

2013 Eastern Division Meeting

Colloquium Abstracts

Perspectival Pluralism in Experimental Neurobiology (I-G)

Nina Atanasova, University of Cincinnati

I defend a kind of perspectival pluralism as the best account of the integration of experimental results in neurobiology. I develop this view in response to Sullivan's (2009) critique of ruthless reduction and mechanistic integration as accounts of the unity of neuroscience. Sullivan shows that the two accounts of the unity of neurobiology are no better than their predecessor. She argues that their prerequisite convergence and integration of experimental results are not achievable given the multiplicity of experimental protocols that characterizes contemporary neurobiology. I then propose an elaboration on Sullivan's suggestion that pluralism rather than unification characterizes contemporary neurobiology, which goes against Sullivan's (2007) prescription for increasing the complexity of neurobiological experimental designs. I defend a perspectival pluralism in experimental neurobiology, which supports the desirability of the existing multiplicity of experimental protocols and simplicity of experimental situations. Finally, I provide examples of neurobiological practice that support my proposal.

Physicalism and the Puppet Argument (IV-I)

Andrew Bailey, University of Notre Dame

Joshua Rasmussen, University of Notre Dame

We examine an underexplored puzzle concerning a material being's relationship to its parts. Specifically, we investigate how a being could be responsible for its actions if its actions are completely determined by the behavior of its parts. Many discussions of determinism and responsibility have focused on determinism that moves from past states to future states. The determination at issue in our paper is importantly different: it moves from parts to wholes. We explain why the latter type of determination poses a special threat to responsibility that the former does not. We suggest that the best way to escape that threat is to posit a special kind of "top-down" determination, whereby features of an object as a whole explain the behavior of its parts. We conclude by pointing out three puzzling consequences of "top-down" determination. The paper serves to advance our understanding of how people might be related to their parts.

Why Metanormative Realism Won't Come from What is Indispensable to Deliberation (II-F)

Sameer Bajaj, University of Arizona

David Enoch has recently argued for robust metanormative realism, the view that there are "response-independent, non-natural, irreducibly normative truths." He argues that the indispensability of

normative truths to deliberation justifies belief in the existence of normative truths. This is because deliberation is a “rationally non-optional” project, and indispensability to a rationally non-optional project suffices to justify ontological belief. In this essay, I argue that Enoch’s argument faces a dilemma. If the putative normative truth that the deliberative project is rationally non-optional must have a realist ontology for Enoch’s argument to work, then the indispensability argument is redundant, since it presumes what it aims to establish, namely, that there is at least one realist normative truth. Yet if a normative truth without a realist ontology can justify the deliberative project, then it is unclear why deliberation requires commitment to realist normative truths.

Aspects (IV-I)

Donald Baxter, University of Connecticut

In metaphysics there are a number of problems in which the apparent unitariness of a thing is in tension with its apparent qualitative complexity. I will give a metaphysical argument that these appearances should be taken seriously; there really is self-differing. I will focus on a case of what I will call Differential Resemblance—a case mentioned by Hume in his discussion of distinctions of reason. The case will suggest that there is qualitative complexity without quantitative complexity. That is, there is qualitative self-differing that cannot be explained by saying that something is intimately related to or partly made up of numerically distinct things. Another way to put it is that things have numerically identical but qualitatively differing “aspects.”

Rediscovering Compassion (IV-H)

Steve Bein, State University of New York–Geneseo

Everyday moral intuitions hold compassion in high esteem, with sensible moral reasons for doing so, but compassion plays virtually no role in most of the predominant moral theories of our day. Its absence is perhaps most notable in utilitarianism, for a *prima facie* analysis would suggest that “maximizing utility” and “behaving compassionately” are very similar on many counts. I argue here that one potential cause of compassion’s conspicuous absence is a fundamental misunderstanding, pervasive in both modern and contemporary philosophy, of compassion itself. Compassion is usually mistaken for commiseration. Here I lay out a more robust understanding of compassion that is not restricted in the ways commiseration is restricted, one that includes sharing in experiences of happiness as of experiences of sorrow. I defend my unorthodox model of compassion against the ordinary sense, using utilitarianism as a lens through which to view this model.

Perceptual Content and Epistemic Foundations (V-J)

Susan Blake, Indiana University–Bloomington

I argue for a broadly Sellarsian conclusion—that the capacities required to possess perceptual beliefs and related perceptual content are in fact relevant to epistemic entitlement. I begin from anti-individualist assumptions about mental content—that content is not fixed by the objects that occasion a

perceptual response. Some abilities required for content possession—those involved in deference to others and recognition and correction of error—are incompatible with common foundationalist notions of perceptual entitlement, which include the constraint that perceptual content must be in some way the same as that of the belief it supports. Further, this argument implies that Tyler Burge’s account of content does not support the idea that we have perceptual entitlement to shared beliefs; his two accounts are thus at odds with each other.

Problems for Perfectionism (II-G)

Gwen Bradford, Rice University

Perfectionism is the view that developing the human essence is good. In this paper, I defend perfectionism against some recent formulations of classic objections. The first objection is that perfectionism counterintuitively undervalues the relevance of (1) pleasure and (2) preferences. The second objection is a sophisticated version of the “wrong properties” objection, wherein the intuitively plausibility of the perfectionist ideal is threatened by a lack of theoretical pressure to accept putative wrong properties cases. I argue these objections are unsuccessful but introduce a new worry, the Deep Problem: perfectionism fails to offer a satisfying foundational justification for why developing the human essence is valuable. The lack of immediate intuitions directed toward the general perfectionist claim place a special burden on perfectionism to provide a justificatory foundation, in contrast to other competing axiologies. In response to the Deep Problem, I consider a new and surprising direction for perfectionism.

Implicit Bias, Context, and Character (VI-F)

Michael Brownstein, New Jersey Institute of Technology

Implicit biases are evaluations of social groups that exist outside of conscious awareness or control. Such biases have been shown to impact social behavior, particularly in the context of race. One reason implicit biases are pernicious is that they tend to persist and to influence the behavior of individuals who don’t endorse the validity of those very biases. Most philosophical writing about implicit bias has focused on this fact, and for good reason. However, there is now substantial evidence that context strongly mediates the activation and expression in behavior of implicit biases. This poses a distinct ethical problem. Whereas the familiar worry is that implicit biases cause agents to be internally disharmonious (Gendler 2008), the worry from context-dependence is that implicit biases threaten the stability of agents’ character. I describe the threat of characterological instability and, in the conclusion of the paper, discuss some strategies for combatting it.

Hegel, the Trinity, and the I (VIII-E)

Paolo Bubbio, University of Western Sydney–Australia

The goal of this paper is to argue the relevance of Hegel’s notion of the Trinity with respect to two aspects of Hegel’s idealism: the overcoming of subjectivism and his conception of the I. I contend that

these two aspects are interconnected and that the Trinity is important to Hegel's strategy for addressing these questions. I argue that the recognitive structure of Hegel's idealism led him to give the Trinity a decisive role in his philosophical account. Also, I argue that the Trinity represents a model for re-thinking the I in a way that overcomes a "naïve realist" and a "subjective" account of the self. I suggest that Hegel's absolute idealism can be conceived as an approach to the I that considers the role of mutual recognition for the genesis of self-conscious thought, and that the Trinity is the *Darstellung* of the relational and recognitive structure of the I.

Trope Bundles in Plato's *Timaeus* (VII-G)

Christopher Buckels, University of California–Davis

I argue that Plato employs a trope bundle theory of particulars in the *Timaeus*. A trope is a particular property-instance; in Plato's language, it is a "this-such" (*toiouton*) or Form image. Plato's tropes coexist with and are dependent upon Forms (i.e., abstract universals), as the name "Form images" implies. So a heat trope, for example, is an image of the Form Heat. In a Platonic bundle theory, fire, for example, turns out to be a bundle of compresent heat, color, shape, and so on. Plato grounds compresence in location; ordinary objects are bundles of co-located Form images, which are located in an absolute space that Plato calls the Receptacle. I examine some disputed passages in the *Timaeus* and argue that they contain a trope bundle theory. Then I look at some novel features of Plato's bundle theory in comparison with contemporary theories.

Unintended Constituents and the Sundial Tribe (V-H)

Mihnea Capraru, Syracuse University

I join the contextualism-relativism debate on the side of contextualism. To defend contextualism I tackle two difficulties: the problem of semantic blindness and the issues related to the kind of semantic naivety evinced by John Perry and by François Recanati. To address these difficulties I argue (1) that as contextualists we can adopt semantic blindness and do so quite plausibly, and (2) that we ought to accept Perryan naivety yet reject Perry's relativist conclusions. Toward these ends I array a family of cases involving a nomadic linguistic community I call the Sundial Tribe. From the Sundial cases emerges a radically externalist view that I call mindless contextualism. According to mindless contextualism, linguistic utterances can semantically encode unintended constituents, that is, constituents of semantic content that are not known, as such, to competent speakers.

Moore's Paradox and Akratic Belief (V-I)

Eugene Chislenko, University of California–Berkeley

G. E. Moore noticed the oddity of statements like "It's raining, but I don't believe it." This oddity is often seen as analogous to the oddity of believing akratically, or against one's better judgment. It has been appealed to in denying the possibility of akratic belief. I describe a Belief Akratic's Paradox, analogous to Moore's Paradox and centered on sentences such as "I believe it's raining, but I shouldn't believe it." I

then defend the possibility of akratic belief against appeals to this analogy. I argue both that akratic belief does not require belief-akratic-paradoxical belief, and that the latter is importantly different from Moorean belief. I conclude by considering the implications of these disanalogies for an account of akratic belief.

Workmanship of the Understanding: Locke on Representation (IV-G)

Ronald Claypool, University of Florida

In this paper I will offer a suggestion as to what Locke means by representation. My focus will be to get clear on how it is that general ideas are supposed to represent all the various things they need to—how things like freedom, horse, and red represent instances of freedom, horsiness, and redness. I will also endeavor to show how it is possible that non-imagistic ideas could be ultimately based upon imagistic ones. I will show how what Robert Hanna called Locke's "decompositional analysis" of complex ideas into simple ones can work. To this end, I will discuss Michael Jacovides's reading of Locke's resemblance theses, and argue that it is insufficient, before suggesting that we understand Locke to have offered a theory of representation that is based upon our use of ideas and terms to represent.

Cartesianism and Epistemic Normativity (VIII-G)

Nevin Climenhaga, University of Notre Dame

In this paper I defend a theory of rational normativity and apply it to traditional debates in normative epistemology. First, I outline my theory, according to which norms that state rational requirements all apply to some kind of agential behavior—believing, acting, hoping, intending, etc. These behaviors represent their objects as having certain features, and this representational content determines the behaviors' function. This function in turn determines the norms governing the behaviors. Since believing that *P* represents *P* as true, the function of belief is to track truth. From this, I argue, it follows that "Believe only what is true" is a correct epistemic norm. Second, I consider "ought implies can." I argue that this principle is false as it means that we must exert voluntary control over a behavior. For example, we do not have voluntary control of our intentions, and yet these are still normatively appraisable. Instead, what is common about behaviors that are normatively appraisable is that they are all reasons responsive—we are able to affect the behavior by reflection and deliberation on our reasons. This suggests an alternate interpretation of "ought implies can." On this interpretation, *N*'s being a correct norm requires that insofar as an agent is rational, she is able to regulate her behavior in accordance with *N*—not by choosing to follow *N*, but by reflecting on her reasons to follow *N*. Third, I argue that the norm to believe only truths, combined with the above interpretation of "ought implies can," allows us to derive the Cartesian thesis that we ought to believe all and only those propositions that are certain for us. My basic argument is that it is only possible to rationally conform our doxastic attitudes to that norm if we do not believe any propositions that even might be false.

Thinking Matter in Locke's Proof of God's Existence (IV-G)

Patrick Connolly, Iowa State University

Commentators almost universally agree that Locke denies the possibility of thinking matter in 4.10 of the Essay. Further, they argue that Locke must do this for his argument to be successful. I disagree. I think that Locke allows for the possibility that matter can think. Further, I argue that this does not destroy his argument; it helps to illuminate the nature of it. There are two main stages to my argument. First, Locke denies that matter can produce thought. I distinguish between two senses of production to show that this claim is compatible with the existence of thinking matter. Second, Locke denies that God could be a system of randomly moving particles. Most commentators take this to mean that such a system could not think. I argue that Locke merely denies that such a system could have the wisdom and knowledge of God.

Guns, Moral Rights, and Physical Security (VII-H)

David DeGrazia, George Washington University

The slaughter of elementary schoolchildren in Newtown, Connecticut, has finally motivated American politicians to reexamine gun policy. This talk will focus on ethics, rather than law, because the ethical terrain is less well-trod, and ethics has a critical role to play in the evaluation of policy. The discussion will concentrate on moral rights because gun advocates emphasize moral (as well as legal) rights to bear arms. And the discussion will be restricted to handguns, which are considered especially appropriate for self-defense in the home. After outlining what I take to be the strongest case for a moral right to own handguns—the Argument from Physical Security (APS)—I critically evaluate the argument and cast doubt on two pivotal assumptions. Acknowledging reasonable disagreement about the soundness of APS, I suggest a way of steering sensibly through the uncertainty toward justified gun policy.

A Defense of Responsibility for Needs Accounts of Parental Obligation Acquisition (VI-H)

Jake Earl, Georgetown University

It is common sense to believe that there are many cases in which people acquire special obligations to care for newborn infants they have voluntarily produced. Surprisingly, there is a dearth of plausible theories of parental obligation that can justify this common-sense belief. Joseph Millum has argued that an otherwise-plausible candidate theory of parental obligation, the “responsibility for needs” account, utterly fails to explain how people acquire parental obligations even in the easiest cases. I argue that Millum’s argument fails because it assumes a false view of the necessary conditions for morally responsible action, a view that Harry Frankfurt showed false in 1969. My argument has important implications for philosophical understandings of moral parenthood and ethical problems related to gamete donation, surrogacy, and same-sex parents that such understandings attempt to address.

Moral Supervenience and Moral Knowledge: How Not to Defend Moral Perception (II-F)

Stewart Eskew, University of Wisconsin–Madison

Moral perceptualism is the view that we can have knowledge of moral facts on the basis of our perceptual experiences of moral facts in much the same way that our knowledge of the external world is based on our perceptual experiences of external world facts. This view seems wholly incompatible with a prominent view about the nature of moral facts. According to non-naturalism, moral facts are non-natural in the sense that they are (at least partly) composed of causally inert moral properties. However, it seems that because we are able to perceive material objects only in virtue of their causal powers, the causally inert nature of moral properties renders it mysterious how we could perceive moral facts. Recently, Justin McBrayer has defended the claim that we can perceive non-natural moral facts in virtue of directly perceiving the non-moral facts on which they supervene. I argue that McBrayer's account fails to establish that we can have knowledge of non-natural moral facts on the basis of our perceptual experience of those moral facts.

Wild Rights (VII-H)

Kyle Fruh, Georgetown University

Wild animals pose an interesting challenge for moral theories that address the standing of individual, non-human animals by positing animal rights. In particular, animal rights views are confronted with the question of whether wild animals have a rights claim to human assistance. In expanding her capabilities view to cover non-human animals, Martha Nussbaum has argued that they do have such a claim, and a strong one at that. The most influential defender of animal rights, Tom Regan, has argued that wild animals have exactly one rights claim on us, and that is to be left alone. Neither position is satisfactory: while the former jeopardizes the very possibility of wilderness, the latter is an insufficient account of the claims of wild animals in a world where human activity is omnipresent. Progress requires a way for wild animals to have restricted claims on humans for assistance without forgoing their wildness.

Cognitive Penetration and the Nature of Experience (V-J)

Dimitria Gatzia, University of Akron–Wayne College

The influence of perception on cognition is a rather uncontroversial issue in philosophy and psychology. We often come to form beliefs, or other cognitive states, on the basis of our experiences. For example, one's perceptual experience of a red traffic light can bring about the belief that one must bring the car into a full stop. The influence of cognition on perception, on the other hand, is a far more controversial issue. MacPherson (2012) defends the view that perception is cognitively penetrable and proposes an indirect mechanism that purports to explain how cognitive penetration may occur. This paper accepts the first part of MacPherson's argument—which involves a counterexample to the cognitive impenetrability thesis—but aims to show that the indirect mechanism she proposes is based on the flawed assumption that perception is passive (Spruit 2008). Two cases of blind subjects who regained their sight late in life are used to illustrate that perception arises from interactions between sensory

inputs and prior knowledge. This view of perception provides a natural explanation for cognitive penetration, one that does not involve such an indirect mechanism.

Heidegger's Modal Claims and Being-Expressive Semantics (VIII-E)

Kevin Gin, University of California–Riverside

There is a *prima facie* tension between the goal of Heidegger's project and his method. Heidegger claims that his methodology is phenomenology, which operates by way of description. But every chapter of *Being and Time* is riddled with claims about what must be the case. The tension arises because we cannot ordinarily (or ever?) justify modally loaded claims through mere description of the world. Wayne Martin has argued that a solution to this problem involves getting clear on the semantics of "Dasein." In this paper, I present the semantic theory that I take Heidegger to have had in mind and show how this would help the tension mentioned above. In addition, by getting clear on Heidegger's semantics, I better indicate exactly what Heidegger needs from phenomenology to justify his modal claims.

Can Retribution Change the Past? (V-G)

David Goldman, Yale University

I defend the retributivist claim that criminal punishment nullifies the wrongdoing to which it is a response. Such proposals are often the subject of philosophical ridicule. After all, how can we claim to have annulled a murder by putting the murderer in jail? Someone has been killed! Nothing we do will change that. At best, perhaps, talk about "annulment" is an imprecise, metaphorical way of referring to other things punishment accomplishes, like repaying a debt or condemning the wrongdoer's action. These might be valuable ends promoted by punishment, and there might be an attenuated sense in which it is appropriate to say that doing so annuls or cancels the wrongdoing. But surely a genuine, retroactive annulment of the past wrongdoing—literally changing the past—is impossible. I argue that it is, in fact, possible to change past wrongdoing. Moreover, it is possible to do so through criminal punishment.

A Pluralist Theory of Truthmaking (IV-I)

Aaron Griffith, Central Michigan University

In this paper a program for a new approach to the theory of truthmaking is presented, which I call a "pluralist theory of truthmaking" (PTT). It is suggested that truthmaking is a variegated phenomenon wherein different truths (e.g., positive existential truths, negative existential truths, conditional truths, etc.) are made true in different ways. According to PTT, for each class of truths there will be a unique principle of truthmaking (i.e., a principle setting out necessary and sufficient conditions under which a proposition is made true by something). Here PTT is characterized and motivated and a number of principles of truthmaking are formulated.

Agent Relativism and Rationally Arbitrary Obligations (V-F)

Berkeley Hall, Georgetown University

Many are inclined toward the view that an agent's practical starting position (desires, values, etc.) determine which features of the world count as reasons for her to do what, and that her reasons in turn determine her obligations in such a way that a difference in practical starting position alone is sufficient for a difference in obligations. I will argue that this sort of view makes differences in the reasons and obligations faced by different agents rationally arbitrary.

Is Knowledge True Belief Plus Adequate Information? (VIII-G)

Michael Hannon, Cambridge University

In his book *When is True Belief Knowledge?* (2012), Richard Foley argues that a subject *S* knows that *p* if and only if there is no important nearby information that *S* lacks. Whether a true belief counts as knowledge thus hinges on the importance of the information one has or lacks. This paper raises doubts about whether there is an informative way to distinguish important information from unimportant information.

The Sincerity of Valuing: Honesty as a Nietzschean Value Standard (VIII-E)

Aaron Harper, West Liberty University

There is an obvious, or at least apparent, tension at the heart of Nietzsche's metaethical position; he denies the traditional authority and objectivity of morality, but in doing so he seems to undermine his own standpoint for providing criticism and offering new values. I hold that Nietzsche offers his values as more than mere preferences, and in this paper I examine the kinds of value standards available to Nietzsche that we find present in his work. Rather than locating external value standards, I argue that Nietzsche offers internal standards of value, which I explicate by focusing on one particular value standard—honesty. Despite Nietzsche's well-known criticisms of truth, he upholds honesty as the only remaining virtue of his free spirits. I defend honesty as a distinct kind of truthfulness, first evident in Nietzsche's work on tragedy, and later in *Zarathustra*, that reveals a distinct kind of limitation on valuing.

Four Arguments against Julia Driver's Utilitarian Account of Virtue (VII-I)

Robert Hartman, Saint Louis University

Julia Driver has recently developed a powerful utilitarian account of virtue. According to her, a virtue is a character trait that systematically produces good states of affairs. If her account of virtue is plausible, it would constitute a significant achievement for utilitarian ethicists because virtue is an important feature of our moral lives and yet many utilitarian theorists fail to provide an account of it. Nevertheless, I will argue that her account of virtue contradicts several pre-theoretical intuitions about virtue. And since other dominant theories of virtue are able to accommodate those intuitions, I aim to show that there

are four intuitions with respect to which Driver's account of virtue is less plausible than other major accounts of virtue.

Kant's Argument for the Principle of Intensive Magnitudes (VI-G)

Tim Jankowiak, Southern Utah University

In *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant argues for a Principle of Intensive Magnitudes, according to which every possible object of experience will possess a degree of "reality" (*Realität*), which is the measure of how much the object fills space. This principle is important to Kant's system because it grounds important claims in his physical theory. However, most commentators take the argument for the principle to be a complete failure. In this paper, I provide a reconstruction of the argument that shows how to rehabilitate the principle back into Kant's transcendental theory of experience. Kant's argument depends on the peculiar relationship between sensations (*Empfindungen*) and what he refers to as the "matter of appearance." I show that we can only make sense of this argument by appeal to Kant's theory of empirical intuition and an account of what sensation contributes to the representational content of intuition.

Hume's "Former Opinions" (IV-G)

Emily Kelahan, Illinois Wesleyan University

Hume was dissatisfied with his account of personal identity. He writes: "But upon a more strict review of the section concerning personal identity, I find myself involved in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent" (T App 10). "Former opinions" is almost universally taken to refer to philosophical opinions concerning Hume's central theoretical apparatus; however, "former opinions" is indeterminate in this passage. I argue that Hume's "former opinions" are best interpreted as pre-theoretical opinions he formed well before pursuing his science of human nature.

On Epistemological Objections to the Threshold View (VIII-G)

Matthew Lee, University of Notre Dame

Richard Foley's "Threshold View" identifies believing a proposition with having a sufficiently high degree of confidence (or degree of belief) in that proposition. This view was introduced in order to effect a "turn" in epistemology by enabling epistemologists to bring arguments and intuitions concerning the rationality of confidence to bear on the epistemology of belief, and vice versa. But the Threshold View has met with significant resistance, stemming mainly (though not solely) from a handful of epistemological objections. This paper addresses objections based on the Lottery Paradox, the Preface Paradox, pragmatic encroachment, and concerns about beliefs based on "naked statistical evidence." The standard reply to the first two does not help with the third or fourth, the standard reply to the third does not help with the others, and there is no standard reply to the fourth. I propose some new lines of response that apply to all four objections.

Exploitation and the Metaphysics of Harm (III-G)

Hallie Liberto, University of Connecticut

Exploitation theorists distinguish between cases of harmful exploitation, in which an exploited person is made worse off by a transaction, and mutually beneficial exploitation, in which the exploited person, along with his exploiter, is made better off. Instances of mutually beneficial exploitation are what give rise to the interesting question: What is the special wrong of exploitation? After all, we cannot point to harm in such cases. In this paper I will argue two points: first, that a wide array of cases that are typically considered instances of mutually beneficial exploitation might, in fact, be harmful, depending on what leading account of the metaphysics of harm we adopt; second, even though these accounts narrow the scope of mutually beneficial exploitation and broaden the scope of harmful exploitation, they still do not remove the need to analyze the concept of wrongful exploitation independently from harm.

External Manipulation (III-G)

Michael Madary, Johannes Gutenberg Universitat Mainz–Germany

In the beginning of the presentation I introduce examples of ordinary external manipulation and suggest that such manipulations influence our behavior. Then I describe how the existence of ordinary external manipulation creates a challenge for compatibilist theories of moral responsibility. The main thesis of the presentation is that a modified version of Fischer and Ravizza's (1998) account of moral responsibility can account for normal cases of external manipulation. The modification is that we take ownership of mechanisms of action that are partly external, rather than exclusively internal.

Love and Agency (IV-H)

Adrienne Martin, University of Pennsylvania

I present a conception of love that draws on a broadly Kantian moral psychology and theory of action. According to this conception, to love a person is to have the familiar desires we associated with love—to be near the beloved, to promote her well-being, and so on—but also to take up those desires as reasons to set ends of being near the beloved, promoting her well-being, and so on. I thus call this the “incorporation” conception of love, because it says that, when we love, we incorporate our loving desires into our loving ends. The incorporation conception presupposes a broadly Kantian moral psychology with three main elements: a dualist theory of human motivation, the attribution of a reflective structure to practical deliberation, and the claim that interpersonal relations are governed by a norm requiring respect. After presenting this moral psychology and the incorporation conception of love that it enables, I present some of the advantages of the conception. First, I argue that it has the ability to surmount the challenges David Velleman raises to accounts of love based in motivation or volition. Second, I argue that it provides a promising account of the continuities and differences between different kinds of love (romantic love, familial love, friendly love, etc.). These strengths, along with some others that I can only gesture at here, provide compelling reasons for taking seriously the incorporation conception and the moral psychology it presupposes. It has long been recognized that Kant’s moral theory is not as hostile to the emotions as it was once thought—we should now consider, I

urge, that his more general view of human psychology and motivation provides the resources for rich and compelling accounts of core human emotions.

Qualities as Proper Grounds of Love (IV-H)

Aaron Mead, University of California–Los Angeles

My central aim in this paper is to defend a version of the quality theory of the grounds of love. A simple quality theory holds that qualities like beauty or virtue may be grounds for loving someone—i.e., considerations that render love for a person appropriate. I begin by defending this view against the substitution objection, which holds that the quality theory is mistaken since it implies I should be indifferent to the substitution of my beloved for his type-identical doppelganger. After all, if the beloved's qualities ground my love, then I have identical grounds for loving the doppelganger. In reply, I argue that either substitution is unproblematic (e.g., in dating situations) or the reason we would not be indifferent to substitution of the beloved need have nothing to do with the grounds for love. Rather, our commitment to the beloved (e.g., in a spousal relationship) could be the reason we would not be indifferent to substitution. Such a commitment can be viewed as a kind of (moral) consideration wholly different from those that ground love. In light of such a commitment, we can understand the qualities of the beloved as grounds of love without the threat of substitution. Despite this reply, I concede that, along with non-relational qualities, relationships may function as grounds for love. However, I reject Kolodny's view that such relationships are love's sole grounds in favor of a pluralist view that includes non-relational qualities. In the last section of the paper I offer several positive arguments for such a pluralist view. For example, I argue that the pluralist view accounts for the beginning of love in certain relationships, and for certain cases of ambivalent love, better than Kolodny's strict relationship view.

Induction in Applied Ethics Variant Case Arguments (V-G)

Thomas Metcalf, University of Colorado–Boulder

I examine the ubiquitous technique of variant cases in applied ethics. I show that common uses of the technique depend upon employing an ampliative argument-form. I consider several inductive versions of this argument-form and show that such versions are open to powerful objections. Therefore, proponents of the technique of variant cases in applied ethics must find a new justification of the technique.

The Egalitarian Ethos and Agent-Prerogatives (VIII-F)

Jari Niemi, Miami Dade College

G. A. Cohen's notion of an egalitarian social ethos faces an objection which alleges that because Cohen is committed to certain self-interested agent prerogatives consistent with his egalitarian social ethos, he is by that very commitment also forced to allow a wider variety of other, non-selfish agent prerogatives which necessitate incentive demands, thus creating increasing economic inequalities not envisioned by Cohen. If true, Cohen's defense of economic equality would be in jeopardy. This paper argues that while

Cohen's allowance of self-interested agent prerogatives do indeed commit him to other, non-selfish agent prerogatives, such acceptance does not commit him to inegalitarian incentive demands. This is because non-selfish agent prerogatives are inconsistent with inegalitarian incentive demands.

Black Identity and Collective Action: A Critique of Tommie Shelby's *We Who Are Dark* (VI-F)

Laura Papish, George Washington University

In *We Who Are Dark*, Tommie Shelby argues that black political solidarity can be grounded in goals that all African Americans can be reasonably expected to endorse, such as eliminating anti-black racism and alleviating ghetto poverty. As such, attempts to develop black political solidarity need not—and in fact ought not—involve demands that its participants cultivate a black identity or have any commitments to black culture. In lieu of these “thick” forms of identity, Shelby claims collective action requires only a “thin” black identity, one based on common experiences of anti-black racism. My essay examines Shelby's conception of thin blackness. After describing in detail the balances Shelby tries to strike between a thin blackness and a robust political solidarity, I develop several criticisms of his approach. I conclude by developing an alternative to thin blackness, one I think will better secure the potential for robust collective action.

When Does Downward Mobility Matter? A Two-Threshold Approach to Mobility and Security (VIII-F)

Govind Persad, Stanford University

Job market changes and recent economic disruptions have subjected many to downward economic mobility. In this paper, I sketch an account of how a just society might approach the problem of downward mobility via a principle of protecting economic security. I suggest defining security as a capability and defining it with respect to some threshold: security is being able to maintain, should you so choose, some threshold level of some good or capability over time. I argue that we should think of the security threshold as separate from, and higher than, a sufficientarian adequacy threshold. I then contrast my proposal with alternatives, including a single-threshold approach of simply treating anyone assured of remaining above a high adequacy threshold as secure, and the influential Rockefeller Foundation Economic Security Index (ESI), on which anyone who experiences a major decline in economic status is insecure, regardless of where the decline begins and ends.

Kant's Agnosticism about Things in Themselves (VI-G)

Mark Pickering, University of Rochester

I will argue that Kant holds that we have no theoretical reason to believe in the existence of things in themselves. The *Critique of Pure Reason* holds only that we can say very little about what such things would be like were they to exist. Although Kant seems to say in a few passages that things in themselves affect what he calls our “sensibility” and that we must assume that things in themselves underlie what

he calls “appearances,” I argue that Kant is only describing unwarranted assumptions we make. All we can definitively say about things in themselves is what they would be like were there to be any. Kant holds that we must assume the existence of things in themselves because our reason must give an account of the supersensible.

Cruel and Unusual Care and Punishment: Epistemic Injustices in Correctional Health Care (VI-H)

Andrea Pitts, Vanderbilt University

Hermeneutical injustice occurs when a collective gap in knowledge unfairly deprives an individual of an ability to make sense of her or his own experiences. Cases of hermeneutical injustice often involve forms of implicit bias and meta-ignorance that support the shared gaps of a social group’s interpretive resources. To elucidate the harms caused by such forms of bias and meta-ignorance, I suggest that we turn to a concrete example, in this case, the context of correctional health care. In this paper, I argue that prisoners may face hermeneutical injustices with respect to their medical care. One of the primary reasons for this is that the current legal evidentiary requirements needed to prove civil rights violations with respect to medical care in prisons set unobtainable standards for many prisoners. The inaccessibility of those standards, I propose, is due to a series of hermeneutical gaps among the epistemic resources available to prisoners.

The Varieties of Envy (II-G)

Sara Protasi, Yale University

Psychologists define envy as an aversive reaction to a perceived inferiority, which we feel toward those who are similar to us, with respect to a good or goal pertaining to a domain that is relevant to our sense of identity. This definition, however, applies to at least two different emotions, with opposite moral valences: malicious envy and benign envy. Scholars have provided different accounts of the distinction. Psychologists believe the crucial factor is whether the envier feels capable to overcome her disadvantage. Philosophers suggest that what differs is the subject’s focus of attention, that is, on whether one is focused on lacking the good or on the fact that someone else, the envied, has it. In my paper I show that both variables are at play and that they do not co-vary but are independent. Consequently, we can experience not just two but four kinds of envy, with varying degree of maliciousness: emulative envy, inert envy, aggressive envy, and spiteful envy. The implications of this taxonomy are wide-ranging: it accounts for the fact that we have many different, sometimes contradictory, intuitions and experiences of envy; it casts light on the moral dimensions of this deadly sin, showing that envy is not always sinful, and that, even when it is, it is not always deadly; it allows the moral educator to target her interventions against envy’s most sneaky and despicable expressions, while encouraging the noble kind.

Supererogation in an Ethics of Care (VI-H)

Rodney Roberts, East Carolina University

Most philosophers who advance an ethics of care do not claim that their theories are meant to account for all of morality, or that they can, or should, replace the traditional Western approaches to moral theory. However, one care ethicist, Michael Slote, holds that his theory can be used to understand all of individual and political morality. Moreover, Slote claims that the way in which his theory accommodates supererogation constitutes a real advantage over the traditional approaches to ethics. My aim in this paper is to show that Slote's theory has difficulty accommodating supererogation. Since the only support for his claim of an advantage over the traditional approaches to ethics is his own account of supererogation, the success of my argument should be enough to cast considerable doubt on the truth of this claim.

Darwin's Quandary (I-G)

Sarah Roe, University of California–Davis

Through "Speaking of Species: Darwin's Strategy," John Beatty was able to change the way we think of Darwin and how Darwin thought of species. Beatty argues that species were, for Darwin, just what naturalists called "species." I argue that Beatty's strategy disallows for times when Darwin was indeed attempting to say something new about species. Although Darwin did not have his own species concept, he was able to utilize some important guiding principles. Therefore, it may be the case that Beatty's strategy was not Darwin's strategy, and if I have indeed cast doubt on the received view provided by John Beatty, then perhaps we must also reexamine the rest of the twentieth-century debate regarding Darwin's species concept, or lack thereof.

Invariant Content Theory for Epistemic Modals (V-H)

David Sackris, State University of New York–Buffalo

Contrary to the popular sentiment in the literature, I argue a plausible case can be made for an invariant semantic content of utterances making use of modals epistemically. I shall argue that an invariant semantics does do a reasonable job addressing problem cases that are typically appealed to in arguments concerning the fitness of any account of the semantics of epistemic modals. I shall argue that an invariant semantics, when combined with a performative account of such utterances, is able to capture speaker intuitions in the central case of speaker retraction typically focused on by theorists working in this area.

Paradox and Incompleteness (VI)

Paul Saka, University of Texas–Pan American

Belief paradoxes such as *B*, "No one believes *B*," carry a number of notable consequences: that no one can know everything, that no one can know their own mind, that no one can know their own cognitive limitations, that no one can recognize their own consistency, and that in a world of perfect thinkers

some truths would not be known at all. I shall sketch proofs of some of the preceding claims, I shall propose a treatment of non-believer sentences, and I shall compare my work with previous contributions on the topic, in particular that of Tyler Burge and Roy Sorensen.

Polity versus Democracy in Aristotle's Politics (III-F)

Athanasios Samaras, University of Georgia

In this paper I argue that there are four instances of *politeia* in the narrow sense (polity) in Aristotle's *Politics* and not only three as usually assumed. I further demonstrate that polity is intended as a solution to the acute banausic problem that many Greek cities, including Athens, faced at the time of the composition of the *Politics*. Finally, I argue that Aristotle's polity, a *politeia* that denies citizenship to banausics, falls within the tradition of the theory of the "mixed constitution" in the fourth century B.C.

Persons and Protagonists: Aristotle's Poetics and Personal Identity (III-F)

Stephanie Semler, Northern Virginia Community College

I believe that what Aristotle tells us about characters in tragic plays is instructive about his concept of persons in his ethical works. It might seem, *prima facie*, that the protagonists of tragedy cannot really be persons in any sense that requires true self-determination. After all, the plot is the driving force for all the characters, while the tragic hero is seemingly also swept away by his tragic error. Because of this, it might seem that there is no room for self-determination in the world of the protagonist. However, since the purpose of tragedy is to elicit pity and fear, we must engage with the hero as a person. What is more, the hero himself cannot see that the plot drives his actions—only the audience can see this. Placing the audience in a position of relative omniscience allows us to view the hero as we might ourselves be seen by the gods: we see an individual identity in the protagonist, but we also view the trajectory of his entire life and lament the destruction of what might have been a happy life. I do not mean, however, to imply that he is making a commentary on ethics in *Poetics*. Many commentators have argued that Aristotle is making a political commentary in his discussion of tragedy, most notably Jonathan Lear, "Testing the Limits: The Place of Tragedy in Aristotle's Ethics," in *Aristotle and Moral Realism*, edited by Robert Heinaman (Routledge, 1995), 61–84, and Martha Craven Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy*, rev. ed. (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). I simply wish to use Aristotle's model of a character in a tragic play to show how it mirrors the structure of an individual in the world.

Deontic Conditionals: Weak and Strong (V-F)

Alex Silk, University of Michigan

Discussions of the Miners Puzzle have prompted renewed interest in how deontic modal claims can be sensitive to relevant information. But these discussions have focused on a limited range of data. I argue that what makes the Miners Puzzle a puzzle are features unique to the semantics of weak necessity modals like "ought." In light of an independently motivated semantics for "ought," as compared with

“must” and “may,” we can explain the data concerning information-sensitivity without introducing any novel complexities into our semantics for modals and conditionals more generally. By considering examples with possibility modals and strong necessity modals, and examining the import of subtle shifts in context, we can illuminate how context and content mutually interact to guide how we coordinate our actions and expectations in conversation, deliberation, and planning.

Of Famines and Food Deserts: Resources, Capabilities, and Democratic Failure (VIII-F)

Andrew Smith, Drexel University

The lack of both ready access to affordable, healthful food and command over healthful eating practices are largely unchecked epidemics in the United States. Some 23.5 million Americans currently live in food deserts: disadvantaged socioeconomic communities in which reasonably priced, nutritious food is difficult to obtain—and, when available, to utilize. This leaves them vulnerable to a variety of diet-related ailments and an increased risk of premature death. I draw on considerations offered by Amartya Sen, who has written extensively on famine as a failure of functional governance, to argue (1) that the perpetuation of food deserts represents an acute breakdown specifically of functional democracy (2) that is best addressed by employing his capabilities approach to justice.

Socrates and Thick Ethical Concepts (VII-G)

Nicholas Smyth, Brown University

Plato tells us that his teacher was unjustly condemned to death for corrupting Athenian youth. However, it is clear that the charge was not entirely fallacious, as Socrates’s problematic relation to traditional Athenian morality is obvious to any sophisticated reader of the Socratic dialogues. However, it is not easy to characterize this tension nor to appreciate just why certain Athenians would have perceived Socrates as a threat. In this paper, I deploy the distinction between “thick” and “thin” ethical concepts to shed some light on this issue. I claim that Socrates, as the father of foundationalist ethical theory, was committed to nothing short of a revolution in Athenian moral discourse, wherein traditional “thick” virtue-concepts were undermined and replaced by a single master-virtue. In order to show how Socrates tries to accomplish this monumental feat, I focus on the *Laches* and *Charmides*. In these early dialogues, Socrates deploys two distinct assumptions about virtue which lead, inexorably, to the elimination of traditional thick concepts *sophrosune* and *andreia*, and to their replacement with a single concept, “knowledge of good and evil.”

Practical Knowledge of Freedom in Kant’s Critical Philosophy (VI-G)

Sasa Stankovic, University of King's College–Nova Scotia

Kant grounds his practical philosophy on the concept of empirically unconditioned causality, that is, on the concept of freedom. However, this concept is problematic in the sense that it cannot be known theoretically; in other words, it cannot be determined in empirical intuition. Does this mean that Kant's

practical philosophy has a dogmatic basis? I argue that it does not. My argument consists of two parts. First, I argue that in practical knowledge the concept of empirically unconditioned causality, that is, the concept of freedom does not mean what it means in theoretical knowledge. Therefore, this practical concept of freedom cannot be dogmatic on the criteria of theoretical knowledge because it does not subscribe to those criteria. Second, I argue, even though this practical concept of freedom cannot be justified by theoretical means, it can be justified by other, practical means that are just as legitimate as theoretical means. Therefore, I conclude, Kant's critical philosophy is not based on a dogmatic concept of freedom, but rather on the critical concept of freedom that we can in fact know.

Against Securitism, the New Breed of Actualism in Consequentialist Thought (VII-I)

Jean-Paul Vessel, New Mexico State University

In his recent book *Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality*, Douglas Portmore introduces a novel position—securitism—regarding the actualist-possibilist controversies in consequentialist thought, a position he argues is theoretically superior to the traditional views in both the actualist and possibilist camps. After distinguishing the two camps through an examination of the original “Procrastinate” case, I will present Portmore’s securitism (a new species of actualism) and its implications regarding his modified “Procrastinate” case. I will then level a series of objections against securitism before arguing that a possibilist variant of the securitist view isn’t susceptible to such objections and thus appears theoretically superior to the actualist version Portmore promotes.

Attributability, Accountability, and Implicit Bias (VI-F)

Robin Zheng, University of Michigan–Ann Arbor

I show that theorizing moral responsibility for implicit bias requires us to disambiguate two very different types of moral responsibility. The first type, responsibility as attributability, involves the idea that actions are expressions of our agency. The second, responsibility as accountability, depends on the social and institutional practices that govern when it is appropriate for people to bear the consequences of their actions. Corresponding to these are two types of moral responses—judgmental and non-judgmental—that differ in whether they imply facts about a person’s character or intentions. I argue that we should refrain from ascriptions of attributability, but that we can and should hold people accountable. Carefully distinguishing between attributability and accountability will not only be more effective in reducing the prevalence and impact of implicit biases but also does justice to our moral experience and agency.