30-9:00 a.m.

BREAKFAST MEETING OF THE 2007/2008 PACIFIC DIVISION PROGRAM COMMITTEES

8:00-9:00 a.m.

PLACEMENT INFORMATION

8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m.

PLACEMENT INTERVIEWING

8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m.

BOOK DISPLAYS

8:30 a.m.-6:00 p.m.

REGISTRATION*8:30 a.m.-8:00 p.m.***LUNCHEON FOR APA BOARD MEMBERS AND COMMITTEE CHAIRS***11:45 a.m.-1:00 p.m.***JOHN DEWEY LECTURE***4:00-5:30 p.m.***JOHN DEWEY LECTURE RECEPTION**

(All Pacific Division Meeting attendees are invited)

*5:30-6:30 p.m.***PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS***6:30-7:30 p.m.***PRESIDENTIAL RECEPTION***7:30-9:00 p.m.***FRIDAY MORNING, APRIL 6****SESSION VII — 9:00 A.M.-NOON****VII-A. Author-Meets-Critics: David DeGrazia, *Human Identity and Bioethics****9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Jennifer Hawkins (University of Toronto)

Critics: Margaret Battin (University of Utah)

Daniel Brock (Harvard University)

Marya Schechtman (University of Illinois–Chicago)

Author: David DeGrazia (George Washington University and National Institutes of Health)

VII-B. Author-Meets-Critics: George Sher, *In Praise of Blame**9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Ken Rogerson (Florida International University)

Critics: Pamela Hieronymi (University of California–Los Angeles)

Robert Kane (University of Texas–Austin)

Angela Smith (University of Washington)

Author: George Sher (Rice University)

VII-C. Author-Meets-Critics: Stephen Mulhall, *Philosophical Myths of the Fall**9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Randall Havas (Willamette University)

- Critics: Taylor Carman (Barnard College)
Ed Minar (University of Arkansas–Fayetteville)
John Richardson (New York University)
- Author: Stephen Mulhall (Oxford University)

VII-D. Author-Meets-Critics: Francesco Guala, *The Methodology of Experimental Economics*

9:00 a.m.–Noon

- Chair: Paul Teller (University of California–Davis)
- Critics: Anna Alexandrova (University of Missouri–Saint Louis)
Daniel Hausman (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
James Woodward (California Institute of Technology)
- Author: Francesco Guala (University of Exeter)

VII-E. Invited Symposium: Adam Smith on Liberty and Sympathy

9:00 a.m.–Noon

- Chair: Don Sievert (University of Missouri–Columbia)
- Speakers: James Otteson (University of Alabama–Tuscaloosa)
“Adam Smith and Liberty”
Kate Abramson (Indiana University–Bloomington)
“Smith and/vs. Hume on Sympathy”
- Commentators: Fonna Forman-Barzilai (University of California–San Diego)
Eric Schliesser (Syracuse University and Universiteit Leiden)

VII-F. Invited Symposium: Singular Thought

9:00 a.m.–Noon

- Chair: Peter Alward (University of Lethbridge)
- Speakers: John Hawthorne (Oxford University)
David Manley (University of Southern California)
“Should Auld Acquaintance Be Forgot?”
Robin Jeshion (University of California–Riverside)
“Singular Thought: Semantic Instrumentalism and Cognitive Elasticity”
- Commentator: Kenneth Taylor (Stanford University)

VII-G. Invited Symposium: The Psychology of the Self

9:00 a.m.–Noon

- Chair: Alexandra Plakias (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)
- Speakers: David Velleman (New York University)
“Artificial Agency”
John Doris (Washington University in St. Louis)
“Talking to Our Selves”

Philip Robbins (Washington University in St. Louis)
 “The Self and Its Social Body”

VII-H. Colloquium: Kantian Aesthetics

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Richard Holmes (University of Waterloo)

Speaker: Joseph Cannon (Northwestern University)
 “Is Ugliness a Pure Aesthetic Category in Kant’s
 Theory of Taste?”

Commentator: Lara Ostaric (St. Michael’s College)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Oliver Sensen (Tulane University of New Orleans)

Speaker: James Reid (Metropolitan State College of Denver)
 “Freedom in Nature: The Moral of Kant’s *Critique of
 Judgment*”

Commentator: Michael Rohlf (Brown University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Brian Laetz (University of British Columbia)

Speaker: Alex Rueger (University of Alberta)
 “Beautiful Surfaces: Kant on Beauty and Perfection”

Commentator: Andrew McGonigal (University of Leeds and Cornell
 University)

VII-I. Colloquium: Kantian Ethics

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Chris Brown (University of Arizona)

Speaker: Zachary Hoskins (Washington University in St. Louis)
 “Kantian Respect: Why Should Humanity, Not the
 Good Will, Be Treated as an End in Itself?”

Commentator: Jennifer K. Uleman (State University of New York–
 Purchase)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Stephen Palmquist (Stanford University and Hong
 Kong Baptist University)

Speaker: Jason Wyckoff (University of Colorado–Boulder)
 “Solving the Problem of Timing Maxims in Kantian
 Ethics”

Commentator: Robert Johnson (University of Missouri–Columbia)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Falguni A. Sheth (Hampshire College)

- Speaker: Helga Varden (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)
 “International Political Obligations”
 Commentator: John Harris (University of Colorado–Boulder)

VII-J. Colloquium: Metaphysics and Language

9:00 a.m.–Noon

9:00–10:00 a.m.

- Chair: Bernard W. Kobes (Arizona State University)
 Speaker: Berit Brogaard (University of Missouri–Saint Louis)
 “Sea Battle Semantics”
 Commentator: Peter Ludlow (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)

10:00–11:00 a.m.

- Chair: Angie Harris (University of Utah)
 Speaker: John Justice (Randolph College)
 “Singular-Term Semantics Simplified”
 Commentator: David Shier (Washington State University)

11:00 a.m.–Noon

- Chair: Joe R. Salerno (St. Louis University)
 Speaker: Julien Murzi (University of Sheffield)
 “All Truths Are Known? The Church-Fitch Paradox
 and the Problem of Transworld Knowability”
 Commentator: Roy Cook (Villanova University)

VII-K. Colloquium: Political Philosophy

9:00 a.m.–Noon

9:00–10:00 a.m.

- Chair: Martin Benjamin (Michigan State University)
 Speaker: Benjamin A. Sachs (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
 “Teleology and Deontology in Distributive Justice”
 Commentator: Nalin Ranasinghe (Assumption College)

10:00–11:00 a.m.

- Chair: David Lefkowitz (University of North Carolina–Greensboro)
 Speaker: Brian Prince (Rice University)
 “Possible Bridges and Hypothetical Consent”
 Commentator: Yolonda Wilson (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

11:00 a.m.–Noon

- Chair: Sandra Woien (Arizona State University)
 Speaker: Louis-Philippe Hodgson (York University)
 “Later Selves and Legal Paternalism”

Commentator: Fritz McDonald (State University of New York–New Paltz)

VII-L. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on Hispanics

9:00 a.m.–Noon

Topic: Latin American Philosophical Themes in the Humanities

Chair: Susana Nuccetelli (University of Texas–Pan America)

Speakers: Monica Diaz (University of Texas–Pan American)
“Indigenous Presence on Latin American Colonial Thought”

Jesús Aguilar (Rochester Institute of Technology)
“On the Possibility of a Distinctive Latin-American Thought”

Greg Gilson (University of Texas–Pan American)
“Rationality, Practical Reason, and the Mayans”

Arleen Salles (St. John’s University)
“Rodo’s Ariel and the Search for the Good (Latin American) Life”

William Carter (South Texas College)
“Scotus, Ockham, and the Conquest of the Americas”

Suzanne Lalonde (University of Texas–Brownsville)
“Simone de Beauvoir in Latin American Feminism”

Luis Rodriguez-Abad (University of Texas–Brownsville)
“The Contribution of ‘Latin’ American Thought to Western Philosophy”

LUNCHEON FOR APA BOARD MEMBERS AND COMMITTEE CHAIRS

11:45 a.m.–1:00 p.m.

FRIDAY AFTERNOON, APRIL 6

SESSION VIII — 1:00-4:00 P.M.

VIII-A. Author-Meets-Critics: Stephen Darwall, *The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability*

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Alex Rajczi (Claremont McKenna College)

Critics: Christine M. Korsgaard (Harvard University)
R. Jay Wallace (University of California–Berkeley)
Gary Watson (University of California–Riverside)

Author: Stephen Darwall (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)

VIII-B. Author-Meets-Critics: Wayne Martin, *Theories of Judgment: Psychology, Logic, Phenomenology*

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Joseph Schear (California Polytechnic State University)

Critics: Lanier Anderson (Stanford University)
Hans Sluga (University of California–Berkeley)
Guenter Zoeller (University of Munich)

Author: Wayne Martin (University of Essex)

VIII-C. Invited Symposium: Contemplation and Virtue in Greek Thought

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Corinne Gartner (Princeton University)

Speakers: Eric Brown (Washington University in St. Louis)
“Contemplative Withdrawal in the Hellenistic Age”
Gabriel Richardson Lear (University of Chicago)
“Aristotle on Theory and Practice”
Christian Wildberg (Princeton University)
“Fatal Distraction: Plotinus on Evil and Vice”

Commentator: Daniel Devereux (University of Virginia)

VIII-D. Invited Symposium: Epistemic Value

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Kelly Becker (University of New Mexico)

Speakers: Neal Judisch (University of Oklahoma)
Wayne Riggs (University of Oklahoma)
“Knowledge and the Problem of ‘Easy Credit’”
Duncan Pritchard (University of Stirling)
“Scepticism, Luck, and Epistemic Value”
Jonathan Kvanvig (Baylor University)
“The Nature and Value of Understanding”

Commentator: John Greco (St. Louis University)

VIII-E. Invited Symposium: Ethics and Cultural Appropriation

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: James O. Young (University of Victoria)

Speakers: Elizabeth Coleman (La Trobe University)
Rosemary Coombe (York University)
“Broken Records: Music and Cultural Rights”
Anne Wescott Eaton (University of Illinois–Chicago)
Ivan Gaskell (Harvard University)
“Do Subaltern Artifacts Belong in Art Museums?”

Laura Arbour (University of British Columbia)
 Daryl Pullman (Memorial University of Newfoundland)
 “Cultural Appropriation of Human Genetic Materials”

VIII-F. Invited Symposium: The Nature of Film

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Angela Curran (Carleton College)

Speakers: Thomas Wartenberg (Mount Holyoke College)
 “Film as Philosophy: The Case of The Flicker”

Katherine Thomson-Jones (Oberlin College)
 “The Literary Origins of the Cinematic Narrator”

Amy Coplan (California State University–Fullerton)
 “The Low-Road to Affect: How Film Elicits Non-Cognitive Affective Responses”

Commentator: Carl Plantinga (Calvin College)

VIII-G. Colloquium: Agency

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Chair: Elizabeth Hamilton (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: Facundo Martin Alonso (Stanford University)
 “Reliance in Shared Intention”

Commentator: Meghan Griffith (Davidson College)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Susanne Sreedhar (Tulane University of New Orleans)

Speaker: Sara Rachel Chant (University of Missouri–Columbia)
 “The Simple View of Collective Agency”

Commentator: Abraham Roth (Ohio State University)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Jeffrey Green (University of Notre Dame)

Speaker: Jesús Aguilar (Rochester Institute of Technology)
 “Agential Systems and Causal Deviance”

Commentator: Mary Clayton Coleman (Bard College)

VIII-H. Colloquium: Metaphysics

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Chair: Iris Einheuser (Duke University)

Speaker: Dana Lynne Goswick (University of California–Davis)
 “Ontological Conventionalism: The New Essentialism”

Commentator: David Barnett (University of Colorado–Boulder)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Helen Longino (Stanford University)

Speaker: Alyssa Ney (University of Rochester)
 “Physical Causation and Difference-making”

Commentator: Douglas N. Kutach (Brown University)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Dale Dorsey (University of California–San Diego)

Speaker: Joshua Spencer (University of Rochester)
 “A Tale of Two Simples”

Commentator: Ted Sider (Rutgers University)

VIII-I. Colloquium: Names and Indexicals

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Chair: Seth Holtzman (Catawba College)

Speaker: Michael P. Wolf (California State University–Fresno)
 “Why Are There Indexicals?”

Commentator: Anastasia Panagopoulos (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Stephanie Patridge (Otterbein College)

Speaker: Stavroula Glezakos (Wake Forest University)
 “Names and Public Language”

Commentator: Dylan Dodd (Syracuse University)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Herminia Reyes (San Diego State University)

Speaker: Heidi Tiedke (University of Maryland–College Park)
 “A Semantics for Names with Full Benefits”

Commentator: Matthew Mosdell (University of Utah)

VIII-J. Colloquium: Political Philosophy

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Chair: Bertha Alvarez Manninen (Arizona State University)

Speaker: Jason Hanna (University of Colorado–Boulder)
 “Democracy and Children’s Suffrage”

Commentator: Agnes Curry (St. Joseph College)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Judith Wagner DeCew (Clark University and Wellesley College)

Speaker: Anne Baril (University of Arizona)
 “Employment Freedom”

Commentator: Kory Schaff (Occidental College)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Stephan Johnson (City College of San Francisco)

Speaker: Eric Roark (University of Missouri–Columbia)
 “Is Michael Otsuka’s Conception of Robust Self-Ownership Too Robust for a Left-Libertarian?”
 (Winner of the Jean Hampton Prize)

Commentator: H. Benjamin Shaeffer (Humboldt State University)

VIII-K. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Medicine

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Topic: Should Children Be Tested for Adult-onset Genetic Disorders?

Chair: Gary Seay (University of Texas–Pan American)

Speakers: Karen Kovach (Mercer University)
 “If I Knew Now What I’ll Know Then...Genetic Testing and the Crystal Ball Problem”

R. G. Frey (Bowling Green State University)

“Luck of the Draw from Child to Adult: Is There Utility in Choosing Not to Know?”

Bonnie Steinbock (State University of New York–Albany and Union-Mount Sinai School of Medicine)

“Prenatal Testing for Adult-onset Genetic Disorders: Cui Bono?”

Loretta Kopelman (East Carolina University)

“Using the Best Interest Standard to Decide Whether to Test Children for Adult-onset Genetic Disorders”

VIII-L. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Topic: Diasporic Asians, Politics, Citizenship, and Race

Chair: Falguni A. Sheth (Hampshire College)

Speakers: Monique Roelofs (Hampshire College)
 “Aesthetics, Racial Address, and the Politics of Cultural Productions”

Falguni A. Sheth (Hampshire College)

“Liberalism and the Rule of Law: Outcasting South Asians in North America at the Turn of the 20th Century”

Mickaella Perina (University of Massachusetts–Boston)

“Reshaping Politics and Community: Race and the Construction of Diasporic Citizenship and Identities”

Darrell Moore (DePaul University)

“States of Exception, Japanese Internment, and Post
September 11th Detainment”

FRIDAY EARLY EVENING, APRIL 6

SESSION IX — 4:00-6:00 P.M.

IX-A. Author-Meets-Critics: Paul Franks, *All or Nothing*

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Peter Thielke (Pomona College)

Critics: Daniel Breazeale (University of Kentucky)

Paul Redding (University of Sydney)

Author: Paul Franks (University of Toronto)

IX-B. Author-Meets-Critics: Lisa Tessman, *Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles*

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Lijun Yuan (Texas State University–San Marcos)

Critics: Cheshire Calhoun (Colby College)

Marilyn Friedman (Washington University in St. Louis)

Christine Koggel (Bryn Mawr College)

Author: Lisa Tessman (State University of New York–
Binghamton)

IX-C. Author-Meets-Critics: Tim O’Keefe, *Epicurus on Freedom*

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Anthony A. Long (University of California–Berkeley)

Critics: Todd Ganson (Oberlin College)

Monte Johnson (University of California–San Diego)

Author: Tim O’Keefe (Georgia State University)

IX-D. Author-Meets-Critics: Robert Audi, *Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision*

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Peter A. Graham (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)

Critics: Stephen Finlay (University of Southern California)

David Owens (University of Sheffield)

Bruce Russell (Wayne State University)

Author: Robert Audi (University of Notre Dame)

IX-E. Invited Paper: Probability

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Byeong-Uk Yi (University of Toronto)

Speaker: John Pollock (University of Arizona)

“Probable Probabilities”

Commentators: James Hawthorne (University of Oklahoma)
Teddy Seidenfeld (Carnegie Mellon University)

IX-F. Colloquium: Aristotle

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.

Chair: Rod Jenks (University of Portland)

Speaker: David Forman (University of Nevada–Las Vegas)
“Aristotle and McDowell on ‘Second Nature’”

Commentator: D.S. Neil Van Leeuwen (Stanford University)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Suzanne Obdrzalek (Claremont McKenna College)

Speaker: Nathanael Stein (Oxford University)
“Aristotle and the Homonymy of Cause”

Commentator: Blake Hestir (Texas Christian University)

IX-G. Colloquium: Justice and Public Deliberation

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.

Chair: Alexei Angelides (Stanford University)

Speaker: Scott Aikin (Vanderbilt University)
“Democratic Deliberation, Public Reason, and
Environmental Politics”

Commentator: Robert Guay (State University of New York–
Binghamton)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Tony Smith (University of Colorado–Boulder)

Speaker: Stephen L. Nathanson (Northeastern University)
“John Stuart Mill on Economic Justice and the
Alleviation of Poverty”

Commentator: Brian Hutchinson (Metropolitan State College of
Denver)

IX-H. Colloquium: Philosophy of Art

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.

Chair: David Kaspar (University of Nevada–Reno)

Speaker: Nicholas Diehl (University of California–Davis)
“Think Like a Character: Analyzing Arguments in
Fictional Contexts”

Commentator: Douglas Cannon (University of Puget Sound)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Renee Conroy (University of Washington)

- Speakers: Ben Caplan (Ohio State University)
 Carl Matheson (University of Manitoba)
 “Modality, Individuation, and the Ontology of Art”
- Commentator: Julie C. Van Camp (California State University–Long Beach)

IX-I. Colloquium: Philosophy of Mind

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.

- Chair: Jeff Johnson (College of St. Catherine)
- Speaker: L. Bryce G. Huebner (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
 “If You Like Pina Coladas...”
- Commentator: Rocco J. Gennaro (Indiana State University)
- 5:00-6:00 p.m.*
- Chair: Brian Epstein (Virginia Tech)
- Speaker: Malte Willer (University of Texas–Austin)
 “In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy”
- Commentator: York Gunther (California State University–Northridge)

IX-J. Colloquium: Wellbeing

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.

- Chair: Carol C. Gould (Temple University)
- Speaker: Martin Peterson (University of Cambridge)
 “Are Persons Mere Containers for Well Being?”
- Commentator: Holly M. Smith (Rutgers University)
- 5:00-6:00 p.m.*
- Chair: Ranjoo Herr (Bentley College)
- Speaker: H. E. Baber (University of San Diego)
 “The Zero-One Rule”
- Commentator: Bruce Chapman (University of Toronto)

IX-K. Symposium: Evolution and Moral Realism

4:00-6:00 p.m.

- Chair: Doran Smolkin (Kwantlen University College)
- Speaker: Kevin Brosnan (University of California–Santa Cruz)
 “The Dissolution of a Dilemma: Why Darwinian Considerations Don’t Confront Moral Realism with Hard Choices”
- Commentators: Mark van Roojen (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)
 Ralph Wedgwood (Oxford University)

IX-L. Symposium: Fallibilism and Purism in Epistemology*4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Allen Carlson (University of Alberta)

Speakers: Jeremy Fantl (University of Calgary)

Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri–Columbia)
“A Case for Pragmatic Encroachment (or for Semi-skepticism)”Commentators: Adam Leite (Indiana University–Bloomington)
Adam Morton (University of Alberta)**IX-M. Symposium: The Contingency of Existence***4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Edward N. Zalta (Stanford University)

Speaker: Michael Nelson (University of California–Riverside)
“The Contingency of Existence”Commentators: Karen Bennett (Princeton University)
Christopher Menzel (Texas A&M University)**IX-N. John Dewey Lecture***4:00-5:30 p.m.*

Chair: James Van Cleve (University of Southern California)

Speaker: Keith Lehrer (University of Arizona)
“Knowledge, Art, and Autonomy”

The John Dewey Lecture offers a major philosopher the occasion for personal reflection on a lifetime of work as a teacher and scholar.

JOHN DEWEY LECTURE RECEPTION*5:30-6:30 p.m.*

Convention attendees are cordially invited to a reception hosted by the John Dewey Foundation.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS*6:30-7:30 p.m.*

Introduction: Nicholas D. Smith (Lewis and Clark College)

Speaker: Calvin Normore (University of California–Los Angeles)
“Freedom, Contingency, and Rational Power”**PRESIDENTIAL RECEPTION***7:30-9:00 p.m.***GROUP MEETINGS, 8:00-11:00 P.M.**

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 2

International Hobbes Association, Session 1

Karl Jaspers Society and the Victor von Weizsäcker Society
 North American Kant Society, Session 1
 Radical Philosophy Association, Session 2
 Society for Empirical Ethics
 Society for Realist/Antirealist Discussion, Session 2
 Society for Social and Political Philosophy: Historical, Continental, and
 Feminist Perspectives, Session 1
 Society for Student Philosophers, Session 3
 Society for Systematic Philosophy, Session 2
 Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy
 Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts
 Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 2
 Society for Women in Philosophy

SATURDAY, APRIL 7, 2007

BOOK DISPLAYS

8:00 a.m.-1:00 p.m.

PLACEMENT INFORMATION

8:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m.

PLACEMENT INTERVIEWING

8:30 a.m.-6:00 p.m.

REGISTRATION

8:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m.

SATURDAY MORNING, APRIL 7

SESSION X — 9:00 A.M.-NOON

X-A. Author-Meets-Critics: Ann Cudd, *Analyzing Oppression*

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Peta Bowden (Murdoch University)
 Critics: Susan Brison (Dartmouth College)
 Marcia Homiak (Occidental College)
 Paul Roth (University of California–Santa Cruz)
 Author: Ann Cudd (University of Kansas)

X-B. Author-Meets-Critics: P. Kyle Stanford, *Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives*

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Sherri Roush (University of California–Berkeley)

Critics: Anjan Chakravartty (University of Toronto)

Arthur Fine (University of Washington)

Peter Godfrey-Smith (Harvard University)

Author: P. Kyle Stanford (University of California–Irvine)

X-C. Author-Meets-Critics: Alfred Mele, *Free Will and Luck*

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Daniel Speak (Azusa Pacific University)

Critics: John Martin Fischer (University of California–Riverside)

Sarah McGrath (Brandeis University)

Derk Pereboom (University of Vermont)

Author: Alfred Mele (Florida State University)

X-D. Invited Symposium: Ancient Natural Philosophy and Science

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Sylvia Berryman (University of British Columbia)

Speakers: Malcolm Wilson (University of Oregon)

“Aristotle’s Brainstorm: A Methodology of Discovery in the *Meteorologica*”

Henry Mendell (California State University–Los Angeles)

“Mathematical Properties and Aristotle’s Physics”

Commentator: Alan Code (University of California–Berkeley)

X-E. Invited Symposium: Context and Content

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Kent Bach (San Francisco State University)

Speakers: Peter Lasersohn (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)

John MacFarlane (University of California–Berkeley)

Zoltan Szabo (Cornell University)

X-F. Invited Symposium: Queer Perspectives on Virtue, Free Will, and the Self

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Raja Halwani (School of the Art Institute of Chicago)

Speakers: William Wilkerson (University of Alabama–Huntsville)

“Choosing Desire, Choosing Identity: Freedom, Determinism, and Sexual Orientation”

Carlos Ball (Pennsylvania State University)

“Property, Self, and Sexuality”

Heather Battaly (California State University–Fullerton)

“Virtue Epistemology and Knowing Our Sexual Orientations”

Commentator: Chris Cuomo (University of Georgia)

X-G. Colloquium: Epistemology

9:00 a.m.–Noon

9:00–10:00 a.m.

Chair: Scott Hendricks (Clark University)

Speaker: Stephen Wykstra (Calvin College)

“The Illusion of Transmission: Where Wright Goes Wrong”

Commentator: Joshua Schechter (Brown University)

10:00–11:00 a.m.

Chair: Justin C. Fisher (University of British Columbia)

Speaker: Brian Glenney (University of Southern California)

“Touch at a Distance: A Case for Spatial Experience”

Commentator: Giovanni Grandi (Auburn University)

11:00 a.m.–Noon

Chair: John Bender (Ohio University)

Speaker: Apaar Kumar (Emory University)

“Does Spontaneity Relate Rationally to Receptivity?”

Commentator: Danielle Macbeth (Haverford College)

X-H. Colloquium: Metaethics

9:00 a.m.–Noon

9:00–10:00 a.m.

Chair: Robert Shanklin (University of Southern California)

Speaker: Susana Nuccetelli (University of Texas–Pan America)

“What’s Right with the Open Question Argument”

Commentator: Charlie Kurth (University of California–San Diego)

10:00–11:00 a.m.

Chair: John Mizzoni (Neumann College)

Speaker: Jorn Sonderholm (Louisiana State University)

“A Logical Response to Blackburn’s Supervenience Argument”

Commentator: Alexander Guerrero (New York University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Michael Gill (University of Arizona)

Speaker: James Harold (Mount Holyoke College)

“Meta-metaethics: Moderate Skepticism about Some Concepts of Metaethical Inquiry”

Commentator: Michael Pendlebury (North Carolina State University)

X-I. Colloquium: Perception and Content

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Jennifer Matey (State University of New York–Stony Brook)

Speaker: Anne Jacobson (University of Houston)

“Properly Functioning Vision: On Block on Noë?”

Commentator: Charles Wallis (California State University–Long Beach)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Sara Bernstein (University of Arizona)

Speaker: James Genone (University of California–Berkeley)

“Perceptual Experience and Error”

Commentator: Mohan Matthen (University of Toronto)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Nick Treanor (Brown University)

Speaker: Ted Poston (University of South Alabama)

“Cognitive Abilities and the Conceptualist/Nonconceptualist Debate”

Commentator: Diana Raffman (University of Toronto)

X-J. Colloquium: Philosophy of Religion

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Henry West (Macalester College)

Speaker: Shieva J. Kleinschmidt (Rutgers University)

“Many-One Identity and the Trinity”

Commentator: Kenneth Himma (Seattle Pacific University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Michael Koch (State University of New York–Oneonta)

Speaker: John Zeis (Canisius College)

“Believing in Order to Know”

Commentator: Majid Amini (Virginia State University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Zach Simpson (Claremont Graduate University)

Speaker: Eric Charles Steinhart (William Paterson University)
 “Stage Theory and Resurrection Replicas”

Commentator: David Vander Laan (Westmont College)

X-K. Colloquium: Time

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Lawrence Lombard (Wayne State University)

Speaker: Stephan Torre (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)
 “In Defense of (a Formulation of) the Date Theory”

Commentator: David Ian Spencer (University of California–Davis)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Tobey Scharding (Stanford University)

Speaker: Tony Roark (Boise State University)
 “On a Moment’s Notice: Aristotle on Perceiving
 Instants in Time”

Commentator: Richard Bett (Johns Hopkins University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Tuomas Manninen (University of Iowa)

Speaker: Caspar Hare (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
 “A Puzzle about Other-directed Time-bias”

Commentator: Cody Gilmore (University of California–Davis)

X-L. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on International Cooperation

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: Indigenous People and Property Rights

Chair: John Christman (Pennsylvania State University)

Speakers: Justine Lacey (University of Queensland)

Julian Lamont (University of Queensland)

“The Ethics of Genetic Research on Indigenous
 Populations”

Clark Wolf (Iowa State University)

“Theft By Patent”

Stephen Munzer (University of California–Los
 Angeles)

Kal Raustiala (University of California–Los Angeles)

“Traditional Knowledge in Law and Global Justice”

Commentators: John Christman (Pennsylvania State University)

Rebecca Tsosie (Arizona State University)

X-M. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committees on the Status of Women and Inclusiveness

9:00 a.m.-Noon

- Topic: Women in Philosophy across the Career Span
 Chair: Christine Koggel (Bryn Mawr College)
 Speakers: Marya Bower (Earlham College)
 "Blending Philosophy and Non-Traditional Career Paths"
 Christina Bellon (California State University–Sacramento)
 "Identifying Woman- and Feminist-Friendly Graduate Programs"
 Christina VanDyke (Calvin College)
 "Negotiating the Tenure Process"
 Barbara Wall (Villanova University)
 "Philosophy, Women, and Administrative Careers"
 Elizabeth Minnich (Association of American Colleges and Universities)
 "Trends in Academia and Their Impact on Women"

SATURDAY AFTERNOON, APRIL 7

SESSION XI — 1:00-4:00 P.M.

XI-A. Author-Meets-Critics: Deborah J. Brown, *Descartes and the Passionate Mind*

1:00-4:00 p.m.

- Chair: John Marshall (University of Virginia)
 Critics: Lilli Alanen (Uppsala Universitet)
 Ronald de Sousa (University of Toronto)
 André Gombay (University of Toronto)
 Author: Deborah J. Brown (University of Queensland)

XI-B. Author-Meets-Critics: Michael Devitt, *Ignorance of Language*

1:00-4:00 p.m.

- Chair: Geoffrey K. Pullum (University of California–Santa Cruz)
 Critics: Elisabeth Camp (University of Pennsylvania)
 Mark Crimmins (Stanford University)
 James Higginbotham (University of Southern California)
 Author: Michael Devitt (City University of New York–Graduate Center)

XI-C. Author-Meets-Critics: Frances M. Kamm, *Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm*

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Gerald Dworkin (University of California–Davis)

Critics: Alastair Norcross (Rice University)

Michael Otsuka (University College London)

Henry S. Richardson (Georgetown University)

Author: Frances M. Kamm (Harvard University)

XI-D. Invited Symposium: Aristotle’s Psychology

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Elliot Welch (University of Maine–Farmington)

Speakers: Jennifer Whiting (University of Toronto)

“Self and Self-consciousness in Aristotle”

Christopher Shields (Oxford University)

“The Priority of Soul in Aristotle”

Victor Caston (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)

“Aristotle on Perceptual Content”

Commentator: Tad Brennan (Northwestern University)

XI-E. Invited Symposium: Chinese Philosophy

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Justin Tiwald (San Francisco State University)

Speakers: Philip J. Ivanhoe (City University of Hong Kong)

“Lessons from the Past: Zhang Xuecheng and the Ethical Dimensions of History”

Kwong-loi Shun (Chinese University of Hong Kong)

“Wholeness and Purity: Moral Trials in Confucian Thought”

David B. Wong (Duke University)

“Identifying with the Nonhuman in Early Daoism”

XI-F. Invited Symposium: Judgment Aggregation

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Branden Fitelson (University of California–Berkeley)

Speakers: Franz Dietrich (Universiteit Maastricht)

Christian List (London School of Economics)

“Aggregating Causal Judgements”

Fabrizio Cariani (University of California–Berkeley)

Marc Pauly (Stanford University)

Josh Snyder (Stanford University)

“Decision Framing in Judgment Aggregation”

Stephan Hartmann (London School of Economics)
 Gabriella Pigozzi (King's College London)
 "Merging Judgments and the Problem of Truth-tracking"

XI-G. Invited Symposium: Perception

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Jonathan Cohen (University of California–San Diego)
 Speakers: Mark Johnston (Princeton University)
 "Presentation, Not Representation"
 Andrew Egan (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor and
 Australian National University)
 "Seeing and Believing: Perception, Belief Formation,
 and the Divided Mind"
 John Campbell (University of California–Berkeley)
 "Sensory Experience and Modes of Presentation"

XI-H. Colloquium: Epistemology

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Chair: Matt Weiner (Texas Tech University)
 Speaker: Berislav Marusic (University of California–Berkeley)
 "Why Not the Self-knowledge Rule?"
 Commentator: Michael A. Rescorla (University of California–Santa
 Barbara)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Lisa Warenski (Union College)
 Speaker: Stephen Crowley (Boise State University)
 "How Reliable Is That Monkey?"
 Commentator: Thomas Senor (University of Arkansas–Fayetteville)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Jack Lyons (University of Arkansas–Fayetteville)
 Speaker: Juan Comesaña (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
 "Reliability and Probability"
 Commentator: Michael Levin (City University of New York–Graduate
 Center)

XI-I. Colloquium: Locke

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Chair: Ian Evans (University of Arizona)
 Speaker: Shelley Weinberg (University of Toronto)
 "Locke: The Role of Consciousness in Sensitive
 Knowledge"

Commentator: Lex Newman (University of Utah)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Sergio Tenenbaum (University of Toronto)

Speaker: Walter Ott (Virginia Tech)
"Relations and Powers"

Commentator: Hans Lottenbach (University of Pittsburgh)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Josh Bright (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: Mary Domski (University of New Mexico)
"Construction Without Spatial Constraints: Locke on
Geometrical Reasoning"

Commentator: Daniel Sutherland (University of Illinois–Chicago)

XI-J. Colloquium: Philosophical Methods

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Chair: Mark Wrathall (Brigham Young University)

Speaker: Aaron Allen Schiller (University of California–San
Diego)

"Dreyfus's Phenomenological Foundations: A Reply"

Commentator: Hubert Dreyfus (University of California–Berkeley)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Joshua Rust (Metropolitan State College of Denver)

Speaker: S. Matthew Liao (Oxford University)
"A Defense of Intuitions"

Commentator: Joshua Alexander (Indiana University–Bloomington)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Michael Hodges (Vanderbilt University)

Speaker: Richard Liebendorfer (Minnesota State University–
Mankato)

"Wittgenstein's Expressivism"

Commentator: Joseph Ulatowski (University of Utah)

XI-K. Colloquium: Virtue Ethics

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Chair: Helmut Wautischer (Sonoma State University)

Speakers: Robert Johnson (University of Oklahoma)

Russell Jones (University of Oklahoma)

"Counterfactual Exemplar-based Virtue Accounts of
Right Action"

Commentator: Erin Taylor (University of California–Los Angeles)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Jacqueline Taylor (University of San Francisco)

Speaker: Eric Silverman (St. Louis University)

“Michael Slote’s Unjustified Rejection of Neo-Aristotelian Ethics”

Commentator: Elisa Hurley (University of Western Ontario)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Elizabeth Radcliffe (Santa Clara University)

Speaker: Rebecca Lynn Stangl (University of Virginia)

“A Dilemma for Particularist Virtue Ethics”

Commentator: Scott A. Anderson (University of British Columbia)

XI-L. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of Women

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Topic: Changing Paradigms in Biology

Chair: Ruth Groenhout (Calvin College)

Speakers: Lorraine Code (York University)

“Ecological Naturalism and the Biological Sciences”

Carla Fehr (Iowa State University)

“Feminist Theory and Evolutionary Paradigms in Biology”

Lenny Moss (University of Exeter)

“Phenotypic Plasticity, Detachment, and Gender: Reflections on the Latest Developments in Biology”

XI-M. Special Session on Berger Prize Winning Essay Arranged by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Law

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Topic: Berger Prize Essay: Mark Greenberg’s “How Facts Make Law”

Chair: Judith Wagner DeCew (Clark University and Wellesley College)

Speakers: Kenneth Einar Himma (Seattle Pacific University)

Jeffrey C. Brand-Ballard (George Washington University)

Respondent: Mark Greenberg (University of California, Los Angeles)

Berger Session Reception

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Convention attendees are cordially invited to a reception hosted by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Law

SATURDAY EARLY EVENING, APRIL 7**SESSION XII — 4:00-6:00 P.M.****XII-A. Author-Meets-Critics: Albert Borgmann, *Real American Ethics****4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Eric Walker (University of Montana)

Critics: Marion Hourdequin (Colorado College)
Paul B. Thompson (Michigan State University)

Author: Albert Borgmann (University of Montana)

XII-B. Invited Paper: Value and Emotion*4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: William Peck (Reed College)

Speaker: Jesse Prinz (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
“Emotion and Aesthetic Value”Commentators: Jenefer Robinson (University of Cincinnati)
James Shelley (Auburn University)**XII-C. Invited Symposium: Kant and Non-Conceptual Content***4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Eric Watkins (University of California–San Diego)

Speakers: Robert Hanna (University of Colorado–Boulder)
“Embodied Rationality: Towards a Kantian Non-Conceptualism”Hannah Ginsborg (University of California–Berkeley)
“Was Kant a Nonconceptualist?”

Commentator: Jose Luis Bermudez (Washington University in St. Louis)

XII-D. Colloquium: Humans and Nonhumans*4:00-6:00 p.m.**4:00-5:00 p.m.*

Chair: Ellen Suckiel (University of California–Santa Cruz)

Speaker: Pamela Lomelino (University of Colorado–Boulder)
“Crossing Species Boundaries: A Feminist Critique of Human-Nonhuman Chimeras”

Commentator: Jason Robert (Arizona State University)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Peggy DesAutels (University of Dayton)

Speaker: Thomas White (Loyola Marymount University)
“DeGrazia, MacIntyre, and Dolphins: A Case Study in the Necessary Evolution of Methodology”

Commentator: Gary Varner (Texas A&M University)

XII-E. Colloquium: Philosophy of Language*4:00-6:00 p.m.**4:00-5:00 p.m.*

Chair: Albert Casullo (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)

Speaker: Mary Beth Willard (Yale University)

“Fictional Realism Rescued”

Commentator: Roberta Ballarin (University of British Columbia)

5:00-6:00

Chair: Ray Rennard (University of the Pacific)

Speaker: Madeleine Arseneault (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

“On Idiom, Ambiguity, and What Is Said”

Commentator: Catherine Wearing (Wellesley College)

XII-F. Colloquium: Philosophy of Mind*4:00-6:00 p.m.**4:00-5:00 p.m.*

Chair: Hilmi Demir (California State University–San Bernardino)

Speaker: Larry A. Herzberg (University of Wisconsin–Oshkosh)

“A Puzzle about Emotion, Perception, and Rationality”

Commentator: John Draeger (Buffalo State College)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Adam Arico (University of Arizona)

Speaker: Dan Ryder (University of Connecticut)

“Too Close for Comfort? Psychosemantics and the Distal”

Commentator: Gualtiero Piccinini (University of Missouri–Saint Louis)

XII-G. Colloquium: Political Philosophy*4:00-6:00 p.m.**4:00-5:00 p.m.*

Chair: Christina Bellon (California State University–Sacramento)

Speaker: Peter Higgins (University of Colorado–Boulder)

“Open Borders and the Right to Immigration”

Commentator: Richard Nunan (College of Charleston)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Ada Jaarsma (Sonoma State University)

Speaker: Lisa H. Schwartzman (Michigan State University)

“Can Liberalism Account for Women’s ‘Adaptive Preferences’?”

Commentator: Russell DiSilvestro (California State University–Sacramento)

XII-H. Colloquium: Promising and Trust

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.

Chair: Yvette Pearson (Old Dominion University)

Speaker: Anita Ho (University of British Columbia)
“The Phenomenon of Trust in Clinical Settings”

Commentator: Hilde Lindemann (Michigan State University)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Devonya Havis (Boston College)

Speaker: Kenneth E. Shockley (State University of New York–Buffalo)
“The Peculiar Practice of Promising”

Commentator: Noell Birondo (Pomona College)

XII-I. Colloquium: Punishment

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.

Chair: Michael Cholbi (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)

Speaker: Erin I. Kelly (Tufts University)
“Punishment and Collective Responsibility”

Commentator: Douglas Portmore (Arizona State University)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Diana Buccafurni (University of Utah)

Speaker: Japa Pallikkathayil (Harvard University)
“Threats, Punishment, and Proportionality”

Commentator: Christine Overall (Queen’s University)

XII-J. Symposium: Epistemic Externalism

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Naomi Reshotko (University of Denver)

Speaker: Tomoji Shogenji (Rhode Island College)
“An Externalist Guide to Epistemic Practice”

Commentators: James R. Beebe (State University of New York–Buffalo)
Baron Reed (Northern Illinois University)

XII-K. Symposium: Freedom of the Will

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Christopher Grau (Florida International University)

Speaker: Kadri Vihvelin (University of Southern California)
“Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and Impossibilism”

Commentators: Michael McKenna (Florida State University)
Jason Turner (Rutgers University)

XII-L. Symposium: The Non-Identity Problem

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: John Beatty (University of British Columbia)

Speaker: Rivka Weinberg (Scripps College)
"Identifying and Dissolving the Non-Identity Problem"

Commentators: Richard Greene (Weber State University)
Elizabeth Harman (Princeton University)

XII-M. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on Lectures, Publications and Research

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Topic: Romanell Lecture

Chair: Don Garrett (New York University)

Speaker: Louis Loeb (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)
"The Naturalisms of Hume and Reid"

XII-N. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of Women and the Society for Women in Philosophy

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Topic: Special Session in Honor of Iris Marion Young

Chair: Marilyn Friedman (Washington University in St. Louis)

Speakers: Carol C. Gould (Temple University)
Cynthia Willett (Emory University)
Naomi Zack (University of Oregon)

GROUP MEETINGS, 6:00-8:00 P.M.

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

North American Kant Society, Session 2

Philosophy of Time Society

Society for German Idealism, Session 2

Society for Skeptical Studies, Session 1

Society for Social and Political Philosophy: Historical, Continental, and Feminist Perspectives, Session 2

GROUP MEETINGS, 6:00-9:00 P.M.

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

American Society for Aesthetics

International Hobbes Association, Session 2

International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy, Session 2

Philosophy of Religion Group

Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy

Society for Business Ethics

Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World, Session 2

Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Graduate Student Section

Society for the Study of Process Philosophy, Josiah Royce Society, and the Society for the Philosophy of Creativity

GROUP MEETINGS, 8:00-10:00 P.M.

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

International Society for Chinese Philosophy

North American Spinoza Society, Session 2

Society for Skeptical Studies, Session 2

SUNDAY, APRIL 8, 2007

SUNDAY MORNING, APRIL 8

**EASTER EGG HUNT AND RECEPTION IN HONOR OF APA PACIFIC DIVISION
PRESIDENT CALVIN NORMORE**

(All Pacific Division Meeting attendees and their children are invited. If you are coming with your children, please contact Secretary-Treasurer Anita Silvers at asilvers@sfsu.edu before the meeting with children's names, ages, and information about any food allergies, so we can be sure to have appropriate goodies for your children to find on the Easter Egg hunt.)

8:00-10:00 a.m.

SESSION XIII — 9:00 A.M.-NOON

XIII-A. Author-Meets-Critics: David Schmitz, *Elements of Justice*

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Rob Reich (Stanford University)

Critics: Richard Arneson (University of California–San Diego)

Jacob Levy (McGill University)

Christine Swanton (University of Auckland)

Author: David Schmitz (University of Arizona)

XIII-B. Author-Meets-Critics: H. Peter Steeves, *The Things Themselves: Phenomenology and the Return to the Everyday*

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Michael Naas (DePaul University)

- Critics: Richard Lee (DePaul University)
 Dennis Rohatyn (University of San Diego)
 David Wood (Vanderbilt University)
- Author: H. Peter Steeves (California State University–Fresno
 and DePaul University)

XIII-C. Invited Symposium: Feeding the Body, Feeding the Mind: Philosophical Explorations of Food

9:00 a.m.–Noon

- Chair: Andrew Askland (Arizona State University)
- Speakers: Abigail Gosselin (Regis University)
 “Eating and Encumbrance: Navigating Freedom and Responsibility through Food”
 Jon Jensen (Luther College)
 “Food with a Face: Ethics, Connections, and Local Food Movements”
 Steven Kramer (Southwest State University)
 “Food, Authenticity, and the Good Life”
- Commentators: Geoffrey Frasz (Community College of Southern Nevada)
 Ramona Ilea (Pacific University)

XIII-D. Invited Symposium: Plato’s Psychology

9:00 a.m.–Noon

- Chair: Fred D. Jr. Miller (Bowling Green State University)
- Speakers: Thomas C. Brickhouse (Lynchburg College)
 Nicholas D. Smith (Lewis and Clark College)
 “Moral Psychology in Plato’s Meno”
 Allan Silverman (Ohio State University)
 “Plato’s Republic as a Vocation”
- Commentators: Rachel Singpurwalla (Southern Illinois University–Edwardsville)
 Joel Yurdin (University of California–Berkeley)

XIII-E. Colloquium: Epistemology

9:00 a.m.–Noon

9:00–10:00 a.m.

- Chair: Abrol Fairweather (University of San Francisco)
- Speaker: Patrick W. Rysiew (University of Victoria)
 “Epistemic Agency and the Non-Local Truth Goal”
- Commentator: Mashahiro Yamada (Claremont Graduate University)

10:00–11:00 a.m.

- Chair: Kay Mathiesen (University of Arizona)

Speaker: Reza Lahroodi (University of Northern Iowa)
 “Collective Epistemic Virtues”

Commentator: Todd Jones (University of Nevada–Las Vegas)

11:00 a.m.–Noon

Chair: Nikolaj Jang Pedersen (University of California–Los Angeles)

Speaker: Jeffrey Glick (Rutgers University)
 “Testimonial Defeat: A Reply to Lackey”

Commentator: Peter Graham (University of California–Riverside)

XIII-F. Colloquium: Practical Rationality

9:00 a.m.–Noon

9:00–10:00 a.m.

Chair: Paul Hurley (Claremont McKenna College)

Speaker: Jason M. Bridges (University of Chicago)
 “The Normativity of Rationality”

Commentator: Linda Radzik (Texas A&M University)

10:00–11:00 a.m.

Chair: Nina Davis (University of California–San Diego)

Speaker: Paul Katsafanas (Harvard University)
 “Constitutivism and Self-Knowledge”

Commentator: Amy Kind (Claremont McKenna College)

11:00 a.m.–Noon

Chair: Amy Schmitter (University of Alberta)

Speaker: Kenneth A. Presting (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
 “On the Representation of Decision Problems for a Unified Theory of Deliberation and Action”

Commentator: Michael Titelbaum (University of California–Berkeley)

XIII-G. Colloquium: Virtue Ethics

9:00 a.m.–Noon

9:00–10:00 a.m.

Chair: Kristina Gehrman (University of California–Berkeley)

Speaker: Jennifer Lackey (Northern Illinois University)
 “Why There Is No Epistemic Partiality in Friendship”

Commentator: Sarah Stroud (McGill University)

10:00–11:00 a.m.

Chair: Jeremy Anderson (DePauw University)

Speaker: Mark LeBar (Ohio University)
 “Virtue Ethics and Deontic Constraints”

Commentator: Evan Tiffany (Simon Fraser University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Mane Hajdin (Santa Clara University)

Speaker: Paul Bloomfield (University of Connecticut)
 “Justice as a Self-regarding Virtue”

Commentator: Danny Scoccia (New Mexico State University)

XIII-H. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: Fatalism in *The Dream of the Red Chamber*

Chair: Jinmei Yuan (Creighton University)

Speakers: Zijiang Ding (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)

“Fatal Transformation of Truth and Falsity (Zhen-Jia) in *The Dream of Red Chamber*: Some Philosophical Reflections”

Xunwu Chen (University of Texas–San Antonio)

“Life’s Karma and Karmic Life: The Janus Face of Fatalism in *The Dream of Red Chamber*”

Jinmei Yuan (Creighton University)

“The Lost Battle Against Fate: Some Philosophical Reflections of the Tragic Endings of the Romantic Love in *The Dream of the Red Chamber*”

Commentators: Xunwu Chen (University of Texas–San Antonio)

Zijiang Ding (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)

GROUP PROGRAM

WEDNESDAY EVENING, APRIL 4, 2007

GROUP SESSION GI — 6:00-8:00 P.M.

GI-A. International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy, Session 1

6:00-8:00 p.m.

Topic: How Predication Is Possible: From a Comparative Point of View

Chair: Lin Ma (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)

Speakers: Bo Mou (San Jose State University)

“A Subject-Comment Account of How Predication is Possible”

Marshall Willman (University of Iowa)

“Logical Form and Predication from a Comparative Point of View”

Commentator: A. P. Martinich (University of Texas–Austin)

GI-B. Society for Phenomenology and Analytic Philosophy

6:00-8:00 p.m.

Topic: Consciousness and Self-Consciousness

Chair: David Smith (University of California–Irvine)

Speakers: Dan Zahavi (University of Copenhagen)

Charles Siewert (University of California–Riverside)

GROUP SESSION GII — 6:00-9:00 P.M.

GII-A. Radical Philosophy Association, Session 1

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Topic: On the 200th Anniversary of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*: Can His Power of Negativity Speak to Today’s Reality?

Chair: Ron Kelch (Independent Scholar)

Speakers: Eugene Gogol (Independent Scholar)

“Dialectics of Organization and Philosophy”

Ron Kelch (Independent Scholar)

“Harris’s Paradox and Dunayevskaya’s New Beginning: Can Hegel’s Method Shape a New Unity of Theory and Practice”

Urszula Wislanka (Independent Scholar)
 “Hegel’s Dialectic and Feminism”

GII-B. Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Topic: Knowledge, Self, and the Meaning of Life

Chair: Jinmei Yuan (Creighton University)

Speakers: Andrew Komasiniski (Loyola Marymount University)
 “Is There Anything More Important Than Life?”

Christian Coseru (College of Charleston)

“Perception, Particulars, and the Question of
 Foundationalism in Buddhist Epistemology”

Russell Pryba (State University of New York–Buffalo)

“The Confucian Self and William James’s
 Metaphysics of Personhood”

GII-C. Society for German Idealism, Session 1

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Chair: John McCumber (University of California–Los Angeles)

Speaker: Marina F. Bykova (North Carolina State University)
 “Spirit and Concrete Subjectivity in Hegel’s
 Phenomenology”

Commentator: Katrin Pahl (Johns Hopkins University)

Speaker: Charles E. DeBord (University of Kentucky)
 “The Logic of Science in Hegel’s Phenomenology”

Commentator: Marcos Bisticas-Cocoves (Morgan State University)

Speaker: Dietmar Heidemann (Hofstra University)
 “Epistemic Justification and the History of Self-
 Consciousness in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit”

Commentator: Scott Jenkins (Reed College)

GII-D. Society for Iberian and Latin American Thought

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Topic: Roots

Chair: David W. Concepción (Ball State University)

Speakers: Alejandro Santana (University of Portland)
 “Did the Aztecs Do Philosophy?”

James Maffie (Colorado State University)

“*Huehue Tlamaniliztli* and *la Verdad*: Philosophical
 Borderlands in Friar Bernardino de Sahagun’s 1524
Colloquios y doctrina chistiana”

Topic: Citizenship and Identity

Speakers: Grant Silva (University of Oregon)

“Questions of Identity in Latin American Philosophy:
 The Philosophical and Cultural Identity Crisis”

- José-Antonio Orosco (Oregon State University)
 “Toward a Mestizo Concept of Citizenship”
- Topic: Expression
- Speakers: Norman K. Swazo (University of Alaska–Fairbanks)
 “Hegel’s Haunt of Latin American Philosophy: The
 Case of Augusto Salazar Bondy”
- Michael Koch (State University of New York–Oneonta)
 “Latin American Philosophy as Post-Philosophical
 Thinking”
- Commentator: Oscar R. Martí (California State University–
 Northridge)

GII-E. Society for Realist/Antirealist Discussion, Session 1

6:00-9:00 p.m.

- Topic: Realism, Value, and Translation: New Perspectives
- Speakers: J. Jeremy Wisnewski (Hartwick College)
 “Phenomenology and Moral Realism”
- Lawrence Pasternack (Oklahoma State University)
 “Reconciling Intrinsic Value and Realism”
- Shyam Ranganathan (York University)
 “Translation and Anti-Realism”

GII-F. Society for Student Philosophers, Session 1

6:00-9:00 p.m.

- Moderator: Shelly Denkinger (University of Hawaii–Manoa)
- Speakers: Gabriel R. Stern (Loyola Marymount University)
 “Action Guidance and Virtue Ethics”
- Mathieu Doucet (Queen’s University)
 “Disabling Particularism: Jonathan Dancy and Moral
 Principles”
- Yali Corea-Levy (University of Arizona)
 “Double Effect Amended: Preserving the Civilian
 Combatant Distinction”
- Michael Hannon (York University)
 “Representations of ‘Truth’ and the Legitimation
 of Testimony in the Criminal Justice System: An
 Analysis of Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault”

GII-G. Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 1

6:00-9:00 p.m.

- Topic: Culture as Explanation I
- Chair: Mark Bevir (University of California–Berkeley)
- Speakers: Paul Roth (University of California–Santa Cruz)
 “The Disappearance of the Empirical”

- Asaf Kedar (University of California–Berkeley)
 “The Ideal Types as a Hermeneutic Strategy: Concept
 Formation for Cultural Analysis”
- Toby Miller (University of California–Riverside)
 “Where Cultural Studies Fears to Tread”

GII-H. Western Phenomenology Conference

6:00-9:00 p.m.

- Topic: Thinking Towards Community
- Chair: Daniela Vallega-Neu (California State University–
Stanislaus)
- Speakers: Ben Pryor (University of Toledo)
 “Nobody Ever Recognizes Us’: Community and
 Aesthetic Experience”
- Jason Winfree (California State University–Stanislaus)
 “Contestation and Community”
- Walter Brogan (Villanova University)
 “Passion and the Secret Gift of the Derridean
 Community”

GROUP SESSION GIII — 8:00-10:00 P.M.

GIII-A. North American Wittgenstein Society, Session 1

8:00-10:00 p.m.

- Chair: Elizabeth Wolgast (California State University–East
Bay)
- Speaker: Monica Vilhauer (Roanoke College)
 “Wittgensteinian Ethics?”
- Commentator: Mike Rohde (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)
- Speaker: Richard Raatzsch (University of Cambridge)
 “Teleological Metaphilosophy”
- Commentator: John W. Powell (Humboldt State University)

MI-5. Joint Meeting of Mini-Conference on Models of God and the Society of Christian Philosophers

7:00-8:30 p.m.

- Speaker: Dallas Willard (University of Southern California)
 “Intentionality and the Substance of the Self”
- Commentator: Brian Treanor (Loyola Marymount University)
- Speaker: Paul Moser (Loyola University of Chicago)
 “Forgiveness as Cognitively Significant”
- Commentator: Pamela Hieronymi (University of California–Los
Angeles)

MI-6. Mini-Conference on Models of God Keynote Address

8:30-10:00 p.m.

Speaker: Wesley Wildman (Boston University)
 “Behind, Between, and Beyond Anthropomorphic
 Models of Ultimate Reality”

THURSDAY EVENING, APRIL 5, 2007

GROUP SESSION GIV — 6:00-8:00 P.M.

GIV-A. American Association of Philosophy Teachers

6:00-8:00 p.m.

Topic: Using and Creating Texts, Textbooks, Anthologies,
 and Other Materials in Teaching Philosophy Courses

Chair: David W. Concepción (Ball State University)

Speakers: Joan Whitman Hoff (Lock Haven University of
 Pennsylvania)
 “Engagement: Exploring the Self and Other via the
 Writing and Teaching of a Text”

Nils Ch. Rauhut (Coastal Carolina University)
 “Selecting Course Materials in Philosophy Classes:
 What Works, What Doesn’t?”

Andrew N. Carpenter (Kaplan University)
 “Teaching Without Texts”

Robert Timko (Mansfield University of Pennsylvania)
 “The Risks (and Benefits) of Engaging Yourself as
 Author (or Editor) of a Philosophical Text”

GIV-B. Hume Society

6:00-8:00 p.m.

Topic: Hume: Reasons and Reasoning

Chair: Aaron Zimmerman (University of California–Santa
 Barbara)

Speakers: Abraham Roth (Ohio State University)
 “Hume on Reasoning: Simple Versus Sophisticated”

Elizabeth Radcliffe (Santa Clara University)
 “Humeanism and Value-Based Reasons”

GIV-C. Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs

6:00-8:00 p.m.

Topic: Human Rights in Global Governance: Alternative
 Perspectives

Chair: Carol C. Gould (Temple University)

Speakers: Helen Stacy (Stanford University)
 “Human Rights and Regional Institutions”

David Reidy (University of Tennessee)
 “Human Rights: Agendas and Institutions”

GIV-D. Society for the Metaphysics of Science*6:00-8:00 p.m.*

Chair: Robert A. Wilson (University of Alberta)

Speakers: Carl Craver (Washington University in St. Louis)
"Mechanisms, Modularity, and Natural Kinds"

Karen Neander (Duke University)

"The New Functionalism"

GROUP SESSION GV — 6:00-9:00 P.M.**GV-A. Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 1***6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Topic: New Work on Chinese Philosophy from Taiwan

Chair: JeeLoo Liu (California State University–Fullerton)

Speaker: Wan-Chuan Fang (Academia Sinica)
"Zhuangzi's Sage as a Moral Agent"

Commentator: Yang Xiao (Kenyon College)

Speaker: Terence Tai (National Zhengzhi University)
"Xunzi on the Nature and Mind of Human Beings"

Commentator: Weimin Sun (California State University–Northridge)

Speaker: Rong-Po Chen (Tunghai University)
"I-Ching's Philosophy of Management"

Commentator: Craig K. Ihara (California State University–Fullerton)

GV-B. Concerned Philosophers for Peace*6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Topic: Ethics in a Dark Time

Speakers: Eddy Souffrant (University of North Carolina–Charlotte)

"Challenges to Collective Global Action"

Daniel Farrell (Ohio State University)

"Self-Defense and Preventive War"

Ron Hirschbein (California State University–Chico)

"The Rite of Self-Defense"

Stephen L Nathanson (Northeastern University)

"Utilitarianism and the Ethics of War"

GV-C. Kierkegaard Society*6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Topic: Furtak and Others on Kierkegaard, Wisdom, and Love

Chair: Noel Adams (Marquette University)

Speakers: Robert Roberts (Baylor University)
"Emotions as Epistemic Ground: Comments on Furtak's Wisdom in Love"

Mark McCreary (Loyola University of Chicago)
 “Kierkegaard on the Obstacles to Faith and Love: The
 Terrifying Truth and the Possibility of Offense”

Michael Strawser (University of Central Florida)
 “Striving for Love in Spinoza and Kierkegaard”

Respondent: Rick Anthony Furtak (Colorado College)

GV-D. North American Nietzsche Society

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: Bernard Reginster, *The
 Affirmation of Life*

Chair: Lanier Anderson (Stanford University)

Author: Bernard Reginster (Brown University)

Critics: Maudemarie Clark (Colgate University)
 Nadeem J. Z. Hussain (Stanford University)
 Ivan Soll (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

GV-E. North American Spinoza Society, Session 1

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Chair: Fred Ablondi (Hendrix College)

Speaker: Frank Lucash (University of Nevada–Reno)
 “Spinoza and Searle on the Nature of the Human Mind”

Commentator: Diane Steinberg (Cleveland State University)

Speaker: Eugene Garver (College of St. Benedict and St. John’s
 University)
 “Religion and Politics as Loci of Rational Agreement”

Commentator: Steve Barbone (San Diego State University)

Speaker: Gideon Segal (Holon Institute of Technology and
 Hebrew University)
 “Spinoza’s Therapeutic Model and the Role of
 Intuitive Knowledge”

Commentator: Firmin DeBrabander (Maryland Institute College of Art)

GV-F. Society for Analytical Feminism

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Topic: Feminist Moral Epistemology

Chair: Alison Jaggar (University of Colorado–Boulder)

Speakers: Phyllis Rooney (Oakland University)
 “Remapping the Terrain of Moral Epistemology”
 Heidi Grasswick (Middlebury College)
 “Knowing Moral Agents: Epistemic Dependency and
 the Moral Realm”

Peg O’Connor (Gustavus Adolphus College)
 “Knowing Our Obligations of Justice: A
 Wittgensteinian Metaphysics and Epistemology”

**GV-G. Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy and the APA
Committee on the Status of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and
Transgendered People in the Profession**

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Topic: Transgender/Feminist

Moderator: D. Rita Alfonso (Grinnell College)

Speakers: Julia Serano (University of California–Berkeley)
“Feminine Wiles: Re-thinking Sexism and Anti-Trans
Woman Sentiment”

Susan Stryker (University of California–Berkeley)
“Feminist Theory and the History of Transgender
Activism”

Dylan Vade (Independent Scholar)
“No Apology: The Intersection of Fat and Transgender
Law”

Sondra Solovay (New College of California)
“No Apology: The Intersection of Fat and Transgender
Law”

Shawna Virago (Independent Scholar)
“Violence Against Women, A Transgender Perspective”

GV-H. Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World, Session 1

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Topic: Religion, Love, and the Abyss

Chair: J. Jeremy Wisnewski (Hartwick College)

Speakers: Andrew Fiala (California State University–Fresno)
“Ethics, Reason, and God”

Charles W. Harvey (University of Central Arkansas)
“Narcissism, Fundamentalism and the Dirty Trick of
Infinitude”

Ralph Ellis (Clark Atlanta University)
“Rethinking Love and the Abyss”

David K. Chan (University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point)
“The Possibility of Philosophy as Religion”

GV-I. Society for Student Philosophers, Session 2

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Moderator: Gabriel R. Stern (Loyola Marymount University)

Speakers: Parker Crutchfield (Arizona State University)
“Mood about You”

James Ambury (State University of New York–Stony
Brook)

“Nietzsche’s Pedagogical Dialectic: On the
Remembering and Forgetting of the Youthful for Life”

Huaping Lu-Adler (University of California–Davis)
 “Realism, Conceptual Relativity, and Analytic
 Entailment”

Marina Folescu (University of Western Ontario)
 “The Fictional Worlds of Impossible Fictions”

GV-J. William James Society

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Topic: Pragmatism and Its Others

Chair: Brendan Hogan (Pacific Lutheran University)

Speakers: Kevin S. Decker (Eastern Washington University)
 “Between Bare Brute Events and Transparent
 Meaning: Dewey and James on Recognition”

Heidi White (New York University)

“Pragmatism and Our Relations with Others”

Lee McBride (College of Wooster)

“The Dynamic Belt of Quivering Uncertainty:
 Individual Differences”

Commentator: Terrance MacMullan (Eastern Washington University)

GROUP SESSION GVI — 8:00-10:00 P.M.

GVI-A. Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking

8:00-10:00 p.m.

Chair: Maurice Finocchiaro (University of Nevada–Las Vegas)

Speaker: Jerry Cederblom (University of Nebraska–Omaha)
 “Is It Sometimes Rational to Accept That an Argument
 Is Sound, but Not Believe the Conclusion?”

Commentator: Don Marquis (University of Kansas)

Speaker: Mark Weinstein (Montclair State University)
 “Towards an Objectivist Account of Truth in
 Argument”

Commentator: Donald Hatcher (Baker University)

GVI-B. North American Wittgenstein Society, Session 2

8:00-10:00 p.m.

Chair: Elizabeth Wolgast (California State University–East
 Bay)

Speaker: Robert Fogelin (Dartmouth College)
 “Grice’s Objections Are More Effective Against Austin
 Than Against Wittgenstein”

Commentator: Jeff Johnson (College of St. Catherine)

The paper and discussion will be followed by a business meeting.

GVI-C. Society for Systematic Philosophy, Session 1*8:00-10:00 p.m.*

Topic: Hegel and Putnam

Chair: Richard Dien Winfield (University of Georgia)

Speaker: Katharina Dulckeit (Butler University)

"Unlikely Bedfellows? Putnam and Hegel on Natural Kind Terms"

Commentator: J. M. Fritzman (Lewis and Clark College)

GVI-D. Society for the Study of Philosophy and the Martial Arts*8:00-10:00 p.m.*

Chair: Joseph Lynch (California Polytechnic State University)

Speakers: Alan Bäck (Kutztown University of Pennsylvania)

"Art, Kata, and Violence"

Richard Schubert (Cosumnes River College)

"Goals and Goallessness in the Martial Arts"

Joseph Lynch (California Polytechnic State University)

"Martial Arts as Philosophy"

Gillian Russell (Washington University in St. Louis)

"Practicing Evil"

Blanche Nonken (University of California–Davis)

"Warrior Isolate"

FRIDAY EVENING, APRIL 6, 2007**GROUP SESSION GVII — 8:00-11:00 P.M.****GVII-A. Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 2***8:00-11:00 p.m.*

Topic: Topics in Confucian Ethics

Chair: Weimin Sun (California State University–Northridge)

Speaker: Sin Yee Chan (University of Vermont)

"The Cultivation of Moral Emotions in Early Confucianism"

Commentator: Manyul Im (California State University–Los Angeles)

Speaker: JeeLoo Liu (California State University–Fullerton)

"The Path from Natural Emotions to Moral Sentiments: An Examination of Wang Fuzhi's Ethical Naturalism"

Commentator: Andrew Terjesen (Washington and Lee University)

Speaker: Derong Chen (Wuhan University)

"Beyond Relativism: Examining Tan Sitong's Criticism of Confucian Ethics"

Commentator: Jinmei Yuan (Creighton University)

GVII-B. International Hobbes Association, Session 1*8:00-11:00 p.m.*

- Moderators: Rosamond Rhodes (Mount Sinai School of Medicine and City University of New York–Graduate Center)
Wendell Stephenson (Fresno City College)
- Speaker: Jeremy Anderson (DePauw University)
“A Suggestive Silence in the Evolution of Hobbes’s Account of Disorder”
- Commentator: Wendell Stephenson (Fresno City College)
- Speaker: John Whipple (University of California–Irvine)
“Hobbes on Miracles”
- Commentator: Martin Bertman (University of Helsinki)
- Speaker: Michael P. Krom (Emory University)
“Vain Philosophy, the Schools, and Civil Philosophy”
- Commentator: Susanne Sreedhar (Tulane University of New Orleans)

GVII-C. Karl Jaspers Society and the Victor von Weizsäcker Society*8:00-11:00 p.m.*

- Chair: Helmut Wautischer (Sonoma State University)
- Speaker: Hartwig Wiedebach (Universität Zürich)
“Pathic Existence and Causality in Victor von Weizsäcker”
- Commentator: Sophia Stone (University of San Francisco)
- Speaker: Gregory Walters (University of Ottawa)
“Evolutionary Epistemology, Ethics, and the Encompassing”
- Commentator: David Rau (Independent Scholar)

GVII-D. North American Kant Society, Session 1*8:00-11:00 p.m.*

- Topic: Kant’s Ethics
- Chair: Daniel Guevara (University of California–Santa Cruz)
- Speakers: Oliver Sensen (Tulane University of New Orleans)
“Kant’s Conception of Human Dignity”
Ido Geiger (Ben Gurion University)
“What Is the Use of the Universal Law Formulation?”
- Commentators: Susan Castro (University of California–Los Angeles)
Sergio Tenenbaum (University of Toronto)

GVII-E. Radical Philosophy Association, Session 2*8:00-11:00 p.m.*

- Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: Anatole Anton and Richard Schmitt, eds., *Toward a New Socialism*
- Chair: Phil Gasper (Notre Dame de Namur University)

- Critics: Tommy Lott (San Jose State University)
 Rita Manning (San Jose State University)
 Jose Mendoza (University of Oregon)
- Respondents: Anatole Anton (San Francisco State University)
 Richard Schmitt (Worcester State College)

GVII-F. Society for Empirical Ethics

8:00-11:00 p.m.

- Topic: Moral Emotions
- Chair: Joel Martinez (Lewis and Clark College)
- Speakers: Justin D'Arms (Ohio State University)
 Daniel Jacobson (Bowling Green State University)
 "Guilt and Wrongness Reconsidered"
- Joshua Knobe (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
 "Moral Cognition: Monolithic Theories Versus
 Hodgepodge Theories"
- Jesse Prinz (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
 "Against Empathy"
- Shaun Nichols (University of Arizona)
 "Do Reactive Attitudes Enshrine Incompatibilism?"
- William A. Rottschaefer (Lewis and Clark College)
 "Moral Emotions: Detectors or Projectors?"

GVII-G. Society for Realist/Antirealist Discussion, Session 2

8:00-11:00 p.m.

- Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: Steven D. Hales, *Relativism and the Foundations of Philosophy*
- Author: Steven D. Hales (Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania)
- Critics: Paul Boghossian (New York University)
 Otávio Bueno (University of Miami)
 Henry Jackman (York University)
 Jonathan M. Weinberg (Indiana University–Bloomington)

GVII-H. Society for Social and Political Philosophy: Historical, Continental, and Feminist Perspectives, Session 1

8:00-11:00 p.m.

- Topic: Wendy Brown's Challenges to Feminist and Leftist Political Theory
- Speakers: Anna Carastathis (McGill University)
 Hasana Sharp (McGill University)
- Respondent: Wendy Brown (University of California–Berkeley)

GVII-I. Society for Student Philosophers, Session 3*8:00-11:00 p.m.*

Topic: What We Don't Know Can Hurt Us: Philosophy and the Overcoming of Ignorance

Moderator: Jeremy Henkel (University of Hawaii–Manoa)

Speakers: Geoff Ashton (University of Hawaii–Manoa)
 “A Case Study of Art as Naturalistic Map: Cognitive Immoralism and the *Mahabharata*”

Shelly Denkinger (University of Hawaii–Manoa)
 “Border Ethics, the Limitations of Knowledge of Others, and Implications for Education”

David Burns (University of New Mexico)
 “Forgetting Nietzsche”

Laura P. Guerrero (University of New Mexico)
 “Land of the Free? The Delusion of Autonomy and its Role in the Enslavement of America”

Allison Hagerman (University of New Mexico)
 “Off the Deep End: The Sublime Folly of Niagara Falls”

Lara Mitias (University of Hawaii–Manoa)
 “Transformation of Memory from a Source of Bondage to a Source of Liberation”

GVII-J. Society for Systematic Philosophy, Session 2*8:00-11:00 p.m.*

Topic: Hegel's Logic of Essence

Chair: J. M. Fritzman (Lewis and Clark College)

Speakers: Richard Dien Winfield (University of Georgia)
 “How Should Essence Be Determined: Reflections on Hegel's Two Divergent Accounts”

David Kolb (Bates College)
 “The Paths of Essence”

GVII-K. Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy*8:00-11:00 p.m.*

Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: Patrick Baert, *Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Towards Pragmatism*

Chair: Heidi White (New York University)

Author: Patrick Baert (University of Cambridge)

Critics: James Bohman (St. Louis University)
 Brendan Hogan (Pacific Lutheran University)
 Paul Roth (University of California–Santa Cruz)
 Stephen Turner (University of South Florida)

GVII-L. Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts

8:00-11:00 p.m.

Chair: Julie C. Van Camp (California State University–Long Beach)

Speakers: Amy Coplan (California State University–Fullerton)
“Feminist Final Girls”

Aaron Golec (University of Wisconsin–La Crosse)

Sheryl Tuttle Ross (University of Wisconsin–La Crosse)

“Reconciled and Terrible Humor in the Culture Industry”

Jeon Suk Oh (Drew University and Kean University)

“Viewing Memoirs of a Geisha through a Postcolonial Feminist Perspective”

Commentator: Julie C. Van Camp (California State University–Long Beach)

GVII-M. Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 2

8:00-11:00 p.m.

Topic: Culture as Explanation II

Chair: Paul Rabinow (University of California–Berkeley)

Speakers: Mark Bevir (University of California–Berkeley)

“Philosophical Historiography after the Linguistic Turns”

Naomi Zack (University of Oregon)

“Political and Cultural Explanation of Disasters”

Dan Segal (Pitzer College)

“Translation Effects in Historical Writing”

GVII-N. Society for Women in Philosophy

8:00-11:00 p.m.

Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: Lorraine Code, *Ecological Thinking: The Politics of Epistemic Location*

Chair: Rosemarie Tong (University of North Carolina–Charlotte)

Author: Lorraine Code (York University)

Critics: Peta Bowden (Murdoch University)

Carla Fehr (Iowa State University)

Charles Mills (University of Illinois–Chicago)

SATURDAY EVENING, APRIL 7, 2007
GROUP SESSION GVIII — 6:00-8:00 P.M.
GVIII-A. North American Kant Society, Session 2

6:00-8:00 p.m.

Topic: Kant on Apperception

Chair: Peter Thielke (Pomona College)

Speakers: Stephen Engstrom (University of Pittsburgh)
 “Unity of Apperception”

Houston Smit (University of Arizona)

“What Is the Unity of Apperception?”

Commentator: Pierre Keller (University of California–Riverside)

GVIII-B. Philosophy of Time Society

6:00-8:00 p.m.

Chair: Alyssa Ney (University of Rochester)

Speakers: Cody Gilmore (University of California–Davis)
 “Temporally Thick Enduring Objects”

Lawrence Lombard (Wayne State University)

“Time for a Change: A Polemic against the
 Presentism/Eternalism Debate”

GVIII-C. Society for German Idealism, Session 2

6:00-8:00 p.m.

Chair: Aaron Bunch (Washington State University)

Speakers: John Russon (University of Guelph)
 “Spirit and Method in Hegel’s Phenomenology”

Brent Adkins (Roanoke College)

“The Politics of Fear: Hegel’s Response to Hobbes in
 the Phenomenology”

GVIII-D. Society for Skeptical Studies, Session 1

6:00-8:00 p.m.

Chair: Rachel Robison (Weber State University)

Speakers: Richard Greene (Weber State University)
 “A Worry about Safety”

William S. Larkin (Southern Illinois University–
 Edwardsville)

“The Incorrigible Foundations of Knowledge”

**GVIII-E. Society for Social and Political Philosophy: Historical,
 Continental, and Feminist Perspectives, Session 2**

6:00-8:00 p.m.

Topic: Rethinking Democracy

Moderator: Hasana Sharp (McGill University)

Speakers: Michael Marder (New School University)

“Risky Recognitions: The Concept of Political Risk in Carl Schmitt”

Cory Wimberly (University of Texas–Pan American)

“Foucault as Democrat: A Rethinking of Democracy!”

Commentator: William Roberts (Washington and Jefferson College)

GROUP SESSION GIX — 6:00-9:00 P.M.

GIX-A. American Society for Aesthetics

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Topic: Relativism and the Philosophy of Art

Speakers: Andrew Egan (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor and Australian National University)

“Looks Good from Here: Self-Locating Aesthetic Relativism”

James O. Young (University of Victoria)

“Relativism, Aesthetic, and Non-Aesthetic”

Andrew McGonigal (University of Leeds and Cornell University)

“Truth in Serial Fiction”

Commentator: Alan Goldman (College of William and Mary)

GIX-B. International Hobbes Association, Session 2

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Moderator: Martin Bertman (University of Helsinki)

Speaker: Jeffrey Barnouw (University of Texas–Austin)

“Reason as Reckoning: Hobbes’s Natural Law as Right Reason”

Commentator: John Deigh (University of Texas–Austin)

Speaker: Tommy Lott (San Jose State University)

“Sovereignty by Acquisition and Hobbes’s Political Realism”

Commentator: Rosamond Rhodes (Mount Sinai School of Medicine and City University of New York–Graduate Center)

Speaker: Steve Viner (Washington University in St. Louis)

“Was Hobbes a Realist?”

Commentator: Gary Herbert (Loyola University–New Orleans)

GIX-C. International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy, Session 2

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Topic: Chinese Aesthetics and Metaphysics in Comparative Perspective

Chair: Yang Xiao (Kenyon College)

- Speakers: Derong Chen (Wuhan University)
 “Metaphor and Abstractness: Metaphysical Terms in Chinese and Western Philosophy”
- Chong Ming Lin (LCM Research)
 “The Influence of the Chinese Character on the Movie Montage”
- Chan Lee (University of Hawaii–Manoa)
 “Zhu Xi on Ontological Reflection of Self-Cultivation”
- Commentator: Mark Brasher (TransPacific Hawaii College)

GIX-D. Philosophy of Religion Group

6:00-9:00 p.m.

- Chair: Anya Farennikova (Biola University)
- Speakers: Daniel Howard-Snyder (Western Washington University)
 “Some Puzzles about Prayer”
- Robert Bolger (Claremont Graduate University)
 “Bringing Heaven Down to Earth: D. Z. Phillips on Immortality”
- Jeffrey Green (University of Notre Dame)
 “The Sovereignty-Aseity Conviction”

GIX-E. Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy

6:00-9:00 p.m.

- Topic: Plato
- Chair: Julius Moravcsik (Stanford University)
- Speakers: Jan Szaif (University of California–Davis)
 “Remarks on the Socratic Conception of Rationality”
- Matthew King (York University)
 “Socrates’s Great Escape: Philosophy and Politics in the Crito”
- John Mouracade (University of Alaska–Anchorage)
 “*Republic* II-IX: An Argument That Ignores Consequences”

GIX-F. Society for Business Ethics

6:00-9:00 p.m.

- Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: Kenneth Goodpaster,
Conscience and Corporate Culture
- Chair: Marvin Brown (University of San Francisco)
- Author: Kenneth Goodpaster (University of St. Thomas–Minnesota)
- Critics: Robert Audi (University of Notre Dame)
 Thomas White (Loyola Marymount University)

GIX-G. Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World, Session 2*6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Topic: Moral Perception

Speakers: J. Jeremy Wisnewski (Hartwick College)

"Ethics and Aesthetics as One: Remarks on the Primacy of Moral Perception"

Jennifer Wright (University of Wyoming)

"The Role of Moral Perception in Mature Moral Agency"

Henry Jacoby (East Carolina University)

"What Is a Theory of Moral Perception?"

GIX-H. Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Graduate Student Section*6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Topic: Intersections in American and Continental Philosophy

Chair: Mathew A. Foust (University of Oregon)

Speakers: Nicholas Reynolds (University of Oregon)

"Royce's Theory of Interpretation and Marcel's Existential Fulcrum"

Seth Vannatta (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)

"Brightman's Personalism and Husserl's Phenomenology"

Erick Burke (Colorado State University)

"One-Dimensionality and the Cosmopolitan Self: Mead and Marcuse"

Christy Reynolds (University of Oregon)

"Absolute You: A Buberian Reading of Purpose and Community in Royce"

GIX-I. Society for the Study of Process Philosophy, Josiah Royce Society, and the Society for the Philosophy of Creativity*6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Chair: John Quiring (Victor Valley College)

Remarks: Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley (California State University–Bakersfield)

"On the Josiah Royce Society"

Randall Auxier (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)

"On the Society for the Philosophy of Creativity"

Speaker: Christina Hutchins (Independent Scholar)

"The Creativity of the Lost Cause: Grief and Imagination as Environmental Praxis"

Respondent: Adam Scarfe (California State University–Bakersfield)

GROUP SESSION GX — 8:00-10:00 P.M.**GX-A. International Society for Chinese Philosophy***8:00-10:00 p.m.*

Topic: Ethical Issues

Chair: Kim Skoog (University of Guam)

Speakers: Kim Skoog (University of Guam)

“How to Avoid Paying for One’s Sins Without Bankrupting the Amasser of Justice”

Jeremy Henkel (University of Hawaii–Manoa)

“How to Avoid Solipsism While Remaining an Idealist: Lessons from Berkeley and Dharmakirti”

Ann Pang-White (University of Scranton)

“The Metamorphosis of Ethics: Confucianism and the Reconstruction of Modern Ethics”

GX-B. North American Spinoza Society, Session 2*8:00-10:00 p.m.*

Chair: Firmin DeBrabander (Maryland Institute College of Art)

Speaker: Matt Wion (Marquette University)

“Can Spinoza’s God Love?”

Commentator: Vance Maxwell (Memorial University of Newfoundland)

Speaker: Tom Cook (Rollins College)

“Leibniz and Spinoza on Chimaeras and Other Unthinkable Things”

Commentator: Steve Barbone (San Diego State University)

GX-C. Society for Skeptical Studies, Session 2*8:00-10:00 p.m.*

Chair: Richard Greene (Weber State University)

Speakers: Ilhan Inan (Bogaziçi University)

“How to Be Open-minded Without Being a Skeptic”

Rachel Robison (Weber State University)

“On Subject Sensitive Invariantism”

Maria Adamos (Georgia Southern University)

“The Ancients, the Vulgar, and Hume’s Skepticism”

MAIN, GROUP, AND MINI-CONFERENCE PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS

(Group sessions begin with “G.” Mini-conference sessions begin with “M.”
All others are main sessions.)

A

Ablondi, Fred (Hendrix College)	GV-E Thu PM
Abramson, Kate (Indiana University–Bloomington)	VII-E Fri AM
Adamos, Maria (Georgia Southern University)	GX-C Sat PM
Adams, Noel (Marquette University)	GV-C Thu PM
Adkins, Brent (Roanoke College)	GVIII-C Sat PM
Aguilar, Jesús (Rochester Institute of Technology)	VII-L Fri AM, VIII-G Fri PM
Aikin, Scott (Vanderbilt University)	IX-G Fri PM
Alanen, Lilli (Uppsala Universitet)	XI-A Sat PM
Alexander, Joshua (Indiana University–Bloomington)	XI-J Sat PM
Alexandrova, Anna (University of Missouri–Saint Louis)	VII-D Fri AM
Alfonso, D. Rita (Grinnell College)	GV-G Thu PM
Allais, Lucy (University of Sussex)	V-I Thu PM
Allhoff, Fritz (Western Michigan University)	MII-3 Wed AM, II-I Wed PM
Alonso, Facundo Martin (Stanford University)	VIII-G Fri PM
Alvarez Manninen, Bertha (Arizona State University)	VIII-J Fri PM
Alward, Peter (University of Lethbridge)	VII-F Fri AM
Ambury, James (State University of New York–Stony Brook)	GV-I Thu PM
Amini, Majid (Virginia State University)	X-J Sat AM
Anderson, Jeremy (DePauw University)	GVII-B Fri PM, XIII-G Sun AM
Anderson, Lanier (Stanford University)	GV-D Thu PM, VIII-B Fri PM
Anderson, Pamela Sue (University of Oxford)	MI-2 Wed AM
Anderson, Scott A. (University of British Columbia)	XI-K Sat PM
Angelides, Alexei (Stanford University)	IX-G Fri PM
Anton, Anatole (San Francisco State University)	GVII-E Fri PM
Arbour, Laura (University of British Columbia)	VIII-E Fri PM
Arico, Adam (University of Arizona)	XII-F Sat PM
Ariew, Andre (University of Missouri–Columbia)	IV-G Thu AM
Arneson, Richard (University of California–San Diego)	XIII-A Sun AM

Arseneault, Madeleine (University of Wisconsin–Madison)	XII-E Sat PM
Asher, Gerald (Gourmet Magazine)	MII-6 Wed PM
Ashton, Geoff (University of Hawaii–Manoa)	GVII-I Fri PM
Askland, Andrew (Arizona State University)	XIII-C Sun AM
Atchison, Adam (Claremont Graduate University)	III-F Wed PM
Audi, Paul (Colgate University)	I-G Wed AM
Audi, Robert (University of Notre Dame)	IX-D Fri PM, GIX-F Sat PM
Auxier, Randall (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)	GIX-I Sat PM
Axtell, Guy (University of Nevada–Reno)	II-G Wed PM

B

Baber, H. E. (University of San Diego)	IX-J Fri PM
Bach, Kent (San Francisco State University)	MII-1 Wed AM, MII-6 Wed PM, X-E Sat AM
Bäck, Alan (Kutztown University of Pennsylvania)	GVI-D Thu PM
Baehr, Jason (Loyola Marymount University)	I-G Wed AM
Baert, Patrick (University of Cambridge)	GVII-K Fri PM
Baker, Lynne Rudder (University of Massachusetts–Amherst) ...	III-B Wed PM
Ball, Carlos (Pennsylvania State University)	X-F Sat AM
Ballarin, Roberta (University of British Columbia)	XII-E Sat PM
Barbone, Steve (San Diego State University)	GV-E Thu PM, GX-B Sat PM
Baril, Anne (University of Arizona)	VIII-J Fri PM
Barnett, David (University of Colorado–Boulder)	VIII-H Fri PM
Barnouw, Jeffrey (University of Texas–Austin)	GIX-B Sat PM
Barr, Bennett (University of Washington)	I-E Wed AM
Bashour, Bana (City University of New York–Graduate School) ...	I-I Wed AM
Basinger, David (Roberts Wesleyan College)	MI-7 Thu AM
Battaly, Heather (California State University–Fullerton)	X-F Sat AM
Battin, Margaret (University of Utah)	VII-A Fri AM
Baxley, Anne Margaret (Washington University in St. Louis)	V-C Thu PM
Baxter, Donald L.M. (University of Connecticut)	IV-E Thu AM
Baxter-Parrott, Matthew (University of California–Berkeley)	I-I Wed AM
Bayley, Carol (Catholic Healthcare West)	III-D Wed PM
Bayne, Steven M. (Fairfield University)	V-I Thu PM
Beall, JC (University of Connecticut)	V-B Thu PM
Beatty, John (University of British Columbia)	XII-L Sat PM
Becker, Kelly (University of New Mexico)	VIII-D Fri PM
Beebe, James R. (State University of New York–Buffalo)	XII-J Sat PM
Beggs, Svetlana (University of California–Riverside)	II-H Wed PM
Beiser, Frederick (Syracuse University)	V-C Thu PM
Bellon, Christina (California State University–Sacramento)	X-M Sat AM, XII-G Sat PM

Bender, John (Ohio University)	MII-4 Wed PM, X-G Sat AM
Bengson, John T. (University of Texas–Austin)	III-J Wed PM
Benjamin, Martin (Michigan State University)	VII-K Fri AM
Bennett, Emily (Claremont Graduate University).....	MI-8 Thu AM
Bennett, Karen (Princeton University).....	IX-M Fri PM
Bergqvist, Anna (University of Reading).....	III-E Wed PM
Berkey, Brian (University of California–Berkeley)	III-A Wed PM
Berkhout, Suze (University of British Columbia).....	V-G Thu PM
Bermudez, Jose Luis (Washington University in St. Louis).....	XII-C Sat PM
Bernstein, Sara (University of Arizona).....	X-I Sat AM
Berryman, Sylvia (University of British Columbia).....	X-D Sat AM
Bertman, Martin (University of Helsinki)	GVII-B Fri PM, GIX-B Sat PM
Bett, Richard (Johns Hopkins University)	X-K Sat AM
Bettcher, Talia (California State University–Los Angeles)	IV-E Thu AM
Bevir, Mark (University of California–Berkeley)	
.....	GIJ-G Wed PM, GVII-M Fri PM
Bezylko, Tony (University of California–Berkeley).....	I-E Wed AM
Birondo, Noell (Pomona College).....	XII-H Sat PM
Bishop, John (University of Auckland)	MI-4 Wed PM, MI-9 Thu PM
Bisticas-Cocoves, Marcos (Morgan State University).....	GII-C Wed PM
Blackson, Thomas (Arizona State University)	VI-E Thu PM
Bloomfield, Paul (University of Connecticut)	XIII-G Sun AM
Bobro, Marc (Santa Barbara City College)	V-I Thu PM
Boersema, David (Pacific University)	V-H Thu PM
Boghossian, Paul (New York University)	GVII-G Fri PM
Bohman, James (St. Louis University).....	GVII-K Fri PM
Bolger, Robert (Claremont Graduate University)	GIX-D Sat PM
Borgmann, Albert (University of Montana)	XII-A Sat PM
Boruah, Bijoy (Indian Institute of Technology–Kanpur).....	II-I Wed PM
Bowden, Peta (Murdoch University).....	GVII-N Fri PM, X-A Sat AM
Bower, Marya (Earlham College).....	X-M Sat AM
Bradshaw, David (University of Kentucky)	MI-4 Wed PM
Brandom, Robert (University of Pittsburgh).....	II-G Wed PM
Brasher, Mark (TransPacific Hawaii College)	IV-F Thu AM, GIX-C Sat PM
Breazeale, Daniel (University of Kentucky)	IX-A Fri PM
Brennan, Tad (Northwestern University)	XI-D Sat PM
Brickhouse, Thomas C. (Lynchburg College).....	XIII-D Sun AM
Bridges, Jason M. (University of Chicago).....	XIII-F Sun AM
Bright, Josh (University of California–Riverside)	XI-I Sat PM
Brisson, Susan (Dartmouth College)	X-A Sat AM
Brock, Daniel (Harvard University)	VII-A Fri AM
Brogaard, Berit (University of Missouri–Saint Louis)	VII-J Fri AM

Brogan, Walter (Villanova University).....	GII-I Wed PM
Brosnan, Kevin (University of California–Santa Cruz)	IX-K Fri PM
Brown, Chris (University of Arizona)	VII-I Fri AM
Brown, Deborah J. (University of Queensland).....	XI-A Sat PM
Brown, Delwin (Pacific School of Religion).....	MI-3 Wed PM
Brown, Eric (Washington University in St. Louis).....	VIII-C Fri PM
Brown, Harvey (Oxford University).....	II-B Wed PM
Brown, Karin (San Jose State University).....	II-I Wed PM
Brown, Marvin (University of San Francisco)	GIX-F Sat PM
Brown, Stephen (Briar Cliff College)	VI-H Thu PM
Brown, Wendy (University of California–Berkeley)	GVII-H Fri PM
Buccafurni, Diana (University of Utah).....	XII-I Sat PM
Buckareff, Andrei (Franklin and Marshall College).....	IV-I Thu AM
Bueno, Otávio (University of Miami)	V-B Thu PM, GVII-G Fri PM
Buller, Thomas (University of Alaska–Anchorage).....	VI-G Thu PM
Bunch, Aaron (Washington State University)	V-I Thu PM, GVIII-C Sat PM
Burke, Erick (Colorado State University).....	GIX-H Sat PM
Burns, David (University of New Mexico)	GVII-I Fri PM
Butler, James (Berea College).....	V-F Thu PM
Bykova, Marina F. (North Carolina State University)	GII-C Wed PM
Byrne, Alex (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)	V-E Thu PM

C

Caie, Michael (University of California–Berkeley).....	I-F Wed AM
Calhoun, Cheshire (Colby College)	IX-B Fri PM
Callaway, Chris (Westmont College).....	III-F Wed PM
Callender, Craig (University of California–San Diego)	V-K Thu PM
Cameron, Ross (University of Leeds).....	V-J Thu PM
Camp, Elisabeth (University of Pennsylvania)	XI-B Sat PM
Campbell, John (University of California–Berkeley).....	XI-G Sat PM
Campbell, Joseph Keim (Washington State University).....	I-E Wed AM
Cannon, Douglas (University of Puget Sound)	IX-H Fri PM
Cannon, Joseph (Northwestern University).....	VII-H Fri AM
Capaldi, Nicholas (Loyola University–New Orleans).....	III-A Wed PM
Caplan, Ben (Ohio State University)	IX-H Fri PM
Carastathis, Anna (McGill University)	GVII-H Fri PM
Cariani, Fabrizio (University of California–Berkeley)	XI-F Sat PM
Carlson, Allen (University of Alberta)	IX-L Fri PM
Carman, Taylor (Barnard College).....	VII-C Fri AM
Carpenter, Andrew N. (Kaplan University)	GIV-A Thu PM
Carriero, John (University of California–Los Angeles).....	VI-I Thu PM
Carroll, Noël (Temple University).....	VI-B Thu PM

Carruthers, Peter (University of Maryland–College Park).....	V-D Thu PM
Carter, William (South Texas College)	VII-L Fri AM
Caston, Victor (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)	XI-D Sat PM
Castro, Susan (University of California–Los Angeles).....	GVII-D Fri PM
Casullo, Albert (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)	XII-E Sat PM
Cederblom, Jerry (University of Nebraska–Omaha)	GVI-A Thu PM
Chakravartty, Anjan (University of Toronto).....	X-B Sat AM
Chalmers, David (Australian National University).....	VI-C Thu PM
Chan, David K. (University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point)	
.....	IV-F Thu AM, GV-H Thu PM
Chan, Sin Yee (University of Vermont)	GVII-A Fri PM
Chance, Brian (University of Pennsylvania).....	V-I Thu PM
Chant, Sara Rachel (University of Missouri–Columbia).....	VIII-G Fri PM
Chapman, Bruce (University of Toronto)	IX-J Fri PM
Chen, Derong (Wuhan University).....	GVII-A Fri PM, GIX-C Sat PM
Chen, Rong-Po (Tunghai University)	GV-A Thu PM
Chen, Xunwu (University of Texas–San Antonio)	XIII-H Sun AM
Chihara, Charles (University of California–Berkeley)	IV-B Thu AM
Cholbi, Michael (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)	
.....	XII-I Sat PM
Christman, John (Pennsylvania State University).....	X-L Sat AM
Chu, Antonio (Metropolitan State College of Denver)	V-F Thu PM
Clark, Maudemarie (Colgate University)	GV-D Thu PM
Clarke, Randolph (Florida State University).....	III-H Wed PM
Clausen, Ginger (University of Texas–Austin).....	IV-E Thu AM
Clayton, Philip (Claremont School of Theology)	
.....	MI-8 Thu AM, MI-10 Thu PM
Clemenson, David L. (University of St. Thomas–Minnesota).....	VI-I Thu PM
Cline, Erin (University of Oregon)	IV-K Thu AM
Code, Alan (University of California–Berkeley)	X-D Sat AM
Code, Lorraine (York University).....	GVII-N Fri PM, XI-L Sat PM
Coffman, E. J. (University of Notre Dame)	IV-F Thu AM
Cohen, Andrew Jason (Georgia State University).....	I-H Wed AM
Cohen, Jonathan (University of California–San Diego)	
.....	XI-G Sat PM, MII-3 Wed AM
Cohen, Joshua (Stanford University)	VI-F Thu PM
Coleman, Elizabeth (La Trobe University)	VIII-E Fri PM
Coleman, Mary Clayton (Bard College)	VIII-G Fri PM
Coleman, Monica A. (Lutheran School of Theology–Chicago)	
.....	MI-3 Wed PM
Comesaña, Juan (University of Wisconsin–Madison)	XI-H Sat PM

Concepción, David W. (Ball State University) GII-D Wed PM, GIV-A Thu PM
Conroy, Renee (University of Washington) IX-H Fri PM
Considine, Daniel (University of Southern California) V-I Thu PM
Cook, Roy (Villanova University) VII-J Fri AM
Cook, Tom (Rollins College) GX-B Sat PM
Coombe, Rosemary (York University) VIII-E Fri PM
Copenhaver, Rebecca (Lewis and Clark College) VI-A Thu PM
Coplan, Amy (California State University–Fullerton) VIII-F Fri PM, GVII-L Fri PM
Corea-Levy, Yali (University of Arizona) GII-F Wed PM
Corkum, Philip (University of Alberta) V-F Thu PM
Coseru, Christian (College of Charleston) II-H Wed PM, GII-B Wed PM
Cowie, Fiona (California Institute of Technology) V-D Thu PM
Crasnow, Sharon (Riverside Community College) V-K Thu PM
Craver, Carl (Washington University in St. Louis) GIV-D Thu PM
Crimmins, Mark (Stanford University) XI-B Sat PM
Crowe, Benjamin (University of Utah) III-F Wed PM
Crowley, Stephen (Boise State University) XI-H Sat PM
Crutchfield, Parker (Arizona State University) GV-I Thu PM
Cudd, Ann (University of Kansas) X-A Sat AM
Cullity, Garrett (University of Adelaide) II-A Wed PM
Cuomo, Chris (University of Georgia) X-F Sat AM
Curran, Angela (Carleton College) VIII-F Fri PM
Curry, Agnes (St. Joseph College) VIII-J Fri PM

D

D'Arms, Justin (Ohio State University) GVII-F Fri PM
Darwall, Stephen (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor) VIII-A Fri PM
Davenport, John (Fordham University) II-H Wed PM
Davis, Angela (University of California–Santa Cruz) I-J Wed AM
Davis, Nina (University of California–San Diego) XIII-F Sun AM
de Sousa, Ronald (University of Toronto) XI-A Sat PM
DeBord, Charles E. (University of Kentucky) GII-C Wed PM
DeBrabander, Firmin (Maryland Institute College of Art) GV-E Thu PM, GX-B Sat PM
DeCew, Judith Wagner (Clark University and Wellesley College) VIII-J Fri PM
Decker, Kevin S. (Eastern Washington University) GV-J Thu PM
Dees, Richard (University of Rochester) V-G Thu PM
DeGrazia, David (George Washington University and National Institutes of Health) VII-A Fri AM
Deigh, John (University of Texas–Austin) GIX-B Sat PM

Dell'Olio, Andrew (Hope College)	MI-2 Wed AM, MI-6 Wed PM
Demir, Hilmi (California State University–San Bernadino)	XII-F Sat PM
DeMoss, David (Pacific University)	IV-F Thu AM
Denkinger, Shelly (University of Hawaii–Manoa)	GII-F Wed PM, GVII-I Fri PM
DesAutels, Peggy (University of Dayton)	XII-D Sat PM
Deshpande, Sharad (University of Pune)	II-I Wed PM
Devereux, Daniel (University of Virginia)	VIII-C Fri PM
Devitt, Michael (City University of New York–Graduate Center)	XI-B Sat PM
Diaz, Monica (University of Texas–Pan American).....	VII-L Fri AM
Dicker, Georges (State University of New York–Brockport)	IV-E Thu AM
Diehl, Nicholas (University of California–Davis).....	IX-H Fri PM
Dietrich, Franz (Universiteit Maastricht).....	XI-F Sat PM
Digby, Tom (Springfield College).....	I-C Wed AM
Diller, Jeanine (Independent Scholar).....	MI-1 Wed AM, MI-9 Thu PM
Ding, Zijiang (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)	XIII-H Sun AM
DiSilvestro, Russell (California State University–Sacramento)....	XII-G Sat PM
Dodd, Dylan (Syracuse University).....	VIII-I Fri PM
Doggett, Tyler (University of Vermont)	V-E Thu PM
Dombrowski, Dan (Seattle University)	MI-3 Wed PM, MI-4 Wed PM
Domski, Mary (University of New Mexico)	XI-I Sat PM
Doppelt, Gerald D. (University of California–San Diego).....	III-D Wed PM
Doris, John (Washington University in St. Louis)	VII-G Fri AM
Dorsey, Dale (University of California–San Diego)	VIII-H Fri PM
Doucet, Mathieu (Queen's University)	GII-F Wed PM
Downes, Steve (University of Utah)	II-E Wed PM
Draeger, John (Buffalo State College)	XII-F Sat PM
Draper, Paul (Ridge Vineyards)	MII-6 Wed PM
Dreier, James (Brown University)	II-A Wed PM
Dreyfus, Hubert (University of California–Berkeley)	XI-J Sat PM
Dulckeit, Katharina (Butler University).....	GVI-C Thu PM
Dunlop, Katherine (Stanford University)	V-I Thu PM
Dworkin, Gerald (University of California–Davis)	XI-C Sat PM
Dyck, Corey (Boston College)	V-I Thu PM

E

Easton, Patricia (Claremont Graduate University)	VI-I Thu PM
Easwaran, Kenny (University of California–Berkeley).....	I-F Wed AM
Eaton, Anne Wescott (University of Illinois–Chicago)	VIII-E Fri PM
Ebels-Duggan, Kyla (Northwestern University)	VI-K Thu PM
Egan, Andrew (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor and Australian National University)	XI-G Sat PM, GIX-A Sat PM

Eggleston, Ben (University of Kansas).....	V-G Thu PM
Einheuser, Iris (Duke University).....	VIII-H Fri PM
Ellis, Jonathan (University of California–Santa Cruz).....	IV-A Thu AM
Ellis, Ralph (Clark Atlanta University).....	GV-H Thu PM
Engstrom, Stephen (University of Pittsburgh).....	GVIII-A Sat PM
Epstein, Brian (Virginia Tech).....	IX-I Fri PM
Ernst, Zachary J. (University of Missouri–Columbia).....	IV-G Thu AM
Eshleman, Andrew (University of Arkansas–Little Rock).....	VI-D Thu PM
Espinoza, Nicolas (Royal Institute of Technology).....	I-I Wed AM
Evans, Ian (University of Arizona).....	XI-I Sat PM
Evnine, Simon (University of Miami).....	V-H Thu PM

F

Faber, Kenneth (Vanderbilt University).....	III-G Wed PM
Fairweather, Abrol (University of San Francisco).....	XIII-E Sun AM
Falk, Arthur (Western Michigan University).....	II-I Wed PM
Falkenstein, Lorne (University of Western Ontario).....	IV-E Thu AM
Fallis, Don (University of Arizona).....	I-I Wed AM
Falvey, Kevin (University of California–Santa Barbara).....	III-J Wed PM
Fang, Wan-Chuan (Academia Sinica).....	GV-A Thu PM
Fantl, Jeremy (University of Calgary).....	IX-L Fri PM
Farennikova, Anya (Biola University).....	GIX-D Sat PM
Farrell, Daniel (Ohio State University).....	GV-B Thu PM
Farrell, Warren (Independent Scholar).....	I-C Wed AM
Fehr, Carla (Iowa State University).....	GVII-N Fri PM, XI-L Sat PM
Feldman, Richard (University of Rochester).....	I-B Wed AM
Fern, Rachel (California Polytechnic State University).....	I-H Wed AM
Fiala, Andrew (California State University–Fresno).....	GV-H Thu PM
Field, Hartry (New York University).....	V-B Thu PM
Fine, Arthur (University of Washington).....	X-B Sat AM
Finlay, Stephen (University of Southern California).....	IX-D Fri PM
Finocchiaro, Maurice (University of Nevada–Las Vegas)	I-B Wed AM, GVI-A Thu PM
Fischer, John Martin (University of California–Riverside).....	X-C Sat AM
Fisher, Justin C. (University of British Columbia).....	X-G Sat AM
Fitelson, Branden (University of California–Berkeley).....	XI-F Sat PM
Florka, Roger (Ursinus College).....	VI-I Thu PM
Fogelin, Robert (Dartmouth College).....	GVI-B Thu PM
Folescu, Marina (University of Western Ontario).....	GV-I Thu PM
Ford, Jason (University of Minnesota–Duluth).....	I-G Wed AM
Forman, David (University of Nevada–Las Vegas).....	IX-F Fri PM
Forman-Barzilay, Fonna (University of California–San Diego).....	VII-E Fri AM

Forster, Malcolm (University of Wisconsin–Madison)	IV-B Thu AM
Foust, Mathew A. (University of Oregon)	GIX-H Sat PM
Francis, Leslie (University of Utah)	III-D Wed PM
Franks, Paul (University of Toronto).....	IX-A Fri PM
Frasz, Geoffrey (Community College of Southern Nevada)....	XIII-C Sun AM
Frede, Dorothea (University of California–Berkeley)	V-F Thu PM
Freeman, James B. (City University of New York–Hunter College)	
.....	I-B Wed AM
Frey, R. G. (Bowling Green State University)	VIII-K Fri PM
Fricker, Miranda (Birkbeck College London)	II-G Wed PM
Friedman, Marilyn (Washington University in St. Louis)	
.....	IX-B Fri PM, XII-M Sat PM
Fritzman, J. M. (Lewis and Clark College)	
.....	III-E Wed PM, GVI-C Thu PM, GVII-J Fri PM
Frost-Arnold, Greg (University of Nevada–Las Vegas).....	V-K Thu PM
Fumerton, Richard (University of Iowa).....	II-D Wed PM
Furtak, Rick Anthony (Colorado College)	GV-C Thu PM

G

Gall, Robert (West Liberty State College)	MI-4 Wed PM
Galvin, Richard (Texas Christian University).....	VI-K Thu PM
Ganson, Todd (Oberlin College)	IX-C Fri PM
Garcia, Ernesto (Syracuse University)	VI-K Thu PM
Garrett, Don (New York University)	VI-L Thu PM
Gartner, Corinne (Princeton University).....	VIII-C Fri PM
Garver, Eugene (College of St. Benedict and St. John’s University)	
.....	GV-E Thu PM
Gaskell, Ivan (Harvard University)	VIII-E Fri PM
Gasper, Phil (Notre Dame de Namur University)	GVII-E Fri PM
Gauthier, Jeff (University of Portland).....	I-H Wed AM
Gehrman, Kristina (University of California–Berkeley)	XIII-G Sun AM
Geiger, Ido (Ben Gurion University).....	GVII-D Fri PM
Geirsson, Heimir (Iowa State University)	V-H Thu PM
Gelinas, Luke (University of Toronto).....	MI-7 Thu AM
Gennaro, Rocco J. (Indiana State University).....	IX-I Fri PM
Genone, James (University of California–Berkeley)	X-I Sat AM
Gere, Cathy (University of Chicago)	III-K Wed PM
Gert, Joshua (Florida State University)	IV-I Thu AM
Gill, Michael (University of Arizona)	X-H Sat AM
Gillis, Marin (University of Nevada–Reno)	III-K Wed PM
Gilmore, Cody (University of California–Davis)	
.....	X-K Sat AM, GVIII-B Sat PM
Gilson, Greg (University of Texas–Pan American).....	VII-L Fri AM

Ginsborg, Hannah (University of California–Berkeley).....	XII-C Sat PM
Glannon, Walter (University of Calgary).....	VI-G Thu PM
Glenny, Brian (University of Southern California).....	X-G Sat AM
Glezakos, Stavroula (Wake Forest University)	VIII-I Fri PM
Glick, Jeffrey (Rutgers University).....	XIII-E Sun AM
Godfrey-Smith, Peter (Harvard University).....	X-B Sat AM
Goering, Sara (University of Washington).....	I-D Wed AM
Gogol, Eugene (Independent Scholar).....	GII-A Wed PM
Goldberg, Sanford (University of Kentucky)	I-G Wed AM
Goldman, Alan (College of William and Mary) ...	IV-I Thu AM, GIX-A Sat PM
Goldman, Alvin (Rutgers University).....	IV-A Thu AM
Golec, Aaron (University of Wisconsin–La Crosse)	GVII-L Fri PM
Gombay, André (University of Toronto).....	XI-A Sat PM
Goodpaster, Kenneth (University of St. Thomas–Minnesota)	GIX-F Sat PM
Gopnik, Alison (University of California–Berkeley).....	IV-A Thu AM
Gordon, Lewis R. (Temple University)	I-J Wed AM
Gosselin, Abigail (Regis University)	XIII-C Sun AM
Goswick, Dana Lynne (University of California–Davis)	VIII-H Fri PM
Gould, Carol C. (Temple University)	
.....	GIV-C Thu PM, IX-J Fri PM, XII-M Sat PM
Graham, Peter (University of California–Riverside)	XIII-E Sun AM
Graham, Peter A. (University of Massachusetts–Amherst).....	IX-D Fri PM
Grahm, Randall (Bonny Doon Vineyards).....	MII-6 Wed PM
Grandi, Giovanni (Auburn University)	X-G Sat AM
Grasswick, Heidi (Middlebury College)	GV-F Thu PM
Grau, Christopher (Florida International University)	
.....	MII-5 Wed PM, XII-K Sat PM
Greco, John (St. Louis University).....	VIII-D Fri PM
Green, Jeffrey (University of Notre Dame).....	VIII-G Fri PM, GIX-D Sat PM
Greene, Richard (Weber State University)	
.....	XII-L Sat PM, GVIII-D Sat PM, GX-C Sat PM
Griffith, Meghan (Davidson College)	VIII-G Fri PM
Groenhout, Ruth (Calvin College).....	XI-L Sat PM
Guala, Francesco (University of Exeter).....	VII-D Fri AM
Guay, Robert (State University of New York–Binghamton)	IX-G Fri PM
Guerrero, Alexander (New York University)	X-H Sat AM
Guerrero, Laura P. (University of New Mexico).....	GVII-I Fri PM
Guevara, Daniel (University of California–Santa Cruz).....	GVII-D Fri PM
Gunther, York (California State University–Northridge).....	IX-I Fri PM
Guyer, Paul (University of Pennsylvania).....	VI-A Thu PM

H

Haber, Matt (University of Utah).....	IV-G Thu AM
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Hagerman, Allison (University of New Mexico)	GVII-I Fri PM
Hajdin, Mane (Santa Clara University).....	XIII-G Sun AM
Hales, Steven D. (Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania)	GVII-G Fri PM
Halpin, John (Oakland University).....	IV-H Thu AM
Halwani, Raja (School of the Art Institute of Chicago).....	X-F Sat AM
Hamilton, Andrew (Arizona State University).....	V-K Thu PM
Hamilton, Elizabeth (University of California–Riverside)	VIII-G Fri PM
Hanna, Jason (University of Colorado–Boulder).....	VIII-J Fri PM
Hanna, Robert (University of Colorado–Boulder)	XII-C Sat PM
Hannon, Michael (York University)	GII-F Wed PM
Hansen, Hans V. (University of Windsor)	I-B Wed AM
Hanser, Matthew (University of California–Santa Barbara).....	VI-D Thu PM
Hardimon, Michael (University of California–San Diego)	III-I Wed PM
Hare, Caspar (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)	X-K Sat AM
Harker, David (East Tennessee State University).....	IV-H Thu AM
Harman, Elizabeth (Princeton University).....	XII-L Sat PM
Harold, James (Mount Holyoke College)	X-H Sat AM
Harris, Angie (University of Utah).....	VII-J Fri AM
Harris, James A. (University of St. Andrews)	VI-A Thu PM
Harris, John (University of Colorado–Boulder)	VII-I Fri AM
Hartmann, Stephan (London School of Economics)	XI-F Sat PM
Harvey, Charles W. (University of Central Arkansas)	GV-H Thu PM
Haslanger, Sally (Massachusetts Institute of Technology).....	II-E Wed PM
Hatcher, Donald (Baker University)	GVI-A Thu PM
Haukioja, Jussi (University of Turku)	I-G Wed AM
Hausman, Daniel (University of Wisconsin–Madison)	VII-D Fri AM
Havas, Randall (Willamette University)	VII-C Fri AM
Havis, Devonya (Boston College).....	XII-H Sat PM
Hawkins, Jennifer (University of Toronto)	VII-A Fri AM
Hawthorne, James (University of Oklahoma).....	IX-E Fri PM
Hawthorne, John (Oxford University)	VII-F Fri AM
Hazlett, Allan J. (Brown University)	V-J Thu PM
Healey, Richard (University of Arizona).....	II-B Wed PM
Heathwood, Chris (University of Colorado–Boulder).....	I-I Wed AM
Heidemann, Dietmar (Hofstra University)	GII-C Wed PM
Heller, Mark (Syracuse University).....	II-C Wed PM
Hendricks, Scott (Clark University).....	X-G Sat AM
Hendricks, Vincent F. (Roskilde Universitetscenter)	IV-D Thu AM
Henkel, Jeremy (University of Hawaii–Manoa).....	GVII-I Fri PM, GX-A Sat PM
Henry, Samuel (University of Chicago)	V-I Thu PM
Herbert, Gary (Loyola University–New Orleans).....	GIX-B Sat PM
Hermanson, Sean (Florida International University).....	IV-G Thu AM

Hermes, Charles (Florida State University).....	I-F Wed AM
Herr, Ranjoo (Bentley College)	IX-J Fri PM
Herwitz, Daniel (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)	IV-J Thu AM
Herzberg, Larry A. (University of Wisconsin–Oshkosh)	XII-F Sat PM
Hestir, Blake (Texas Christian University)	IX-F Fri PM
Heuer, Ulrike (University of Leeds).....	VI-D Thu PM
Hickerson, Ryan (Western Oregon University).....	V-C Thu PM
Hieronymi, Pamela (University of California–Los Angeles)	MI-5 Wed PM, GII-H Wed PM, VII-B Fri AM
Higginbotham, James (University of Southern California).....	XI-B Sat PM
Higgins, Peter (University of Colorado–Boulder).....	XII-G Sat PM
Hill, Christopher (Brown University).....	IV-A Thu AM
Hill, Thomas (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill).....	V-A Thu PM
Himma, Kenneth (Seattle Pacific University)	X-J Sat AM
Hindriks, Frank (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen)	IV-F Thu AM
Hintikka, Jaakko (Boston University).....	IV-D Thu AM
Hinton, Beverly (West Virginia University)	V-F Thu PM
Hirschbein, Ron (California State University–Chico)	GV-B Thu PM
Hitchcock, Christopher (California Institute of Technology)	III-H Wed PM, IV-B Thu AM
Ho, Anita (University of British Columbia)	XII-H Sat PM
Hodges, Michael (Vanderbilt University)	XI-J Sat PM
Hodgson, Louis-Philippe (York University)	VII-K Fri AM
Hoff, Joan Whitman (Lock Haven University of Pennsylvania)	GIV-A Thu PM
Hoffmann, Glen (Ryerson University).....	I-F Wed AM
Hogan, Brendan (Pacific Lutheran University)....	GV-J Thu PM, GVII-K Fri PM
Holmes, Richard (University of Waterloo)	VII-H Fri AM
Holtzman, Seth (Catawba College)	VIII-I Fri PM
Horniak, Marcia (Occidental College)	X-A Sat AM
Hood, Pamela (San Francisco State University)	II-H Wed PM
Horgan, Terry (University of Arizona)	I-A Wed AM
Hoskins, Zachary (Washington University in St. Louis).....	VII-I Fri AM
Houlgate, Stephen (Warwick University).....	V-C Thu PM
Hourdequin, Marion (Colorado College)	XII-A Sat PM
Howard-Snyder, Daniel (Western Washington University)	GIX-D Sat PM
Hudson, Hud (Western Washington University)	II-C Wed PM
Hudson, Nancy (California University of Pennsylvania)	MI-4 Wed PM
Huebner, L. Bryce G. (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	IX-I Fri PM
Hunter, Bruce (University of Alberta)	II-D Wed PM
Hunter, David (Ryerson University).....	IV-I Thu AM

Hurley, Elisa (University of Western Ontario)	XI-K Sat PM
Hurley, Paul (Claremont McKenna College)	XIII-F Sun AM
Hurley, Susan L. (University of Bristol and All Souls College)...	IV-A Thu AM
Hussain, Nadeem J. Z. (Stanford University)	II-H Wed PM, GV-D Thu PM
Hussain, Waheed (University of Pennsylvania)	III-G Wed PM
Hustwit, Jeremy (Claremont Graduate University)	MI-1 Wed AM, MI-3 Wed PM
Hutchins, Christina (Independent Scholar)	GIX-I Sat PM
Hutchinson, Brian (Metropolitan State College of Denver).....	IX-G Fri PM

I

Ihara, Craig K. (California State University–Fullerton)	GV-A Thu PM
Ilea, Ramona (Pacific University)	XIII-C Sun AM
Im, Manyul (California State University–Los Angeles).....	GVII-A Fri PM
Inan, İlhan (Bogaziçi University)	GX-C Sat PM
Iseminger, Gary (Carleton College)	VI-B Thu PM
Ivanhoe, Philip J. (City University of Hong Kong)	IV-K Thu AM, XI-E Sat PM

J

Jaarsma, Ada (Sonoma State University)	XII-G Sat PM
Jackman, Henry (York University)	GVII-G Fri PM
Jacobson, Anne (University of Houston).....	X-I Sat AM
Jacobson, Daniel (Bowling Green State University)	GVII-F Fri PM
Jacoby, Henry (East Carolina University)	GIX-G Sat PM
Jaggat, Alison (University of Colorado–Boulder)	V-G Thu PM, GV-F Thu PM
Jagnow, René (University of Georgia)	I-E Wed AM
Jaworska, Agnieszka (Stanford University)	I-D Wed AM
Jenkins, Scott (Reed College)	GII-C Wed PM
Jenks, Rod (University of Portland).....	IX-F Fri PM
Jensen, Jon (Luther College).....	XIII-C Sun AM
Jeshion, Robin (University of California–Riverside).....	VII-F Fri AM
Johns, Oliver Davis (San Francisco State University).....	V-K Thu PM
Johnson, Jeff (College of St. Catherine)	GVI-B Thu PM, IX-I Fri PM
Johnson, Monte (University of California–San Diego)	IX-C Fri PM
Johnson, Robert (University of Missouri–Columbia)	VII-I Fri AM
Johnson, Robert (University of Oklahoma)	XI-K Sat PM
Johnson, Stephan (City College of San Francisco)	VIII-J Fri PM
Johnston, Mark (Princeton University)	XI-G Sat PM
Jollimore, Troy (California State University–Chico)	VI-H Thu PM
Jones, Russell (University of Oklahoma)	XI-K Sat PM
Jones, Todd (University of Nevada–Las Vegas).....	XIII-E Sun AM

Jubien, Michael (University of Florida).....	MII-4 Wed PM
Judisch, Neal (University of Oklahoma).....	VIII-D Fri PM
Justice, John (Randolph College).....	VII-J Fri AM

K

Kamm, Frances M. (Harvard University).....	XI-C Sat PM
Kane, Robert (University of Texas–Austin).....	VII-B Fri AM
Kania, Andrew (Trinity University).....	VI-B Thu PM
Kaspar, David (University of Nevada–Reno).....	IX-H Fri PM
Katsafanas, Paul (Harvard University).....	XIII-F Sun AM
Kaufman, Dan (University of Colorado–Boulder).....	II-F Wed PM
Kawall, Jason (Colgate University).....	II-G Wed PM
Kedar, Asaf (University of California–Berkeley).....	GII-G Wed PM
Kegley, Jacquelyn Ann K. (California State University–Bakersfield)	III-E Wed PM, GIX-I Sat PM
Kelch, Ron (Independent Scholar).....	GII-A Wed PM
Keller, Pierre (University of California–Riverside).....	GVIII-A Sat PM
Kellner, Douglas (University of California–Los Angeles).....	I-J Wed AM
Kelly, Erin I. (Tufts University).....	XII-I Sat PM
Kenny, Patrick (University of Rochester).....	IV-E Thu AM
Kerstein, Samuel (University of Maryland–College Park).....	V-A Thu PM
Kind, Amy (Claremont McKenna College).....	XIII-F Sun AM
King, Matthew (York University).....	GIX-E Sat PM
Kipnis, Kenneth (University of Hawaii–Manoa).....	III-D Wed PM
Kirby, Jeremy (Albion College).....	VI-E Thu PM
Kisner, Matthew J. (University of South Carolina).....	IV-E Thu AM
Klein, Ellen (U.S. State Department).....	I-C Wed AM
Kleinschmidt, Shieva J. (Rutgers University).....	X-J Sat AM
Knobe, Joshua (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill).....	GVII-F Fri PM
Kobes, Bernard W. (Arizona State University).....	VII-J Fri AM
Koch, Michael (State University of New York–Oneonta)	GII-D Wed PM, X-J Sat AM
Koggel, Christine (Bryn Mawr College).....	IX-B Fri PM, X-M Sat AM
Kolb, David (Bates College).....	GVII-J Fri PM
Komasinski, Andrew (Loyola Marymount University).....	GII-B Wed PM
Kopelman, Loretta (East Carolina University).....	VIII-K Fri PM
Korolev, Alexandre V. (University of British Columbia).....	V-K Thu PM
Korsgaard, Christine M. (Harvard University).....	VIII-A Fri PM
Kovach, Karen (Mercer University).....	VIII-K Fri PM
Kraay, Klaas (Ryerson University).....	MI-2 Wed AM, III-F Wed PM
Kramer, Steven (Southwest State University).....	XIII-C Sun AM
Krom, Michael P. (Emory University).....	GVII-B Fri PM

Kumar, Apaar (Emory University)	X-G Sat AM
Kung, Peter (Pomona College)	V-E Thu PM
Kurth, Charlie (University of California–San Diego).....	X-H Sat AM
Kutach, Douglas N. (Brown University).....	VIII-H Fri PM
Kvanvig, Jonathan (Baylor University).....	VIII-D Fri PM

L

Lacey, Justine (University of Queensland).....	X-L Sat AM
Lackey, Jennifer (Northern Illinois University)	XIII-G Sun AM
Laetz, Brian (University of British Columbia)	VII-H Fri AM
Lahroodi, Reza (University of Northern Iowa)	XIII-E Sun AM
Lalonde, Suzanne (University of Texas–Brownsville).....	VII-L Fri AM
Lamont, Julian (University of Queensland)	X-L Sat AM
Landesman, Bruce (University of Utah).....	I-H Wed AM
Larkin, William S. (Southern Illinois University–Edwardsville)	
.....	V-H Thu PM, GVIII-D Sat PM
Lasersohn, Peter (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign).....	X-E Sat AM
Lear, Gabriel Richardson (University of Chicago).....	VIII-C Fri PM
LeBar, Mark (Ohio University)	XIII-G Sun AM
LeBuffe, Michael (Texas A&M University).....	IV-E Thu AM
Lee, Chan (University of Hawaii–Manoa)	GIX-C Sat PM
Lee, Richard (DePaul University).....	XIII-B Sun AM
Lefkowitz, David (University of North Carolina–Greensboro) ...	VII-K Fri AM
Lehrer, Adrienne (University of Arizona)	MII-5 Wed PM
Lehrer, Keith (University of Arizona)	MII-5 Wed PM, IX-N Fri PM
Leite, Adam (Indiana University–Bloomington).....	IX-L Fri PM
Leon, Felipe (University of California–Riverside).....	IV-F Thu AM
LePore, Ernest (Rutgers University).....	IV-D Thu AM
Levin, Michael (City University of New York–Graduate Center)	
.....	XI-H Sat PM
Levine, Joseph (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)	I-A Wed AM
Levy, David (George Mason University)	III-A Wed PM
Levy, Jacob (McGill University)	XIII-A Sun AM
Levy, Neil (University of Melbourne)	IV-F Thu AM
Lewis, Frank (University of Southern California)	
.....	MII-5 Wed PM, VI-E Thu PM
Liao, S. Matthew (Oxford University).....	XI-J Sat PM
Lichtenberg, Judith (University of Maryland–College Park).....	VI-F Thu PM
Liebendorfer, Richard (Minnesota State University–Mankato)....	XI-J Sat PM
Lin, Chong Ming (LCM Research)	GIX-C Sat PM
Lindemann, Hilde (Michigan State University).....	XII-H Sat PM
Linsky, Bernard (University of Alberta).....	V-H Thu PM
List, Christian (London School of Economics).....	XI-F Sat PM

Liu, JeeLoo (California State University–Fullerton)	GV-A Thu PM, GVII-A Fri PM
Lockard, Matthew (University of California–Los Angeles)	I-G Wed AM
Loeb, Louis (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)	VI-L Thu PM
Lombard, Lawrence (Wayne State University)	X-K Sat AM, GVIII-B Sat PM
Lomelino, Pamela (University of Colorado–Boulder)	XII-D Sat PM
Long, Anthony A. (University of California–Berkeley)	IX-C Fri PM
Longino, Helen (Stanford University)	VIII-H Fri PM
Lopes, Dominic McIver (University of British Columbia)	III-E Wed PM
Lott, Tommy (San Jose State University)	GVII-E Fri PM, GIX-B Sat PM
Lottenbach, Hans (University of Pittsburgh)	XI-I Sat PM
Lu-Adler, Huaping (University of California–Davis)	GV-I Thu PM
Lucash, Frank (University of Nevada–Reno)	GV-E Thu PM
Lucey, Kenneth (University of Nevada–Reno)	IV-F Thu AM
Ludlow, Peter (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)	VII-J Fri AM
Lynch, Joseph (California Polytechnic State University)	GVI-D Thu PM
Lyons, Jack (University of Arkansas–Fayetteville)	XI-H Sat PM

M

Ma, Lin (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)	GI-A Wed PM
Macbeth, Danielle (Haverford College)	X-G Sat AM
MacDonald, Scott (Cornell University)	IV-C Thu AM
MacFarlane, John (University of California–Berkeley)	X-E Sat AM
Machery, Edouard (University of Pittsburgh)	V-D Thu PM
MacLean, Doug (University of North Carolina)	MII-5 Wed PM
Macleod, Alistair M. (Queen's University)	I-H Wed AM
MacMullan, Terrance (Eastern Washington University)	GV-J Thu PM
Maffie, James (Colorado State University)	GII-D Wed PM
Maiese, Michelle (Emmanuel College)	II-H Wed PM
Mallon, Ron (University of Utah)	II-E Wed PM
Manley, David (University of Southern California)	VII-F Fri AM
Manninen, Tuomas (University of Iowa)	X-K Sat AM
Manning, Rita (San Jose State University)	GVII-E Fri PM
Marder, Michael (New School University)	GVIII-E Sat PM
Marino, Patricia (University of Waterloo)	IV-I Thu AM
Markosian, Ned (Western Washington University)	III-B Wed PM
Marquis, Don (University of Kansas)	GVI-A Thu PM
Marshall, John (University of Virginia)	XI-A Sat PM
Martin, Raymond (Union College)	III-B Wed PM
Martin, Wayne (University of Essex)	VIII-B Fri PM
Martinez, Joel (Lewis and Clark College)	VI-E Thu PM, GVII-F Fri PM
Martinich, A. P. (University of Texas–Austin)	GI-A Wed PM

Martí, Oscar R. (California State University–Northridge).....	GII-D Wed PM
Marusic, Berislav (University of California–Berkeley).....	XI-H Sat PM
Mascarenhas, Vijay (Metropolitan State College of Denver)....	III-G Wed PM
Matey, Jennifer (State University of New York–Stony Brook).....	X-I Sat AM
Matheson, Carl (University of Manitoba).....	IX-H Fri PM
Mathiesen, Kay (University of Arizona)	XIII-E Sun AM
Matthen, Mohan (University of Toronto)	MII-2 Wed AM, X-I Sat AM
Maxwell, Vance (Memorial University of Newfoundland)	GX-B Sat PM
May, Larry (Washington University in St. Louis).....	IV-J Thu AM
May, Robert (University of California–Davis)	MII-4 Wed PM
McBride, Lee (College of Wooster)	GV-J Thu PM
McBride, William (Purdue University).....	II-I Wed PM
McCreary, Mark (Loyola University of Chicago).....	GV-C Thu PM
McCumber, John (University of California–Los Angeles).....	GII-C Wed PM
McDaniel, Kris (Syracuse University).....	II-C Wed PM
McDonald, Fritz (State University of New York–New Paltz).....	VII-K Fri AM
McGivern, Patrick (University of Alberta)	IV-H Thu AM
McGonigal, Andrew (University of Leeds and Cornell University)	
.....	VII-H Fri AM, GIX-A Sat PM
McGrath, Matthew (University of Missouri–Columbia).....	IX-L Fri PM
McGrath, Sarah (Brandeis University)	X-C Sat AM
McKenna, Michael (Florida State University)	XII-K Sat PM
McKerlie, Dennis (University of Calgary)	I-D Wed AM
McNaughton, David (Florida State University).....	II-A Wed PM
McPherran, Mark (Simon Fraser University).....	V-F Thu PM
Mele, Alfred (Florida State University).....	X-C Sat AM
Melnyk, Andrew (University of Missouri–Columbia)	I-A Wed AM
Mendell, Henry (California State University–Los Angeles)	X-D Sat AM
Mendieta, Eduardo (State University of New York–Stony Brook)	
.....	I-J Wed AM
Mendoza, Jose (University of Oregon)	GVII-E Fri PM
Menn, Stephen (McGill University)	VI-E Thu PM
Menon, Tarun (University of California–San Diego).....	IV-H Thu AM
Menzel, Christopher (Texas A&M University)	IX-M Fri PM
Menzel, Paul (Pacific Lutheran University)	V-G Thu PM
Messina, James (University of California–San Diego)	I-E Wed AM
Meyer, Ulrich (Colgate University)	V-J Thu PM
Miller, Christian (Wake Forest University)	III-C Wed PM
Miller, Fred D. Jr. (Bowling Green State University)	XIII-D Sun AM
Miller, Toby (University of California–Riverside).....	GII-G Wed PM
Mills, Charles (University of Illinois–Chicago)	GVII-N Fri PM
Millstein, Roberta L. (University of California–Davis).....	VI-J Thu PM

Minar, Ed (University of Arkansas–Fayetteville)	VII-C Fri AM
Minnich, Elizabeth (Association of American Colleges and Universities).....	X-M Sat AM
Mitias, Lara (University of Hawaii–Manoa)	GVII-I Fri PM
Mizzoni, John (Neumann College)	X-H Sat AM
Moellendorf, Darrel (San Diego State University)	IV-J Thu AM
Moffett, Marc (University of Wyoming)	III-J Wed PM
Moggach, Douglas (University of Ottawa).....	V-C Thu PM
Mohr, Richard (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)	V-F Thu PM
Moore, Darrell (DePaul University)	VIII-L Fri PM
Moore, Eric (Longwood University).....	II-H Wed PM
Moran, Kate (University of Pennsylvania)	MI-2 Wed AM
Moravcsik, Julius (Stanford University)	GIX-E Sat PM
Morton, Adam (University of Alberta).....	IX-L Fri PM
Morton, Jennifer (Stanford University)	IV-I Thu AM
Mosdell, Matthew (University of Utah)	VIII-I Fri PM
Moser, Paul (Loyola University of Chicago)	MI-5 Wed PM, GII-H Wed PM
Moss, Lenny (University of Exeter)	XI-L Sat PM
Mosteller, Timothy (California Baptist University).....	III-D Wed PM
Mou, Bo (San Jose State University)	GI-A Wed PM
Mouracade, John (University of Alaska–Anchorage)	V-F Thu PM, GIX-E Sat PM
Mulhall, Stephen (Oxford University)	VII-C Fri AM
Muntean, Ioan (University of California–San Diego).....	IV-H Thu AM
Munzer, Stephen (University of California–Los Angeles)	X-L Sat AM
Murphy, Daniel (St. Anselm College).....	MI-4 Wed PM, III-F Wed PM
Murphy, Dominic (California Institute of Technology).....	III-C Wed PM
Murzi, Julien (University of Sheffield).....	VII-J Fri AM

N

Naas, Michael (DePaul University).....	XIII-B Sun AM
Narveson, Jan (University of Waterloo).....	V-G Thu PM
Nathanson, Stephen L. (Northeastern University)	GV-B Thu PM, IX-G Fri PM
Neander, Karen (Duke University).....	GIV-D Thu PM
Nelkin, Dana (University of California–San Diego)	I-D Wed AM
Nelson, Alan (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill).....	II-F Wed PM
Nelson, James L. (Michigan State University)	V-G Thu PM
Nelson, Michael (University of California–Riverside)	IX-M Fri PM
Newman, Andrew (University of Nebraska–Omaha).....	II-D Wed PM
Newman, Lex (University of Utah)	XI-I Sat PM
Ney, Alyssa (University of Rochester)	VIII-H Fri PM, GVIII-B Sat PM
Nichols, Shaun (University of Arizona).....	GVII-F Fri PM

Nickel, Bernhard (Harvard University)	I-F Wed AM
Nickel, Philip (University of California–Irvine)	VI-K Thu PM
Noble, Ann (University of California–Davis)... ..	MII-1 Wed AM, MII-6 Wed PM
Nonken, Blanche (University of California–Davis)	GVI-D Thu PM
Norcross, Alastair (Rice University)	XI-C Sat PM
Normore, Calvin (University of California–Los Angeles).....	Fri PM
North, Jill (Yale University)	V-K Thu PM
Nuccetelli, Susana (University of Texas–Pan America)	
.....	VII-L Fri AM, X-H Sat AM
Nunan, Richard (College of Charleston)	XII-G Sat PM

O

O'Connor, Peg (Gustavus Adolphus College)	GV-F Thu PM
O'Keefe, Tim (Georgia State University)	IX-C Fri PM
Obdrzalek, Suzanne (Claremont McKenna College).....	IX-F Fri PM
Odenbaugh, Jay (Lewis and Clark College)	VI-J Thu PM
Oh, Jea Suk (Drew University and Kean University).....	GVII-L Fri PM
Olson, Eric (University of Sheffield)	III-B Wed PM
Orosco, José-Antonio (Oregon State University).....	GII-D Wed PM
Ostarcic, Lara (St. Michael's College)	VII-H Fri AM
Otsuka, Michael (University College London).....	XI-C Sat PM
Ott, Walter (Virginia Tech)	XI-I Sat PM
Otteson, James (University of Alabama–Tuscaloosa)	VII-E Fri AM
Overall, Christine (Queen's University)	XII-I Sat PM
Owens, David (University of Sheffield).....	IX-D Fri PM

P

Pahl, Katrin (Johns Hopkins University)	GII-C Wed PM
Paller, Bonnie (California State University–Northridge).....	IV-G Thu AM
Pallikkathayil, Japa (Harvard University)	XII-I Sat PM
Palmer, Daniel (Kent State University)	III-L Wed PM
Palmquist, Stephen (Stanford University and Hong Kong Baptist University)	MI-9 Thu AM, VII-I Fri AM
Panagopoulos, Anastasia (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)	
.....	VIII-I Fri PM
Pang-White, Ann (University of Scranton)	GX-A Sat PM
Papineau, David (King's College London)	V-E Thu PM
Park, Dong-Sik (Claremont Graduate University).....	MI-8 Thu AM
Parr, Rajat (Restaurant Michael Mina)	MII-6 Wed PM
Parsons, Josh (University of Otago)	II-C Wed PM
Pasnau, Robert (University of Colorado–Boulder)	IV-C Thu AM
Pasternack, Lawrence (Oklahoma State University).....	GII-E Wed PM
Patridge, Stephanie (Otterbein College)	VIII-I Fri PM

Paul, L. A. (University of Arizona).....	VI-C Thu PM
Pauly, Marc (Stanford University)	XI-F Sat PM
Pearson, Yvette (Old Dominion University)	XII-H Sat PM
Peart, Sandra (Baldwin-Wallace College).....	III-A Wed PM
Peck, William (Reed College)	XII-B Sat PM
Pedersen, Nikolaj Jang (University of California–Los Angeles)	XIII-E Sun AM
Pelletier, Francis Jeffrey (Simon Fraser University).....	I-F Wed AM
Pence, Gregory (University of Alabama–Birmingham)	I-I Wed AM
Pendlebury, Michael (North Carolina State University)	X-H Sat AM
Pereboom, Derk (University of Vermont).....	X-C Sat AM
Perin, Casey (University of Massachusetts–Amherst).....	V-F Thu PM
Perina, Mickaella (University of Massachusetts–Boston)	VIII-L Fri PM
Perry, John (Stanford University).....	IV-D Thu AM
Peters, Ted (Pacific Lutheran Theological Seminary).....	MI-A Wed AM
Peterson, Martin (University of Cambridge).....	IX-J Fri PM
Pettigrove, Glen (Massey University)	III-F Wed PM
Phillips, Hollibert (Whitman College)	V-H Thu PM
Phillips, Jamie (Clarion University).....	V-H Thu PM
Piccinini, Gualtiero (University of Missouri–Saint Louis).....	XII-F Sat PM
Pickave, Martin (University of Toronto)	IV-C Thu AM
Pignocchi, Alessandro (Institut Jean Nicod).....	III-E Wed PM
Pigozzi, Gabriella (King’s College London)	XI-F Sat PM
Plakias, Alexandra (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor).....	VII-G Fri AM
Plantinga, Carl (Calvin College)	VIII-F Fri PM
Pollock, John (University of Arizona).....	IX-E Fri PM
Portmore, Douglas (Arizona State University)	XII-I Sat PM
Poston, Ted (University of South Alabama)	X-I Sat AM
Potochnik, Angela (Stanford University)	V-K Thu PM
Powell, John W. (Humboldt State University).....	GVII-A Wed PM
Pradhan, Ramesh C. (University of Hyderabad).....	II-I Wed PM
Presting, Kenneth A. (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	XIII-F Sun AM
Priest, Graham (University of Melbourne and University of St. Andrews)	V-B Thu PM
Prince, Brian (Rice University)	VII-K Fri AM
Prinz, Jesse (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	GVII-F Fri PM, XII-B Sat PM
Pritchard, Duncan (University of Stirling).....	VIII-D Fri PM
Pryba, Russell (State University of New York–Buffalo)	GII-B Wed PM
Pryor, Ben (University of Toledo)	GII-I Wed PM
Pryor, James (New York University).....	VI-C Thu PM

Pullman, Daryl (Memorial University of Newfoundland) VIII-E Fri PM
 Pullum, Geoffrey K. (University of California–Santa Cruz) XI-B Sat PM

Q

Quiring, John (Victor Valley College) GIX-I Sat PM

R

Raatzsch, Richard (University of Cambridge) GIII-A Wed PM
 Rabinow, Paul (University of California–Berkeley) GVII-M Fri PM
 Racine, Eric (Institut de Recherches Cliniques de Montréal) ... VI-G Thu PM
 Radcliffe, Elizabeth (Santa Clara University) GIV-B Thu PM, XI-K Sat PM
 Radzik, Linda (Texas A&M University) XIII-F Sun AM
 Raffman, Diana (University of Toronto) X-I Sat AM
 Rajczi, Alex (Claremont McKenna College) VIII-A Fri PM
 Ranasinghe, Nalin (Assumption College) VII-K Fri AM
 Ranganathan, Shyam (York University) GII-E Wed PM
 Rattan, Gurpreet (University of Toronto) I-E Wed AM
 Rau, David (Independent Scholar) GVII-C Fri PM
 Rauhut, Nils Ch. (Coastal Carolina University) GIV-A Thu PM
 Raustiala, Kal (University of California–Los Angeles) X-L Sat AM
 Rayo, Agustin (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) I-F Wed AM
 Rea, Michael (University of Notre Dame) II-C Wed PM
 Reath, Andrews (University of California–Riverside) V-A Thu PM
 Redding, Paul (University of Sydney) IX-A Fri PM
 Redhead, Mark (California State University–Fullerton) III-G Wed PM
 Reed, Baron (Northern Illinois University) XII-J Sat PM
 Reginster, Bernard (Brown University) GV-D Thu PM
 Reich, Rob (Stanford University) XIII-A Sun AM
 Reid, James (Metropolitan State College of Denver) VII-H Fri AM
 Reidy, David (University of Tennessee) GIV-C Thu PM
 Rennard, Ray (University of the Pacific) XII-E Sat PM
 Rescorla, Michael A. (University of California–Santa Barbara) XI-H Sat PM
 Reshotko, Naomi (University of Denver) XII-J Sat PM
 Reyes, Herminia (San Diego State University) VIII-I Fri PM
 Reynolds, Christy (University of Oregon) GIX-H Sat PM
 Reynolds, Nicholas (University of Oregon) GIX-H Sat PM
 Reynolds, Steven (Arizona State University) I-G Wed AM
 Rhoda, Alan (University of Nevada) MI-7 Thu AM
 Rhodes, Rosamond (Mount Sinai School of Medicine and
 City University of New York–Graduate Center)
 III-K Wed PM, GVII-B Fri PM, GIX-B Sat PM
 Rice, Rebekah (Whitworth College) III-H Wed PM
 Rice, Richard (Loma Linda University) MI-7 Thu AM

Richardson, Henry S. (Georgetown University)	XI-C Sat PM
Richardson, John (New York University)	VII-C Fri AM
Riggs, Wayne (University of Oklahoma).....	VIII-D Fri PM
Risse, Mathias (Harvard University).....	VI-F Thu PM
Roark, Eric (University of Missouri–Columbia).....	VIII-J Fri PM
Roark, Tony (Boise State University).....	X-K Sat AM
Robbins, Philip (Washington University in St. Louis).....	VII-G Fri AM
Robert, Jason (Arizona State University)	XII-D Sat PM
Roberts, Robert (Baylor University)	GV-C Thu PM
Roberts, William (Washington and Jefferson College)	GVIII-E Sat PM
Robinson, Jenefer (University of Cincinnati)	XII-B Sat PM
Robison, Rachel (Weber State University).....	GVIII-D Sat PM, GX-C Sat PM
Rockwell, Teed (Sonoma State University).....	IV-G Thu AM
Rodriguez-Abad, Luis (University of Texas–Brownsville)	VII-L Fri AM
Roelofs, Monique (Hampshire College).....	VIII-L Fri PM
Rogerson, Ken (Florida International University).....	VII-B Fri AM
Rohatyn, Dennis (University of San Diego)	XIII-B Sun AM
Rohde, Mike (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)	GIII-A Wed PM
Rohlf, Michael (Brown University)	VII-H Fri AM
Roholt, Tiger (Columbia University)	III-E Wed PM
Roland, Jeffrey (Louisiana State University)	V-B Thu PM
Rooney, Phyllis (Oakland University)	III-J Wed PM, GV-F Thu PM
Rorty, Mary V. (Stanford University)	VI-G Thu PM
Rosenstand, Nina (San Diego Mesa College)	III-L Wed PM
Ross, Jacob (University of Southern California).....	IV-I Thu AM
Ross, Sheryl Tuttle (University of Wisconsin–La Crosse)	GVII-L Fri PM
Rota, Michael (University of St. Thomas–Minnesota)	IV-C Thu AM
Roth, Abraham (Ohio State University)	GIV-B Thu PM, VIII-G Fri PM
Roth, Paul (University of California–Santa Cruz)	
.....	GII-G Wed PM, GVII-K Fri PM, X-A Sat AM
Rottschaefter, William A. (Lewis and Clark College)	
.....	IV-G Thu AM, GVII-F Fri PM
Roush, Sherri (University of California–Berkeley).....	X-B Sat AM
Rudd, Anthony (St. Olaf College)	II-H Wed PM
Rueger, Alex (University of Alberta).....	VII-H Fri AM
Ruhmkorff, Samuel (Simon’s Rock College of Bard)	
.....	MI-1 Wed AM, MI-9 Thu PM
Russell, Bruce (Wayne State University)	IX-D Fri PM
Russell, Gillian (Washington University in St. Louis)	GVI-D Thu PM
Russon, John (University of Guelph)	GVIII-C Sat PM
Rust, Joshua (Metropolitan State College of Denver)	XI-J Sat PM
Ryder, Dan (University of Connecticut).....	XII-F Sat PM

Rysiew, Patrick W. (University of Victoria) XIII-E Sun AM

S

Sachs, Benjamin A. (University of Wisconsin–Madison) VII-K Fri AM

Salerno, Joe R. (St. Louis University) VII-J Fri AM

Salles, Arleen (St. John's University) VII-L Fri AM

Sandell, Michelle (California State University–Sacramento) V-G Thu PM

Santana, Alejandro (University of Portland) GII-D Wed PM

Saran, Kranti (Harvard University) I-E Wed AM

Sartorio, Carolina (University of Wisconsin–Madison) III-H Wed PM

Savitt, Steven (University of British Columbia) II-B Wed PM

Scarfe, Adam (California State University–Bakersfield) GIX-I Sat PM

Schaff, Kory (Occidental College) VIII-J Fri PM

Schaffer, Jonathan M. (University of Massachusetts–Amherst) V-J Thu PM

Scharding, Tobey (Stanford University) X-K Sat AM

Schear, Joseph (California Polytechnic State University) VIII-B Fri PM

Schechter, Joshua (Brown University) X-G Sat AM

Schechtman, Marya (University of Illinois–Chicago) VII-A Fri AM

Schiller, Aaron Allen (University of California–San Diego) XI-J Sat PM

Schliesser, Eric (Syracuse University and Universiteit Leiden) VII-E Fri AM

Schmidtz, David (University of Arizona) XIII-A Sun AM

Schmitt, Richard (Worcester State College) GVII-E Fri PM

Schmitter, Amy (University of Alberta) XIII-F Sun AM

Schroeder, Mark (University of Southern California) II-H Wed PM

Schroeder, Timothy (Ohio State University) IV-I Thu AM

Schroer, Robert (Arkansas State University) I-E Wed AM

Schubert, Richard (Cosumnes River College) GVI-D Thu PM

Schultz, Dawson (Gonzaga University) V-G Thu PM

Schwartzman, Lisa H. (Michigan State University) XII-G Sat PM

Scoccia, Danny (New Mexico State University) XIII-G Sun AM

Seay, Gary (University of Texas–Pan American) VIII-K Fri PM

Secada, Jorge (University of Virginia) II-F Wed PM

Seeley, William P. (Franklin and Marshall College) V-D Thu PM

Segal, Dan (Pitzer College) GVII-M Fri PM

Segal, Gideon (Holon Institute of Technology and
Hebrew University) GV-E Thu PM

Seidenfeld, Teddy (Carnegie Mellon University) IX-E Fri PM

Senor, Thomas (University of Arkansas–Fayetteville) XI-H Sat PM

Sensen, Oliver (Tulane University of New Orleans)
..... VII-H Fri AM, GVII-D Fri PM

Serano, Julia (University of California–Berkeley) GV-G Thu PM

Shaeffer, H. Benjamin (Humboldt State University) VIII-J Fri PM

Shanklin, Robert (University of Southern California).....	X-H Sat AM
Sharp, Hasana (McGill University)	GVII-H Fri PM, GVIII-E Sat PM
Shelley, James (Auburn University)	XII-B Sat PM
Sher, George (Rice University)	VII-B Fri AM
Sheth, Falguni A. (Hampshire College)	VII-I Fri AM, VIII-L Fri PM
Shieber, Joseph (Lafayette College).....	V-H Thu PM
Shields, Christopher (Oxford University).....	XI-D Sat PM
Shier, David (Washington State University).....	VII-J Fri AM
Shockley, Kenneth E. (State University of New York–Buffalo)	XII-H Sat PM
Shogenji, Tomoji (Rhode Island College)	XII-J Sat PM
Shrage, Laurie (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)	
.....	I-C Wed AM
Shun, Kwong-loi (Chinese University of Hong Kong).....	XI-E Sat PM
Sider, Ted (Rutgers University)	VIII-H Fri PM
Sievert, Don (University of Missouri–Columbia).....	VII-E Fri AM
Siewert, Charles (University of California–Riverside)	
.....	GI-B Wed PM, V-J Thu PM
Silva, Grant (University of Oregon)	GII-D Wed PM
Silverman, Allan (Ohio State University)	XIII-D Sun AM
Silverman, Eric (St. Louis University)	XI-K Sat PM
Simpson, Zach (Claremont Graduate University)	X-J Sat AM
Singpurwalla, Rachel (Southern Illinois University–Edwardsville)	
.....	XIII-D Sun AM
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (Dartmouth College).....	II-A Wed PM
Skare, Sharon (University of California–San Diego).....	III-C Wed PM
Sklar, Lawrence (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor).....	II-B Wed PM
Skoog, Kim (University of Guam).....	GX-A Sat PM
Skow, Bradford (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)	IV-H Thu AM
Skyrms, Brian (University of California–Irvine)	IV-B Thu AM
Slettom, Jeanyne (Claremont Graduate University)	MI-8 Thu AM
Sluga, Hans (University of California–Berkeley).....	VIII-B Fri PM
Smalligan, Jennifer (University of California–Berkeley)	IV-E Thu AM
Smeenck, Christopher (University of California–Los Angeles)....	II-B Wed PM
Smit, Houston (University of Arizona)	GVIII-A Sat PM
Smith, Angela (University of Washington)	VII-B Fri AM
Smith, Barry C. (University of London)	MII-2 Wed AM
Smith, David (University of California–Irvine)	GI-B Wed PM
Smith, Holly M. (Rutgers University)	IX-J Fri PM
Smith, Matthew Noah (Yale University).....	VI-F Thu PM
Smith, Nicholas D. (Lewis and Clark College)	Fri PM, XIII-D Sun AM
Smith, Tony (University of Colorado–Boulder)	IX-G Fri PM
Smolkin, Doran (Kwantlen University College).....	IX-K Fri PM

Snyder, Josh (Stanford University)	XI-F Sat PM
Soll, Ivan (University of Wisconsin–Madison)	GV-D Thu PM
Solovay, Sondra (New College of California).....	GV-G Thu PM
Sonderholm, Jorn (Louisiana State University).....	X-H Sat AM
Souffrant, Eddy (University of North Carolina–Charlotte)	GV-B Thu PM
Sowaal, Alice (San Francisco State University)	II-F Wed PM
Speak, Daniel (Azusa Pacific University).....	X-C Sat AM
Spencer, David Ian (University of California–Davis)	X-K Sat AM
Spencer, Joshua (University of Rochester)	VIII-H Fri PM
Sreedhar, Susanne (Tulane University of New Orleans)	
.....	VIII-G Fri PM, GVII-B Fri PM
Stacy, Helen (Stanford University)	GIV-C Thu PM
Stanford, P. Kyle (University of California–Irvine).....	X-B Sat AM
Stangl, Rebecca Lynn (University of Virginia).....	XI-K Sat PM
Steeves, H. Peter (California State University–Fresno and DePaul University)	XIII-B Sun AM
Stein, Nathanael (Oxford University).....	IX-F Fri PM
Steinberg, Diane (Cleveland State University).....	GV-E Thu PM
Steinbock, Bonnie (State University of New York–Albany and Union-Mount Sinai School of Medicine).....	VIII-K Fri PM
Steinhart, Eric Charles (William Paterson University)	X-J Sat AM
Stephens, Christopher (University of British Columbia).....	IV-G Thu AM
Stephenson, Wendell (Fresno City College).....	GVII-B Fri PM
Sterba, James P. (University of Notre Dame)	I-C Wed AM
Stern, Gabriel R. (Loyola Marymount University)	
.....	GII-F Wed PM, GV-I Thu PM
Stojanovic, Isidora (Institut Jean Nicod)	V-H Thu PM
Stoljar, Daniel (Australian National University).....	I-A Wed AM
Stone, Sophia (University of San Francisco).....	GVII-C Fri PM
Stoutland, Fred (St. Olaf College).....	VI-D Thu PM
Strawser, Michael (University of Central Florida)	
.....	III-G Wed PM, GV-C Thu PM
Stevens, Michael (New York University)	VI-J Thu PM
Stroud, Sarah (McGill University)	XIII-G Sun AM
Stryker, Susan (University of California–Berkeley).....	GV-G Thu PM
Suckiel, Ellen (University of California–Santa Cruz)	XII-D Sat PM
Sun, Weimin (California State University–Northridge)	
.....	GV-A Thu PM, GVII-A Fri PM
Suppes, Patrick (Stanford University)	IV-D Thu AM
Sutherland, Daniel (University of Illinois–Chicago)	XI-I Sat PM
Sveinsdottir, Asta (San Francisco State University)	V-J Thu PM
Swanton, Christine (University of Auckland).....	XIII-A Sun AM
Swazo, Norman K. (University of Alaska–Fairbanks).....	GII-D Wed PM

Sweeney, Kevin W. (University of Tampa)	MII-3 Wed AM
Swoyer, Chris (University of Oklahoma)	V-J Thu PM
Szabo, Zoltan (Cornell University)	X-E Sat AM
Szaif, Jan (University of California–Davis).....	GIX-E Sat PM

T

Tai, Terence (National Zhengzhi University)	GV-A Thu PM
Talbert, Matt (University of California–San Diego)	III-C Wed PM
Taliaferro, Charles (St. Olaf College)	MI-2 Wed AM, MI-6 Wed PM
Talisse, Robert (Vanderbilt University).....	I-H Wed AM
Tannenbaum, Julie (National Institutes of Health)	I-D Wed AM
Taylor, Erin (University of California–Los Angeles)	XI-K Sat PM
Taylor, Jacqueline (University of San Francisco).....	XI-K Sat PM
Taylor, Jim (Westmont College).....	MI-1 Wed AM
Taylor, Kenneth (Stanford University).....	VII-F Fri AM
Teller, Paul (University of California–Davis)	VII-D Fri AM
Tenenbaum, Sergio (University of Toronto).....	GVII-D Fri PM, XI-I Sat PM
Tennant, Neil (Ohio State University)	I-F Wed AM
Terjesen, Andrew (Washington and Lee University)	
.....	III-A Wed PM, GVII-A Fri PM
Tessman, Lisa (State University of New York–Binghamton)	IX-B Fri PM
Thalos, Mariam (University of Utah).....	I-I Wed AM
Thielke, Peter (Pomona College)	IX-A Fri PM, GVIII-A Sat PM
Thomas, Brian (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	III-G Wed PM
Thompson, Michael (University of Pittsburgh)	VI-H Thu PM
Thompson, Paul B. (Michigan State University)	XII-A Sat PM
Thomson-Jones, Katherine (Oberlin College)	VIII-F Fri PM
Thomson-Jones, Martin (Oberlin College).....	IV-G Thu AM
Tiedke, Heidi (University of Maryland–College Park)	VIII-I Fri PM
Tiffany, Evan (Simon Fraser University).....	XIII-G Sun AM
Tillman, Chris (University of Manitoba).....	V-J Thu PM
Timko, Robert (Mansfield University of Pennsylvania)	GIV-A Thu PM
Timmermann, Jens (University of St. Andrews)	V-A Thu PM
Timmons, Mark (University of Arizona).....	V-A Thu PM
Timpe, Kevin (University of San Diego).....	IV-F Thu AM
Titelbaum, Michael (University of California–Berkeley).....	XIII-F Sun AM
Tiwald, Justin (San Francisco State University).....	XI-E Sat PM
Tognazzini, Neal A. (University of California–Riverside)	IV-F Thu AM
Tong, Rosemarie (University of North Carolina–Charlotte).....	GVII-N Fri PM
Torre, Stephan (University of Massachusetts–Amherst).....	X-K Sat AM
Townsend, Dabney (Armstrong Atlantic State University)	VI-B Thu PM
Treanor, Brian (Loyola Marymount University)	
.....	MI-5 Wed PM, GII-H Wed PM

Treanor, Nick (Brown University)..... X-I Sat AM
 Tsosie, Rebecca (Arizona State University)..... X-L Sat AM
 Turner, Donald (Nashville State Community College).....MI-4 Wed PM
 Turner, Jason (Rutgers University)XII-K Sat PM
 Turner, Stephen (University of South Florida)GVII-K Fri PM
 Turrell, Ford (Nashville State Community College).....MI-4 Wed PM
 Tye, Michael (University of Texas–Austin)..... I-G Wed AM

U

Ulatowski, Joseph (University of Utah)XI-J Sat PM
 Uleman, Jennifer K. (State University of New York–Purchase) ... VII-I Fri AM

V

Vade, Dylan (Independent Scholar)..... GV-G Thu PM
 Vallabha, Bharath (Harvard University)I-E Wed AM
 Vallega-Neu, Daniela (California State University–Stanislaus) ... GII-I Wed PM
 Vallier, Kevin (University of Arizona)..... I-H Wed AM
 Vallor, Shannon (Santa Clara University)..... IV-H Thu AM
 Van Camp, Julie C. (California State University–Long Beach)
 IX-H Fri PM, GVII-L Fri PM
 Van Cleve, James (University of Southern California)IX-N Fri PM
 Van Leeuwen, D.S. Neil (Stanford University) IX-F Fri PM
 van Roojen, Mark (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)IX-K Fri PM
 Vander Laan, David (Westmont College).....X-J Sat AM
 VanDyke, Christina (Calvin College) X-M Sat AM
 Vannatta, Seth (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)GIX-H Sat PM
 Varden, Helga (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)..... VII-I Fri AM
 Vargas, Manuel (University of San Francisco)..... III-C Wed PM
 Varner, Gary (Texas A&M University)..... XII-D Sat PM
 Velleman, David (New York University) VII-G Fri AM
 Vihvelin, Kadri (University of Southern California)XII-K Sat PM
 Vilhauer, Benjamin (William Paterson University).....IV-I Thu AM
 Vilhauer, Monica (Roanoke College)..... GIII-A Wed PM
 Vineberg, Susan (Wayne State University).....I-I Wed AM
 Viner, Steve (Washington University in St. Louis) GIX-B Sat PM
 Viney, Donald Wayne (Pittsburg State University).....MI-3 Wed PM
 Virago, Shawna (Independent Scholar)..... GV-G Thu PM
 Vision, Gerald (Temple University) II-D Wed PM
 Vitz, Rico (University of North Florida) VI-I Thu PM
 Vogler, Candace (University of Chicago)..... VI-H Thu PM

W

Walker, Eric (University of Montana)XII-A Sat PM

Walker, Margaret (Arizona State University)	II-A Wed PM
Wall, Barbara (Villanova University)	X-M Sat AM
Wallace, Andy (Sonoma State University).....	III-I Wed PM
Wallace, R. Jay (University of California–Berkeley)	VIII-A Fri PM
Wallis, Charles (California State University–Long Beach).....	X-I Sat AM
Walters, Gregory (University of Ottawa)	GVII-C Fri PM
Ward, Barry M. (University of Arkansas–Fayetteville)	V-K Thu PM
Warenski, Lisa (Union College).....	XI-H Sat PM
Warren, Mary Anne (Independent Scholar)	III-K Wed PM
Wartenberg, Thomas (Mount Holyoke College).....	VIII-F Fri PM
Waters, Kenneth (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)	VI-J Thu PM
Watkins, Eric (University of California–San Diego)	XII-C Sat PM
Watson, Gary (University of California–Riverside)	VIII-A Fri PM
Wautischer, Helmut (Sonoma State University)....	GVII-C Fri PM, XI-K Sat PM
Wayne, Andrew (University of Guelph).....	IV-H Thu AM
Wearing, Catherine (Wellesley College)	XII-E Sat PM
Webb, Judson (Boston University)	IV-D Thu AM
Wedgwood, Ralph (Oxford University)	IX-K Fri PM
Weinberg, Jonathan M. (Indiana University–Bloomington).....	GVII-G Fri PM
Weinberg, Rivka (Scripps College)	XII-L Sat PM
Weinberg, Shelley (University of Toronto)	XI-I Sat PM
Weiner, Matt (Texas Tech University)	XI-H Sat PM
Weinstein, Mark (Montclair State University)	I-B Wed AM, GVI-A Thu PM
Weiskopf, Daniel (University of South Florida)	I-G Wed AM
Weiss, Harold (Northampton Community College).....	III-L Wed PM
Welch, Elliot (University of Maine–Farmington)	XI-D Sat PM
Wertheimer, Alan (National Institutes of Health)	I-H Wed AM
West, Henry (Macalester College)	X-J Sat AM
Westbrook, Nathan (University of California–Riverside).....	IV-G Thu AM
Whipple, John (University of California–Irvine)	GVII-B Fri PM
White, Heidi (New York University)	GV-J Thu PM, GVII-K Fri PM
White, Thomas (Loyola Marymount University)...	XII-D Sat PM, GIX-F Sat PM
Whiting, Jennifer (University of Toronto)	XI-D Sat PM
Wiedebach, Hartwig (Universität Zürich).....	GVII-C Fri PM
Wildberg, Christian (Princeton University)	VIII-C Fri PM
Wildman, Wesley (Boston University).....	MI-6 Wed PM
Wilkerson, William (University of Alabama–Huntsville)	X-F Sat AM
Willard, Dallas (University of Southern California) MI-5 Wed PM, GII-H Wed PM
Willard, Mary Beth (Yale University).....	XII-E Sat PM
Willer, Malte (University of Texas–Austin).....	IX-I Fri PM
Willett, Cynthia (Emory University)	XII-M Sat PM

Williams, Michael (Johns Hopkins University).....	II-G Wed PM
Willman, Marshall (University of Iowa).....	GI-A Wed PM
Wilson, Malcolm (University of Oregon).....	X-D Sat AM
Wilson, Robert A. (University of Alberta).....	V-D Thu PM, GIV-D Thu PM
Wilson, Yolonda (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	VII-K Fri AM
Wimberly, Cory (University of Texas–Pan American).....	GVIII-E Sat PM
Winfield, Richard Dien (University of Georgia) ...	GVI-C Thu PM, GVII-J Fri PM
Winfree, Jason (California State University–Stanislaus).....	GII-I Wed PM
Wion, Matt (Marquette University).....	GX-B Sat PM
Wislanka, Urszula (Independent Scholar).....	GII-A Wed PM
Wisnewski, J. Jeremy (Hartwick College)	I-H Wed AM, GII-E Wed PM, GV-H Thu PM, GIX-G Sat PM
Woien, Sandra (Arizona State University)	VII-K Fri AM
Wolf, Clark (Iowa State University).....	X-L Sat AM
Wolf, Michael P. (California State University–Fresno).....	VIII-I Fri PM
Wolgast, Elizabeth (California State University–East Bay)	GIII-A Wed PM, GVI-B Thu PM
Wong, David B. (Duke University).....	XI-E Sat PM
Wood, Allen (Stanford University).....	III-I Wed PM
Wood, David (Vanderbilt University).....	XIII-B Sun AM
Woodruff, David (Huntington University).....	MI-7 Thu AM
Woods, John (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities).....	V-J Thu PM
Woodward, James (California Institute of Technology).....	VII-D Fri AM
Wrathall, Mark (Brigham Young University)	XI-J Sat PM
Wray, K. Brad (State University of New York–Oswego).....	IV-H Thu AM
Wright, Cory (University of California–San Diego).....	I-F Wed AM
Wright, Jennifer (University of Wyoming).....	GIX-G Sat PM
Wyckoff, Jason (University of Colorado–Boulder).....	VII-I Fri AM
Wykstra, Stephen (Calvin College)	X-G Sat AM
Wylie, Alison (University of Washington).....	II-E Wed PM

X

Xiao, Yang (Kenyon College)..... IV-K Thu AM, GV-A Thu PM, GIX-C Sat PM

Y

Yablo, Stephen (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)..... V-E Thu PM
 Yaffe, Gideon (University of Southern California)..... VI-A Thu PM
 Yamada, Masahiro (Claremont Graduate University)..... XIII-E Sun AM
 Yang, Xiaomei (Temple University)..... IV-K Thu AM
 Yates, Melissa (Northwestern University)..... III-D Wed PM
 Yeomans, Christopher (Kenyon College)..... III-I Wed PM
 Yi, Byeong-Uk (University of Toronto)..... IX-E Fri PM
 Young, Charles (Claremont Graduate University)..... I-I Wed AM

Young, James O. (University of Victoria)..... VIII-E Fri PM, GIX-A Sat PM
 Youpa, Andrew (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale) VI-I Thu PM
 Yuan, Jinmei (Creighton University)
GII-B Wed PM, GVII-A Fri PM, XIII-H Sun AM
 Yuan, Lijun (Texas State University–San Marcos)..... IX-B Fri PM
 Yurdin, Joel (University of California–Berkeley)..... XIII-D Sun AM

Z

Zack, Naomi (University of Oregon)..... GVII-M Fri PM, XII-M Sat PM
 Zahavi, Dan (University of Copenhagen) GI-B Wed PM
 Zalta, Edward N. (Stanford University) IX-M Fri PM
 Zeis, John (Canisius College) X-J Sat AM
 Zimmerman, Aaron (University of California–Santa Barbara)
 III-J Wed PM, GIV-B Thu PM
 Zimmerman, Dean (Rutgers University) III-B Wed PM
 Zoeller, Guenter (University of Munich) VIII-B Fri PM

GROUP SESSIONS

A

American Association of Philosophy Teachers, *Thursday, April 5, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*

American Society for Aesthetics, *Saturday, April 7, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 1, *Thursday, April 5, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 2, *Friday, April 6, 8:00-11:00 p.m.*

Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking, *Thursday, April 5, 8:00-10:00 p.m.*

C

Concerned Philosophers for Peace, *Thursday, April 5, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

H

Hume Society, *Thursday, April 5, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*

I

International Hobbes Association, Session 1, *Friday, April 6, 8:00-11:00 p.m.*

International Hobbes Association, Session 2, *Saturday, April 7, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

International Society for Chinese Philosophy, *Saturday, April 7, 8:00-10:00 p.m.*

International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy, Session 1, *Wednesday, April 4, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*

International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy, Session 2, *Saturday, April 7, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

K

Karl Jaspers Society and the Victor von Weizsäcker Society, *Friday, April 6, 8:00-11:00 p.m.*

Kierkegaard Society, *Thursday, April 5, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

N

North American Kant Society, Session 1, *Friday, April 6, 8:00-11:00 p.m.*

North American Kant Society, Session 2, *Saturday, April 7, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*

North American Nietzsche Society, *Thursday, April 5, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

North American Spinoza Society, Session 1, *Thursday, April 5, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

North American Spinoza Society, Session 2, *Saturday, April 7, 8:00-10:00 p.m.*

North American Wittgenstein Society, Session 1, *Wednesday, April 4, 8:00-10:00 p.m.*

North American Wittgenstein Society, Session 2, *Thursday, April 5, 8:00-10:00 p.m.*

P

Philosophy of Religion Group, *Saturday, April 7, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Philosophy of Time Society, *Saturday, April 7, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*

R

Radical Philosophy Association, Session 1, *Wednesday, April 4, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Radical Philosophy Association, Session 2, *Friday, April 6, 8:00-11:00 p.m.*

S

Society for Analytical Feminism, *Thursday, April 5, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy, *Saturday, April 7, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, *Wednesday, April 4, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Society for Business Ethics, *Saturday, April 7, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Society for Empirical Ethics, *Friday, April 6, 8:00-11:00 p.m.*

Society for German Idealism, Session 1, *Wednesday, April 4, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Society for German Idealism, Session 2, *Saturday, April 7, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*

Society for Iberian and Latin American Thought, *Wednesday, April 4, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy and the APA Committee on the Status of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgendered People in the Profession, *Thursday, April 5, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Society for Phenomenology and Analytic Philosophy, *Wednesday, April 4, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*

Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs, *Thursday, April 5, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*

Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World, Session 1, *Thursday, April 5, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World, Session 2, *Saturday, April 7, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

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- Society for Realist/Antirealist Discussion, Session 1, *Wednesday, April 4, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*
- Society for Realist/Antirealist Discussion, Session 2, *Friday, April 6, 8:00-11:00 p.m.*
- Society for Skeptical Studies, Session 1, *Saturday, April 7, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*
- Society for Skeptical Studies, Session 2, *Saturday, April 7, 8:00-10:00 p.m.*
- Society for Social and Political Philosophy: Historical, Continental, and Feminist Perspectives, Session 1, *Friday, April 6, 8:00-11:00 p.m.*
- Society for Social and Political Philosophy: Historical, Continental, and Feminist Perspectives, Session 2, *Saturday, April 7, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*
- Society for Student Philosophers, Session 1, *Wednesday, April 4, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*
- Society for Student Philosophers, Session 2, *Thursday, April 5, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*
- Society for Student Philosophers, Session 3, *Friday, April 6, 8:00-11:00 p.m.*
- Society for Systematic Philosophy, Session 1, *Thursday, April 5, 8:00-10:00 p.m.*
- Society for Systematic Philosophy, Session 2, *Friday, April 6, 8:00-11:00 p.m.*
- Society for Women in Philosophy, *Friday, April 6, 8:00-11:00 p.m.*
- Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Graduate Student Section, *Saturday, April 7, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*
- Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, *Friday, April 6, 8:00-11:00 p.m.*
- Society for the Metaphysics of Science, *Thursday, April 5, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*
- Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts, *Friday, April 6, 8:00-11:00 p.m.*
- Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 1, *Wednesday, April 4, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*
- Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 2, *Friday, April 6, 8:00-11:00 p.m.*
- Society for the Study of Philosophy and the Martial Arts, *Thursday, April 5, 8:00-10:00 p.m.*
- Society for the Study of Process Philosophy, Josiah Royce Society, and the Society for the Philosophy of Creativity, *Saturday, April 7, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*
- Society of Christian Philosophers, *Wednesday, April 4, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*
- W**
- Western Phenomenology Conference, *Wednesday, April 4, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*,
William James Society, *Thursday, April 5, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*
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GRADUATE STUDENT TRAVEL STIPEND WINNERS

Madeleine Arseneault (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
“On Idiom, Ambiguity, and What Is Said”
XII-E Saturday, April 7, 4:00-6:00 p.m.

Anne Baril (University of Arizona)
“Employment Freedom”
VII-J Friday, April 6, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

John T. Bengson (University of Texas–Austin)
Marc Moffett (University of Wyoming)
“Know-how and Concept Possession”
III-H Wednesday, April 4, 4:00-6:00 p.m.

Anna Bergqvist (University of Reading)
“Sibley and Defeasible Reasons: Holism about Reasons in Aesthetic Evaluations”
XIV-C Sunday, April 8, 1:00-3:00 p.m.

Suze Berkhout (University of British Columbia)
“Relational Autonomy and Human Capabilities”
V-G Thursday, April 5, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Nicolas Espinoza (Sveriges Största Tekniska Universitet)
“Margins of Error in Value Comparisons”
I-I Wednesday, April 4, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

James Genone (University of California–Berkeley)
“Perceptual Experience and Error”
X-I Saturday, April 7, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

Brian Glenney (University of Southern California)
“Touch at a Distance: A Case for Spatial Experience”
X-G Saturday, April 7, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

Jeffrey Glick (Rutgers University)
“Testimonial Defeat: A Reply to Lackey”
XIII-F Sunday, April 8, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

Dana Lynne Goswick (University of California–Davis)
“Ontological Conventionalism: The New Essentialism”
VIII-H Friday, April 6, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

L. Bryce G. Huebner (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
“If You Like Pina Colodas...”
XIV-D Sunday, April 8, 1:00-3:00 p.m.

Robert Johnson (University of Oklahoma)
Russell Jones (University of Oklahoma)
“Counterfactual Exemplar-Based Virtue Accounts of Right Action”
XI-J Saturday, April 7, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Paul Katsafanas (Harvard University)
“Constitutivism and Self-Knowledge”
XIII-G Sunday, April 8, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

Shieva J. Kleinschmidt (Rutgers University)
“Many-One Identity and the Trinity”
II-I Wednesday, April 4, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Felipe Leon (University of California–Riverside)
Neal A. Tognazzini (University of California–Riverside)
“Why Frankfurt-Examples Don’t Need to Succeed to Succeed”
IV-G Thursday, April 5, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

Pamela Lomelino (University of Colorado–Boulder)

“Crossing Species Boundaries: A Feminist Critique of Human-Nonhuman Chimeras”

XII-D Saturday, April 7, 4:00-6:00 p.m.

Berislav Marusic (University of California–Berkeley)

“Why Not the Self-knowledge Rule?”

XI-G Saturday, April 7, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Jennifer Morton (Stanford University)

“Practical Reasoning and the Varieties of Agency”

IV-J Thursday, April 5, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

Japa Pallikkathayil (Harvard University)

“Threats, Punishment, and Proportionality”

XIV-F Sunday, April 8, 1:00-3:00 p.m.

Alessandro Pignocchi (Institut Jean Nicod)

“Motor Perception: A Third Way to Perceive Pictures?”

XIV-C Sunday, April 8, 1:00-3:00 p.m.

Angela Potochnik (Stanford University)

“Generality, Complexity, and Approaches to Explanation”

V-K Thursday, April 5, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Brian Prince (Rice University)

“Possible Bridges and Hypothetical Consent”

VIII-J Friday, April 6, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Eric Roark (University of Missouri–Columbia)

“Is Michael Otsuka’s Conception of Robust Self-Ownership Too Robust for a Left-Libertarian?”

VII-J Friday, April 6, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

Benjamin A. Sachs (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

“Teleology and Deontology in Distributive Justice”

VIII-J Friday, April 6, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Kranti Saran (Harvard University)

“Illusions Without Contents?”

I-E Wednesday, April 4, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

Aaron Allen Schiller (University of California–San Diego)

“Dreyfus’s Phenomenological Foundations: A Reply”

XI-I Saturday, April 7, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Eric Silverman (St. Louis University)

“Michael Slote’s Unjustified Rejection of Neo-Aristotelian Ethics”

XI-J Saturday, April 7, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Joshua Spencer (University of Rochester)

“A Tale of Two Simples”

VIII-H Friday, April 6, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Nathanael Stein (Oxford University)

“Aristotle and the Homonymy of Cause”

IX-E Friday, April 6, 4:00-6:00 p.m.

Heidi Tiedke (University of Maryland–College Park)

“A Semantics for Names with Full Benefits”

VIII-I Friday, April 6, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Stephan Torre (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)

“In Defense of (a Formulation of) the Date Theory”

XIII-H Sunday, April 8, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

Kevin Vallier (University of Arizona)

“Liberalism and Economic Growth”

I-H Wednesday, April 4, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

Shelley Weinberg (University of Toronto)

“Locke: The Role of Consciousness in Sensitive Knowledge”

XI-H Saturday, April 7, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Malte Willer (University of Texas–Austin)

“In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy”

XIV-D Sunday, April 8, 1:00-3:00 p.m.

Jason Wyckoff (University of Colorado–Boulder)

“Solving the Problem of Timing Maxims in Kantian Ethics”

VIII-G Friday, April 6, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Melissa Yates (Northwestern University)

“The Underdetermination of Political Conceptions of Personhood”

III-D Wednesday, April 4, 4:00-6:00 p.m.

SPECIAL SESSIONS SPONSORED BY APA COMMITTEES

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 4

Author-Meets-Critics: Angela Davis, *Abolition Democracy* (I-J)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on Blacks in Philosophy

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Philosophy in India: Metaethics (II-I)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on International Cooperation

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Teaching Ethics (III-L)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges

4:00-6:00 p.m.

THURSDAY, APRIL 5

Political Reconciliation and Transitional Justice (IV-J)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on International Cooperation

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chinese Philosophy of Religion (IV-K)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Romanell Lecture (VI-L)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on Lectures, Publications, and Research

4:00-6:00 p.m.

FRIDAY, APRIL 6

Latin American Philosophical Themes in the Humanities (VII-L)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on Hispanics

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Should Children Be Tested for Adult-onset Genetic Disorders? (VIII-K)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Medicine

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Diasporic Asians, Politics, Citizenship, and Race (VIII-L)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies

1:00-4:00 p.m.

SATURDAY, APRIL 7**Indigenous People and Property Rights (X-L)**

Sponsored by the APA Committee on International Cooperation

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Women in Philosophy Across the Career Span (X-M)

Sponsored by the APA Committees on the Status of Women and Inclusiveness

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Changing Paradigms in Biology (XI-L)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of Women

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Berger Prize Winning Essay (XI-M)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Law

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Special Session in Honor of Iris Marion Young (XII-M)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of Women and the Society for Women in Philosophy

4:00-6:00 p.m.

SUNDAY, APRIL 8**Fatalism in *The Dream of the Red Chamber* (XIII-H)**

Sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies

9:00 a.m.-Noon

ABSTRACTS OF COLLOQUIUM AND SYMPOSIUM PAPERS

AGENTIAL SYSTEMS AND CAUSAL DEVIANCE (VIII-G)

JESÚS AGUILAR, ROCHESTER INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

A plausible strategy to defend the Causal Theory of Action from deviant causal chains is grounded on the proposal that an intentional bodily movement must be sensitive to the content of the mental state that causes it. This strategy is directly challenged by causally deviant cases where bodily movements are produced through the intervention of a second agent. In this essay I criticize John Bishop's influential answer to this challenge. In particular, I criticize Bishop's alleged "Final Breakthrough" concerning the necessary and sufficient conditions for an intentional action which is a central part of his answer to causal deviance.

DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION, PUBLIC REASON, AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (IX-G)

SCOTT AIKIN, VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

The activity of democratic deliberation is governed by the norm of public reason—namely, that reasons justifying public policy must both be pursuant of shared goods and be shareable by all reasonable discussants. Environmental policies based on controversial theories of value, as a consequence, are in danger of breaking the rule that would legitimate their enforcement.

RELIANCE IN SHARED INTENTION (VIII-G)

FACUNDO MARTIN ALONSO, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

Bratman (1999a) and Tuomela and Miller (1988) propose that we regard the intentions of individuals in shared intention as intentions in favor of the joint activity. In this paper I explore what cognitive attitudes an individual is required to have in order for him to intend the joint activity in the way involved in shared intention. I argue that both Bratman and Tuomela and Miller are right in claiming that the content of these cognitive attitudes must include the other participants' intentions in favor of the joint activity (Bratman) and their respective actions (Tuomela and Miller). However, I claim that these authors are wrong in thinking that these cognitive attitudes need to be beliefs. I argue that an individual's reliance on the other participant's relevant intentions and actions provides sufficient epistemic elements, even in the absence of belief, for him to intend the joint activity.

WHY FITNESS IS NOT A PROPENSITY (IV-G)*ANDRE ARIEW, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI—COLUMBIA**ZACHARY J. ERNST, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI—COLUMBIA*

Recently advocates of the propensity interpretation of fitness have turned critics. To accommodate examples from the population genetics literature they conclude that fitness is better defined more broadly as a family of propensities rather than the propensity to contribute descendants to some n generation. We argue that the propensity theorists have misunderstood the deeper ramifications of the examples they cite: these examples demonstrate why there are factors outside of propensities that determine type fitness.

ON IDIOM, AMBIGUITY, AND WHAT IS SAID (XII-E)*MADELEINE ARSENEAULT, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN—MADISON*

There are a host of expressions whose meaningfulness goes beyond their compositionally derived ordinary meaning. Unlike metaphor, idiomatic phrases have received considerably little attention from philosophers of language. Presumably this is because idiomatic phrases are accommodated into the lexicon of the language and are treated as a limit of, while not a challenge to, semantic compositionality. I reexamine idiomatic phrases and how they inform the concepts of ambiguity and saying. I draw out a surprising consequence of the standard view of idiom. I argue that the standard view is committed to holding that it is unintelligible to describe idioms as cases of saying one thing but meaning something else by it. Though this might not constitute a refutation of the standard view, I think it warrants a reexamination of idiomaticity.

THE ZERO-ONE RULE (IX-J)*H. E. BABER, UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO*

Understanding well being in terms of preference-satisfaction makes interpersonal comparisons of well being problematic. Preferences are usually represented by means of an ordinal utility function, which does not provide any account of how much well being the satisfaction of a given preference provides or allow for interpersonal comparisons. We can contrive a bounded cardinal representation of people's preferences, by assigning 1 to the top of each individual's utility function and 0 to the bottom, which allows for interpersonal comparisons of utility. Daniel Hausman and others, however, suggest that this Zero-One rule produces results that are counterintuitive and incompatible with some of our firmest moral convictions. I argue that an informed preference account of well being fortified with the Zero-One rule is neither counterintuitive nor inconsistent with our moral convictions. Individuals at the same level of their personal preference rankings, however greedy or modest they are, are equally well off.

EMPLOYMENT FREEDOM (VII-J)

ANNE BARIL, UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

A person's employment so permeates the rest of her life that if she doesn't have a real choice about her employment, she can't properly be said to have a real choice about the way she lives her life. Effective freedom—the actual ability to make real, substantial decisions about the direction of one's life—requires effective freedom with respect to one's choice of employment (“work freedom”). I propose that work freedom is not merely a matter of acceptable alternatives, but also of the number and diversity of choices one has about what kinds of effective freedom one will have as a result of one's employment. Number and diversity of such choices is not the whole story, however; some choices matter more than others. Finally, which kinds of choices make a difference to one's

HUME, DISTINCTIONS OF REASON, AND DIFFERENTIAL RESEMBLANCE (IV-E)

DONALD L.M. BAXTER, UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT

In explaining the distinction of reason, Hume's main concern is to resolve a tension with his principle that “all ideas, which are different, are separable.” However, a deeper problem arises. Hume holds that the same thing, even a simple, uncomposed, thing, can resemble something in one respect and differ from it in another. Additionally, Hume thinks that the respects of resemblance are numerically identical with the thing itself. Unfortunately, it follows that in the identical respect of resemblance, the same thing does and does not resemble something else. Differential resemblance yields a contradiction. The contradiction undermines not only his account of distinctions of reason, but also his account of abstract ideas, and ultimately the Empiricist program of deriving all ideas from inner and outer sense.

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF LEIBNIZ ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SENSIBLE AND INTELLECTUAL REPRESENTATIONS (V-I)

STEVEN M. BAYNE, FAIRFIELD UNIVERSITY

Kant believed Leibniz failed to realize there is a distinction in kind between intellectual and sensible representations. Kant believed Leibniz thought the difference between concepts and sensible intuitions was a only a difference of degree not type—that is, concepts and sense perceptions turn out to be the same type of mental representation and they only differ from each other in terms of their relative distinctness. Concepts possess this distinctness, while sense perceptions do not. Kant believed that Leibniz held sense perceptions to be nothing but sets of confused concepts. I argue that although this interpretation seems initially plausible, the textual evidence for it is at best inconclusive. I then argue that there are clear texts in which Leibniz does seem to draw a distinction in kind between sensible and intellectual representations. Finally, I argue that these passages cannot consistently be reinterpreted as being consistent with the Kantian interpretation of Leibniz.

KNOW-HOW AND CONCEPT POSSESSION (III-H)

*JOHN T. BENGSON, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS–AUSTIN**MARC MOFFETT, UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING*

The relation between know-how and ability is rather puzzling: Why do some know-how attributions entail ability attributions while others do not? Our answer is that know-how attributions that entail ability attributions ascribe to the subject the possession of ability-based concepts. Although the mere possession conditions for such concepts may be relatively cheap, the sort of reasonable mastery of these concepts that is presupposed by know-how attributions requires that the subject possess certain abilities. We end by showing how considerations such as these suggest that the key to an adequate philosophical theory of the nature of know-how is not the relation between know-how and ability, but the connection between know-how and concept possession.

SIBLEY AND DEFEASIBLE REASONS: HOLISM ABOUT REASONS IN AESTHETIC EVALUATIONS (III-E)

ANNA BERGQVIST, UNIVERSITY OF READING

In this paper, I outline a new reading of Sibley's conception of *prima facie* reasons in aesthetic evaluations, which is outlined in his article "General Criteria and Reasons in Aesthetics." Sibley seems to think that there are general *prima facie* aesthetic reasons, for he maintains that there are general features or criteria whose aesthetic value-polarity is inherently positive or negative when taken in isolation from other features with which they may interact. So there is some excuse for approaching Sibley's position in terms of Rossian intuitionism. Nevertheless, I shall argue that Sibley's overall discussion of aesthetic reasoning and aesthetic evaluation is more akin to a version of holism that figures in Jonathan Dancy's recent defence of moderate particularism, which employs the notion of a default reason instead of that of a *prima facie* reason. In particular, it is my aim to show that Sibley would do better to abandon the notion of inherent or *prima facie* aesthetic polarity for features that may be possessed by artworks (and hence to aesthetic evaluations), since this conception is at odds with his discussion of the way the actual aesthetic polarity of such features is always contextually determined.

RELATIONAL AUTONOMY AND HUMAN CAPABILITIES (V-G)

SUZE BERKHOUT, UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

The growing interest in alternative conceptions of autonomy within philosophy in general, and medical ethics in particular, reflects many of the reasons given for rejecting the individualistic, decision-focused account of autonomy. But outside of the demand for attention to background social and material conditions, there is little suggestion of exactly how to make these assessments meaningful when dealing with individual patients within a medical context. Here I argue that Nussbaum's capability approach is able to operationalize a general conception of relational autonomy to

the extent that would be necessary for its practical use within medicine. Focusing on capabilities better reflects the aims and objectives of medical practice and medical ethics, while providing a means of establishing where interventions and policy might make an impact on the health and well being of individuals and the communities within which they live.

JUSTICE AS A SELF-REGARDING VIRTUE (XIII-G)

PAUL BLOOMFIELD, UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT

The benefit of being a just person has long appeared inscrutable at best. Assuming that self-respect is a benefit to a person, an argument is given for the conclusion that without the virtue of justice a person cannot have self-respect. The argument proceeds by an investigation of the role of supervenience in justice (understanding supervenience here as treating like cases alike), the need for fair judgment in order to possess self-knowledge, and the need for the latter for self-respect.

THE NORMATIVITY OF RATIONALITY (XIII-F)

JASON M. BRIDGES, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

There is a familiar conception of rationality according to which rationality is wholly a matter of internal consistency—of how well a person's propositional attitudes hold together, rather than of how well they track the actual reasons for and against them. Is rationality, in this sense, normative? We folk seem to think so. Accusing someone of irrationality, in the sense in question, is a criticism, and it appears to carry the implication that the person ought to change her attitudes so as to eliminate the irrationality. But difficulties arise when we try to get a clear philosophical picture of how normative principles of "subjective" rationality are supposed to operate. In this talk, I will critique two recent accounts of the normativity of subjective rationality, due to John Broome and Niko Kolodny, and propose an alternative. My primary positive suggestion is that the key to making sense of norms of rationality is to see that they govern only a special kind of conduct on our part: what we might call rational self-management.

SEA BATTLE SEMANTICS (VII-J)

BERIT BROGAARD, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI–SAINT LOUIS

The assumption that the future is open makes well known problems for traditional semantics. We have a strong intuition to the effect that today's occurrence of the sentence, "there will be a sea battle tomorrow," while truth-valueless today, will have a determinate truth-value by tomorrow night. Yet given traditional semantics, sentences that are truth-valueless now cannot later "become" true. Relativistic semantics supposedly does a better job accommodating our intuitions about future contingents than does non-relativistic semantics. I will argue, however, that our intuitions about future contingents cannot by themselves motivate such a paradigm shift, for, initial appearances to the contrary, standard non-relativistic semantics (plus an account of truth-value gaps) can accommodate both of our intuitions about future contingents.

THE DISSOLUTION OF A DILEMMA: WHY DARWINIAN CONSIDERATIONS DON'T CONFRONT MORAL REALISM WITH HARD CHOICES (IX-K)

KEVIN BROSNAN, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA–SANTA CRUZ

What are the implications, if any, for the epistemic status of our moral beliefs, if they were formed by a process that is independent of presumptive moral facts? On Street's (2006) view, the implication is that our moral beliefs are very probably false, while on Joyce's (2006), the implication is that they are unjustified. Street claims (albeit cautiously) that the content of our moral beliefs was produced by natural selection, and Joyce, that natural selection is the best explanation for our capacity to form beliefs about what is right and wrong. They agree that evolution by natural selection is a process that operates independently of presumptive moral facts. I will argue (a) that this is not always the case, and (b) that even if it were, it implies neither that our moral beliefs are probably false nor that they are unjustified.

WHAT KANT MEANS BY "OBJECTIVE REALITY" AND ITS BEARING ON THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTIONS (V-I)

AARON BUNCH, WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY

Contrary to a pervasive and natural view (held by Allison, Beck, and others), I argue that in Kant's works the "objective reality" of a concept denotes the reality of the concept itself and does not require the actuality of its corresponding object. A "real" concept, on my view, is one that has a possible object, since a "concept" without any possible application would be no concept at all, but only a meaningless word, a chimera, or a "figment of the brain" (to use some of Kant's favorite language). I argue that the natural view, which requires the instantiation of the concept for its objective reality, cannot make sense of Kant's deductions and makes the very project of transcendental critique incoherent. My view, however, makes sense of Kant's deductions and shows how the a priori legitimation of knowledge claims is possible.

IS UGLINESS A PURE AESTHETIC CATEGORY IN KANT'S THEORY OF TASTE? (VII-H)

JOSEPH CANNON, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

A central claim in Henry Allison's *Kant's Theory of Taste* is that "ugliness" is for Kant a pure aesthetic category. In this paper I will argue that this is incorrect. A pure judgment of taste pronounces something beautiful or not-beautiful. Ugliness is not a pure aesthetic category—judgments of which for Kant must be disinterested—but a category that is intrinsically interested. Thus, judgments that declare something ugly cannot be pure aesthetic judgments. For Kant, when we claim that an object is ugly, we make an aesthetic claim bound up with either a moral claim or a prudential claim. I show that one does not find a pure aesthetic account of ugliness in Kant's text, and additionally show that the attempt to introduce one produces intractable problems for the requirement that judgments of taste be disinterested.

MODALITY, INDIVIDUATION, AND THE ONTOLOGY OF ART (IX-H)

BEN CAPLAN, OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

CARL MATHESON, UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

David Davies uses the work-relativity of modality (according to which different works composed at the same time are not equally modally flexible with respect to musico-historical context) to argue for The Performance Theory (according to which a musical work is a performance) and against The Contextualized Product Theory (according to which a musical work is a product that is generated by a performance and that is individuated in part by the musico-historical context in which it is produced). We argue that The Contextualized Product Theory can accommodate the work-relativity of modality if The Performance Theory can.

THE SIMPLE VIEW OF COLLECTIVE AGENCY (VIII-G)

SARA RACHEL CHANT, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI—COLUMBIA

In this paper, I argue that at least some collectives possess a kind of collective agency that is on a par with the richest form of human agency. I argue for this conclusion by considering the implications of two straightforward methodological principles. The first is that whatever account of collective agency we consider, it ought to be in analogy to existing accounts of individual agency. The second is that the ability to perform actions should be considered the most important mark of agency.

DESCARTES ON CONSCIOUSNESS AND FORMS OF THOUGHT (VI-I)

DAVID L. CLEMENSON, UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS—MINNESOTA

Descartes's view of thoughts as self-perceptions implies that all thoughts are ideas; this seems at first to contradict his claim (Third Meditation, AT VII 37) that many thoughts are not ideas, strictly speaking. However, closer analysis reveals not only that there is no contradiction here, but that the self-perception involved in pure perceptions ("ideas" in the strict sense of AT VII 37) is radically confused: all such perceptions, no matter how distinctly they may exhibit their proper objects, fail to exhibit themselves distinctly even as things (the case is different with "impure" perceptions such as volitions; here self-perception may be perfectly distinct). If sensory ideas of cold, heat, colors, etc. are pure self-perceptions (as the Fourth Replies, AT VII 233 would suggest) then the foregoing holds out hope for a clear and consistent explanation of the material falsity and radical confusion of sensory ideas in Cartesian theory.

LUCK AND STANDARD LIBERTARIANISM (IV-F)

E. J. COFFMAN, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

"Standard Libertarianism" (SL) says that you act freely on a given occasion only if the past and laws of nature do not entail your acting as you do then. The so-called "Luck Argument" is one of the premier objections to SL. I here provide a reply to the Luck Argument that's superior to ones prominent in the literature. Section 1 presents a common version of the

Luck Argument, and highlights a challenge its proponents face. Section 2 identifies two desiderata of a reply to the Luck Argument, and uses them to reveal considerable shortcomings of prominent replies. Section 3 assesses the best extant version of the Luck Argument, one due to Alfred Mele. I present two replies to Mele's argument, each of which meets Section 2's desiderata. Section 4 evaluates another version of the Luck Argument, one involving an account of luck different from Mele's. I argue that this version impugns nothing in SL's neighborhood.

RELIABILITY AND PROBABILITY (XI-H)

JUAN COMESAÑA, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

It can often be heard in the hallways, and occasionally read in print, that a reliabilist theory of epistemic justification runs into trouble regarding fair lottery cases. My main aim in this paper is to argue that this is not so. Nevertheless, fair lottery cases do force us to pay close attention to the relation between reliability and probability.

ARISTOTLE ON MATHEMATICAL EXISTENCE (V-F)

PHILIP CORKUM, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

Both literalists and fictionalists deny the existence of a world of mathematical objects distinct from the empirical world. Literalists argue that mathematical objects simply exist in the empirical world; on this account, mathematical statements assert true beliefs about perceivable objects. Fictionalists, on the other hand, hold that mathematical objects do not exist at all; on this account, mathematical statements express merely fictional attitudes. Although these two positions are apparently quite opposed to one another, they nonetheless have been both ascribed to Aristotle. Indeed, Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics exhibits some of the features characteristic of literalism and some of the features characteristic of fictionalism. However, Aristotle's position also exhibits features interestingly different from both literalism and fictionalism. In this paper, I'll discuss literalism and fictionalism, the ascription of literalism and fictionalism to Aristotle, and the points of agreement and disagreement among Aristotle, literalists, and fictionalists.

HOW RELIABLE IS THAT MONKEY? (XI-H)

STEPHEN CROWLEY, BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY

Naturalism is currently a popular position within epistemology. Not all naturalisms however are equally naturalistic. I focus on an "ideal type" of naturalism (which I call Epistemology as Science, or EaS for short) that represents the empirical extreme in the continuum of naturalized epistemologies. Current work in the EaS framework standardly links EaS with a reliabilist approach to knowledge and justification. I argue that although this alliance is immune, by its own lights, to standard epistemic criticisms of reliabilism, serious challenges to its adequacy are raised by current work in comparative psychology on uncertainty monitoring in monkeys.

BETTER BRAINS, BETTER SELVES? THE ETHICS OF NEUROENHANCEMENTS (V-G)*RICHARD DEES, UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER*

The idea of enhancing our abilities through medical means makes most people uncomfortable. People have a vague feeling that altering our brains messes with the core of our personalities and the core of ourselves. It changes who we are, and doing so seems wrong, even if the exact reasons for the unease are difficult to define. However, the lack of such a clear argument against them has led some to argue that we should permit their use on a general principle of allowing people to do what they want as long as they do not harm others. In this paper, I will suggest that most of the arguments against neuroenhancements fail, and the ones that do succeed—the arguments that such changes undermine our integrity and that they prevent us from living authentic lives—will condemn only a few of the uses that are proposed.

ANTI-BERKELEY (IV-E)*GEORGES DICKER, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK—BROCKPORT*

I am not a Berkeleyan. This isn't because I don't appreciate the force of the good Bishop's arguments against matter, for I think that many of them are highly effective against their targets. I also find Berkeley's skeptical arguments, in sections 18-20 of the *Principles of Human Knowledge*, very powerful; though of course they can't show that matter doesn't exist, since it would be fallacious to argue that because we cannot know or be justified in believing that matter exists, therefore it does not exist. But putting these epistemological arguments to one side, I think that the targets of Berkeley's arguments against matter fall into two classes: (1) demonstrably unsound arguments, and (2) arguments directed against views that no friend of matter needs to hold. This is too broad a thesis to defend in a 30-minute paper. So I ignore arguments that I believe fall into class (1); nor do I try to show that all of Berkeley's remaining arguments against matter fall into class (2). But I support the hypothesis that they do, by reference to three key parts of Berkeley's case against matter—his attacks on material substance/substratum, on representationalism, and on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities—leaving for other occasions the question of whether other Berkeleyan arguments against matter are amenable to a similar treatment.

THINK LIKE A CHARACTER: ANALYZING ARGUMENTS IN FICTIONAL CONTEXTS (IX-H)*NICHOLAS DIEHL, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—DAVIS*

There are many philosophical puzzles associated with truth in fiction, among them the problem of how we are to make sense of arguments involving fictional truths. We commonly make inferences involving these propositions in the course of reading fiction and these inferences appear to be ordinary inferences, governed by ordinary logical rules. Yet it is clear from recent counterexamples that there can be significant problems with ordinary valid deductive argument forms when we attempt to apply them to fictional contexts, suggesting that arguments about fictions must

be analyzed differently than their actual world counterparts. This paper explains the puzzle of arguments about fictions and provides a new analysis of the deductive arguments we make while reading fiction. I argue that arguments involving fictional truths only succeed when we recognize the standing prescription to think about these arguments as a character in the fiction would.

CONSTRUCTION WITHOUT SPATIAL CONSTRAINTS: LOCKE ON GEOMETRICAL REASONING (XI-I)

MARY DOMSKI, UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO

In a number of recent articles, Emily Carson (2002, 2005a, 2005b) has brought attention to what she takes to be a tension in Locke's account of geometrical reasoning. On the one hand, Locke claims that our ideas of geometrical figures are simple modes that the mind creates by modifying the simple idea of space. On the other hand, Locke claims that we can have certain knowledge in mathematics because mathematical objects are ideal, that is, because they are products of the understanding. According to Carson, a clear tension in this general argument begins to emerge once we consider that our construction of geometrical figures is constrained by the general conditions of space. As a result of these constraints, the simple modes of space are not free creations of the understanding, and thus, not ideal in the sense Locke claims them to be. Consequently, the certainty of mathematical knowledge becomes problematic at best and untenable at worst. My goal in this paper is to offer a reply on Locke's behalf. For while I agree with Carson that our creation of geometrical figures must be constrained by something, I do not agree that these constraints are tied to features of space we learn from experience. By appealing to Locke's presentation of the simple idea of space in Book II of the *Essay*, I want to show that space, by his definition, cannot play a restrictive role on our constructions. I will thus suggest that any constraints must be "internal" to our constructions, i.e., such constraints must be tied to the power of the imagination. By embracing the imagination as that which determines which figures we can or cannot create, I will argue that Locke can preserve the ideality of geometrical figures on which he grounds the certainty of geometrical knowledge.

CONNUBIUM RATIONIS ET EXPERIENTIAE: CHRISTIAN WOLFF ON THE RELATION BETWEEN EMPIRICAL AND RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY (V-I)

COREY DYCK, BOSTON COLLEGE

Rational psychology was first introduced among the topics of metaphysics by Christian Wolff; nevertheless, historians of philosophy borrow their conception of rational psychology not from Wolff but from Kant who subjects this science to critical scrutiny in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Accordingly, rational psychology is often identified as a rationalist psychology and associated with the abjuration of observation typically associated with philosophical rationalism. By contrast, I demonstrate that Wolff accorded an important function to those observations catalogued

in empirical psychology within rational psychology. While empirical and rational psychology are distinguished in method and emphasis, the latter was considered to be heavily reliant upon the former for its principles and for confirmation of its results. This conception of rational psychology prevailed until Kant's introduction of the (non-empirical) I think as the sole text of rational psychology.

GENETIC DISCRIMINATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: AN ETHICAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (V-G)

BEN EGGLESTON, UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

Current research on the human genome holds enormous promise for improvements in health care, but it poses an immediate ethical challenge in the area of health insurance, by raising the question of whether insurers should be allowed to take genetic information about customers into account in the setting of premiums. It is widely held that such discrimination is immoral and ought to be illegal, and the prevalence of this view is understandable, given the widespread belief, which I endorse, that every individual has a right to affordable health care. But prohibiting genetic discrimination in health insurance is not an effective way to protect this right. On the contrary, I argue that because of the nature of insurance as a product sold in a competitive market, such a prohibition is misguided, and its worthy aims must, instead, be pursued through reforms in our country's system of publicly provided health care.

MARGINS OF ERROR IN VALUE COMPARISONS (I-I)

NICOLAS ESPINOZA, ROYAL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

In this paper margin of error principles for comparative value judgements are outlined. They are based on the idea that if a proposition concerning the value relation between two value bearing options is true, but there are sufficiently similar cases in which it is false, it is not available to be known. To demonstrate the usefulness of the principles, they are applied in building an epistemological case against the so-called small-improvement argument (SIA), which is often considered the strongest case for value incomparability. If we acknowledge margins for error in comparative value judgement, it follows that some of the crucial steps in SIA are epistemically unwarranted.

TYE-DYED TELEOLOGY AND THE INVERTED SPECTRUM (I-G)

JASON FORD, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA-DULUTH

Michael Tye's considered position combines representationalism with externalism about color, so he needs to block the possibility that two people might have experiences that are identical with respect to representational content but differ in their phenomenal character. Tye's responses to the problem of the inverted spectrum in *Color, Content and Consciousness* (2000) and "Visual Qualia and Visual Content Revisited" (2002) rely on a teleological approach to the evolution of vision to secure the grounds upon which people with normal color vision can be justly called "right"

and those with inverted color vision can be called “wrong.” This paper shows that no biologically acceptable concept of teleology will allow Tye to draw the distinction he needs. Tye’s failure illustrates a hazard which any attempt to explain mental content using natural selection must be careful to avoid.

ARISTOTLE AND McDOWELL ON “SECOND NATURE” (IX-F)

DAVID FORMAN, UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA—LAS VEGAS

The concept of “second nature” is central to McDowell’s project of reconciling thought’s autonomy or spontaneity with its external constraint by the world. And of central importance here is his appeal to Aristotle: Aristotle’s account of ethical character formation as the development of a second nature serves as a model meant to reassure us that the acquisition of norms responsive to an autonomous space of reasons does not detach the realm of thought from nature in general and human nature in particular. But far from providing such reassurance, the Aristotelian account of second nature (when considered as an account of norms in general—as required by McDowell’s project) actually encourages an anxiety about the how the acquisition of conceptual abilities could be possible.

A CASE FOR PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT (OR FOR SEMI-SKEPTICISM) (IX-L)

JEREMY FANTL, UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

MATTHEW McGRATH, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI—COLUMBIA

According to received tradition in epistemology, whether one knows that *p* is solely a matter of truth-related factors wrt *p*, whether these are conceived internalistically or externalistically. Call this doctrine epistemological purism. My aim in this paper is to show that such purism fits poorly with fallibilism, which I understand as the thesis that for a wide range of ordinary propositions *p*, we know that *p* even though our probability for *p* is less than 1. The poor fit stems from certain pragmatic aspects of knowledge, and most fundamentally from a certain link between knowledge and rational action. Most of the paper is devoted to establishing this link. In doing so, I draw upon some recent work in the theory of practical reason and claim that knowledge plays a certain fundamental normative role. In the last part of the paper, I turn the question of which should go—fallibilism or purism—assuming I am right that fallibilist purism is untenable. Some might think the answer is easy: drop fallibilism. But, as I will argue, the price of dropping fallibilism is skepticism or at least a robust form of semi-skepticism. To avoid semi-skepticism, I argue, we must endorse “pragmatic encroachment” and so deny purism.

THE PRACTICAL CONTRADICTION INTERPRETATION RECONSIDERED (VI-K)

RICHARD GALVIN, TEXAS CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY

In his treatment of the Formula of Universal Law, Kant famously claims that maxims which cannot be conceived as universal laws denote violations of duties of perfect obligation. Readers have naturally viewed the contradiction in conception test (CC) as playing a central role in Kant’s moral philosophy.

My focus here will be on how various versions of the Practical Contradiction Interpretation (PCI) have addressed two issues related to CC, viz. how to formulate the maxim, and exactly how maxims of actions that violate perfect duties, and only those maxims, generate contradictions when raised to the status of a universal law. I will examine three proposals for how to formulate the maxim, each of which faces serious difficulties. Next I shall examine one prominent version of PCI, which includes a specific stipulation regarding the formulation of the maxim, as well as a template for generating contradictions in conception for maxims of actions that violate perfect duties. I will then provide a detailed analysis of one recent attempt to modify PCI in response to serious objections raised against it. I argue that this attempt to rescue PCI is unsuccessful, and conclude that sympathetic interpreters of Kant should abandon PCI in favor of its principal competitor, the Logical Contradiction Interpretation.

SEXUAL COERCION AND THE PROBLEM OF PREEMPTIVE CONSENT (I-H)

JEFF GAUTHIER, UNIVERSITY OF PORTLAND

In his recent book, Alan Wertheimer disputes feminist theorists who would move away from a consent criterion in rape law and argues that the transformative power of consent is not imperiled by conditions of inequality. In my paper, I argue that even if we accept Wertheimer's general account of coercion, we need not follow him in finding that gender inequality is irrelevant to the validity of sexual consent. I argue that a broad range of quid pro quos involving the exchange of sex for other goods may be judged coercive using Wertheimer's criterion. Moreover, I argue that the general failure to acknowledge the coerciveness of these proposals plays a key part in the evidentiary difficulties that accompany a certain class of rape prosecutions.

ACQUAINTANCE AND DE RE BELIEF (V-H)

HEIMIR GEIRSSON, IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY

Donnellan argues that Leverrier does not have de re knowledge of Neptune. It is further plausible to conclude that if Leverrier does not have de re knowledge of Neptune then those to whom he passes the name "Neptune" do not have such knowledge either. Nevertheless, many direct designation theorists have embraced the view that one acquires beliefs of objects, or de re beliefs, when one sincerely assents to a sentence expressing a singular proposition. Given the appeal of Donnellan's view it appears that the direct designation theorists have made it too easy to acquire de re beliefs of an object.

PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE AND ERROR (X-I)

JAMES GENONE, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-BERKELEY

Many philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists hold the view that perceptual experiences are, in some sense, representational. I begin by differentiating two versions of this thesis: first, the view that perceptual experiences involve awareness by a subject of a representation

of her environment, and second, that perceptual experiences have representational content. After mentioning some general reasons for rejecting the first version of the view, I turn to focus on the second version and consider several challenges that have been raised to it by the disjunctive theory of perceptual experience. I argue that these challenges can only hope to undermine the view that perceptual experiences have representational content if an alternative account can be provided that respects the motivations behind the representational content view. I attempt to achieve this by sketching and defending a relational view of perceptual experience in such a way as to give an adequate account of illusory and hallucinatory

GENERALISM ABOUT PRACTICAL REASONS: A DEFENSE FROM THE ANALOGY WITH THE EPISTEMIC (IV-I)

JOSHUA GERT, FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

The point of this paper is to undermine the support that particularism in the domain of epistemic reasons might seem to give to particularism in the domain of practical reasons. In the epistemic domain, there are two related notions: truth and the rationality of belief. Epistemic reasons are related to the rationality of belief, and not directly to truth. Because of this, they inherit the messiness of human nature and its idiosyncratic cognitive limitations. In the domain of practical reasons, however, the role of truth is taken by the notion of objective rationality. Practical reasons are directly relevant to this objective notion, and therefore the reasons to expect holism and particularism in the epistemic domain do not transfer to the domain of practical rationality. This undermines one popular strategy for rendering particularism about practical reasons plausible.

PARALLELS BETWEEN THE ETHICS OF EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH AND ABORTION (III-K)

MARIN GILLIS, UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA--RENO

Bioethicists have been concerned with the relationship between the ethics of abortion and stem cell research. Many think that analogies between the two debates should not be drawn. While I agree that the essential moral question in the stem cell debate is not that of the absolute moral value of the embryo, I hold that some arguments in the abortion debate are relevant to understand significant moral issues in stem cell research. In particular, once moral issues in abortion are properly understood we may also understand how women may be harmed in stem cell research and therapy.

TOUCH AT A DISTANCE: A CASE FOR SPATIAL EXPERIENCE (X-G)

BRIAN GLENNEY, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Is there a commonality between visual and tactile experiences? I argue that some visual and tactile experiences are both spatial in that they share the same spatial content, the same shape or number properties for instance, while lacking any sensory content, such as color or texture properties.

I argue that the use of sensory substitution devices (SSD), an apparatus which provides content like visual images usually unavailable to a particular sense modality like touch, is a clear case of spatial experience. Users of SSDs report having novel experiences that lack sensory content but yet clearly include spatial content. I conclude by arguing that the competing sensorimotor account of experience does not correctly explain such novel experiences.

NAMES AND PUBLIC LANGUAGE (VIII-I)

STAVROULA GLEZAKOS, WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY

The influential theory of names developed by Saul Kripke in *Naming and Necessity* possesses many virtues, not least among them the provision of “an explanation of how a name in local use can be connected with a remote referent.” Kripke motivates his view, which has come to be known as the direct reference theory of names, by providing examples that amply demonstrate that typical speakers do not possess the descriptive or conceptual means to uniquely identify the referents of many of the names that they use; he then develops a framework which locates the mechanism of reference not in those who use names, but in the names themselves. Essential to the direct reference account is the notion of a shared, public language. Kripke writes that a name comes into existence via an “initial baptism” of a referent; once created, a name can be passed from one language user to another. The notion of a public and passable name is a necessary element in Kripke’s explanation of how a language user who does not possess identifying information sufficient to specify a referent can nonetheless refer: success in reference stems from the fact that the name being used can be traced from user to user all the way back to its introduction as a name of a particular object, the referent. In this paper, I highlight a serious deficiency in the picture developed by Kripke: its failure to include an explanation of how language users are able to stand in the proper relations to names in the public language. I argue that the direct reference picture’s embrace of public language names, while providing a mechanism by means of which a name can be connected with a remote referent, comes at the cost of an explanation of how a local user attains the required connection to that name.

TESTIMONIAL DEFEAT: A REPLY TO LACKEY (XIII-E)

JEFFREY GLICK, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

In her 1999 paper, Jennifer Lackey attempts to undermine the view that in cases of testimony the speaker must know that p when she testifies that p if the hearer is to come to know that p via the speaker’s assertions. Her criticisms are centered around the fact that problems with the epistemic status of a statement for a speaker do not necessarily transfer from speakers to hearers in cases of testimony. In such cases, her audience can come to know that p on the basis of her testimony even though the speaker does not herself know that p. This paper seeks to dissolve Lackey’s criticisms. In any case of testifying that p where the speaker does not know that p, there will always be a defeater which arises as a result of the testimonial act.

ONTOLOGICAL CONVENTIONALISM: THE NEW ESSENTIALISM (VIII-H)*DANA LYNNE GOSWICK, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—DAVIS*

I argue that we are not justified in endorsing Kripkean Essentialism because Kripke has never bridged the Modal Gap. That is, he has never provided a satisfactory explanation of how we make the leap from our mere imaginative inability to conceive of object *o* lacking property *p* to the claim that *o* has *p* essentially. I examine the most promising attempt to close the Modal Gap: Bealer's Moderate Rationalist theory of a posteriori necessity. I explain why I think Bealer fails to close the Modal Gap. Finally, I present a new version of Essentialism which retains Kripke's Essentialist conclusions while also solving the Modal Gap.

DEMOCRACY AND CHILDREN'S SUFFRAGE (VIII-J)*JASON HANNA, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO—BOULDER*

I challenge the arguments typically offered in favor of child disfranchisement by showing that they speak against universal adult suffrage. My thesis is conditional: if all adults are allowed to vote, then nearly all children should be allowed to vote. I argue, first, that concerns about voters' political knowledge support the implementation of voter competency tests rather than age limits. Second, I show that the rationale behind child disfranchisement could be used to support the disfranchisement of most adults. I then consider the objection that child disfranchisement is justified because we must balance the need for an inclusive electorate against the need for an informed electorate. This objection fails because it implies that some adults should be disfranchised or given less voting power than other adults. Finally, I argue that it is unreasonable to disfranchise children on the grounds that their political preferences would be shaped by their parents.

A PUZZLE ABOUT OTHER-DIRECTED TIME-BIAS (X-K)*CASPAR HARE, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY*

Many of us, when we think about our own joys and miseries, are time-biased. We don't just care about what happens to us, we also care about when it happens. In particular, we care about whether it is past or future—other things being equal, we would prefer bad things to be past and good things to be in the future. But what happens when we think about the joys and miseries of other people? Are we time-biased on their behalf? That depends. Our other-directed time-bias is sensitive, in a curious way, to things that typically come with distance. I argue that it should not be so.

META-METAETHICS: MODERATE SKEPTICISM ABOUT SOME CONCEPTS OF METAETHICAL INQUIRY (X-H)*JAMES HAROLD, MOUNT HOLYOKE COLLEGE*

The dispute in metaethics between cognitivists and non-cognitivists is at bottom a dispute over the correct way to characterize our psychology: are moral judgments beliefs, or a kind of pro-attitude? In this paper, I argue that this dispute comes to nothing; it dissolves in the light of a reasonable

skepticism about folk psychology, and with it, the distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism collapses. I begin by briefly reviewing some contemporary positions in metaethics on cognitivism and non-cognitivism that are intended to emphasize the supposed psychological differences between the two views. I show that the appearance of a clear difference between these views depends on one's having a very strong commitment to the accuracy and completeness of certain concepts of folk psychology. I then review several arguments that support moderate skepticism about folk psychology. I conclude that folk concepts like "belief" are not well-defined enough to settle this metaethical dispute.

EXTERNALISM AND CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS (I-G)

JUSSI HAUKIOJA, UNIVERSITY OF TURKU

Does an externalist theory of the meaning of natural kind terms commit one to the view that conceptual analysis about natural kinds is impossible? It is clear that externalism makes the application conditions of natural kind terms a posteriori, but what about reference-fixing conditions? Can one come to know, merely on the basis of reflecting on one's own semantic intuitions, which properties fix the reference of a natural kind term? Many philosophers have recently claimed that the externalist has to answer in the negative to this question as well. In this paper, I distinguish between three ways of specifying reference-fixing conditions and argue that standard forms of externalism are in fact committed to the a priori knowability of reference-fixing conditions in one of these senses. I will also claim that we should be optimistic about the possibility of the other two.

THE MYTH OF FACTIVE VERBS (V-J)

ALLAN J. HAZLETT, BROWN UNIVERSITY

Most philosophers believe that certain two-place predicates which denote relations between persons and propositions—"knows," "learns," "remembers," and "realizes," for example—are factive in this sense: that S knows p entails p, that S learned p entails p, and so on. But it is false that these expressions are factive, in this sense. It is my business in this paper to convince you that this is so, to explain why it appears plausible that these expressions are factive, and to propose an alternative account of the implication from (for example) "S knows p" to the truth of p.

FITTING ATTITUDES AND WELFARE (I-I)

CHRIS HEATHWOOD, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO–BOULDER

The purpose of this paper is to present a new argument against so-called fitting attitude analyses of value, according to which, roughly, for something to be intrinsically good is for there to be reasons to want it for its own sake. The argument is indirect. First, I submit that advocates of such a theory should also, for the sake of theoretical unity, endorse a fitting attitude analysis of a closely related but distinct concept: the concept of welfare. Then I argue directly against fitting attitude analyses of welfare. This argument, which is the focus of the paper, is based on the idea that

whereas whether an event is good for a person doesn't change over time, the attitudes it is rational to have towards such an event can change over time. Therefore, one cannot explain the former in terms of the latter, as fitting attitude analyses attempt to do.

BLINDSIGHT IN MONKEYS, LOST AND PERHAPS FOUND (IV-G)

SEAN HERMANSON, FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

The study of blindsight might contribute to general investigations of animal consciousness. Perhaps whether there is something that it is like to be a given animal perceiving visually depends on whether it exhibits the neurological and behavioral profile of conscious vision versus that of a non-conscious "natural blindsight." One difficulty for this project is finding a way for an animal to non-verbally indicate whether or not it is perceiving consciously. Interestingly, it has become routine to claim that the work of Stoerig and Cowey shows that monkeys with lesions in the primary visual cortex have blindsight. However, Mole and Kelly argue that this conclusion is unwarranted because their evidence is compatible with an alternative hypothesis positing a deficit in attention and perceptual working memory. I describe a revised experimental paradigm that can distinguish between these hypotheses. I also offer reasons for thinking that the blindsight hypothesis will prevail.

DISPOSITIONAL AND COUNTERFACTUAL LOGIC (I-F)

CHARLES HERMES, FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

Recently, the problems of finks, masks, and mimics made counterfactual accounts of dispositions much less attractive. Many theorists remain hopeful, however, that merely being more precise in stating what the antecedent of the relevant counterfactual is will solve these problems. Nevertheless, even if these problems can be rectified, a more serious problem exists. The logic of dispositional ascription is distinct from standard counterfactual logic. The reason for these differences is that unusual features of the world that are extrinsic to an object are not relevant in ascribing dispositions to that object. Nevertheless, two principles of standard counterfactual logic ensure that these features will be relevant in counterfactual evaluation. Endorsing a counterfactual analysis of dispositions requires endorsing a non-standard account of counterfactuals that rejects these principles. Nevertheless, one of these principles is essential in any adequate analysis of counterfactuals. So, counterfactual accounts of dispositions are doomed.

A PUZZLE ABOUT EMOTION, PERCEPTION, AND RATIONALITY (XII-F)

LARRY A. HERZBERG, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-OSHKOSH

Two overlapping strands of recent work in the philosophy of emotion present a *prima facie* puzzle. The first recognizes that emotions are properly evaluated in terms of their rationality. The second holds that types of emotion are literally kinds of perception. When one tries to weave these strands together, a puzzle is generated by the fact that perceptions are generally held not to be evaluable in terms of their rationality, on the

grounds that such normative assessment requires a responsible subject, and subjects are not responsible for their perceptions. In his book *Gut Feelings: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion* (2004), Jesse Prinz accepts these grounds but tries to weave the strands together anyway. I argue in this paper that the solution he offers to the puzzle is, at best, incomplete, but that his theory of emotion contains the resources necessary for a more adequate solution.

OPEN BORDERS AND THE RIGHT TO IMMIGRATION (XII-G)

PETER HIGGINS, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO–BOULDER

Liberals and cosmopolitans have argued that the moral equality of individuals entails that liberal states must acknowledge a universal human right to immigration. To the contrary, I argue that liberal cosmopolitan arguments in favor of such a right make false assumptions about the social location of those affected by the admissions policies of liberal states, especially with respect to their gender, race, and class. Such assumptions mask the fact that acknowledgement of this right by liberal states would benefit most those who are already relatively advantaged (including residents of liberal states themselves), while positively harming those currently most disadvantaged by the global economic order. For this reason, I argue that, in order to be just, even by their own standards, the admissions policies of liberal states must take account of the social location of those affected by them and the effect open borders would have in perpetuating economic inequalities globally.

THE FREEDOM OF COLLECTIVE AGENTS (IV-F)

FRANK HINDRIKS, RIJKSUNIVERSITEIT GRONINGEN

Conceiving of groups as collective agents that perform joint actions, I propose an analysis of the conditions under which a group is free to perform a joint action. According to a reductive account of group freedom, a group is free if and only if (the requisite number of) the individuals who constitute the group are free. It is argued here, contra Kramer (2003), that individual freedoms are neither necessary nor sufficient for group freedom. I offer an alternative account of group freedom in terms of the ability of the members to perform their parts of a joint action jointly.

ON MATTER AND TWO MODELS OF CHANGE IN ARISTOTLE'S *PHYSICS* A (V-F)

BEVERLY HINTON, WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY

There are two uses of *ex hou* that Aristotle employs to talk about change. One use is that “out of which” a change occurs, i.e., that which is replaced in the change—the privation. The other use is that “out of which” a substance is constituted—the matter. Aristotle appears to conflate these two uses in his account of change in *Physics* A 7. I argue that there is no confusion; instead, every change is out of a substratum in which the functions of matter and privation are both made possible by a more general concept of matter. I examine Aristotle's two models of change to show that privation is said at the same time to be in opposition to matter and to be a part

of matter. As such, the concept of matter for Aristotle is best seen as a principle of complexity.

THE PHENOMENON OF TRUST IN CLINICAL SETTINGS (XII-H)

ANITA HO, UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

In recent decades, the traditional model of the trusting physician-patient relationship has been subject to criticisms. However, many patients indicate in memoirs and surveys that they trust their physicians and prefer to go along with their recommendations rather than take on the deliberative process and choose a particular medical option on their own. Why would patients trust their physicians' judgment and actions, so much so that they sometimes defer decision-making to those professionals? If being free from internal and external controlling influences and possessing the capacity for self-knowledge and intentional action are important for agency, does trust conflict with one's autonomy? This essay argues that appropriate trust and autonomy complement each other. Patients cannot make autonomous decisions without trust in the professionals and the medical enterprise, and trust is appropriate only if it enhances patient autonomy.

LATER SELVES AND LEGAL PATERNALISM (VII-K)

LOUIS-PHILIPPE HODGSON, YORK UNIVERSITY

I defend a new way to reconcile certain types of paternalistic intervention with the doctrine of individual sovereignty: the idea that competent adults should be free to make their own choices, and their own mistakes. I proceed in two steps. I first argue that an authorization to use force against one's future self cannot be irrevocable: each person has the right to decide what can be done to her body at any given moment, and cannot alienate that right through an act of authorization. I then show that setting off a mechanism that will cause injury to one's future self violates that right, and that consequently a competent adult can justifiably be prevented from doing so. This suggests a justification for forbidding certain dangerous activities (taking certain recreational drugs, or riding a motorcycle without a helmet, for instance) that is paternalistic, yet compatible with the doctrine of individual sovereignty.

TRUTH, SUPERASSERTABILITY, AND CONCEIVABILITY (I-F)

GLEN HOFFMANN, RYERSON UNIVERSITY

The superassertability theory of truth, inspired by Crispin Wright (1992), claims that a statement is true iff it is superassertable in the following sense: it possesses indefeasible warrant, i.e., warrant that cannot be defeated by any improvement of our information. While initially promising, the superassertability theory of truth is vulnerable to an inexorable difficulty highlighted by Van Cleve (1996) and Horgan (1995): it is formal/informally illegitimate in a similar sense that unsophisticated epistemic theories of truth are generally believed to be. A formal/informal legitimacy argument against the superassertability theory of truth has a non-question begging basis, I claim, in the form of a plausible conceivability/possibility thesis—

it is conceivable and, as a result, possible that any statement might be superassertable yet false (or vice versa).

KANTIAN RESPECT: WHY SHOULD HUMANITY, NOT THE GOOD WILL, BE TREATED AS AN END IN ITSELF? (VII-I)

ZACHARY HOSKINS, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS

Kant instructs us to respect humanity as an end in itself. On one popular interpretation, “humanity” for Kant consists in the capacity to set ends. I argue for a broader interpretation of humanity as including a disposition toward morality. Another, related problem remains, however. Kant maintains that humanity has unconditional worth and hence warrants respect. But this appears to contradict his claim that a good will is the only unconditional good. Why would Kant not instruct us to respect a good will, rather than humanity, as an end in itself? On Kant’s account, I contend, it would be incredibly difficult to respect a good will, because we could not pick out instances of it with any certainty. Motives may be opaque, and it may never be clear whether an agent exhibits a good will. All rational agents, however, have the disposition toward a good will (i.e., humanity), which warrants respect.

IF YOU LIKE PINA COLADAS... (IX-I)

L. BRYCE G. HUEBNER, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA—CHAPEL HILL

If you like pina coladas... One might think that even if we had a complete story regarding the neurophysiology of wetness, there would remain what Joe Levine has called an “explanatory gap.” I don’t buy it, and I don’t think you should either! In this paper, I argue that the explanatory gap can be dissolved by way of a strategy of divide and conquer. I claim that there are actually two sorts of gaps, neither of which is all that problematic for the materialist.

A CHALLENGE TO PETTIT’S REPUBLICAN THEORY OF FREEDOM (III-G)

WAHEED HUSSAIN, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

In his influential book *Republicanism*, Philip Pettit argues that we should understand freedom in terms of the absence of domination. The republican theory is meant to chart a third way between traditional approaches to freedom associated with both positive and negative liberty. In this paper, I argue that insofar as the republican theory is clearly an alternative to views associated with positive freedom, it suffers from a serious weakness: it lacks the resources to criticize distinctively modern forms of oppression that work, not by preventing people from doing what they want, but by shaping what they happen to want in the first place. I go on to argue that the only reasonable way to account for the facts of oppression in the modern world is to think of freedom in terms of positive liberty.

PROPERLY FUNCTIONING VISION: ON BLOCK ON NOË? (X-I)

ANNE JACOBSON, UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON

It is a commonplace among those working on the philosophy of vision that contemporary vision neuroscience follows David Marr's computational approach closely. Two claims characteristic of recent work show up in Ned Block's review of Alva Noë's *Action in Perception*. (1) Any contribution from outside the brain is merely causal and does not affect the supervenience base for vision; (2) If A and B are in the same brain state, then they each have the same experiential state, where the latter exemplifies a category important in understanding vision. I argue in contrast that vision science importantly is and should be concerned with explaining human successes, which has a large effect on the taxonomy and the research questions considered central. It turns out relatedly that Block's category of "same experiential state" revealed in philosophical thought experiments cannot be useful in cognitive neuroscience.

DISAPPEARING APPEARANCES: A CRITIQUE OF ALVA NOË'S APPROACH TO SPATIAL PERCEPTUAL CONTENT (I-E)

RENÉ JAGNOW, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA

A round plate seen from an angle looks elliptical. How is it possible to see one shape, even though it looks another shape? This question has an important phenomenal aspect. The roundness of the plate is perceptually present in the experience. Alva Noë has recently argued that his version of the enactive approach to perception is able to explain this phenomenal aspect. In this paper, I argue that Noë's proposal is problematic because his notion of appearances as occlusion properties is phenomenologically inadequate. On Noë's enactive approach, appearances as occlusion properties would have to be dependent on the perceiver's actions while simultaneously retaining their independence from other perceived properties. I show on phenomenological grounds that it is not possible to define a notion of appearance that fulfills both conditions.

COUNTERFACTUAL EXEMPLAR-BASED VIRTUE ACCOUNTS OF RIGHT ACTION (VII-I)

ROBERT JOHNSON, UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

RUSSELL JONES, UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

Rosalind Hursthouse and Linda Zagzebski defend different versions of counterfactual exemplar-based virtue theory. Their theories share the following definition of right action: [R] A right act in some circumstances is an act a virtuous agent might characteristically do in like circumstances. Our central purpose in this essay is to evaluate counterfactual exemplar-based virtue theories of the sort proposed by Hursthouse and Zagzebski in light of two related objections to [R]. One of these, which we call the Williams objection, is familiar in the literature. According to this objection, theories of the sort we are considering often give mistaken evaluation or bad advice to non-virtuous people. The second objection is not developed in the literature, but is hinted at by Gilbert Harman. The Harman objection is that [R] often fails to give any action-guidance and evaluation for non-

virtuous people. After spelling out these two objections, taking particular care to develop the less familiar Harman objection, we consider how [R] might avoid both objections. The discussion turns on developing the concept of like circumstances. We argue that the strength of the objections depends on the conception of like circumstances adopted; changing the conception of like circumstances may weaken or eliminate the force of the objections. However, a problem still remains for [R], for it is important to Hursthouse and Zagzebski that counterfactual exemplar-based virtue ethics remain practical. We argue that adopting a conception of like circumstances which weakens or eliminates the force of the Williams and Harman objections results in an unacceptable loss of practicality for [R].

SINGULAR-TERM SEMANTICS SIMPLIFIED (VII-J)

JOHN JUSTICE, RANDOLPH-MACON WOMAN'S COLLEGE

Singular-term semantics has been intractable. Frege took the referents of singular terms to be their semantic values, which left vacuous terms without values. Russell separated the semantics of definite descriptions from the semantics of proper names, which caused truth-values to be composed in two different ways and still left vacuous names without values. Montague gave all noun phrases sets of verb-phrase extensions for values, which created type mismatches when noun phrases were objects. There is a type of value for noun phrases that dissolves the difficulties besetting singular-term semantics.

CONSTITUTIVISM AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE (XIII-F)

PAUL KATSAFANAS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Lately, a new account of practical reason has found its place among the familiar contenders: constitutivism. Constitutivists argue that we can derive substantive conclusions about reasons for acting from an account of the nature of action itself. One of the foremost proponents of this view is David Velleman. In this essay, I argue that Velleman's constitutivist project fails. While objections to Velleman's account of intentional action are common, I take a different approach. I show that even if we grant Velleman the analysis of action, his arguments fail to establish any substantive conclusions about practical reason. Put differently: even if Velleman were right about the nature of action, he would be wrong about practical reason.

PUNISHMENT AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY (XII-I)

ERIN I. KELLY, TUFTS UNIVERSITY

Worries about proper regard for the rights of offenders are difficult to settle with a deterrence rationale for punishment. General deterrence especially is hard to justify, because it certainly seems like we are "using" someone when we make an example out of him in order to discourage other people from committing crimes. A deterrence rationale may also seem to permit punishing either too little or too much. I propose a solution to these worries that appeals to the idea of collective responsibility rather than individual blameworthiness. I use the idea that offenders bear collective responsibility

for the social harm their crimes cause in order to develop a nonretributivist account of proportionality in sentencing.

SPINOZA ON THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE PASSIONS (IV-E)

MATTHEW J. KISNER, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Since Spinoza's ethics revolves around mastering negative emotions, one might imagine that the passions do not have a positive role to play in a virtuous life. This paper aims to show that Spinoza's philosophy allows for a more complicated understanding of the value of our passivity. Since pleasure and pain correspond to changes in our perfection and most passions are forms of pleasure and pain, it follows that the passions provide a kind of intelligence about the state of our perfection which is important to practical reasoning, for instance, indicating what contributes to or hinders our perfection. I defend this claim from two objections: (1) since the passions are ideas of the body, they are too confused to provide genuine intelligence; (2) since pains can sometimes be good and pleasures sometimes bad, pain and pleasure must not reliably indicate increases or decreases in our

MANY-ONE IDENTITY AND THE TRINITY (X-J)

SHEIVA J. KLEINSCHMIDT, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

Trinitarians claim there are three Divine persons each of which is God, and there's only one God. It seems they want three to equal one. It just so happens, some metaphysicians claim exactly that. They accept the Strong Composition Thesis (SC): each fusion is identical to the plurality of its parts. I evaluate SC's application to the doctrine of the Trinity and argue it fails to give the Trinitarian any options he/she didn't already have. Further, while SC does give us a new way to assert polytheism, its help requires us to endorse a claim that undercuts any Trinitarian motivation for the view.

WHY THEISM REQUIRES A MULTIVERSE (AND WHY IT IS THE BEST OF ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS) (III-F)

KLAAS KRAAY, RYERSON UNIVERSITY

Theism holds that there exists a being who is unsurpassable in power, knowledge, and goodness, and who is the creator and sustainer of all that is. In contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, divine creation is construed like this: God surveys the set of actualizable possible worlds, and selects one on the basis of its axiological properties. I argue that given some plausible assumptions, theists should maintain that the world God selects is a multiverse. I first introduce a schema for discussing the axiological properties of possible worlds. This schema suggest that there are three candidate hierarchies of actualizable worlds: either there is exactly one unsurpassable world, or infinitely-many, or none. I describe an argument for atheism on each hierarchy. I then introduce the multiverse, and explain why theism requires it. I claim that the multiverse precludes the latter two hierarchies of possible worlds, together with their respective arguments for atheism.

DOES SPONTANEITY RELATE RATIONALLY TO RECEPTIVITY? (X-G)

APAAR KUMAR, EMORY UNIVERSITY

Contra the view held by Davidson and Sellars that sense-impressions can only relate to our beliefs and active judgments in a causal way, I argue that McDowell provides a coherent philosophical framework that can indeed serve as the basis for our being able to view sensory perceptions as rational justifications for our beliefs or judgments. I show how we can coherently argue that the objects we receive from the world can rationally relate to our beliefs and judgments if we construe rational justifications as justification by “pointing” from thinking to objects in the world, if we conceptualize experience as a mutually-constituting relation, and, finally, if we accept that human beings operate in the realm of second nature and not “disenchanted” nature.

WHY THERE IS NO EPISTEMIC PARTIALITY IN FRIENDSHIP (XIII-G)

JENNIFER LACKEY, NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY

In recent papers, both Sarah Stroud and Simon Keller have argued on behalf of what I call the Epistemic Partiality in Friendship Thesis (henceforth, the EPFT), which consists of the following two claims: first, friendship requires certain beliefs where our friends are concerned and, second, such beliefs—and the practices leading to their formation—are often epistemically irrational or biased. The EPFT, if correct, would have important consequences, not only for discussions in ethics and moral theory, but also for various issues in epistemology. For if the EPFT is true, we seem to face a choice: be a good friend or be a good believer. In this paper, however, I argue that the EPFT is false—friendship does not require epistemic irrationality or bias. We can, then, be both good friends and good believers and, hence, there is no need to worry about conflicts between friendship and epistemic rationality.

COLLECTIVE EPISTEMIC VIRTUES (XIII-E)

REZA LAHROODI, UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN IOWA

At the intersection of social and virtue epistemology, lies the important, yet so far entirely neglected, project of articulating the social dimensions of epistemic virtues. Perhaps the most obvious way in which epistemic virtues may be social is that they may be possessed or instantiated by social groups and collectives. We often speak of groups as if they could instantiate epistemic virtues. It is tempting to think of these expressions as ascribing virtues, not to the groups themselves, but to their members. I argue that this temptation should be resisted. I show that individualist accounts of group virtues are either too weak or too strong. I then formulate a non-individualist account modeled after Margaret Gilbert’s influential account of collective beliefs. Crucial disanalogies between collective traits and beliefs, I argue, make the success of this model unlikely. I end with some questions the future work on collective epistemic virtues should engage.

KNOWLEDGE, ASSERTION, AND RISK (V-H)

WILLIAM S. LARKIN, SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY—EDWARDSVILLE

I will propose a Moorean solution to the puzzle that arises from considering such propositions as: (L) My multi-million-dollar-lottery ticket is a loser. We normally deny knowing propositions like L, resist flat out asserting them, and avoid using them in our practical deliberations even though our epistemic relation to them is very often stronger than it is to more ordinary propositions. I will argue that knowledge and risk tolerance naturally come apart with respect to propositions like L, and then I will rely on a new act account of assertion to explain why it is normally inappropriate to assert or attribute knowledge of such propositions.

VIRTUE ETHICS AND DEONTIC CONSTRAINTS (XIII-G)

MARK LEBAR, OHIO UNIVERSITY

One important objection to virtue ethical theories is that they apparently must account for the wrongness of a wrong action in terms of a lack of virtue (or presence of vice) in the agent, and not in terms of the effects of the action on its victim. We take such effects to ground deontic constraints on how we may act, and virtue theory appears unable to account for such constraints. I claim, however, that eudaimonist virtue theory can account for wrongness in just this way. I draw on recent work by Stephen Darwall on the “second-person standpoint,” in which we see others as independent sources of claims on us—as sources of “deontic constraints.” We have reason to occupy that standpoint as a matter of virtue, and thus virtuous agents should and will have reasons to respect deontic constraints.

WHY FRANKFURT-EXAMPLES DON'T NEED TO SUCCEED TO SUCCEED (IV-F)

*FELIPE LEON, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—RIVERSIDE**NEAL A. TOGNAZZINI, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—RIVERSIDE*

Ordinarily, Frankfurt-style counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities are considered a success if they identify a metaphysically possible scenario according to which an agent is morally responsible for some action even though the agent could not have done otherwise. Many have contributed to the project of attempting to construct a successful FSC; many have contributed to the project of arguing against the possibility of constructing a successful FSC. In this paper, we distinguish between two different senses in which one might consider FSCs successful. We argue that although FSCs may fail in the traditional sense, they may still succeed in another. If this is right, then we can still learn something interesting about moral responsibility from FSCs without getting entrenched in the more technical debates about them.

A DEFENSE OF INTUITIONS (XI-J)

S. MATTHEW LIAO, OXFORD UNIVERSITY

Radical experimentalists argue that their empirical studies show that intuitions vary according to factors such as cultural and educational background,

and what other cases have recently been considered. Accordingly, radical experimentalists believe that we should give up relying on intuitions as evidence in philosophy. In this paper, I argue that the studies presented by the radical experimentalists in fact show that some intuitions are reliable. I then propose a way of understanding how intuitions can conflict, and I argue that on this understanding, both moderate experimentalism and intuition as evidence approaches to philosophy can play a role in helping to resolve these conflicts. The upshot is that we should embrace moderate experimentalism, but reject radical experimentalism.

WITTGENSTEIN'S EXPRESSIVISM (XI-J)

RICHARD LIEBENDORFER, MINNESOTA STATE UNIVERSITY—MANKATO

I will describe and attempt to make plausible a view I will attribute to Wittgenstein, a view I will call an expressive view of conceptual content. My strategy will be to develop a little bit, a precious little bit of history against which I will attempt to sketch the view in question. Specifically, I will develop some contrasting views of Cartesian rationalism, Humean empiricism, as well as Kant's response to those views. What I'm calling Wittgenstein's expressivism is developed as a response to problems with classical rationalism, classical empiricism, and Kant's response to them.

CROSSING SPECIES BOUNDARIES: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF HUMAN-NONHUMAN CHIMERAS (XII-D)

PAMELA LOMELINO, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO—BOULDER

In this paper, I examine a particular article, Baylis and Robert's "Crossing Species Boundaries" (*American Journal of Bioethics*, 2003), in order to illustrate the extent to which a feminist critique is called for in the current Bioethical debate regarding the moral permissibility of creating human-nonhuman chimeras. In addressing the common objections in the literature, as well as Baylis and Robert's proposed objection. I argue that all of these objections rely on harmful and mistaken stereotypes regarding "human" and "nonhuman." In arguing this, it is my hope to evoke the reader to understand the importance of addressing these stereotypes as a necessary part of an ethical analysis of creating these chimeras.

IS CONSISTENCY IN THE APPLICATION OF UNJUST LAWS A FORM OF JUSTICE? (I-H)

ALISTAIR M. MACLEOD, QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY

Partly on the footing that justice requires consistency (or uniformity, or equality) of treatment—with similar cases having to be treated similarly—it is still sometimes supposed that consistency in the application even of unjust laws or rules to particular cases is a form of justice. On this view judgments about the justice or injustice of law- or rule-applying decisions are logically independent of judgments about the justice or injustice of the laws or rules they presuppose. I distinguish two versions of this "independence" thesis. According to the first, the lack of connection between judgments about the justice of laws and rules on the one hand and judgments about the justice of the decisions that apply these laws and rules to particular cases

on the other is taken to be grounded in the claim that the former have normative force while the latter are normatively neutral. According to the second, there is no connection despite the fact that judgments of both sorts have normative force. The first version of the independence thesis is false because—unlike the term “rights” to which talk about the “just” and the “unjust” is often assumed to be systematically related—“just” and “unjust” haven’t acquired any purely descriptive connotation. In discussing the (somewhat more plausible) second version, I examine—and reject—five arguments that have been presented in its support. I conclude that while consistency in the application of laws and rules to particular cases is a necessary condition of justice in the administration of these laws and rules it is not a sufficient condition of a special form of justice.

THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECISION AND MORAL EVALUATION (II-H)

MICHELLE MAIESE, EMMANUEL COLLEGE

In this paper, I challenge the traditional view that emotions are an affront to reasoning and deliberation and argue that just as emotion plays a central role in decision-making, it also assumes center stage in effective moral evaluation. As individuals engage in decision-making and moral evaluation, they do not process all of the information that is potentially available to them, but instead select and highlight certain features. This ability to delimit and filter information is key to solving what I describe as the “frame problem” for decision-making and moral evaluation and depends largely on the various patterns of discrimination and salience involved in emotional engagement. My central claim is that because affect-based framing is an integral part of information processing for creatures like us, decision-making and moral judgment that involves the emotions will turn out to be more effective and efficient.

ON ESSENTIALLY CONFLICTING DESIRES (IV-I)

PATRICIA MARINO, UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO

Some philosophers have argued that desire-ambivalence—wanting A and not-A—is rare and possibly irrational. Others have tried to show that pressure toward evaluative coherence can ground the non-relativity of normative reasons and moral obligation. This raises the question, just what is wrong with “inconsistent” desires? I argue for two claims. First, the proper characterization of “desiderative inconsistency” involves not logical form—whether the desires have the form A and not-A—but, rather, whether there is a possible world in which one’s desire are mutually fulfillable. Second, the “essential” conflicts involved in desiderative inconsistency are quite common and no worse than contingent ones. If this is right, it can be rational and appropriate to be desideratively inconsistent, and those relying on evaluative coherence will have to find another explanation of its normative status.

WHY NOT THE SELF-KNOWLEDGE RULE? (XI-H)

BERISLAV MARUSIC, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—BERKELEY

My aim is to pose a challenge for proponents of the Knowledge Account of assertion and belief: Why should we not instead prefer the Self-Knowledge Account? According to this proposal, the Self-Knowledge Rule governs belief and assertion: "One must: assert or believe *p* only if one knows that one knows *p*." The main arguments for the Knowledge Account also support the Self-Knowledge Account. For instance, the challenge, "How do you know?" is explained by both accounts, and both accounts predict that it is impermissible to assert or believe that one will lose the lottery. Moreover, independent arguments for the Self-Knowledge Account are available: Failures of higher-order knowledge undermine our first-order claims and beliefs. I conclude that the Knowledge Account stands in need of further defense.

MODAL PROPERTY COMPREHENSION (V-J)

ULRICH MEYER, COLGATE UNIVERSITY

To define new property terms, we combine already familiar ones by means of certain logical operations. Given suitable constraints, these logical operations may presumably include the resources of standard first-order logic: truth-functional connectives and quantification over objects. What is less clear, however, is whether we can also use modal operators for this purpose. The aim of this paper is to clarify what is involved in this question, and to argue in favor of modal property definitions. To define new property terms, we combine already familiar ones by means of certain logical operations. Given suitable constraints, these logical operations may presumably include the resources of standard first-order logic: truth-functional connectives and quantification over objects. What is less clear, however, is whether we can also use modal operators for this purpose. The aim of this paper is to clarify what is involved in this question, and to argue in favor of modal property definitions.

SOME IDENTITY STATEMENTS IN PLATO: AN OLD PUZZLE IN THE *SOPHIST* AND A NEW SENSE OF "TO BE" (V-F)

RICHARD MOHR, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS—URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

In addition to the common senses of "to be" used in identity statements of the sort "Jones is Prime Minister" and "The lion is a four-legged mammal," there exists in both English and Attic Greek a sense of "to be" that states identities of another sort, exemplified by the sentences "Business is business," "I'm not myself today," "Let Poland be Poland," and "Enough is enough." The function of these sentences—I call them simple identities—is to assert the existence of an essence. Simple identities are not disguised descriptions, not analytically true statements, not telescoped definitions. Nor are they vacuous, for they affirm states of affairs. We should not be surprised that simple identity provides a resource for understanding key elements in Plato's metaphysics. For Platonism is basically the view that some simple identity statements are true.

GETTING A CLUE ABOUT CONSEQUENCES: COUNTERFACTUAL SEMANTICS, AGENT ABILITY, AND THE EPISTEMIC OBJECTION (II-H)

ERIC MOORE, LONGWOOD UNIVERSITY

James Lenman's "Consequentialism and Cluelessness" offers a new and ingenious version of the epistemic objection to consequentialism. His basic point is that the remote consequences of any action will often swamp its nearby, visible consequences, and that this fact renders consequentialism extremely implausible. In this paper, I argue that a proper interpretation of the relevant counterfactuals shows just the opposite: the visible consequences of an action will usually outweigh its distant effects.

PRACTICAL REASONING AND THE VARIETIES OF AGENCY (IV-I)

JENNIFER MORTON, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

I use an argument modeled on Hume's discussion of the conditions of justice to motivate the idea that practical reason might vary depending on an agent's psychology and environment. I argue that we should be skeptical of constitutive aim theories of agency that attempt to derive the norms of practical reasoning from a substantial aim because they fail to take into account this variety. I develop an argument against David Velleman's theory of agency in particular by making a case for a whimsical agent that doesn't aim at self-knowledge. If we weaken the aim of self-knowledge enough to account for this kind of agency, the theory ends up losing its normative grip on us. However, if we strengthen it, the theory ends up not being able to make sense of a whimsical agent as such.

TELEOLOGY AND EMBRYONIC PERSONHOOD (III-D)

TIMOTHY MOSTELLER, CALIFORNIA BAPTIST UNIVERSITY

This paper argues to the conclusion that teleology is real in human organisms, and because it implies personhood, the intentional killing of early stage human embryos is morally unjustified. First, I present reasons to believe that teleology is necessarily present in the natural world, especially in biological organisms. Second, I argue that the concept of biological teleology is conceptually tied directly to the concept of personhood for human beings. Third, I argue that if human beings are persons at every stage of teleological development, then the intentional disruption of teleological development is morally unjustified.

ALL TRUTHS ARE KNOWN? THE CHURCH-FITCH PARADOX AND THE PROBLEM OF TRANSWORLD KNOWABILITY (VII-J)

JULIEN MURZI, UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD

A well-known argument, first published by Frederic Fitch, purports to show that semantic anti-realism, the view that all truths are knowable, collapses into a naive form of idealism, according to which all truths will be known by someone at some time. Following Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno, the paper endorses the view that the proof can be seen as classically invalid. Brogaard and Salerno's proposal requires transworld knowability, i.e., in

the most striking case, possible knowledge of actual truths. Such a notion faces serious problems. According to Timothy Williamson, it is necessarily trivial. His argument has it that we can't have substantial knowledge of what's happening in any particular possible world. Yet, it seems, we do have knowledge of particular possible worlds. What has gone wrong? This paper defends a counterfactual account of transworld knowledge by providing two arguments against Williamson's objection.

JOHN STUART MILL ON ECONOMIC JUSTICE AND THE ALLEVIATION OF POVERTY (IX-G)

STEPHEN L. NATHANSON, NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY

In spite of the great interest in J. S. Mill's political thought and in problems of poverty and economic justice, Mill's views on these subjects are seldom discussed. This results partly from their appearing in his generally unread *Principles of Political Economy* but also from erroneous extrapolations from *On Liberty and Utilitarianism*. In this paper, I sketch some of Mill's ideas on justice and poverty alleviation and their relation to Mill's utilitarianism. Like socialists, Mill condemned the economic distribution of his time, but he mainly argues for a reformed capitalism whose principles of justice require distribution of resources based on people's "exertions" and on the abstinence required for investing capital. He applies these ideas to issues like land ownership, inheritance, and state assistance to the poor. In addition, Mill stresses high productivity, population control, free education, and equal status for women as means for combatting poverty.

THE CONTINGENCY OF EXISTENCE (IX-M)

MICHAEL NELSON, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—RIVERSIDE

There are strong intuitions that what actually exists might not have existed and that there might have existed things that do not actually exist. For example, it is highly plausible that I might never have been and it is highly plausible that, although actually there are not, there might have been talking donkeys. There are powerful arguments, however, that these intuitions are mistaken. In this paper I present those arguments and consider ways of dealing with them.

PHYSICAL CAUSATION AND DIFFERENCE-MAKING (VIII-H)

ALYSSA NEY, UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER

This paper examines the relationship between physical and difference-making accounts of causation. It then considers in a preliminary way the consequences that this issue has for a current debate regarding mental causation.

GENERICIS AND PLURAL QUANTIFICATION (I-F)

BERNHARD NICKEL, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Generics both characterize kinds and state generalizations about the instances of kinds. Many theorists endorse an ambiguity view that mirrors this distinction, taking bare plural expressions in generics to be ambiguous between reference to kinds and reference to their instances. I argue that

this ambiguity view is untenable, and that we can achieve better empirical coverage by giving semantics for plural expressions that follow the work of George Boolos.

THE “STRUCTURE” OF PHYSICS: A CASE STUDY (V-K)

JILL NORTH, YALE UNIVERSITY

We are familiar with talking about the “structure” posited by a given theory of physics, such as the spacetime structure of relativity. We also talk of the “existence” of these structures. What, exactly, do we mean by this? What is “structure” in this sense, and what do we mean by the existence of one structure rather than another? Modern theories of physics are formulated in mathematical language, using abstract mathematical objects. What does the structure of the mathematics used to formulate a theory tell us about the physical structure of the world according to that theory? This is particularly puzzling when there are different mathematical formulations of a given theory. Different mathematical formulations mean different mathematical structures. Then what do we infer from the theory about the structure of the world? Do different mathematical formulations posit different structures, or are they mere notational variants, different ways of describing the same underlying structure? I consider these questions by looking at the case of Lagrangian and Hamiltonian formulations of classical mechanics. I argue that, contrary to the usual view, these are not genuinely equivalent. For there is a difference in structure, and this is an all-important difference. I suggest more generally that we should be realists about structure.

WHAT’S RIGHT WITH THE OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT (X-H)

SUSANA NUCCETELLI, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS—PAN AMERICA

A qualified defense of Moore’s open question argument recasts OQA in two different versions, depending on the variety of reductive naturalism each attempts to undermine. One is a non-question-begging extended argument that can transmit by entailment the a priority of premises to the conclusion that no thesis of semantic naturalists is true. This argument rests on the contention that Moorean questions have the privileges of cogito-like thoughts. The other, a non-deductive argument against metaphysical naturalism, takes the failure of semantic naturalism as suggesting that some good reason is needed for the naturalists’ view that value predicates and purely descriptive predicates are co-extensional. Since the only reason that is consistent with these naturalists’ reductive program rests on an implausible view of the relevant identity statements, it follows that the burden of proof is on them.

RELATIONS AND POWERS (XI-I)

WALTER OTT, VIRGINIA TECH

After decades of abuse at the hands of the Cartesians, the Aristotelian notion of power was resuscitated by Robert Boyle and John Locke. A chief complaint against powers was that they were ontologically mysterious,

since, on the Scholastic view, they are not reducible to the size, shape, and motion of extended substances. In the first two sections, I explain how Locke and Boyle “sanitize” the notion of power by treating it as a species of relation and then arguing for a reductive account of relations generally. In the third, I turn to some implications for the question of Locke’s commitment to mechanism. Given Locke’s reductionism, God cannot imbue bodies with powers independent of their primary qualities.

THREATS, PUNISHMENT, AND PROPORTIONALITY (XII-I)

JAPA PALLIKATHAYIL, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

In this paper, I argue against justifications of the practice of punishment which begin by attempting to justify threats of punishment, like those views advocated by Warren Quinn and Larry Alexander. I argue that views of this kind cannot make sense of the thought that the severity of a punishment should in some way reflect the severity of the crime. Although this is a very plausible constraint on permissible acts of punishment, it cannot be simply tacked on to this kind of view without argument and the structure of this kind of view makes such an argument difficult to provide.

ARE PERSONS MERE CONTAINERS FOR WELL BEING? (IX-J)

MARTIN PETERSON, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

It is widely believed that consequentialists are committed to the view that persons are mere containers for well being. I challenge this argument by proposing a new version of consequentialism, according to which the identities of persons matter in themselves. It is shown that the new theory, two-dimensional prioritarianism, is a natural extension of traditional prioritarianism. In resemblance with the latter, the two-dimensional view holds that well being matters more for persons who are at a low absolute level than for persons who are better off. However, two-dimensional prioritarianism also holds that it is worse to be deprived of a given number of units than it is to gain the same number of units, even if the new distribution is a permutation of the original one.

THE PARADOX OF DIVINE FORGIVENESS (III-F)

GLEN PETTIGROVE, MASSEY UNIVERSITY

The paradox of divine forgiveness suggests it is unreasonable to be comforted by the thought that God forgives acts that injure human victims. A plausible response to the paradox suggests that the comfort derives from the belief that God’s forgiveness releases the wrongdoer from punishment for her misdeed. This response is shown to be flawed. A more adequate response is then developed out of the connection between forgiveness and reconciliation.

WHAT CAN A DRUNK REALLY KNOW? SOLVING A PUZZLE FOR PRAGMATISM (V-H)

JAMIE PHILLIPS, CLARION UNIVERSITY

Let Epistemic Pragmatism [EP] refer to the theory that an agent, *S*, knows some proposition, *p*, only if some pragmatic condition is met, and let us

assume that the justification for EP is grounded on the epistemic/pragmatic intuition [PI] that the importance of *p* to *S* raises or lowers the evidential standards (or justificational thresholds) necessary for *S* to know *p*. Robert Howell has recently argued that EP, so stipulated and defended, faces a trilemma leading to either skepticism, to the denial of the deductive closure principle, or to the rejection of PI itself. The only way to avoid this initial trilemma, claims Howell, is to face a dilemma leading on both hands to the unfortunate result that drinking increases knowledge. In this paper I intend show that both Howell's arguments should be rejected that it remains an important, and open, question whether knowledge always contains an ineliminable pragmatic component.

MOTOR PERCEPTION: A THIRD WAY TO PERCEIVE PICTURES? (III-E)

ALESSANDRO PIGNOCCHI, INSTITUT JEAN NICOD

Philosophers traditionally distinguish two ways of perceiving pictures: we can perceive the content of the picture (what the picture represents) or its design (the picture as an object, with its own physical properties). Traditional questions regard the factors that determine what the content of a picture is, and the relations between the content and the design (Gombrich 2002, Wolheim 2003). I will argue that the perception of the design has not received sufficient attention from researchers, and that many pictorial phenomena could be understood in a more efficient way by separating design perception into two essentially distinct kinds of perception; first, the perception of the picture as a historical object. Properties of the picture are in this case perceived as pertaining to an object that has neither representational nor historical properties. Second, the motor perception, in this case properties are perceived as the result of the actions of an intentional agent. I will give arguments drawing on neuroscience to show that at the functional level the motor perception is a natural third kind of perception. I will then suggest that motor perception should have particular subjective manifestations that have been neglected by phenomenologists. Motor perception allows us to explain and describe very punctual pictorial phenomena, and it then could be a good field to see neuropsychology and phenomenology make progress hand in hand.

COGNITIVE ABILITIES AND THE CONCEPTUALIST/NONCONCEPTUALIST DEBATE (X-I)

TED POSTON, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH ALABAMA

In a recent paper "Are there different kinds of content?" Richard Heck argues for nonconceptualism, the thesis that perceptual content is different in kind than cognitive content. Heck's argument is interesting and helps to regiment and clarify the central issue between conceptualists and nonconceptualists. I defend conceptualism against Heck's central argument. Conceptualists can utilize a number of Heck's points to clarify and argue for their own view. Additionally, I explain how the debate between conceptualists and nonconceptualists has been misled by conceiving of cognitive abilities as involving language-like representation. Once this picture is set aside Heck's central argument for nonconceptualism collapses and the conceptualist claim has a much more natural and unobjectionable formulation.

GENERALITY, COMPLEXITY, AND APPROACHES TO EXPLANATION (V-K)

ANGELA POTOCHNIK, *STANFORD UNIVERSITY*

On the assumption that explanations are causal, the question may be posed of which among the potentially many causal factors influencing an event should be included in the event's explanation. This problem is particularly pressing when facing the task of explaining events that result from highly complex causal processes, such as cumulative evolutionary change, for such events have multitudinous causal influences. One possible solution is maximal inclusion: perhaps the best explanation would include all factors that make a difference to the occurrence of an explanandum. I argue, to the contrary, that some subset of the causal factors at work often provides the best explanation. In my view, the causal factors that should be included depend in part upon what I will refer to as the context of inquiry, which is shaped by the interests of the explanation-seekers. This position has implications for the debate over levels of explanation.

ON THE REPRESENTATION OF DECISION PROBLEMS FOR A UNIFIED THEORY OF DELIBERATION AND ACTION (XIII-F)

KENNETH A. PRESTING, *UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA-CHAPEL HILL*

The object of this paper is to offer a new diagnosis of a shortcoming which is commonly attributed to Richard Jeffrey's *The Logic of Decision*. Proponents of the so-called "causal" decision theories object that Jeffrey's system depends on probabilistic correlations which can be misleading. I will argue that Jeffrey's system does not err in its recommendations, but, rather, that it cannot consistently represent decision problems in which causal and statistical correlations occur together but disagree. The argument is conducted by formalizing *The Logic of Decision* in a first-order language with identity, so that a decision problem may be represented as a finite set of assertions, rather than as a matrix of probability and utility values. If this finite set is consistent with the axiomatized first-order theory, then the agent's choice is represented as a logical consequence of the assertions stating that the choice is offered.

POSSIBLE BRIDGES AND HYPOTHETICAL CONSENT (VII-K)

BRIAN PRINCE, *RICE UNIVERSITY*

Some arguments based on hypothetical consent contain an important feature that may be easily overlooked. The feature can be brought out by asking why it is important, in these arguments, that I actually be in the situation to which I might have consented. Gregory Kavka's work on Hobbesian moral theory contains two arguments of this type, one of which I discuss in this paper. These arguments cannot be understood without giving an account of the role of the actuality of the situation hypothetically agreed to. This will point toward a principle that can only be vaguely outlined in this paper, but some of whose general features will be described. I refer to this as a bridge principle, since its function would be to extend normative force from one possible world, in which something had been agreed to, to some other worlds in which the agreement had not taken place.

FREEDOM IN NATURE: THE MORAL OF KANT'S CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT (VII-H)

JAMES REID, METROPOLITAN STATE COLLEGE OF DENVER

Kant's philosophy is organized around the concept of freedom. But the account of freedom defended and developed in the writings of the 1780s has been criticized for failing to register the moral requirements of embodied natural agents. *The Critique of Judgment* offers Kant's first attempt to defend a view of the concepts of freedom and nature as two aspects of a single, undivided human agent concerned about the realization of her purposes in the only world in which it is her lot to live. The author argues for the moral import of the third Critique and defends a reading of its view of freedom in nature as compatible with both our scientific interest in naturalistic explanation and our moral interest in the realization of our purposes in the world of nature.

IS MICHAEL OTSUKA'S CONCEPTION OF ROBUST SELF-OWNERSHIP TOO ROBUST FOR A LEFT-LIBERTARIAN? (VIII-J)

ERIC ROARK, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA

In this paper I explore Michael Otsuka's left-libertarian attempt to reconcile robust self-ownership and equality. I argue that Otsuka's left-libertarian reconciliation fails because his offering of robust self-ownership, in place of the formal libertarian right of self-ownership, falls prey to glaring egalitarian worries. Robust self-ownership, that is, ought to be rejected by anyone who incorporates a serious egalitarian component into their theory of justice. Michael Otsuka's robust self-ownership is indeed too robust for a left-libertarian. I offer that a left-libertarian must be content with endorsing merely the formal libertarian right of self-ownership or give up the left-libertarian reconciliation of self-ownership and equality altogether.

ON A MOMENT'S NOTICE: ARISTOTLE ON PERCEIVING INSTANTS IN TIME (X-K)

TONY ROARK, BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY

Aristotle claims in the *De Sensu* that instants in time are individually *per se* perceptible. As it happens, this claim is a crucial component of the metaphysics of time he develops in the *Physics*, but it stands in stark contrast to another view that he endorses in the *De Sensu*, namely, the view that arbitrarily small sense-quality instances (e.g., patches of color) are only potentially, not actually, perceived. I reconstruct Aristotle's argument for the perceptibility of instants and in so doing elucidate the meaning of the claim. I then explain the incongruity of the two views mentioned and consider some of the salient consequences thereof.

ARE THERE ANY BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS IN EXPERIMENTAL BIOLOGY? MARCEL WEBER'S ACCOUNT OF HETERONOMOUS EXPLANATION IN EXPERIMENTAL BIOLOGY (IV-G)

WILLIAM A. ROTTSCHAEFER, LEWIS AND CLARK COLLEGE

In his recent *The Philosophy of Experimental Biology*, Marcel Weber argues that explanation in experimental biology, in contrast to evolutionary

biology, makes use of only physical and chemical laws to explain biological phenomena. Any reference to biological phenomena is merely descriptive. Consequently, these explanations are heteronomous. I examine and find wanting four of his arguments for heteronomy. Using Weber's own appeal to thermodynamic considerations in the case of ion flow in a neuron, I argue that the biological boundary conditions referred to in experimental biological explanations indicate that they constrain physiochemical activity. Arguing for a modest autonomy thesis, I propose that understanding living systems as far from equilibrium dynamic systems suggests that biological factors play a causal role generally in the phenomena studied in experimental biology. I conclude that Weber's heteronomy thesis has not been established and that modest autonomy hypothesis is a plausible alternative.

NARRATIVE UNITY: A DEFENCE (II-H)

ANTHONY RUDD, ST. OLAF COLLEGE

Over the last two or three decades, a number of influential philosophers, psychologists, and others have invoked the notion of narrative unity as having a central role to play in our thinking about ethics. However, something of a backlash now seems to be developing, exemplified in recent work by, for instance, Galen Strawson, Martha Nussbaum, and John Christman. My intention here is to defend the value of a narrative approach, based mainly on the work of Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor from some of the most common recent criticisms. One centrally important aspect of the dispute is a first-order ethical one about the extent to which we should seek for a unity based on narrative coherence in our lives, and I will offer a defence of Taylor's claim that an ethical life must aspire to, and to some extent achieve, narrative unity.

BEAUTIFUL SURFACES: KANT ON BEAUTY AND PERFECTION (VII-H)

ALEX RUEGER, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

Kant's distinction of free and adherent beauty has been considered problematic on several accounts. I am interested here in the question whether Kant is really committed to claiming that we can, at least in principle, regard all cases of adherent beauty as instances of free beauty if we abstract from whatever concepts we have of what the objects are supposed to be. Are there really no plausible constraints on our power of abstraction? I argue that the operation of abstracting from concepts of the objects in Kant's theory is not as arbitrary as might seem and that the strategy, properly understood, has its roots in aesthetic theories that preceded Kant's.

TOO CLOSE FOR COMFORT? PSYCHOSEMANTICS AND THE DISTAL (XII-F)

DAN RYDER, UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT

Naturalistic theories of intentionality typically fail to explain how our mental representations manage to denote distal things rather than mere disjunctions of proximal stimuli. In this paper, I present a neuroscience-

based teleosemantic solution to the distality problem. The key observation is that a certain broad type of distal entity—which includes individuals and kinds—is selectionally relevant to the design of the representational network in the cerebral cortex.

EPISTEMIC AGENCY AND THE NON-LOCAL TRUTH GOAL (XIII-E)

PATRICK W. RYSIEW, UNIVERSITY OF VICTORIA

Knowledge is widely held to be more valuable than true belief. Further, we place higher value on the possession of some truths over others. Each of these facts has been said to conflict with “epistemic value monism” (EVM), the view that truth is the epistemic goal. I argue that a plausible version of the truth-goal, together with an acknowledgement of our cognitive-epistemic finitude, explains the valuations upon which these objections to EVM turn.

TELEOLOGY AND DEONTOLOGY IN DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (VII-K)

BENJAMIN A. SACHS, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN—MADISON

In this article I introduce two views—teleology in distributive justice (TDJ) and deontology in distributive justice (DDJ). TDJ is the view that we should determine which distribution would be best, and then aim to achieve it. DDJ is the view that we should choose the distribution at which to aim based on some other consideration. I discuss the implications of the distinction between telic and deontic views for luck egalitarianism, egalitarianism, and prioritarianism. I argue that luck egalitarianism is not a version of egalitarianism, and that, in fact, the two views stand on opposite sides of the telic/deontic divide. Luck egalitarianism is a telic view, while egalitarianism, like prioritarianism, is most promising as a deontic view. My main point is that if we want to adjudicate the dispute among egalitarians, prioritarians, and luck egalitarians, we need to start debating the relative merits of teleology and deontology in distributive justice.

ILLUSIONS WITHOUT CONTENTS? (I-E)

KRANTI SARAN, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

It is widely assumed that perceptual experiences have contents. M.G.F. Martin, John Campbell, Bill Brewer, and Charles Travis have recently criticized this assumption. The central rationale for the assumption is that it allows a natural and elegant treatment of illusion in terms of bearing a perceptual attitude to false contents. Travis argues that his alternative account of illusion—which does not invoke contents—undermines the central rationale for the assumption. This paper reconstructs and assesses Travis’s account of illusion. He explains illusory experiences in terms of false expectations about the world rather than as misrepresentations of it. I argue that his proposal fails to plausibly account for the robustness of certain illusions. The central rationale for the assumption remains untouched.

THE LEAST DISCERNING AND MOST PROMISCUOUS TRUTHMAKER (V-J)

JONATHAN M. SCHAFFER, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS-AMHERST

The only truthmaker one needs is the world. But truthmaker theorists have been swift to dismiss this prospect. Thus Armstrong labels the world “the least discerning” and “most promiscuous truthmaker” (2004: 19), dismissing it as “an uninteresting truthmaker, mentioned here just for theoretical completeness” (2004: 18) and immediately moving to the notion of a minimal truthmaker, which is said to be “more interesting, and of quite special importance for metaphysics” (2004: 19). I will argue for a reconsideration of this “least discerning and most promiscuous” truthmaker. On the theory I will defend, worlds are the only truthmakers. I argue that this provides an elegant account of truthmaking, which solves the problem of negatives, in an ontologically revealing way.

OMISSIONS: AN EXCLUSION PROBLEM FOR CAUSALISM (III-H)

CAROLINA SARTORIO, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

Causal theories of agency face several challenges, among them, the problem of causal exclusion of the mental by the physical (how can mental states be the causes of actions, if their physical realizers are sufficient for the job?), and the problem posed by intentional omissions (if omissions cannot enter in causal relations, then the intentionality of omissions cannot be explained in causal terms). In this paper I argue that even if these two traditional problems are overcome, a new problem arises, which combines features of the two: it is a problem of causal exclusion for just omissions. The problem arises because whereas the causalist wants to say that an intentional omission is caused by certain intentions, inclinations, beliefs and desires, etc., that the agent has, we should regard it as flowing from the absence of certain intentions, inclinations, beliefs and desires, etc., that the agent doesn't have.

DREYFUS'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS: A REPLY (XI-J)

AARON ALLEN SCHILLER, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-SAN DIEGO

In his 2005 Presidential Address at the Pacific Division Meeting of the APA, Hubert Dreyfus proposed that philosophers of all stripes should work together to address the following problem: to show “how the ground floor of pure perception and receptive coping supports the conceptual upper stories of the edifice of knowledge.” While much of the address focused on what sorts of phenomena pure perception and receptive coping could be, much less time was spent defending the claim that such phenomena are foundational in the way seemingly required by his formulation. In this paper, I consider the meaning of, and arguments for, Dreyfus's phenomenological foundations. I argue that, even if one can agree with Dreyfus that there are some capacities which are minimal or receptive or reactionary, there seems to be no good reason to accept, and several good reasons to reject, that they form any kind of “foundation.”

HOW THE TRANSPARENCY OF VISUAL EXPERIENCE IMPACTS INVERTED EARTH (I-E)

ROBERT SCHROER, ARKANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY

Ned Block's "Inverted Earth Argument" is a well-known objection to Representationalist theories of phenomenal character that offer externalist accounts of representational content. In this paper, I explore the question of what impact assumptions about the so-called "transparency" of perceptual experience can make on this argument. More specifically, I examine what the Inverted Earth Argument looks like if you assume that visual experiences are transparent and what it looks like if you assume that visual experiences are not transparent. The conclusions I reach are these: If you assume that visual experiences are not transparent, then the Inverted Earth Argument looks like a strong argument against externalist Representationalism, but only because it's seriously begging the question. If you assume that visual experiences are transparent, then the Inverted Earth Argument looks like a good objection against one version of externalist Representationalism, but does little to impugn externalist Representationalism in general.

CAN LIBERALISM ACCOUNT FOR WOMEN'S "ADAPTIVE PREFERENCES"? (XII-G)

LISA H. SCHWARTZMAN, MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

Feminist philosophers have questioned whether liberal theory can account for the phenomenon of adaptive preferences, specifically women's preferences that are formed under conditions of sexist oppression. In this paper, I examine one feminist attempt to address the problem of women's "deformed desires" by relying on a liberal framework. Assessing this argument, I conclude that liberalism provides inadequate resources for responding to this issue since it errs in understanding adaptive preferences as exceptional, it provides little explanation of how changes in individual preferences are motivated, and it often fails to identify the adaptive nature of such preferences. I illustrate my arguments through a brief discussion of women's choices around motherhood and sexuality, and I conclude by offering several suggestions of how an alternative theory might better address the problems raised by preference adaptation in the context of oppression.

THE PECULIAR PRACTICE OF PROMISING (XII-H)

KENNETH E. SHOCKLEY, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK-BUFFALO

What is wrong with breaking a promise? One might claim that promising is a form of assurance, and that the wrong of breaking a promise is then just the wrong of violating that assurance. This position seems especially plausible if we take promising to be part of social practices used to provide assurance. I argue, however, that we can recognize the practice dependence of promising without losing what is peculiar about promising. In this paper I take an ecumenical approach to the practice of promising: promising cannot be made sense of without that practice. But I argue that promising adds something over and above emphasis: it provides the promisee with a particular ground for complaint over and above the grounds had by all those subject to the practice of promising. The peculiar practice of promising makes this ground possible.

AN EXTERNALIST GUIDE TO EPISTEMIC PRACTICE (XII-J)

TOMOJI SHOGENJI, RHODE ISLAND COLLEGE

This paper searches for a proper framework of epistemic evaluation to guide our epistemic practice. It is sometimes thought that for the purpose of guiding our epistemic practice, we need an internalist epistemology of the classical kind, where epistemic evaluation is conducted from the first-person perspective based on the epistemic subject's conscious mental states, although it is also thought that strictly first-person internalism that disallows any evidence or epistemic principle outside the subject's conscious states to support her beliefs leads to radical skepticism. I argue that the fear of radical skepticism is unfounded since strictly first-person internalism also disallows any evidence or epistemic principle outside the subject's conscious states to undermine the positive epistemic evaluation of her beliefs. However, I also argue that strictly first-person internalism provides no informative epistemic norms and thus is inappropriate for guiding our epistemic practice. I propose an externalist framework of epistemic evaluation, where evaluation is conducted from the third-person perspective by the epistemic experts in the community. This version of externalism, motivated by the idea of making epistemic evaluation guide our epistemic practice, differs from the standard form of externalism in that full epistemic evaluation must be based on evidence and reasoning available to the community.

MICHAEL SLOTE'S UNJUSTIFIED REJECTION OF NEO-ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS (XI-K)

ERIC SILVERMAN, ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY

Michael Slote has recently criticized Neo-Aristotelian virtue theory in favor of a sentimentalist approach to ethics. While Slote claims that virtues such as benevolence and care cannot be supported by a Neo-Aristotelian theoretical structure, this paper demonstrates that Neo-Aristotelian eudaimonistic accounts of virtue ethics can incorporate these virtues. Furthermore, this paper demonstrates that Slote's ethical theory is far more limited than Neo-Aristotelian ethics in its ability to provide nuanced ethical evaluations of moral agents in moral dilemmas.

TWO ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE MILL-RAMSEY-LEWIS THEORY (IV-H)

BRADFORD SKOW, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS-AMHERST

I am a primitivist about laws of nature. That is, I think that the operator "It is a law that..." has no analysis: not in non-nomic terms, and not in nomic terms either. In this paper I do some of the work needed to defend my view. I present two arguments against the most popular non-nomic analysis: the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis theory. Roughly speaking, that theory says that the laws are the members of the deductive system that best balances simplicity and strength. I first argue that there is no way to give "best balances" a meaning that makes the theory plausible. Then I argue that second-order laws are possible and present several examples. Since the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis theory entails that second-order laws are impossible, it follows that the theory is false.

A LOGICAL RESPONSE TO BLACKBURN'S SUPERVENIENCE ARGUMENT (X-H)

JORN SONDERHOLM, LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY

Simon Blackburn's supervenience argument against moral realism has been widely discussed since its first appearance more than thirty years ago. A number of different suggestions have been made as to how the argument can be countered. In his review of Blackburn's *Spreading the Word*, Crispin Wright comments on the argument and rather briefly points out some technical difficulties with it that arise from the formula used in the definition of supervenience (*Mind* 1985, pp. 310-19). This paper builds on Wright's criticism and aims at showing that the Moorean realist can meet Blackburn's explanatory charge. The main point is that by exploiting certain features of the formulae involved in classical definitions of supervenience, weak and strong supervenience claims can be made trivially true. This holds even in cases where the modal operator(s) are interpreted to denote conceptual necessity.

A TALE OF TWO SIMPLES (VIII-H)

JOSHUA SPENCER, UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER

There is a puzzle, strikingly similar to one put forward by McDaniel (2003) and discussed by Hudson (2006). This puzzle is meant to show that extended mereological simples cannot be heterogeneous. Although several plausible responses have been given to this puzzle, I wish to reopen the case against heterogeneous extended simples. In this paper, I briefly canvass responses to this puzzle which may be made in defense of extended heterogeneous simples. I then present a new version of this puzzle which targets simples that occupy atomic yet extended regions of space. It seems that none of the traditional responses can be used to successfully save this particular kind of extended simple from the new puzzle. Finally, I will suggest that the similarities between the old and new cases result in a substantial case against the possibility of extended heterogeneous simples of any kind.

A DILEMMA FOR PARTICULARIST VIRTUE ETHICS (XI-K)

REBECCA LYNN STANGL, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

There is an obvious affinity between virtue ethics and particularism. Both stress the complexity of the moral life, the inadequacy of rule-following as a guide to moral deliberation, and the importance of judgment in discerning the morally relevant features of particular situations. And yet, it remains an open question how deep the affinity goes. In this paper, I argue that the implications for virtue ethics of one kind of particularly strong form of particularism are more radical than has been appreciated. Adopting such a view would require the virtue theorist either to adopt an unattractive model of moral motivation or to embrace a version of the unity of the virtues.

ARISTOTLE AND THE HOMONYMY OF CAUSE (IX-F)

NATHANAEL STEIN, OXFORD UNIVERSITY

To know is to grasp causal relations, according to Aristotle: this is his consistent claim throughout his logical, metaphysical, and scientific

treatises. Famously, there are four kinds of causal relation: formal, material, efficient, and final causation. This leads to an interpretive and philosophical problem: if knowledge is the grasping of causes, but there are four kinds of cause, then knowledge is ambiguous, unless the kinds of cause can be appropriately and non-trivially unified. The problem can only be solved by appreciating that causation is one of the concepts Aristotle recognizes as homonymous: concepts which are not univocal but nonetheless organized around a core concept, or focal meaning. The core concept for causation is, in fact, the concept of predication. This result ought to be of interest both for scholars of Aristotle and for those wishing to defend causal pluralism.

STAGE THEORY AND RESURRECTION REPLICAS (X-J)

ERIC CHARLES STEINHART, WILLIAM PATERSON UNIVERSITY

According to John Hick, resurrection is replication. If Fallen is resurrected as Risen, then Risen is a replica of Fallen at the last stage of Fallen's earthly life. But replication is not identity. An endurantist says that diachronic sameness entails identity. So on endurantism, Risen cannot be the same person as Fallen. A worm theorist says that diachronic sameness is co-membership in the same 4D space-time worm. But there is no 4D worm that contains both Risen and Fallen. So on worm theory, Risen cannot be the same person as Fallen. A stage theorist says diachronic sameness is a temporal counterpart relation. If stage theory is right, then Hick can defend the view that Risen is the same person as Fallen. We show how stage theory helps Hick's resurrection theory.

ALLAIS-LIKE PREFERENCE REVERSALS ARE EVERYWHERE (I-I)

MARIAM THALOS, UNIVERSITY OF UTAH

Maurice Allais had strong reservations about the classical theory of utility—reservations that are yet to be quelled. If his criticism of classical utility is accepted, then decision theory, as standardly founded upon classical utility, is doomed—at least as a prescriptive enterprise. Allais's classic counter-example (called a “paradox” in many classic texts) involves judgment concerning risk, in which Allais himself judged “reversal” as rational. (“Reversal” refers to the orientation of judgment in relation to the prescriptions of classical utility theory.) What previous commentators have failed to appreciate is that the reversals are more pervasive. This paper demonstrates that reversals infect how humans judge cases involving time and effort, just as much as they infect cases involving risk.

CLEARING A PATH TOWARDS A CRITICAL THEORY OF SOCIAL IDENTITY (III-G)

BRIAN THOMAS, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA—CHAPEL HILL

For those working on race and gender, one useful way of making traction in the project of developing a critical theory of social identity is to consider what would a good or just society make of an individual's race or sex, and whether racial and sexual distinctions would ever properly be taken into account. These questions should sound familiar, having been discussed by Richard Wasserstrom and recently by Sally Haslanger and Linda Martin-

Alcoff. Though there are disagreements amongst these theorists about whether the ideal society would, as it were, contain gender, they all agree that the ideal society would not contain race. I argue two points. First I argue that Wasserstrom's criteria for deciding the status of racial identity in the good society are mistaken. Second, I argue that the attempts by Haslanger and Martin-Alcoff to argue in favor of gender but against race are inconsistent.

A SEMANTICS FOR NAMES WITH FULL BENEFITS (VIII-I)

HEIDI TIEDKE, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND—COLLEGE PARK

A good account of the role of proper names in fiction requires one to adopt a non-standard semantics for proper names, and to reject accounts of the relation between names and truth that have it that the relation is one of determination (that the meaning of a name determines its contribution to the truth-conditions of utterances containing it). At least this is so if one makes the following assumptions: an assertive utterance of "Holmes smokes" can be literally true; the intuitive truth-conditions of utterances like these are indicative of the semantics of the expressions involved; "Sherlock Holmes" belongs to the same semantic category as "Bertrand Russell"; and an account of the truth of an utterance of "Holmes smokes" must explain how natural language, as it is, is apt for expressing such truths. I here argue for a semantics for names that meets these conditions.

IN DEFENSE OF (A FORMULATION OF) THE DATE THEORY (X-K)

STEPHAN TORRE, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS—AMHERST

In this paper I evaluate the date theory in light of objections that have been raised against it by Quentin Smith. The force of Smith's arguments has been acknowledged by a number of B-theorists and many agree that they pose a serious threat to the date theory. Smith provides an objection to the date theory given a reductionist account of time and an objection to the date theory given a substantivalist account of time. I argue that Smith's objection against the reductionist date theorist fails because he attributes to the reductionist an implausible account of the identity of times across worlds. I argue that Smith's objection against the substantivalist date theorist can a) be reformulated to apply to the reductionist as well and b) succeeds in refuting one formulation of the date theory. There is another formulation of the date theory, however, that avoids Smith's objections entirely.

LIBERALISM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (I-H)

KEVIN VALLIER, UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

Modern liberal theories of justice tend to be unconcerned with economic growth. Instead, they emphasize that all members of society should possess equal or decent shares of society's common resources. But this emphasis has led liberal theories of justice away from their goal of helping the least advantaged. I argue that a lack of emphasis on growth is due in part to modern liberals' failure to countenance the possibility that the economic policies they typically defend hurt the least advantaged by reducing

economic growth. If we take the possibility seriously then many putative obligations to redistribute may be undermined. I argue that if redistributive policies hurt the people they were intended to benefit by reducing economic growth then they cannot be justified. Modern liberal theories of justice must pay more attention to the moral matter of economic growth.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS (VII-I)

HELGA VARDEN, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS-URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

In this paper I argue that the liberal ideal of political obligations in the international sphere is non-voluntarist in nature. I argue with Kant that the impartial form of the international authority gives it, and no one else, rightful standing to solve problems of assurance and specification in the international sphere. The legitimacy of the international authority stems from how it represents each interacting state, stateless person, and member of an oppressive state—and yet none of them individually. Any state that insists on providing assurance or applying international laws on its own commits wrongdoing in the highest degree, since it thereby fails to respect the sovereignty of other states and the rights of stateless individuals. Because international justice is possible only through the establishment of an international authority, I conclude that the international authority has a special status in international relations that individual states cannot possibly have.

COMPATIBILISM, INCOMPATIBILISM, AND IMPOSSIBILISM (XII-K)

KADRI VIHVELIN, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

I shed light on the free will/determinism problem by drawing on a distinction that has not been noted in the literature: the incompatibilist (someone who believes that free will is possible, but only at indeterministic worlds) is not an impossibilist (someone who believes that free will is metaphysically impossible). I defend compatibilism by showing that incompatibilist arguments either fail or turn out to be arguments for impossibilism.

DESCARTES AND THE QUESTION OF DIRECT DOXASTIC VOLUNTARISM (VI-I)

RICO VITZ, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH FLORIDA

One issue that has received a fair amount of attention from philosophers interested in the ethics of belief is the question of whether (or the extent to which) people have direct voluntary control over their beliefs—that is, the question of direct doxastic voluntarism. Happily, so it might seem, this is one issue on which contemporary philosophers appear to have reached a consensus: namely, that people cannot voluntarily control their occurrent beliefs, or judgments, directly. In this paper, I elucidate Descartes's strikingly different answer to the question and explain its implications for the current consensus. More specifically, I argue that on Descartes's account, people can have direct voluntary control over their judgments, and I contend that a careful look at what he actually says suggests that contemporary philosophers have failed to make a compelling case against his position and, hence, that the current consensus is unsubstantiated.

TAKING THE RAVEN PARADOX WITH A GRAIN OF SALT (V-K)

BARRY M. WARD, UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS—FAYETTEVILLE

It is argued that the raven hypothesis and similar claims, such as “all sodium salts burn with a yellow flame,” are not universal generalizations. They are nomic claims for which Hempel’s paradox cannot be generated. Further, it is argued that standard Bayesian treatments of the confirmation of such hypotheses are mistaken, and an alternative Bayesian account is sketched.

CAUSES THAT MAKE A DIFFERENCE (VI-J)

KENNETH WATERS, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA—TWIN CITIES

The aim of this paper is to solve a conceptual puzzle about what it means to pick out actual causes and to answer two related questions about causal reasoning in biology. The first question asks whether the existence of multiple causes in complex processes implies that there cannot be an ontological difference that justifies focusing attention on some causes and not others. The second question concerns what kind of causal generality matters in biology. I motivate the puzzle by examining causal reasoning in genetics, showing that distinguishing actual causes from mere causes is an important part of biological practice. I solve the puzzle about the conceptual difference between actual causes and mere causes by using James Woodward’s manipulability theory of causation as a basis for explicating a causal concept that has escaped philosophical attention, the concept of an actual difference maker. According to my analysis, being a cause only entails that something is a potential difference maker, not an actual difference maker. To be an actual difference maker, there must be an actual difference of interest in an actual population. What distinguishes actual difference making causes from potentially difference making causes is that an actual cause actually varies in a real population and that it is this variation that accounts for the actual difference of interest in the population. Biologists’ explanations of complex processes focus on actual difference makers because these causes explain actual differences of interest. Hence, notwithstanding calls for parity by philosophers of biology, biologists are justified in emphasizing some causes more than others. Furthermore, despite philosophical calls for universality, practicing biologists are perfectly content with narrow causal generalizations because the generality that matters most is generality across the variation of causal conditions that actually exists in organisms and environments, not generality across conditions that are never actualized.

SINGULAR LIMITS, EXPLANATION, AND EMERGENCE IN PHYSICS (IV-H)

ANDREW WAYNE, UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH

Recent work on emergence in physics by Robert Batterman and Alexander Rueger has focused on the presence of asymptotic and singular limit relations between basal and upper-level theories. This paper argues that emergent properties are not due to singular limiting relations in the way that Batterman and Rueger claim. It shows that in the case of the van der

Pol oscillator, a classic example of singular limit problem, novel upper-level properties are not emergent and can be entirely explained in basal terms. The paper suggests that the failure of basal explainability is constitutive of emergence in physics.

IDENTIFYING AND DISSOLVING THE NON-IDENTITY PROBLEM (XII-L)

RIVKA WEINBERG, SCRIPPS COLLEGE

Philosophers concerned with procreative ethics have long been puzzled by Parfit's Non-Identity Problem. Various solutions have been proposed, but I argue that we have not solved the problem on its own direct, narrow person-affecting terms, i.e., in terms of the identified future individuals affected by procreative decisions and acts. Thus, the core problem remains unsolved. This is a nagging concern for all who hold the common intuition that actions that harm no one are permissible. I argue against Harmon's and Woodward's direct, narrow person-affecting solutions, and in favor of a new solution to the Non-Identity Problem. My solution, or, rather, dissolution, is based on the argument that merely possible people, i.e., hypothetical people who could possibly, but will not actually, exist, are morally irrelevant. I show that the Non-Identity problem only arises when we concern ourselves with merely possible people. Once we are careful to restrict our concerns to only those that do or will exist, the Non-Identity Problem is dissolved.

LOCKE: THE ROLE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN SENSITIVE KNOWLEDGE (XI-I)

SHELLEY WEINBERG, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

Locke makes the enigmatic claim that knowledge is the perception of an agreement or disagreement between ideas and that sensitive knowledge consists in the perception of an "actual real Existence agreeing to an Idea" (IV.i.7). What could he be thinking? I argue that Locke has a conception of consciousness that makes sense of this claim. Consciousness interpreted as a reflexive awareness that ideas have particular sources provides evidence internal to perception that makes sense of Locke's claim that sensitive knowledge does not extend beyond our ideas yet is the perception of an actual real existence. It also explains why the perception of an actual real existence constitutes a case of knowledge rather than probable judgment. Although sensitive knowledge concerns the existences of particular things, it satisfies the criteria for knowledge, namely, a clear and relatively immediate perception of an agreement of real existence between ideas.

EMPIRICISM AND THE VEHICLES OF THOUGHT (I-G)

DANIEL WEISKOPF, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA

According to concept empiricism, concepts are nothing more than perceptual representations. One line of evidence for empiricism comes from neuroscientific studies showing that perceptual regions of the brain are activated during cognitive tasks. But the extant neuroscientific evidence falls short of establishing empiricism. First, there is widespread activity outside perceptual systems during conceptual processing. This suggests

that concepts are partially non-perceptual representations. Second, many brain regions are multimodal. These multimodal regions often implement complex processing of perceptual information beyond what takes place inside sensory systems. Third, the key notion of a copy of a perceptual representation is a slippery one. On the most plausible conception of a copy, we have little reason to believe that perceptual copies are widespread in the brain. In sum, the causal structure of the brain involves widespread activity in perceptual and non-perceptual systems, and no subset of this activity can be singled out as the unique neural vehicle of conceptual thought.

DEGRAZIA, MACINTYRE, AND DOLPHINS: A CASE STUDY IN THE NECESSARY
EVOLUTION OF METHODOLOGY (XII-D)

THOMAS WHITE, LOYOLA MARYMOUNT UNIVERSITY

Despite the fact that recent philosophical discussions of nonhumans have shown an increased interest in dolphins, these discussions have been characterized by fundamental weaknesses. These investigations have been based on a faulty methodology that has led thinkers to argue for positions that are neither scientifically nor philosophically defensible. The methodology at issue is characterized by insufficient familiarity with the relevant scientific literature, no direct observation of dolphins in their native habitat, and an unintentional anthropocentrism. This essay illustrates these weaknesses by examining the work of two philosophers (David DeGrazia and Alasdair MacIntyre) and calls for an improved methodology. (While this paper concentrates solely on the problems connected with how these two philosophers have discussed dolphins, I believe that a similar methodological weakness appears to pervade the “animal rights” discussion in general.)

FICTIONAL REALISM RESCUED (XII-E)

MARY BETH WILLARD, YALE UNIVERSITY

Defenders of pretense theories of fiction have argued against fictional realism by noting that the fictional realist would be committed to the existence of objects that are logically problematic, and as pretense theories of fiction have no need to postulate the existence of such problematic objects, they should be favored over fictional realism. In particular, Anthony Everett argues that fictional realists are committed to two propositions that jointly entail the existence of vague, logically incoherent, ontologically indeterminate objects: “Invented,” if the world of a story concerns a creature *a*, and if *a* is not a real thing, then *a* is a fictional character, and “Symmetry,” if a story concerns *a* and *b*, and if *a* and *b* are not real things, then *a* and *b* are identical in the world of the story iff the fictional character of *a* is identical to the fictional character of *b*. While both propositions are intuitively appealing, I will argue that “Symmetry” is false. Within the world of a story, where we imagine fictional characters as real persons who could have done otherwise, we do not require “Identity,” but a much looser relationship of similarity and authorial intent. As a result, identity within the world of the story does not necessarily entail identity outside

the world of the story, and thus the fictional realist is not committed to the existence of incoherent objects.

IN DEFENSE OF THE PHENOMENAL CONCEPT STRATEGY (IX-I)

MALTE WILLER, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS–AUSTIN

The Phenomenal Concept Strategy—the view that the explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness stems from the way we think about consciousness—is defended against a recent criticism articulated by David Chalmers. Contra Chalmers, it is claimed that proponents of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy can provide a non-physical explanation of the explanatory gap which is neither regressive nor circular.

WHY ARE THERE INDEXICALS? (VIII-I)

MICHAEL P. WOLF, CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY–FRESNO

In this paper, I argue for an account of indexicals and demonstratives based on their pragmatic significance, articulated in terms of their inferential role. While some favor attributing direct reference to these expressions, I show that it is their being taken up in a scheme of substitution inferences that grants them their significance in the language. Indexicals and demonstratives are recurrent but non-reusable expressions, meaning that entitlement to use them does not entitle us to make inferences to claims involving other rigid designators or descriptions. That entitlement may be secured through familiar empirical means and expressed in the form of identity statements, but the restrictions on inferences involving indexicals and demonstratives thus grant us a freedom to make some assertions within a context without obligations outside it and rein in our moves beyond that context until we have grounds to do so.

THE REAL VALUE OF PREDICTION (IV-H)

K. BRAD WRAY, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK–OSWEGO

Predictivists claim that a theory that yields a true prediction is superior to a theory that is designed to account for a body of data. I argue that the case for predictivism rests on a miscalculation of the justificatory value of prediction. This common miscalculation is a consequence of failing to distinguish between the epistemic value of prediction and its pragmatic value. When we attend to just the justificatory value of prediction prediction offers no more support for a theory than does accommodation. My attack on predictivism will focus on Peter Lipton's recent defense of predictivism. I argue that the plausibility of predictivism is a consequence of misrepresenting the nature of both accommodation and prediction in science.

SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF TIMING MAXIMS IN KANTIAN ETHICS (VII-I)

JASON WYCKOFF, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO–BOULDER

One plausible interpretation of Kant's notion of a contradiction in conception is that of a "practical contradiction," meaning that the universalized form of the agent's maxim would frustrate the agent's purposes at the world

in which the maxim is universalized. Barbara Herman argues that this interpretation would force the Kantian mistakenly to conclude that so-called “timing maxims,” in which agents coordinate their actions with the behavior of others, would be morally problematic. I argue that the Practical Contradiction Interpretation can be rescued from Herman’s objection by restricting the question of universalizability to the closest possible world to ours.

THE ILLUSION OF TRANSMISSION: WHERE WRIGHT GOES WRONG (X-G)

STEPHEN WYKSTRA, CALVIN COLLEGE

In important and much-discussed recent papers, Crispin Wright argues “transmission” differs fundamentally from “closure”: he then argues that some situations generate failure of transmission, but not of closure. (Closure, in Wright’s sense, requires only that when you have grounds that warrant certain premises and see that they entail a conclusion, it is also the case that you are warranted in believing the conclusion. Transmission requires that by virtue of having grounds that “supply a warrant” for believing premises and seeing they entail a conclusion, you can acquire warrant for that conclusion.) I argue Rudolf Carnap’s distinction between “static” and “dynamic” senses of “confirm” can be extended to epistemic realtions like “supply a warrant.” Wielding this extended “Carnapian Distinction,” I show that Wright’s main argument suffers from severe equivocation. I then consider one way of trying to reconstruct his argument and argue that it threatens to make Transmission itself—considered as distinct from the Closure Principle—an illusion.

THE UNDERDETERMINATION OF POLITICAL CONCEPTIONS OF PERSONHOOD (III-D)

MELISSA YATES, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

My aim in this paper is to suggest reasons for rejecting a widely accepted conception of public reason developed by John Rawls in *Political Liberalism* and to limit deliberative obligations. In my discussion of the underdetermination objection, I argue that political debates about the legislation of abortion, euthanasia, and stem cell research rely on controversial conceptions of personhood and cannot be settled in merely public terms. Religious and nonreligious beliefs about personhood should be accommodated in public deliberation, and theories of deliberative obligations should be redefined in order to permit this inclusion. I conclude the paper with several limitations we should set on theories of deliberative obligations: citizens should not be expected to refrain from offering comprehensive moral or religious defenses for political positions when no public alternatives are available, and deliberative obligations should not inhibit the ability of public deliberation to serve as a source of moral-political knowledge.

HEGEL ON RETRIBUTION AND PUNISHMENT (III-I)

CHRISTOPHER YEOMANS, KENYON COLLEGE

Hegel famously argues that crime involves the will in a kind of self-destruction, and that retribution against the criminal is the mere expression of the contradictory nature of the criminal will (its “nullity”). Hegel seems to imply that there is a conceptual connection between crime and punishment, and thus that punishment is logically necessary (not merely useful in deterring future crime). Though it is one of Hegel’s most well-known doctrines, consensus has escaped interpreters with respect to its meaning. What does it mean for the will involved in crime to be self-destructive? What is the nature of the conceptual connection (if any) between crime and retribution? Against most interpreters, I suggest that the contradiction is primarily in the will of the victim, and that this contradiction is that the victim is complicit in his own victimization. The central question animating Hegel’s philosophy of punishment is, “How is it possible that I, a free being, can be coerced?” His answer is that I must freely will to be coerced, which puts my will in an untenable situation: my willing consists in forcing objects to serve my ends, and yet as a complicit victim of crime I appear to undermine the service of my ends by those same objects. Punishment is then the resolution of this untenable situation by forcible reassertion of my ends at the expense of the criminal’s ends. It is therefore an instance of the plasticity and persistence with respect to goals that are aspects of any true teleological relationship. Thus the teleological dimension of agency itself provides the conceptual connection between crime and punishment.

BELIEVING IN ORDER TO KNOW (X-J)

JOHN ZEIS, CANISIUS COLLEGE

Evidentialism is generally taken to be a position which is not friendly to a religious epistemology. However, in this paper, I will argue for a religious epistemology which is compatible with fundamental tenets of an evidentialist position on epistemic justification. It is a position which entails both a “will to believe,” which goes beyond the standard evidentialist principles governing the appropriate doxastic attitude towards a proposition, but nonetheless satisfies epistemic principles at the basis of an evidentialist position on justification. If my argument is successful, a proponent of a conception of religious faith may be able to have her cake and eat it too: namely, she may be able to fundamentally accept both the evidentialist demand that epistemically rational belief fit, or be supported by evidence as well as the position that rational faith is willing belief beyond what one’s evidence strictly demands.

APA PLACEMENT SERVICE

Lindsay Palkovitz will be the Coordinator for the APA Placement Service at the 2007 Pacific Division Meeting. Questions concerning the Service should be directed to Lindsay at the American Philosophical Association, University of Delaware, 31 Amstel Avenue, Newark, DE 19716. She can also be reached by telephone at (302) 831-1112, fax: (302) 831-8690, or email: lindspal@udel.edu.

APA PLACEMENT SERVICE GENERAL HOURS OF OPERATION:

Wednesday, April 4: Placement Information, 11 a.m. – 9:00 p.m.

Thursday, April 5: Placement Information, 8:30 a.m. – 5:00 p.m.

Placement Interviewing, 8:30 a.m. – 5:00 p.m.

Friday, April 6: Placement Information, 8:30 a.m. – 5:00 p.m.

Placement Interviewing, 8:30 a.m. – 5:00 p.m.

Saturday, April 7: Placement Information, 8:30 a.m. – 1:00 p.m.

Placement Interviewing, 8:30 a.m. – 1:00 p.m.

APA PLACEMENT SERVICE LOCATIONS

The Placement Services will be located in the Westin St. Francis. For your convenience, maps of the hotel appear at the back of this issue.

JOB CANDIDATES

1. Candidate Numbers will be assigned at the Placement Desk.
 2. The location of a Job Interview will be available from the Placement staff, or posted on the bulletin board at the information desk.
 3. Additional “Request for Interview” forms will be available at the Placement Desk.
 4. APA Membership Applications will be available at the APA Meeting Registration Desk.
 5. Information and instructions for using the Service will be available at the Placement desk (also see following pages), and posted on the
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information bulletin board.

6. The mailboxes for Job Candidates will be located at the Placement Desk.
7. A complete set of Job Postings will be available at the Placement Desk.
8. A message for the APA Placement Ombudsperson can be left at the Placement Desk.

INTERVIEWERS

1. **Interviewers check in here**—as soon as possible upon arrival.
2. Payments for **On-Site Interviewing Departments** will be received here.
3. Space will be provided here for interviewers to check their files.
4. “Request for Interview” forms received from job candidates that have been reviewed by interviewers **should be returned** here.
5. A list of interviewing table assignments will be posted on the Placement Information Bulletin Board.

INTERVIEWING AREA

1. APA Interviewing Tables will be located here.
2. In the event that additional space for interviewing is needed, we will post the additional location on the Placement Information Bulletin Board.

INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOB CANDIDATES

REQUIREMENTS FOR USING THE PLACEMENT SERVICE

1. You **must be an APA member** in order to use the Service. Placement is a benefit of membership for candidates, and there is no additional charge to use this service. Membership applications are available on the APA web site (www.apaonline.org) or by contacting the APA National Office (302) 831-1112, or at the Membership/Registration desk at the Meeting.
2. You **MUST REGISTER** for the **MEETING** in order to use the Service.
 - If you **register in advance** for the meeting and indicate that you will be a candidate (an advance registration form is located at the back of this issue), a candidate number will be assigned in the National Office and will appear on the back of your badge. You **must** pick up your badge from the APA Registration staff prior to using the Placement service.
 - If you register on-site for the meeting, present your badge to the Placement Staff, who will be available to assign you a candidate number in the “Placement Service” line.

WHAT TO BRING WITH YOU

1. Your copies of recent issues of *Jobs For Philosophers*.
 2. Several copies of your curriculum vitae. If you run out of CVs at the meeting, the hotel has a copy center located in the Business Center.
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HOW TO USE THE PLACEMENT SERVICE

After you have picked up your registration materials from the APA Registration staff, you are ready to use the Service. If you do not yet have a candidate number on the back of your badge, please go to the job candidates' area to receive one.

JOB CANDIDATES' AREA

Here you will find a file folder (mailbox) with your candidate number on it. All communications addressed to you during the meeting will be placed there. Your folder contains:

1. "Request for Interview" forms. Additional forms will be available from the Placement staff. **Be sure that your Placement Number appears at the top of all forms.**
2. A "Locator" form for you to list your name and hotel address. Please do not remove this form from your folder. This is used only in the event that we need to contact you during the meeting.

JOB POSTINGS

New jobs (not having appeared in the *Jobs for Philosophers*) will be posted on a bulletin board in the Placement Service Area. You should check this board regularly for new postings. Each ad should contain instructions on how to apply.

INSTITUTIONS THAT HAVE CHECKED IN WITH PLACEMENT

The names of institutions that have registered to use the Service will be posted on the bulletin board (updated regularly) in *alphabetical order*. Each listing will indicate the following:

1. If the listing institution has checked in with Placement.
2. If the institution is accepting interview requests at the meeting.
3. The relevant *JFP* for the institution's opening(s).
4. Where the institution plans on interviewing (Table with number assignment).
5. Miscellaneous notes deemed appropriate by the Placement staff or the institution.

SUBMITTING AN INTERVIEW REQUEST FORM

Complete the *top* portion of the "Request for Interview" form and attach a copy of your CV. **Be sure that your candidate number appears at the top of all forms.** After you have completed the necessary information, place your request form and CV in the box marked *Requests for Interviews* which will be prominently displayed on the Placement Service Desk. Your "Request" will be forwarded to the institution by a staff member.

INTERVIEWS

After your “Request” has been reviewed by a representative from the institution, the form will be returned to your file folder with the institution’s response appearing on the *bottom* of the form. Check your file folder often so that you can be certain to receive your messages promptly.

By Noon on April 8, all “Requests” submitted by you should have been returned to your file folder, and you should remove them at that time. Occasionally, an institution may retain applications to review at a later date. If you applied for a job that had been posted and the institution did not check in with the Service during the meeting, it is suggested that you contact the institution by mail.

INTERVIEWING LOCATIONS

Some departments will be conducting interviews at tables. Other interviewing table locations will be posted if additional space is required. Each institution using a table for interviewing will be assigned a table number. The table numbers assigned to institutions will be posted on the bulletin board in the Placement Service Area.

ADVICE FOR JOB APPLICANTS

The APA Committee on Career Opportunities offers the following advice for job applicants: The schedule for those seeking jobs and those Departments offering positions is difficult for all concerned. From the point of view of Departments, any publication date for *Jobs for Philosophers* is a compromise between the competing demands imposed by the need to get funding for positions, so the later the better, and by the need to have time to process applications, so the sooner the better. From the point of view of job applicants, there are also competing demands: the sooner it is published, the more time to apply, but the later it is published, the more opportunities will be available. There is no easy solution to this problem, but you can ease your difficulties somewhat by being prepared when the *JFP* is published. You should have your curriculum vitae ready to put in an envelope, a generic draft of a letter of application ready to be fine-tuned for particular job opportunities, and the rest of your file ready for mailing. This means talking to those who are to write letters of recommendation long before the *JFP* is due to arrive, preparing material about your teaching capacities, and selecting a writing sample for those Departments that request it. Applications should be complete, as well as clearly organized. It is to your advantage to send in your application as soon as possible after an ad appears.

INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR INTERVIEWERS

REQUIREMENTS FOR USING THE PLACEMENT SERVICE

1. It is expected that **all individual interviewers will register for the meeting** either by using the registration form found in the back of this issue or by stopping at the APA Registration Desk to register on-site prior
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to using the Placement Service.

2. All **Departments (not individuals)** planning to interview at the meeting should complete the Placement Service advance registration form found on our web site, www.apaonline.org/apa/divisions/pacific or at the end of this section.

Upon receipt of an advance registration form additional information pertaining to the Placement Service will be sent to the attention of the contact person listed on the form. In the event that we send Placement forms either via email or mail, please be sure to complete these and return them to our office **at your earliest opportunity**. Not doing so may cause your materials to arrive after the Staff has already left the office to travel to the meeting. In this case, we **must** have you fill out the forms again on site. If time does not allow sending them to us, please bring them with you and turn them in at the Placement Desk.

CHECKING IN WITH THE SERVICE

Before you begin to interview candidates, please check in with the Placement Staff. We will need to know that you have arrived on site for candidates inquiring about your institution. Additional information will be requested from you (or confirmed if your department pre-registered) at this time as well.

Some institutions accept interview requests at the meeting; some of these job notices may have appeared in *Jobs for Philosophers* while others are unpublished positions. A new, unpublished position will be assigned an AD# and posted on the bulletin board in the Placement Service area. If you are bringing such a job notice with you to the meeting, please provide the Placement Staff with **four** copies of the notice for the position you are advertising. Such a position announcement should be typed on *one side only* in a good size and easy to read font, and be as brief as possible. Only positions that have **not** appeared in *Jobs for Philosophers* will be posted. If you would like a position that has been posted at this meeting to appear on our website immediately following the meeting, or in the issue of *Jobs for Philosophers*, you need to submit this ad immediately, following the close of the meeting via our website, www.apa.udel.edu/apa/publications/jfp/advertise.asp. If you need assistance with this, contact the APA National Office.

Some institutions interview by prearrangement after placing an advertisement in *Jobs for Philosophers* and then contacting candidates prior to the meeting. When you arrange an interview with candidates, please inform them that they **must be APA Members in order to use the Service and they must register for the meeting in order to use the Service**.

If you plan to conduct job interviews anywhere other than at the interviewing tables/suites we have provided, please let us know your plans because candidates often come to us to ask questions about the location/time (etc.) of their interviews, and we need to have complete, up-to-date information in order to help them (and you).

Departments using a **Suite** for interviewing will need to complete an

interview schedule form at the time they check in with the Service. Doing so enables the Service to notify the candidates you wish to interview of your interviewing location. **Be assured that only those candidates listed on your interview schedule will be told the location of your hotel room, unless you have directed us to give this information to all candidates who ask.** Departments interviewing at tables **DO NOT** need to complete this form.

N.B.: If you are conducting interviews in a hotel room, please be aware of the following policy statement adopted by the APA Board of Officers at its November 2004 meeting:

“Departments should not conduct Job Interviews in non-suite hotel rooms. Candidates who are subject to such interviews can appeal to the APA and are guaranteed anonymity.” (Originally published in *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, Vol. 78, No. 5, pp. 23, 119.)

APA INTERVIEWING TABLES

The Placement Service provides numbered tables for interviewing purposes; you will receive your table number assignment when you check in. These table number assignments will also be posted on the Placement Service Bulletin Board. Should additional space for interviewing tables be necessary, this location will be posted as well.

INSTITUTION FILE FOLDER (MAILBOX)

There will be a file folder bearing the name of your institution located in the Candidates' Area. Requests for interviews from candidates will be placed in this file folder.

REVIEWING INTERVIEW REQUESTS

When a candidate requests an interview with your institution, you should receive her/his curriculum vitae attached to a “Request for Interview” form. The bottom of this form is to be completed by you and returned to Placement staff. If an interview is granted, space is provided on this form to list the time, date, and location of the interview. If you are *unable to interview a candidate*, space for this response is also provided on the form. Any request you receive in an envelope contains confidential material and should be destroyed rather than returned to the candidate. As a matter of professional courtesy, *all requests should receive a response*. When a candidate receives a “Request” form back without a response, he or she is likely to assume that the material *has not been reviewed* and might return this to you via our service or contact your institution by mail.

Each candidate is assigned a numbered file folder to facilitate prompt communication between interviewers and candidates. Materials that you wish to transmit to a registered candidate should be handed in to the Placement Service staff, and will be delivered to the candidate by our staff.

APA STATEMENT ON PLACEMENT PRACTICES

The APA Committee on the Status and Future of the Profession reminds you of its Statement on Placement Practices: The APA discourages the nomination by graduate departments of job seekers for positions in philosophy, and the submission of their dossiers in response to announcements of positions, without their knowledge or interest. This may seriously mislead those who are conducting searches, and may have unfortunate consequences both for them and for genuinely interested applicants. Graduate departments using a nomination procedure or submitting dossiers on behalf of job seekers should either attest explicitly that the candidate wishes to be considered for the positions in question, or (preferably) ensure that the job seekers themselves submit personal letters of application for these positions. Departments conducting searches are encouraged to recommend or require explicitly (in their position announcements) that each candidate, to be assessed of full consideration, should submit a personal letter of application for and interest in the announced position.

A Placement Ombudsperson will be available at the meeting. Please see the Placement Service Staff if you would like to contact the Ombudsperson.

PAPER SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

Online Paper Submissions: Papers may be submitted either electronically or in hard copy by mail. For electronic submissions, follow the instructions on the APA web site. For hard copy submissions, mail to: Lindsay Palkovitz, ATTN: [Eastern, Pacific, or Central] Division Papers, The American Philosophical Association, University of Delaware, 31 Amstel Avenue, Newark, DE 19716, (302) 831-1112. NOTE: Authors of accepted papers will be asked to submit their abstracts by e-mail to the National Office. Papers in any area are welcome. All papers are blind reviewed. Author's name, institution, or references pertaining to the identity of the author should be omitted from the paper, abstract, notes, and bibliography. Submitted papers are not returned to authors. Papers not accepted by one Division may be re-submitted for consideration to another Division. In submitting papers, authors warrant that those papers are entirely their own work or the joint work of the authors identified in the cover letter, and that, where appropriate, acknowledgement of the contributions of others has been made.

Graduate Student Travel Stipends and Awards: Papers to be considered for Graduate Student Travel Stipends/Awards must meet the criteria specified by each Division. For more information, visit the following address: www.apa.udel.edu/apa/divisions/stipends.

GUIDELINES FOR ALL THREE DIVISIONS

(Guidelines 6, 7, 9, and 10 only apply to authors who are submitting papers in hard copy.)

1. Authors must be members in good standing of the APA.
 2. 1 copy of the paper.
 3. 1 copy of the abstract.
 4. Colloquium papers are limited to 3,000 words.
 5. Abstracts for colloquium papers are limited to 150 words.
 - *6. Title or cover page, which must include: a) title; b) word counts for all papers and abstracts; c) author's contact information; d) the Division the paper is to be submitted for.
 - *7. Papers must be typed on one side of page, double spaced, 1 inch margins on all sides, all pages numbered, 10-12 pt. font.
 8. No more than one submission by the same author for the same Division will be considered.
 - *9. Indicate name of Division on outside lower left side of the envelope containing the paper.
 - *10. Include a self addressed stamped envelope to the National Office if
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you wish the receipt of your paper to be acknowledged.

11. Any paper which is under consideration for publication elsewhere will be considered, provided that it will not appear in print until after the Divisional meeting is held. If this is the case, indicate when and where the paper is expected to be published.
12. Papers are not accepted by e-mail.
13. Authors are advised to provide accurate email addresses as part of their contact information because they may be contacted by email, sometimes under urgent circumstances. Authors who expect to relocate between the date of submission and the date of the meeting should arrange for email forwarding, or else provide both current and new email addresses with their contact information.

EASTERN DIVISION:

Meeting is held December 27-30.

Selections are announced in May or June.

Papers accepted by either the Central Division or the Pacific Division may not be presented at any subsequent meeting of the Eastern Division.

Papers exceeding 3,000 words will not be considered as colloquium papers.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper.

Any paper submitted without an abstract will not be considered. Any paper whose abstract is deemed unacceptable by the Program Committee will not be accepted. No revised abstract submitted after the paper's acceptance will be published in the *Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association* without the approval of the Program Committee.

PACIFIC DIVISION:

Meeting is usually held at the end of March.

Selections are announced in January.

A paper that has been on the Main Program at a past APA meeting (any division), or will be on the Main Program at a future Central or Eastern division meeting, cannot be presented as a Main Program colloquium/symposium paper at the Pacific Division meeting.

Submissions for consideration as colloquium papers must not exceed 3,000 words.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper. (This will be considered a single submission.)

CENTRAL DIVISION:

Meeting is usually held at the end of April.

Selections are announced in January, or before when possible.

Papers under consideration by the Pacific Division will not be considered by the Central Division.

Papers exceeding 3,000 words will not be considered.

MINUTES OF THE 2006 PACIFIC DIVISION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 22, 2006

CROWN ROOM (23RD FLOOR), PORTLAND HILTON

Present: Sara Goering, Calvin Normore, Nick Smith, Anita Silvers, Allen Wood

Guests: Dom Lopes, Fred Schueler

1. **CALL TO ORDER:** Chair Goering called the meeting to order at 4:06 p.m. Secretary-Treasurer Silvers explained that the meeting would recess at 6:00 p.m. to enable members to attend the "Secrecy" mini-conference closing reception. The Executive Committee would reconvene over dinner at 7:00 to complete the meeting.
2. **APPROVAL OF AGENDA:** The agenda was approved.
3. **APPROVAL OF MINUTES OF MARCH 23, 2005:** The Minutes printed in the January 2006 *Proceedings* were approved.
4. **REPORT OF SECRETARY TREASURER:** Secretary-Treasurer Silvers reported on the financial state of the division and on future finances as they would be affected by the upcoming transition in the secretary-treasurer's office.

Secretary-Treasurer reported on actions taken by the Executive Committee since its last meeting. These included approval of mini-conference proposals and contracts for the 2007 and 2010 meetings.

5. **2007 PROGRAM COMMITTEE:** Fred Schueler, the 2007 Program Chair, reported to the Executive Committee on the responses of their nominees to invitations to join the Program Committee. The Executive Committee made additional recommendations about possible members to cover essential fields.
6. **2007 NOMINATING COMMITTEE:** After a long discussion about how to be responsive to the Shrage petition's request for an elected nominating committee, the Executive Committee decided to assign its authority and responsibility to form a nominating committee to the *ad hoc* committee that the Executive Committee was recommending be formed at the following day's business meeting.

The *ad hoc* committee would be responsible for deciding how to respond to the requests and recommendations contained in the petition requesting bylaw changes. Therefore, the *ad hoc* committee could clarify the means for creating a nominating committee and could create one, and facilitate its work, so as to keep the nominating

process even further removed from the Executive Committee than is presently the case.

Unlike the other two divisions, where an Executive Committee member chairs the Nominating Committee, no Executive Committee member currently sits on the Pacific Division Nominating Committee or participates in any way in its deliberations. Executive Committee members supported the current distancing of the Nominating Committee from the Executive Committee and preferred to increase the distance between the two.

The selection of a nominating committee, the nominating committee's selections, and the *ad hoc* committee's report all must be completed by early November 2006 so they can be printed in the January 2007 *Proceedings*.

7. **ELECTION OF NEW EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE CHAIR:** The Executive Committee decided to request Joan MacGregor to chair the 2007-2009 Executive Committees, provided that she be elected to the Executive Committee on the following day.
 8. **REPORT OF 2006 PROGRAM CHAIR:** Sara Goering, 2006 Program Chair, reported on the details of the 2006 program.
 9. **CONTINUATION OF JOINT ADVERTISING FUND:** The Executive Committee voted to continue participation in the cross-divisional joint advertising fund.
 10. **REQUEST FOR \$3,250:** The Executive Committee voted to provide \$3,250 to underwrite the APA Board of Officers' contribution for the 2006 PIKSI Summer Institute for Undergraduates. The contribution will be made with a request that special attention be paid to recruiting and including participants from the Pacific region in the program.
 11. **RESTRICTED USE OF REGISTRATION INCOME SUBSIDY TO APA NATIONAL OFFICE:** The APA National Office may make additional chargebacks of convention expenses to the Pacific Division. The Pacific Division already assigns \$25 of each nonstudent registration fee to the National Office. To prevent going into deficit in order to absorb new charges, the Pacific Division Executive Committee voted to restrict the use of this donation to expenses incurred by the APA National Office for the Pacific Division convention. This alternative is preferable to raising convention fees to cover the new charge-backs.
 12. **PROPOSAL FOR MINI-CONFERENCE ON SPINOZA'S PSYCHOLOGY:** Calvin Normore reported on a conversation he had had with Don Rutherford about strengthening the organizing committee for this proposal. The prospect of doing so with Rutherford's and Normore's help is very good. The Executive Committee voted to encumber funds to support this mini-conference (dates to be negotiated), contingent on such an expansion and improvement of the organizing committee, and on a new proposal being submitted.
 13. **OVERFLOW HOTELS AND UNION HOTEL POLICY, 2008 MEETING:** The Executive Committee wrestled with the problem of whether to contract with a union hotel if the meeting site does not offer sufficient union hotels to absorb possible overflow. While no contracts need be
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entered into with overflow hotels, failing to do so leaves members at these hotels paying very high rates.

This will be a particular problem in finding a meeting site for the 2009 meeting, which is scheduled to be somewhere in southern California. Hotels in Southern California either have short-term contracts that will end in a few months, or do not have labor contracts. Responding to recommendations from Executive Committee members, the Secretary-Treasurer will investigate Santa Monica to see if enough of its hotels are unionized with contracts extending to 2009 so as not to pose a problem.

14. DIVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION, SECRETARY-TREASURER TRANSITION:

The Executive Committee discussed details and financial matters related to the approaching transition in the secretary-treasurer position. Silvers explained the process, noting that there are funds to support the transition's occurring over the next two years. Smith worried about how the division will pay for the two-year transition each time there is a change of secretary-treasurers. Silvers pointed out that the impending transitional challenge is specially difficult as a new APA Executive Director will take office next year. Precipitous changes may be expected to occur, as such have been imposed by the last two new executive directors, and the longer transition period is meant to permit collaborative work between outgoing and incoming secretary-treasurers to enable divisional operations to be maintained during such national change.

15. BUSINESS MEETING AGENDA: The Executive Committee set the agenda for the next day's business meeting. The previous version, circulated by email, was altered substantially to accommodate discussion of and actions responsive to the Shrage petition.

16. ADJOURNMENT: The meeting adjourned at 10:34 p.m.

Respectfully submitted,

Anita Silvers

Secretary-Treasurer

MINUTES OF THE 2006 PACIFIC DIVISION BUSINESS MEETING

PAVILION ROOM, PORTLAND HILTON, PORTLAND, OREGON

THURSDAY, MARCH 23, 2006, NOON

1. **CALL TO ORDER:** President Jeffrie Murphy called the meeting to order at 12:06 p.m.
 2. **APPROVAL OF AGENDA:** Secretary-Treasurer Silvers asked members to look on their chairs to find copies of the petition proposing revisions in the election procedure by-laws, signed by Pacific Division members and other APA members. She called attention to agenda item 8, explaining that the Executive Committee would present a motion to establish the *ad hoc* committee called for in the petition. Item 9 of the agenda concerned a special procedure the Executive Committee will adopt so as to approach the 2007 nominations in a way that acknowledges the petition-signers. Item 11 would give the body the opportunity to designate what the *ad hoc* committee would do.
The agenda was approved with no objections or abstentions.
 3. **APPROVAL OF MINUTES OF MARCH 24, 2005 (Draft minutes are published in the January 2006 Proceedings):** The minutes were approved with no objections or abstentions.
 4. **ANNOUNCEMENTS:**
 - a. President Murphy read the names of members who had passed away since the last meeting, and the body observed a moment of silence in memory of them.
 - b. Secretary-Treasurer Silvers reminded Pacific Division members to check in with the vote checkers and receive their voting cards.
 5. **REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-TREASURER:** Secretary-Treasurer Silvers distributed copies of the APA audited report for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2005. The Pacific Division is shown as operating in the black, with income exceeding expenses. (This report is published in the May '06 *Proceedings*.) However, Silvers pointed out, the report does not show the \$20,000 encumbered for mini-conferences for 2006 and 2007, nor the amount needed to reimburse SFSU for the secretary-treasurer's APA work during her sabbatical (no invoice has yet been received). Further, the auditor's report shows the APA National Office as absorbing a "bad debt expense" of \$19,438, but this amount represents divisional advertising and exhibitors fees from previous years that the APA National Office failed to invoice and/or collect, despite previous audited reports showing these funds as usable assets. This matter is one of several problems with past APA financial management and
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reporting practices that have been discovered by the new auditors and finance manager. Among the formerly published assets now written off as bad debts is income owed by exhibitors to the Pacific Division.

Turning to non-financial matters, Silvers mentioned that associations had adopted different strategies regarding the labor problems at San Francisco hotels. One strategy involved canceling meetings already booked, while rebooking for a future date. Another, pursued by the Pacific Division of the APA, involved refusing to rebook until labor issues were settled. Silvers pointed out that the former strategy actually rewarded the hotel management companies.

She then distributed a letter from Anthony Dugdale, a senior analyst for the hotel workers' union Unite Here! Dugdale said that the St. Francis hotel now is being helpful to the union and that the union encourages the APA Pacific Division to contract for future meetings at the St. Francis in San Francisco. Silvers reported that, in view of this communication with the union, the Executive Committee has signed contracts to hold meetings at the St. Francis in San Francisco in 2007 and 2010. The Executive Committee is aware that the dates of these future meetings are not ideal, but they are the only ones that remained free at the St. Francis at the late date at which the contracts were signed. The Executive Committee balanced the strongly expressed views of some APA members and the APA Board of Officers' policy of support for the hotel workers' union against the difficulties the dates might present for other members, and the former prevailed.

The contracts permit the APA to cancel without penalty if members believe there is a labor dispute, as long as the division rebooks for a future meeting at the St. Francis. The major impediment to canceling continues to be the labor involved in moving a meeting, but the current chair of the APA Board has pledged full staff assistance if there is a need to move a meeting. Silvers observed that in contrast to the St. Francis, the San Francisco Hilton, which was the main target of the meeting cancellation strategy, and the other twelve San Francisco hotels, were still under boycott by the union.

Silvers reported that Fred Schueler will chair the 2007 Program Committee and Mark Wrathall will chair the 2008 Program Committee.

Silvers then asked the body to rise and thank Sara Goering, the 2006 program chair, and her program committee for a wonderfully rich and exciting program. The motion was endorsed unanimously. On behalf of the Executive Committee, she presented a piece of artglass from Portland's Saturday Market to Goering, and a gift to Goering's 13 month old daughter Ella with thanks for allowing her mother to make so many valuable contributions to the APA.

- 6. REPORT OF THE PACIFIC DIVISION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:** Executive Committee Chair Sara Goering reported on the work of the Executive Committee. At its meeting the previous evening, the Executive Committee had allocated \$3,250 for the 2006 Philosophy in an Inclusive Key Summer Institute for Undergraduates that is
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intended to help remedy under-representation of various groups in the profession. The Institute's staff will be urged to recruit participants from the Pacific Division region very vigorously. The Executive Committee also encumbered \$5,000 for a mini-conference on Spinoza's Psychology, contingent on a strengthening of its organizing committee membership. The Executive Committee renewed its participation in the pooled divisional advertising revenue program that helps support all three divisions' meeting operations. And the Executive Committee has restricted the proportion of Pacific Division registration income that is allocated to the APA National Office to the use of defraying costs of National Office convention support.

7. **REPORT FROM THE APA BOARD OF OFFICERS:** Silvers explained that neither Board Chair Sosa nor Acting Director Mann was available to make a report at the business meeting. She had been asked to report that the search for a new Executive Director was progressing, and semi-finalists were being interviewed at the Pacific Division meeting. She added that there were more and better applicants than in previous searches.
8. **ACTION ON CREATION OF *AD HOC* COMMITTEE TO FORMULATE WORDING FOR AMENDMENTS TO PACIFIC DIVISION BY-LAWS:** On behalf of the Pacific Division Executive Committee, Vice President Normore moved the creation of an *ad hoc* committee to formulate wording for amendments to the Pacific Division by-laws. He then turned the floor over to Laurie Shrage, who explained the motivation behind her group's petition and the reasons the petition called for establishment of such an *ad hoc* committee. After discussion, and when no further speakers sought recognition, the chair put the question to the body. The motion carried with 29 in favor, 0 opposed, and two abstentions.
9. **CREATION OF 2007 NOMINATING COMMITTEE:** Secretary Silvers reported that the Executive Committee will assign its authority and responsibility to form a nominating committee to the *ad hoc* committee. The Executive Committee is doing so because the *ad hoc* committee is responsible for deciding how to respond to the requests and recommendations contained in the petition requesting bylaw changes. The petition proposes a change to an elected nominating committee, but the mechanism for making such a change requires clarification and interpretation. For example, the petition recommends that the Pacific Division look to the other divisions for guidance. Both the Eastern and Central Division have their immediate past presidents, who remain on their executive committees, chair their nominating committees, while currently no member of the Pacific Division Executive Committee serves on the divisional nominating committee. Otherwise, the Eastern and Central Divisions use different procedures to select their candidates for their nominating committees. Not knowing which to look to for guidance, the Pacific Division Executive Committee will refer the matter to the *ad hoc* committee for interpretation, judgment, and implementation.

Silvers added that the selection of a nominating committee, the

nominating committee's selections of candidates for office, and the *ad hoc* committee's report all must be completed by early November 2006 so they can be published in the January 2007 *Proceedings*.

- 10. REPORT OF 2006 NOMINATING COMMITTEE/ELECTION OF OFFICERS:** Nominating Committee Chair Keith Lehrer placed the 2006 Nominating Committee's slate of candidates in nomination. (The names of nominees are published in the January 2006 *Proceedings*.) He described the qualifications of the candidates. The candidates were elected by a vote of 23 in favor, none opposed, and 9 abstentions.
- 11. ACTION ON PETITION WITH PRINCIPLES FOR AMENDING PACIFIC DIVISION BY-LAWS:** Discussion about the charge to the *ad hoc* committee ensued. Eventually, Paul Menzel moved the following resolution: "The *ad hoc* committee will consider amendments to the Pacific Division by-laws concerning procedures for nomination and election of all officers, the executive committee, and the nominating committee, and the terms of all such positions. It may but need not propose more than one alternative to preserving the current by-laws unamended." David Owen seconded the motion. After further discussion, which yielded confirmation of the idea that the Menzel motion permitted the *ad hoc* committee to consider further matters that might call for bylaw amendment, and when no one else sought recognition, the chair put the motion to the body. The motion carried with 26 in favor, no one opposed, and no abstentions.

Discussion of the *ad hoc* committee continued. Secretary Silvers announced that Laurie Shrage's request to have a request for volunteers for the *ad hoc* committee posted on the APA website, and circulated to the email list, would be forwarded to the APA National Office with a request for action on it.*

- 12. ADJOURNMENT:** At 12:59 p.m., Rega Wood called for the orders of the day. The chair moved to the next agenda item, "new business." Having received no request for additional business to be put before the body, the chair moved to the final agenda item, "adjournment," and put the question of adjournment to the body. The body voted 19 in favor, none opposed, and none abstaining, to sustain the orders of the day and adjourn at 1:00 p.m.

Respectfully submitted,
Anita Silvers
Secretary-Treasurer

*In Spring 2006, the Executive Committee appointed the following individuals to form the *Ad Hoc* Committee: Patricia Hanna, Bernard Linsky, Paul Menzel (chair), Robert Pasnau, Ronald Sundstrom, and Alison Wylie. The Executive Committee made sure that two-thirds of the *Ad Hoc* Committee's membership, including the chair, consisted of petition-signers so as to be sure that the proposals advanced in the petition were addressed. The report of and proposals from the *Ad Hoc* Committee are included in this *Proceedings*. – A.S.

2007 CANDIDATES FOR OFFICE

Brief Biography of Vice Presidential Candidate Nancy Cartwright: Nancy Cartwright is professor of philosophy at the University of California San Diego and at the London School of Economics, where she is chair for the Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science. She studied mathematics at the University of Pittsburgh, graduating summa in 1966. In 1971 she completed her Ph.D., “Philosophical Analysis of the Concept of Mixture in Quantum Mechanics,” at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Her major publications include *Measuring Causes: Invariance, Modularity and the Causal Markov Condition*, *The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science*, *Otto Neurath: Philosophy between Science and Politics*, *Nature’s Capacities and their Measurement*, and *How the Laws of Physics Lie*. Cartwright has received the MacArthur Fellowship and is a member of the British Academy.

Statement of Vice Presidential Candidate Nancy Cartwright: “I spent the first half of my career at Stanford and now the second at UCSD and LSE. When I moved from Stanford I shifted my focus from physics to the social sciences, which I have always cared about but thought would be far too hard to take on at the beginning of my career. I teach a lot of philosophy of economics now and have done a great deal of research on causation. Philosophically I think I am best described as a pluralist: I don’t ever start out intending to take a pluralist stance on a subject, but repeatedly once I start digging into the details—from studies in physics to those in economics and from methodology to metaphysics—I end up defending some kind of pluralist position. My central concern right now is to encourage philosophers of science to devote more effort to studying and fostering what Philip Kitcher calls ‘well-ordered science’, science that better serves global human needs. My own current project is on the concept and use of evidence for evidence-based policy.”

Brief Biography of Executive Committee Member-at-Large Candidate Stewart Cohen: Stewart Cohen is professor of philosophy at Arizona State University. He received his B.A. from Wayne State University in 1974 and his Ph.D. from University of Arizona in 1983. He publishes articles and book chapters in epistemology. He is editor-in-chief of *Philosophical Studies* and co-editor of the Philosophical Studies Book Series and the Ashgate Epistemology and Mind Series. He has served on the program committee of the APA Pacific Division.

Statement of Executive Committee Member-at-Large Candidate Stewart Cohen: “I have been interested in skeptical arguments and the challenge they present to our ordinary claims to knowledge. In response to some of these arguments, I have developed and defended a contextualist theory of knowledge ascriptions. I have also worked more generally on the nature of justification and how it must be structured in order to yield knowledge.”

REPORT OF THE *Ad Hoc* COMMITTEE ON BY-LAW AMENDMENTS FOR NOMINATION AND ELECTION PROCEDURES OF THE PACIFIC DIVISION OF THE APA ON AMENDMENTS RECOMMENDED FOR THE AGENDA OF THE SPRING 2007 ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING

[Pursuant to the action recommended to the 2006 Business Meeting, and the actions adopted by the 2006 Business Meeting, the Executive Committee appointed an ad hoc committee to address the proposals of the petitioners who had requested changes in the division's by-laws. - See Minutes of the 2006 Business Meeting in this Proceedings. This is the Ad Hoc Committee's Report.]

I. CONTEXT AND OVERVIEW

The task of the committee was established by action at the annual business meeting of the division on 23 March 2006: "to consider amendments to the Pacific Division by-laws concerning procedures for nomination and election of all officers, the executive committee, and the nominating committee, and the terms of all such positions." The committee was invited, but not directed, to propose more than one alternative to preserving the current by-laws unamended. We have chosen *not* to offer *multiple* options of amendment. We have, however, chosen to divide our recommendations into three motions. The primary motion concerns a set of amendments to sections 1-4 of the current by-laws that speak to the charge from the motion of March 2006 and address nomination and election procedures. The second motion is an amendment to section 5 of the current by-laws concerning the methods stipulated for amending the by-laws themselves. The third motion concerns a schedule for implementation of the amended by-laws if the first motion should pass.

The full set of amendments that we recommend are attached [or follow after this narrative report].

In the Division's current by-laws, amendments to the by-laws can only be accomplished by a two-thirds vote of those present at an annual business meeting. Therefore it is at the Division's April 2007 annual business meeting that these amendments will be debated and voted on.

II. THE RECOMMENDED AMENDMENTS

In the proposed primary set of amendments, a key element is the Nominating Committee. The composition of the committee is addressed in a new section, 1-c. The revised committee, like nominating committees in the Eastern and Central divisions currently, would be comprised of five persons, four of whom would be elected and one of whom (the immediate past president of the division) would serve *ex officio* and would serve as the committee's chair.

The work and selection of the Nominating Committee are detailed in a new section 3 (with the current sections 3, 4, and 5 then becoming sections 4, 5, and 6). This section stipulates that the Nominating Committee nominate two persons for Vice-President, each at-large position on the Executive Committee, and the representative to the National Board; this would be similar to current Eastern and Central Division by-laws. Also stipulated is that the committee nominate one or more person(s) to be Secretary-Treasurer.

The last provision mentioned is similar but not identical to the Central division, where "one" (though not "one or more") nominee is stipulated, and it is unlike the Eastern division where the Secretary-Treasurer is not elected but appointed by the Executive Committee. We believe that the Secretary-Treasurer is a different sort of position, involving more administrative work for the Division and its Executive Committee than any of the other offices. Although we can see advantages in both of the other divisions' models, we have decided to follow more the Central than the Eastern Division model and recommend that the Secretary-Treasurer be elected. We also recommend that while the Nominating Committee should have the option of submitting more than one nominee, it should not be required to nominate more than one.

A major element of the new section 3 on the Nominating Committee and its work is that nominees for all positions will be announced in the issue of the APA *Proceedings* that contains the program for the Pacific Division annual meeting. This is more advance notice than is currently required in either the Eastern or Central Divisions. We believe that such advance notice would serve the interests of more thoughtful consideration of nominations by the membership and that the deadline that it involves is perfectly feasible for the Nominating Committee to meet. The option for nomination by petition of division members that is currently part of Pacific Division by-laws is preserved (with 5 member signatures required, as distinct from the 25 and 10, respectively, required in the Eastern and Central Divisions). Such nominations by petition need to meet a deadline of seven days prior to the beginning of the annual meeting. When people arrive at the meeting, they will then receive a complete slate of nominees, including those whose source is by petition as well as those from the Nominating Committee. This provides opportunity for discussion of candidacies at the annual business meeting.

We have chosen to recommend that the nominations for election to the Nominating Committee be made by that committee itself (last sentence

of the new section 3-a). This is similar to the Central division, but different from both the Eastern division, in which the Executive Committee makes the nominations, and the current Pacific Division, where the Nominating Committee is not elected at all but appointed directly by the Executive Committee. It seems to us that the Nominating Committee, with its experience of reviewing numerous possible nominees for offices from among the membership of the division, is best situated to make nominations for the Nominating Committee—best situated to do this, at least, as long as any potential for entrenchment of committee members is blunted by the recommended limit of two two-year terms for any one committee member (section 1-d). Also, candidacy for Nominating Committee positions is open to nomination by 5-member petition, just as is candidacy for all other elected positions.

The term limits of all offices and positions are addressed in the new section 1-d. We propose that the Secretary-Treasurer, unlike most of the other officers and committee members, be limited not to two terms, but to three consecutive terms. This office is different than others. For a President and Executive Committee to best execute the work of the division, continuity in the Secretary-Treasurer's office has distinct advantages. We note, however, that only rarely has a Secretary-Treasurer served more than nine years in either of the other divisions. We believe that a limit of three elected three-year terms has the merit of combining considerable continuity with opportunity for choice by the division's membership.

The latitude of the Executive Committee to establish committees, including the Program Committee, is spoken to in section 2-c. With a different framework for the Nominating Committee addressed in the new sections 1-c and 3, specific mention of the Nominating Committee in section 2-c is deleted in our recommended amendments. On the role of the Secretary-Treasurer, we recommend that the Executive Committee's latitude be expanded to include the discretion of having the Secretary-Treasurer serve *ex officio* on any committee appointed by the Executive Committee, but that such *ex officio* service not be mandated.

The proposed revisions of existing section 3 (which becomes section 4 if the by-laws are amended) address the timely election of officers and the Nominating Committee by mail ballot. To eliminate multiple mailings in situations where more than two persons stand for election to a given position, the method of "transferable vote" ("preferential voting") is stipulated. Reference is made specifically to the form of preferential voting described in Robert's Rules of Order; Robert's Rules stipulates that a specific form of the method must be mentioned in the by-laws if preferential voting is going to be used.

Our recommended second motion concerns the procedure established in the by-laws for amending the by-laws (current section 5, in the amended version section 6). While this was not part of our charge in the authorizing motion of March 2006, we believe that it would be inconsistent to move from vote at the annual business meeting to mail ballot for the election of officers and certain Executive and Nominating Committee positions while retaining the existing process of amending the by-laws only by a vote at the

annual business meeting. Amending the by-laws should be by mail ballot, too, if the election of officers and selected committee positions is. (The Eastern Division, which elects officers by mail ballot, requires a mail vote for by-law amendments.) Moreover, if our recommended first motion that speaks to all the other proposed by-law revisions should fail, this second motion would technically still be in order.

III. A FUTURE MATTER: ON-LINE VOTING

On-line voting will no doubt come up in the future as a desired ballot vehicle. If the Pacific Division were to adopt on-line voting as a permissible or preferred form of voting for elected positions instead of mail ballot, actual execution would still be dependent on the capacity of the national office. The membership databases of the national office are currently not set up to make on-line voting feasible. Questions may also be raised concerning whether one division should use on-line voting when the others are not yet willing to. Moreover, exactly how to state such provision in the by-laws is not entirely clear at this time. Our *ad hoc* committee is receptive to this form of voting for the Pacific Division, but because of these and other concerns, we have not included provision for it in our recommended by-law amendments. We think it best to leave this matter to later potential amendment.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION

We recognize that implementation of any by-law amendments that pass is the responsibility of the Executive Committee. Often when amendments are passed, however, a timetable for implementation is also adopted. The *Ad Hoc* Committee recommends that, if they are passed, the changes we have recommended become effective on 1 July 2007. We believe that the most practical way to execute the change in the year of transition would be for the Nominating Committee for 2007-08 to be appointed *before 1 July 2007* and *by the Executive Committee* (as the Executive Committee does in the current by-laws). That Nominating Committee's one-year term would begin 1 July 2007. Though it will have been appointed by the Executive Committee (as in the current by-laws), it would then conduct its business under the newly adopted by-laws. The Nominating Committee would do its work throughout 2007-08, and the first officers and Executive and Nominating Committee members selected under the new by-laws would be elected by mail ballot in April 2008.

Admittedly, this manner of implementation would have the oddity, in relation to the current by-laws, of the Executive Committee appointing a *five-member* Nominating Committee before 1 July 2007; the current by-laws that govern until then only have the Executive Committee appointing a *three-member* committee. The committee that the Executive committee is appointing, however, would be a committee that comes into existence only after 1 July 2007 when the new by-laws would be in effect. That would seem to argue for the appointment of a *five-member* committee for the first year, even if that committee is appointed by the Executive Committee. Of all the implementation scenarios we have been able to imagine, we believe that this approach of the Executive Committee, before 1 July 2007,

appointing a five-member Nominating Committee for the first year that begins 1 July 2007 harbors the fewest dislocations in making the transition from the current to the new by-laws.

Further details of implementation should be worked out by the Executive Committee in the spirit of the newly adopted by-laws.

We thank the Executive Committee for the opportunity to serve the division by making these recommendations. We look forward to the discussion of these by-law changes at the April 2007 annual business meeting.

Respectfully submitted,

Patricia Hanna (University of Utah)

Bernard Linsky (University of Alberta)

Paul Menzel (chair, Pacific Lutheran University)

Robert Pasnau (University of Colorado)

Ronald Sundstrom (University of San Francisco)

Alison Wylie (University of Washington)

PROPOSED REVISIONS OF THE BY-LAWS OF THE PACIFIC DIVISION, APA

As proposed to the Division's Executive Committee on 18 October 2006 by the *Ad Hoc* Committee on By-law Amendments for Nomination and Election Procedures of the Pacific Division, and placed before the April 2007 Pacific Division Business Meeting by the Executive Committee (additions denoted by bold type, deletions by strike-through).

1. Officers

a. The officers of the Division shall be a president, a vice-president, a secretary-treasurer, and Pacific Division representative to the National Board of Officers. The terms of office of the president and vice-president shall be one year. Each year the presidency shall be assumed without further election by the vice-president of the year preceding, and a new vice-president shall be elected. The terms of office of the secretary-treasurer and of the representative to the Board of Officers shall be three years. All officers assume office on July 1 following their election. All terms end on the appropriate June 30.

b. There shall be an Executive Committee consisting of nine members, as follows: (a) the officers of the Division, *ex officio*, (b) the immediate past president of the Division, (c) three members elected at large, for three-year staggered terms, and (d) the chair of the program committee, *ex officio*. The chair of the Executive Committee shall be chosen by the Committee from among the members elected at large. All members of the Executive Committee must be members of the Association who are certified by the Executive Director as affiliated with the Pacific Division. A majority of its members shall constitute a quorum of the Executive Committee.

c. There shall be a Nominating Committee of five to nominate officers for the Division. The Committee shall consist of the immediate past president, who shall act as chair, and four other members, two of whom shall be elected each year for two-year terms.

d. The terms of president and vice-president shall be one year; no one may serve more than one term in these offices. The terms of the at-large Executive Committee members shall be three years, and those of the elected Nominating Committee members shall be two years; elected members may serve two consecutive terms on either of these committees, after which they are not eligible for re-election to that committee for a period equivalent to one term. The representative to the National Board of Officers may serve up to two three-year terms. The Secretary-Treasurer may serve up to three consecutive three-year terms.

2. Duties of the Executive Committee

- a. Arrangements for the regular annual Pacific meeting of the Association shall be the responsibility of the executive committee.
- b. The agenda of the annual business meeting to be held during the regular Pacific meeting of the Association shall be the responsibility of the executive committee.
- c. The Executive Committee shall establish such committees as it deems necessary to aid it in efficiently attending to the business of the division, retaining in every case full responsibility for the action of such committees. Among these committees shall be: ~~(1) a program committee of three or more members, serving staggered three-year terms, the chair to serve ex officio on the Executive Committee. The Program Committee shall be responsible for the program of the annual Divisional meeting. 2) A nominating committee of three members. The nominating committee shall be responsible for making nominations to all offices of the Division. At the discretion of the Executive Committee, the secretary-treasurer may shall serve ex officio on any committee appointed by the Executive Committee.~~
- d. The Executive Committee shall fill vacancies to any office of the Division in cases in which the elected officer leaves office before the completion of his or her term.

3. Duties of the Nominating Committee

- a. **The Nominating Committee shall nominate a slate of candidates for election to consist of: two names for the office of vice-president, two names for a member of the Executive Committee, and in appropriate years, one or more names for the office of secretary-treasurer and two names for the office of representative to the National Board of Officers. It shall also nominate two candidates for each of two positions on the next year's Nominating Committee.**
 - b. **The Nominating Committee is free to consult with any officer of the Division in order to assist it in fulfilling these responsibilities.**
 - c. **The Nominating Committee shall publish its report in the issue of the APA *Proceedings* that contains the program of the Pacific Division annual meeting (normally the January issue). Before the name of a nominee is published, the individual nominated shall have expressed to the Nominating Committee explicit written consent to stand for election.**
 - d. **Upon publication of the report of the Nominating Committee, members of the Pacific Division may by petition make additional nominations for the next year's Nominating Committee, for officers, and for members of the Executive Committee. Such petitions must be signed by five members of the Association affiliated with the Pacific Division, must bear the written consent of the nominee, and must be received by the Nominating Committee no later than seven days before the start of the annual divisional meeting.**
 - e. The Nominating Committee will make the final slate of candidates available in print at the beginning of the divisional meeting, for
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discussion at the annual business meeting.

3-4. Elections

a. Nominations made by the Nominating Committee for all elections to office in the Division shall be **published in the issue of the APA Proceedings that contains the program of the Pacific Division annual meeting (normally the January issue)**. ~~circulated to members affiliated with the Pacific Division in advance of the annual meeting.~~

b. Any five members of the Division can submit nominations for offices of the Division after the nominations of the Nominating Committee have been **published, up until seven days before the start of the annual divisional meeting**. ~~circulated before the annual divisional business meeting.~~ Such nominations shall bear the signatures of the five members and the consent, in writing, of the nominee.

c. (a) and (b) specify the sole methods of nomination.

d. All elections to office shall be ~~held at the annual business meeting, except in cases in which there is more than one candidate for a given office. In such cases election to that office shall be~~ by mail ballot to all members **of the Association who are certified by the Executive Director** as affiliated with the Pacific Division, mailed within 30 days after the end of the annual meeting by the secretary-treasurer. ~~Election will be by majority of those voting.~~ **Ballots shall be counted six weeks after they are sent out. When there are more than two persons nominated for a single office, voting shall be the method of transferable vote described in the section on preferential voting in Section 44 of Robert's Rules of Order, Newly Revised.**

4-5. Meetings

a. A quorum for the annual business meeting shall consist of those who attend the meeting.

b. Resolutions which purport to represent the sense of the Pacific Division on matters of public policy may be voted on only by mail ballot authorized by the annual business meeting. Such mail ballots will include relevant minutes of the meeting and a summary of the arguments presented.

c. In the business meeting, questions of order shall be covered by Robert's Rules of Order.

5-6. Amendments

a. Amendments or additions to these by-laws may be proposed only by the executive committee, by the national Board of Officers, or by a petition signed by at least twenty members of the Association with voting affiliations with the Pacific Division.

b. Proposals to amend or add to these by-laws must be announced to the members of the Association who have voting affiliations with the Pacific division at least two weeks prior to the meeting at which a vote is taken.

c. **Any proposed amendment of or addition to these by-laws must be presented for discussion at a regular Business Meeting**

and shall then be submitted by mail ballot to all members of the Association who are certified by the Executive Director as affiliated with the Pacific Division, with passage dependent upon acceptance by two-thirds of those casting votes. ~~If the above conditions have been met, these by-laws may be amended or added to by a vote of two-thirds of the members with voting affiliation with the Pacific Division present at the annual business meeting.~~

PROPOSED REVISED BYLAWS OF THE APA

A PROPOSAL ENDORSED BY THE APA BOARD OF OFFICERS AND TRANSMITTED TO THE DIVISIONS

The APA Board of Officers recommends to the Divisions the following revised Bylaws for the APA. Members may recall that a set of revised Bylaws was proposed by the Board in the 2003-2004 academic year. A majority of voters in the Eastern and Central Divisions approved the revisions, but Pacific Division voters did not. The revisions proposed by the Board in 2003-2004 therefore did not pass; a majority in all three Divisions is required.

The revised Bylaws now proposed by the Board differ from the previous set in that, with one exception, they include no substantive changes to the current APA Constitution and By-Laws. They are designed purely to achieve a clearer and more easily understandable document than we currently have. The one exception stems from the fact that the current division into two major parts—the Constitution and the By-Laws—is eliminated in the proposed revised Bylaws. There is currently a different procedure for amending each of the two parts; by contrast, the new proposed revised Bylaws have only one procedure for amendment, corresponding to that currently governing the Constitution.

This copy is marked to indicate, so far as possible, the changes from the current ByLaws of the APA. Deletions from the current text are marked as ~~strikeout text~~, and additions are marked as underlined text. Changes in capitalization are generally not noted.

BYLAWS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

ARTICLE 1 - NAME

1.1. NAME.

1.1: *Compare Current Bylaws I*

The name of this organization shall be The American Philosophical Association.

ARTICLE 2 - DEFINITIONS

2.1 *New Section*

2.1. Definitions.

The following terms used in these Bylaws shall have the meanings set forth below:

A. "the Act" refers to the Pennsylvania Nonprofit Corporation Law of 1988, as amended.

B. “Association” refers to The American Philosophical Association.

C. “Board” refers to the Board of Officers of the Association.

D. “Bylaws” refers to the Bylaws of the Association, which shall be the applicable governing document for all Members, the Board, the Committees, and the Divisions.

E. “Divisions” refers to the three divisions of the Association, the Eastern, Central, and Pacific Divisions.

F. “Divisional Executive Committee” refers to the governing body of a particular Division of the Association, which shall be responsible for the affairs of that Division.

G. “Regular Members” refers to those Members of the Association who qualify in accordance with Article 4.2. “Emeritus Members” refers to those Regular Members who in accordance with Article 4.3 qualify for, and have elected to assume, emeritus status, and who pay no dues. “Student Associates” refers to Members who qualify in accordance with Article 4.5. “International Associates” refers to Members who qualify in accordance with Article 4.6. “Members” refers to Regular Members, Student Associates, and International Associates.

H. “Regular Meetings” refers to the three regularly scheduled meetings of the Association, each of which is sponsored by one of the Divisions, held each year.

I. “Good Standing” refers to the status of those Members whose dues are not in arrears.

ARTICLE 3 - PURPOSES

3.1. Purposes.

3.1.A: Compare Current Bylaws II.1

A. The purposes of ~~the~~ The American Philosophical Association shall be to promote the exchange of ideas among philosophers, to encourage creative and scholarly activity in philosophy, and to facilitate the professional work of teachers of philosophy.

3.1.B: Compare Current Bylaws II.2

B. The Association is established exclusively for educational and scientific purposes as set forth in the Articles of Incorporation. ~~In pursuing such purposes,~~ The Association shall not act so as to impair its eligibility for exemption under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.

3.1.C: Compare Current Bylaws II.3

C. The purposes of the Association shall be served by:

3.1.C.1: Compare Current Bylaws II.3.a

1. The holding of Regular Meetings at which addresses, symposia, papers, and discussions of philosophical significance are presented;
2. The publication of the *Proceedings and Addresses*, the presidential

addresses, and the membership list of the Association, as well as such additional items as may be germane to the purpose of the Association;

3.1.C.3: *Compare Current Bylaws II.3.c*

3. The work of the Standing and Special Committees of the Association;

3.1.C.4: *Compare Current Bylaws II.3.d*

4. Such other means as may be deemed appropriate by the Regular Members and the Board of Officers.

ARTICLE 4 - MEMBERSHIP

4.1. Regular Members.

4.1: *NEW SECTION*

The Association shall have Regular Members who are entitled to vote, as specified in these Bylaws, and who shall have all other rights of a Member as set forth herein.

4.2. Qualifications for Regular Membership.

4.2.A: *Compare Current Bylaws III.1*

A. Regular Membership in the American Philosophical Association shall be limited to:

4.2.A.1: *Compare Current Bylaws III.1.a*

1. Persons whose training in philosophy has been advanced and systematic enough to make them competent to teach the subject at the college or university level;

4.2.A.2: *Compare Current Bylaws By-Law.4
as well as 4.5 of the Proposed Bylaws*

4.2.A.3: *Compare Current Bylaws III.1.b*

2. Persons whose ~~interests or~~ achievements in philosophy are ~~regarded by the Board of Officers of the Association as~~ sufficient to warranting their affiliation with the Association.

4.2.B: *Compare Current Bylaws III.2*

~~B. Membership in the Association shall be by election by the Board of Officers. The authority to pass on an individual's qualifications for Regular Membership in the Association rests with the Board, which shall normally delegate it to the Executive Director.~~

4.3. Membership Dues.

4.3.A: *Compare Current Bylaws III.4*

A. The annual dues of Regular Members shall be fixed by a two-thirds majority vote of the Board of ~~Officers of the Association~~.

4.3.B: *Compare Current Bylaws By-Law.6.a*

B. Regular Members who have had five years of Good Standing ~~as members of the Association, and have retired due to age or ill health from full-time work,~~ may elect to assume emeritus status for purposes of dues. This

election is entirely at their discretion. Emeritus Members shall pay no dues, but shall otherwise continue to have the full rights of ~~members under the Association's constitution and By-laws~~ afforded Regular Members of the Association.

4.3.C: *Compare Current Bylaws* By-Law.6.b

C. The annual dues of International Associates and Student Associates shall be fixed at the approximate single-member cost of the production and distribution of the publications of the Association.

4.4. Divisional Affiliation.

4.4: *Compare Current Bylaws* III.3

Each Regular Member shall signify to the Executive Director of the Association the Divisional affiliation desired (~~as described in Articles IV and V~~) for purposes of voting on Divisional and Association matters. The privileges of voting at a Divisional Business Meeting and receiving mail ballots of that Division shall be limited to Regular Members certified by the Executive Director as affiliated with that Division.

4.5. Student Associates.

4.5: *Compare Current Bylaws* By-Law.4

Persons who are actively engaged in the study of philosophy at accredited colleges or universities shall be eligible ~~to be~~ for membership as Student Associates.

A. The authority to pass on an individual's qualifications for ~~student association~~ the status of Student Associate shall be vested in the ~~Board of Officers of the Association~~ Executive Director. ~~Student associates shall only have such rights as are provided to them by these By-laws and shall not have the rights of members under the Association's constitution and By-laws, or under the Act.~~

B. Student Associates are ~~not affiliated with any Division, and may not vote at Meetings of the Members or of the Divisions. In addition, Student Associates cannot hold any position that would require them to have voting rights within the Divisions or the Association. Student Associates may attend and appear on the program of all Regular Meetings and receive all publications of the Association.~~

4.6. International Associates.

4.6.A: *Compare Current Bylaws* By-Law.3

A. International Associates are Residents of nations other than the United States and Canada who are qualified to be Regular Members of the Association, but who wish only to receive the ~~several~~ publications of the ~~American Philosophical Association~~ and to be eligible to take part in Regular Meetings, provided that:

the authority to pass on an individual's qualifications for status as an International Associate is vested with the ~~Board of Officers of the Association~~ Executive Director. ~~;~~ and

~~b.~~ Recommendations for international association be made by the

~~International Cooperation Committee of the Association. International Associates shall only have such rights as are provided to them by these By-laws and shall not have the rights of members under the Association's constitution and By-laws, or under Pennsylvania Nonprofit Corporation Law of 1988, as amended (the "Act").~~

~~B. International Associates are not affiliated with any Division, and may not vote at Meetings of the Members or of the Divisions. In addition, International Associates cannot hold any position that would require them to have voting rights within the Divisions or the Association. International Associates may attend and appear on the program of all Regular Meetings and receive all publications of the Association.~~

4.7. Expulsion from Membership.

4.7: Compare Current Bylaws III.5

Any Member may be expelled from membership by a two-thirds majority vote of the Board, provided that written notice of the intention to expel and reasons for expulsion have been provided to the Member at least ten (10) days in advance of the meeting of the Board where the action is taken. No Member shall be expelled without having the opportunity to be heard at such meeting. No formal hearing procedure need be followed by the Board when it considers the expulsion of a Member, except that the Member shall have the right to demand an evidentiary hearing before the Board. At such an evidentiary hearing, the proponents of expulsion shall have the right to present evidence in response. The proponents of expulsion and the member shall each have the right to present and cross-examine witnesses, and to offer argument in support of their positions.

4.8. Good Standing, Termination, and Reinstatement of Regular Members, International Associates, and Student Associates.

4.8.A: Compare Current Bylaws By-Law.5.a

A. A Regular Member or International Associate is in Good Standing in a specified year, (July 1 to June 30); if that person is a life member or does not owe dues to the Association for any year preceding that year and pays dues by January 1 of that year. A Regular Member or International Associate who is not in Good Standing is in arrears.

B. A Regular Member who elects and is eligible for the status of Emeritus Member is considered in Good Standing with the Association.

4.8.C: Compare Current Bylaws By-Law.5.b

C. The name of any person who is in arrears, whether that of a Regular Member or International Associate, shall be removed from the mailing list of the Association until that person regains Good Standing.

4.8.D: Compare Current Bylaws By-Law.5.c

D. A Regular Member or International Associate who does not owe dues to the Association for any year preceding the then current year but who is in arrears shall regain Good Standing by paying that year's dues.

4.8.E: *Compare Current Bylaws* By-Law.5.d

E. ~~Anyone~~ A Regular Member or International Associate who is in arrears for two years shall be dropped from the Association's membership list.

4.8.F: *Compare Current Bylaws* By-Law.5.e

F. ~~Anyone~~ A Regular Member or International Associate who is in arrears for at least one year or who has been dropped from the Association shall regain Good Standing by paying the dues for the then current year plus a fee equal to one-half of such dues.

4.8.G: *Compare Current Bylaws* By-Law.5.g

G. ~~Anyone~~ A Regular Member or International Associate who has resigned while in good standing shall be reinstated in the Association upon application to the Executive Director.

4.8.H: *Compare Current Bylaws* By-Law.5.h

H. At its discretion, the Board ~~of Officers~~ may declare a period during which the fee required to regain membership with Good Standing in the Association will be waived.

4.8.I: *Compare Current Bylaws* By-Law.5.f

I. A Student Associate is in Good Standing if that person has paid dues for the then current year. A Student Associate who has not paid dues by the beginning of the then current year shall be dropped from the Association's mailing list and membership list.

ARTICLE 5 - MEETINGS OF THE ASSOCIATION: THE DIVISIONS**5.1. Regular Meetings.**5.1.A: *Compare Current Bylaws* IV.1

A. The ~~American Philosophical~~ Association shall hold three Regular Meetings each year: one on or near the Pacific Coast, one in the Midwest, and one on or near the Atlantic Coast.

2: For the purpose of planning the programs and making other arrangements for the Regular Meetings of the Association, ~~as specified in section 1,~~ there shall be respectively ~~a Pacific~~ an Eastern Division, a Central Division, and ~~an Eastern~~ a Pacific Division of the Association.

5.1.B: *Compare Current Bylaws* IV.3

B. Each Regular Meeting shall include an appropriate philosophical program, a presidential address, a Divisional Business Meeting for Members whose voting affiliation is with the Division hosting the Regular Meeting, and such other events as the Divisional Executive Committee may deem fitting and consonant with the purpose of the Association. ~~At each business meeting, reports of the Board of Officers on the affairs of the Association and of the divisional executive committee on the affairs of the division shall be presented.~~

5.1.C: *Compare Current Bylaws* IV.6

C. Voting at Regular Meetings shall be in the manner specified in the

bylaws of each Division, ~~copies of which are attached to the Bylaws of the Association.~~ Where no method of voting is specified in the Division's ~~By-Laws~~ bylaws, voting at Regular Meetings shall be in person, except that a majority of those present and affiliated with that Division can provide for a vote by mail ballot.

5.1.D: *Compare Current Bylaws* IV.5

D. Meetings arranged in whole or in part by a Division shall be held at times and places within or without the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as shall be set by the Divisional Executive Committee in consultation with the Executive Director of the Association. Any other meetings shall be held at times and places within or without the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as shall be set by the Chair of the Board of ~~Officers~~ in consultation with the Executive Director of the Association.

5.2. Divisional Business Meetings.

5.2: *Compare Current Bylaws* IV.3, III.3 and IV.7

At each Divisional Business Meeting, reports of the Board of Officers on the affairs of the Association and of the Divisional Executive Committee on the affairs of the Division shall be presented. ~~The privileges of voting at a divisional business meeting and receiving mail ballots of that division shall be limited to members certified by the Executive Director as affiliated with that division.~~ At each Divisional Business Meeting, Regular Members whose voting affiliation is with the Division hosting the Regular Meeting shall have an opportunity to vote on such matters that require a vote, in accordance with these Bylaws or the bylaws of the Division. Acts taken at a regular or special meeting where a quorum is present shall constitute ~~acts of the members.~~ Divisional Business Meeting shall constitute acts of that Division.

5.3. Special Meetings.

5.3.A: *Compare Current Bylaws* IV.4

A. Special Meetings of the Association may, given at least one month's notice ~~to the membership~~, be called jointly by the Board of ~~Officers~~ and one or more of the Divisional Executive Committees or upon the request of 10% of the Regular Members of the Association. The notice of a Special Meeting shall specify the general nature of the business to be transacted at the meeting.

5.3.B: *Compare Current Bylaws* IV.6

B. Voting procedures at regular meetings shall also apply to special meetings, except that voting on the business to be transacted at the Special Meeting, as specified in the meeting notice, shall be by mail ballot.

5.4. Quorum for Divisional Business and Special Meetings.

5.4: *Compare Current Bylaws* IV.7

A quorum for ~~regular meetings~~ Divisional Business Meetings and Special Meetings shall consist of those eligible to vote who attend the meeting. ~~Acts taken at a regular or special meeting where a quorum is present shall constitute acts of the members.~~

5.5. Resolutions.

5.5.A: *Compare Current Bylaws* By-Law.9

A. Only such resolutions as are adopted by all three Divisional Business Meetings within a given twelve-month period shall be recorded and publicized as resolutions of the Association. They shall otherwise be recorded and publicized only as resolutions of the Board of Officers or of one of the Divisions.

5.5.B: *Compare Current Bylaws* By-Law.9.a

B. A resolution adopted by ~~at~~ the Board of Officers of the Association Meeting shall, at the request of the Board of Officers, be placed on the agenda of the regular Divisional Business Meeting of each of the three Divisions in the twelve-month period following announcement to the Members of the action of the Board of Officers.

5.5.C: *Compare Current Bylaws* By-Law.9.b

C. A resolution adopted by a Divisional Business Meeting shall, at the request of that Business Meeting or the Divisional Executive Committee, be placed on the agenda of the next regular Business Meetings of the other two Divisions following announcement to the Members of the first Division's action.

5.5.D: *Compare Current Bylaws* By-Law.9.c

D. Resolutions which purport to represent the sense of a Division on matters of public policy may be voted on only by mail ballot authorized by the annual Business Meeting of that Division. Such mail ballots will include relevant minutes of the meeting and a summary of the arguments presented.

ARTICLE 6 - DIVISIONS OF THE ASSOCIATION

6.1. Divisions.

6.1: *Compare Current Bylaws* IV.2

~~For the purpose of planning the programs and making other arrangements for the regular meetings, as specified in section 1;~~ There shall be three Divisions of the Association, the Eastern Division, the Central Division, and the Pacific Division, respectively ~~a Pacific Division, a Central Division, and an Eastern Division of the Association.~~ Each Division shall plan or make other appropriate arrangements for one Regular Meeting of the Association each year, as specified in Article 5.1 of these Bylaws.

6.2. By-laws of the Divisions.

6.2.A: *Compare Current Bylaws* VIII.2.a

A. By-laws of a Division shall be applicable only to that Division.

6.2.B: *Compare Current Bylaws* VIII.2.b

B. A Division may adopt such Divisional by-laws as it sees fit, including by-laws for amending and adding by-laws to the Divisional by-laws, ~~the changes to be effective~~ unless, within a twelve-month period, the Board of Officers of the Association determines that they are not consonant with the

purpose of the Association or are not consistent with the constitution and By-laws of the Association.

6.3. Officers of the Divisions.

6.3.A: *Compare Current Bylaws V.1*

A. Each Division shall elect ~~officers of that division~~ Divisional officers. It shall be free to determine offices and manner of nomination for office, provided that:

6.3.A.1: *Compare Current Bylaws V.1.a*

1. The responsibility for the affairs of the Division be entrusted to an Executive Committee which shall include at least a president and secretary; and

6.3.A.2: *Compare Current Bylaws V.1.b*

2. The Divisional officers be chosen from among the Regular Members of the Association whose voting affiliation is with that Division.

6.3.B: *Compare Current Bylaws V.2*

B. Each Division shall be free to determine the duties of its officers, provided that:

6.3.B.1: *Compare Current Bylaws V.2.a*

1. The president prepare an address to be delivered at the Regular Meeting arranged by the Division and to be published subsequently in the ~~addresses and proceedings~~ Proceedings and Addresses of the Association;

6.3.B.2: *Compare Current Bylaws V.2.b*

2. The secretary keep records of the Division and serve as an associate editor of the publications of the Association;

6.3.B.3: *Compare Current Bylaws V.2.c*

3. The Divisional Executive Committee assume responsibility for arranging the Regular Meeting held in its region, including, insofar as is feasible, the raising of such funds as are needed for defraying the expenses of the meeting; and

6.3.B.4: *Compare Current Bylaws V.2.d*

4. The duties of Divisional Officers specified under Article ~~V~~ 7 be performed.

ARTICLE 7 - ~~THE BOARD OF OFFICERS~~ OF THE ASSOCIATION

7.1. Board.

7.1: *Compare Current Bylaws VI.1*

The governing body of the ~~American Philosophical~~ Association shall be ~~a the~~ Board of Officers, ~~all of whom, with the possible exception of the Treasurer, shall be members of the Association.~~ The Board shall have all powers and duties for the conduct and management of the business and affairs of the Association except as otherwise required by law, these Bylaws, or a resolution duly adopted by the Board. It shall be composed as follows:

7.2. Qualifications of the Board.

7.2: Compare Current Bylaws VI.1

Each officer of the Board shall be a Regular Member of the Association, with the exception of the Treasurer as specified in Article 7.8 of these Bylaws.

7.3. Composition of the Board.

7.3: Compare Current Bylaws VI.1

The officers of the Board shall be:

(a) The Vice-President of each Division, during the term of office in accordance with its bylaws;

(b) The President of each Division, during the term of office in accordance with its bylaws;

(c) The Immediate Past President of each Division, during the term of office in accordance with its bylaws;

(d) The Secretary or Secretary-Treasurer of each Division, during the term of office in accordance with its bylaws;

(e) A representative of each Division, elected by the Division in accordance with its bylaws for a three-year term, the terms to be staggered;

~~* The chairs of the six standing committees of the Association enumerated in Article VII;~~

~~* The Executive Director of the Association, during the term of office;~~

(f) The Chair of the Board, during the term of office;

(g) The Vice-Chair of the Board, during the term of office;

(h) The Chairs of the Standing Committees of the Association as enumerated in Article 8 herein;

(i) The Executive Director of the Association, during the term of office;
and

(j) The Treasurer of the Association, during the term of office.

7.3: Compare Current Bylaws VI.6

All Officers of the Board shall have voting rights, with the exception of the Treasurer, as set forth in Article 7.8 of these Bylaws.

7.4. Chair of the Board: Election, Term of Office and Duties.

7.4.A: Compare Current Bylaws VI.3

A. The Chair of the Board of Officers shall be elected by majority vote of the Board from among the present and past presidents of the Divisions for a three-year term, once renewable. The Executive Director shall be appointed by the Board for a five-year term and may be reappointed indefinitely thereafter to mutually agreed-upon terms of no more than five years each. When the terms of office of the Chair and the Executive Director terminate simultaneously, the term of the Chair shall be extended for one year.

7.4.B: *Compare Current Bylaws VI.8*

B. The Chair of the Board of Officers shall be the chief executive officer of the American Philosophical Association. The Chair of the Board of Officers shall preside at meetings of the Board of Officers, ~~appoint (with the advice and consent of the Board of Officers) members and chairs of the committees;~~ and represent or appoint others to represent the Association at ceremonial and other official occasions. As a matter of practice the duties of the ~~chief executive officer~~ Chair of the Association shall include hearing complaints of Members concerning affairs of the Association and arbitrating when necessary.

7.5. Vice-Chair of the Board: Nomination, Election, Term of Office, and Duties.7.5: *Compare Current Bylaws VI.7*

~~A. The Vice-Chair shall serve as Chair if the Chair is unable to perform the duties of the office, until such time as the Chair either returns to duty or is replaced. The Vice-Chair may represent the Chair on such occasions as the Chair designates.~~ The Vice-Chair shall be nominated by the Chair of the Board and appointed by ~~vote of~~ the Board. A Chair beginning a term of office may nominate a candidate who, if approved, shall serve an initial term of not more than fifteen months. The appointment is renewable through the same process for a succeeding year and renewable again through the same process until the term of the Board Chair is over. The term of a Vice-Chair shall not continue beyond the expiration of the term of the ~~Board~~ Chair. Nominees for the position of Vice-Chair shall be chosen from among the present or past Board Members ~~either present or past~~.

B. The Vice-Chair shall serve as Chair if the Chair is unable to perform the duties of the office, until such time as the Chair either returns to duty or is replaced. The Vice-Chair may represent the Chair on such occasions as the Chair designates.

7.6. Chairs of Standing Committees: Election, Term of Office.7.6: *Compare Current Bylaws VI.2*

The Chairs of Standing Committees shall be elected by the Board ~~for terms of.~~ Chairs shall normally serve a full term of three years, and under normal circumstances shall be ineligible after the completion of their terms to serve as chair of any Standing Committee. Under no circumstances shall a person serve more than two consecutive, full terms as the Chair of the same Standing Committee. ~~The chairs of the standing committees shall cast no votes on the appointment of committee chairs or members.~~

7.7. Executive Director: Appointment, Term of Office, and Duties.7.7.A: *Compare Current Bylaws VI.3, VI.8*

A. The Executive Director shall be appointed by the Board for a five-year term and may be reappointed indefinitely thereafter to mutually agreed-upon terms of no more than five years each. The Executive Director shall not vote as a member of the Board on issues concerning the Executive Director's terms of employment.

7.7.B: *Compare Current Bylaws VI.5*

B. The Executive Director of the Association shall maintain the national office of the Association, keep membership records, serve as the secretary of the Association, serve as editor of the publications of the Association, and carry out such other duties as the Board of Officers may require.

7.8. Treasurer: Nomination, Election, Term of Office, Duties, and Voting Rights.7.8: *Compare Current Bylaws VI.6*

A. The Treasurer shall be nominated by the Chair of the Board and appointed by vote of the Board. The term of office shall be three years and shall be renewable through the same process.

B. The Treasurer shall review the financial records of the national office and the Divisions, the investments and investment policies of the Board of Officers, and the annual audit of the Association, and shall report to the Board on these matters. ~~The Treasurer shall be nominated by the Chair of the Board and appointed by vote of the Board. The term of office shall be three years and shall be renewable through the same process.~~

C. A Treasurer who is a Regular Member of the American Philosophical Association shall be entitled to vote at Board meetings. The Treasurer need not be a Regular Member of the Association. If not a Regular Member, the Treasurer will not be entitled to vote at Board meetings.

7.9. Meetings of the Board of Officers.7.9.A: *Compare Current Bylaws VI.4*

A. ~~The Board of Officers shall meet at least once a year. The Executive Director shall provide at least ten (10) days written notice of each Board meeting to the members of the Board of officers, stating the time, place, and purpose of the meeting.~~

7.9.B: *Compare Current Bylaws By-Law.7*

B. The Executive Director of the Association shall, after consultation with the Chair and the other ~~Members of the Board of officers~~, prepare a formal agenda for the annual meeting of the Board of Officers. ~~Provided that they are submitted to the Executive Director at least one month in advance of the annual meeting~~, Agenda items proposed by a Divisional Executive Committee, a Divisional Business Meeting, a Standing Committee of the Association, or fifty or more Regular Members of the Association shall be placed on the agenda of the annual meeting of the Board of Officers provided that they are submitted to the Executive Director at least one month in advance of the annual meeting of the Board.

7.10. Quorum for Board Meetings.7.10: *NEW SECTION*

A majority of officers shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. The acts of a majority of the officers present at a meeting at which a quorum is present shall be the acts of the Board.

7.11. Actions of the Board Outside Board Meetings.7.11: *NEW SECTION*

If Board action is necessary when the Board is not holding a meeting, the Chair of the Board may call for a vote of the Board by electronic mail, preceded, if necessary, by discussion via the same medium. In such cases, the votes of a majority of the officers of the Board shall constitute acts of the Board. The votes shall be recorded and announced to the Board by the Executive Director or the Chair of the Board.

7.12. Review of Actions Taken by the Board of Officers.7.12: *Compare Current Bylaws By-Law.8*

Regular Members of the Association a given Division have a right to request the Executive Committee of their that Division to ask the Board of Officers to review or rescind actions taken by the Board. When such actions have not been explicitly approved by at the Divisional Business Meeting, or through direct petition to the executive committee by any ten voting members of a division a Regular Member of that Division may individually make such a request; when they have been so approved, a petition signed by ten Regular Members of that Division is required. It shall be the prerogative of the Divisional Executive Committee, as the elected organ of the division, to decide whether the request shall be transmitted to the Board, and if the request is transmitted to state what action the Divisional Executive Committee recommends. All such petitions shall be made known to the Executive Committees of the other Divisions for their consideration.

ARTICLE 8 - COMMITTEES OF THE ASSOCIATION**8.1. Standing Committees of the Association.**8.1: *Compare Current Bylaws VII.1.**The list is rearranged in alphabetical order*

There shall be six Standing Committees of the Association, as follows:

- (1) The Committee on Academic Career Opportunities and Placement;
- (2) The Committee on Inclusiveness;
- (3) The Committee on International Cooperation;
- (4) The Committee on Lectures, Publications, and Research;
- (5) The Committee on the Status and Future of the Profession (which shall include as *ex officio* members the chairs of the other standing committees);
and
- (6) The Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy.

8.2. Duties of the Standing Committees.8.2: *Compare Current Bylaws VII.2*

Detailing the duties and responsibilities of the Standing Committees shall be the duty of the Board of Officers.

8.3. Chairs and Members of the Standing Committees: Appointment, Term of Office.

8.3: *Compare Current Bylaws VII.3.*

~~Members and Chairs~~ and Members of the Standing Committees shall be appointed from among the Members of the Association and shall (except for the *ex officio* members of the Committee on the Status and Future of the Profession) be appointed for three-year terms.

8.4. Additional Committees.

8.4: *Compare Current Bylaws VII.4.*

The Board may authorize the appointment of committees for special purposes and projects. Such committees shall be referred to as Committees.

9: *Compare Current Bylaws IX*

ARTICLE 9 - LIABILITY AND INDEMNIFICATION

9.1. Liability.

9.1: *Compare Current Bylaws IX.1*

General Rule. An officer of the Board Member or other authorized representative shall not be personally liable for monetary damages as an officer of the Board Member or other authorized representative for any action taken, or any failure to take any action, unless:

9.1.1: *Compare Current Bylaws IX.1.a*

1. The ~~Board Member~~ officer or other authorized representative has breached or failed to perform the duties of a Director in accordance with the standard of conduct contained in Section 5712 of the Pennsylvania Nonprofit Corporation Law of 1988, as amended, and any amendments and successor acts thereto; and

9.1.2: *Compare Current Bylaws IX.1.b*

2. The breach or failure to perform constitutes self-dealing, willful misconduct, or recklessness;

Provided, however, the foregoing provision shall not apply to (i) the responsibility or liability of ~~a Board Member~~ an officer or other authorized representative pursuant to any criminal statute or (ii) the liability of ~~a Board Member~~ an officer or other authorized representative for the payment of taxes pursuant to local, state, or federal law.

9.2. Indemnification.

9.2: *Compare Current Bylaws IX.2*

The Association shall indemnify any officer or ~~Board Member~~ other authorized representative who was or is a party or is threatened to be made a party to any threatened, pending, or completed action, suit, or proceeding, whether civil, criminal, administrative, or investigative (and whether or not by, or in the right of, the Association) by reason of the fact that such person is or was a representative of the Association, against

expenses (including attorneys' fees), judgments, fines, and amounts paid in settlement actually and reasonably incurred in connection with such action or proceeding if such person acted in good faith and in a manner he or she reasonably believed to be in, or not opposed to, the best interests of the Association, and with respect to any criminal proceeding, had no reason to believe such conduct was illegal, provided, however, that no persons shall be entitled to indemnification pursuant to this Article in any instance in which the action or failure to take action giving rise to the claim for indemnification is determined by a court to have constituted willful misconduct or recklessness; and provided, further, however, in instances of a claim by or in the right of the Association, indemnification shall not be made under this section in respect of any claim, issue, or matter as to which the person has been adjudged to be liable to the Association unless and only to the extent that the court of common pleas of the judicial district embracing the county in which the registered office of the Association is located or the court in which the action was brought determines upon application that, despite the adjudication of liability but in view of all the circumstances of the case, such person is fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnity for such expenses that the court of common pleas or other court shall deem proper.

9.3. Indemnification Procedure.

9.3: Compare Current Bylaws IX.3

Unless ordered by a court, any indemnification under ~~Article IX, paragraph 2–~~Article 9.2, or as otherwise permitted by law, shall be made by the Association only as authorized in the specific case upon a determination that indemnification is proper in the circumstances because ~~he or she~~ the officer or other authorized representative has met the applicable standard of conduct set forth under that section. Such determination shall be made:

9.3.1: Compare Current Bylaws IX.3.a

1. By the Board ~~of Officers~~ by a majority vote of a quorum consisting of ~~Board Members~~ officers or other authorized representatives who were not parties to the action or proceeding; or

9.3.2: Compare Current Bylaws IX.3.b

2. If such a quorum is not obtainable or if obtainable and a majority vote of a quorum of disinterested ~~Board Members~~ officers or other authorized representatives so directs, by independent legal counsel in a written opinion; ~~or~~

~~3. By the members.~~

9.4. Advancement of Expenses.

9.4: Compare Current Bylaws IX.4

Expenses incurred by a person entitled to indemnification pursuant to this Article or otherwise permitted by law in defending a civil or criminal action, suit, or proceeding shall be paid by the Association in advance of the final disposition of such action, suit, or proceeding upon receipt

of an undertaking by or on behalf of such person to repay the amount so advanced if it shall ultimately be determined that such person is not entitled to be indemnified by the Association.

9.5. Continuing Right to Indemnification.

9.5: *Compare Current Bylaws IX.5*

The indemnification and advancement of expenses provided pursuant to this Article shall continue as to any person who has ceased to be an officer or other authorized representative of the Association and shall inure to the benefit of the heirs, executors, and administrators of such person.

9.6. Other Rights.

9.6: *Compare Current Bylaws IX.6*

This Article shall not be exclusive of any other right which the Association may have to indemnify any person as a matter of law.

10: *Compare Current Bylaws By-Law.2*

ARTICLE 10 - FUNDS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

10.1. Derivation of Funds.

10.1: *NEW SECTION*

Funds of the Association shall be derived from membership dues, charitable contributions, and any other sources of funds consistent with the purposes of the Association.

10.2. Maintenance of Funds.

10.2.A: *Compare Current Bylaws By-Law.2.a*

A. The Executive Director of the Association shall maintain accurate records of the receipts, deposits, and disbursements of the Funds of the Association. The authority for receipt, deposit, and the disbursement of funds shall be the Board of ~~Officers~~ acting in accordance with the following provisions:

10.2.A.1: *Compare Current Bylaws By-Law.2.a.i*

1. Funds designated for special purposes shall be disbursed only for those purposes.

10.2.A.2: *Compare Current Bylaws By-Law.2.a.ii*

2. Funds designated for the exclusive use of a Division (hereinafter referred to as "Divisional Funds") shall be, at the pleasure of that Division, disbursed to the Divisional Secretary for the purpose of defraying the costs of the Regular Meeting arranged by that Division or for other legitimate expenditures of that Division.

10.2.A.3: *Compare Current Bylaws By-Law.2.a.iii*

3. Income resulting from the meetings arranged by a Division and gifts and grants designated for use of a Division shall be received as Divisional Funds; and

10.2.A.4: *Compare Current Bylaws By-Law.2.a.iv*

4. At the pleasure of the Divisional Executive Committee ~~of a division~~, a

Divisional Secretary may function as Treasurer of all or part of the Divisional Funds of that Division.

10.2.B: *Compare Current Bylaws* By-Law.2.b

B. Should a deficit or temporary financing need occur in a Division either as a result of expenditures connected with the Regular Meeting held in that Division's region or as a result of other legitimate expenditures, the Board of Officers shall, insofar as is consistent with the interests of all three Divisions, allocate funds to cover the deficit or extend the credit for the temporary financing need.

10.2.C: *Compare Current Bylaws* By-Law.2.c

C. Records of all receipts, deposits, and disbursements of the funds of the Association, including Divisional Funds, shall be subject to regular annual audit; and the report of the auditor shall be published for the Members of the Association.

11: *Compare Current Bylaws* X

ARTICLE 11 - AMENDMENTS

11.1. Amendments.

11.1.A: *Compare Current Bylaws* X.2

A. Amendments ~~to this constitution~~ of and additions to the Bylaws may be proposed only by a Divisional Business Meeting, a Divisional Executive Committee, the Board of Officers, or by a petition bearing the signatures of at least fifty Regular Members.

11.1.B: *Compare Current Bylaws* X.3

B. Any ~~proposed amendment to the constitution~~ proposal for amending or adding to the Bylaws must be announced to the Regular Members ~~of the Association~~ at least one month in advance of the first Divisional Business Meeting at which it is discussed.

11.1.C: *Compare Current Bylaws* X.1

C. Any proposed amendment to the ~~constitution~~ Bylaws must be presented, for discussion or amendment only, at a ~~regular business meeting of each of each of the Divisional Business Meetings of~~ the three Divisions. After discussion, the proposed amendment must be submitted to a mail ballot in each Division. Passage of a proposed amendment requires a majority of the votes cast in each of the three Divisions. Passage of a proposed amendment requires a majority of the votes cast in each of the three Divisional mail ballots.

CALL FOR PROPOSALS FOR MINI-CONFERENCES

CALL FOR PROPOSALS FOR MINI-CONFERENCES HELD IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION, PACIFIC DIVISION

The Pacific Division Executive Committee invites APA members to organize small conferences in conjunction with the annual meetings in 2008 and 2009. The APA Pacific Division will provide a venue and can also provide some support for such conferences.*

The purpose of this new program is to give members opportunities for collective exploration of important philosophical topics in more depth than is offered by the usual meeting schedule.

Members are invited to submit proposals. Proposals received by March 1, 2007**, will be considered by the Pacific Division Executive Committee at its meeting in April 2007. The proposal should describe the topic of the conference and explain its timeliness and importance, and its potential audience; identify prospective speakers; and specify what support will be needed to hold the conference, and what contribution (in addition to meeting space) the Pacific Division is asked to make. Conference organizing committees should include at least one member of the Pacific Division.

Please contact Secretary-Treasurer Anita Silvers (asilvers@sfsu.edu) if you would like more information. Proposals should be sent by email and should be submitted by March 1, 2007, to be considered by the Executive Committee at its April 2007 meeting.

*Up to \$5,000 can be made available to defray direct expenses of the mini-conference.

**Proposals received after this date will be considered by the Executive Committee at the next possible opportunity.

RESTAURANTS AND ATTRACTIONS

Use this section to plan visits to restaurants, museums, and performances. Many San Francisco restaurants are small, so advance reservations are a good idea if you expect to have constraints on your time.

RESTAURANTS

Here are just a few of San Francisco's good restaurants. Most (but not all) of the restaurants on this list are convenient to the downtown area near the hotel. Quite a few are within walking distance. For example, Belden Place, a close-by alley just east of Kearny between Bush and Pine, has six small restaurants serving lunch and dinner at both outdoor and indoor tables (see below for more detailed Belden Place restaurant information).

The St. Francis is the site of a high-end restaurant called **Mina**. **Mina** enjoyed the highest profile opening accorded to any San Francisco Restaurant in the past decade. The comprehensive wine list has 1500 entries, and the restaurant is the *Wine Spectator's* best in S.F. pick. **Mina** also recently secured two stars in the Michelin Guide. (See below for other two and one star Michelin Guide recipients in San Francisco. The French Laundry in Yountville is the only Bay Area three-star restaurant in the Michelin Guide.) Securing your reservation at **Mina** well in advance is advised: call (415) 397-9222. The St. Francis remains a favorite stop for afternoon tea, and a new lobby bar, The Onyx, has expanded the locations where philosophers can enjoy conversing.

Of note: the Ferry Bldg., at the foot of Market St., is an upscale version of Philadelphia's Lexington Market, with informal restaurants featuring in-season produce (especially during the Farmer's Market on Saturday). You can taste caviars (with champagne), sip exotic teas, or sample oysters. Plan to bring home a bag filled with boutique farm products: preserves, sausages, herbs, and similar bounty. You also can hop on a ferry to go across the Bay. To get there, catch a Market St. bus or trolley down to the Bay (or use BART).

Of further note: For dinner after a late evening session, see the *Late Night Eating* list after the general restaurant list.

The recently opened Westfield Mall is two blocks from the hotel (walk down Powell to Market—underground, the Mall merges into the Powell Muni and BART stations). Several branches of good local restaurants are in the Mall: **Lark Creek Steakhouse** (try the butter poached lobster, beer braised brussel sprouts, and Concord grape cheesecake with peanut butter shortbread crust), 593-4100; **Straits** (Singaporean menu, the salt plum and the cucumber margaritas go well with the food) 668-1783; and **Zazil** (Mexican inspired seafood, with such items as octopus carpaccio and carnitas de atun) 495-6379. By the time of your reading, Charlie Phan's

Out the Door version of his famous Slanted Door should be open. The Mall also has several sandwich and salad shops: **Cocola Bakery** (the Gucci of patisseries), and highly recommended Wichcraft (substantial sandwiches such as grilled cheddar with smoked ham and pear on cranberry-pecan bread and marinated white anchovies with soft cooked egg, roasted onion, and salsa verde on country bread). Still not enough choice of foods? Westfield Mall also has a sprawling food court with local and nationally franchised fast food vendors, and a high-end grocery store with 20,000 food items and take-out deli, rotisserie, pizza, bakery, salad bar, etc.

And here are some of our San Francisco restaurant recommendations:

Absinthe, brasserie, great frites, steak, duck confit, skate with polenta, 398 Hayes (at Gough), 551-1590.

Alaturca, bring a group to enjoy cold or hot meze. The pide—stuffed breads—are exceptional. Platters such as the lambchops are large enough to share. And try the sutlac pudding. Inexpensive. Walking distance. 869 Geary (at Larkin), 345-1011.

Albona, wonderful Italian food from the area of Trieste, moderately priced, 545 Francisco, 441-1040.

Alma, the first Nuevo Latino restaurant in the City, inspired, moderately priced, 1101 Valencia, 401-8959.

Ana Mandara, Vietnamese Coastal cuisine. 891 Beach, 771-6800. Azie, Glamorous, delicious East/West fusion, 826 Folsom, 538-0918.

B44, good Catalan and Portuguese rustic food, try the small plates/roasted rabbit in hazelnut sauce/eight kinds of paella, indoor/outdoor eating, walking distance, 44 Belden, 986-6287. Baguette Express, inexpensive, very good and filling Vietnamese sandwiches (12 kinds), 666 Larkin, between Eddy and O'Farrell, walking distance.

Bambuddha Lounge, excellent drinks, Asian-theme food such as five-spice duck on coconut pancakes, salt-cured salmon carpaccio on shrimp chips, macademia encrusted lamb chops, and sensual lemongrass custard. Walking distance. 601 Eddy at Larkin, 885-5088.

Baraka, Sufi influence. Moroccan tapas such as roasted sweet peppers and white anchovies with artichokes. Also try the tangine with veal cheeks, eggplant, dates, and chickpeas, and the sauteed daurade. Moderately priced. 288 Connecticut at 18th, 255-0370.

Bizou, for beef cheeks, braised pork shoulder, cassoulet, and other warming dishes, 598 Fourth, 543-2222.

Blue Plate, stellar appetizers and side dishes like grilled pork chop with cranberry walnut compote, quirky surroundings. 3218 Mission St., 282-6777.

Bocadillos, highly recommended, reasonably priced Basque small plates, breakfast through dinner. The mid-day meal is mostly small sandwiches, two for \$7.50. The warm Catalan sausage with manchego and arugula, chorizo with walnut spread and pardely, and serrano ham with tomato spread all

are excellent. For dinner try tripe basquaise, pig trotters, prawns with fresh lemon confit, all at \$7. 710 Montgomery (at Washington), 982-2622.

Bodega Bistro, despite its name, serves fresh and zingy Vietnamese food. Inexpensive. The pho (noodle soup) is recommended. Walking distance. 607 Larkin (at Eddy), 921-1218.

Borobudur, carefully traditional Indonesian food. We recommend ikan pepes, spice paste rubbed fish. Moderately priced. Walking distance. 700 Post at Jones, 775-1512.

Boulevard, Nancy Oakes's American food, one of the City's most popular restaurants, 1 Mission St., 543-6084.

Brindisi Cucina di Mare, cuisine of the region of Puglia, indoor/outdoor eating, walking distance, 88 Belden Place, 593-8000.

Café 52, Mediterranean-California mix, tuna tartare, pomegranate lamb, prawns with horseradish orange marmalade sauce, indoor/outdoor dining, walking distance, 52 Belden Place, 433-5200.

Café Bastillo, Parisian ambiance, food uneven but the rack of lamb is wonderful, indoor/outdoor eating, walking distance, 22 Belden Place, 986-5673.

Café Claude, Parisian-style café in the city. Onion soup and roast chicken. Terrific selection of sandwiches and wines. Moderately priced. Walking distance, 7 Claude Ln., 392-3505.

Café Marimba, food from Oaxaca, many salsas and moles, fish, folk art—you feel as if you are in Mexico. Modestly priced. 2317 Chestnut, 776-1506.

Cafe Museo, the cafe in the Museum of Modern Art, 151 Third St., drop in for a quick lunch between 10:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m.

Café Spencer, a high-end brasserie, with asparagus in truffle emulsion and succulent squab on barley soaked in foie gras jus. Franco-California cuisine includes antelope au poivre and mango tarte tatin. The lyonnaise salad, with smoked duck, a poached egg, and bitter greens is recommended. 82 14th St., 864-2191.

Café Tiramisu, pasta is a must order, but counter-carbers should try the sanddabs (a local flat fish) dore, indoor/outdoor dining, walking distance, 28 Belden Place, 421-7044.

Campton Place, intricately crafted French food, tasting menus, the “foie gras bar” is highly recommended, walking distance, expensive. 340 Stockton, 955-5555.

Canto do Brazil, quite authentic Brazilian food, very reasonable. 41 Franklin, 626-8727.

Chaat Café, irresistible naan serves as a wrap for sandwiches, noteworthy pakoras. Inexpensive. 320 Third at Folsom, 979-9946.

Charango, inventive tapas-style Cuban/Caribbean cuisine, moderately priced. 2351 Mission St., 282-1813.

Chaya Brasserie, fresh and simple to point of starkness, 132 Embarcadero, 777-8688.

Chez Nous, lamb chops with lavender sea salt, braised rabbit, frites with harissa aioli, other Mediterranean food, modest prices, 1911 Fillmore, 441-8044.

Citizen Cake, brunch, lunch, high tea, small plates of seafood, quick in and out before the theater, 399 Grove (at Gough), 861-2228.

Cliff House, a 1909 building at the far Western end of the City (ask the concierge for advice on public transportation), wonderful view overlooking Seal Rock, good food at moderate prices, recommended for weekend champagne buffet brunch complete with popovers. There is also a new upscale restaurant in the complex called Sutro's that is suspended over the cliff just above the waves. 1090 Point Lobos, 386-3330.

Da Flora, a small quintessentially personalized San Francisco restaurant. Delicious Italian and Hungarian dishes with local and home-cured ingredients, and rave reviews for the desserts, specializes in Italian wines from small producers, moderately plus priced, 701 Columbus (at Filbert), 981-4664.

Delfina, underground hit because of great food and modest prices, 3621 18th, 552-4055

Dosa, south Indian, vegetarian, large menu, highly recommended, inexpensive. 996 Valencia, 642-3672.

Edinburgh Café Pub/Old Chelsea Fish and Chips, The Pub is on Geary at Larkin and the Old Chelsea is on Larkin at Geary. Crispy battered fish fillets and thick chips. Inexpensive. Walking distance. 474-5015.

El Farolito, one of the top 20 taquerias in the Bay Area. Open late. Excellent avocado-tomatillo sauce. 2779 Mission at 24th, 641-0758.

Elite Café, try the Cajun Sunday brunch, 10:00-3:00 p.m., 2049 Fillmore, 346-8668. Farallon, restaurant critic's darling. Seafood in a sea-themed setting, always on the S.F. "best restaurant" list, walking distance (across the street), 450 Post, 956-6969.

1550 Hyde (at Pacific), stellar gnocchi, braised pork shoulder, tempura halibut cheeks, maple syrup tart. 775-1550.

Fifth Floor, complex and sophisticated, try the pork belly poached with truffles and roasted crispy, 12 Fourth St., 777-5558. First Crush, excellent priced wine list and stylish food, 101 Cyril Magnin at Ellis, 982-7874

Fleur de Lys, extraordinary French food with Alsatian emphasis, a vegetarian tasting menu, brisk walking distance, 777 Sutter, 673-7779.

Foreign Cinema, very good Mediterranean food, oyster bar, you can watch a film while you dine, all-day Sunday dining on heated patio, 2534 Mission, 648-7600.

Fog City Diner, we like it for outdoor weekend brunch, 1300 Battery, 982-2000.

42 Degrees, some say bold and brassy, some say soulful, food and music (live jazz nightly), 235 16th, 777-5558. Gary Danko, creative dishes with seasonal ingredients, won the James Beard award for the best new restaurant in the U.S. and recent Zagat commendation as best in S.F., some

APA members judge that the price is very reasonable given the quality of the food. 800 North Point, 749-2060.

Gaylord India, venerable Indian restaurant with elaborate luncheon buffets. Ghirardelli Square, 771-8822.

Globe, serves dinner till 1 a.m., the city's chefs eat here, 290 Pacific, 391-4132.

Grand Café, French, try the skate wing and braised rabbit, chef strongly recommended, and a great bar with excellent bar food. 501 Geary, very close walking distance, 292-0101.

Great Eastern, largest selection of live seafood from tanks in the City, Open to 1 a.m., BUT don't order Americanized dishes or you will be turned over to the chef who specializes in tourists, 649 Jackson, 986-2500.

Greens, still a premiere vegetarian restaurant with an outstanding wine list, Building A, Fort Mason, 771-6222.

Hana Zen, a convivial yakitori bar (20 kinds), walking distance. 115 Cyril Magnin near Ellis, 421-2101. Hawthorne Lane, creative California-style with Asian flair, with excellent bar menu. 22 Hawthorne Lane, 777-9779. Hayes and Vine, wine bar with 600 choices, upscale nibbles including caviar. 377 Hayes, 626-5301.

Hayes Street Grill, classic fish house, excellent service. 320 Hayes, 863-5545.

Hung Ky, second best pho (Vietnamese noodle soup) in the City, southern style. An inexpensive and filling meal. Walking distance. 337 Jones (between Ellis and Eddy), 674-8278.

Isa, specializes in small French plates, moderate prices. 3324 Steiner St, 567-9588.

Jai Yun, an exceptional (and very small) restaurant in Chinatown, highly recommended adventure, call for reservations. Chef-owner speaks no English and little Cantonese (he's from west of Shanghai). 923 Pacific Ave. (at Powell), 981-7438.

Jardiniere, exceptional execution and high prices to get it, 300 Grove, 861-5555. Jeanty's at Jack's, the current reincarnation of Jack's, a San Francisco fixture since 1864, is as a sibling of the famous Yountville brasserie. Excellent and expensive. 615 Sacramento, 693-0941.

Joubert's, here the comfort food is from South Africa, Try yam and corn soup, and stewy chicken peri-peri. Moderate prices. But be warned that the restaurant is far from Union Square, way out by the Great Highway that runs along the Pacific Ocean. 4115 Judah, 753-5448.

Kabuto A&S, Both traditional and whimsically San Francisco sushi. Some say the best toro in the City. An exceptional sake list as well. Moderately priced for the quality. 5121 Geary near 16th, 752-5652.

Kelly's Mission Rock, heaven for weekend brunch, modest prices, heated outdoor dining with a beautiful view of the Bay. 817 China Basin, 626-5355.

Kokkari Estiatorio, Beautiful ambiance with a wide selection of excellent Greek food, one of Thomas Keller's favorite S.F. restaurants. 200 Jackson, 981-0983.

Kuleto's, great for breakfast, Italian food from wood-burning oven. Walking distance, half a block from the hotel. 221 Powell, 397-7720.

Lahore Karachi, spinach and lamb curry, fish dishes a specialty, inexpensive, a long walk. 612 O'Farrell (at Leavenworth) 567-8603. La Santaneca de la Mission, down-home Salvadoran cuisine, with outstanding pupusas, corn masa pockets, tortillas with crema, and curtido (pickled cabbage). Breakfast through dinner. Inexpensive. 2815 Mission at 24th St (take BART), 285-2131.

La Tasca, contemporary Spanish cuisine, moderate prices, tapas and paella with a recommended late night tapas menu, two flamenco performances every Saturday evening. 1772 Market Street, 863-3516.

La Taqueria, one of the oldest and best in the Mission District. A top twenty taqueria pick. Try the carnitas and fresh fruit drinks. Ask for the crispy tacos, not on the menu. Inexpensive but high for a taqueria. 2889 Mission St., 285-7117.

Le Charm, friendly prices for French menu, 315 Fifth, 546-6128. Le Colonial, Upscale and innovative Vietnamese, walking distance. 20 Cosmo Place, 931-3600.

La Folie, Lyonnaise cuisine. 2316 Polk, 776-5577.

Last Supper Club, inventive raviolis and other comfort foods. Very reasonable wine list. 1199 Valencia at 23rd St., 695-1199. Liberty Cafe, American with great wine list. 410 Cortland, 695-8777. Lichee Garden, Cantonese family style. 1416 Powell, 397-2290. Limon, moderately priced with the best Peruvian food in San Francisco. pan-seared halibut or bouillabaise with a smoky Peruvian sauce are recommended, as is the spicy sweet sangria. 524 Valencia between 16th and 17th St., 252-0918.

Little Delhi, North Indian and Bengali, large menu, great desserts including Indian ice cream, inexpensive, walking distance. 83 Eddy (at Mason), 398-3173.

L'Osteria del Forno, Italian. 519 Columbus, 982-1124. Lulu, Excellent dishes from wood-fired oven; many fishes and roasted veggies. 816 Folsom, 495-5775.

Luna Park, another comfort food menu, this one with moderate prices. Start up with grilled artichokes or fries dipped in the lemon aioli, warm up with pot-au-feu or hunter's pie, and finish up with a wedge of coconut cream pie big enough for a couple of diners. 694 Valencia, 553-8584.

Mandalay, Burmese cuisine (and Mandarin as well). Remarkable tea leaf and green papaya salads are recommended. Inexpensive. 4348 California (at Sixth Ave. in Richmond District), 386-3896.

Masa's, back on top, Excellent tasting menu, delicious meat and game dishes, and desserts. walking distance. 648 Bush, 989-7154.

Maykadeh Persian Cuisine, exquisite food, full range of authentic ingredients, try the lamb tongues in saffron and the wonderful desserts. North Beach site, a trek for good walkers—others are advised to call a cab. 470 Green, 362-8286.

Max's, at the corner past the St. Francis Carriage Entrance at Geary and Mason. Relatively inexpensive comfort food, opens for breakfast at 7:00 a.m. and is highly recommended, excellent sandwiches and salads, try the smoked pot roast, matzoh ball soup and cabbage soup, chopped chicken livers, wonderful desserts, no reservations.

Medicine New-Shojin Eatstation, Japanese veggie, at lunch there are “foundation” sets (\$8-\$12) with base of rice, grains, or noodles, plus vegetable and pickle toppings, and soup. Try the custardy sesame tofu and the chilled coconut cup with silver ear mushrooms and toasted buckwheat. Inexpensive for downtown S.F., walking distance to 161 Sutter, third floor of the Crocker Galleria, 677-4405.

Millenium, a destination vegetarian restaurant, 246 McAllister, 487-9800.

Miller's East Coast West Deli, finally, a real New York deli in San Francisco, everything is good, the corned beef is home cured, and there is an extensive selection of smoked fish. Breakfast, lunch and dinner. Inexpensive. 1725 Polk, 563-3542.

Ngoc Mai, 124 Vietnamese dishes, try the bun (cloud-like rice noodles), the goat curry, seafood chow mein. Only one dish over \$7, but be warned—this restaurant closes at 7 p.m. 547 Hyde near Geary, 931-4899.

Oola Restaurant, walking distance on Folsom between Fourth and Fifth, we recommend the seafood chunk skewer on a confit of fennel and artichoke, sprinkled with fennel pollen, and the fig over blue cheese and onion jam tart, drizzled with chestnut honey. This is the San Francisco version of bistro food, and it is open till 1 a.m. 860 Folsom, 995-2061.

One Market, fresh food that wows diners, petrale sole souffle, osso buco for two, 1 Market St., 777-5577.

Pacific Catch, fish prepared in many styles, from Baja fish and shrimp tacos to grilled ahi or salmon in a wasabi bowl. Sweet potato fries go with all. Inexpensive. 2027 Chestnut, 440 1950.

Pagplac, enormously popular Vietnamese restaurant with bargain-price tasting menu. Wraps, grills, clay pots and “seven flavors of beef” dinner. Cash only. Walking distance. 655 Larkin (near Ellis), 776-3234.

Pakwan, Pakistani, put your order in at the counter and wait. Try the eggplant Pakwan, chicken makhani, and lamb achar, all cooled down by yogurt raita. Inexpensive. Walking distance. 501 O'Farrell and 653 Clay. Pancho Villa Taqueria, very moderate prices, one of the best of the Mission's many taquerias. 3071 Mission, 864-8840. Parc Hong Kong, state-of-the-art Cantonese. 5322 Geary, 668-8998

Petit Robert, recommended dishes are pork chops rubbed with olive, shredded brussel sprouts with hazelnuts, and cinnamon lamb shank on mint-sparked cous-cous. 2300 Polk, 922-8100. Piaf's, live music and cabaret. 1686 Market, 864-3700.

Pho Hoa, some of the best pho (Vietnamese noodle soup) in the City, large bowl is excellent proof against any early morning chill, this restaurant opens at 8:00 a.m. for Vietnamese breakfast. Walking distance. 431 Jones (between Ellis and O'Farrell), 673-3163.

Plouf, more European than strictly French, this bistro serves mussels seven ways. Other star dishes keep the focus on seafood, prices are more moderate than the presentation and service would indicate. Top 100, indoor/outdoor eating, walking distance, 40 Belden Place, 986-6491.

Piperade, Basque-inspired menu continues San Francisco's pursuit of upscale comfort food. Try the squid bathed in a foie gras sauce with grapes, moderately priced. 1015 Battery, 391-2555.

Postrio, Wolfgang Puck signature restaurant, mixed reviews. Walking distance. 545 Post, 776-7825.

Powell's Place, soul food. 511 Hayes, 863-1404.

Puccinni & Pinetti, good trattoria food, try the devil's food cake. 129 Ellis at Cyril Magnin, 392-5500.

R and G Lounge, some of best Hong Kong food in town, try #2 Geoduck sashimi, #6 Salt-and-pepper crab, #11 Beef brisket and turnip in clay pot, #12 Dried scallops with chinese melon, #15 Fried stuffed bean curd, and (not on menu but ask for it) pea shoots or amaranth with three kinds of egg. 631 Kearny, 982-7877.

Redwood Park, exquisite food and perfect wine list. 600 Montgomery, 283-1000. Rotunda at Nieman Marcus, great for lunch and cocktails, we recommend the truffle risotto and lobster pot au crème. Walking distance one block away. 362-3900.

Saigon Sandwiches, sets the standard for Vietnamese-French sandwiches, open for breakfast, lunch and dinner. Inexpensive. Walking distance. 560 Larkin at Eddy, 474-5698.

Samovar Tea Lounge, teas from around the world, plus bison burgers, tofu hotpot, wood-smoked salmon crumpet, blinis and caviar, bergamot bread pudding, medjool dates stuffed with chevre, hand-cut Tibetan noodles with lobster tails, and other cross-national dishes. Walking distance. 730 Howard between 3rd and 4th, 227-9400.

Sam's Grill, classic San Francisco grill, excellent petrale sole, veal porterhouse, celery victor, moderate prices, brisk walk. 324 Bush, 421-0594.

Scala's, first rate bistro, try the wood-oven roasted mussels. Not too expensive. Walking distance. 432 Powell, 395-8555.

Sears Fine Foods, best pancakes in the world, now serving all day long. Inexpensive. Walking distance. 439 Powell St., 986-1160.

Shanghai 1930, elegant Shanghai combinations such as "fish pillows." 133 Steuart, 896-5600.

Shalimor, one of Travel and Leisure Magazine's top 50 restaurants, but no dish costs more than \$8.00. Tandoori, curries, vegetarian dishes. No credit

cards. 532 Jones, 928-0333.

Slanted Door, San Francisco's most popular upscale Vietnamese restaurant, now situated in the Ferry Building at the foot of Market St., 861-8032.

Stars, simple, impeccable, expensive. 555 Golden Gate, 861-7827. Suppenkuche, good German with lots of beers and great specialties. 601 Hayes, 252-9289.

Tajine, check to make sure Tajine has not moved to a site with more than the current seven tables. Good bastilla and chicken tajine, and kebabs and sandwiches. Good for lunch Wed. and Thurs. Dinner nightly. Inexpensive. Walking distance. 552 Jones (at Geary), 440-1718.

Tallula, very San Francisco, this restaurant's cuisine is Indian-style, executed with French sensibilities and California ingredients. At the bar, you may nibble on little lemon and cilantro pancakes with tamarind-date chutney or grilled sardines with mango and cucumber relish. Advance to one of the dining rooms and try fresh tomato soup with kaffir lime and stuffed squash blossoms. Main courses are too numerous to list. Among desserts, try the roasted peaches with saffron. Brunch is served on Sundays. 4230 18th Street, at Diamond, 437-6722.

Taqueria Vallarta, another of the top twenty taquerias. Excellent beef tongue and gushy as well as gutsy burritos. On warm nights, try the stand outside the restaurant. 3033 24th St. near Treat, 826-8115.

Tepin Thai, try the green chicken curry and crying lady prawns. Moderately priced. 298 Gough, 863-9335.

Thai House Express, regional dishes such as spicy sausage, slow-braised pork leg, poached chicken over oil-cooked rice. Regarded as most authentic Thai street food in the Bay Area. Inexpensive. Open till midnight. Walking distance. 901 Larkin at Geary, 441-2248. Thai Me Up, open only for lunch, good Thai food, no dish more than \$5. 836 Mission, 777-0444.

ThirstyBear, Spanish food and homemade beers, press your lips around the fishcheeks. 661 Howard, 974-0905. Ti Couz, sweet and savoury crepes, large collection of hard ciders, modest prices. 3108 16th St., 252-7373.

Ton Kiang, top dim sum parlor in the City, some Hakka dishes, will take reservations for large parties. 5821 Geary, 386-8530.

Turtle Tower, best pho (noodle soup) in the City, in delicate northern style. Inexpensive. Walking distance. 631 Larkin St (at Willow between Eddy and Ellis), 409-3333.

Yank Sing, 80 different dim sum on the carts at any time. 101 Spear St., 957-9300. Also at 49 Stevenson St.

Vietnam II, an extensive menu including roast crab. For breakfast, lunch, or dinner, you can't beat the pho at prices that go up to \$6.50, large bowls of star anise-scented broth full of your choice of seafood, poultry, meat, vegetables. Walking distance. Inexpensive. 701 Larkin at Ellis, 885-1274.

Watergate, expensive but considered a bargain given the complexity of the cooking and presentations. Rack of lamb with ragout of lamb shank, crab salad with pea shoots, warm lobster martini. 1177 California (at Taylor). 474-2000.

XYZ, beautiful food, service, people, prices to match. 181 Third, 817-7836. Zuni Cafe, classic California cafe food, a favorite of philosophers for two decades, the cookbook based on Zuni Café's offerings is the *New York Times* "best cookbook of 2002." 1658 Market, 552-2522.

LATE NIGHT EATING (WHERE S.F. CHEFS EAT LATE AT NIGHT)

Brick, dinner till midnight, mini-burgers and buffalo wings. 1085 Sutter, Walking distance. 441-4232.

Farmer Brown, dinner till midnight, walking distance. 25 Mason (at Turk), 409-3276.

Globe, dinner till 1 a.m., great pizzas, frisson salad, mac-and-cheese, steak. 290 Pacific (near Battery), long walk. 391-4132.

Oola, dinner till 1 a.m., see above restaurant list for description.

Ryoko, dinner till 2 a.m., a favorite sushi spot. 619 Taylor between Sutter and Post, walking distance. 775-1028.

Thai House Express, dinner till midnight, see above restaurant list for description, walking distance. 441-2248.

Yuet Lee, dinner till 3 a.m., calamari, scrambled eggs with prawns, and deep fried pig intestines for the more adventurous. 1300 Stockton (at Broadway), very long walk, 982-6020.

Stars awarded to San Francisco Restaurants by the Guide Michelin

**Aqua

**Mina (in St. Francis Hotel)

**Manresa

*Acquerello

*Boulevard

*Dining Room at the Ritz Carlton

*Fifth Floor

*Fleur de Lys

*Gary Danko

*La Folie

*Masa's

*Range

*Rubicon

*Quince

THEATERS WITHIN WALKING DISTANCE OF HOTEL

(Tickets can be purchased across the street from the hotel, at the TIX in Union Square. Or try Theatre Bay Area, at www.theatrebayarea.org, or 415-433-7827 for tickets. including day of performance bargains.)

Cable Car Theatre: The Cable Car Theatre, an intimate space with low ceilings and a casual feel, presents a variety of mainstream and alternative off-Broadway shows. 430 Mason St. (415) 956-8497.

Curran Theatre: Although not as sumptuous as its neighbor, the Geary Theatre, this house does host many traveling Broadway shows. 445 Geary St., (415) 776-1999.

Geary Theatre: Home to the prestigious American Conservatory Theatre. This building's beautiful 1909 facade -- encrusted with colorful foliage -- was recently cleaned and restored to its original luster. 415 Geary St., (415) 743-2228.

Golden Gate Theatre: Built in 1920 for the Orpheum circuit, the Golden Gate Theatre was designed by Gustav Albert Lansburgh, who also constructed SF's Warfield and other theaters across the country. The theater, which used to present vaudeville and feature films in the vein of Radio City Music Hall, was restored in 1979 and now presents Broadway shows. 1 Taylor St., (415) 551-2000.

Il Teatro 450: Formerly known as the 450 Geary Studio Theatre, this small space now features productions by up-and-coming performers from the Bay Area. 450 Geary St., (415) 433-1172.

Lorraine Hansberry Theatre: This 300-seat theatre, which opened in 1981, is named after the African-American author of "Raisin in the Sun" and features productions written by black playwrights. The entrance is through the lobby of the Sheehan Hotel. 620 Sutter St., (415) 474-8800.

Marines Memorial Theater: fun shows, often musical. 877-771-6900

PERFORMANCE SITE PHONE NUMBERS

(All in the 415 area code, some very close to hotel, all can be reached by public transportation)

American Conservatory Theater	749-2228
Yerba Buena Center for the Arts	978-2787
Orpheum Theater	551-2000
San Francisco Ballet	865-2000
Fort Mason Theater	345-7575
Theatre Rhinoceros	861-5079
Victoria Theater	863-7576
San Francisco Opera	864-3330
San Francisco Performances	398-6449
San Francisco Symphony	864-6000

Project Artaud	626-DOME
Ticketmaster	512-7770
Teatre Zinzani	438-2668
Intersection for the Arts	626-2787
Exit on Taylor	675-5995
Zeum	749-2228
Actors Theatre	296-9179
Phoenix Theatre	789-8221

For current shows, and what's playing in the dozens of small theaters, try the METROACTIVE website: <http://metroactive.com/calendar/>

For music events and clubs, try the following website:
<http://www.sanfrancisco.com/music/index.html>

Ticketweb is a very comprehensive on-line service for Bay Area events:
<http://www.ticketweb.com/user/sfbay>

Go to the Laughing Squid site for the underground "what's on in San Francisco": <http://www.laughingsquid.org/>

EXHIBITIONS AT SAN FRANCISCO MUSEUMS

We will post information about special exhibitions on the internet as we approach the Pacific Division meeting dates.

MUSEUMS AND GALLERIES

Sites within walking distance are asterisked. In addition to the (mostly public) sites listed below, there are dozens of private galleries within the blocks surrounding our hotel.

The Museum of Modern Art, within easy walking distance from the hotel, has a major exhibition of Picasso and his influence on American artists scheduled during the APA meeting dates.

(newly reopened) **DeYoung Museum – Museum**

50 Hogwara Tea Garden Drive in Golden Gate Park, (415) 863-3330

Palace of the Legion of Honor – Museum

100 34th Ave San Francisco CA (415) 750-3600

Asian Art Museum-San Francisco – Museum (short bus or one-stop BART ride)

Civic Center, San Francisco CA (415) 557-6966

San Francisco Museum of Modern Art – Museum *

151 3rd St San Francisco CA (415) 357-4000

Museum of the African Diaspora* – Museum *

685 Mission Street, (415) 358-7200

Museum of Craft and Folk Art – Museum *

51 Yerba Buena Lane, San Francisco CA (415) 227-4888

Yerba Buena Center for the Arts – Gallery *

701 Mission St San Francisco CA (415) 978-2787

Zeum (Museum of electronic media arts) *

Yerba Buena Roof Garden, 221 Fourth St, San Francisco CA (415) 777-2800

Cartoon Art Museum – museum *

655 Mission Street, (415) CAR-TOON

California Academy of Sciences – Natural History and Anthropology Museum *

875 Howard St San Francisco CA (415) 321-8000

Folk Art International – Gallery *

140 Maiden Ln San Francisco CA (415) 392-9999

(walk across Union Square to see this little Frank Lloyd Wright building with a mini-spiral ramp, a model for the Guggenheim)

Museum of Craft-Design – Museum *

550 Sutter St San Francisco CA (415) 773-0303

Exploratorium – Museum

3601 Lyon St San Francisco CA (415) 397-5673

San Francisco Women Artists – Gallery

370 Hayes St San Francisco CA (415) 552-7392

San Francisco Performing Arts Library and Museum –

401 Van Ness Avenue, 4th Floor War Memorial Performing Arts Center San Francisco CA (415) 255-4800

Pacific Heritage Museum – Museum

608 Commercial St. San Francisco CA (415) 399-1124

Contemporary Jewish Museum – Museum

121 Steuart St, San Francisco CA (415) 344-8800

S.F. African American Historical and Cultural Society

Fort Mason, San Francisco CA (415) 441-0640

Xanadu Tribal Art Gallery – Gallery *

140 Maiden Ln San Francisco CA (415) 392-9999

American Indian Contemporary Arts – Other *

23 Grant Ave San Francisco CA (415) 989-7003

Center For Electronic Art – School & Studio

250 4th St San Francisco CA (415) 512-9300

Sfmoma Contemporary Extension

151 3rd St San Francisco CA

Museum of Russian Culture

2450 Sutter Street San Francisco CA (415) 921-4082

Museo Italo-Americano – Museum

Fort Mason Center San Francisco CA (415) 673-2200

Capp Street Project – Gallery

525 2nd St San Francisco CA (415) 495-7101

Chinese Historical Society of America – Museum

965 Clay (415) 391-1188

Tattoo Art Museum

841 Columbus Avenue San Francisco CA (415) 775-4991

Museum of the City of San Francisco – Museum

2801 Leavenworth, 3rd floor San Francisco CA (415) 928-0289

Galeria de la Raza-Studio 24 – Gallery

2857 24th St San Francisco CA (415) 826-8009

National Maritime Museum Library – Museum

Bay St at Van Ness Ave Bldg E 3rd Flr San Francisco CA (415) 556-9870

Mission Cultural Center for Latino Arts – School & Studio

2868 Mission Street San Francisco CA (415) 821-1155

Steinhart Aquarium – Museum

Lincoln Way at 9th Ave San Francisco CA (415) 221-5100

African American Art & Culture Complex – Gallery

762 Fulton St San Francisco CA (415) 922-2049

CHILDCARE INFORMATION

There are no readily available short-term childcare facilities in downtown San Francisco. The following organizations may be able to help:

Hazel's Family Child Care

415- 648-8482

Wu Yee Child Care Consulting & Information Services


415-781-7535

The Family Childcare Association of San Francisco has a list of providers, but these usually are not for short term childcare. This list of providers can be found at <http://www.familychildcaresf.org/>.

For short term childcare, San Franciscans often turn to Craig's List. Experienced baby sitters list themselves on Craig's List, and out-of-town families advertise for baby sitters for the location and dates of their visits to the City.


MEZZANINE

WESTIN ST. FRANCIS



2ND FLOOR

WESTIN ST. FRANCIS



12TH FLOOR

WESTIN ST. FRANCIS

