

2013 Eastern Division Meeting

Invited and Symposium Abstracts

Questions, Identity, and Knowledge (VI-C)

Maria Aloni, University of Amsterdam

The paradigmatic examples of knowledge attributions found in the philosophical literature are sentences of the form “a knows that p.” However, many of the sentences we use to express knowledge take a different form, with “know” embedding a wh-clause (a question) as in (1) or a nominal (a “concealed question”) as in (2).

- (1) Philip knows who denounced Catiline.
- (2) Meno knows the way to Larissa.

In this paper I will present a uniform analysis of (embedded) questions and concealed question building on Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984), Aloni (2001), and Aloni and Roelofsen (2012). On the defended account, (concealed) questions quantify over contextually determined domains of individual concepts. The main motivation behind the account is the intuition that our interpretation of questions may vary relative to the particular perspective that is taken on the individuals in the domain of discourse. For example, suppose Philip is aware that Cicero denounced Catiline but he is unaware that Tully denounced Catiline. Then (1) is judged true if the denouncer of Catiline is identified as Cicero, but is judged false if he is identified as Tully. The proposed semantics will be applied to explain more complex examples like (3) and (4):

- (3) Alice, you don't know who you are: you're the rightful heir to the Swedish throne. (Boer and Lycan 1986)
- (4) John knows the price that Fred knows. (Heim 1979)

and the contrast in meaning between the sentences in (5)-(7) (Heim 1979):

- (5) John found out who the murderer of Smith is.
- (6) John found out who is the murderer of Smith.
- (7) John found out the murderer of Smith.

Two Models of Disestablished Marriage (V-E)

Vaughn Baltzly, University of Maryland–College Park

Many theorists have recently observed that the response to the same-sex marriage controversy most congruent with basic liberal principles is neither the retention of the institution of marriage in its present form nor its extension so as to include same-sex unions along with heterosexual ones, but rather the “dis-establishment” of marriage. Less commonly observed, however, is the fact that there are

two competing models for how the state might effect a regime of disestablished marriage. On the one hand, there is a “deflationary” approach, on which the state ceases to confer marital status but does remain in the status-conferring business. On this approach, the state would still bestow a certain “thinner,” more “neutral” legal status—as it does when it creates civil unions, for instance. Call this the “Status Model” of disestablished marriage. On the other hand, there is an “eliminativist” approach, on which the state ceases to confer any sort of status at all—not even the thin or neutral status of “civilly unioned.” There simply are no registered domestic partnerships. What there is, is contract law, and individuals entering into contracts for life-partnership—contractual arrangements that might assume any of a wide variety of forms. Call this the “Contract Model” of disestablished marriage. In this paper, I explore the merits of these competing models. After briefly discussing what it means to speak of “disestablishing marriage” and examining the case for disestablishment, I proceed to consider the advantages and disadvantages of each model. My tentative conclusion is that the Contract Model is the one that best instantiates cardinal liberal virtues.

Acquiring Epistemic Virtue (I-D)

Heather Battaly, California State University–Fullerton

Do we acquire epistemic virtues, like open-mindedness, simply by acquiring knowledge? If not, why not? To possess epistemic virtues, one must perform epistemically virtuous acts. But, knowing which acts are epistemically virtuous does not always cause one to perform those acts. The factors that prevent knowledge from causing action can be internal to one’s psychology, or externally located in the environment or “situation.” Philosophers and psychologists have argued that features of situations can prevent us from performing acts that we know to be *morally* virtuous. This paper argues that features of situations can also prevent us from performing acts that we know to be *epistemically* virtuous. In so doing, it summarizes Virtue-Responsibilism: the view that epistemic virtues are acquired character traits for which we are partly responsible. Virtue-Responsibilists endorse an epistemic analogue of Aristotelian *akrasia*. This paper explains epistemic *akrasia* in terms of external features of the situation. Finally, it suggests some new strategies for encouraging the development of epistemic virtues in college classrooms. If some features of situations—e.g., group unanimity—inhibit epistemically virtuous action, then we can (at least initially) eliminate those features from our classrooms. Instead, we can design environments and engender conditions that are conducive to practicing epistemically virtuous actions. These strategies are not meant to be sufficient for producing epistemic virtues, but they suggest that we can help students develop epistemic virtues by capitalizing on what we have learned from the challenge of situationism.

Margaret Cavendish on the Use of Natural Resources (VIII-B)

Deborah Boyle, College of Charleston

In this paper, I focus on Margaret Cavendish’s views regarding the relationships between humans and the natural environment. Cavendish’s natural philosophy has recently received increased attention from historians of philosophy, and some have read her as an early advocate of animal welfare. I show how Cavendish’s views on human interaction with the environment are shaped by her vitalist materialist

theory of matter, her views about human pride and self-love, and her beliefs in norms of behavior intended to produce order and peace in society and nature. Cavendish, I argue, did not object in principle to the human use of animals and natural resources. Her objection, rather, was to using them in inappropriate, wasteful ways; the basis of her objection was a desire to preserve order and peace, rather than concern for the environment or animals themselves. I examine Cavendish's attitudes towards animal experimentation (such as the blood transfusions performed by members of the Royal Society of London), vegetarianism, hunting, and the use of metals in alchemy.

What's Basic about Basic Logical Principles? (VII-E)

Matthew Carlson, University of New Mexico

The contemporary literature on the epistemology of logic primarily concerns the justification of “basic” logical principles. It is not widely recognized, however, that there are actually (at least) two distinct senses of “basic” employed in the literature. I call these “systematically basic” and “epistemically basic,” respectively. Roughly, a principle is systematically basic in a system of logical principles if it plays an axiomatic or foundational role in that system, while a principle is epistemically basic if we can justifiably accept it in an immediate way, without accepting it on the basis of anything else. In these terms, a central task in the epistemology of logic is to show how systematically basic principles can be also epistemically basic and thus to explain how we can justifiably accept them without proof. However, on many leading accounts of the epistemology of logic (e.g., rational insight, concept possession, cognitive mechanisms), the epistemically basic principles are justified independently of their role in any particular system. This has the consequence that the systematically and epistemically basic can come apart, and when they do, I argue, the postulation of a special epistemically basic class of principles is unmotivated and incapable of solving the main problem—that of the justification of systematically basic principles. I close by briefly sketching an alternative holistic picture, inspired by work of Stewart Shapiro and Crispin Wright, in which systematically basic principles are holistically justified, but there is nonetheless an important methodological sense in which they are epistemically basic.

Responsibility, Autonomy, Affectivity: A Heideggerian Approach (IV-A)

Steven Crowell, Rice University

This paper explores some consequences of Heidegger's ontological approach to the human being, which replaces the traditional definition (“rational animal”) with the concept of “care” (*Sorge*). The human being is not an animal that has a distinctive faculty (rationality) but “that being in whose being that being is an issue for it.” This move has implications for how we think about responsibility—in particular, our being responsible for feelings, impulses, and inclinations, which Heidegger groups under the category of “affectedness” (*Befindlichkeit*). After outlining the structure of care and showing how it grounds rationality as responsiveness to the normative (or measure) as such, I interpret Heidegger's approach to affectedness as revealing an “enigma of being,” disclosed in anxiety (*Angst*), which demands that we undergo our affective life in light of a normative distinction between success and failure at being a self. Next, I contrast this Heideggerian version of “autonomy” with the closely related Kantian approach, which adheres to the traditional bifurcation between rationality and animality. In a

final section I confront the challenge of the psychoanalytic understanding of affectivity. Jonathan Lear's account of it, examined here, joins Heidegger in rejecting the definition of human beings as rational animals and in recognizing that anxiety is central to a proper understanding of responsibility. But in Lear's version, psychoanalysis challenges a core element of Heidegger's understanding of the self and its relation to norms. Identifying certain conceptual problems inherent in that challenge, I argue that a Heideggerian ontology of selfhood can accommodate the dimension of unconscious affective mental functioning that psychoanalysis brings to light.

Author Meets Critics on Terry Pinkard's *Hegel's Naturalism: Mind, Nature, and the Final Ends of Life* (V-D)

Katerina Deligiorgi, University of Sussex–United Kingdom

Hegel's Naturalism is deceptive. This slim volume consists of two books: the first is a contribution to the study of Hegel's philosophy, supported by extensive footnotes and scholarly references to the recent literature; the second is a contribution to the study of "mind, nature, and the final ends of life," which offers a sustained argument for a distinctive sort of philosophical anthropology, a view of what it is to be a human being and the theoretical and practical commitments that flow from that view.

Judged as a contribution to the study of Hegel's philosophy, Terry Pinkard's book makes a compelling case for interpreting Hegel's idealism as a kind of naturalism. I will comment briefly on this, citing the textual support for the interpretation and rationale for Pinkard's translation of certain Hegelian terms, with a view to establishing that the naturalist Hegel makes an important claim to our interest and advances the dialectic set in course by recent neo-pragmatist, metaphysical realist, and modernist interpretations.

My main focus is on what Pinkard has to say about mind, nature, and the final ends of life. Here Pinkard takes up the formidable challenge of showing how Aristotelianism can be made modern or how we can have our nature disenchanted and spiritually livable too. I will be discussing in some detail the following topics: the structure of practical agency Pinkard defends, under three separate headings—will, desire, the good; the relation of intuitions to representations and the notion of theoretical agency this relation motivates; contemplation as a final good; and, finally, the very conception of the human animal Pinkard offers us in this book.

Collaborative Explanation and Biological Mechanisms (VI-E)

Melinda B. Fagan, Rice University

This paper motivates and outlines a new account of scientific explanation, which I term "collaborative explanation." My approach is pluralist: I do not argue that all scientific explanation is collaborative explanation, but only that some important scientific explanations are of this sort. The argument is in three parts. The first examines influential accounts of mechanistic explanation, which are based on careful study of discovery practices in molecular biology, cell biology, and neuroscience. I offer a general framework for comparing these accounts, in terms of three key features they attribute to mechanisms:

complexity, causality, and hierarchy. Different accounts prioritize and interpret these three features in contrasting ways. Second, I argue that prioritizing the causal or hierarchical aspect leads to different kinds of mechanistic explanation (mEx). Clarifying this distinction requires shifting philosophical focus from discovery to *explanatory* practices. A causal-mEx describes the spatial, temporal, and causal organization of active components (ϕ -ing x's) that causally produce some outcome of interest (P). A constitutive-mEx describes the spatial, temporal, and causal organization of active components (ϕ -ing x's) that constitute an overall working system (M Ψ -ing). Similar discovery practices can reveal either kind of explanation; in practice, they are often found together. However, though philosophical accounts of causal-mEx are available, constitutive-mEx is largely uncharacterized. The third part of the paper aims to remedy this situation. To do so, I use a case study of explanatory practice in a prominent new field: systems explanations of cell development. This case displays the key features of what I term collaborative explanation: diverse components, meshing properties, "bottom-up" direction, and constitution. I next argue that collaborative explanations improve our understanding of biological systems by unifying different levels of organization and integrating disparate causal relations. I conclude by reflecting on parallels between collaborative scientific practices and the explanations they produce.

Gender, Vulnerability, and Norms of Victimization (II-A)

Erinn Gilson, University of North Florida

This paper investigates the relationship between conceptions of vulnerability, gender, and social norms regarding victimization. It attempts to make sense of three problematic contemporary responses to instances of victimization and vulnerability: first, the tendency to deny the victimization of others and failure to take seriously the harm they have experienced (akin to blaming the victim); second, the tendency to refuse to regard oneself as being victimized when one has been harmed; and third, the tendency to assume victim status in the absence of real harm (akin to a persecution complex). Although these three phenomena differ significantly from one another, I contend that a feminist analysis of them can reveal how they have shared roots in (1) a reductive understanding of what it means to be vulnerable, which opposes vulnerability to strength, activity, capacity, self-determination, and invulnerability; (2) a socio-cultural normalization and idealization of invulnerability; and (3) gendered social norms for "true" or "proper" victimhood that rely on 1 and 2.

Art and Its Social Theory: Rethinking the Philosophical Significance of Red Square Paintings (I-E)

Lydia Goehr, Columbia University

This lecture addresses the thought experiment with which Arthur Danto begins his *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace*. It investigates the prehistory of the thought experiment in the aesthetic theory of the 1840s (Kierkegaard, Hegel, etc.) in order to reveal the social theory and theological assumption that came to lie behind the later development of monochrome painting. The early history, understood with respect to social theory, turns the terms of transfiguration and commonplace upside down, persuading one in turn to change the terms also of the thought experiment.

Iteration and Fragmentation (III-E)

Daniel Greco, Yale University

That our mental lives are not transparent to us is one of the few Freudian doctrines that has been robustly confirmed by subsequent psychological research. Nevertheless, much work in the philosophy of language and in cognate disciplines assumes various “iteration principles” that can seem to conflict with this psychological truism. By “iteration principles” I have in mind principles like the infamous KK principle concerning knowledge and the analogous BB principle concerning belief. These principles tell us that certain epistemic and doxastic operators (knowledge and belief, in these cases) automatically iterate. In this paper I'll discuss a pair of paradigmatic examples of mental non-transparency. Both can be seen as counterexamples to iteration principles like KK and BB. However, I'll distinguish two strategies for making sense of the examples, and only on one of these strategies, which I'll call the “anti-iteration” strategy, do the examples clearly conflict with iteration principles. On the other strategy, which I'll call the “fragmentation” strategy, there is room for defending versions of iteration principles like KK and BB while acknowledging that our mental lives are not transparent to us. While the anti-iteration and fragmentation strategies are not strictly speaking inconsistent with one another, they do compete, since they do similar explanatory work. This is significant, as I suspect many philosophers have been sympathetic to both strategies and have failed to notice that adopting the fragmentation strategy undercuts much of the motivation for adopting the anti-iteration strategy. After introducing the examples and the two different strategies for making sense of them, I'll ultimately offer one argument in favor of the fragmentation strategy and against the anti-iteration strategy. I'll argue that the fragmentation strategy provides a satisfying way of making sense of the opacity of the mental, while also saving what's attractive about iteration principles.

Beyond Precarity: Judith Butler's Feminist Biopolitics (II-A)

Sarah Hansen, Drexel University

Throughout much of her recent writing, Judith Butler turns away from her well-known theory of performativity and towards a non-violent ethics of bodily vulnerability. In *Precarious Life* and *Frames of War*, Butler focuses on the shared “precariousness” of human bodies, the fact that our bodies ineluctably expose us to care and injury. On her view, precariousness is a condition for and a source of resistance to “precarity,” the particular exposures that face poor, dispossessed, and marginalized populations. All bodies are vulnerable (i.e., precarious) but some face greater risks and insecurities than others (i.e., precarity); by embracing our shared human vulnerability, we might oppose the forces of marginalization.

This paper argues that Judith Butler's call to embrace vulnerability should be understood as a form of “affirmative biopolitics” insofar as she discovers modes of feminist political resistance *in life itself*. I compare Butler's theory to other varieties of affirmative biopolitics, in particular that of Italian philosopher Roberto Esposito. Finally, I turn to scenes of precarity in the U.S. abortion debate in order to raise concerns about the feminist applications of Butler's politics of life. On my reading, the ambiguous

distinction between precariousness and precarity complicates Butler's attempt to mobilize life itself toward feminist ends.

The Location(s) of Philosophy: Generating and Questioning New Concepts in African Philosophy (VI-D)

Bruce B. Janz, University of Central Florida

The life-blood of African philosophy (as with any philosophy) is the generation of new concepts adequate to an intellectual milieu. That milieu includes historical, cultural, political, and pragmatic elements, among others, as well as the existing concepts that make the milieu philosophically viable. These concepts are both the result and the starting point of questions that can only be asked in a particular manner within an African milieu(s). The access to these questions comes initially from the writing done by those who are of this place, and ultimately from a phenomenological presence in and to the place. This paper will illustrate this approach to philosophy-in-place by considering some concepts (specifically, environmental responsibility, the nature and form of philosophical questioning, and the digital) and arguing that African milieu(s) enable valuable and unique questions to be asked. In fact, I will advocate that while the imperative to philosophically "be true to Africa" is crucial and should never be forgotten, that truth must come with a creative element in which concepts adequate to the present milieu are created, and are recognized as they are being created. This paper is a sketch of what that creativity might look like.

There Are No Pragmatic Reasons for Believing (VII-F)

Ward Jones, Rhodes University–South Africa

A number of writers have drawn an inference from the fact that some beliefs confer pragmatic benefit on their believers to the conclusion that there are pragmatic reasons for believing. The upshot of this paper is that this inference is not a good one. My argument is the following: reasons must be reflectively followable; pragmatic considerations in favor of believing are not reflectively followable; therefore, non-epistemic considerations are not reasons for believing. This argument is an improvement on the best available argument against the existence of pragmatic reasons, an argument appealing to the nature of deliberation and defended by Richard Moran, Jonathan Adler, and Nishi Shah.

Kant's Second Thoughts on Colonialism (II-B)

Pauline Kleingeld, University of Groningen–Netherlands

Kant is widely regarded as a fierce critic of colonialism. In *Toward Perpetual Peace* and the *Metaphysics of Morals*, for example, he forcefully condemns European conduct in the colonies as a flagrant violation of the principles of right. His earlier views on colonialism have not yet received much detailed scrutiny, however. In this essay I argue that Kant actually *endorsed and justified* European colonialism until the early 1790s. I show that Kant's initial endorsement and his subsequent criticism of colonialism are closely related to his changing views on race because his endorsement of a racial hierarchy plays a

crucial role in his justification of European colonialism. He gave up both while he was developing his legal and political philosophy during the mid-1790s and adopted a more egalitarian and republican conception of the proper relationship among peoples.

Simone de Beauvoir, Political Philosopher (VII-A)

Sonia Kruks, Oberlin College

Simone de Beauvoir's political philosophy emerges from her ontological claims concerning the ambiguity of human existence. To be human is to live a paradox: to be an *embodied subject*. It is to be capable of free choice and action, yet also to be physically vulnerable and constrained by the diverse and contingent facticities of one's situation. It is also to be in the world with many other such existents among whom relations may, variously, be hostile and/or solidaristic: The materiality of human existence both enables each to engage reciprocally with others and makes each vulnerable to harm from them. Thus, the multiplicity of actions that make the human world will intersect in ways that often give rise to morally ambiguous and unpredictable outcomes.

Such ambiguities become especially heightened in the domain of politics. Here, the ubiquitous presence of conflict, even violence, and contingency poses severe challenges to rationalist thinking. Accordingly, the paper considers how Beauvoir complicates the kind of political philosophy that is committed to "ideal theory." For, she argues, acting according to ideals or determinate principles in the uncertain and conflictual world of politics leads to a dangerous evasion of responsibility for harms that may ensue. Harms may often result, for example, from the pursuit of justice or human rights—or, indeed, from the very pursuit of freedom that Beauvoir herself values. Beauvoir thus criticizes what she calls "moral purism" in politics and she insists on the need to acknowledge the ubiquity of failure, for there are rarely "good" solutions to be found. To explore certain implications of her claims, the paper considers some instances of ambiguity and failure that concerned Beauvoir herself: the pursuit of "justice" against Nazi collaborators after World War Two, and action in "solidarity" with the Algerian independence movement.

The Deployment of Sexual Violence in Beauvoir's Philosophy (VII-A)

Shannon M. Mussett, Utah Valley University

This paper takes up the literary and political employments of sexual violence in Simone de Beauvoir's philosophy in order to determine what limits can and should be placed on violence in general. Beauvoir's philosophy of liberation, grounded in the tradition of Hegelian and Marxist theories of revolution, uneasily condones the use of violence as sometimes necessary in the fight against oppressive practices. However, her qualified support of violence poses a dilemma in that such force often reduces the other to a state of pure immanence—an act explicitly rejected on the grounds of her ethical theory. Nowhere is this diminution of the other into a passive object more conspicuous than in the practice of sexual violence. In her essay "Must We Burn Sade?" (1951) Beauvoir argues that we cannot outright reject Sade's writings, crowded as they are with sexual viciousness and glorified scenes of rape, torture, and murder. Yet, she also maintains "to sympathize with Sade too readily is to betray him. For it is our

misery, subjection, and death that he desires.” Ten years later, she publically opposes the French-Algerian war in the preface to the work *Djamila Boupacha* (1962), which documents the torture and rape of a young Algerian girl accused of terrorist acts by the French military. The difference between the uncomfortable tolerance of Sade on the one hand and the outright rejection of the French government on the other seems obvious: one is a literary fiction, the other an account of political atrocity. Yet how can the line be so clear for an existentialist author who refuses to draw sharp distinctions between aesthetics, politics, and ambiguous embodied existence? Addressing both literary and practical approaches to sexual violence in Beauvoir’s philosophy, I explore the myriad manifestations of violence and what limitations should be placed on its employment.

Territorial Restitution in Cosmopolitan Law (II-B)

Peter Niesen, Technische Universität Darmstadt–Germany

Immanuel Kant condemns unlawful behavior in the international realm but does not say much about setting past wrongs right. While he criticizes colonial appropriation and all annexation by military means, he gives no systematic treatment of entitlements to restoration arising out of such violations. This paper attempts to formulate elements of Kant’s missing theory of de-colonization, focusing on the question of territorial restoration to former colonized peoples. Is restoration possible after colonization, and, if so, is it obligatory? With Kant, the paper distinguishes three types of colonization: the permanent occupation of uninhabited land, the permanent subjection of states by other states, and the integration of formerly non-state peoples into a public legal condition. It is the last case that raises hard questions for the feasibility, and therefore also the normativity, of territorial restitution.

Open-Mindedness in the Classroom (I-D)

Wayne D. Riggs, University of Oklahoma

In this paper I elaborate a fairly detailed account of the intellectual character virtue, open-mindedness. In particular, I highlight three aspects of open-mindedness that have implications for, among other things, how one might attempt to inculcate open-mindedness in one’s students. The first two of these aspects of open-mindedness I call “propriety” and “sensitivity.” They have to do with how well a person discerns on a given occasion that it is an opportunity to employ the traits characteristic of open-mindedness. The third aspect of open-mindedness discussed is the role that various affective states, or “cognitive feelings,” play in the operation of open-mindedness. Given that feelings inevitably play important roles in belief acquisition and inquiry, part of what is required in inculcating intellectual virtues like open-mindedness is an ability, not to suppress cognitive feelings, but rather to manage them effectively toward one’s cognitive ends.

Thoughts on G. A. Cohen's Final Testament (I-C)

John E. Roemer, Yale University

Three topics are discussed. What was G. A. Cohen's theory of justice, as presented in his final book *Why Not Socialism?* What was Cohen's view of the relationship between human nature and justice? Finally, is Cohenesque socialism feasible? While the first two questions are philosophical, the third involves some crystal-ball-gazing social science.

Moral Virtuosity, Moral Improvisation, and Moral Sense in Confucian Spontaneity (VII-B)

Bongrae Seok, Alvernia University

Spontaneity typically refers to behavioral or dispositional attributes of reflexive automatisms, quick intuitive judgments, and immediate perceptual decisions. In this paper, I will analyze different meanings of spontaneity, develop an interpretation of Confucian spontaneity, and discuss its unique moral psychological orientations. One way to understand a spontaneous behavior is to characterize it as a reflexive reaction. Some moral actions and decisions are quick and non-deliberate, but they are not necessarily spontaneous in this sense of the term. Confucius says that an ideally virtuous person is not a virtue machine, a person with fixed and blind dispositions to moral challenges. Rather, an ideal Confucian agent is fully spontaneous in a different way. She is a cool moral virtuoso. She knows what to do, when, and how without any confusion, hesitation, or interruption. She is also an interactive moral improviser. Like a beautiful piece of musical improvisation, her action is fully prepared for unexpected moral challenges in handling moral dilemmas quickly and effectively, yet maintaining her moral integrity or self-control. In addition to moral virtuosity and moral improvisation, Confucian spontaneity is intrinsically linked to special attributes (such as immediacy, heightened awareness, and strong motivation) of inner sense and faculty. A spontaneous moral action or emotion, in this sense of spontaneity, comes out as a natural and unimpeded expression of the underlying ability (moral sense or faculty) of the mind that may not need extensive, deliberate, or effortful development. From the perspectives of moral virtuosity, moral improvisation, and moral sense, spontaneity in Confucian moral philosophy is characterized neither as reflexive automatism of fixed behaviors that inspired Legalist control of human behavior by external enforcement nor as sheer naturalness of uncontrolled reactions that overlaps with Daoist ideal of effortless behavior but as moral excellence with interactive resilience and moral sense of compassion and appropriateness.

The Individuation of Finite Modes in Spinoza and the Importance of Sensing Our Body (I-F)

Noa Shein, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev-Israel

Spinoza proves, within the very first fifteen propositions of *The Ethics*, that there can only be a single infinite substance. In light of this, on the one hand, it is no small challenge to see how to account for finite things, that is, to explain how the Infinite can give rise to the finite. On the other hand, Spinoza's definition of finitude as "what is limited by another" (1D2) and his characterization of finitude as being

“in part a negation” can be seen to imply the impossibility of the existence of finite things at all. Put simply, the concern is that if something were wholly passive (i.e., fully limited, determined, or a negation), it would literally be nothing. It seems, then, in either case, given Spinoza’s own definitions and metaphysical principles, the viability of finite modes is put into question. I will argue for a way of understanding finite modes that aids in dissolving this apparent tension.

To do so, I will first explain how bodies are said to be determined in Extension. I will then look closely at Spinoza’s second axiom in Part Two: “we sense a certain body affected in many ways.” I will argue that this axiom gives us immediate epistemic access to the fact that we are both *determined* and *determining*. I will explain why anything that is determined (i.e., is passive) must simultaneously also determine (i.e., be active). The first concern will be addressed by showing how we come to know that there are in fact finite things and what account can be given of them. The second concern is addressed by understanding the peculiar nature of finite modes as simultaneously being both active and passive. I say “peculiar” because, as I will show, in order to conceive of anything passive (i.e., finite), one must simultaneously also conceive it to be active (i.e., infinite).

G. A. Cohen’s Anti-Market Socialism (I-C)

Nicholas Vrousalis, University of Cambridge

G. A. Cohen’s *Why Not Socialism?*, published about one month after his death in August 2009, concludes as follows: “every market, even a socialist market, is a system of predation.” This paper is an attempt to vindicate this claim on Cohen’s own terms, by surveying his work in political philosophy and drawing upon its disparate (and sometimes conceptually dormant) critiques of liberalism and market socialism. I will argue that: (1) Cohen’s *Why Not Socialism?* contains a fraternity-based critique of market socialism, (2) this critique recasts main elements of Cohen’s (1992) fraternity critique of Rawls, (3) the latter critique is, at least in part, a critique of the market, and, since (4) fraternity and distributive justice part ways, by Cohen’s own lights, it follows that (5) Cohen’s anti-market political philosophy is not exclusively or even principally concerned with unfairness or injustice in distribution. Distributive egalitarianism, it turns out, forms only a small part of the defense of socialism in which Cohen was manifestly engaged throughout his career. On the reading I shall defend, therefore, Cohen should not be read as a liberal to the left of Rawls, or as someone aiming to remedy inconsistencies in the liberal canon, but rather as a radical critic of liberalism.

Talking with Objects (II-E)

Roger Wertheimer, Agnes Scott College

Talking *about* objects requires talking *with* objects, presenting objects in speech to identify a term’s referent. I say *This figure is a circle* while handing you a ring. The ring is a *prop*, a perceptual object referenced by an extra-sentential event to identify the extension of a term, its *director* (“This figure”). Props operate in speech acts and their products, not in sentences. Intra-sentential objects we talk with are *displays*. Displayed objects needn’t be words but must be like words, perceptually, reproductively, and syntactically. Displays are presented by their syntactical position, as terms, with a term-like function.

Semantically they are props. The O in FOD (*This figure O is a circle*) is a prop-like referent, not a term. The O in OD (*O is a circle*) may be that of FOD, but that display may have semantically and syntactically diverse directors, and without a specific one OD has no determinate sense.

Describing the display of quotations demands distinguishing displays from quotations. Quotations are repetitions of something said. Displays are perceptual objects, linguistic and non-linguistic, reproductions and originals, presented in sentences to identify a referent. Display markers are disambiguators that say: *Read this as a prop*. They may mark direct speech from indirect speech. Markers of quotation say: *Someone said this*. That historical claim is outside a sentence's propositional content. Those marks don't say: *This is a display*. They do make it true.

Calling displays quotations muddies the study of speaking with speech. Calling both displays and *intranym*s quotations muddies the study of meaning and truth. *Intranym*s are terms, consisting of an expression flanked by lines, that denote that interior expression. *Intranym*s are created by stipulation to formalize a metalanguage. Formalization of a metalanguage replaces displays with *intranym*s. Formalized metalanguages lack the logical form and subject matter of our natural metalanguage.

Affective Virtue in Heidegger's Aristotle (IV-A)

Katherine Withy, Georgetown University

In this paper, I build on Heidegger's idea that affectivity is our most fundamental openness to things by developing the claim that it is through affectivity that entities (seem to) make a demand on us to let them show up as the entities that they are. First, I use Heidegger's early interpretation of Aristotle's notion of *pathos* to generate a Heideggerian account of emotions as "disclosive postures": compartments in the world in which entities encounter us by touching or moving us. On this picture, our emotions are open to normative assessment in terms of how perspicuously entities reveal themselves in them. Second, I argue that on Heidegger's reading, Aristotle's virtue (as regards the *pathē*) amounts to a commitment to let entities affectively reveal themselves as they are. I suggest that we are called to this commitment because of the kinds of entities that *we* are—because, that is, of our nature as disclosing and discovering. As affectively disclosive, we are already in the business of allowing entities to place demands on us; it remains only for us to take responsibility for meeting those demands. When we do so, we allow the world to make a claim on us that is independent of and more basic than the normative demands that we take over when we take up a social role or practical identity.

Re-orienting Discussions of Scientific Explanation: A Functional Perspective (VI-E)

Andrea Woody, University of Washington

Philosophy of science offers a rich lineage of analysis concerning the nature of scientific explanation, but the vast majority of this work addresses a single question and, more importantly, interprets that question in a particular way. Asking "What is the nature of scientific explanation?", most philosophers take for granted that an appropriate response will provide an analysis of the relation that binds a given

explanans to its corresponding *explanandum*. Such analyses presume the proper analytic focus rests at the level of individual explanations. Yet there are other questions we could ask about explanation in science. Indeed, here are three distinct questions:

1. What are the adequacy conditions for scientific explanations?
2. How should explanatory power be justified as a theoretical virtue, if indeed it should be?
3. What role does explanatory discourse play in science?

In contrast to the first two, the third question has received little attention from philosophers, yet this question is where I will begin. What I will label *the functional perspective* aims to reveal how the practice of explanatory discourse functions within scientific communities given their more comprehensive sets of practices. In comparison to traditional accounts of scientific explanation, there is a shift in focus away from explanations, as achievements, toward explaining, as a coordinated activity of communities. In this talk, I will outline the functional perspective, argue that taking the functional perspective can reveal important methodological roles for explanation in science, and, consequently, that beginning with the third question provides resources for developing more adequate responses to the first two. In particular, through examples in chemistry, I will emphasize the normative status of explanations within scientific communities and discuss how such status underwrites a compelling rationale for explanatory power as a theoretical virtue.

Creating a Disturbance: Art, Social Ethics, and Relational Autonomy (I-E)

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Talk about “art and ethics” can create a disturbance. It can unsettle professional practices in the arts, and it can upset common notions of ethics. This paper aims to disturb both. Not simply to disturb them, however, but to help transform both art and ethics. It will suggest that good art is intrinsically ethical. Moreover, precisely because of this intrinsic ethicality, the arts can contribute to other modes of ethical conduct.

Here I use the term “ethics” to discuss what I prefer to call “social ethics.” By “social ethics” I mean the most important normative considerations that govern interpersonal relations, cultural practices, and social institutions. It refers to the ways in which, following societal principles such as solidarity and justice, human beings, in their relations, practices, and institutions, can contribute to the common good.

Standard notions of the autonomy of art make it difficult to say how the arts contribute to social goodness. They either relegate the arts to the margins of society or elevate them to a sacrosanct pedestal. As an alternative, I propose a different account of art’s purported autonomy, namely, as relational autonomy that consists of three closely interlinked forms: interpersonal autonomy, internal autonomy, societal autonomy. Interpersonal autonomy has to do with normative expectations concerning responsible participation in the arts. The internal autonomy of art pertains to characteristics that help distinguish art from other realms of cultural endeavor and make it both intrinsically worthwhile and societally important. The societal autonomy of art has to do with how the arts relate to

political and economic systems. The paper lays out a relational conception of all three forms of autonomy and, in that context, describes the greatest social-ethical challenges facing contemporary art.