Role and influence of civil society in 21st century global policy processes

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Abstract

This article analyses the role and influence of civil society in three recently instituted global policy processes: G20, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), and the High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-AE). Distinct from more established international institutions, these 21st century processes are characterised by their relatively recent emergence, country composition and very recent establishment of formal mechanism for civil society involvement. As such, they offer important insights into the evolving, contemporary role of civil society in a multi-polar world. Through time series content analysis of official documents and participant observation, we explore: i) formal mechanisms for state-civil society interaction, ii) the extent and ways in which leaders refer to civil society, and iii) uptake of civil society recommendations related to development policy commitments. Our initial findings suggest an embedded and influential role of civil society in HLF-AE processes, a lagged but formalising position within the G20, and an emergent role with the BRICS – overall, an increasing but still incomplete recognition of civil society in 21st century global policy processes.

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Introduction and Background

Civil society groups and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) have played diverse roles in social and political change throughout history. This article analyses their role and influence in three recently instituted global policy processes: G20, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), and the High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-AE).

Previous work on civil society engagement in global governance has predominantly focused on United Nations conventions, multilateral trade and finance, and the G8 (Brown and Fox 2001, Seyfang 2003, Martens 2005, Kirton and Hajnal 2006, Ahmed and Potter 2006, Wiess and Gordenker 2006, Joachim 2007, Walker and Thompson 2008, Scholte 2011). Distinct from these more established institutions, G20, BRICS and HLF-AE processes are characterised by their relatively recent emergence, country composition and very recent establishment of formal mechanism for civil society involvement. As such, they offer important insights into the evolving, contemporary role of civil society in a multi-polar world.

In order to investigate the role and influence of civil society actors across, G20, BRICS and High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness processes over time, we examine three dimensions: i) formal mechanisms for state-civil society interaction and the presence of civil society compared to other non-state actors, ii) the extent and ways in which civil society is referenced in meeting communiques, and iii) influence of civil society in shaping global policy commitments related to development issues. Our initial findings suggest an embedded and influential role of civil society in HLF-AE processes, a lagged but formalising position for civil society within the G20, and an emergent role with the BRICS – overall, an increasing but still incomplete recognition of civil society in 21st century global policy processes. The sector appears to have gained a greater level of involvement and influence in global aid effectiveness fora, which began prior to and are much more topically focused than G20 and BRICS processes.
Emergence and composition of global policy processes

Recent global policy processes related to aid effectiveness and among G20 and BRICS governments differ in several ways from international institutions that have previously been the focus of civil society activity and scholarship. Compared to the United Nations (UN), World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), created in the aftermath of the Second World War, 21st century processes have emerged in a very different geopolitical context. With the exception of Japan, the G7 and international financial institutions (IFIs) are led by people from high income countries in Europe and North America. Moreover, IFIs and the UN are institutions with permanent staff and headquarters in established geographic locations.

In contrast, the three global policy processes examined here have been in existence for just over a decade, with the first High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Rome in 2003. The G20 Heads of State convened for the first time in 2008 in Washington, DC, and the BRICs leaders meeting separately shortly thereafter. High level meetings have taken place on a regular basis, with preparatory and follow-up activities throughout the year; however, none of these three processes are institutionalized organisations per se, with the presidency and location rotating with each meeting.

In addition, the High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness, G20 and BRICS processes have brought together new configurations of actors, representing a more diverse country composition and leadership. The G20 includes Heads of State from all regions of the world. As the name indicates, the BRICS is comprised of populous (re)emerging economies. The 2011 HLF-AE in Busan, South Korea featured leadership by African governments with the first ever African Consensus and Position on Development Effectiveness.

With their very recent formation, G20, BRICS and HLF-AE processes may be less path dependent and perhaps more malleable. Since they are less formalised and rotate
leadership frequently, there may be more entry points for non-state actors. Furthermore, their
country composition may foster greater receptivity to civil society perspectives that are not
represented in other structures, with the exception of the UN. Therefore, the role and
influence of civil society in G20, BRICS and High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness could
potentially be different than with other types of international institutions given differences in
historical context, leadership and structure.

To date, however, civil society engagement in new global processes has outpaced
scholarship in the area. This article aims to fill this gap in understanding. As an initial step,
we characterise formal involvement of, institutional references to, and uptake of civil society
recommendations in each of the three processes over time. Based on these initial patterns, we
then outline future areas of inquiry for this emergent field.

Methods

In order to investigate the role and influence of civil society, we analysed three key
dimensions: i) civil society presence: whether and when formal mechanisms were established
for civil society and other non-state actor involvement; ii) references to civil society: the
extent and ways in which leaders have referred to civil society in meeting communiques and
other official documents, and iii) policy commitments: when and what type of policy
commitments leaders have made related to issues of development and inequality, and the
extent to which these commitments reflect specific civil society recommendations.

We conducted content analyses of meeting communiques, agendas, participant lists and
other documents and websites from the inception of each policy process: G20 from 2008-2014,
This analysis was supplemented by participant observation of civil society meetings and
government interactions prior to, during and following global summits from 2012 to November
2014. This paper was original prepared for the ISTR conference in July 2014 and subsequently updated in January 2015 to include 2014 BRICS and G20 developments that occurred after the conference.

Findings

Civil society engagement in G20 processes: Lagged but formalising

Civil society presence. As illustrated in Table 1, non-state actors began meeting alongside G20 summits in 2010, two years after the first meeting among Heads of State. Business leaders (B20) and youth (Y20) have been meeting since 2010, labour (L20) since 2011 and academics (Think20) since 2012. Although an international civil society statement was issued in 2010 and NGOs representatives have participated in B20 convenings, formal mechanisms for civil society involvement did not exist until the 2013 G20 meeting in Russia. The Civil20 (C20) continued in 2014 under the Australian G20 presidency, and the Turkish G20 presidential priorities for 2015 indicate their intent to reach out to civil society representatives and dialogue with the Civil20 specifically. This continuation indicates that this mechanism for formal engagement is now institutionalised.

The level of access and amount of financial support provided by host country governments for non-state actor involvement has varied both by group type and by country. For example, in Brisbane in 2014, the Australian Presidency held a formal B20 dinner with G20 leaders and invited business representatives to the Leaders’ reception. B20 Members were also registered as formal delegates at the G20 summit, whereas civil society delegates only had access to the media centre. In her commentary following the summit, the C20 Sherpa, Joanne Yates (2014), remarked ‘the process was certainly less than equitable.’ In 2013, the Russian government provided financial support for the inaugural Civil20 meeting as well as for C20 preparatory meetings. In contract, the C20 Secretariat in Australia
was required to raise 50% of the funds to convene the C20 meeting. The Think20 organisers were provided with substantially more financial support than the Civil20, estimated to be as much as a 10-fold difference.
Table 1. Non-state actor, non-member involvement in G20 processes over time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Member governments</th>
<th>Other governments</th>
<th>Non-state actors</th>
<th>Civil society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>G5 Finance Ministers: Britain, France, Germany, US, Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>G5 Heads of State: Britain, France, Germany, US, Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>G7 Heads of State: Britain, France, Germany, US, Japan, Italy, Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>G8 Finance Ministers: Britain, France, Germany, US, Japan, Italy, Canada, Russia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>G20 Finance Ministers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>G8 Okinawa, Japan</td>
<td>G8 hosts begin inviting leaders from developing countries in Africa and Asia to meet on margins of the summits</td>
<td>Civil society meeting with the Canadian G8 sherpa, French ambassador, British High Commissioner &amp; two reps from Japanese embassy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>G8 Kananaskis, Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td>Civil society meeting with the French G8 sherpa, Japanese ambassador, senior officials from UK, Canada, Germany, Italy and Russia</td>
<td>Civil society meeting with all G8 governments including 5 sherpas &amp; EC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>G8 Elysee, France</td>
<td></td>
<td>Civil society meeting with all G8 governments including 5 sherpas &amp; EC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>G8 Gleneagles, UK</td>
<td>Blair invites Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa to Gleneagles</td>
<td>Civil society meeting with the Canadian G8 sherpa, French ambassador, British High Commissioner &amp; two reps from Japanese embassy</td>
<td>Civil society meeting with the French G8 sherpa, Japanese ambassador, senior officials from UK, Canada, Germany, Italy and Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>G8 St. Petersburg, Russia</td>
<td>Youth Forum</td>
<td>Civil society meeting with the Canadian G8 sherpa, French ambassador, British High Commissioner &amp; two reps from Japanese embassy</td>
<td>Civil C8 meetings with all sherpas, Putin; parallel engagement between Putin and 12 participants of the International Advocacy NGO group (Greenpeace, CIVICUS, WWF, Social Watch)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>G8 Heiligendamm, Germany</td>
<td>Germany regularizes relationship among the G8+5, Heiligendamm Process</td>
<td>Civil society meeting with the Canadian G8 sherpa, French ambassador, British High Commissioner &amp; two reps from Japanese embassy</td>
<td>Civil society meeting with the French G8 sherpa, Japanese ambassador, senior officials from UK, Canada, Germany, Italy and Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>G20 Heads of State in Washington, DC</td>
<td>Spain, Netherlands, UN Secretary General, IMF, World Bank, Financial Stability Forum</td>
<td>Civil society meeting with the Canadian G8 sherpa, French ambassador, British High Commissioner &amp; two reps from Japanese embassy</td>
<td>Civil society meeting with the French G8 sherpa, Japanese ambassador, senior officials from UK, Canada, Germany, Italy and Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>G20 London</td>
<td>Consultative meeting with African leaders</td>
<td>Civil society meeting with the Canadian G8 sherpa, French ambassador, British High Commissioner &amp; two reps from Japanese embassy</td>
<td>Civil society meeting with the French G8 sherpa, Japanese ambassador, senior officials from UK, Canada, Germany, Italy and Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>G20 Toronto</td>
<td>Outreach meeting with ASEAN</td>
<td>B20, G8/G20 Youth Summit, G20 Young Entrepreneur Summit</td>
<td>International Civil Society Statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>G20 Seoul</td>
<td>Consultation with non-G20 countries, participation by Spain, AU, NEPAD, 3G, ASEAN, Financial Stability Board, ILO, IMF, OECD, UN, World Bank, WTO</td>
<td>Consultation with civil society &amp; development groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>G20 Cannes</td>
<td>AU, ASEAN, Chile, Colombia, Spain</td>
<td>L20 Think20, Rethinking20, G(iris)20</td>
<td>16 CSO meetings with Mexican officials, CSO liaison office, position papers from 17 NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>G20 St. Petersburg</td>
<td>AU, NEPAD, CIS, ASEAN, 3G, Spain</td>
<td>Civil20 conference in Moscow, meeting with Putin</td>
<td>Civil20 conference in Melbourne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>G20 Brisbane</td>
<td>AU, NEPAD, ASEAN, Spain, NZ, Singapore</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

G20 references to civil society. In their communiques from 2008-2014, Heads of State have made few references to civil society. The sector was not explicitly referenced until the 2010 Seoul summit. In all instances except one, civil society has been mentioned in G20 statements alongside other non-state and intergovernmental organisation (IGO) actors: ‘We will increase our efforts to conduct G20 consultation activities in a more systematic way, building on constructive partnerships with international organisations, in particular the UN, regional bodies, civil society, trade unions and academia’ (G20 communique, 2010). The 2013 G20 Vision Statement did acknowledge the Civil20 (along with the Business20, Labour20, Youth20 and Think20), legitimising this formal mechanism for involvement. Similarly, the 2014 Brisbane communique acknowledged the contribution of the Civil Society 20, again, alongside many other IGO and non-state actor groups.

G20 policy commitments. Analyses of G20 areas of focus over time indicate that development issues are elevated when an emerging economy is host (Kirton 2011), the 2010 Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth being the prime example. In this case, G20 attention to development preceded the existence of the Civil20 in 2013; however, the international civil society statement issued in 2010 in Toronto and guiding principles for G20 dialogue with civil society issued in 2012 in Los Cabos asserted goals of equity and poverty reduction. In 2013 and 2014 joint civil society position papers were developed, with some overlap between C20 recommendations and policy positions of other non-state actors: with Labour20 on inequality and tax, Business20 on food security, and Youth20 on sustainable development and climate change.

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1 The Turkish G20 Presidency Priorities for 2015, which emphasise inclusion and explicitly state that the Presidency ‘will place development at the centre of its G20 agenda’ (Davutoglu, 2014) support this finding.
In 2014, early indications suggested that the Australian government would not recommit the G20 to an inclusive growth agenda or acknowledge the impact of inequality on growth. The Melbourne C20 Communique called on the G20 to reduce global inequality and improve inclusive growth. These priorities were reinforced at the national level through meetings between civil society organisations and G20 sherpas. Ultimately, the November 2014 Brisbane Communique included a statement committing to poverty eradication, and inclusive and sustainable growth in low-income and developing countries, similar to previous communiques.

In summary, although civil society has been engaged with the G20 for some time, the establishment of a formal mechanism has lagged behind that of other non-state actors. Their access and support from host governments has varied, and to date been more limited than the B20 and T20. The G20 has referred to civil society infrequently and alongside many other groups. The extent of their commitments to development appear to be associated with the profile of the host country more so than non-state actor policy positions.

Civil society engagement in BRICS processes: Emergent

Civil society presence. No formal mechanism currently exists for civil society involvement in BRICS processes. BRICS summits are closed inter-governmental meetings whose agendas have not been publically available. The BRICs Academic Forum was established at the first Heads of State convening and in 2013, the BRICS established a BRICS Think Tank Council to enhance cooperation in research, knowledge sharing, capacity building and policy advice among think tanks in Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Similarly, the BRICs Business Forum was formed in 2010 and the BRICS Business Council in 2013. The creation of a BRICS Youth Forum and a BRICS Trade Union Forum have been discussed since 2013, but have not yet been established.
In the absence of a formal structure, civil society groups have pursued dual insider-outsider strategies. They organised alternative summits in 2013 and 2014: ‘BRICS from Below’ in Durban and ‘The Struggle is not a Crime: Anti-BRICS Capitalist Exploration’ in Fortaleza.

At the same time, civil society groups have secured meetings with high level officials in South Africa and Brazil. They have held side conferences alongside annual meetings, including workshops on the New Development Bank, extractives, inequality and the first women’s BRICS forum in 2014. In 2014, both South African and Brazilian governments committed to regular meetings with CSOs at a national level before and after BRICS summits, as a means of sharing information and taking into consideration CSO positions. These commitments demonstrate a move towards greater transparency and accountability on behalf of both governments towards a more participatory process in involving its citizens in BRICS processes.

Ahead of the 2014 Fortaleza BRICS summit, civil society groups put forward formal requests to South African and Brazilian sherpas for a formal BRICS Track 3 mechanism. Plans for a Civil Society Track appear to be gaining momentum. A new website\(^2\) for a BRICS Civil Society Forum was launched in October 2014. It refers to Civil BRICS as an ‘innovative political process, for the first time to be implemented within the BRICS Summit in 2015, the year of the Russian Federation Presidency.’

**BRICS references to civil society.** From 2009-2013 there were no explicit mentions of civil society in BRICS communiques. Indirect references encourage people-to-people exchanges and express condolences and solidarity after natural disasters: ‘*We affirm the importance of encouraging the dialogue among civilizations, cultures, religions and peoples. ...We reaffirm*’

our solidarity towards the Haitian people. …Express condolences and solidarity with people and Governments of Brazil and China for the lives lost in the mudslide…and earthquake’ (BRICS communique, 2010).

For the first time in 2014, civil society was mentioned in the communique, alongside business and academia, in relation to the use of information and communication technologies to foster sustainable economic progress and social inclusion. Civil society is referenced in Pillar 5 (attaining progress through knowledge and innovation sharing) of the BRICS Vision, adopted at the Fortaleza Summit.

**BRICS policy commitments.** Attention to development among BRICS leaders remained stable from 2009-2012 (Marchyshyn, 2013). Heads of State and Finance Ministers have made consistent and specific statements regarding the structure, governance and purpose of International Financial Institutions, including the need for greater voice and representation, democratic and transparent decision-making. They have discussed the need for increased resources and a shift in orientation to advance development, achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and reduce poverty:

‘We also stressed the importance of consolidating recent gains in social inclusion and poverty reduction.’ (Sao Paulo 2008)

‘We also urge developed economies and development institutions to strengthen their support for the hardest hit developing countries to ensure the achievement of the MDGs.’ (Horsham 2009)

‘The world needs a fair, equitable, inclusive and well-managed financial and economic architecture.’ (London 2009)

‘We are also determined to speed up structural reform to sustain strong growth which would advance development and poverty reduction at home and benefit global growth and rebalancing.’ (Washington 2011)

‘An institution that promotes equal partnership with all countries as a way to deal with development issues and to overcome an outdated donor-recipient dichotomy.’ (Delhi 2012)
Inclusion, sustainability and development featured prominently in the 2014 BRICS summit in Fortaleza, where the New Development Bank was established. The communique reiterated strong commitments to poverty reduction and equality, and framed development as a human right:

‘Our shared views and commitment to international law and to multilateralism, with the United Nations at its center and foundation, are widely recognized and constitute a major contribution to global peace, economic stability, social inclusion, equality, sustainable development and mutually beneficial cooperation with all countries.’

‘BRICS, as well as other EMDCs, continue to face significant financing constraints to address infrastructure gaps and sustainable development needs. With this in mind, we are pleased to announce the signing of the Agreement establishing the New Development Bank (NDB), with the purpose of mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging and developing economies.’

‘We agree to continue to treat all human rights, including the right to development, in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing and with the same emphasis. We will foster dialogue and cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual respect in the field of human rights, both within BRICS and in multilateral fora – including the United Nations Human Rights Council where all BRICS serve as members in 2014 – taking into account the necessity to promote, protect and fulfil human rights in a non-selective, non-politicized and constructive manner, and without double standards.’ (Fortaleza 2014)

To date, civil society has not issued joint policy positions; they have, however, submitted letters urging leaders to adopt specific commitments. The BRICS Academic Forum has issued recommendations since 2012 and the BRICS Think Tank Council prepared an extensive document outlining a long-term vision for the BRICS. Thus, similar to the G20, BRICS discussion of development preceded active civil society involvement at a global level. Of the three policy processes examined here, the BRICS have acknowledged civil society the least, with no formal mechanisms for involvement and only one explicit mention in a summit communique. That said, civil society engagement and recognition has
grown each year, with indications that there will be a formal mechanism for involvement through the Civil BRICS under the 2015 Russian presidency.

Civil society engagement in High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness processes: Embedded and influential

Finally, we turn to the High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness, in existence for the longest amount of time among the three processes examined here, but with the fewest number of convenings. Compared to G20 and BRICS, HLF-AE have a much more targeted remit, focusing exclusively on development assistance. Moreover, since the outset, HLF-AE have had a much broader, less senior participant base than G20 and BRICS processes. For example, the First High Level Forum in Rome in 2003 included ministers, heads of aid agencies and other senior officials representing 28 aid recipient countries and more than 40 multilateral and bilateral development institutions – a markedly different scope and participant profile than five Heads of State.

Civil society presence. Civil society has convened parallel meetings throughout HLF-AE processes and established the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness in 2009 following the 2008 HLF in Accra. What is most distinct about their role in HLF processes, however, has been the embedded nature of civil society in formal decision-making processes. In the Fourth HLF in 2011, civil society representatives were among the signatories of the official Busan Partnership Agreement – not simply interacting with leaders through a separate mechanism like the C20, but one of the (many) decision-making partners themselves:

‘We, Heads of State, Ministers and representatives of developing and developed countries, heads of multilateral and bilateral institutions, representatives of different types of public, civil society, private, parliamentary, local and regional organisations..., recognise that we are united by a new partnership that is broader and more inclusive than ever before, founded on shared principles, common goals and differential commitments for effective international development.’
This involvement began ahead of and continued after the December 2011 High Level Forum, including civil society participation in the September 2011 Africa Regional Meeting on Development Effectiveness, at which representatives of African governments, parliaments, regional economic communities and institutions, civil society organisations, academia and the private sector from 43 African countries ratified the African Consensus and Position; the July 2012 Post-Busan Pan African CSO Conference which gathered participants from 24 African countries; and active civil society participation in the post-Busan interim group (PBIG). The Busan process also created new mechanisms for further engagement: the CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE) and multi-stakeholder Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation.

HLF-AE references to civil society. Civil society has been recognised in each of the four declarations, with increasing frequency over time. The 2008 Accra Agenda for Action portrays the role of civil society primarily as a consultative, contributing body rather than one directly involved in designing, implementing and monitoring, but commits to deepening engagement with CSOs as independent development actors in their own right. The 2011 Busan Partnership Agreement more fully acknowledges the central role of civil society, marking a shift in how the sector is viewed from one of consultation to agency:

‘Civil society organisations play a vital role in enabling people to claim their rights, in promoting rights-based approaches, in shaping development policies and partnerships, and in overseeing their implementation. They also provide services in areas that are complementary to those provided by states.’

HLF-AE policy commitments. In 2011 the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness issued a series of joint policy recommendations. As noted, civil society groups were also involved in shaping the African Consensus and Position on Development Effectiveness. As
illustrated in Appendix A, all ten global monitoring indicators of the Busan Partnership Agreement reflect CSO recommendations. The second indicator directly relates to the civil society operating environment.

Thus, in contrast to G20 and BRICS processes, civil society has been consistently referenced and increasingly engaged in HLF-AE processes. Their recommendations are well reflected in policy commitments, to which they are a co-signatory alongside government and other non-state actors.

**Discussion and Future Research**

Across all three global policy processes, we observe a growing role for and formalisation of civil society involvement over time, reflected in the establishment of the CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness in 2012, Civil20 in 2013, and potential Civil BRICS Forum in 2015. Although increasing, the recognition of civil society remains incomplete, particularly for G20 and BRICS processes. Formal mechanisms for civil society engagement have lagged behind those of other non-state actors: business, labour, youth and academia. In meeting communiques, civil society is infrequently mentioned and done so alongside other non-state actors. Most indirect references to civil society express condolences, solidarity and concern for citizens affected by conflict, discuss standards of living, and people-to-people cultural exchanges rather than acknowledging civil society agency. Nonetheless, initial statements from the 2015 G20 Turkish presidency and plans of the 2015 Civil BRICS in Russia suggest that the coming year may offer new opportunities for civil society, both in terms of process and policy priorities.

Over time, the G20 and particularly BRICS leaders have discussed development issues prior to formal civil society involvement and in the absence of joint CSO policy positions. However, the measures used here relied predominantly on documented statements
and formal mechanisms for state-civil society interaction, so the role and influence of CSOs through less visible, informal channels is likely underestimated.

Distinct from G20 and BRICS processes, the High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness have featured civil society in a much more central role. This prominence is evident in declaration language and multi-stakeholder participation mechanisms. The uptake of CSO policy positions has been substantial, and their contributions more distinguishable since other non-state actors have been less engaged. However, as noted, the longer duration, narrow thematic focus, large size and diverse participant profile of these High Level Fora make this process quite distinct from G20 and BRICS.

Taken together, these preliminary findings suggest an embedded and influential role of civil society in HLF-AE processes, a lagged but formalising position for civil society within the G20, and an emergent role with the BRICS, whose statements have referenced inclusion, equity and poverty reduction from the outset. Given the notable difference between HLF and the Heads of State-driven G20 and BRICS processes, future research could explore the extent to which breadth of focus, thematic issue area, and number and seniority of stakeholders influences adoption and implementation of policy commitments. Is there a minimum level of state involvement required to retain state interest? By broadening decision-making, does the multi-stakeholder Global Partnership for Development Effectiveness, for example, risk decreasing the power possible when fewer people are involved?

Based on initial patterns, future research could also explore what factors explain the formalisation of CSO mechanisms. To what extent does the scale and diversity of civil society, access to funding, and stronger norms of consensus affect the emergence and structure of CSO mechanisms relative to other non-state actors? Does formalisation simply represent the evolution of increasing civil society involvement over time? What is the
influence of geopolitics and the orientation of the host country? If the Civil BRICS does indeed become formalised in 2015, mechanisms for civil society involvement in both G20 and BRICS processes will have been established for the first time in Russia, providing a critical case study of their emergence.

In addition to the mechanisms themselves, who within civil society is engaged in these policy processes over time and across countries: grassroots organisations, social movements, national CSO networks, international NGOs? Furthermore, given the overlap in some policy positions, what is civil society’s unique role relative to other actors? Is their value greatest in some phases of the policy process more than others – agenda setting, policy formation, adoption and/or implementation?

Given their recent formation, both the orientation of these 21st century global policy processes themselves, and the potential role and influence of civil society will likely continue to evolve. The 2015 Turkish G20 presidency, 2015 Russian BRICS presidency, New Development Bank and Global Partnership for Development Effectiveness offer additional opportunities to further this inquiry as global contexts shift, and with it, civil society engagement and response.
Appendix A. Comparison of civil society policy positions and global monitoring indicators of the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation

Civil society policy positions:
CSOs on the road to Busan: Key messages and proposals, April 2011
African Consensus and Position on Development Effectiveness, September 2011

Global indicators
CSO D. Launch an inclusive Busan Compact at HLF4 which brings together specific time-bound commitments and initiates fundamental reforms in the global governance of development cooperation

1. Development cooperation is focused on results that meet developing countries’ priorities

African Consensus (AC) 21a. Essentially, to scale up the development impact of aid interventions, Africa reinforces the urgency to reframe the Aid delivery model for a more robust and context-relevant one that mirrors Africa’s development landscape. The Continent therefore calls on the full support of its development partners in working towards attaining this objective in Busan and beyond. This calls for the alignment of aid to both national and regional priorities.

2. Civil society operates within an environment which maximises its engagement in and contribution to development

AC 27e. Recognize the need for strengthening and deepening domestic accountability, creation of enabling environment for stakeholders including civil society organizations, achievement of gender equality, youth empowerment, human rights and environmental protection as cornerstones for development effectiveness

CSO C. Agree on minimum standards for government and donor policies, laws, regulations and practices that create an enabling environment for CSOs.

3. Engagement and contribution of the private sector to development

AC 21e. Africa undertakes to utilize self-organizing ‘beyond Aid’ mechanisms to reduce Aid reliance and stimulate a strong and varied development financial base for sustainability. Development assistance should particularly be directed to Africa’s real economy to enhance the present growth path, while ensuring the full involvement and participation of an empowered private sector.

CSO A. Orient private sector development for self-sustaining livelihoods

4. Transparency: information on development cooperation is publicly available

AC 27c. Resolve to programme and manage aid more effectively to achieve development results, accountability and transparency, including through building of strong institutions for accountability, oversight and implementation and the promotion of greater
participation of parliament, civil society and private sector in defining and implementing
the development agenda.

CSO A. Implement full transparency as the basis for strengthened accountability and
good governance: Create and work with clear inclusive accountability frameworks at
country and global levels. Adhere to and implement the highest standards of openness
and transparency-applicable to all aid actors.

5. **Development cooperation is more predictable**

AC 28.3. Underscore the need for concrete action plan from the development partners in
fulfilling the unfinished aid effectiveness agenda including but not limited to the use of
country systems, harmonization, aid predictability, alignment, mutual accountability and
transparency and elimination of conditionalities.

CSO A. Carry forward and strengthen the Paris and Accra commitments through realizing
democratic ownership in development cooperation: Address the unpredictability of aid
flows

6. **Aid is on budgets which are subject to parliamentary scrutiny**

AC 33c. Urge our development partners to support the achievement of fiscal transparency
and strengthening the oversight function of parliaments, civil society and the private
sector, for greater accountability of programming and use of development (aid and non-
aid) resources.

CSO A. Use country systems as the first option. In this regard, they must increase the use
of program-based approaches, negotiated with transparency and the participation of all
development actors, including local governments and parliaments.
Create and works with clear inclusive accountability frameworks at country and global
levels. Effective democratic mechanisms for accountability require both parliamentary
capacities for robust policy scrutiny and respect for the rights of all development actors.

7. **Mutual accountability among development cooperation actors is strengthened
through inclusive reviews**

AC 27d. Emphasize that Mutual Accountability framework must embrace the set up and
strengthening of African-owned aid information, broad-based ownership of the
management and monitoring systems, creation of dialogue frameworks between
stakeholders and the integration of human rights and gender equality.

AC 29. Further call for concerted efforts towards the adoption of mutual accountability
assessment framework, building on mutual trust and strengthening of capacities of all
stakeholders in the next dispensation of development effectiveness.

CSO A. Give priority to inclusive multi-stakeholder policy dialogue

8. **Gender equality and women’s empowerment**
AC 21a. The unfinished Aid Effectiveness agenda: Further, as stated in the AAA, the achievement of gender equality, human rights, environmental sustainability, must inform the development effectiveness agenda.

CSO B. Promote and implement gender equality and women’s rights.

9. **Effective institutions: development country's systems are strengthened and used**

AC 28.3. Underscore the need for concrete action plan from the development partners in fulfilling the unfinished aid effectiveness agenda including but not limited to the use of country systems, harmonization, aid predictability, alignment, mutual accountability and transparency and elimination of conditionalities.

AC 28.4. Call on development partners, to be responsive to national and regional contexts and needs. Harmonization of policies and procedures at the international level, including through greater delegation of authority to the country or regional offices; use of country and regional systems and procedures and alignment remains paramount.

CSO A. Use country systems as the first option

10. **Aid is untied**

   CSO A. Fully untie all forms of aid
References


Tomlinson, Brian. CSOs on the road from Accra to Busan. CSO initiatives to strengthen development effectiveness: Documenting the experiences of the CSO BetterAid platform and the Open Forum on CSO Development Effectiveness. BetterAid.

