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Prasanta Bandyopadhyay and Matthew R. Dasti

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FROM THE EDITORS

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This issue of the newsletter continues the investigations initiated in the previous issue under the broad heading “Indian Thought and Culture.” There, we recognized three major currents of contemporary work on Indian philosophy: (i) excavation and reconstruction of classical Indian thought; (ii) critical consideration of political, racial, and ideological factors that have influenced the Western reception of Indian thought and culture in the colonial and post-colonial periods; and (iii) reflection upon modern Indian philosophical and cultural production. While the last issue was devoted to the first two currents, this issue will be devoted to the third.

Illustrating that it is not only the classical authors who require and, indeed, deserve careful and devoted excavation, Jay Garfield and Nalini Bhushan inaugurate this issue with a study of A. C. Mukerji and K. C. Bhattacharyya, two of the most important modern Indian philosophers. Garfield and Bhushan explore their work on subjectivity and consciousness, while embedding their groundbreaking contributions to the epistemology and metaphysics of subjectivity within the philosophical and cultural movements of the late colonial period. Simon Dixon’s essay reflects on one of the most prominent examples of modern Indian cultural production, Bollywood, examining K. Asif’s sophisticated epic Mughal-E-Azam from a formalist aesthetic perspective. The final two papers reflect both the second and third currents of inquiry. Michelle Maskiell’s paper tracks the changing conceptions of the adequacy and value of Indian-made products in the West during the modern period, and Himadri Banerjee’s provides a study of Indian modernity in the form of the Sikh experience, while problematizing the notion of diaspora as often applied to South Asian religious communities.

We’d like to thank Jay Garfield and Erin Shepherd for their guidance and assistance in the editing of this newsletter.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES AND INFORMATION

1. Purpose: The purpose of the newsletter is to publish information about the status of Asians and Asian Americans and their philosophy and to make the resources of Asians and Asian-American philosophy available to a larger philosophical community. The newsletter presents discussions of recent developments in Asians and Asian-American philosophy (including, for example, both modern and classical East-Asian philosophy, both modern and classical South Asian philosophy, and Asians and Asian Americans doing philosophy in its various forms), related work in other disciplines, literature overviews, reviews of the discipline as a whole, timely book reviews, and suggestions for both spreading and improving the teaching of Asian philosophy in the current curriculum. It also informs the profession about the work of the APA Committee on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies. One way the dissemination of knowledge of the relevant areas occurs is by holding highly visible, interactive sessions on Asian philosophy at the American Philosophical Association’s three annual divisional meetings.

Potential authors should follow the submission guidelines below:

(i) Please submit essays electronically to the editor(s). Articles submitted to the newsletter should be limited to ten double-spaced pages and must follow the APA submission guidelines.

(ii) All manuscripts should be prepared for anonymous review. Each submission shall be sent to two referees. Reports will be shared with authors. References should follow The Chicago Manual Style.

(iii) If the paper is accepted, each author is required to sign a copyright transfer form, available on the APA website, prior to publication.

2. Book reviews and reviewers: If you have published a book that you consider appropriate for review in the newsletter, please ask your publisher to send the editor(s) a copy of your book. Each call for papers may also include a list of books for possible review. To volunteer to review books (or some specific book), kindly send the editor(s) a CV and letter of interest mentioning your areas of research and teaching.
3. Where to send papers/reviews: Please send all articles, comments, reviews, suggestions, books, and other communications via email to the editor(s): Jay L. Garfield (jay.garfield@yale-nus.edu.sg) and Prasanta Bandyopadhyay (psb@montana.edu).

4. Submission deadlines: Submissions for spring issues are due by the preceding November 1, and submissions for fall issues are due by the preceding February 1.

5. Guest editorship: It is possible that one or more members of the Committee on Asian and Asian American Philosophers and Philosophies could act as guest editors for one of the issues of the newsletter depending on their expertise in the field. To produce a high-quality newsletter, for one of the issues of the newsletter depending on their expertise in the field. To produce a high-quality newsletter, one of the co-editors could even come from outside the members of the committee depending on his/her area of research interest.

ARTICLES

Self and Subjectivity in Colonial India: A. C. Mukerji and K. C. Bhattacharyya

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1. CONTEXT
By the 1920s, philosophy in India was conditioned by two broad intellectual currents, one internal to the academy, and the other deriving from religious movements in the more public sphere. Academically, Kant and post-Kantian German philosophy were at the center of philosophical education, and the impact of British neo-Hegelianism, through the enormous influence of Hiralal Haldar, was widespread. Outside of the academy, Swami Vivekananda and Śri Aurobindo had brought Advaita Vedānta to the center stage. Their impact was enormous, not only on public discourse, but also in the philosophical academy. Vedānta had come to represent the Indian philosophical tradition in a way that Nyāya had in earlier times, and the confluence of this Indian idealistic tradition and the German idealism was a powerful determinant of philosophical speculation.

This modern Vedānta, when it entered the sphere of academic philosophy, was brought into dialogue with two other important intellectual movements: Anglo-American psychology and European phenomenology, each of which had made its way to the subcontinent. The psychology was that of James, Ward, and Watson. The phenomenology was that of Husserl. The encounter with psychology forced important questions concerning the boundaries between the domains of philosophical and empirical speculation regarding the mind; the encounter with phenomenology forced parallel questions concerning the boundaries between the first- and third-person perspectives on subjectivity, and concerning embodiment and the mental, and between experience and knowledge. Taken together, these two streams of thought raise what has come to be called, following David Chalmers (2003), the “hard problem,” or what the philosophers we are about to encounter would have called “the old problem,” the problem of understanding the nature of consciousness or subjectivity itself. This problem, of course, is what animates Vedānta thought from the very beginning.

It is therefore not surprising that the two most prominent academic epistemologists and metaphysicians of the last three decades of the colonial period—A. C. Mukerji of Allahabad and K. C. Bhattacharyya of Calcutta—were preoccupied with the puzzle of subjectivity and consciousness. Nor is it surprising that each of these, also accomplished historians of Western philosophy and steeped in the Sanskrit tradition of Indian philosophy, approached this problem with both of these traditions in view. Neither was a comparative; neither took the history of philosophy, whether Indian or Western, as the focus of his research; but both took each of these traditions to be the background against which questions were to be raised and solutions considered. In this respect as well, we see in Mukerji and Bhattacharyya a distinctively secular, academic approach to the discipline of philosophy, and, indeed, one more innovative and cosmopolitan in its scope than we might find in their European or American contemporaries (or successors, for that matter).

2. A. C. MUKERJI (1888–1968)

2.1 BIOGRAPHY
Anukul Chandra Mukerji was born in 1888 in Murshidabad in West Bengal. He studied philosophy, earning his B.A. and M.A. at Central Hindu College (now Benares Hindu University) in Varanasi, where he was a student of the prominent philosophers Bhagavan Das and P. B. Adhikari. Although Mukerji taught and wrote entirely in English, he read both Sanskrit and German and was trained in both Indian and Western philosophy. Mukerji’s entire professional career was spent at the University of Allahabad, one of the best institutions of higher learning in colonial India.

Despite a stellar academic reputation during his lifetime, however, Mukerji was and remains unknown in the West; surprisingly, he is little known in contemporary India. This is largely because he, like many of his Indian contemporaries, published almost entirely in local venues. Most of his articles were published in the campus journal Allahabad University Studies. Mukerji’s two books were published by the Juvenile Press (later the Indian Press) of Allahabad and are currently almost impossible to find, even in second-hand book stores. Bhattacharyya, by contrast, remains well known, especially in India, and is widely regarded in India today as the only truly great and original Indian philosopher of the colonial period. During their careers, both were very prominent, leading the two most prestigious philosophy departments in India. Mukerji served several terms as president of the Indian Philosophical Congress, and Bhattacharyya was a leading figure in the philosophical scene at the Institute for Indian Philosophy at Amalner, a
center in remote Maharashtra where many luminaries of Indian philosophy gathered for regular seminars.

2.2 A. C. MUKERJI’S PHILOSOPHICAL PROGRAM

Mukerji approached Indian idealism through the Advaita Vedānta school. He focused there on the work of Śankara and Yajñavalkya, as well as Ramanujan, Vācaspāti, and Prabhākara. He also attended to Buddhist idealism, particularly that of Dignāga, Vasubandhu, and Uddyotakara and to its Buddhist Mādhyamika interlocutors, such as Nāgārjuna and his commentator Candrakīrti, and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika figures such as Kanada and Praśastapāda. His scholarship in the Indian tradition—both the orthodox and the Buddhist schools—is impeccable, and his readings are both insightful and critical.

Despite his impressive scholarship in the history of Western and Indian philosophy, Mukerji is not primarily a historian of philosophy. He draws on the history of philosophy as a resource for his systematic thinking about then current philosophical problems, many of which continue to attract philosophical attention. Mukerji was a specialist in the philosophy of mind and psychology. He was a committed naturalist in that he saw the deliverances of empirical psychology as foundational to an understanding of the mind. He paid close attention especially to the psychologist William James and the philosophers John Watson and James Ward. Nonetheless, Mukerji was convinced that psychologism was in the end insufficient as an understanding of subjectivity, and required supplementation by a transcendental philosophy of the pure subject, for which he turned principally to Hegel, Caird, and Śankara as inspirations for his own synthetic view.

It is striking as well that despite the penchant at the time of many young philosophers to use the method of comparison in their work, Mukerji was not a comparativist. While he was philosophically concerned with the project of comparativism, a preoccupation initiated in India by B. N. Seal, he explicitly rejected it as a method. This put him at odds with Radhakrishnan and with his younger contemporary P. T. Raju, each of whom followed Seal in taking this to be the best avenue for advancing Indian philosophy in a global context. Mukerji instead insisted simply on doing philosophy, and doing it using all available resources, no matter their origin. He believed that the best way to advance Indian philosophy was to use it in philosophical practice, and never distinguished between Indian and Western sources in a systematic fashion. In short, he was more a cross-cultural than a comparative philosopher.

Mukerji wrote two substantial monographs: *Self, Thought, and Reality* (1933) and *The Nature of Self* (1938). Each of these develops themes first articulated in a series of journal articles published in Allahabad University Studies. These two books can profitably be read as a single, two-volume study exploring and defending a naturalistic, Vedānta-inflected transcendental idealism as an account of the nature of subjectivity and of the relation of mind to the world. In each book, Mukerji is concerned to emphasize the rational intelligibility of the world and the foundational role that consciousness and self-knowledge play in the edifice of knowledge more generally. Here, we focus on the philosophy articulated in this two-volume study, as these volumes present the clearest statement of Mukerji’s reconstruction of the history of philosophy, his philosophy of mind, and his account of the interface between epistemology and metaphysics, and because it, along with the philosophy of Bhattacharyya, is representative of the attention to the philosophy of mind in the context of both Indian and Western traditions so characteristic of philosophy in the Indian renaissance.

Both books are animated by a single puzzle that preoccupies Mukerji as well as Bhattacharyya (and many of their contemporaries): given that it is (1) manifest that we do know ourselves; (2) necessary that we do so in order for any other knowledge to count as knowledge; but (3) clear that we don’t know ourselves as objects, in what sense and how does self-knowledge arise and count as knowledge? Mukerji sees the conundrum posed by this apparently inconsistent triad as the central problem of modern epistemology, and as central both to the Western and the Indian problematic, and only soluble by bringing the two traditions to bear on the problem. *Self, Thought, and Reality* begins with the epistemology of the world of objects and the relation between knower and known; *The Nature of Self* uses this platform to launch the investigation of knowledge of the subject itself. We begin with the epistemology of the outer.

2.3 SELF, THOUGHT, AND REALITY

*Self, Thought, and Reality* is organized around three concerns. The first is the relation between idealism and realism: Mukerji is concerned to show that they are not, in fact, rivals but rather complementary aspects of any plausible philosophical position. Second, Mukerji is interested in the relationship between correspondence theories and coherence theories of truth and knowledge, once again, concerned to show that the dichotomy is false. Finally, he is concerned, as he puts it, with the relation between “being and becoming,” by which he really means the relation between metaphysics and science. These three concerns structure Mukerji’s account of our knowledge of the outer world and frame his inquiry into the possibility of knowledge of the inner.

Mukerji opens his inquiry into the relationship between idealism and realism by examining Kant’s response to Hume. He sees the foundation of Hume’s realism in his commitment to a reductionist program—one he takes to be aligned with the positivism and forms of empiricism fashionable in his own time. He then reads Kant as rejecting that reductionism in favor of a view of entities as constituted as unities in virtue of the synthetic operation of consciousness. Put this way, we can see Mukerji as arguing for the robust reality of the objects of the human *lebenswelt*, as opposed to those who would see them as merely constructions and who look for greater reality in the ephemeral, atomic, and disconnected which constitute them. Here is how he puts the point:

*Our aim, therefore, is to show, in how imperfect a form, that Kant’s answer to Hume has thoroughly*
undermined the only basis upon which all forms of realism must ultimately stand, and consequently the realistic and empirical philosophies of our time, in spite of what value they may possess for students of philosophy, do not represent a real development of thought. If we attempt a brief formulation of the underlying principle of empiricism it will be found to consist in the assumption that the “unconnected manifold” have a superior reality in comparison to their unity.¹

This ontological insight is grounded as much in a reading of Bradley and Green as of Kant. Mukerji hence sees another way of posing Hume’s problem and Kant’s response: Hume argues that real entities exist prior to the relations in which they stand, and that they exist independently of those relations. Kant, on his view, sees that things exist only in relation to consciousness in some sense, but Bradley completes this ascent. He does so, on Mukerji’s view, by arguing that the identity of any thing is constituted by its relations to everything else, and hence that relations are essential, or internal, to being not mere accidents attaching to things that would exist even were they not to stand in those relations. Mukerji hence lines up the distinction between Kantian idealism and Humean realism with the neo-Hegelian distinction between holism and atomism.

Things . . . do not exist at first in separation from each other so that all connections between them would be mere fortuitous generalizations; on the contrary, their existence has no intelligible meaning except in relation to each other. What we call the real existence of the world is constituted by the various relations, spatial, temporal, causal, etc., subsisting between things, and each thing is what it is only through its relations. . . . Green puts the whole position this way: “abstract the many relations from the one thing, and there is nothing. They, being many, determine or constitute its definite unit. It is not the case that it first exists in its unity, and then is brought into various relations. Without the relations it would not exist at all.” [Green, Prolegomenon §28]²

Mukerji takes the second issue between Hume and Kant as a debate concerning the ontological role of mind itself. To the question, “Does the mind have a special ontological status?” Hume, argues Mukerji, answers “no.” Kant, he argues, answers “yes.” That is, Hume adopts a psychologistic approach to epistemology, while Kant adopts a normative, transcendental approach. Mukerji defends Kant here, arguing that to be an empirically real object is to be an object for a subject, and that is to be an object whose unity is the consequence of the synthesis of the manifold of sense by the operations of the understanding. To say this, he argues, is not to reject empiricism, per se, in epistemology, but it is to reject the demotion of the mind to one entity among others and to refuse to reduce the project of epistemology to the project of understanding the operations of the mind from an empirical point of view. In introspection, Mukerji argues, cannot displace epistemological reflection (a view with which, as we will see, Bhattacharyya concurs). Mukerji characterizes the psychological attitude as the view that “the minds he studies are objects, in a world of other objects.”³ He contrasts this with the epistemological attitude:

The epistemological attitude, on the other hand, is distinct from the psychological . . . and consists in treating the knowing mind, not as one object among other objects, but as that which is presupposed by everything known or knowable and in treating knowledge not as an attribute of a particular thing, but as the medium through which all objects reveal themselves.⁴

Mukerji forcefully rejects subjective idealism, which he takes to be an inevitable consequence of psychologism, and which he associates with Berkeley as well as certain Vedānta thinkers such as Śrīharṣa, as well as Buddhist idealists such as Dignāga and Vasubandhu, according to which external objects are unreal. Instead, he argues that when each is properly understood, the apparent duality between idealism and realism is chimerical. Instead, they are complementary, and even mutually entailing: idealism, he argues, presents an answer to the question, “What is it to be real?” and realism is guaranteed by the fact that although objects exist for us only as they are represented, their existence and character is independent of any particular thought or thinker. And it is science, he argues, that is the measure of the empirically real. Mukerji thus defends both transcendental idealism and scientific realism, so long as each keeps to its respective domain. On his view, things exist independently of us—the core of realism—but our knowledge of them is dependent on the structure of thought, and so they exist for us only subject to the conditions of thought—the core of idealism.

Far from subtracting anything from the common things of the world, idealism adds to the reality of the things, insofar as it alone makes it clear that things have far other aspects of their life than those which are revealed to commonsense or to science.⁵

This synthesis of idealism and realism provides the basis for Mukerji’s second synthesis—that of correspondence and coherence. Given the association of coherence theories with idealism and correspondence theories with realism, it is natural to see them as in tension with one another, but also therefore natural to anticipate Mukerji’s reconciliation of this apparent dichotomy. A pure correspondence theory of thought and truth would hold that the mind and the world are entirely independent of one another, and that our ideas can be examined to determine the degree to which they correspond in some way to be specified with an independently examined world. As Mukerji points out, Berkeley puts paid to this naive idea.

But as a theory of truth, Mukerji argues, correspondence is not bad. The idea that correspondence is the content of truth, he says, makes good sense, but to take it as a test for truth does not.⁶

The real defect of the correspondence theory consists in not the definition but the test that it claims to offer of a true judgment. It is futile . . .
to attempt to know whether our knowledge at a particular stage is true or not by reference to things external to knowledge. The correspondence can be known only by the amount of harmony that knowledge has so far attained to. The more knowledge tends to be a whole, the greater is our assurance of correspondence; the more there are discords and disharmony in knowledge, the greater is the distance between knowledge and reality.7

That is, he argues, it is internal to the very idea of the truth of a thought or a sentence that it represents the world correctly. The problem arises when we also take correspondence to provide a criterion of that correctness, requiring the impossible independent access to the representation and to the represented. Instead, he argues, a coherence theory, while it makes no constitutive sense of truth, provides the best possible criterion that we can use in the evaluation of the truth of sentences or of thoughts. We take something to be true to the degree that it coheres with the weight of other evidence and other secure views, including our evidence regarding the methods by means of which we test it. We can never escape the web of coherence critically, but this does not mean that we do not discover the world, and that our criteria are not criteria for accurate correspondence.

Another way to put this subtle point is that the dichotomy between construction and discovery, on Mukerji’s view, is also chimerical. One way that Mukerji defends this view is to argue that the very concept of belief presupposes the concept of truth: truth is that at which belief aims. But the concept of truth presupposes in turn an objective order of things. So, even to believe that one merely believes—the idealistic view—presupposes that the reality in which one believes is independent of that belief—the essential core of realism.

Once it is admitted that the distinction between a true and a false belief is not to be found in the nature of the belief as an event in the mental history of the individual, it is easy to see that what invests it with the logical character is its conformity or otherwise to something beyond itself. That is, the truth or falsity of the belief has to be ascertained by reference to an objective order of things, so that when an assertion is claimed to be true, what is implied is not simply that an individual has somehow or other come to hold a particular belief, but that it has an objective basis in the nature of things. No theory of truth that does not distinguish between these two aspects of an assertion can stand the scrutiny of critical thought.8

Here, we see Mukerji drawing together the question of the relation between the real and the ideal with the critique of psychologism. Neither epistemology nor the philosophy of mind, he argues, can make do with a naïve naturalism about truth, knowledge, belief, or, indeed, cognition itself. Each of these involves an ineliminable normative dimension. Mukerji’s third concern in this book, as we have noted, is the status of scientific knowledge and its relation to pure epistemology and metaphysics. It is very important to him that the philosophical and the scientific standpoints are each necessary to provide a complete picture of the world, and that neither—pretensions of some partisans to the contrary notwithstanding—can replace the other. Nonetheless, he argues, they must each be regarded as a distinct standpoint, and not as providing distinct worlds.9 The world whose transcendental conditions we investigate when we do philosophy, the world we experience in everyday life, and the world delivered by the best science are the same world, differently understood. And it is the task of good philosophy to explain why and how this is so.

The resolution of the dichotomies between realism and idealism and between correspondence and coherence take us to Mukerji’s resolution of a third apparent duality: that between metaphysics and science. He argues that these two cognitive enterprises stand in need of one another. On his view, transcendental idealism ensures that the world is a systematic unity; its dependence as object on the mind ensures that it is intelligible.

Thus, even empirical science has an a priori basis: science itself and its methodology, he argues, depend upon our conception of what constitutes explanation, and on our transcendental demand that all phenomena can be subsumed by explanation. Therefore, without the metaphysics and epistemology that constitute its methodological ground, we can have no science. Without science, on the other hand, we can have no confidence in the reality of any objects of knowledge. Even the quantum theory, and the uncertainty principle, Mukerji argues, presuppose transcendental conditions on explanation, the notion of truth, knowledge, and of entities in interaction with one another. So, while scientific revolutions might alter the details of our metaphysical picture, they still presuppose a metaphysics and an epistemology that renders the science itself intelligible.

The indeterminacy of an entity in certain respects presupposes its determinateness in other respects; in other words, we can conceive arbitrariness in the behaviour of an entity, only insofar as it behaves in perfectly definite ways under other conditions. Absolute lawlessness is inconceivable, either in the world matter, or in that of spirit.

If then so much be granted, one must give up the idea of constructing physical structures on a non-causal basis. No knowledge is possible without the categories of cause and substance, because they enter into the essence of every conceivable entity, no matter whether we are thinking of energy, mass, wave-function or quantum constant.10

Mukerji—as Goodman would decades later—characterizes science as “drawing world-pictures.” The world constrains the content of those pictures; epistemology guarantees that they can be drawn in the first place and constrains their form. The pictures, he insists, are not, simply in virtue of being drawn by us, fictions; instead, they are interpretations.
What is called a world-picture is but an extension of the same process of interpretation that begins with identification. Even the things of ordinary commonsense knowledge would not be what they are if the sense-given data had not been interpreted and taken into conceptual frames. To feel a feeling and to know it as a feeling . . . are two very different functions of the mind.

The distinction then, between the world of sense-data and world-pictures, we submit, is based on an unreal abstraction. All of this scientific realism notwithstanding, for Mukerji, the most important consequence of all of this, returning to his initial critique of Hume, is that the self cannot be conceived of as a thing among things, or as a substance with attributes, even cognitive attributes, as the Cartesian might have it. Instead, he argues, the self is that to which all things or substances are related, that in relation to which they can be real, and by which they can be known. Its special place in the world is that which grounds the normativity of knowledge and of the scientific enterprise in the first place.

Mukerji closes this first book, and anticipates the second, by examining this special role of the self and our knowledge of that self. In his conclusion, he draws in the Indian Advaita Vedānta philosopher Śankara to understand this. But while one might think that this turn to the East is a turn away from reason and towards mysticism, Mukerji insists that that is inadmissible. The very demand for rational understanding that takes one this far is the demand that self-knowledge be rationally comprehensible.

The relation between dialectic thought and intuition . . . is not, for Śankara at least, one of antagonism. The path to intuition lies through the labyrinth of reasoned discourses, and this explains his invectives against mystical practices, or of mere feeling.12

2.4 THE NATURE OF SELF
In the preface to The Nature of Self, Mukerji dismisses mere comparative philosophy:

Comparative philosophy has so far been either predominantly historical and descriptive, or it has contented itself with discovering stray similarities between the Western and Indian thought. No serious attempt, as far as I know, has yet been made to undertake a comparative study for mutual supplementation of arguments and consequent clarification of issues. Yet, this alone can suggest the paths to new constructions and thus help the development of philosophical thought.13

Mukerji is committed to this project of “mutual supplementation,” and he is interested not in comparison but in the “clarification of issues.” This book makes good on this promise.

Mukerji frames The Nature of Self in terms of what he calls “the egocentric paradox.” He formulates the paradox in terms of another apparently inconsistent triad: On the one hand, the self must be known, and, indeed, must be known better and more intimately than any object. On the other hand, for anything to be known, it must be an object, and so not a subject. But, the self is that which is always subject and never object. It hence appears that while self-knowledge is the necessary condition of all knowledge, it itself is impossible.

The first approach to resolving this trilemma, already considered and rejected in the first book, is to reject the third claim, through psychologism, a position Mukerji associates in this volume both with the Buddhists and with Hume. On this view, the self is placed on the object side of the divide. While this makes empirical psychology possible, it can never reveal or generate any understanding of the subject which then must contemplate the objective self, and so remains a failure.

The second approach is that of Caird—the theory of so-called mediated self-consciousness—and rejects the second thesis of the trilemma. On this view, we know the subject in virtue of a thorough analysis of the object, and a transcendental inquiry into the nature of a subject that can construct such an object. Mukerji objects that this falls prey to another form of skepticism. For given the co-relativity of subject and object, it is impossible to completely know the object without also knowing the subject. This project hence cannot get off the ground. A Hegelian approach, in which we seek higher categories that can apply not only to objects but also to subjects, Mukerji argues, only gets us more of the same: the self is either recast as an object of knowledge of yet another subjective self, or it must be known in relation either to that as yet unknown self or to an object which remains unknowable so long as the self is not known.

Mukerji considers a number of philosophical maneuvers conducted both in Europe and in India, and concludes that any model that distinguishes the self as knower from the self as known opens an unacceptable skeptical gap. He is led then to an articulation of Śankara’s idea of svapraκaśa, or self-illumination, as a model of self-understanding. It is important to see that he does not simply adopt Śankara’s own view, but rather takes on an insight shared by Śankara and certain Buddhist philosophers, combines it with ideas drawn from Hegel, Bradley, and Green, and develops a highly original synthesis as an account of self-knowledge. While svapraκaśa is introduced in the classical tradition as an explanatory primitive, Mukerji modernizes it (anticipating contemporary neo-Husserlian positions according to which consciousness is necessarily self-revealing), arguing that svapraκaśa is at bottom a theory of consciousness. The account of svapraκaśa at which Mukerji aims is an account of pure, unmediated consciousness of self.

It is therefore necessary for him to resolve a metaphysical tension at the outset: Is consciousness prior to or posterior to matter in the order of explanation? This is, of course, another way of putting the question regarding idealism and realism Mukerji addressed in Self, Thought, and Reality, and...
his approach here is similar. He argues that while matter may be prior to thought in the order of being, thought is prior to matter in the order of knowing. An emphasis on the fundamental role of consciousness in knowledge, he argues, is therefore not antithetical to modern scientific materialism, and the analysis of existence in terms of transcendental subjectivity does not preclude a material theory of the origin of the mind.

A word of explanation may be useful . . . in regard to the precise meaning in which consciousness is said to be the prius of reality. This doctrine is often interpreted on the idealistic line and supposed to deny the independent existence of the material world apart from consciousness. . . . It is, therefore, important to dissociate the assertion of the priority of consciousness from the idealistic contention, and realize clearly that the doctrine of the priority of consciousness is equally compatible with the realistic belief in an independent world. Even if it be granted that knowledge does not create but only reveal a pre-existent reality, yet it would remain unchallengeable that the external reality could not be revealed to us apart from consciousness which is the principle of revelation. . . . The epistemological priority of the conscious self is thus reconcilable with realism as well as with idealism.14

Mukerji interprets svapraśā as a kind of immediate self-knowledge in which there is no distinction between subject and object. He is concerned to argue that there is nothing mystical, irrational, or even essentially Indian about this notion. Moreover, he argues, if it is known to be true, that cannot be by means of introspection, but only through philosophical argument. For introspection can tell us nothing about the self as subject.

Neither inference nor introspection is capable of proving the reality of the conscious self, for the simple reason that the self is not a thing in the democracy of things. What introspection can guarantee is the reality of pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, because they are objects; but the self as foundational consciousness, as the universal logical implicate of all known things, cannot be grasped as an object. That for which my entire world has a meaning, that in the light of which my universe shines, cannot be objectified and perceived in the same way in which the cow or the tree is perceived. Self-consciousness is not, therefore, the consciousness of the self as an object given in introspection; and Hume as well as his Indian predecessors, the Buddhists, failed to find it in the flux of mental states, because they wanted to know it as a definite type of object among other objects.15

While Mukerji argues that this absolute self is pure subjectivity, he hence argues as well that it is not a Kantian transcendental existence, but rather is entirely immanent. Nor is it a concrete universal as Hegel would have it but is rather a personal self, only non-objectified, existing only as subject. It is important to note that this is not simply a recitation of Śāṅkara's version of Advaita Vedānta. For unlike Śāṅkara, Mukerji does not take the absolute reality of the self as subject to disparage the reality of its objects. In fact, on Mukerji's understanding of the fundamental predicament of skepticism, Śāṅkara's own position opens up one more skeptical abyss by denying the reality of the object that must be correlative with the subject. Mukerji's own position is simply that subjectivity is immediately self-revealing not in introspection but rather in the pre-reflective awareness of the fact that one is the subject of one's objective experience. It is the impossibility of denying this fact and the distinctive awareness of it that preclude skepticism about the self, and hence skepticism in general, but it can never be reduced to any other kind of knowledge. He concludes as follows:

The Self is not a category at all, and, consequently, it cannot be said to be even a system or a relational whole or, again, a unity-in-difference. On the contrary, it is the ultimate, non-relational, Consciousness, which is necessarily distinctionless, unobjectifiable, and immediate.16

This return to classical Vedānta categories for a solution to a problem posed by modern European philosophy, but a return informed not only by a scholarly engagement with the Indian tradition but also with the Western tradition, and in a way that simply refuses to draw boundaries between the two, is characteristic of Mukerji's thought. But it is not characteristic only of his thought. The Indian renaissance evoked a new kind of philosophical subjectivity that we see evinced here in the study of subjectivity itself. It is a subjectivity that was experienced as problematic, and even as opaque by those practitioners themselves.

3. K. C. BHATTACHARYYA (1875–1949)

3.1 BIOGRAPHY

K. C. Bhattacharyya was born in Serampore in West Bengal and educated at Presidency College in Calcutta. He spent his entire professional career at the University of Calcutta, where he was King George V Professor of Philosophy, and is widely regarded as the foremost Indian philosopher of the colonial period. His early work was focused on logic and the philosophy of language, addressing such topics as negation, the logic of indefinite articles, and the debate between coherence and correspondence theories of truth. He then turned to topics in metaphysics and phenomenology, addressing topics in Jain philosophy and Vedānta, in particular, the nature of illusion and error.

3.2 INTRODUCTION

Bhattacharyya and Mukerji never refer to each other's work, and there is no way of knowing how much of the other's work they were reading. Nonetheless, they were plowing very similar fields, at roughly the same time, heading (as we have mentioned before) two of the most prestigious philosophy departments in India. Each took Kant's account of subjectivity and knowledge to provide a compelling account of our empirical knowledge of the external world, and each follows Kant closely in their respective accounts of empirical knowledge and of the relation between the
conceptual and sensory contributions to knowledge. Mukerji and Bhattacharyya are also in agreement regarding their critique of the Kantian project. Kant, they each argue, although in different ways, fails to provide an account of self-knowledge, assimilating the status of the self to the degree that it can be known to that of external objects—as distinct from the knowing subject—and arguing that the subject itself is unknowable. Neither Mukerji nor Bhattacharyya is content to deny our knowledge of ourselves as subjects.

### 3.3. SUBJECT AS FREEDOM: THE PROBLEMATIC

Bhattacharyya’s most important systematic work, *The Subject as Freedom* (1923), is a sustained engagement with Kant’s discussion of self-knowledge in the *Critique of Pure Reason* from the standpoint of Vedānta. In this respect, his project is akin to Mukerji’s. The central doctrine of the Kantian critical philosophy that the self is an unknowable knower is anathema to Bhattacharyya as well. From the standpoint of the Vedānta and Vaishnava tantric traditions that form the backdrop of Bhattacharyya’s thought, Kant gets things completely backwards: knowledge of the self is the very goal of philosophical and spiritual practice, and the self, being that with which we are most intimately involved, must be knowable, if indeed anything is truly knowable—since anything that is known as object must be known in relation to the self. On the other hand, given that the self is never object, but only subject, and given that thought is always objective—that is, directed upon an object—the self, from the standpoint of this tradition, cannot be thought.

The view shared by Kant, Mukerji, and Bhattacharyya that the self is a kind of epistemic singularity leads Bhattacharyya to explore the points of contact between the Kantian and the Vedānta frameworks. He parts company from Kant as well as from Mukerji in diagnosing the nature of this singularity: while Kant sees the self as in the domain of thought, but not in the domain of knowledge, Bhattacharyya sees it as falling within the domain of knowledge but not within the domain of thought. Bhattacharyya sees a deep tension in Kantian philosophy that can only, on his view, be resolved from the perspective of Vedānta: he sees the Kantian view as committed to a series of claims about the self that undermine its own commitment to the self’s unknowability.

Bhattacharyya takes seriously Kant’s own association of transcendental subjectivity and freedom. The awareness of our acts—including our act of thought—as our own, is at the same time the awareness of our freedom as thinkers, as subjects, and as actors. And it is a condition of our subjectivity that we know that these acts are ours; hence that we know that we are free; hence that we know the self. This knowledge of the self is not a knowledge of acquaintance, but rather a direct awareness of the fact that we are selves, a knowledge of who we are, and of our freedom. For these reasons, Bhattacharyya takes it that on Kant’s own terms, self-knowledge must be possible. Vedānta, because of the affinities we have just noted to the broader Kantian perspective, provides the entrée for the explanation of how this is possible. Here is how Bhattacharyya himself puts the predicament:

11. The metaphysical controversy about the reality of the subject is only about the subject viewed in some sense as object. The thinnest sense in which it is objectified is “being taken as meant.” Ordinarily the validity of this degree of objectification of the subject is not questioned, nor therefore the possibility of a dispute about its reality. If, however, the subject is taken, as explained, to be what is expressed by the word / as expressing itself, it is not meant or at best meant as unmeaning and is accordingly above metaphysical dispute. There is properly no metaphysic of the subject, if by metaphysic is understood an inquiry into the reality conceived as meanable. Even the unknowable thing-in-itself of Spencer and Kant is not taken to be unmeanable. It is at worst taken to be a problem in meaning. The knowable is meant and the negation of the knowable is, if not meant, tried to be meant, being not a gratuitous combination of words but a believed content that is problematically formulated. . . . The subject as I is neither contradictory nor meanable and the exposition of it accordingly is intermediate between mysticism and metaphysic. As, however, the subject is communicable by speech without metaphor, it cannot be taken as falling outside philosophical inquiry.

This discussion trades on Bhattacharyya’s distinction between the speakable and the meanable. The meanable roughly coincides with Kant’s knowable. Whatever can be designated intersubjectively as an object falls, for Bhattacharyya, under the head of the “meanable.” In fact, in §§3-3 (87-88), Bhattacharyya explicitly ties meaning to intersubjective agreement and availability of referents for terms. This anticipation of Wittgenstein and Sellars takes him a bit beyond Kant, of course, but the ideas are nonetheless congruent. The speakable, on the other hand, is whatever can be spoken of or communicated about through language. It is a broader category than the meanable, since there may be some things we can communicate—that are not nonsense—even though we cannot assign them meanings. So, we can talk about ourselves, even though there is no term that can mean the self.

With this distinction in mind, we can return to the dilemma Bhattacharyya poses for the Kantian view: The subject cannot be taken to be meant, for it is not intersubjectively available as the referent for I. Nobody but me is aware of my own subjectivity, and so there is no way to establish a convention of reference or meaning. And the first-person pronoun has a unique role in designating the self. Were I to refer to myself using a name or a description, in the third person, the possibility of error through misidentification intrudes. But the first-person indexical gets immediately, directly, at the speaking subject, and is so understood by addressees as well as by the speaker.

So, although the word I has no meaning in this strict sense, it is not meaningless. It conveys something and is understood; indeed, it is indispensable. It is therefore speakable, but not meanable. But it is therefore not nonsense, and therefore denotes a possible object of knowledge. But knowledge of
what kind? Not discursive, or “metaphysical” knowledge, for that would suggest that the self is an entity among entities, an object, and not the subject we wish to know. Nonetheless, it is communicable, but communicable as a kind of “intuition,” not entirely mystical, but not entirely empirical either. To explain the manner in which the self is known is the goal of Bhattacharyya’s inquiry.

3.4. Subjectivity and Freedom

At the end of the first chapter of The Subject as Freedom, Bhattacharyya returns to the Kantian problem. Here, he develops the direct connection between subjectivity and freedom.

21. The persisting objective attitude of Kant in his first Critique explains not only his admission of the thing-in-itself and his denial of self-knowledge, but also his disbelief in the possibility of a spiritual discipline of the theoretic reason through which self-knowledge may be attainable. From the subjective standpoint, object beyond knownness, this beyond this-ness is, as explained, meaningless. It may be that, wedded as we are to our body, we cannot get rid of the objective attitude and the tendency to look beyond the constructed object to the purely given. But not to be able to deny need not imply admission and though the Kantian disclaimer of idealism as accomplished knowledge is intelligible, his admission of the unknowable reality appears to be an unwarrantable surrender to realism . . .

22. Self-knowledge is denied by Kant: the self cannot be known but can only be thought through the objective categories . . . there being no intuition of it. 21

This is the summation of Bhattacharyya’s diagnosis of the Kantian predicament. Kant allows the reality of the self, and indeed its necessity, but denies us any knowledge of it, including, presumably, the knowledge that it lies beyond knowledge. The “surrender to realism” is the commitment—inhomogeneous on Kant’s own grounds—to something that is real, yet in its nature independent of our mode of intuition and knowledge. We will see that when Bhattacharyya examines the self as an object of knowledge, it will importantly not be real in this sense, but will turn out to be transcendentally ideal, not given independent of our modes of subjectivity but determined by those very modes. In this sense, as we will see, Bhattacharyya takes himself to be even more of a transcendental idealist—more relentlessly consistent in this commitment—than Kant himself. Bhattacharyya continues later in this paragraph:

The subject is thus known by itself, as not meant but speakable and not as either related or relating to the object. It is, however, believed as relating to object and symbolized as such by the objective relations. The modes of relating are at the same time the modes of freeing from objectivity, the forms of the spiritual discipline by which, it may be conceived, the outgoing reference to the object is turned backwards and the immediate knowledge of the I as content is realized in an ecstatic intuition. 22

Self-knowledge, that is, knowledge of the self as it exists independently of its objects, even though that must be knowledge of a self that is essentially capable of objective relations. And this is the first link of subjectivity to freedom. The self must be capable of being understood simply as a self, free of any relation to a particular object. That knowledge must be immediate, on pain of turning the self into an object, but can only be realized through an act of ecstatic transcendence in which subjectivity stands outside of itself. Bhattacharyya emphasizes this in the next paragraph:

23. Spiritual progress means the realization of the subject as free. . . . One demand among others—all being absolute demands—is that the subjective function being essentially the knowing of the object as distinct from it, this knowing which is only believed and not known as fact has to be known as fact, as the self-evidencing reality of the subject itself. 23

Bhattacharyya identifies three broad stages of subjectivity, each consisting in a distinctive level of freedom. The first is bodily subjectivity. In being aware of ourselves as bodies in space, we are aware of our determinate location in relation to other objects, and so our freedom to consider or to disengage with other objects in space and time. In psychic subjectivity, we are aware of ourselves as mental subjects whose direct intentional objects are representations. In this awareness, we recognize our freedom from our bodies and from our location in space and time, and the fact that we can entertain representations in the absence of any external object to which they correspond. 24 In the final level of subjectivity, spiritual subjectivity, we recognize our freedom from those representations. We come to realize that our existence is not dependent upon our objects, but they depend upon us. At this point, we intuit ourselves as spiritual subjects per se. We complete this process of self-knowledge, Bhattacharyya intimates, when we adopt the same cognitive attitude of freedom towards ourselves that we are able to develop in relation to our objects, an unmeanable sense of ourselves as pure subjects.

Bhattacharyya, like Mukerji, rejects the idea that introspection alone can ever give us knowledge of the self—the subject of experience. This is because while introspection, he argues, is essential to any knowledge—since we must know what we know and that we know it in order for any state to count as knowledge at all—introspection always retains an objective attitude towards the epistemic subject, so taking it implicitly as object. Thus, while in introspection we achieve a certain kind of necessary detachment from the object of knowledge, in virtue of seeing it as object for ourselves as subjects, our subjectivity is presented to us only in a mediated sense, and we, to whom it is presented, remain absent from the cognitive state.

To take introspective knowledge as knowledge of the subject would take us only as far as Kant goes in
his account of empirical self-knowledge, and when Kant excludes the subjective side from the domain of knowledge, Bhattacharyya argues, he excludes what must be presupposed even as a ground of the argument for its exclusion, sawing off the metaphysical branch on which the transcendental philosophy rests. The very fact that we can only know what is subject to the constructive activity of the mind entails that if knowledge of that is possible, knowledge of the subject that conditions it must be possible as well, and this in two respects: first, to know that our knowledge is always conditioned by the subject is to know something about the subject; and second, to really understand the objects of our knowledge, to understand their limitations to the conditions of our subjectivity and to understand them as our objects, is to be aware of ourselves as subjects. Bhattacharyya sums this up as follows:

51. Thus we meet the Kantian difficulty. Psychic fact . . . is object and more than object. It is more in the sense of being a metaphysical reality constitutive of the object which is its phenomenon, a reality that is known as unknown and as knowable . . . . [it] is at once real and realizing, realizing as being already real, this being the objective counterpart of knowing the object as unknown. To Kant, metaphysical reality . . . is only thought and believed. . . . We agree that the introspective awareness of the presentation . . . is not knowledge of knowing but only imagination of knowing the metaphysical. The imagination, however, is not an illusion, but only incomplete or unrealized knowledge. . . . Cognitive realization of the metaphysical reality as subjective has to be admitted, at least, as an alternative spiritual possibility.25

3.5. THE GRADES OF BODILY SUBJECTIVITY
The first grade of subjectivity is the physical: awareness of and knowledge of oneself as a body. Bhattacharyya distinguishes three successive moments of this subjectivity, each involving a distinct aspect of self-knowledge, and each implicating a distinct mode of freedom. The first of these is the awareness of the body as an external object; the second is the awareness of the body as a felt immediate object; the third and most abstract, the awareness of absence. Let us consider each of these in turn.

We identify ourselves with our bodies; we recognize ourselves in the mirror; we recognize and ostend others as bodies. Our bodies constitute the perspective from which we are perceptually engaged with others, the mode under which we act, and the loci of our sensations. They also provide the spatial reference point from which we experience the world—the here that makes it the case that I am always here. Bhattacharyya emphasizes this centrality of the body to self-experience:

58. The materialistic view that the subject is but the body is true insofar as the body represents a stage of being of the subject. But it ignores the unique singularity of one’s own body even as a perceived object. No merely objectivist account can do justice to this singularity. The objectivity of other perceived objects is constituted by their position relative to the perceptor’s body, which itself, therefore, cannot be taken to be so constituted. To the perceptor, the body is an object situated relatively to some other perceptor’s body as imagined, being not perceived by himself in a space-position though not known, therefore, as non-spatial. The perceptor as in his body or as his body is in this sense, dissociated from the external world, being what his perceived world is distinct from. At the same time he cannot help imagining himself as included in the world though it may be as a privileged object.24

At a basic but nonetheless essential level, the subject is the body. When I use the first-person singular pronoun to refer to my physical incarnation, I am correct. Nonetheless, one way in which I know my body is to perceive it as an object using external senses including sight, touch, and even smell and taste. I am hence perceivable, and am hence, as body, a kind of fusion of subject and object. My senses give me knowledge of my body as object, but although the mechanism of their doing so is the same as that by means of which they deliver other objects, they also do so in a way importantly different from that in which they give me those others: for I lie at the origin of the spatial coordinate system that structures my knowledge of the external world, and all other bodies are spatially located relative to my body. The only way that I locate my body in subjective space is by reference to the imagined gaze of another, as to assign a determinate location (as opposed to a subjective origin) presupposes another origin for the coordinate system (as Merleau-Ponty was to argue later).

Self-knowledge at this level of subjectivity is hence in part perceptual, and in part an immediate knowledge of myself as spatial origin. Without the former, I cannot represent myself as a physically instantiated subject in a physical world, and so cannot even represent my own sensory knowledge as mine; without the latter, I cannot distinguish myself as a subject from all else in the world that is object. And at this level of subjectivity, I already distinguish myself as subject precisely by a kind of freedom—in this instance, the freedom from being simply another object located in the external world, and hence the freedom to posit the loci of the objects of my lebenswelt in relation to me, to my body.

The second moment of bodily subjectivity concerns the body not as perceived in external sense, but as known immediately. This immediate knowledge is the awareness of the body from the inside, as subjective. The account of this subjectivity, which is the first level at which, Bhattacharyya argues, a genuine sense of freedom emerges, and at which subjectivity is first experienced as subjectivity, is complex. Bhattacharyya draws the distinction between the perceived and the felt body as follows:

60. One’s own body is not only perceived from the outside; one is immediately or sensuously aware of it also from within in what is called “feeling of the body.” This feeling is not, like the feeling of an object, a psychic fact from which the object
known is distinguished. The bodily feeling is but the felt body, which is not known to be other than the perceived body. Yet the perceived body is distinct from it so far as it is an “interior” that is never perceived and cannot be imagined to be perceived from the outside. . . . [T]he interior cannot be understood here as the interior that one may imagine oneself seeing. . . .

The first distinction here is the distinction between an awareness in which the object is distinct from the psychic fact of which it is an object, on the one hand, and feeling, in which there is no such distinction, on the other. When I perceive any object—say, when I see my hand—we can distinguish between the act of perception, in this case, perhaps, a visual perception, and the object, my hand. The former is psychic fact; the latter object. But when I feel my body as a physical interiority, there is no such distinction. There is not an act of feeling distinct from my being my body. Second, Bhattacharyya emphasizes, this interiority is not simply a distinct perspective on the same object. The interiority of my felt body is not an imagined spatial interior that I might see, for instance, in a laparoscope, but rather a position that can never be imagined to be perceived. It is in this sense, while physical, purely subjective.

Bhattacharyya draws this distinction in yet another way, pointing out that the kind of space represented in the interior of the felt body is different from the kind of space the perceived body occupies. He puts this in terms of a kind of indefiniteness. The guiding idea here is that while the interior space of the felt body is not experienced as having definite dimensions or spatial location, that indefiniteness is not the same kind of indefiniteness that we might find in the interior space of the felt body. The perceived body is in one sense the objective side. This has important consequences for subjectivity and freedom.

The indefiniteness of spatial representation in the felt body is not an absence of precision; it cannot be precisified at all, in fact. Instead, even when we limn perfectly the volume of the interior of the body, we leave out the interiority of the body, which, while spatially oriented, outruns any attempt at location. Bhattacharyya now turns to the implications of these differences for the nature of subjectivity itself and the freedom it implicates:

64. We may consider body-feeling in relation to psychic fact and introspection into psychic fact on the one hand and to the perceived body and perceived object on the other. The perceived body is only potentially dissociated from the perceived object inasmuch as it is not merely like presentation not denied to be object but is positively known as object. . . . The object, however, is fully distinguished from the felt body: the perceived object presents exterior surface only. . . . Corresponding to this full distinction from the felt interior, there is the actual but imperfect dissociation of freedom of the felt body from the perceived environment. The felt body, however, does not appear even imperfectly dissociated form the perceived body. . . .

The perceived body is, he points out, not all that different from other perceived objects. While to be sure, it has, as he argued earlier, a subjective dimension, it is also represented as an object from which, like all other objects, the subjective awareness of it is dissociated. The felt body is entirely different in this respect. Even though, as Bhattacharyya notes at the end of this passage, the felt body is in one sense the same thing as the perceived body, in its mode of presentation as felt, it is entirely distinct from the object. Perceived objects are only surfaces—they are essentially exterior, the felt body, as opposed to the perceive body, has no surface—it is essentially interior. Bhattacharyya now brings this point to bear in order to draw another important distinction, in terms of psychic fact and identification:

65. Again, the perceived body is fully distinguished from psychic fact. . . . There may be consciousness of the body as mine and at the same time as not other than myself, unlike the consciousness of the object which if felt as mine is felt as not me. The felt body, however, is only half distinguished from psychic fact, since it is the feeling of the body on the one hand is not actually dissociated from the perceived body on the other.

When we perceive objects, including our own bodies, there is, as noted above, a distinction between object and cognitive act. The object is hence alien to the self, and this is true even of the perceived body, as perceived. But the felt body is not mine, but me; not alien, but intimate. For that reason, the felt body is more like a psychic fact than the object of one; it is hence, unlike the perceived body, on the subject side of the subject-object duality, not on the objective side. This has important consequences for subjectivity and freedom:

66. The facthood of the subjective is constituted by the feeling of detachment or freedom. The first hint of this freedom is reached in the feeling of the object. . . . When the perceived body is distinguished from the felt body, the exterior from the interior, we have an explicit feeling of distinctation, detachment or freedom from the perceived object. . . .

While there is indeed, as we saw above, a simple level of freedom in the perceptual awareness of the body, there can be, Bhattacharyya, argues, no awareness of that freedom in that perceptual consciousness of body, simply because without the awareness of interiority, there is no awareness of the distinction between psychic fact and object, and hence of subjectivity itself. Only when we have this feeling of body do we rise to the level of true self-consciousness, and at that, only at the most basic level. We climb one step further when we enter the third and final moment of bodily awareness: the awareness of absence.
The awareness of absence constitutes an essential mode of subjectivity for Bhattacharyya, as Sartre was to notice a few decades later. Unlike Sartre, however, he argues that this mode of subjectivity is an aspect of bodily self-consciousness, and indeed is the most abstract and profound mode of that consciousness. It is noteworthy that Bhattacharyya introduces the knowledge of absence at this point. He does so without comment, but it is clear that here he is relying on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology in which absence (abhāvā) is one of the fundamental categories of existence. In this classical philosophical system—whose center was and still is Bengal—specific absences of objects at loci are among the basic constituents of reality, and are objects of immediate perceptual knowledge. Bhattacharyya relies on this ontology here.

The examples he gives us are the awareness of the absence of a tree in a field in which the tree once stood, and the absence of a book we seek in a room where we expected to find it. In each case, a specific absence becomes the object of our awareness. Now, Bhattacharyya concedes (¶ 74) that our awareness of the absence is not entirely perceptual. After all, we see an empty field, not an absent tree, and we see a space on the table where we expected the book, not an absent book. There is hence an essentially inferential aspect to this awareness. So, unlike the perception of the body, or even the feeling of the body in perception of an external object, here the object of our awareness is not a perceived particular, but rather an inferred abstraction, although inferred in the very act of perception.

Bhattacharyya characterizes the mode of our awareness of the absent object as imaginative. Using an example closer to that Sartre was to mobilize in his discussion of the absence of Pierre in the café, Bhattacharyya writes:

77. Consider the absence of a beloved person. ... When such a person is missed or imaginatively perceived as now absent, there may not be any relevant reference to the locus, namely the room. But one may come to imagine the room as with the person and then realize his absence in reference to this imagined content. To imagine an object in a perceived locus is a special form of imagination in which the present locus I viewed as characterizing and not as characterized by the imagined content. The belief in the absence of the object as thus characterized by the locus, the absence here of the imagined room as sentimentally associated with the beloved person, is immediate knowledge but not perception. The absence is not taken to be fact in the present locus; and as the presentness of the absence is not the presentness of any concrete thing, it cannot be said to be perceived. The secondary cognition is conscious non-perception, the room that is perceived by sense being turned into the imagined character of the location of the imagined person.12

While Bhattacharyya regards the awareness of absence as in a certain sense immediate—that is, we are not first aware of seeing something, and then aware of inferring an absence from it—that is not the immediacy of perception, but rather of an automatic act of imagination. Sartre sees the empty café, but he is instantly aware of the absence of Pierre. And he is not thereby perceptually aware of Pierre, but rather imaginatively aware of the café avec Pierre, while perceptually aware of it sans Pierre, and at the same time aware that that is mere imagination, or, as Bhattacharyya puts it, conscious non-perception.

But this conscious non-perception requires more of us than would the actual perception of Pierre. The latter requires awareness of the object, and so immediately of its relation to our body in space. To become aware of that awareness in turn requires attention to our own bodily interiority—to the fact that our subjectivity is in our body, even though it is not perceivable. But to become aware of the absence requires us to be immediately aware of the fact that we are perceiving one thing and imagining another, and hence of the position of the body with respect not only to that which impinges upon it and to which it is perceptually related, but also with respect to what we merely imagine. We imagine the absent object—even though it actually bears no determinate relation to our body—in relation to our body. The awareness is hence bound up with the body, but free of the actual nexus of our body with its surrounds. Bhattacharyya puts it this way:

78. In the imaginative perception of absence and the absent, there is no explicitly felt dissociation from the position of the perceived body, which however is imperfectly distinguished from the imagined position of absence or of the absent. In conscious non-perception, there is the explicitly felt dissociation from the perceived body but not from the felt body, though the felt body has begun to be distinguished from the absence of the absent. The relation of the perceived body in the former case and the felt body in the latter to the known absence is like the relation of the perceived body to the felt body. The perceived body is half distinguished from the felt body which, however, is not felt to be dissociated from the perceived body. Absence imaginatively perceived is thus on a level with the felt body, both being felt undissociated from the perceived body which however is half distinguished from them. Absence known by conscious non-perception is on a higher level . . . 33

This paragraph is far from transparent. But once we see what is going on here, we will see why this form of consciousness is, according to Bhattacharyya, physical, and why it is so important in the hierarchy of modes of self-consciousness and self-knowledge. First, Bhattacharyya notes, when we are aware of an absence, we are aware of that as an absence in a particular locus, and that locus is identified in relation to our body. It is an absence here or there. But second, we do not relate the absent thing to our perceived body. After all, the perceived body occupies a particular space, and the absent thing does not. Instead, we locate it with respect to the felt body. Bhattacharyya calls attention to a strange asymmetry in the relation between the perceived and the felt body: When we are aware of the perceived body, it is “half distinguished” from the felt body; that is, it is present as mine, not as
me in perception, even though I identify myself with it in other respects, taking it to be the same as the felt body. I do not, on the other hand, represent the felt body also as mine, and so do not consciously associate it with the perceived body. Bhattacharyya points out that the absence is represented as distinct from the perceived body—it is represented as an absence in a space outside of the perceived body—but it is not dissociated from the felt body, for it is not represented as a real concrete thing, but rather as a cognitive act of imagination carried out by the embodied subject. For this reason, the awareness of absence is a higher level of consciousness, and implicates a higher level of self-consciousness, despite remaining tied to an embodied perspective. Bhattacharyya concludes this discussion with the following observation:

79. Conscious non-perception then is a transitional stage between body-feeling and imagination with which psychic fact begins. It is the consciousness of presentness without space-position. . . . It is free from space but not from the present and accordingly does not imply a presentation of the object as dissociated from the object. Psychic fact begins with the distinguishing of what the present is not. . . . Were one to start with object-perception, . . . the first clear hint of the subjective fact would be realized in the knowledge of absence through conscious non-perception.34

The awareness of absence is hence the pivot point in self-knowledge. It allows us to be aware of an object, but not at a particular place. Nonetheless, in virtue of the temporality of that awareness, it is an awareness of that object in relation to the physical self. And it is a direct awareness of the object, albeit as absent, not an awareness of a representation of that object. So, once again, it is tied to the physical, to embodied reality, the world of objects that exist in relation to the physical self. Nonetheless, because of the awareness of the distinction between what is perceived and what is imagined, reflection on this mode of awareness takes us for the first time beyond the physical into the realm of psychic fact. For the distinction between perceiving Pierre and imagining Pierre is a psychic, not a physical distinction. Self-knowledge here then rises to the apperceptive awareness of myself as a being who perceives in distinct modes. It is on this basis that I can come to be aware of myself as a mind, and of the distinction between my representations and reality. It is to that mode of awareness and that level of self-knowledge that we now turn.

3.6. PSYCHIC AND SPIRITUAL SUBJECTIVITY

Bhattacharyya begins the transition to the discussion of psychic subjectivity with this observation:

80. Psychology does not begin till the perceived object is distinguished from the half-perceived body. . . . To those who would not go further in psychology, introspection is only observation of the indefinite body-interior and psychic fact is only a bodily attitude, the beginning of the behavior of an organism to the environment. Some, however, would go one step further and admit the image as a unique fact, appearing as a quasi-object from which object including the body is distinguished. . . . The image may be functional in character as a reference to the object, . . . but that it appears presented as a substantive something from which the object is distinct and exists in a sense in which the object does not exist cannot be denied.35

Here, we see the transition from the final mode of bodily consciousness to psychic consciousness. Bhattacharyya uses the term image as Kant does vorstellung or we do representation.36 He is noting that while we can make sense of the activity of introspection into somatic self-consciousness, we also, upon reflection, recognize the presence in our psychological life of thought mediated by representations, and hence of those representations themselves. While representations share with felt somatic states (as opposed to perceived somatic states) the absence of any determinate spatial location, and like them are on the subjective, as opposed to the objective side of experience, unlike somatic states they lack both spatial temporal determinateness. Our beliefs or imaginings need not be recent; they need not have fixed temporal boundaries. And unlike felt somatic states, he urges (¶¶ 86 ff), these are not experienced as internal to the body but rather to the mind. Introspection into our cognitive activity finds not felt states but rather thoughts, and these thoughts are all intentional in structure.

A second moment of psychic subjectivity, Bhattacharyya argues, emerges when we move from the awareness of images, or representations of objects, to ideas. Ideas are non-imagistic, discursive symbols that do not represent concrete objects. Bhattacharyya’s principal examples of ideational thought are logical thoughts, and thoughts expressed in words. Bhattacharyya draws the distinction between the representational and the ideational in two ways: in terms of their respective vehicles of thought and in terms of their respective objects of thought. The vehicle of imagistic thought is the representation of an object, and its object is a particular, the vehicle of ideational thought is the word, and its object is a universal.

Corresponding to each of these moments of subjectivity is a new degree of freedom. In imagistic thought, the subject is conscious of its freedom from the object. Unlike perception—even “perception” of absence—there is no requirement in representational thought of the representation of the body, or of the presence in thought of any external object or space whatsoever. And when we move to ideational thought, there is a further freedom—a freedom from the particular as an object of thought, together with a freedom from any sensory component of thought whatsoever. The purely symbolic frees thought from any reference to the concrete at all, even in intentional content. To be conscious of oneself as a thinking subject is hence to be conscious of oneself as free in a sense far greater than that involved in thinking of oneself as an embodied subject—it is to represent one’s cognitive subjectivity as absolutely independent not only of the external world, but also of the modes of appearance of that world to physical senses. The affinities to Vedânta and, indeed, to Mukerji’s own analysis of subjectivity should be apparent: the
subject as a unique, primordial ontological status, and is the unconditioned condition of all of this objects.

Reflection on this mode of subjectivity yields yet another level of self-knowledge. Even at the level of imagistic representational thought, Bhattacharyya claims, introspection finds not somatic states or feelings but intentionality. And once the climb has been made to ideational subjectivity, introspection finds intentionality directed to the abstract and not the concrete. We come to know ourselves at this level of subjectivity not as conscious bodies but as intentionally directed, concept-and-language-wielding thinking things. Again, this self-knowledge does not replace, but supplements that developed earlier, layering our self-understanding as we layer our subjectivity.

The final moment of subjectivity for Bhattacharyya is the spiritual. In developing his account of this kind of subjectivity, the level at which complete freedom emerges, as well as the most complete self-knowledge, he begins with the concept of feeling. Importantly, this term must be understood not in the sense of somatic feeling that is in play in the discussion of the second level of bodily subjectivity, but rather in the sense of aesthetic, as well as ethical feeling. In approaching spiritual subjectivity in this way, Bhattacharyya is following not Kant’s path to the third Critique but the Vedānta emphasis on aesthetic sensibility as the path to the understanding of Brahman, a track he also treads in his important essay, “The Concept of Rasa.” Bhattacharyya argues in that essay that it is essential to aesthetic experience not only that we are affected by the aesthetic object, but that we free ourselves from that affection by contemplating that affection, and so achieving reflective awareness of ourselves as subjects.

In ethical experience, we address one another as subjects in dialogue with one another. In this discussion at the close of The Subject as Freedom, Bhattacharyya recur to an important insight he defends near the beginning of the book: to take oneself as the referent of I is to take addressees as you, others as he or she. In short, he argues in the first chapter of the book, the possibility of speech—and hence subjectivity—is conditional upon intersubjectivity, simply because speech presupposes both addresses and conventions that constitute meaning. He deploys that insight at the denouement of the discussion to argue that to understand oneself as a subject is to understand oneself as a member of a class of those capable of introspective self-awareness:

120. The realization of what a speaker means by the word I is the hearer’s awareness of a possible introspection. Such awareness is as much knowledge as actual introspection. The speaker calls himself I and may be understood by the hearer as you. As thus understood, the introspective self is individual, not an individual being—for introspection is not a subjective being like feeling—but the function of addressing another self. The speaker does not understand himself through the meaning of the word I: his introspection is through the word and not through its meaning and is less a self-knowing than a self-revealing, revealing to a possible understander of the word I. Yet as the addressing attitude is only implicit, it is to him accidental and posterior to his self-knowing. To he understanding self, however, although he understands the speaker’s self-knowing because he is himself self-knowing, his understanding of the other I is primary while his own self-knowing is accidental and secondary. The speaker knows himself in implicitly revealing to the hearer and the hearer knows the speaker in implicitly knowing himself. . . . There are thus two cases—self-intuition with other-intuition implicit in it and other-intuition with self-intuition implicit in it. Both are actual knowledge. . . . Because the word I is at once the symbol and the symbolized, it cannot be said to have simply the symbolizing function . . . .

121. Actual introspection is implicitly social, being a speaking or addressing or self-evidencing to another possible introspection or self. . . .

This is dramatic stuff, original to Bhattacharyya, and quite different from the individualistic perspective we encounter in Mukerji, despite the shared Vedānta roots. It is hard to miss the anticipations of Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Sellars, whose respective emphases on the necessarily social nature of self-consciousness, language, and thought were to transform twentieth-century philosophy of mind.

First, Bhattacharyya notes, the term I does not denote an object. It is, in the language of the first chapter of the text, a term expressing a speakable, but not a meanable. When we use the first-person pronoun, we signal that we are introspectors—that we are capable of self-consciousness—but we do not denote that which is the ultimate content of introspection, for that is subjectivity itself, which, if denoted, becomes object, and not subject. Second, in virtue of the role of I as a vocable but non-denoting term, this speaking of the self, and hence self-consciousness itself, is parasitic on the very possibility of language, and so on the existence of addressees who are also capable of using the first- and the second-person pronouns and on consciousness of myself as a possible addressee by another. So, self-knowledge, and therefore also subjectivity, are essentially intersubjective phenomena, not private.

Spiritual subjectivity, the awareness of oneself as pure subject, capable of action, reflection, and judgment is then not the awareness of an isolated ego but the awareness of a self among selves, and for this reason can rise from the level of mere awareness to that of knowledge. Bhattacharyya concludes his investigation with this reflection on the nature of freedom as it emerges from this collective notion of subjectivity:

135. I am never positively conscious of my present individuality, being conscious of it only as that which is or can be outgrown, only as I feel freeing myself from it and am free to the extent implied by such as feeling. I do not know myself as free but I conceive that I can be free successively as body from the perceived object, as presentation
from the body, as feeling from presentation and as introspective function from feeling. . . . [1] may be free even from this distinctness, may be freedom itself that is de-individualized but not therefore indefinite—absolute freedom that is to be evident.\textsuperscript{29}

Absolute freedom, like absolute subjectivity, Bhattacharyya concludes, is not an object of immediate awareness, not something of which I am positively conscious as an entity. Instead, it is something that I know as a potential; the potential to ascend in reflection at any time through reflection on my identity as a body to reflection on my identity as a thinker, and finally to reflection on my self as that which can be aware of itself either as body or as cognitive subject. The cognitive subject is transcendent and, like Kant's transcendent subject, is absolutely free in aesthetic or ethical experience. On the other hand, contra Kant, I can speak intelligibly about it, even if that self about which I speak remains beyond denotation.

That self is not pure individual, but a social subjective position of which I have knowledge whenever I speak with others as a person among persons. While the absolute subjectivity, with its special mode of transcendental access to the self, is inspired by that articulated in Vedānta, the insight that the social turn is necessary for its intelligibility is Bhattacharyya's.

When we assemble this complex and sophisticated form of self-knowledge, we can see the shape of Bhattacharyya's distinctive response to Kant. While Kant insisted that we could think, but could never know the subject, Bhattacharyya shows that we know the subject in a variety of modalities: perceptual, cognitive-introspective, and reflective; cognitive, ethical, and aesthetic. Nonetheless, we do not know the subject as an object among objects; that would be to deny its subjectivity and its transcendental status. Instead, while we know and can even speak of the subject, we can never directly refer to, or mean it. Rather, we engage with it as a mode of freedom, and as a mode of our engagement with other subjects.

Bhattacharyya hence makes good on the promise to vindicate a central insight of the Vedānta tradition—the insight that the self as subject is knowable, and that knowledge of it is a necessary context for all other knowledge. And he does so both through the surprising route of a detailed examination of bodily consciousness, undoubtedly inspired by Vaishnava tantric ideas. But as we have seen, it is not a mere appropriation. There is a dramatic linguistic and communitarian twist. This transcendent self-knowledge is not immediate, but is mediated through our linguistic interactions with others.

4. CONCLUSION
Bhattacharyya's account of subjectivity and his response to the Kantian problem of self-knowledge are very different from Mukerji's. Our aim here is not to assess their relative merits, but to point out that each is a strikingly original and powerful contribution to philosophy, and that each is emblematic of the renaissance sensibility we have characterized. Bhattacharyya, like Mukerji, is doing philosophy, not reporting on it, and he is doing philosophy in an easy cosmopolitan dialogue with Indian and European sources and ideas (despite his own exasperating refusal to acknowledge any of them explicitly). Bhattacharyya, like Mukerji, takes a classical tradition (or several) as his reference point for addressing modern problems. And like Mukerji, he works happily in an Indian vernacular language—English—albeit in conversation with texts he is reading in German and in Sanskrit. Once again, we see a philosophically progressive moment—indeed, one that anticipates many later developments in European philosophy—in continuity with an Indian tradition, and in dialogue with the West. However different the specific approaches to the account of subjectivity of Mukerji and Bhattacharyya are, their own subjectivities are remarkably akin.

NOTES
2. Ibid., 33.
3. Ibid., 183 [James, *Principles of Psychology I*].
4. Ibid., 294-95.
5. Ibid., 47.
6. Note the remarkable anticipation of Davidson's (1984) joint commitment to a correspondence theory of truth and to holism about meaning and justification.
8. Ibid., 172.
9. It is worth comparing this acceptance of multiple standpoints (perhaps drawing on a Jain tradition) with Bhattacharyya's account of multiple levels of subjectivity—distinct from one another, but each presupposing the others, and each generating different kinds of knowledge of a single self—that we will encounter below.
11. Ibid., 276.
12. Ibid., 401.
15. Ibid., 247-48.
18. There is a nice parallel here to the problematic with which Wittgenstein wrestles in the *Tractatus*, a book with which Bhattacharyya would not have been familiar.
19. As John Perry was famously to point out in 1979. So, I might erroneously believe myself to be John Perry. I would then misidentify myself as John Perry as the person thinking this thought. I cannot, however, be wrong about the fact that I am thinking this thought.
20. Note that while Bhattacharyya agrees with Mukerji that Kant can make no sense of self-knowledge, despite being, by his own lights, required to do so, the reason is very different. Mukerji focuses primarily on the transcendental conditions of speech and of experience.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. It is worth noting in this context that Bhattacharyya, like Mukerji, is concerned to develop an idealistic system that is nonetheless robustly realistic about the external world. While for Mukerji the strategy to that goal involved the reconciliation of transcendental idealism and science, for Bhattacharyya, the route goes through the phenomenology of embodiment.

26. Ibid., 122-23.
27. Ibid., 123-24.
28. Ibid., 124.
29. Ibid., 125.
30. Ibid., 126.
31. Ibid., 127.
32. Ibid., 133.
33. Ibid., 134.
34. Ibid., 135.
35. Ibid., 136.
36. It is likely that Bhattacharyya is thinking of the Sanskrit term ākāra here, often translated as image, though more often these days as representation, a term that would have the semantic range he is here attaching to image.
39. Ibid., 171.

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Indian Film as Film: Reflections on the Bollywood Aesthetic

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As a cultural product, the popular Hindi language Bollywood film deploys and reflects some version of Indian-ness through narrative, music, dance, and visual design (pro-filmic set design and cinematographic pictorial construction) which emmatize regional and national Indian identity. 1 But as film, as an aesthetic type, Bollywood film also tries to work out the same aesthetic problems as European and American film—problems which belong less to the Indian subcontinent than to the cinema as an art form.

From the very beginning of Indian film history, in the work of Dadasaheb Phalke, there is a clear interest in the possibilities of aesthetic play with illusion. In The Birth of Krishna (1918), for example, Phalke follows the tendency of Georges Méliès to create fantastic illusionary effects rather than the documentary recording of street scenes or small dramas directly observed, such as we find in primitive silent films produced by Edison, Louis Lumière, and the Biograph shorts of Griffith. 2 Bombay was already a liminal place at the Western edge of the country, with a cosmopolitan culture, when the first Lumière films were shown in 1896, just months after the very first screenings in Paris, and ever since Phalke’s first efforts in 1913, any Bombay filmmaker has always negotiated between two influences: the one domestic and cultural (Indigenous art and theatre, Indian song, Indian dance), the other, international and technological (a monocular Western machine that would record and then project an illusion of movement). Indian filmmakers have also had to balance the complexity and sophistication of film form (a form that needs substantial capital investment in projects with little guarantee of success), and the tendency of the cultured classes to dismiss cinema as unserious: a mere entertainment for the masses. Thus, for many years, Bengali auteur Satyajit Ray, one of cinema’s greatest poets, served as an unofficial and sole ambassador for Indian film: if a Western filmgoer knew of any Indian film director, he or she knew of Satyajit Ray. 3 Strongly influenced by Jean Renoir (whom he met and assisted during Renoir’s location shoot of The River) and by Italian neorealist directors Visconti, Rossellini, and DeSica, Ray made low-budget films of high literary ambition and formal sophistication. Just as a tension develops between the Hollywood entertainment film and the European arthouse cinema of Ingmar Bergman, Michelangelo Antonioni, and Alain Resnais, so India sees a contrast between Calcutta-based Ray and the popular, expensive, star-driven studio productions of Bombay. The aesthetic divisions are hardly absolute, however: the second generation of new-wave directors in Europe, such as Truffaut and Godard, themselves influenced by Italian neorealism, are equally in thrall to the great Hollywood auteurs like Hitchcock and Wyler, Huston and Welles. These French new-wave cinephiles found great art in the Hollywood product, and they said so in articles they wrote for the influential film journal Cahiers du Cinéma before they embarked on filmmaking careers. 4 By contrast, the high aesthetic achievements of Bombay studio productions from the fifties and sixties—the works of great auteurs like Raj Kapoor, Mehboob Khan, Guru Dutt, Bimal Roy, and Karimuddin Asif, among many others—were scarcely recognized by Western film scholars. These foundational figures of Bollywood cinema created a film idiom that is neither Hollywood entertainment nor an art cinema but a Hindi language, studio-produced, finely crafted, and highly lyrical film form that extends the very possibilities
of the medium and which does so while appealing to huge audiences worldwide.8

This popular Hindi film, focused on Bombay and using a language, Hindustani—a mode of Hindi that is specifically associated with film rather than a geographical location—becomes a site of exchange between cinema's modernist aesthetic technology and a rich and ancient cultural heritage—a unique artistic space.8 Mughal-E-Azam (1960), my focus here, is exemplary for its synthesis of Indian art history and studio filmmaking practice that is specifically guided by its director, Karimuddin Asif, according to complex aesthetic investigations of the unique possibilities of motion picture art. Mughal-E-Azam rewards a close critical analysis of Asif's grand design, showing that the cinema is much more than a medium for telling stories, and that the Bollywood film in particular tests the limits of film's aesthetic potential. This is not just a question of glittering sets and fine costumes: Asif's film is made primarily as a projected print with sound, and the story of love at odds with imperial duty becomes in Asif's hands an exhibition of film's capacity to place all the arts in symphony. Indeed, the experience of Bollywood is closer, in its abstract appeal to the emotions, to attending a performance of a symphonic orchestra than to attending a play. Once we understand the aesthetic stakes as lyrical rather than narrative, and that the finished film is one of the plastic arts, the Bollywood film's form becomes inherently sophisticated in the way that Beethoven's emotional, stirring symphonies reward the sophisticated listener. I mean "lyrical" in the broad sense here: as abstract form; the abstraction is partly musical, partly in poetic dialogue, partly in cinematography, but especially in enunciative capacities unique to cinema, such as a musical phrase matched to an extreme close-up.

In the opening titles, Asif sets the stage for an epic tale with this epigraph:

*History and Legend link the
Story of our past.
When both are fused in the
Crucible of Art and Imagination,
The spirit of this great Land
Is revealed in all its
Splendour and Beauty.*

In Mughal-E-Azam, this fusion of art, imagination, and spirit is determined by film form itself; now these words pave the way for a work that will dissolve the imaginary world and the material art object. Behind the opening titles and these magisterial words, a dark, silhouetted map of India rises above a city. Sumita Chakravarty has said of this sequence that its rhetoric is one of timelessness; that "India, the image tells us, has always been the same, in the sixteenth century as in the twentieth, through all the vicissitudes of history. Political lines are drawn to separate people, but nature/land knows no such differences."7 However, there is more to this image: as the light comes up, India's physical geography, with the great barrier of the Himalaya to the north, comes into relief. This shift from silhouette to relief map is a key model for the self-referential artistic agenda of the whole film; a surface body sculpted in light, but whose form will come to possess the weight—indeed the archaeological longevity—of stone. This artistic theme of flatness and relief runs through the film in the strange but crucial figure of the sculptor, whose work leans toward the more-than-flatness of the bas reliefs that stand behind the opening credits, and also to the realism of the movie screen, which witnesses life itself in photographic indexicality.8 Stanley Wolpert, in *A New History of India*, describes, at Fatehpur Sikri, the red palace twenty-three miles from Agra, an imperial mise-en-scène to rival the most imaginative and ostentatious film staging, both in art direction and set decoration:

In architecture as well as painting, Akbar's era reflects a blend of Perso-Islamic and Rajput-Hindu styles and motifs. The buildings at Fatehpur Sikri are a unique synthesis of Indian craftsmanship and design employed in the service of one of Islam's most liberal monarchs. The multi-tiered roofs topped by howdah-like nests in sandstone resemble the palaces of Rajasthan more than those of Isfahan or Shiraz, and the pillared porticos suggest the Hindu temple in its classical form, rather than the mosque. In painting, even more vividly than in architecture, the central theme of Akbar's policy of fashioning a Mughal-Rajput alliance reached its peak of artistic expression. More than a hundred painters were employed at court, honored with mansabdar rank, and constantly encouraged by the emperor himself to improve their magnificent pictures, which would be exhibited each week before him. Their portraiture, book illumination, and naturalistic animal and bird paintings remain among the most beautiful treasures of Indian civilization.9

This account of a flourishing community of artists and designers sustained by great wealth means more to us here than history: it enables us to see the blockbuster studio production like Mughal-E-Azam as a continuation of this artistic community rather than a twentieth-century pastiche of it. The film, which took fourteen years to finish and had a massive budget, re-stages Mughal artistic excesses, employing painters and dancers again, but this time in a commercial rather than imperial enterprise. Chakravarty has noted that the establishing shots of Fatehpur Sikri provide a set of "spatial configurations [that] signify solidity, permanence, immobility. They also embody the highest cultural synthesis of Hindu and Islamic artistic and philosophical styles."10 Although the film is shot almost entirely in the studio, we begin with location shots of a real palace, and these combined with the map and the voice-over function as triangulation points to locate us within the film's spatio-temporal indeterminacy such that we don't just witness the story but as readers of the film and judges of its conduct actually contribute to it, and therefore to the myth of past imperial glory of Hindustan, and present Indian nationhood. The implications are great, since they place Mughal-E-Azam in the company of Mehboob Khan's *Mother India* (1957) as an instrument in the construction of national identity rather than just a reflection of it. Brief though it is, the location shot keys us into a realist aesthetic, making of the film not so much a mirror as a crystal ball into which one
looks with greater hope and expectation for the future, but less confidence that one will recognize the image in it.

*Mughal-E-Azam* is also a musical. And like the Hollywood musical, which in many respects it seems not to resemble, the Indian popular film deploys the song and dance “number” as a moment of filmic-enunciative plenitude, a “firing on all cylinders” where the possibilities of film as an aesthetic medium are articulated to their limit as poetic words, melody, dance, spectacular décor, and narrative are all combined. A notable condition of the Bollywood film is that the special role of the playback singer is understood and appreciated. When Lata Mangeshkar sings for Madhubala, we might respond with disappointment that Madhubala isn’t singing (that in Hollywood, for example, Judy Garland had to sing and act). The playback singer, as an institution, provides a hint that if we want a Madhubala who sings, we are missing the point about the play of artifice in Bollywood aesthetics. The role of the playback singer also encourages us to treat the film as a film, not as a recording of a profilmic event, and in this respect the Hollywood film leans as much towards the aesthetics of animation as the aesthetics of the musical. At the same time, of course, the Hollywood star system pulls us away from the fully graphic tendency of animated film: we recognize Dilip Kumar, just as we recognize the star voice of Lata Mangeshkar when Anarkali sings; but the Bollywood playback song is a dual or manifold articulation of sound-with-image uniquely available to film, rather as a musical chord articulates all the notes in an arpeggio at once, in harmonic plenitude. In *Mughal-E-Azam*, when the numbers are filmed in color and the palatial splendor meets its match in dance and song, we are a long way from architectural history, and in a place best described as belonging, quite simply, to cinema. The original film’s mix of monochrome and color (it has since been digitally colorized throughout) also served to announce the film’s own artifice: the sudden arrival of color makes us recognize the medium. The “Busby Berkeley” shots, taken from above the dancers and in a fragmented mirror surface, apparently look to Hollywood film of the thirties as a model; and the late battle scenes surely cite Sergei Eisenstein’s *Alexander Nevsky*—and indeed the Soviet master’s theories of dynamic composition within the frame. But for Asif there is this dual heritage: for color and the non-perspectival, the lyrical, the coloristic) that Asif explicitly draws upon in *Mughal-E-Azam*, and that are present nonetheless, implicitly, in all Bollywood film art.

Asif mobilizes Mughal architecture through set design and in a series of set pieces that are gratuitously performative; not motivated by plot but by a mix of stage craftsmanship and theatrical style. In a sequence of shots where Salim walks around the palace after returning from battle, his surveying of the scene is staged as meta-filmic, with the rising of a flat curtain to reveal a deep space behind it. This is Salim’s experience but also clearly ours too, so that his experience of imperial spectacle, at which he is as much an alien—or at least, as much at odds—as the film spectator, is ours too. Salim’s experience of surface and depth is echoed in the shot of the sculptor in the presence of a bas-relief. Both figures are spectators-in-the-text, both standing screen right, but also both taking in that which absorbs our own gaze. These shots have the effect of unifying the star (Dilip Kumar as Salim), the thematic character (M. Kumar as Sangtarash the sculptor), and the spectator, and thereby working to implicate the spectator in the work of the film. Much of this work is done on the soundtrack, where the melody is trans-diegetic: when we see the image of the flute-playing deity Krishna, we actually hear a solo flute on the soundtrack. In this way, the sculptural (the substantial, the weighty), conflated with the musical (the insubstantial, the fleeting), thickens the filmic matter, confusing the spectator’s senses (sound, sight, touch), finally positing a uniquely filmic artifice.

The exchange between the sculptor and Anarkali’s rival Bahar establishes his problematic status, and also in some senses Asif’s alibi for the censors. When he claims that “this very creation of mine may be waiting to become alive with my blood” and gestures to his own image of an execution, there is drama in his audacity and fearlessness, but also a moment of filmic and aesthetic formal self-consciousness, which is brought forcefully home by the immediate cut to a plunging perspective shot of the palace wall. These two shots might be described as flat sculpture (bas-relief) and deep flatness (the screen image), and they complicate further the film artwork’s implication in the plot.

The plot concerns Salim’s love for a common court dancer, Anarkali, who does not belong, supposedly, in the princely realm. First of all, as a dancer, she exemplifies film’s claim to veracity (it is hard, as Yeats said, to tell the dancer from the dance, and so she represents the purity of theatrical performance). But Salim’s introduction to Anarkali is more complicated: she is also staged as the work of the “cynical” sculptor of whom it is said that “the mind enjoys the beauty of [his] work, but not the heart.” The sculptor’s arrogance acts as an intermediary between low birth and royal privilege, since beauty (or at least the artistic skill that can create it) transcends class. “What is the point of a statue” he asks, “if it hasn’t the power to make the greatest heads bow before it?” Salim, on seeing his work, acknowledges that “the sculptor’s proud claim is justified,” praising his “loyalty to the beautiful.” In the plot, loyalty to the beautiful, and to romantic love, meets the equally strong force of loyalty to tradition, to culture. Salim asks the statue (Anarkali), “Why did you keep still when the arrow was shot at you?” to which she replies, “I wanted to see how a mere tale can turn into reality.” The film, by forcing upon the viewer this conflation of its own medium with the “mere tale” it tells, seeks to achieve precisely this startling embodiment. In many respects, Salim’s relation with Anarkali is played out as a relation to the viewer, and this is initiated by a crucial look at the camera as Salim addresses the statue. The statue Anarkali, the living woman made into an object, is then complicitous in dissembling, even when in personal danger. This is Anarkali’s fate: to find herself
taken up in the prince’s gaze, and then to acquiesce in this drama of vulnerability. So the scene late in the film when Anarkali is walled up, live, is an elaborate staging of this initial ambivalent status. What better figure of filmic mise en scène—this disposition in space for the sake of a flat and yet deeply illusory product—than Anarkali’s punishment: she’s overwhelmed by flatness (a wall is built in front of her until its last brick casts her into darkness) and then leaves, as it were from behind the screen, into the unknown. This is an art-film figure that French new-wave director Jacques Rivette will employ almost in homage in his La belle noiseuse (1992), when a painting of a woman is walled up. For Rivette, the wall is a figure for the exclusionary brutality of the screen, its victim only a painting, and the spectator’s eyes are forced into an awareness of the physicality of directing real actors over a long time such that a relationship develops, and the camera witnesses that relationship. But Asif’s staging of Anarkali’s torture clearly imbricates these filmic and depictive moments with a different kind of exclusionary brutality: that of the regal and the common, the discriminatory Mughal emperor and his subjects. In this, as in many other respects, the film’s mise en scène works, one might say hand in glove, with this narrative of romantic love, of engagement and exclusion.

The cynical sculptor is less a character than a trope of the filmic; he combines a pure concern with form and an attribute—cynicism—generally attached to literary, not plastic, art. For the theme to be fully embodied narratively the sculptor must sing: for only when sculpted illusion has an auditory counterpart is Asif’s trope of cinematic embodiment complete. We might go so far as to designate the sculptor’s song a “mise en figure,” which is to say, granting this character the enunciative force of a filmic figure or trope (the sculptor who sings, the physical body formerly associated with dumb and heavy stone now endowed with life and voice). If Mughal-E-Azam only relied on principles of aesthetic form, the singing sculptor would bring the work to a conclusion. It does not, of course, because the film is also a narrative, a narrative of romance, of engagement and exclusion. So the scene late in the film when Vision immediately recognizes it as a portrait of Beauty and Heart. A Mughal illustration by Fattahi Nishapuri (c. 1570–1575) for this poem is held at the Ashmolean Museum at the University of Oxford. In the Azam period painting of this allegory is shown the image of Heart by the emissary Vision, the image is a painting within the painting. But it might be said that Mughal-E-Azam both draws upon the aesthetic of Mughal gouache painting, and with the figure of the carver of bas reliefs also restores the narrative from this poem in which Vision *eventually arrives in the Eastern Kingdom of Love, whose daughter Beauty (Husn) dwells in a garden where the Water of Life flows. It so happens that this princess possesses a fine carved image whose subject is a mystery to her. Vision immediately recognizes it as a portrait of his master* (Topsfield, 14). While Mughal-E-Azam tells a different story, it is still a story of love, in which the intermediaries are art, and the allegorical figure of vision, the sculptor. The Odyssey painting, Topsfield notes, is “a fairytale version of Akbar’s palace city of Fatehpur Sikri, built in the 1570s.”

2. Still an excellent guide to the pioneering years of Indian cinema is Erik Barnouw and S. Krishnaswamy’s Indian Film (1963).

3. Satyajit Ray received the rare honor of an Honorary Academy Award in 1992. At the Oscar ceremony in Hollywood, Audrey Hepburn spoke of Ray’s “rare mastery” of cinema and of the “profound humanism” in his films.

4. Satyajit Ray’s reputation for serious, documentary-style, low-budget realism depends especially on the Apu trilogy (Pather Panchali, Aparajito, and Apur Sansar), and on literary studies like Jahagir (1936) and Charulata (1964); but Ray, even the master of cinema, is just as interested in the plastic possibilities of the film image, as we see in the complex shadow theater scene in Goopy Gyne Bagha Byne (Goopy and Baja, 1969).

5. In particular, Guru Dutt might come across to Western film scholars as another Orson Welles, a great auteur whose genius suffers at the hands of unreliable studios. Dutt’s poignantly autobiographical Kaagaz Ke Phool (Paper Flower, 1959) traces the fading fortunes of a film director, played by Dutt himself, who is estranged from his wife and his upper-class anglicized in-laws who refer to the film world as “filthy.” The film’s thesis, that they are wrong about cinema, that it is capable of high aesthetic endeavor, of great poetry, is measured in every frame and in every song of Kaagaz Ke Phool itself, but also in the risk implicit in Dutt’s existentialist performance as both actor and director.

6. The special nature of Hindustani as a Bollywood idiom has been described by Tejaswini Ganti in Bollywood: A Guide to Popular Hindi Cinema as “a language associated with bazaars and trading that served as a lingua franca across northern and central India” (12). It is significant that, as Ganti notes, the languages of the Bombay region are not Hindi but Gujarati and Marathi; so Hindustani, estranged from its own locality, is seen to belong primarily to film, and thereby to the Indian nation as a guarantor of commonality. Not only is the dialogue, the narrative “vernacular.” “Hindustani,” according to Nasreen Munni Kabir, “by over 500 million people on the Indian subcontinent,” the spoken idiom is specifically filmic. Kabir describes this language as part of Bollywood’s “stylized form that operates outside the restrictions of reality,” and she quotes screenwriter Javed Akhtar: “In Hindi cinema, a son can tell his mother, ‘Ma, mujhe samajhne ki koshish karro’ [‘Mother, try to understand me.’]. Now, in India, no son would ever say such a thing to his mother, that’s for sure” (Kabir, 3).


8. The intervention of art at the beginning of the love affair between Saawan and Anarkali is a notable re-staging for the film of the Persian prose romance Hus o Dill (Beauty and Heart). A Mughal illustration by Fattahi Nishapuri (c. 1570–1575) for this poem is held at the Ashmolean Museum at the University of Oxford. In the Azam period painting of this allegory is shown the image of Heart by the emissary Vision, the image is a painting within the painting. But it might be said that Mughal-E-Azam both draws upon the aesthetic of Mughal gouache painting, and with the figure of the carver of bas reliefs also restores the narrative from this poem in which Vision eventually arrives in the Eastern Kingdom of Love, whose daughter Beauty (Husn) dwells in a garden where the Water of Life flows. It so happens that this princess possesses a fine carved image whose subject is a mystery to her. Vision immediately recognizes it as a portrait of his master* (Topsfield, 14). While Mughal-E-Azam tells a different story, it is still a story of love, in which the intermediaries are art, and the allegorical figure of vision, the sculptor. The Odyssey painting, Topsfield notes, is “a fairytale version of Akbar’s palace city of Fatehpur Sikri, built in the 1570s.”


11. The aesthetic potential provided by the discrepancy between the miming actor and the dubbed playback singer’s voice is not limited to the musical numbers. Nasreen Munni Kabir notes that Bollywood’s common practice of post-synchronous dubbing (in which the actor records a dialogue track separately to their performance for the camera) “inevitably reinforces a sense of artificiality and makes it difficult to create atmosphere through a sense of sound perspective. As a result, Bollywood movies have a distinctly unreal feeling about them and provide the actors with
vocal qualities that most ordinary humans don’t have. Boosting the echo effect to a melodramatic line of dialogue makes the star look and sound larger than life” (28). This “larger than life” condition, consistent with Bollywood’s pre-history in theatrical style, is precisely an aesthetic practice rather than the response to a technical difficulty: a foregrounding of cinema’s capacity to re-cast the real in plastic terms.

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The Rhetoric of Indian Exoticism and Work, circa 1600 to 2014

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In September 2014, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi appeared at New York City’s Madison Square Garden dressed in his trademark political party orange; thousands from India’s American diaspora cheered him at what The New York Times reporter Shreeya Sinha called a “rock star reception.” In his speech, Mr. Modi committed himself to changing what he characterized as world opinion of India’s “brand” as “a land of snake charmers.” Snake charming, the supposed hypnotizing of a cobra or other snake by playing a flute-like instrument, has long been a stereotype of the Indian exotic. Mr. Modi came to the United States to market his “Make in India” slogan, and his rhetoric mocks the hoary language of colonial and postcolonial denigrations of Indian workers as credulous and traditional.¹

I will argue that denigrating Indian workers comes out of a historically competitive environment in which "Made in India" was an international selling point for high-quality printed cottons in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and for fashionable shawls in the nineteenth. From roughly the middle of the eighteenth century until 1947, the British ruled much of the territory within the current nations of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. The British Raj created and maintained economic relationships designed to benefit imperial and commercial interests. To simplify a complicated history, one goal of government officials and businesses was to transform the colony into both a source of raw materials for industrial workers in the United Kingdom and a market for British machine-made goods. British officials and European social scientists developed a colonial narrative that contrasted Euro-American industrial workers, represented as modern, progressive, and efficient, with Indian workers, represented as the “other,” traditional, and inefficient. Indian artisans became colonial subjects in this narrative, while Indian handicrafts were simply colonial products.²

Many affluent Europeans and Americans eagerly purchased handicrafts from India during the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Kashmiri shawls provide a specific example that illustrates changes in the types and values of Indian products as well as continuities in depictions of their producers. Kashmiri shawls were fabric rectangles worn primarily as shoulder mantles from the 1770s until the 1870s, and they came in a wide variety of sizes, patterns, and modes throughout their century of widespread popularity in Europe and the United States. Handloom weavers produced the shawls in Kashmir ("Cashmere"), a "native state," ruled by the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir (1858–1947) but ultimately controlled by the British Raj. Luxurious Kashmiri shawl fabric, woven from soft, warm goat hair, was wound as men’s turbans in Egypt, stitched into wealthy women’s jackets in Iran, prized for men’s coats in Turkistan, and worn as sashes in Tibet—all before affluent Euro-American women draped their bodies with these distinctive wraps. Both Asian and European merchants moved Kashmiri shawls from their sites of production to Euro-American stores along distribution networks that evolved gradually, from Asian-focused seventeenth-century routes to the bustling colonial trade routes of the nineteenth century.³

Changing Euro-American consumption of Kashmiri shawls over the course of the nineteenth century developed contrapuntally with social scientific and cultural theories about "modern" industrial commodities and "modern" labor. Both the shawls themselves and the artisans who fabricated them were deployed as negative counterparts of modern (i.e., Western European and American) products and workers. First, British and French businesses appropriated designs and technologies from each country’s colonies. Western companies sometimes purchased Kashmiri shawls to copy their designs, but, more often, they simply pirated both plans and production technology. For example, counterfeit shawls, hand-woven of goat hair by French orphan girls using a loom "of the Indian type" and a weaving technique similar to the Kashmiri, were sold at the French Exposition of 1823 “as Indian ones without any suspicion that they were made in France.” Some manufacturers simply labeled local European fabrics "cashmere" or "thibet" to suggest that they were imported. French printed shawls on both cotton and wool from the Alsace region were heralded as trompe l’oeil masterpieces, "perfect imitations of the [Kashmiri] woven shawls."⁴

These imitation shawls were but one product manufactured in Britain and France using technological innovations begun in the seventeenth century to counter the market superiority of Indian hand-loomed cloth called "chintz" (painted or hand-printed cotton). An increased demand for non-wool cloth inspired the most famous examples of British manufacturers’ import substitutions: spinning cotton thread and weaving cotton cloth by machine. Both tariffs on the importation of Indian cotton textiles into England and copying of Indian cloth-dying technology permitted British
factories to flourish. British businesses invested some of the capital gained from colonial ventures to manufacture cheap textiles that substituted for higher-quality imported Indian cottons. The long list of industrial innovations in yarn-spinning, machine weaving, and printing technologies all enabled British manufacturers to supply the lower end of their home market. They also exported machine-spun cotton yarn and machine-loomed cotton cloth to India and other places in the empire at a price that undercut locally produced yarn and cloth.¹

Nineteenth-century British officials and intellectuals claimed cultural authority over the peoples and products of colonial India, including the right to use Eurocentric norms to judge their designs and production methods. British folklorists used the authority claims of disinterested scholarship to publish accounts of Indian beliefs and customs. These accounts depicted people and communities who were supposedly unsullied by Western influences; they thus followed “authentic” customs and produced “authentic” handicrafts. Meanwhile, British businesses employed a linked rhetoric of exoticism and authenticity to merchandise Kashmiri shawls.

The spectacle of Asian workers crafting their wares in Europe illustrates how they were both mirrors and foils for European and American industrial workers.² In 1885, for example, Liberty’s, an early London department store, displayed Indian textiles by creating an Indian village at the Albert Palace in Battersea Park, complete with a “contingent of Indian natives.” These “natives” displayed their skills as “silk spinners, saree weavers, Bigapoo carpet weavers, embroiderers,“ and the like. They diverted potential customers with “a snake charmer [emphasis added] and juggler” along with “dancing girls [and] acrobats.”³ Indian artisans thus were positioned as performers; handicraft skills became entertainment rather than work.

Nineteenth-century European theories of labor propounded by Karl Marx (1818–1883) and others relied on the concept of societal evolution to theorize historical changes in economic production. An “Asiatic mode of production,” a stage between the tribal and the ancient stages, was congruent with contemporary beliefs in geographical determinism and differing racial productive capacities. Asian laborers, racially inferior, handicapped by their enervating environment, and stuck in the historical past, were a dramatic rhetorical contrast for Euro-American workers.

The Western European gendering of employment skills as primarily either feminine or masculine intersected with this racist colonial labor discourse in the representations of Kashmiri shawl weavers. Male refugars (“repairers” or “darners”) used embroidery to embellish Kashmiri shawls from at least the late sixteenth century, but it was shawls made with the time-consuming kani (woven twill tapestry) weaving technique that initially reached Europe. While eighteenth-century kani shawls contained only a small amount of embroidery, several nineteenth-century production changes in Kashmir led to new types of shawls in which needlework became much more important. In these “patchwork” or “pieced” twill tapestry shawls, male artisans used intricate needlework to join many small woven pieces. Male artisans also embroidered the previously woven designs of kani shawls onto plain-weave pashmina (fabric woven from goat hair), creating amikari or amli shawls.⁴ European textile historians have often interpreted this production shift as the opposite of progressive technical innovations, partially because they equated embroidery with nineteenth-century women’s and children’s low-skilled labor.

When British and French manufacturers first attempted to produce imitation Kashmiri shawls at the end of the eighteenth century, they hired impoverished women and children to hand-embroider (or “darn”) designs on them. Later, French and British male weavers took over the production of imitation Kashmiri shawls. This replacement of supposedly low-skilled (female adult and child) embroiderers by allegedly highly skilled (male) weavers fitted Eurocentric notions of “progress,” whereas the Kashmiri changes in production, from weaving to embroidering shawls, were judged to be just the opposite.

Nineteenth-century British representations of Kashmiri shawl weavers focused on the exoticism of their surroundings and emphasized the supposedly changeless nature of their technology. An 1852 article entitled “Shawls” from Household Words, Charles Dickens’s popular British magazine, contained outlandish misinformation about Kashmiri weavers that was contrasted with a prosaic description of shawl production at Paisley, Scotland. The anonymous author (Dickens?) concluded:


\[\text{\textbf{[it] seems a pity that \ldots the solemn, patient Hindoo, should not come to Paisley and see how shawls are made there. To [him] \ldots throwing his antique shuttle under the palm, how strange would be the noise, and the stench, and the speed, and the numbers employed, and the amount of production!}\]

Contemporary British specialists on colonial India would have deplored the author’s misidentification of the Muslim Kashmiri weavers as “Hindoo,” since religious differentiation was at the heart of official attempts to understand and to control colonial peoples in India. They might well have laughed at the idea of palm trees, found in South and East India, shading a shawl weaver in northern Kashmir. However, they likely would have concurred with the description of the Kashmiri weaver as a “simple and patient Oriental” who was “not very likely” to “come up to our methods of production.”⁵ Ṣhe details might differ and be more or less ethnographically correct in nineteenth-century positivist terms when colonial officials described Indian labor practices, but the contrast between Western European and “Hindoo” workers was an intellectual construct and matter of faith for colonial bureaucrats just as it was for the 1852 British author. The sheer number of shawls produced in the Scottish town of Paisley contributed to English speakers naming the signature teardrop design of Kashmiri shawls “paisley.”⁶

Modernization theories of the 1950s and 1960s sustained the denigration of Kashmiri labor in a fashion similar to the
imperial chauvinism of a century earlier. Thomas Leavitt, for example, contrasted handloom production with “an efficient, thoroughly integrated factory system,” to narrate his 1970s history of Kashmiri shawls and Euro-American imitations. Leavitt positioned Kashmiri shawl weavers as artisans using an outmoded craft process in contrast to European manufacturers and industrial workers who were the agents of modernity. European and American manufacturers certainly excelled at making imitations of the Kashmiri shawl designs on cheaper fabrics. They transformed the late-eighteenth-century European practice of weaving shawls using various fiber mixtures and imitative designs to the mid-nineteenth-century practice of printing European shawl designs on cotton cloth, which was considerably cheaper than pashmina. Leavitt argued that the differing costs of Kashmiri shawls and their Euro-American imitations resulted primarily from differing modes of production. However, he ignored the power of the British, French, and United States governments to impose import duties and to control currency exchange. These all enabled Euro-American businesses to lower the retail price of imitation shawls.

Political and economic conditions in Kashmir and Asia were critical for Kashmiri shawl production. Euro-American consumption was only one of the demand factors relevant for colonial-era changes in production. Anglophone economic historians often have superimposed the history of European imitation textiles imagined as "industrial progress" onto the history of Kashmiri production fictionalized as the "traditional" defeated by the "modern." The continuing strength of economic assumptions rooted in stereotypes of "traditional" and "modern" appeared yet again in the twenty-first-century marketing of pashmina shawls, employing the recycled tropes of exoticism and fantasy ethnography crafted during the heyday of British colonialism.

Mr. Modi’s evocation of the snake charmers’ shadow that supposedly still looms over Indian workers in 2014 is no accident. India industrialized in the 1950s, but the governments’ economic goals were not to create high-quality goods for export. “Made in India” retained its colonial meaning as a label for inefficiently produced, non-modern products. Indian industrial workers today continue to struggle with the reputation of being equally inefficient and non-modern despite their changed position as citizens of a free nation. Mr. Modi’s “Make in India” campaign aims to “rebrand” workers, promoting them as ready to fill contemporary industrial jobs funded by foreign investment. This is ironic because the world frame of reference is no longer a comparison of Indian workers with Europeans but with laborers in China. Meanwhile, American stereotypes of India in the early twenty-first century are much more likely to be as a land of call centers and outsourced service jobs rather than as a nation filled with old-fashioned entertainers like “snake charmers.”
Nuancing the Notion of Diaspora: A Case Study of Indian Sikhs

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DEFINING THE CONCEPT OF DIASPORA AND ITS VARIED NUANCES

The notion of diaspora is commonly associated with dissimilar forms of human displacement, migration, and settlement outside one’s native land to transnational locations. The concept has its origin in the history of forced Jewish migration from their homeland during the pre-Christian era. It led to Jewish settlements in different parts of the world with the community’s memory of the past and their desire to return to their native land. In the parts of the world with the community’s memory of the pre-Christian era, it led to Jewish settlements in different parts of the world, but also incorporates varied past representations without undertaking any fresh journey outside the native land. The perception of diaspora thus remains a site of contestation of dissimilar experiences and recollections.

It stimulates dissimilar endeavors emphasizing not only the relevance of mapping different home trajectories but also their varied levels of ghettoization in the host society. As their new generation is born in new sites, the immigrants’ duration of settlement is extended for an indefinite period. Fresh memories are added to the community’s recollections and play a crucial role in making a home in new locations. Their memories of their native land, as well as the history of their long passage, new aspiration, frustration, and other related issues, are galvanized to set up their new home. It emphasizes that their new home continues to have many reflections of their old home and gives rise to diaspora in faraway residential sites.

This essay reviews some of these interesting issues with reference to several Sikh passages beyond Punjab in India. In spite of being less than 2 percent of the Indian population, the community has a long history of journeys which carried them to distant transnational locations. These passages made them an important segment of the South Asian population in different overseas settlements. Some of these Sikh residential sites have received scholarly attention. But their numerous journeys beyond Punjab in different parts of India over the centuries have hardly evoked any serious academic enthusiasm.

This essay revisits some of these neglected issues and proposes to incorporate these narratives within the framework of diaspora. Secondly, it proposes an alternative way of looking at the Sikh past. Instead of reviewing the community’s past from the perspective of those Sikhs residing in Indian Punjab, here is an attempt at examining those distant Indian locations scattered beyond Punjab, but lying within the territorial limits of the Indian nation state. These sprinkled Sikh sites would enable historians to assess how long these Sikhs were living in India outside Punjab before the emergence of transnational residential sites beyond India. In the absence of any convenient term, these Sikhs may be bracketed as IndianSikhs.

They are marginalized in Sikh studies pursued in the universities of Punjab and the West. Finally, the article assesses the complex relationship of home, host, and community, which the Indian Sikhs tried to communicate from their distant Indian sites scattered from Mandi (in Himachal Pradesh) to Moreh (in Manipur).

DELINEATING THE EARLY PROCESS OF INTERNAL SIKH DISPERSIONS

There are reasons to suggest that some of the early passages of the Indian Sikhs began in the sixteenth century but witnessed crucial modifications since the late nineteenth century under British rule. During the first five decades following India’s Partition and Independence (1947), the community once more underwent fresh trajectories of circulation. These carried them to nearly all five hundred districts of the country. It complicated their relationship with their native land (Punjab) and the rest of India. At the threshold of the twenty-first century, these sites accommodate nearly one-fifth of the Sikh population compared with the 5 percent residing in the West.

Generally speaking, Sikhism reached some of these Indian locations through important trading channels. Initiated by Sikh Gurus (1469–1708), their early journeys were dominated by trading Khatis who were known for their communicational skill across communities. They set up sangats (religious congregations) from Pune in Western India to Patna in the east of the country and enjoyed many revenue-free grants for running these local organizations. It not only facilitated the foundation of two out of five Sikh takhats (seats of temporal authority), but also made room for dialogue with other bhakti (devotional) traditions of the country.

Early Sikh traders carried a few paddas (couplets) of regional saintpoets for their subsequent incorporation in the Sikh sacred text (Adi Granth) and encouraged the coming of three out of five panjpyaries (five beloved) from different parts of India outside Punjab. They stimulated the introduction of a fresh code of conduct in the ranks of the Sikhs. Designated as the Khalsa (1699), they redefined the new Sikh identity with five Ks (kesh/hair, kangha/comb, kara/bracelet, kirpan/sword, and kachha/underwear) and underscored a wider commitment to military tradition. Induction of the Khalsa led to certain other changes in the ranks of immigrants. They were no longer merely traders, but were militiamen ready to participate in different eighteenth-century political developments across the country.

NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE SIKH JOURNEYS DURING THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

As the number of the Sikh immigrants increased outside Punjab in the post-Guru Period, it emboldened their participation in the eighteenth-century state formation process. The leadership mostly consisted of Jat peasants.
They were armed Sikhs and dominated the voice of the Khalsa who were found raiding adjoining GangaYamuna doab (lands lying between these two rivers) in the east and moved as far as northern Rajasthan in the west. Others did not take time to reach the distant south as far as Karnataka, set up a powerful center Sikh around Nander (in Maharashtra), and managed to create their distinct space in lower Assam valley in the east. These voyages not only brought changes in their social composition, but also emphasized that the faith was no longer restricted to Punjab.

Men from other occupational backgrounds swelled their ranks and reinforced their bid for military domination outside Punjab. Some of them were local men who had no access to the Sikh sacred text written in Punjabi. Induction of local human resources stimulated dialogue with neighboring ethnic groups and cemented the community’s access to faraway locations. A few arranged nuptial ties with local women and, through them, incorporated indigenous societal experiences. It sometimes intensified the thrust for vernacularization of the faith, stimulated fluidity in their perceptions of home, and led to bricolage in their ranks. In the process, these Sikhs were steadily deterritorialized.

**INDIGENIZATION OF SIKHS OUTSIDE PUNJAB**

These dissimilar journeys across the country led to many significant changes. One of them was the birth of a few indigenous Sikh groups across the country. Instead of projecting them as hybrid and hyphenated segments of the community, they represent fresh additions in the ranks of Sikhs who are traced from Jammu and Kashmir in the north to Assam in the northeast. Some of them were traced in different parts of Bihar, while other groups have managed to extend their links as far as Hyderabad (Deccan) and reached the south. Many carried external Sikh symbols like kesh (hair) and kara (bracelet), though some of their associates enthusiastically put red tilak (marker) on forehead, married women of different linguistic backgrounds and, through them, introduced varied culture, assimilated their religious beliefs, tasted indigenous foods prepared at the local level, and participated in their celebrations.

These inclusions invigorated Sikhism beyond Punjab and added fresh shades to Sikh experiences. A sizable section felt free to designate them as Sanatani (traditional) Sikhs by incorporating those indigenous rituals against the dominant Khalsa rait (social code of conduct). These practices occasionally precipitated prickly debates in the ranks of the immigrants. In spite of sporadic tensions and rivalries, they deserve credit for pushing the frontiers of Sikhism beyond Punjab, effectively dislodging the seemingly inviolable notion that all early Sikhs were Punjabis.

**THE COLONIAL RULE AND ITS IMPACT UPON THE INDIAN SIKHS**

Encounters between precolonial, native Sikhs and their new colonial counterparts of the late nineteenth century represents another interesting stage of Sikhism’s dialogue with the rest of India. In spite of the redefinition of Sikhism in Punjab under British rule with its well-defined code of theology and social conduct (rait) in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, it could not altogether dislodge plurality in the ranks of the Sikhs residing outside Punjab. The faith continued to remain nearly as splintered and heterogeneous as it had been in precolonial times. British imperial interests beyond Punjab urged upon them to undertake long journeys to new industrial cities, important urban centers, and distant hill stations to take up new jobs, which were virtually hitherto unknown to them.

There is evidence to show how emigrants carried home memories and reproduced them in new settlements. For example, they constructed religious space (gurdwara) to highlight the community’s religious distinctiveness to the members of host society. It may be defined as an important entry point of their varied stages of remembering native place. In other locations, there would be attempts at setting up a Khalsa School for teaching Punjab to their progeny born outside Punjab so that their identity as Sikhs could be legitimized. They were not reluctant to celebrate different festivities widely popular in Punjab and bring out Punjabi publications reinforcing links with Sikh tradition. Again, they, were not unaware of caste hierarchy prevalent in their old home. Immigrants incorporated these experiences and remembered them at the time of family marriage and other social negotiations. In spite of sharing of some common Punjabi sociocultural experiences hailed as punjabiyat, their sharp sociocultural markers based on territoriality and well-defined caste ranking turned the local Sikh space competitive, hierarchical, and fragmented. 5

**BIRTH OF REGIONAL SIKH GROUPS**

Another important area of difference surfaced under the colonial rule. As the recently immigrated Sikhs with five distinct external markers reached locations which had already accommodated precolonial indigenized Sikhs, fresh areas of competition emerged. The new immigrants refused to regard the native groups as “true” Sikhs and planned to castigate them in innumerable ways. One such strategy was the capturing of the native Sikhs’ gurdwaras in the name of bringing an end to their “unSikh-like religious practices.” It had already become an important strategy of aggression in the early twentieth-century Punjab, which did not take time to reach faraway Indian sites. Many such developments were reported from the city of Kolkata as well as from the Assam valley. Their plan of remembering home thus attained a new height and direction and reinforced the community’s claim to continue as a diaspora folk beyond Punjab.

**RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SIKH SCENARIO IN THE POSTCOLONIAL DECADES**

The Independence of India (1947), nationalization of trade in Myanmar (1962), and the collapse of the Sovieted Afghan Government (1992) deeply affected the economic fortune of a significant number of the Sikhs residing in adjoining countries. It prompted a largescale migration of Sikh refugees towards Punjab, Delhi and other places. According to an estimate, nearly 2.5 million Sikh refugees from Pakistan alone were rehabilitated beyond Punjab, which led to a significant change in the community’s demographic profile at the all-India level. The bulk of the displaced Sikh peasantry was rehabilitated in rural Punjab.
and Haryana (then a part of Punjab), Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. The second group, who were of trading and other professional castes, was accommodated in different urban commercial positions scattered throughout the country.

While struggling for a fresh beginning in a new home, the Sikh refugees tried their best to preserve some of their earlier home experiences carried over to their new home. These were underscored by family marriage networks or other strategies of social interactions which allowed them to maintain close touch with those who were long known to them since the days of undivided Punjab. Some of their older festivities and culinary practices were reproduced in new sites. These reminded them of their intimate socio-cultural ties with places such as Pakistan, Myanmar, and Afghanistan, which had been their home until they were displaced from these locations in recent years.7


Finally, the Indian Sikhs encountered many devastating experiences in the 1980s. These owed much to the crisis of Punjab in the 1980s and carried many complex repercussions in the lives of their counterparts residing in these scattered locations. Some of these critical issues may be dated back to the days of the trification of Punjab in 1966. But the crisis took a critical turn through the Government of India’s military assault over the most sacred Sikh religious space (Golden Temple in Amritsar) and the subsequent assassination of India’s prime minister (1984) by one of her Sikh bodyguards. It not only led to a bitter Hindu-Sikh communal divide in Punjab but also erupted into a largescale massacre of thousands of innocent Sikhs in different parts of the country. The Delhi Sikh Pogrom reported the community's highest loss of men and money.

The heartbreaking experiences of these years generated a deep sense of Sikh alienation and anger, intensified the development of a distinct transnational community identity, and propelled a section of them to struggle for a separate political space outside India. The struggle, widely known as the fight for Khalistan, gave a new dimension to the Sikh mentality of "victimhood." It figured intermittently in their creative imagination and social behavior within the limits of sacred space and other important areas of domesticity.8 There was virtually no limit to the community's sufferings at the hands of local police who often placed many of them under strict surveillance for showing any real or imagined sympathy and support towards the khadkus (Sikh rebels).

In spite of widespread sympathy for the community's sufferings, the majority of the Indian Sikhs preferred to maintain silence or keep distance from these unfortunate experiences for different reasons. Others agreed to stay away from these bloody Punjab scenarios. There were other Sikhs who did not ignore their overarching tie with their native land. Like transnational Sikhs, many of them continued to live in two places. Their longing for Punjab often figured in dreams, while a few others would silently share their experiences of tragedy with their Sikh neighbors. A significant section of the new generation who were born outside Punjab and had never been to the native land were not reluctant to regard these Indian sites as their new home. Unlike their parents, they were born in a locality where they had grown up in the midst of local friends and culture and felt free to share many of their aspirations and successes. Besides, they possibly did not suffer like other Sikh neighbors. Many of them could not read Punjabi well, but shared local space with the members of the host society. But their parents did not agree to the new generation's divide which relocated their home in new Sikh residential sites away from Punjab.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This essay underscores how internal Sikh dispersions had evolved a distinct Sikh space outside Punjab. These Indian Sikhs do not invariably trace their origin in Punjab, nor do they represent any homogenous ethnic community claiming Punjabi as their mother tongue. They communicate in dissimilar languages and prefer to accommodate many local experiences in their everyday life. Here, Sikhism is translated in dissimilar forms which underscore their rootedness in local culture. These Sikhs have neither adequately figured in any serious academic inquiry undertaken in the West, nor do they have any important politiccultural platforms to voice their views in Punjab.

Compared to the spectacular economic success of a sizable number of transnational Sikhs of the West, the growing marginalization of the Indian Sikhs made matters worse for them. But they are more numerous and economically less successful than their counterparts residing beyond Punjab in India. Some of their differences widen the difference between the members of the transnational Sikhs and their counterparts residing within the frontiers of the Indian nation state. These differences between the two diasporas emphasize the need for a meaningful dialogue.

It indirectly emphasizes why the Sikhs of the Indian diaspora could not be adequately vocal like their transnational counterparts in their fight for Khalistan during the 1980s. There are other areas of differences that continue to rock their relationship. It continues to revolve around the proposed enactment of an all-India Gurdwaras Act, which suggests bringing all Sikh religious spaces under an umbrella body with its headquarters at Amritsar.

Many provincial Sikh leaders residing away from Punjab in different parts of the country have already expressed deep concern regarding the proposed legislation. In their perceptions, it remains an astute ploy for bringing all gurdwaras scattered across the country under the control of the Sikh political leadership based in Punjab. Instead of decentralizing power at the regional level, they question whether the Act would reinforce the authority of those who had already battered their power in the Sikh politics and marginalized their voice at the different levels of the Sikh society outside Punjab. The proposed enactment would likely intensify their friction and create fresh roadblocks to their economic development at the pan-Indian level beyond Punjab. In other words, economic differentiatiation and social hierarchy between the two Sikh diasporas would continue to dictate terms and keep them separated in the early years of the twenty-first century.
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