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FROM THE OUTGOING EDITOR

I became editor of the APA Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy in 2008. With this issue, I conclude my tenure as editor. Over the past five years, I have had the opportunity to work with some of the most outstanding Hispanic/Latino philosophers in the United States and abroad. While all of the past nine issues were important to me, the fall 2009 newsletter that focused on the significance of the nomination of Sonia María Sotomayor to the US Supreme Court remains one of the most memorable and enjoyable issues I edited. I am appreciative of guest editors Eduardo García-Ramírez, from Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, and Elena F. Ruiz-Aho, from Florida Gulf Coast University, for their leadership and organization of the spring 2011 and fall 2012 newsletters, respectively. I would also like to thank the APA editor, Erin Shepherd, for her assistance and patience over the past five years. Finally, I would like to thank my co-editor, Carlos Alberto Sánchez, who joined the newsletter in the spring of 2011 and has been a great source of innovation and energy. Five years ago, when I began, I said: “My vision for the next five years will be to sustain the high quality of publications the newsletter has had in the past; to encourage discussion on diverse issues and views, particularly those that are marginalized in mainstream philosophical journals and forums; and to provide a genuine service for philosophers who are interested in Hispanic/Latino philosophy.” I hope that I have accomplished these objectives. It has been an honor to be trusted with the responsibility of assuring the continuance of quality scholarship and research on Hispanic/Latino issues in philosophy, if only for a short time. The newsletter is in good hands with Carlos Alberto Sánchez’s direction and management, and I wish him the best of luck moving forward.

Bernie Canteñs, Moravian College

FROM THE EDITORS

We are pleased to feature Cynthia Paccacerqua as guest editor of the spring 2013 issue of this newsletter. She has organized a section on Latina Feminism with an article from Natalie Cisneros, “Mestizaje and ‘Alien’ Identity,” and three interviews. The first is an interview with Linda Martín Alcoff conducted by Edwina Barvosa. The second and third interviews are with Pedro Di Pietro and Mariana Ortega conducted by Cynthia Paccacerqua.

Following this section are two articles: “Voting Rights for Non-Citizens: Treasure or Fool’s Gold?” by Avigail Eisenberg and “Critically Theorizing Folk Uses of Ethnoracial Terms: Wiggas, White Chocolate, and Afro-Latinicity” by Ernesto Rosen Velásquez.

In “Voting Rights for Non-Citizens: Treasure or Fool’s Gold?” Avigail Eisenberg argues that while extending the right to vote to non-citizen residents in multinational states seems like a tool of empowerment (i.e., a treasure), in fact it can have the reverse effect and make these non-citizens groups more vulnerable (i.e., fool’s gold). She begins by examining two specific cases, Spain and Belgium, demonstrating how enfranchising non-citizens can negatively affect a country’s minority national’s interest in protecting their cultural and linguistic identity and thus can become politically controversial. Eisenberg explores how the “all affected interests principle” (AAIP), which states that justice requires that those who are affected by and subjected to the governing laws of a community ought to have a say in the making of those laws. The conclusion drawn from the AAIP argument is that non-citizens ought to have the right to vote. However, Eisenberg goes on to argue that the AAIP is context sensitive and that in the real world its implementation can have unintended unjust effects, both for the non-citizens and for national minorities. She refers to the problem as “the Trojan horse problem.” Granting voting rights to non-citizens in multinational states can make them pawns in the political struggle between national minorities and national majorities. She explains, “In my view, the all affected interests principle cannot provide helpful guidance in multinational contexts and any principled way of limiting it only seems to deepen the tensions described above [between majority and minority national groups].” Eisenberg demonstrates that the implementation of AAIP ought to take into consideration the “real world” political complexities existing in the given region.

In the second article, “Critically Theorizing Folk Uses of Ethnoracial Terms: Wiggas, White Chocolate, and Afro-Latinicity,” Ernesto Rosen Velásquez explores the difficult relationship between ethnicity and race. Can one be ethnically African-American and racially white? Velásquez examines ethnoracial identities that are created through folk uses of ethnoracial non-pejorative terms. He explores the cases of the basketball player Jason Williams, who is called “white chocolate”; the singers Robert Van Winkle (aka Vanilla Ice) and Michael Mathers (aka Eminem), who are examples of “wiggas” and “white chocolate,” respectively; and Larry Harlow who is identified by Puerto Ricans in New York City as “wiggas, white chocolate, and Afro-Latinicity.”

Velásquez argues that the formation of ethnoracial identity have “fundamentally relational, contextual and historical dimensions.” He provides an intelligible way we can think about ethnoracial identity while appropriating the ethnic or racial elements in a balanced way so as not to sacrifice...
FROM THE GUEST EDITOR

**Latina Feminism in Philosophy**

**Cynthia Paccacerqua**  
*University of Texas–Pan American*

The papers collected in this section of the present issue of the *Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy* are meant to provide our readers with a critical overview of Latina feminism within the greater field of philosophy, and to do so from a diversity of standpoints. Showcasing theoretical work and first-person reflections by junior scholars as well as leading Latina philosophers in the field, this collection will allow intellectuals from different disciplinary backgrounds and at different stages of their studies and professional development, who are interested in understanding the place of Latina feminism in philosophy, to better grasp the nature of scholarship, the challenges faced, the successes achieved, and the future potentiality in this area of inquiry.

In the first essay, “*Mestizaje* and ‘Alien’ Identity,” Natalie Cisneros identifies how contemporary US political discourse on immigration functions as a disciplinary and regulatory site for the production of an “alien” subjectivity that is a threat to the nation’s security and well-being. What is unique about her approach is that she de-centers a tendency to delimit Gloria Anzaldúa’s theoretical insights to the sphere of lived experience and border identity by instead translating these insights into a post-structuralist critique of political discourse. The move makes it possible to delineate a “biopolitics” particular to Anzaldúa’s thought; in its “local design,” such a biopolitics has a better chance to offer a more effective political critique in the United States. Cisneros’s careful post-structuralist analysis nonetheless remains attentive to the multilayered understanding of the construction of identity by bringing to bear the distinct ways “illegal alien” subjects are produced *qua race*, gender, and class. Her timely essay provides the politically concerned with much needed tools for the making of oppositional meaning.

Natalie Cisneros’s essay is followed by three interviews that constitute a dialogical encounter among differently positioned members of a community with a shared interest in Latina feminism. Informed by the singular experiences and particular aims of specialization that provide them with distinct epistemic positions, Linda Martín Alcoff, Mariana Ortega, and Pedro Di Pietro speak openly in their evaluation of the state of Latina feminism from Mariana Ortega’s perspective on Latina feminist thought and the field of philosophy in general. Indeed, this exchange illustrates key insights into her unique philosophical development and current interests, her perspectives on the types of choices that some junior faculty and scholars confront, and her take on the most urgent challenges and positive developments in the field of philosophy. Linda Martín Alcoff traces the personal and institutional origins of her interests in bridging the analytic and continental divide while simultaneously engaging the philosophical tradition in Latin America. She also identifies the specific intellectual value this type of work has for the field of philosophy in general, particularly in light of the discipline’s tendency to train its practitioners to do “ideal theory.” For instance, she notes how Latin American or Latina feminist philosophy’s insistent concern with the concrete are traditions that, if bridged, can offer younger philosophers examples as to how to practice philosophy otherwise. In discussing different levels of institutional practices in higher education, in particular those characteristic of academic philosophy, she touches upon specific types of institutional dynamics that hinder the field’s ability to be genuinely hospitable to racial, ethnic, and gender minorities, practitioners whose philosophical interests are not represented in traditional Western philosophy, and non-tenure track faculties working in rapidly deteriorating conditions. Finally, she shares the reasons she feels encouraged about the APA’s potential role in transforming the field into a more inclusive and pluralistic environment.

For the last two interviews I sought a much more specific evaluation of the state of Latina feminism from Mariana Ortega and Pedro Di Pietro, who work in Latina feminism but whose differential positions arise not only from the fact that they are in different stages in their professional careers, but also from their individual identities. Their individual responses create an opening to critically assess the degree of continuity and rupture in the types of experiences and accounts they provide.

A careful comparative reading of their answers exemplifies analytical distinctions relevant to the very idea of “Latina feminism” in philosophy. Mariana Ortega, one of the leading Latina feminist philosophers in the United States, reminds us of the difference between Chicana feminism and Latina feminism, a distinction born out of different genealogies as well as the number and lived experience of women identified under these categories working in philosophy. Pedro Di Pietro, a junior scholar trained in philosophy and currently working in the interdisciplinary field of ethnic studies, views a question concerning the “state of Latina feminism in philosophy” as an invitation to examine the assumptions contained under such identification. Not only does he posit the need for careful analytical differences between Chicana, Latina, and Latin American feminisms in philosophy, but he also raises the question of whether we speak of it as a demarcated theoretical field, or rather the outline of a practice. And, if the latter is the case, then the question arises as to who comprises such a community of practitioners.

Both recognizing that the field of Latina feminist thought is much more vibrant outside the field of philosophy, especially within interdisciplinary contexts and approaches, Ortega and Di Pietro speak of the specific obstacles that hinder Latina Feminism in the field of philosophy, weaving personal-professional experiences into their respective explanatory narratives. These experiences range from: (a) the pain of
having to make choices that would irrevocably do violence to their philosophical orientation, (b) the alienating feeling of having little or no access to environments designed to foster one’s intellectual interests, (c) the pedagogical difficulties of teaching “disciplinary subfields” in terms of the particular character of student populations in philosophy as well as the availability of works that are both systematic philosophical inquiries and decolonizing in their methodologies, and (d) the contested status as a job candidate in philosophy, whose areas of specialization include Latina feminism, among others. Ortega and Di Pietro also explore how to develop strategies to overcome the disciplinary obstacles that have very real effects upon intellectual creativity and the lived experience of the practitioners in the field.

One unifying thread of the pieces appearing in this section is the essential function the concept of “sites” of production appears to play: Cisneros points us to the disciplinary and regulatory site of the production “alien” identity in the United States; Alcoff describes the nurturing sites out of which her philosophical interests in bridging work originated; Ortega expresses the pain undergone at the liminal site of the relentless desire for philosophical knowledge, where Latina and other women of color in philosophy are often sentenced to being *traccioneras*; and, finally, Di Pietro speaks of the privilege of having access to epistemic sites for “interdisciplinary and praxical philosophical inquiry” for a multi-layered decolonization of thought, denied to most members of academic programs in philosophy today.

Considering the repetitive appeal to such concepts in the development of philosophical analysis and in the evaluation of the field of inquiry in the material presented in this issue, it is possible to speculate about the extent to which Latina feminism in philosophy has the concern with “sites of production” as one of its main characteristic traits. The expressed desires for environments, places, and opportunities to overcome what can otherwise be experienced as alienating working conditions, to encourage the conception of new paradigms and oppositional meaning against marginalizing political discourses, and to gain a place of recognition within Anglo-European feminism, Latin American philosophy, and the field at large, point us in that direction. Perhaps more significantly, Latina feminist philosophy is a search for a home conceived as a place of internal critique where the members of the household are invited to try out ideas, knowing that even if these are problematic in nature, they are received with a generous, caring, and critical consciousness, a “home” Ortega identifies as a condition of *conocimiento.* I believe this is in fact what Di Pietro has in mind when in the interview he speaks of Latina/Latin American feminist thought as “the site of interrogation of libratory projects where the collective self is produced through epistemic and political critiques.” For Di Pietro, this includes “recognizing that Latinos and Latin American men, in their precarious and multifaceted gender locations, are not merely allies standing in the outskirts of feminist theorizing but co-contributors from within.”

It is my sincere belief that the exciting moment in Latina feminism in philosophy today is due to the fact that these types of sites of production are slowly becoming *real.*

An exceptional case of this is the yearly Roundtable on Latina Feminism, created by Mariana Ortega. Born out of the pain that arises out of alienation, Ortega transformed the wounds in her philosophical self into the creation of nothing less than space itself, a very special one, at that. Indeed, she enacted in the flesh what she identifies as a key moment in *Anzaldúa’s* theory of the realization of *mestiza* consciousness, in which the wounds arising out of life in the Borderlands can be a source of transformative power that allows for the affirmation of one’s liminal existence. The repercussions of such an act, moreover, extend beyond the individual’s transformation. Ortega’s choice to organize the Roundtable on Latina Feminism, which is ultimately the creative expression of an original wound, exemplifies simultaneously an affective power to transform the lives of other Latinas and Latinos as they encounter the stubborn obstacles as practicing philosophers interested in this particular area of inquiry. This is especially important because, for many of us, the obstructions to the expression of our philosophical selves can become paralyzing and tragically silencing. As a result of her leadership, we are witness to a concrete example of how wounds have the potential to heal wounds.

Every contributor to this section has a seat at the Roundtable on Latina Feminism, and the issue would not have come to fruition without the community of scholars consolidated through that “site” of production. The future of Latina feminism in philosophy is contingent upon the availability of these types of sites. As a result of her embracing the creative power of the inner “snake” of her *mestiza* consciousness, I would like to dedicate this issue of the newsletter to Mariana Ortega, whose leadership has helped a new generation of scholars to join a stronger community of thinkers.

Notes
1. Gloria *Anzaldúa,* *This Bridge We Call Home* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 540.
3. Ibid.
4. *Anzaldúa,* *This Bridge,* 540.

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**LATINA FEMINISM**

**Mestizaje and “Alien” Identity: Gloria Anzaldúa on Immigration**

**Natalie Cisneros**  
*Gettysburg College*

On January 29, 2013, President Obama delivered a speech on comprehensive immigration reform at Del Sol High School in Las Vegas, Nevada. In the speech, which followed a mention of immigration policy in his second inaugural address, the president explicitly called for reforms including a pathway to citizenship for some of the eleven million undocumented immigrants who live in the US. In outlining his argument for immigration reform, Obama listed the types of undocumented immigrants who he argued should be offered such a pathway—the “brilliant students sitting in universities all over the world”; the “DREAMers—the young people who were brought to this country as children”; the “contributing members of our community . . . [who are] looking out for their families.” But even as Obama called for a path to citizenship for many undocumented immigrants (who, according to the president, “we all agree . . . should have to earn their way to citizenship”), he reaffirmed the necessity of eliminating others. He touted his administration’s work towards “strengthened security” and increased “enforcement” practices, trumpeting his administration’s record number of deportations, and describing these measures as necessary in order to remove “criminals who are here illegally and danger our communities.”

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Thus, even while calling for comprehensive immigration reform, Obama reinforced the distinction between the criminal subjects/populations that “endanger our communities” and must be removed for the security of the state and those non-citizens who in their industrious virtue rightfully belong to the population of citizen-subject.

In this political discourse, “illegal aliens” are constituted as a type of always-already criminal, infectious, and dangerous subject, the opposite of the virtuous citizen-subject. The analysis of aspects of the contemporary construction of “illegal alien” subjectivity that follows draws on Gloria Anzaldúa’s project as both a distinct account of how human beings are made into subjects en la frontera, and also as an instance of a discourse that resists these problematic constructions through the performance of mestizaje. In this vein, I reflect on how Anzaldúa’s work in Borderlands/La Frontera might contribute to a new understanding of how “illegal aliens” are constituted by extra-legal discourses and practices, including especially structures of what Michel Foucault calls “biopolitical racism.” I also discuss what Anzaldúa’s work on mestiza consciousness suggests for how these oppressive mechanisms of power might be resisted.

**Biopower and the “illegal alien”: Foucault and Anzaldúa on immigrant subjectivity**

The political discourses that constitute the “illegal alien” as a threat to the state can be helpfully understood as consistent with what Foucault calls normalizing, or biopolitical, functions of power:

we have, then, two technologies of power which were established at different times and which were superimposed. One technique is disciplinary; it centers on the body, produces individualizing effects, and manipulates the body as a source of forces that have to be rendered both useful and docile. And we also have a second technology which is centered not upon the body but upon life: a technology which brings together the mass effects characteristic of a population...²

For Foucault, disciplinary and regulatory mechanisms of power are in some sense distinct or distinguishable—the former operates through institutional mechanisms of surveillance and training in individualizing bodies, and the latter functions through state regulation of biological processes. But that these regimes of power are theoretically distinguishable does not mean, for Foucault, that they are mutually exclusive; to the contrary, because these two sets of mechanisms exist at different levels, they can be “articulated with each other.”⁵ In fact, these two regimes of power are both operational in what Foucault calls “the normalizing society”.

The normalizing society is a society in which the norm of discipline and the norm of regulation intersect along an orthogonal articulation. To say that power took possession of life in the nineteenth century, or to say that power at least takes life under its care in the nineteenth century, is to say that it has, thanks to the play of technologies of discipline on one hand and technologies of regulation on the other, succeeded in covering the whole surface that lies between the organic and the biological, between the body and population. We are, then, in a power that has taken control of both the body and life or that has, if you like, taken control of life in general—with the body as one pole and population as the other.⁴

For Foucault, then, our existence in a “normalizing society” or “biopolitical society” means that we are simultaneously subjected to and by both disciplinary and regulatory power; power has covered the whole surface of life through its management of individual organisms on the one hand and disindividuated biological processes on the other. Rather than mechanisms of regulatory power replacing those of disciplinary power, Foucault makes clear that technologies of the body on both of these levels function together in the service of the “care of life.” These two mechanisms of power “took possession of life” in this way through and towards the enforcement of norms; in regulatory disciplinary regimes, “the norm is something that can be applied to both a body one wishes to discipline and a population one wishes to regularize.”³ Biopower is at its center a normalizing regime, and so, for Foucault, it is also at the center of an investigation into how “human beings are made into subjects” in the contemporary era.

Though Foucault rarely mentions immigration in his texts and lectures, and he never engages in a thorough discussion of immigrant subjectivity, a Foucaultian biopolitical analysis can shed light on how the “illegal alien” subject is constituted as threatening and perverse within larger narratives of race, sexuality, criminality, and citizenship in ways that don’t always conform with juridical discourse. Biopolitical analysis brings into relief how this form of subjectivity is (re)formed by extra-legal discourses and practices. This is particularly evident when Foucault’s analysis is put into conversation with Anzaldúa’s account of borderland identity in Borderlands/La Frontera, which can be understood as an account of how the “illegal alien” has been constituted as a subject in the US context in particular. Anzaldúa’s analysis points to the ways that “illegal alien” subjectivity is constituted by normalizing power on the southwest border of the United States, both materially (in terms of locations of governmental institutions and disciplinary technologies) as well as symbolically (in terms of language, ethnicity, and culture).

Like Foucault, Anzaldúa is interested in “how human beings are made into subjects” within normalizing structures of power. In particular, Anzaldúa’s project is concerned with the formations of subjectivity on the linguistic, cultural, and material border between the United States and Mexico. She describes the US–Mexican border as a “vague and undetermined” home of bodies pushed to the margins by the processes of normalization:

The prohibited and forbidden are its inhabitants. Los atravesados live here: the squint-eyed, the perverse, the queer, the troublesome, the mongrel, the mulatto, the half-breed, the half dead; in short, those who cross over, pass over, or go through the confines of the “normal.”⁶

Anzaldúa’s work, unlike Foucault’s discussions of biopolitical structures of power, deals explicitly—and at length—with the formation of perverse, criminal, and impure subjectivities in the context of immigration discourses and practices. The inhabitants of the “borderlands” are the subjects who have been constituted by their marginalization as the nation’s “other.” Anzaldúa’s use of the Spanish word atravesados to characterize these inhabitants unites their constitution as broadly immigrant (the Spanish verb atravesar can be translated as “to cross” or “to pass/to go through”) and perversely hybrid (as an adjective, atravesado can be translated as “perverse,” “troublesome,” “mongrel,” “half-breed”). In this way, Anzaldúa’s account of immigration provides an analysis of how the “transgressions” of the border-crossers through immigration are linked with other kinds of perversity and impurity within a biopolitical regime of power.
that reform him, “shame pushing his head down . . . the deportation he is exposed to strategies of normalizing power as a mechanism of normative power—through his interaction with these normative categories.

And if, conversely, a power of sovereignty, or in other words, a power that has the right of life and death, wishes to work with the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization, it too must become racist. When I say “killing,” I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on.

Thus, racism serves an important purpose in the functioning of normalizing power under a biopolitical regime—it introduces a break within a population, dividing a population into “subraces” and thus constituting certain individuals and populations as threatening and therefore allowing for normative strategies to employ the “old sovereign right to kill.” This racist “right to kill” consists of the literal right to murder as well as the right of political death or expulsion. In fact, normalizing “power over death” not only permits but also, in many cases, requires the elimination of the “threat” it has constituted.

In Borderlands/La Frontera, Anzaldúa describes the way in which biopolitical racism operates in the subjectification of inhabitants of the US–Mexico border in particular:

Borders are set up to define the places that are safe and unsafe, to distinguish us from them. A border is a dividing line, a narrow strip along a steep edge. A borderland is a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary. It is in a constant state of transition. The prohibited and forbidden are its inhabitants. Los atravesados live here: the squint-eyed, the perverse, the queer, the troublesome, the mongrel, the mulatto, the half-breed, the half-dead; in short, those who cross over, pass over, or go through the confines of the “normal.”

This analysis is resonant with Foucault’s account of biopolitical racism. Here, Anzaldúa points to the way that “alien” subjects are constantly (re)constituted as impure, dangerous, and perverse against a confining norm. The “inhabitants of the borderlands” Anzaldúa speaks of can thus be understood as an “impure subrace,” constituted through the fracturing in US society into the “one true race” of virtuous, pure, and healthy citizens and its antipode, a threatening race of dangerous “border-dwellers.” She makes explicit that the “impure subrace” that dwells at the US–Mexico border is constituted as racially impure. By describing this “alien” group as “the mongrel, the mulatto, the half-breed,” she illustrates how the normalizing discourse of purity/impurity is intimately bound to conceptions of race in this context. In this way, her analysis affirms the centrality of discourses of “purity” in the context of biopolitical racism in general, while illustrating the important role it plays in the constitution of the “illegal alien” subject in particular.

Anzaldúa’s description of normalizing strategies of subjectification in terms of setting up borders that are “tense,” “vague and undetermined,” and “in a constant state of transition” beautifully captures the tenuous and ever-changing nature of these formations of biopower, while her account of the “unsafe,” “steep,” and “unnatural” nature of this fracture illustrates the violence and pain indicative of the constitution of “abnormal” subjects. Anzaldúa’s description of “borders” and “bordering” illustrates how the constitution of the “alien” subjectivity is both particular/local and connected to other practices, strategies, and patterns of normalization. By focusing
Anzaldúa explains that the construction of certain bodies as “alien” occurs through strategies of biopolitical racism that are both historically and phenomenologically situated in terms of always-already raced bodies. In so doing, Anzaldúa makes clear that the constitution of the “alien” “subrace” does not—and cannot—occur without relation to the historical and continuing patterns of racialization of bodies in the United States. As the above passage illustrates, what I call “illegal alien” subjectivity maps onto bodies that have already been racialized as “Chicanos, Indians or Blacks.” In fact, the phenomenological and historical racialization of bodies determines their “alienness” to a greater extent than their technical immigration status. Regardless of whether they “possess documents or not,” those who aren’t white or “align[ed] . . . with whites” are constituted as threatening trespassers. The “illegal alien” subject is thus constituted as always-already racialized and impure.

Anzaldúa’s description of the inhabitants of the borderland as “los atravasados . . . the squint-eyed, the perverse, the queer, the troublesome” also brings to the fore the intersectionality of racialized “alien” identity. The “illegal alien” subject, as an “inhabitant of the borderlands,” is impure and abnormal not only in terms of race and ethnicity but also in terms of gender, sexuality, and class. The intersectional nature of the oppressive structures of power that constitute the “illegal” subject is made dramatically intelligible by a troubling trend surrounding recent state-level immigration legislation, including Arizona’s controversial SB1070. Despite the fact that some of the state bill’s most controversial provisions were blocked by a preliminary court injunction, after the law was passed there were numerous reports suggesting that women with “questionable immigration status” had been avoiding domestic abuse hotlines and shelters for fear of deportation. The law thus operated as a mechanism of regulative disciplinary power in exposing differently gendered racialized “illegal alien” subjects to violence in different ways. Afraid of being identified as “illegal aliens” because of their racialized bodies, many “alien” women, according to reports, declined to seek protection or support in situations of domestic violence; the legislation intensified the “tension that grips the inhabitants of the borderlands like a virus” in a unique way for these particularly racialized and gendered subjects. In this way, the law’s functioning as a mechanism of regulative disciplinary power can be understood not only as the operation of racializing norms but also as indicative of what Norma Alarcón calls the “multiple interpellation” of women of color.12 The subjectification and exposure to violence of “alien women” cannot be accounted for by racializing norms alone. Instead, “alien women” are “multiply interpellated” and thus uniquely and multiply exposed to violence and exploitation. The trends surrounding recent immigration legislation can be understood as an example of how norms surrounding race, gender, class, and sexuality operate with and through one another in the constitution of “illegal alien” subjects as dangerous transgressors.

That the “illegal alien” is constituted as a member of an always-already dangerous and criminal “race” also serves the useful purpose of (re)exposing particular bodies to economic exploitation. Anzaldúa describes the function of the criminalization of the “alien” subject in the production of docile bodies for manual labor:

Living in a no-man’s-borderland, caught between being treated as criminals and being able to eat, between resistance and deportation, the illegal refugees are some of the poorest and most exploited of any people in the US. It is illegal for Mexicans to work without green cards. But big farming combines, farm bosses and smugglers who bring them in make money off the “wetbacks” labor—they don’t have to pay federal minimum wages, or ensure adequate housing or sanitary conditions.

Here Anzaldúa gives an account of how the deployment of mechanisms of normalization in the constitution of the “illegal alien subject” results in violent economic exploitation. Because dwellers of the “borderlands” are constituted by these mechanisms of disciplinary regulative power as always-already criminal (as we saw in the passage about Pedro, above), they are often excluded from protections afforded by labor regulations and union membership, and feel forced by their fear of interaction with law enforcement officials to accept deplorable conditions and treatment. These subjects who are constituted as perverse, abnormal, and threatening are thus made vulnerable to physical violence and economic exploitation. In this way, the mechanisms of normalizing power that constitute the “dangerous criminal alien” concretely benefit the “ruling class” through providing a constant stream of docile bodies for labor.

**Mestiza consciousness: resisting normalizing power**

In addition to providing an autobiographical and genealogical account of “borderland” subjectivity at the center of oppressive formations of power, Anzaldúa’s work describes and performs a resistant counter-discourse from within “border” subjectivity. She describes the enactment of a new form of subjectivity, an active process of self-creation that she terms “mestiza consciousness.” For Anzaldúa, the creative enactment of mestiza consciousness “disrupts pretend continuity” in terms of identities, categories, and bodies.14

I am participating in the creation of yet another culture, a new story to explain the world and our participation in it, a new value system with images and symbols that connect us to each other and to the planet. Soy un amasamiento, I am an act of kneading, of uniting and joining that not only has produced both a creature of darkness and a creature of light, but also a creature that questions the definitions of light and dark and gives them new meanings.15

Anzaldúa’s account locates the possibility of resisting oppressive functions of biopower with those it constitutes as most essentially “abnormal” and threatening. Mestiza identity is possible not through the border inhabitant “pervert’s” “purification” but through acceptance of ambiguity and breakdown of oppressive dualities.

One such “oppressive duality” is that constructed and relied by the function of biopower that places the racialized “criminal alien” subject on one hand and the white “virtuous citizen” subject on the other. Anzaldúa’s account of the potential of mestizaje as a means for both resistance and constructive meaning-making in the face of oppressive formations of power casts in a critical light attempts to advocate on behalf of immigrants—such as President Obama’s—that call for “immigration reforms” while employing the discourses and
strategies of normalization in their articulation. Though Obama’s and others’ calls for changes in national and state-wide legislation are unquestionably meaningful in struggles against oppressive normalizing power, such discourses can actively reinforce the constitutive dichotomy between the “dangerous criminal alien” subjects and “virtuous citizen subjects.” By justifying certain individuals’ movement toward citizenship because of their resemblance to the latter category, they often reinforce racist strategies of biopower.

Because of the problematic—and indeed violent—nature of this binary, resistance must be levied at this dichotomy itself. Anzaldúa suggests that in the blurring of the lines between dichotomies of identity such as “alien/citizen” a hybrid identity must be fashioned: “At some point, on our way to a new consciousness, we will have to leave the opposite bank, the split between two mortal combatants somehow healed so that we are on both shores at once, and, at once, see through serpent and eagle eyes.” She points to borderland identity as a resource for resisting forces of normalization, and holds that the “alien” subject must develop a tolerance for contradictions, a tolerance for ambiguity. She learns to be an Indian in Mexican culture, to be Mexican from an Anglo point of view. She learns to juggle cultures. She has a plural personality, she operates in a pluralistic mode—nothing is thrust out, the good the bad and the ugly, nothing rejected, nothing abandoned. Not only does she sustain contradictions, she turns the ambivalence into something else.

For Anzaldúa, mestiza identity presents the possibility for transformation from within the “alien” subjectivity constituted by normative structures of power. By embracing the “doubled” nature of this always-already racialized identity, the “new mestiza” resists and reforms the mechanisms of disciplinary strategies of power that are constitutive of both “alienness” and “citizenship.” In turn, the mestiza’s embracing and enactment of hybrid identity disrupt the discourses of purity that characterize normalizing power and biopolitical racism. Through this critical performance, mestiza consciousness simultaneously uncovers the “hybrid” and “impure” nature of “citizenship” itself and calls for healing through the recognition of the way that quests for racial, sexual, and cultural “purification” have acted in covering over this hybridity.

Notes

3. Ibid., 250.
4. Ibid., 253.
5. Ibid.
7. Ibid., 4.
8. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 256.
9. Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera, 3.
10. Ibid., 3-4.
13. Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera, 12.
15. Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera, 81.
16. Ibid., 79.
17. Ibid.

An Interview with Linda Martín Alcoff
Edwina Barvosa
University of California, Santa Barbara

Linda Martín Alcoff is one of the best-known and most influential philosophers working today. In her scholarly writings she has engaged with a wide range of topics from epistemology, hermeneutics, and phenomenology to race, identity, feminism, and current political events. Adding to her many achievements, she is now the current president of the American Philosophical Association-Eastern Division. To celebrate her tenure as president of the APA-Eastern, we asked Linda Martín Alcoff to discuss her work and perspectives. In this interview with Edwina Barvosa, Martín Alcoff discusses her ongoing efforts to bridge different philosophical traditions, and to link philosophy with other domains of intellectual, political, and social life. She also shares some of her vision for the future of APA as she fulfills her tenure as APA-Eastern president.

EB: In your career, you have often sought to bridge analytic and continental philosophy and to draw connections among various domains of philosophical thought. What draws you to this kind of bridge building work?

LMA: I know that there may well be an autobiographical explanation here, since I have been engaging in bridging work from the time of my childhood in a family of split identities, nationalities, languages, political orientations, religions, not to mention races and ethnicities! But really, my bridge work in philosophy started when I found myself in a happily pluralist undergraduate department at Florida State University in the 1970s, where analytic, continental, and Latin American philosophy were taught side by side, and I found all of it quite interesting. The linguistic turn happening in analytic philosophy had a strange correlate in the obsessions about language in continental philosophy from Heidegger through Derrida. And the emergence of the philosophy of liberation in Latin America was interesting to compare to the development of analytic Marxism, both of which were endeavoring, in their way, to put liberatory thought on a more secure, secular grounding. One could not help but hear the resonances between the diverse areas of philosophy as sometimes harmonious.

Thus, I never felt capable of choosing one tradition or the other, or sequestering my philosophical work entirely within one stream. The analytics had the advantage in clarity and precision, while the continentalists had a depth and interdisciplinarity that philosophy needed to remain connected to the world. And Latin American thought brought a whole series of approaches and topics completely ignored in the global north. Obviously, I felt, one needed to become trilingual!

Yet these diverse traditions are also huge and clearly deserve their own specialists. It’s not that everyone should become a bridge worker (although it would be good if everyone supported and respected such efforts). But it is quite useful to have some multilingual philosophers with the capacity
to consider neglected connections and bring traditions into conversation. Bridge workers, like the “outsider researchers” discussed in social science methodology, have a unique epistemic utility. No field of inquiry benefits from retaining closed doors.

**EB:** How do you view the role and value of bridge building among philosophical traditions? Given the many possibilities, is it more common and influential than we often think?

**LMA:** Bridging work in philosophy can come in several forms. One form actually endeavors to strengthen a theoretical development by providing supports from outside its usual domain. Here one might look at the work of Joseph Rouse, who has strengthened certain trends in the Anglo-American epistemology of the sciences by bringing in the work of Foucault and Heidegger. Another form offers criticisms of dominant tendencies in one domain by bringing in the perspective of another. Here the work of Sandra Harding is exemplary, who has offered critiques of founding concepts and approaches in the philosophy of science by bringing feminist and post-colonial theory to bear. The caustic diagnoses that Richard Rorty and John McCumber have offered regarding shortcoming in analytic philosophy also take this form of critique. A third form works to reveal the lines of continuity and connection between diverse domains that some consider incommensurable. These connections have an intrinsic interest, but they can also shed light on less obvious aspects of the philosophical domains involved. This last form has been the type that my own bridging work has taken. It involves working through the normative epistemological claims of analytic and continental philosophers as well as the links between Enrique Dussel’s and Foucault’s work and others.

I wish more people recognized how many of our greatest philosophers have been quite capable of bridging traditions and quite motivated to do so as well—such as Michael Dummett, Jürgen Habermas, Richard Rorty, and Hilary Putnam. Roderick Chisholm, one of my professors, is generally thought of as the quintessential analytic epistemologist, but in actuality he made liberal use of Brentano and Meinong and phenomenological approaches. Derrida and Searle took each other seriously enough to engage in book-length dialogues. One can see Hegel’s heavy footprint everywhere from the American pragmatists to the African American philosophy tradition to the more recent discussions in political philosophy about public reason. The greatest philosophers have always been secure enough to branch out; only small minds feel the need to stay in small circles.

**EB:** Is bridging analytic and continental philosophy still among your goals? Has our overall need for this particular bridge changed in any way since your initial efforts?

**LMA:** The need for bridging work is greater than ever, but there are new and different obstacles than when I first began publishing in the late 1980s. Analytic philosophy has changed from the days when Davidson was essentially doing a kind of deconstruction of metaphysics. After that period, David Lewis revived a speculative approach in metaphysics, and today the neurosciences are used to settle metaphysical questions about persons, minds, and will. Yet I continue to believe that most topics worth our philosophical interest not only benefit from multiple traditions, but require them.

**EB:** You have helped to place North American philosophy into greater dialogue with Latin American philosophy. Is there more that you would like to do in this particular arena?

**LMA:** Yes, very much so. I believe that some of the younger Anglo-American and European philosophers are becoming aware of our field’s narrow geographical range, its Anglocentrism and Eurocentrism. But this awareness does not yet translate into knowing what the alternative is, or knowing how to do philosophy that is not decontextualized and aiming for universalist accounts. In turn, the contrast between contextualized and non-contextualized philosophy is connected to the debates over ideal theory versus non-ideal theory: we have mainly been trained in the US and Europe to do ideal theory and few know what it would mean to do philosophy without doing ideal theory in either value theory or epistemology or other sub-fields. It is in this area that the tradition of Latin American thought has a lot to offer—especially in the broad range of value theory, but also in other areas. Its approach has been much more cognizant of its location in time and space, and the need to formulate concepts of justice and of identity germane to a particular historical and cultural condition and a particular people (such as mestizos) understood as a temporary formation. Latin American philosophy is thus ahead of the game in this regard, with a rich debate on contextualized philosophy at least two centuries long. I’d like to work more on bringing this to light in the North American world.

**EB:** What new perspectives and/or significant issues, if any, would you like to see Latina/o philosophers address in the near future?

**LMA:** I am of course just happy to see any Latina/o philosophers make it in our profession and work on whatever topics they want to work on. But I do believe it is a bit of bad faith when many people say that white women in philosophy and philosophers of color should be able to work on any area of philosophy they want to work on. Of course that is true, but our choice of topic areas is never really neutral or without strategy. All job seekers must work in areas that departments recognize and value. And philosophers who are not white and/or male are likely to experience stereotype threat if they raise issues of gender in metaphysics courses or race in seminars on philosophy of language. So in saying that I would be happy to see Latina/o philosophers work in any area of philosophy, what I really mean is that I would like the profession to be such that they can truly pursue their interests of all sorts without fear of further marginalization. I suspect we would enlarge the community of people working in Latin American philosophy if this was true!

**EB:** In your scholarly life, you also bridge philosophy and activism. How would you advise new and/or seasoned scholars contemplating activist endeavors today?

**LMA:** I would give two pieces of advice. First, everyone needs to figure out first and foremost how to get a foothold in this profession if they want to stay in it. This means publishing and developing one’s capacity as a teacher and as a departmental colleague. Aspiring scholar-activists should not feel guilty for doing what they must do to develop their skills and prove themselves worthy of a job and tenure. This does not mean that one should not be politically engaged. But it does mean that you need to have some balance between your long-term goals and short-term preoccupations.

Second, what is interesting is that the closer one’s activism is to one’s own department—or perhaps one’s own profession—the more risk one takes. Many people tolerate the denouncements of far-flung oppressions, but not the efforts to reform the climates in their own neck of the woods. This is a consideration relevant not only if you want to keep your job but also your mental health.

So those are notes of caution, I suppose. But I would also say that political engagement has actually kept me sane and richly informed my philosophical work—as I know it has for many others. What looks to some to be sideline activities irrelevant to one’s philosophical work can be intellectual work in its own right that feeds one as a philosopher. I wrote a paper

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on this topic that has just come out in a new anthology edited by Raja Halwani, who is a great role model in this regard.

**EB:** You have suggested that a strategic retooling could position the APA for greater influence. Could you say more about your vision for a transformed APA?

**LMA:** Over the years, many of our efforts to advance the inclusiveness of philosophy as a profession have been waylaid by the divisional structure of the APA (i.e., Pacific, Central, Eastern). Inclusiveness is a national agenda, yet the national office has been historically much poorer than the divisions. I believe that this is one of the main reasons why the APA is currently so far behind its sister organizations—such as those in political science, religion, English, and history—which have made more aggressive efforts to enhance their inclusiveness through initiatives organized by their national offices. These efforts include scholarships, caucuses, mentoring programs, and summer workshops. These sorts of activities have only happened in philosophy through non-APA efforts (although recently, with significant APA financial support).

On the other hand, the divisional structure can be a good thing, even for the project of inclusiveness. Smaller organizations make democracy easier, as we know, and smaller conferences can make for more meaningful networks and interaction. The divisions can sometimes be more efficient in instituting new practices without having to go through the board. Each division has made real progress in having programs with significant philosophical pluralism, as anyone can tell who compares programs over the last twenty years.

Yet we still need those larger national projects, and should not rely on the volunteering of heroes among the marginalized who sacrifice their time of their own accord. So in the APA, I am glad to see that we are moving toward a middle path at this point in which budgeting decisions can be made in a more national way even while our conferences and program committees can remain regional. The APA board has been funding important initiatives like the Rutgers Summer Institute for Diversity in Philosophy, PIKSI, CUSP, mentoring workshops for women, and now site visits for departments wanting to be more pro-active about inclusiveness. The APA, however, should now take the next step of undertaking its own serious initiatives, rather than just waiting to fund submitted proposals. The APA also needs to step up and take some of the heat that inevitably follows any institutional changes, and come forward more openly and directly on the side of inclusiveness.

**EB:** You have written boldly on the gender inequities that still influence academic philosophy today. This intervention has generated some controversy. In that context, what are your current thoughts on the struggle for gender equity in philosophy?

**LMA:** There are clear signs of progress in some areas: there is now an organized critical mass of women philosophers agitating for acknowledgment of implicit bias and the need to attend to sexual harassment. And there is a beautiful growth of work in feminist philosophy. But we have two large hurdles around which I see fewer signs of progress. The first hurdle concerns the debate about whether or not there is a connection between the low numbers of women in philosophy and the derision with which feminist philosophy is generally held. To me, this should be a no-brainer. As long as feminist philosophy is considered questionable, neither women nor men can work on whatever topics they choose, and women will especially be “policed” for signs of a political corruption in their work. It also remains the case that the critics of feminist philosophy read little or none of it. That in itself should be a sign that what is going on here is sexism, not philosophical disagreement. The second hurdle is that we have to develop more intersectional approaches in our efforts to address gender disparity. White straight women have made real headway, but unless we focus equally on race and sexuality we will find ourselves with a profession that has a nice gender pluralism of straight white people.

**EB:** You once observed that a strong publishing record can be as much or more the result of institutional contexts as individual brilliance. Do you see the APA as having a role to play in fostering productive institutional contexts for all philosophers?

**LMA:** Yes, the APA can and should play a role here, and it often has. Our profession is a pyramid scheme in which the differences between the work lives of faculty at rich institutions and those at poor institutions are getting larger, just as class differences in the United States generally are getting larger. The APA needs to be attentive to these huge differences in whether people can travel to conferences and pay for expensive hotel rooms. There should also be efforts to push for special fellowships for philosophers with heavy teaching loads. And of course we should not assume that because people at the top of the pyramid have more release time that they are necessarily doing the best philosophy. Many philosophers at the bottom of the pyramid are working on very interesting topics relatively ignored at the top. In my experience, the kind of philosophy done at more prestigious universities is often motivated by competition for resources and desire for status, the kind of status that faculty at two- and four-year colleges have given up on (which makes them freer to pursue whatever kind of philosophy they want!). When you know you will never be in the running for a Rockefeller grant, and never in need of winning a letter from someone in one of the departments that people regard as the best, it is really quite freeing.

I don’t want to underestimate the amazing hurdles people have to overcome in some institutional contexts, those who are working without release time, graduate teaching, office and technical support, or the opportunity to get feedback from peers working in their areas. It also makes a difference if one can make a salary large enough to afford things like afterschool care and vacations and maybe even household cleaning help! So there is no question that our work can suffer in difficult contexts.

The APA has changed a great deal in the last twenty years since I have been involved in it, and many more of its leaders are aware of these kinds of issues and less inclined to engage in the unthinking elitism that I used to encounter. The all-important program committees, for example, are much more pluralist than they used to be, drawing from philosophers in different kinds of institutions. But I believe that the APA could do much more in acknowledging the creeping inequalities of higher education and the adverse effects that this can have on the development of philosophy for all of us.

**EB:** As tenure-track faculty positions are being replaced by poorly compensated adjunct positions, what APA developments would you like to see in response to these changes?

**LMA:** We have to make more of an effort to “bring up the floor,” as union activists call it. It is not just about money and benefits for adjuncts, but teaching loads and working conditions, such as offices, phones, and supplies. There are philosophy departments—even ones at poorer institutions such as Hunter College where I teach—that have instituted practices for ensuring better conditions for at least some of the part-time instructional staff. If non-tenure track positions cannot be eliminated wholesale, they should be jobs with living wages, benefits, regular release time, and manageable teaching loads. Chairs can tell their deans that they will simply offer fewer classes and pay their adjuncts more. Get some backbone! But we also need to join unions and professional organizations that are making national efforts at reform. The APA needs to become more of a player in these efforts. Philosophy is one of the most vulnerable professions in the humanities, with small
departments, low budgets, and teaching personnel with many years of investment who have often no other job options. Too much of the leadership is just unaware of the real world conditions out there for most philosophers in our profession. We need to raise the level of organization for less secure strata through unions as well as other professional associations that can then work inside the APA as a bloc to push for more action.

EB: Linda, thank you so much for your time and for sharing your views with us. Good luck with the remainder of your tenure as president of the APA-Eastern Division.

LMA: Thank you.

En diálogo con Pedro di Pietro (In Dialogue with Pedro di Pietro)

Cynthia Paccacerqua
University of Texas–Pan American

Pedro Di Pietro is Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow in the Humanities and visiting assistant professor in the ethnic studies department at the University of California, Berkeley. He obtained his PhD in the Philosophy, Interpretation, and Culture Program at Binghamton University (SUNY). His work focuses on decolonial ways of thinking and producing difference. To study styles of being permeated by indigenous cosmologies, he examines the production of queer spaces in the Andes and their diasporic dispersal throughout the Latin/a/o Americas. His postdoctoral research is two-fold. On the one hand, he explores the linkages between subaltern queerness from indigenous/mestizo backgrounds and vernacular spirituality among Latino/as in the United States. On the other, he weaves regional epistemologies of sex/gender/desire together with the decolonial critique of the human/non-human distinction and its ethico-political aftermath across ethnic, gender, and queer studies. He is currently co-editing a volume on the work of Latina philosopher María Lugones.

CP: As you know, this edition of our newsletter is dedicated to “Latina Feminism” in philosophy. As both a Latin American/Latina philosopher and a philosopher who, among other areas, specializes in Latina feminism, how would you describe the current state of Latina feminist thought in the field of philosophy?

PDP: At first, the question seems to encompass an overarching task, a totalizing epistemic position. After teasing out the nuances of its formulation, the question begs for the dialogue to begin with the discussion of universalism and positionality, two of the most salient critiques in feminist theorizing for the last forty years. Following a suggestion recently presented by Ofelia Schutte,¹ I would like to consider this question by examining the knowing position and the relation between theory and practice that it outlines. I reframe this interrogation with the hope of problematizing the geopolitical valence of my engagement with Latin American/Latina feminist methodologies. Given the nature of this dialogical format, I can only provide a sketch of the components of the decolonial feminist epistemology that I enact when considering the issues raised by all of the questions presented to me (us).

Unlike the epistemic and political position that Schutte describes in the article mentioned above, I am positioned at the outer edge of the conundrum that she identifies in her account of “Latin American feminist theory” as sociocultural practice.² That is, one the one hand, being misidentified as “male,” at least if the term is understood within its Eurocentric and heterosexualist meaning, I may fall outside the figure of the practitioner of “Latin American feminist philosophy” in Schutte’s terms. Since her project involves finding a “conceptual home”³ for a kind of Latin American feminist theory able to speak to the “common problems women must face and challenge in different parts of the world [Latin America]”⁴ and attend to “the living conditions of most women and girls in Latin America,”⁵ it is difficult for me to understand whether I am being addressed by her proposal as one of the practitioners doing and producing what she calls Latin American feminist philosophy. To risk an answer, I have to ask very critically what my own location and involvement in this field are. On the other hand, not being either Latin American or Latino but both, the geopolitical site in which I come to voice is significantly different from the spatiality of Latin America that Schutte has in mind. Although she acknowledges the dangers of claiming a purist understanding of “feminist” and “Latin America,”⁶ she nevertheless sides with the specificity of a geopolitics of knowledge rooted only in the Latin Americas of the southern cone.

If I understand her starting point with some critical sense, Schutte is concerned with finding a conceptual home for a constellation of socio-cultural practices which, under Eurocentered and male-centered hegemony, have been obliterated within cultural, political, and academic contexts in Latin America. In the vein of collective hermeneutics characteristic of feminist theorizing, Schutte speaks of “Latin American feminist theory” as the conceptual home for this politico-epistemic constellation. She underlines the urgency to overcome two of the main hurdles in the path of visibility for such “home”: (a) the history of male-domination within the field of philosophy⁷ and (b) the constraints of philosophy as site of feminist thought.⁸ I take both hurdles to be part of a larger problem, also defining of a political project, through which the sense of collectivity being built within this “home” is brought under a hermeneutical critique. That is, much in the fashion of my reframing of the questions at hand, I follow Schutte in scrutinizing the “we,” the collective subject, and the scope of this philosophical endeavor. Within this larger horizon of inquiry, I think that the question that you posed enables a decentering of two of the underlying assumptions in Schutte’s own formulation of the current state of Latin American feminist philosophy. Let me, then, address both of the concerns that I just listed as I continue to further elaborate my position.

I trained as a practitioner of intercultural and interdisciplinary decolonial feminist philosophy with Dr. María Lugones at Binghamton University, where she directs the Center for Interdisciplinary Research in Philosophy, Interpretation, and Culture (CPIC). Lugones, also a popular educator, belongs to the same generation of feminist theorists in which Schutte developed her scholarship. They both obtained their doctoral degrees in philosophy the same year and, probably, they are the two scholars who initiated, at least in the United States, the systematic philosophical interrogation of the Latina and Latin American condition within the realm of feminist theorizing. Although Linda López McAlister should also be mentioned within this initial moment of the field, I believe that, by her own admission, she did not begin to reflect on her “Chicano roots”⁹ until the late ‘70s when she was acting as campus dean at San Diego State University’s Imperial Valley Campus. The landscape for Latin American/Latina philosophy has changed since they were granted their doctorates, but the academic programs where philosophy graduate students can pursue this kind of work remain, until this day, just a few (among them, University of South Florida, CUNY Graduate Center, Binghamton University, SUNY-Buffalo, SUNY-Stony Brook, and University of Oregon).¹⁰

The type of training that I received, and in which I participated along with a cluster of engaged decolonial thinkers,
speaks to both of Schutte’s concerns (male-domination in philosophy and disciplinary boundaries). At the heart of the sustained conversations cultivated at CPIC, we produce a site of epistemic and political coalition through which the coloniality of power, knowledge, being, and gender is contested. The Politics of Women of Color Workshop and the Decolonial Thinking Workshop are unique in providing a multi-gender, multi-racial, and intercultural grounding for interdisciplinary and praxical philosophical inquiry. In the style that Dr. Lugones has theorized the coloniality of gender, we tease out the multifarious mechanisms through which the cognitive imposition of Eurocentrism secures the complicity between racialized and racially unmarked men when it comes to both gender oppression in everyday life and gender domination in the sphere of cultural production, including the politics of knowledge inside and outside the university. Men of color, among us Latino/Latin American men, learn to see ourselves as part of the problem but also the way out of the coloniality of gender.

There is great amount of privilege tied to the experiences that I am describing. Being part of a university setting in the global north, no matter the level of transgression with which we occupy the space, is certainly a temptation, a door into the teaching machine of late capitalism. Many of us from Latin America or “third-world” countries able to cross national boundaries in the name of intellectual pursuits, under whatever immigrant visas we happen to hold, benefit from mobility and educational opportunities rarely experienced by our peers in our communities of origin. But this privilege is critically foundational in the decolonial site of Latin American/Latina feminist methodology that I am trying to convey. It is this world-system understanding of colonial and imperial powers and their shaping of intersubjectivity that feeds our epistemic positions and political struggles. In the CPIC-Workshops that I mentioned, this type of critical interculturalidad/interculturality becomes the very departure point of an organic and ongoing process in which location and praxis are intimately linked as we examine our involvement in the gendered histories of the Latin/o/a Americas, the geopolitical margin north/south that we produce, and the centering of the authoritative voice of masculinizing knowledge.

So to sum up my train of thought in answering this question, I agree in part with the diagnosis proposed by Ofelia Schutte, but I think that the way that you formulated the issue at hand allows for a response in which the limitations of her project may be explored. In my own journey, Latina/Latin American feminist theorizing has become the site of interrogation of liberatory projects where the collective self is produced through epistemic and political critiques, recognizing that Latinos and Latin American men, in their precarious and multifaceted gender locations, are not merely allies standing in the outskirts of feminist theorizing but co-contributors from within. The recent works of decolonial philosophers Nelson Maldonado-Torres, Manuel Chavez-Jimenez, and Gabriel Soldatenko speak to the continuous engagement with pluralizing the “we” of Latin American/Latina feminist theorizing across gender, sexuality, and hemispherical lines. Moreover, with regards to the transgression of the hemispheric schism, the most active conversations in feminist theorizing across the Latin/o/a Americas are taking place at the intersection between subaltern epistemologies, resistance to colonizing and nationalistic legacies, and a fierce critique of globalizing capitalism and its linkages to neoliberal democratic values. These are sites where communal autonomy and ancestral knowledges, whether Afro-diasporic or indigenous, are mobilized with the spirit of feminist and intercultural realities at heart. This oppositional realm of Latina/Latin American feminist meaning-making is vibrantly blossoming in its polluting and transgressive pan-Latinidad. It is simultaneously collective, interdisciplinary, decolonial, praxical, translocal, and attentive to the challenges of liberatory projects.

CP: You are a trained philosopher currently working within an interdisciplinary institution, and as such you have a good grasp of the state of research in Latina feminist thought outside the academic field of philosophy as well. Do you think that this area of inquiry is more vibrant outside the field? If so, why do you think there is such a difference?

PDP: It is, indeed, more vibrant outside the field. The Eurocentrism underlying philosophical training is rampant. It triggers a rift between knowing from experience and knowing from within an abstract universal, a claim that Paula Moya and Linda Martín Alcoff have so eloquently argued. I have been told—for the sake of my “professional” career—that if I wanted to pursue research on subalternized knowledge, I should first be fluent in the continental canon. Much of the push towards “diversity in philosophy” has the veneer of restorative justice, a way of including an otherized epistemology (Eastern, Latin American, Caribbean, and African) into a regimen of disciplinary subfields. The field, however, remains in its core oblivious of its own provinciality. Part of the epistemic straightjacket is that Eurocentered feminism, in its critical theory (Nancy Fraser) or postmodern vein (Judith Butler), has also been damaging for the epistemic autonomy of Latina/Latin American feminism across the north/south divide. It has also appropriated uncritically the disciplinary and commoditized routes of the circulation of knowledge from north to south. Having come to political awareness in the company of multicultural feminists in Latin America and US-based women of color, I have witnessed first-hand the reception of theories of global justice (Fraser; Nussbaum) by the so-called technocratic feminism post-Beijing.

In spite of the prolific work by some of the scholars that I already mentioned and others such as Mariana Ortega, Shireen Roshanravan, Jen McWeeny, Sarah Hoagland, Gabriela Veronelli, Elena Ruiz-Aho, Cynthia Paccacerqua, and Mariana Alessandri, I have to admit that the most provoking interlocution for Latina/Latin American feminisms is cultivated outside the field. It is perhaps the fact that area studies are interdisciplinary, at least in nominal terms, from their inception. Reflecting on the wonderful initiative founded in 2006 by Dr. Ortega under the name of Latina Feminism Roundtable at John Carroll University, it is the crosspollination of epistemic frameworks and political standings that laid out the foundation of this enriching space. My own search for inspiration and class assignments constantly takes me to a thriving field of, as I stated before, oppositional meaning-making out of which I would like to mention just a short collection of gems: the decolonizing archive of Chicana altar/alterities in the work of Dr. Laura Elisa Pérez (UC, Berkeley); the Spoken Wor(l)d Art Performance Activism (SWAPA) of methodology of the oppressed theoretician Chela Sandoval (UC, Santa Barbara); the Semiotics of Communicology for Latina Feminism of Jacqueline M. Martinez (Arizona State University); the inquiry on Mesoamerican Eros in the engagement of Dr. Sylvia Marcos with indigenous healing practitioners from Arnevaltepec, Guerrero, Mexico; and the incisive genealogy of counterfeminisms that Maylei Blackwell has furnished in her ¡Chicana Power!.

CP: Could you identify for us some of the biggest obstacles that you think this field of inquiry has to contend with in philosophy?

PDP: In addition to the critique of Eurocentrism and its love for disembodied knowledge that I offered in my prior answer, I would like to add some of the concerns that I gather from my teaching experience in the Ethnic Studies Department at
the University of California, Berkeley. I am the only faculty member on this campus teaching courses where the sphere of philosophy, as “discipline,” is associated with the Latin/a/o Americas. I actually teach a class on Latina/o Philosophy and Religious Thought (CS110) which is one of the upper level courses in the Chicana/o-Latina/o Studies Major. The catalog description of the course was created by Professor Nelson Maldonado-Torres while he was working at this department.

Among the sixty students who enrolled in this class (spring 2012, spring 2013), only 15 percent to 20 percent have declared a major in philosophy. That makes introducing this student population to Latino/a philosophical inquiry much more challenging. I find that the underrepresentation of Latinas/os in the philosophy department of this campus but, most importantly, in the enrollment for the only course being offered under the heading Latina/o Philosophy represents the kind of tremendous obstacle that you are underlining with this question. Moreover, those who do have a philosophical training are at first disoriented by the weight of geopolitical considerations that I bring to the classroom as an opening to discuss the regionalism of continental philosophy. To borrow Nelson Maldonado-Torres’s terms, “the ethical and de-colonial suspension of the universal” embedded in Eurocentered humanism challenges philosophy students on this campus to shift the geopolitics of knowledge informing their education in the analytic tradition.

But above all, when it comes to the remaining 80 percent without previous “philosophical” background, they tend to grasp very quickly, almost as an intuition, that there is a qualitative difference between, for instance, Enrique Dussel’s “A Nahua Interpretation of the Conquest” (1994) and Laura Pérez’s “Spirit/Glyph” chapter in Chicana Art (2007). Although they both address the subjugation of “flor y canto” and its sensual epistemology by the colonial imposition of lettered knowledge, the students find an embodied affinity with the translocal s/ Spiritual feminism of Latina/Chicana alterity in Pérez’s offering/ ofrenda. For those interested in reading Pérez’s own account of this queer of color-centered and women of color-centered affinity across the north/south divide, you may want to look up her essay “Enrique Dussel’s Ética de la liberación, U.S. Women of Color Decolonizing Practices, and Coalitionary Politics amidst Difference.”

With regards to obstacles in pedagogy, the challenge has been to find work both in the north and south which are decolonizing and multicultural and that, without imposing US-based categories of social inquiry, provide students with a thorough understanding of the gender politics of philosophy, the dispersal of knowledge, and Latina/o and Latin American thought. The likelihood of students being exposed to a systematic philosophical inquiry that is at the same time decolonizing and pancontinental, in a pan-Latinidad fashion as it were, is very slim. This is the main challenge in the classroom but, as Gloria Anzaldúa taught us, it is also that sense of being torn and dislocated that can be turned into an enriching site of collective and psychological transformation.

As a practicing philosopher, have you confronted personal obstacles in your work that were singular to your engagement with Latina feminist thought? Could you give us some examples?

This is a question that has many different registers. I think that the most fruitful register for this dialogue would be addressing the linkages between the personal and professional spheres. I applied to graduate school to pursue a degree in philosophy because I had found a moving epistemology in the transgression of the theory/practice split performed by women of color thinking; particularly, in the works of Dr. Lugones and the late Gloria Anzaldúa. Most of my undergraduate and graduate background prior to arriving at Binghamton was linked to Eurocentered cultural and media studies. Within that kind of scholarship, I was instructed to engage the social either as an abstract observer or ethnographer. Little in my educational path was meant to maintain alive the knowledges and affects I gathered as a child in close proximity to indigenous and peasant worldviews in the Andean region of Argentina’s northwest. It wasn’t until I met Dr. Lugones, while she was researching the life and prolific writing of Rodolfo Kusch, that I started to reflect on the workings of Cartesian thought in disembodied my knowing position. I cannot think of an obstacle bigger than that when trying to pursue an ethical engagement with Latina feminisms.

The job-search process is another facet worth to mention. Due to the highly interdisciplinary research that I have developed—I wrote a doctoral dissertation on “decolonizing queer spatiality”—I have been a candidate for jobs in philosophy, women’s, gender, and sexuality studies, and in ethnic and/or critical race studies (including Chicana/o and Latina/o Studies). At one of the campus interviews that I had with a committee from a four-year public university, for a joint-appointment between WGS and Latina/Africana Studies, I was asked by the dean of that school under what kind of “circumstances” I had developed an interest in “women’s studies.” According to the dean’s view, I was an unusual candidate for that job. Since the comment was formulated in a veiled manner, it is hard to decipher what exactly I was being asked but it is not as hard to read between the lines what the implication was. With regards to the few job interviews that I had for positions in philosophy departments, and I should consider myself lucky having had five of them to date, I have probably not passed the test on the “generalist” status. My strong commitment to transgressing the disciplinary canon may be read as narrowing my scope in the practice of philosophy rather than as expanding it through a radically multicultural methodology.

CP: Dr. Di Pietro, you are one of the scholars that has actively participated in the yearly gatherings of the Roundtable on Latina Feminism, organized by Dr. Mariana Ortega. Would you be kind to share with us what role this Roundtable played in your professional development? To follow up on this question, how do you see the Roundtable’s function vis à vis the development of research and writing in Latina Feminism philosophy?

PDP: In addition to the comments that I already made about the Roundtable, I want to emphasize that this is one of the most exciting sites of epistemic and political engagement that I have encountered in my professional development. It is unique in its ability to bring together not only practitioners from different disciplines but, most importantly, from different geopolitical positions and geographical areas. It is remarkable that this initiative is able to attract renowned scholars, junior and senior faculty, and graduate and undergraduate students. Located in the midwest, it also makes an explicit effort to close the gap between Latinidad in the northeast, in south Florida, and the US-southwest. I am reminded of the notion of epistemic coalition when I think about the Roundtable and of the challenges associated with this experience.

I am committed to honoring the vision of the Roundtable. I have participated in all but one of its meetings since 2006. It granted me the opportunity to meet, the same year and at the very same place, three of the main interlocutors for the research that I pursue, Linda Martin Alcoff, Laura Elisa Pérez, and Chela Sandoval. Out of this experience, I began a more sustained conversation with Jen McWeeny and, together with Shireen Roshanravan, we are in the process of co-editing a volume about the contributions made to the field by Dr. Maria Lugones. Finally, I have to credit the Roundtable for introducing me to

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Dr. Perez. She has become a truly extraordinary mentor. She has been exceptional in providing advice and much needed guidance for my postdoctoral project right after graduation. Dr. Perez also transgresses the boundaries of disciplinary knowledge and makes of intellectual collaboration a genuinely decolonizing practice.

CP: Thank you so much for participating in this diálogo filosófico. I wish you the best of luck with your current postdoctoral research.

Notes

2. Ibid., 784.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 783.
5. Ibid., 784.
6. Ibid., 785.
7. Ibid., 787.
8. Ibid., 784–85.
9. López-McAlister, Biographical Information.
10. This list does not include the academic settings where theological inquiry engages liberation theology and Latin American feminist and “mujerista” theology. See Maria Pilar Aquino, A Reader in Latina Feminist Theology (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2002).
12. Lugones, “Heterosexualism.”
13. I am referring to a complex form of communication that affirms the autonomy of gendered-consciousness-raising while privileging the cross-gender coalitional move, epistemic and political, when it comes to deciphering the intricacies of the coloniality of power. This collective worked systematically designing not only lecture series and summer institutes in order to theorize the coloniality of gender but also conducting participatory research and organizing mobilizations to eradicate violence against women of color at Binghamton University.
15. Walsh, “De-colonialidad e Interculturalidad.”
21. Alcoff et al., Identity Politics Reconsidered.
22. In my role as academic coordinator for the graduate program in gender, society, and politics at FLACSO-Buenos Aires (Latin American Graduate School of Social Sciences), I am part of a transcontinental teaching and research team where scholars, advocates, and community organizers are involved in analyzing the multiple dimensions of gender politics and policy-making in the region.
23. Maldonado-Torres, Against War, 158.

Bibliography

En diálogo con Mariana Ortega (In Dialogue with Mariana Ortega)

Cynthia Paccacerqua
University of Texas–Pan American

Mariana Ortega is one of the leading Latina feminist philosophers today. Her research focuses on existential phenomenology, in particular Heideggerian phenomenology, race theory, Latina feminism, and aesthetics. She has particular interest in the questions of self and identity, the relationship between the individual and the social, and photographic representations of the racialized body. Her work has appeared in various journals, including *Hypatia, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Latino Studies,* and *Philosophy and Geography.* She is co-editor with Linda Martín-Alcoff of the anthology *Constructing the Nation: A Race and Nationalism Reader* (SUNY, 2009). A genuine organic intellectual, Mariana Ortega’s contribution to philosophy extends beyond her scholarly engagement with these topics, as she has effected a real, tangible transformation in the philosophy community itself. By organizing what has become a yearly Roundtable on Latina Feminism, she created an intellectual place that strengthened the existing community of scholars in the field of Latina feminist thought and provided the much needed support for a new generation of scholars to flourish. She is also especially known for her excellence in teaching, mentorship, and commitment to her students. Mariana Ortega received her PhD from the University of California, San Diego. She currently holds the Don Shula Chair in Philosophy at John Carroll University.

**CP:** This edition of our newsletter is dedicated to “Latina Feminism” in philosophy. As both a Latina philosopher and a philosopher who, among other areas, specializes in Latina feminism, how would you describe the current state of Latina feminist thought in the field of philosophy?

**MO:** While Latina feminism, and more specifically Chicana feminism, has a rich history and literature, Latina feminism is only emerging within philosophy. There are very few Latinas in the discipline and very few of them engage directly with the work of Latina feminist thinkers. However, my view is that at the moment we are at a crucial and exciting time for the development of Latina feminism within philosophy as there are some established Latina philosophers such as Linda Martín Alcoff, María Lugones, and Ofelia Schutte whose works are making an impact in various areas of philosophy. Moreover, some Latinas are entering the discipline and choosing to engage with texts written by Latina and Chicana feminists. Not only are they studying the work by the few established Latina philosophers, but they are also interested in important figures in Chicana feminism such as Gloría Anzaldúa and engaging philosophically with issues of great relevance to Latinas such as immigration. Young Latina philosophers are also starting to look at the intersections of Latina feminism and postcolonial and race theorists as well as canonical philosophical figures. It is my hope that young Latina and other philosophers will start to discover the fertile field of Latina feminism and engage with it in-depth and lovingly. That is, my view is that Latina feminism is taken seriously within philosophy and not simply as a way to satisfy a diversity or inclusiveness requirement. As philosophers we are all too familiar with the marginalization of those subjects in philosophy that deal with marginalization itself, with colonization, with racism, with sexism among others and thus I am aware that the recognition and endorsement of Latina feminism within philosophy might seem like a flight of the imagination, but I remain hopeful.

**CP:** Would you describe the state of Latina feminist thought as stronger outside of the field of philosophy per sé? If so, why do you think there is such a difference?

**MO:** Latina feminist thought is indeed stronger outside the field of philosophy. There is important work being done within various disciplines including sociology, history, literature, political science, anthropology, and other fields, and there are many publications of an interdisciplinary nature. There are various reasons for this lack of presence of Latina feminism...
within philosophy, including the important fact that feminism, the area of philosophy which would have been the space to open its doors to Latina feminism and other feminisms by women of color, was itself encapsulated in its own sphere and thus primarily concerned with the interests of middle class white women. Women of color feminist theorizing exposed the white tunnel vision of feminists, leading to revisions and reconfigurations of a more inclusive and critical feminism. Yet, this expanded feminist vision remains a work in progress and Latina feminism gets little attention even within feminism. It is not surprising that it gets even less attention in other areas of philosophy. A renewed commitment to a more inclusive feminism as well as the recent interest in Latin American philosophy may serve as springboards for the development and study of Latina feminism within philosophy, especially if those interested in Latin American philosophy are open to considering the work of Latinas living in the United States.

CP: Could you identify for us some of the biggest obstacles that you think this field of inquiry has to contend with in philosophy?
MO: The biggest obstacle is the white male and white female tunnel vision of philosophy and of philosophers, an attempt to look at the world from the point of view of white males and females, that undermines, ignores, or erases the knowledge as well as the political and ethical demands of those who are marginalized. Another obstacle is what I would call the fear of lived experience—especially the lived experience of what Anzaldúa calls los atravesados, those at the margins, at the borders, the unwanted the rejected, the ones that do not fit the accepted or dominant norms—the fear within some philosophical camps of dealing with flesh and bone beings that are all around us, that have lived experiences that may disrupt clean, tight, supposedly objective theories. Interestingly, even within phenomenology, the area in philosophy that promises theories that do justice to lived experience, we find a lack of attention to the lived experience of the so-called “other”—the other having become a theoretical construct, no more than a metaphor that helps explains experiences of shame or possibilities of empathy. We thus inhabit a discipline that has a long way to go not only in recognizing its own limits but also in integrating the vision and concerns of those who are at the borders. Finally, another obstacle has to do with yet another fear, and if not a fear a distrust of interdisciplinarity. Given the various economic, cultural, and disciplinary constraints that women of color face in academia and at large, they produce work that is truly border-crossing—they write in many voices, inspired by various life experiences and disciplines and methodologies and embrace interdisciplinarity. Latina feminist work cuts across many disciplines and methodologies and consequently cannot always be classified under the label “philosophy.” Those with a penchant for philosophical purity, if there is such a thing, may thus not even consider it as worthy of entering the pristine philosophical halls.

CP: As a practicing philosopher, have you confronted personal obstacles in your work that were singular to your engagement with Latina feminist thought? Could you give us some examples?
MO: The main example that I can provide and that has been quite painful is the fact that I have encountered opposition due to my interest in thinking both phenomenology and Latina feminism together. I am no longer interested in conducting research in phenomenology without looking at the ways in which the work of women of color, specifically Latina feminist work, challenges or enhances standard phenomenological accounts. To finish my degree I had to carry out such research but it became clear to me that I could no longer practice philosophy, think philosophically, without looking at the work produced by those who were marginalized, especially women of color. My interest became to intersect phenomenological views, especially Heideggerian phenomenology, with Latina feminism. Unfortunately, I have been criticized by both camps, Heideggerians who do not deem work written by Latina theorists as even worth reading, especially in philosophy and Latina feminists who consider the reading of work by a German philosopher with an atrocious political view as a traición. Clearly, these criticisms stem from two very different stances. I am deeply bothered by many philosophers’ inability to take feminist work seriously, especially when it is by women of color. I am indeed more attuned to the reasons as to why Latinas would not be willing to engage not only with canonical figures in philosophy that will undoubtedly be white and male but also with figures that are known for their terrible political views. I am in no way sympathetic or apologetic about Heidegger’s political choice. In some of my work I am interested in engaging traditional phenomenological texts with Latina feminism in the spirit of understanding how these different traditions intersect and critically inform one another. It is important that we as Latina philosophers are free to explore the different ways in which different philosophical texts, including canonical texts, can be read anew with the help of insights from Latina feminists.

CP: Dr. Ortega, you have been one of the most important agents in the transformation of our philosophical community when it comes to developing and nurturing both minorities as well as research in Latina feminism. I would like to ask if you could share with us your experience in creating and leading the Roundtable on Latina Feminism.
MO: I remember going to the first Roundtable on Philosophy of Race then organized by Ronald Sundstrom and being so moved by being in an environment where all the panels were about race—you know what I mean—not just the one or two “race” panel that we usually see at conferences. I returned home and thought about how wonderful it would be to have a small, intimate space where all the panels were dedicated to Latina feminism—that is how the roundtable started, with very little funding, a thirst for learning more about what Latina feminists had to say, and a vision of a small group of women who cared about Latina feminism sharing and participating in every session. From the outset I understood that while I really wanted to promote Latina feminism within my own discipline of philosophy I should not restrict the presentations just to philosophy. As I mentioned previously, one of the important features of woman of color theorizing is its interdisciplinarity. I thus decided to invite academics from all disciplines to present in any area of Latina feminism, but I also kept in mind the need to invite, encourage, and nurture Latina women in philosophy. I am happy to know that various young Latinas have felt empowered by their experiences at the roundtable and that their participation has increased their interest in using Latina feminism in their philosophical work. It is not always easy to organize a space that while occupied primarily by Latinas interested in Latina feminism also contains tremendous heterogeneity in terms of nationality, class, sexual orientation, interests, disciplines, age, political affiliations, etc. There have been stressful, tense, and difficult moments when participants have realized our differences but even those moments have served as opportunities for critical reflection, growth as well as understanding of what our limits as we engage in coalitional work. As participants, we have to remain attuned to our similarities and differences with the hope of learning from each other and from our particular disciplines in the hope of understanding and expanding Latina feminism. As Latina feminism starts being considered within the discipline of philosophy it too must remain attuned to and respectful of differences within, self-critical, and ready for growth.
have no political voice. The case for extending the franchise to 40 percent and 40 percent of the population, who have worked heavily populated by non-citizens, in some places between 20 Spain, which are two examples discussed here. But, in fact, the discussion of the consequences of extending the franchise to happy and, if only for this reason, one would expect to find more history of non-citizen voting rights has not been altogether and lived in a community for years but have no vote when it extend the franchise to non-citizens in the midst of democratic conflicts in multinational states. The question raised here is whether voting rights for non-citizen residents are justified in multinational contexts. Several political theorists have recently argued in favor of extending the right to vote to non-citizens on the basis of the “all affected interests principle,” which holds that all those whose interests are affected or who are coerced by a state’s policy ought to have a say in deciding on that policy. The all affected interests principle (AAIP) was initially formulated by Robert Dahl but has since been adopted, expanded, revised, and debated. All of those who employ something like the principle make the same important point, that democratic legitimacy requires that all who are subject to state law should also be its authors. In the context of contemporary debates about immigration and citizenship rights, the principle is used to argue that voting rights for non-citizen residents are a requirement of a just and fair government, and that these rights help to prevent the mistreatment of non-citizens who are de facto stakeholders in the community where they live, work, and pay taxes, and who are more vulnerable to exploitation if they have no political voice. The case for extending the franchise to non-citizens seems especially strong in municipalities that are heavily populated by non-citizens, in some places between 20 percent and 40 percent of the population, who have worked and lived in a community for years but have no vote when it comes to local issues that directly affect their lives.

Where national minorities form a territorial majority, the history of non-citizen voting rights has not been altogether happy and, if only for this reason, one would expect to find more discussion of the consequences of extending the franchise to non-citizens in multinational democracies, such as Belgium or Spain, which are two examples discussed here. But, in fact, the circumstances of national minorities are rarely mentioned in these discussions and, consequently, neither is consideration of one of the leading dilemmas encountered when extending the franchise to non-citizens. On one hand, extending the franchise is a powerful means to recognize the political equality of non-citizens within the community, while, on the other hand, it can jeopardize what is often a fragile balance of power in some communities, in particular, between minorities and national majorities. Decisions to extend the franchise to non-citizens thus threaten the ability of national minorities to be democratically self-governing.

Here I argue that extending voting rights to non-citizens is often represented as treasure but is more often fool’s gold. Voting rights may do little to improve fair relations between citizens and non-citizens, and in some circumstances can deepen the vulnerability of non-citizens. This is especially true in multinational contexts where efforts have been made to extend the franchise to non-citizens in the midst of democratic struggles by national minorities for self-determination. However, the concerns raised here do not rest entirely on the non-ideal consequences of particular national minorities. The problem is also connected to two features of the AAIP, which is the principal argument for extending the franchise. First, the inertia of the principle is to include without consideration for which community those included identify with, and, second, advocates of the principle tend to link the presence of affected interests to the political act of voting. As a result, the application of the principle eschews the issue of which community—the national majority or the minority—non-citizens residents identify with and are more likely to support in competitive electoral contexts while, at the same time, ignoring the consequences for national minorities and for non-citizens of voting under such circumstances. I argue that the AAIP plausibly shows that those whose interests are affected by state power have a claim on the state for its attentiveness or even responsiveness to their interests, but they do not have a claim on the right to vote.

I begin by briefly examining the experiences of Spain and Belgium, where the franchise was extended to some non-citizen residents in local decision making following the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. The experiences in these two multinational states help to illuminate some reasons why, today, the AAIP has become such an attractive basis to justify extending the franchise to non-citizens. At the same time, they illustrate some concerns about the real world purchase of the right to vote for non-citizens who settle in regions where national minorities form territorial majorities. The settlement and political empowerment of non-citizens in minority territory acts as a kind of Trojan horse that can be used to dilute the political strength of minority nationalism and this concern points to a well-known feature of multinational states today that the more decision making power is held by voters who are not members of the minority nation, the more power is de facto held by the dominant majority group. For reasons considered below, non-citizens and newcomers tend to identify with dominant national groups, not struggling national and linguistic minorities, and therefore the issue of which level of government controls the settlement and status of new members is usually contentious in multinational states. In this context, non-citizens are often vulnerable third parties and their vulnerability may easily worsen by extending to them not just any right, but voting rights, which have a great deal of symbolic significance but carry little political power of the sort that non-citizens need to protect the interests most important to them. So, while it is difficult to doubt that withholding rights from non-citizens is sometimes motivated by anti-immigrant sentiments, the claim that extending voting rights to non-citizens residents today advances progressive political and social aims may be overly general if not downright doubtful in many circumstances.

Minority nationalism and non-citizen voting rights in Belgium and Spain

In the last thirty years, liberal political theorists have written extensively about the claims of national minorities to self-determination, exploring how these claims might be connected to broader principles of justice, freedom, human rights, and democratic citizenship. They have offered a wide range of arguments to explain why people have a strong sense of identification with their language, culture, territory, religion, and national group, and how these identifications have too often been unfairly ignored or suppressed by dominant majorities in contemporary nation states, resulting in unfair forms of disadvantage or oppression that have historically limited the freedom and equality of members of national minorities, amongst others. One of the best ways to understand how national self-determination, in particular, is connected to the
broader principles of justice is to consider how people fare when the institutions of their national community are destroyed or seriously damaged by colonialism or war. In these cases, national communities lose their capacity to provide members with a viable context in which to lead their lives and thereby leave them vulnerable to assimilation and the eventual loss of their language and culture. According to some liberal accounts, national communities and their societal institutions have moral value because they help establish the conditions necessary for individual freedom and equality. But many of those who do not endorse the liberal argument nevertheless support the right of national minorities to self-determination because they recognize that individuals suffer real loss and are exposed to discrimination and disadvantage where they have no access to their own national institutions. On this basis, a strong case has been made that, where national minorities are territorially concentrated and large enough to sustain their own institutions, they are entitled to govern themselves and this entitlement is grounded in their capacity to sustain a context in which their members can exercise meaningful freedom.

In democratic practice, the right of national minorities to self-determination comes down to the right to govern the public sphere in ways that sustain their distinctive identity, which today usually amounts to protecting their linguistic identity. The terms by which national minorities do so are typically jurisdictionally shared with the larger state and often a matter of ongoing dispute. Since the 1970s, a key source of conflict between national majorities and national minorities in many western states has been policies related to the linguistic security of the national minority, and what often follows from these conflicts is a strong interest by national minorities in controlling immigration settlement, which is often also contested. As Zapata-Barrero puts it, “[t]he politics of immigration are linguistic politics,” and so it is hardly surprising to discover that, since the 1990s, efforts to enfranchise non-citizens and empower immigrants within regions dominated by national minorities have caused political conflict.

In this respect, the Belgium case is instructive because its political struggles illustrate some consequences of recent attempts to extend the franchise to non-citizens. In 1993, European states that signed the Maastricht Treaty agreed to extend voting rights to all citizens of European Union (EU) states in local/municipal elections. In Belgium, this idea was not new. Enfranchising all non-citizens residents (EU and non-EU) had been on the political agenda since the 1970s and found considerable support in neighboring states such as the Netherlands. But at the time of the Maastricht treaty, the issue became intensely politicized to the point that the Belgian government believed the Treaty referendum would not pass unless the provision to extend non-citizen voting rights in local elections was delayed or an exemption to it could be made (which Belgium eventually did, albeit temporarily). The issue of non-citizen voting rights turned out to be politically divisive, attracting popular support to Belgium’s right wing, anti-immigrant parties, especially amongst the Walloons and Flemish who lived around Brussels, while at the same time the proposal pushed centrist parties to adopt anti-immigrant policies in order to shore up their own support. For instance, the centrist government agreed to pass legislation that implemented what some view as blatantly discriminatory practices, such as denying non-EU migrants the right to register as residents in their local municipality, in hopes that they could thereby stem the tide of right-wing support and reassure national minorities who feared a loss of their political power, especially in the area of Brussels where, at the time, over 20 percent of the population was not Belgian.

A similar pattern, though with less extreme outcomes, occurred in Spain. The voting provisions of the Maastricht treaty similarly raised the anxieties of Spain’s minority nationalist communities, especially in Catalunya, where 1 in 7 people is an immigrant and, in Barcelona, where the proportion of non-Spanish citizen residents rose dramatically in the 2000s from 2.9 percent to over 15 percent. Unlike Belgium, the provision to include all EU citizens in the local municipal franchises of Spain did not threaten the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty. The Spanish approach, which has been described as pragmatic about immigration and generally tolerant of diversity, focused primarily on how to manage the challenges of diversity, especially in relation to non-Spanish, Muslim migrants. Yet, the growth in immigration and the anticipated empowerment of non-citizens due to the franchise extension divided the country along lines that highlighted a lack of trust by national minorities in the autonomous regions towards the national government. This lack of trust was especially evident in Catalunya, where immigration is perceived to endanger the secure future of the Catalan language and identity. In the early 2000s, for instance, Catalans accused the national government of encouraging Moroccan immigrants to settle in Catalunya as a way of weakening the autonomy of the Catalan community, perhaps partly as a means to demand more jurisdictional authority for Catalunya over its fiscal resources and immigration policy. In general, the Spanish strategy has been to establish measures that ensure immigration does not threaten linguistic and cultural security and that require immigrants to integrate. One such measure is linguistic immersion through all compulsory education levels, in minority languages, which are treated on par with Spanish within the autonomous regions of Catalunya, Basque, and Galicia. Another proposal is to insist that minority languages are recognized as the language of the work place, and another is to transfer all powers over migration to the autonomous regions. Even though the intensity of dissension found in Belgian politics is not evident in Spain, Catalan political parties and political debate also became sensitized by the Maastricht voting provisions. In 2010, opposition political parties and socialist mayors campaigned on strongly anti-immigrant platforms in regional and municipal elections. Municipalities have been slow to facilitate the voting rights of non-citizens and measures have been proposed to require non-citizens to prove they have integrated into Catalan society before they are eligible to participate in municipal politics. One proposal is to require immigrants to sign a contract that commits them to working towards integration, respecting the customs and culture of Catalunya as well as learning the Catalan language as a means to speedier access to non-essential services, while another proposal is to require that immigrants agree to return to their country if they find themselves without a job. Yet another strategy is to deny non-citizens from outside the EU voting rights which has meant, in effect, that attempts to extend the franchise beyond non-citizens from Spanish-speaking countries and countries with reciprocal agreements with Spain (e.g., Denmark, Sweden, Norway) are consistently blocked by Catalan nationalistic parties.

**The attractiveness of the all affected interests principle (AAIP)**

Democratic theorists who argue in favor of extending the franchise to non-citizen residents usually do so on the basis of the all affected interest principle (AAIP), which holds that those who are subject to the law should also be its authors. The general principle has become a helpful touchstone in debates about the voting rights for non-citizens because it draws into question the arbitrary nature, from a democratic point of view, of linking voting rights to citizenship status in a transnational context.
world. At the same time, because the inclusiveness of the principle has radical implications, its advocates have proposed several different ways to limit its application. Whereas in the broadest renditions, the floodgates open, at least in principle, and relevant voters include all whose interests are possibly (as opposed to actually or probably) affected, in other accounts, only people whose basic and vitally important interests are affected must be included in the vote. Bauböck argues that the vote ought to be extended to those affected because they are stakeholders in a society in the sense that their “rights are dependent on protection by a particular polity [which] ties an individual’s well-being to the common good of that polity,” while Abizadeh and Blake suggest that only those subject to the state’s coercive power are affected in the relevant sense. Even in light of these variations, the principle has an inclusionary logic such that policies that deny the vote to those non-citizens who have lived in a community for a long time appear to be suspect and arbitrary from a democratic point of view.

Against the background of immigration politics today, three reasons stand out as to why the AAIP is especially attractive. The first reason is the crisis of democracy in an age of migration, which is exemplified by what have been called “votless neighborhoods” found in many western states today. Both Belgium and Spain have “votless neighborhoods” where a sizable proportion of the population—sometimes more than 30 percent—does not have citizenship and therefore is ineligible to vote in local elections where numerous policies and regulations are developed that affect their interests. Local elections determine the character of municipal government and municipal government is primarily concerned with essential services such as how the city delivers water and picks up garbage, how much property tax residents pay, how property is zoned, how police services are organized and delivered, how schools are run (including whether students can wear religious dress or symbols), streets built, parks cared for, libraries stocked, recreational centres run, etc. Non-citizens and citizens alike, who are residents of a municipality, use and pay for municipal services, yet only citizens get a say in how they are run. Where whole neighborhoods are “votless,” this inequality is amplified because the distinctive concerns of disenfranchised residents are less likely to be addressed sympathetically by candidates seeking election. Votless neighborhoods illustrate one reason why the principle of all affected interests is democratically salient today. Where those who are subject to the law are not also its authors, the risk is that their interests will be marginalized or ignored.

Second, today the AAIP is defended in a real world context where several states in the west have adopted discriminatory measures to protect their sovereign power from internal and external populations so that ethnic or linguistic majorities can retain their dominance. For instance, several states have denied citizenship and rights to long-term guest workers (e.g., Turks in Germany, Moroccans in Spain), downgraded the recognition of family reunification as important to the daily lives of residents in the community. The attractiveness of the AAIP is reinforced by a status that emerges from the practices of shared membership and therefore ought to be viewed as a status that emerges from the practices of shared membership and therefore ought to be considered citizens of a community even if they are denied the legal status of citizenship according to the laws of the state. On this view, measures to extend the right to vote to non-citizen, long-term residents is a way to bridge the gap between the sociologically grounded reality of membership and the politico-legal rules that guide the (sometimes unjust) regimes of citizenship imposed by the state. On the basis of this bottom-up view of citizenship, defenders of AAIP have strong grounds to argue that, of all levels of decision making, non-citizens should have the right to vote on local decisions, not only because some of their basic interests are affected by decisions at the local level, but also because they are more likely to be social citizens of their neighborhoods within the local communities where they live and work.

In sum, the AAIP is especially attractive today as a means to defend a democratic approach to citizenship and immigration in light of votless neighborhoods, discriminatory measures to exclude residents from citizenship, and the growing importance of local communities in developing citizenship norms. Defenders of the principle draw on these real-world challenges of immigration politics and use the principle directly to argue for more inclusive, sociologically sensitive norms of citizenship and for voting rights. The principle is meant to challenge reality without overstretching the limits of democratic credibility, and so many of its defenders also suggest ways to qualify the principle, for instance, to limit the franchise to those whose interests are “vitaly affected” or affected in ways that make them stakeholders. Without these qualifications, the AAIP has been criticized for being overly broad and unsuitable even as a rough guide in the real world. Yet, as one defender of the principle puts it, regardless of which qualifications are chosen, the onus the principle places on those who reject its radically inclusionary logic is to show what other than “affected interests” or “subjection to state coercion” is the proper basis of democratic legitimacy and inclusion.

The Trojan horse problem

Members of national minorities are no more or less likely to be committed to the democratic principle of inclusion than are members of majorities. But three concerns, when taken together, show why, in multinational contexts, non-citizens are at risk of being politically exploited in the context of debates about extending the franchise to them. First, the concern repeatedly expressed by minority nationalists today is that their governments do not have sufficient power to control the terms of migration and integration into their regions. Immigration and citizenship policy
is usually under the jurisdiction of national governments that typically retain all executive power over who crosses the borders of the state and devolve some policy making power to manage migrants to regions and municipalities through negotiated agreements. As a result, it can appear to national minorities that state immigration policy fails to provide them either with “the tools or the resources for the nation itself to manage this process that affects its very development as a cultural community,” and thereby leaves the minority nation to find other means to protect its identity. Even where negotiated agreements have devolved power to national minorities to decide the volume and terms of immigration, such as in Quebec, concerns often remain that immigration policy is biased in favor of the national majority. As a result, minority nations can end up using their power over policing, labor inspections, the recognition of immigrant associations, and the facilitation of local elections, to manage the effects of migration in their territory.

Second, the implementation of policies to protect the language and culture of national minorities occurs at the local level, which is also where pressure exists to extend the franchise to non-citizens. In multinational states, the governing powers most important to national minorities are those that allow local communities to decide how the language and culture of a national minority will be sustained in the everyday life of local community. In federations, national minorities often have jurisdiction over local matters in order to control how national principles that recognize the minority’s right to a secure culture and language are translated into policies locally that establish how public institutions operate. Such policies include, for instance, how the protection of linguistic rights is interpreted through educational policy, how municipal zoning bylaws regulate the location of churches or mosques, whether recreational centers offer information in non-local languages or rent space to religious groups, whether garbage is collected on Friday, or whether buses run on the Sabbath through all neighborhoods. These are just a few examples of the kinds of decisions typically made at the municipal level whereby the abstract commitment to protect the identity of the national minority are translated into specific policies that determine the character of local institutions and neighborhood life. In some countries, like Spain, decision making about cultural and religious accommodation is almost entirely devolved to the municipal level where national minorities have strong interests in controlling decision making and where, in some cases, non-citizens now have the right to vote. So even if strong guarantees to protect the national minority is in place in the nation’s constitution, the incentive is, nevertheless, great for national minorities to control local decision making in order to protect their identity.

Finally, a third concern, which significantly increases the risk for political tension between non-citizen voters and minority nationalists, is that non-citizens and recent immigrants are often perceived to be more strongly with the national majority rather than the national minority. This is true, surprisingly, even in places like Quebec, where, starting in 1968, immigration control, acculturation, and language services have devolved to the province (although not to other Canadian provinces) partly in order to address this bias of “belongingness” and partly to disable the federal government’s capacity to use immigration to dilute the “French fact” (and later the nationalist aspect) of Quebec. Despite this devolution of powers, recent immigrants are less likely to support pro-Quebec separatist parties (and referendums), are more likely to support policies that sustain the linguistic identity of national majorities, and are often more inclined to cast their votes in ways that strengthen the power of the dominant national group as opposed to the interests of the local national minority. This pattern exists elsewhere as well. Newcomers are, at best, ambivalent about the national minority project, and this fact can be exacerbated by the confusing signals they receive from national and regional governments, which often present different impressions of the country to them. In the case of Spain, for instance, one concern is that immigrants “do not know whether Spain is a unitary state, a federation or a state made of autonomous communities” in part because the national institutions of Spain do not provide them with this information, nor allow the autonomous regions the power to do so, and in part because all encounters migrants have with state authorities are in Spanish: “how can immigrants be integrated into Catalonia’s linguistic reality if the principle ‘references of authority’ (the administration of their legal documents, for example, or their workplace) are expressed in Spanish?” Similarly, in Brussels, where the complexity of power sharing amongst different national communities is legend, “immigrants may legitimately ask . . . to what society are we bound to integrate?”

Besides mixed signals, the prospects for social mobility and economic success help to explain why migrants are less likely to identify with national minority projects or vote in ways that sustain them. If immigrants migrate in order to pursue better economic opportunities, as most do, then they are less likely to support policies that are contrary to these interests (such as separatism in Quebec, Basque country, or Catalunya) and more likely to oppose measures aimed at securing a local minority’s language and cultural identity if these measures conflict with their ability to realize economically tangible interests, such as ensuring that they or their children have the language skills and opportunities to access wider job markets. For instance, unless Catalan is the primary language of the workplace, migrants have little incentive to learn it. And they may have even less incentive to vote in favor of expensive linguistic standardization policies that require expending large amounts of resources in order to immerse children into the culture and language of small linguistic communities (e.g., Wallonia, Galicia, Basque country, as well as Catalunya), where the chances of finding a good job are predictably restricted. Whereas national minorities are often willing to pay a high price to protect their identity through their own democratic institutions, and usually this cost is born in terms of higher regional taxes rates, such sacrifices are unlikely to be priorities for those who do not share the commitment to uphold the language and cultural identity of the minority community and who, in any case, may view (and often are encouraged to view) the larger nation-state as the demos to which they belong. These differences between the interests related to securing identity often manifest themselves in political struggles between national majorities and minorities where non-citizens and new citizens are pawns in the struggle.

So far, three factors have been identified that increase the risk of political conflict occurring over non-citizen voting rights in multinational states. First, national minorities and their communities are often both involved, albeit on unequal terms, in managing the status and integration of migrants, and they are often engaged in a struggle over the powers needed to do so effectively. Second, the impetus to extend voting rights to non-citizens can conflict with political struggles of national minorities to control decision making over matters important to their identity, and, in practice, this conflict is especially intense where pressures exist to extend the franchise to non-citizens over local matters, which are, as it turns out, matters that ground a sociologically sensitive ideal of citizenship and, at the same time, where laws and principles that protect minority identities are translated into policies that inform how public institutions work at the local level. And third, migrants are often viewed as belonging, in the first instance, to the broader national
community, not to the national minority, and have little incentive to support expensive policies aimed at protecting the language or culture of the national minority if this protection conflicts with their interests in economic or social mobility.

Together, these three concerns lead to what I will call the “Trojan horse problem.” The settlement of non-citizens in minority territory can, in two senses, act as a kind of Trojan horse that dilutes the political strength of minority nationalism. First, on the basis of their sheer numbers, non-citizens can dilute the power of a territorially concentrated national minority and destabilize a fragile balance of power between national minorities and majorities. This is especially a risk where the policy areas important to minority self-determination, which are typically the source of conflict between national minorities and the state, are also the areas directly relevant to immigrant interests and entitlements, e.g., educational policy, language laws, revenue sharing agreements, immigration, and labor policy. Second, dominant national groups can act opportunistically to keep the state united by using non-citizen settlement and naturalization processes to dilute the strength of regionally focused minority nationalist parties and political programs. Partly for this reason, immigration policy and naturalization is a contested area of jurisdiction in most multinational states and minority nationalists often suspect, not without grounds, that immigration policy is biased in favor of the national majority.

As the Trojan horse problem shows, non-citizen residents become pawns in these political struggles. From a non-citizen’s perspective, this is somewhat ironic given that, after all, the vulnerability of non-citizens is more likely owing to the fragility of their legal rights, specifically their lack of mobility rights, and thereby the risks they face of being deported or denied reentry, rather than whether they can participate in local elections. And yet, empowering non-citizens politically at the municipal level has stirred up the anxieties of national minorities and led, in many multinational states, to the growth of support for reactionary parties and policies that target the rights of non-citizen residents and pressure governments to further restrict and even discriminate against them. Whereas the AAPI has focused attention on the justness of including people in communities to which they are de facto members, it offers no guidance in such cases, where everyone has an interest in belonging to a secure, healthy, and prosperous community, but people disagree about which secure, healthy, and prosperous community they wish to belong to. This disagreement is central to the politics of multinational states where members of the minority are often willing to protect their national identity even if this means paying an economic price to do so. The risk for national minorities is that the more political power is held by voters who are not members of the minority nation, the more power is de facto held by the dominant national majority, which, by virtue of its majority, does not have to rely on controlling the political power of non-citizens in order to protect its language or culture. Under these circumstances, the AAPI facilitates the power of dominant national majorities because the inclusionary logic of the principle, though intended primarily to target the absolute sovereignty of states to control their borders and membership, directly places at risk the democratic capacities of national minorities to protect their cultural and linguistic identity in local institutions.

One way of resolving this problem is to liberalize access to citizenship and thereby offer non-citizens the chance to become citizens. This proposal might seem a viable way to decrease the vulnerable circumstances of non-citizens while addressing the anxieties of national minorities, as long as it allows national minorities to impose strong integration measures that effectively ensure the integration of non-citizens into the minority’s demos. But one problem with it is that, as the evidence suggests, the integration of non-citizens into the sometimes expensive identity-based projects of national minority communities is an elusive goal. A second problem is that measures that extend citizenship to long-term residents end up shifting rather than removing the problem as additional pressure is placed on the state to restrict who is admitted in the first place. If the chances are good that long-term residents will become citizens, then national minorities will use the powers they have (e.g., policing power, labor inspections, the recognition of NGOs, etc.) to exclude non-citizens before they become long-term residents. As Ryan Pevnick points out, where legal access to residency or jobs is blocked, migrants will negotiate their way in through a series of dangerous and unpredictable avenues. In the United States, for example, “it is estimated that 350 people die annually attempting to surreptitiously cross the US-Mexico border (the rate of deaths has reportedly tripled since the US Border Control stepped up enforcement in 1993).” So rather than resolving the problem, liberalizing access to citizenship only pushes the problem back onto would-be migrants and noncitizen short-term residents in ways that can severely increase their vulnerable status.

In my view, the all affected interests principle cannot provide helpful guidance in multinational contexts and any principled way of limiting it only seems to deepen the tensions described above. The complexity of actual circumstances reveals competing national communities, competing understandings of who constitutes the relevant demos, and competing basic interests and entitlements. Non-citizens are a third party in these disputes, and so the risk is great that they are more likely to become pawns within the larger game of multinational competition and may end up more rather than less vulnerable to discrimination and arbitrary treatment by being allowed to vote.

All affected interests and the political act of voting

Finally, it is worth briefly mentioning the connection usually made between the AAIP and the act of voting. The AAIP provides a justification for extending the franchise to those whose interests are affected by a law rather than merely guaranteeing to them, through constitutional provisions or consultative forums, that their interests will be considered and their rights will be protected. The connection between the AAIP and the act of voting is important in two ways. First, the principle is intended to provide a justification for the inclusion of those whose interests, not whose fundamental rights, are affected by state policy; and this is because we would expect that the fundamental rights of all people—citizens, non-citizens, travelers, illegal migrants, etc.—are universally protected by the state independently of which government is elected at any given time. Second, in contrast to fundamental rights, interests can reasonably diverge within a political community and which interests end up being championed by elected government is considered the appropriate subject of democratic contestation. So, the link between affected interests and voting makes sense as a means to ensure that all people have a political voice to express their interests in competitive electoral contexts. There are, of course, other ways to ensure that governments are attentive to interests. For example, many governments have in place consultative forums to which they invite groups and individuals to participate, or they commission reports that assess the various interests within a community for consideration by policy makers, to name two examples. None of these mechanisms require that those consulted are citizens. To the contrary, many non-governmental organizations aim at representing the voices of the unenfranchised or underrepresented—such as children
or women within minority communities—in order to ensure that policy makers are attentive to their interests.

For those who believe that voting ensures that people’s interests will be taken seriously by elected governments, all of these other means to express and amplify interests may appear to be second best. The question then is whether second best is sufficient to ensure the appropriate level of consideration for the interests of long-term residents who, for a variety of different reasons (none of which have been explored here) are not eligible for citizenship or have chosen not to apply for it. Whereas voting may be considered important for non-citizen residents because it gives currency to other means by which they can express political interests, such as protesting, campaigning, and letter writing, it cannot be considered unique in this respect. Voting remains an important way to express political voice, but the justification for extending the franchise to non-citizens is neither because the vote is meant to ensure their fundamental rights are protected (because fundamental rights ought to be protected anyways) nor because the only way in which people can express their shifting and reasonably divergent interests in democratic contexts is to vote, because other consultative and investigative means exists.

In real world contexts, voting is a political act that is part of a broader event in which, at least in democratic electoral contexts, parties and candidates compete with each other. And because of the politicized and competitive nature of elections, anti-immigrant parties and reactionary politicians have been able to use the status of non-citizens as voters to fan the flames of the group-based identity anxiety of national minorities. Of course, the unjustified reaction of right-wing parties is no reason to withhold rights from any individual or group. But the case for extending to non-citizens the vote in multinational contexts is weak in the first place due to the considerations discussed above. First, the voting rights of non-citizens who settle in minority territory can act as a kind of Trojan horse that dilutes the political strength of minority nationalism and strengthens support for the interests of dominant national majorities. This occurs, in part, because non-citizens and immigrants are given mixed messages from national majority and minority governments as to which community they are supposed to integrate into, in part because non-citizen voting rights apply at the local level where protections for minority language and culture are translated into policies that shape how local institutions operate, and in part because non-citizens do not have the same identity-based interests as national minorities and so are less likely to support the political and expensive educational projects of national minorities.

Without attending to these circumstances, the voting power of non-citizens, which is justified on the basis of AAIP, becomes an easy target of political strategy and political mischief. In electoral competitions, leaders within minority national communities have strong incentives to highlight if not inflate the burdens imposed on their linguistic and cultural security by immigrants and non-citizens especially where doing so strengthens arguments for withholding voting and other participatory rights from those who are not members of the national minority. Whereas there is no doubt that political efforts to withhold voting rights from non-citizens are sometimes motivated by racism and xenophobia, national minorities have independent reasons, grounded in their desire to protect their distinctive culture and language from the dominance of national majorities, to retain control over decision making at a local level. Proposals to expand the franchise to non-citizens that don’t take into account the competitive context in which voting exists and the competitive struggles between national minorities and majorities may well intensify the attractiveness of reactionary politics within nationalist minority communities. In these contexts, non-citizens may indeed have a strong democratic claim to have their voices heard in the community where they have become de facto members, and politics may be obligated to protect their rights and be attentive to and responsive to their interests. But having one’s voice heard or one’s interests considered is not always the same as having the vote.

**Conclusion**

Here I have argued that extending voting rights to non-citizens may do little to improve the vulnerable circumstances of non-citizens and, in some circumstances, will deepen their vulnerable status. The moral arguments for extending voting rights to non-citizens are, in one sense, inevitably linked to context, and in most places in the world, communities are engaged in active, on-going, and agonistic disputes over which community citizens de facto belong to and to which they ought to give priority. The arguments for non-citizen voting rights cannot be theorized in a way that holds these factors in abeyance and instead uses the culturally secure and nationally homogeneous state as the implicit backdrop against which the participatory rights of non-citizens are then considered. Voting rights for non-citizens may erode the democratic self-determination of vulnerable national minorities, with or without the political manipulation sometimes found in struggles between national minorities and majorities. In these contexts, the AAIP is the ally of national majorities.

The AAIP needs to be interpreted in a way that is sensitive to how voting works in real political settings where, sometimes, simply extending the franchise to non-citizens will not advance the abstract democratic ideal expressed by the principle. In some circumstances, fidelity to the principle of “all affected interests” will require that all those affected by state power have a claim on the state for attentiveness or responsiveness to their interests, especially but not only where basic human rights are at issue. But they may not have a claim on the right to vote.

**Notes**

4. Lenard and Munro, “Extending the Franchise.”
5. For example, Brussels is estimated to have 30 percent foreign residence; several municipalities in New York, Florida, and California have more than 40 percent non-citizen residents.
6. Belgium and Spain offer good examples of the issues of interest here, but other more complex examples also come to mind. For instance, proposals for non-citizen voting rights have been made in Toronto and Vancouver, but to my knowledge no one has assessed the impact that a decision to extend voting rights to non-citizens in these two English Canadian cities would have on Montreal, where the issue is likely to be more contentious for reasons explored here, and on the relations between English and French Canada.
8. See Eisenberg and Kymlicka, “Bringing Institutions Back In.”
11. According to Article 81, “[e]very citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national shall have
the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections in the Member State in which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State."


14. See Zapata-Barrero and Gropas, Active Immigrants," 172. According to Jacobs ("Debate Over Enfranchisement") the Belgian government secretly sought an exemption clause from the EU regulation that allowed it temporarily to reserve the right to vote to nationals in municipalities with more than 20 percent non-Belgium EU voters.


18. See Zapata-Barrero, "Managing Diversity."

19. Ibid., 388.


22. Tremlett, "Spanish Party Website."


24. Pozuelo, "Unemployed Immigrants." Such proposals were part of the campaign platform of the Convergencia i Unio Party in 2006 and the Partido Popular in 2008. Similar contracts have been proposed and/or adopted in other European countries. Groenendijk ("Legal Integration") discusses the increase in restriction on immigrants and non-citizen residents in Europe from the late 1990s, when the Maastricht provisions came into effect, until 2004.

25. Garriga, "Los Partidos Catalanes."


27. See especially Bauböck, "Stakeholder Citizenship," and Song, "Democratic and Noncitizen Voting Rights."

28. Goodin, "Enfranchising All Affected Interests," 53–55. As I understand him, Goodin proposes this more expansive version while recognizing that it would, at least in principle, "give virtually everyone a vote on virtually everything virtually everywhere in the world" (64) because he thinks that it exerts the right kind of democratic pressure on polities and will require that polities compensate those whose interests have been affected through decision-making processes from which they are excluded. I take up the issue of compensation below in note 48.

29. Shapiro, Democratic Justice, 37.


31. See Estévez, "Human Rights."

32. There are many more examples of voteless neighborhoods throughout the world. For instance, Song reports that California has eighty-five municipalities where non-citizens make up over 25 percent of the adult population, and twelve municipalities where non-citizens make up more than 50 percent of the adult population ("Democratic and Noncitizen Voting Rights," 608). See Siemiatycki, "Invisible City," and Lenard and Munro, "Extending the Franchise," for a discussion of voteless neighborhoods in Toronto. To my knowledge, the term "voteless neighborhoods" was originally coined by Siemiatycki.

33. See Lenard’s chapter in this volume for an argument that favors extending the franchise to non-citizens in national rather than local elections because policies that are especially important to the interests of non-citizens, e.g., immigration status and mobility rights, are developed at the national level. I agree that many national policies are important to the interests of immigrants, but so are many local policies. Two additional considerations that highlight the importance of the local are, first, the argument for social citizenship, which is strongest at the local, not national, level and offers one (albeit not the only) justification for including non-citizens in the franchise, and second, the likelihood that electors can have an impact on policy relevant to their interests. This likelihood is greatest at the local level, where policies are typically designed to reflect the distinctive interests of neighbourhoods and regions, rather than broader national interests, as is the case with policies about borders control, security, and citizenship status.

34. See Carens, "On Belonging."

35. There are other reasons as well, in particular, the ascendance of transnational and supranational organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the European Union, etc., with real decision-making power.


37. Zapata-Barrero, "Building a Public Philosophy."

38. For example, in the case of Quebec, see Labelle and Rocher, "Immigration, Integration and Citizenship Policies," and Gagnon, "Immigration in a Multinational Context."

39. For example, see Castiñeira, "Immigration in Multinational States," 173; Pero, "Migrants"; and Zapata-Barrero, "Building a Public Philosophy," 154.


41. Castiñeira, "Immigration in Multinational States," 166.

42. Zapata-Barrero, "Building a Public Philosophy," 152.

43. Bousseta, Multinational Federalism," 97; and in the case of Quebec, see Banting and Soroka, "Minority Nationalism," 161.

44. The importance of social mobility and incentive structures for immigrant integration is discussed by Kymlicka in Politics in the Vernacular, chapter 15.


46. Evidence in Canada of the salience of this anxiety about whether immigrants identify with national minority or majority communities is the many studies devoted to the subject. Most recently, see Banting and Soroka, "Minority Nationalism," who measure the effects of competitive nation-building on immigrants’ sense of belonging in Canada/Quebec and conclude that immigrants in Quebec have a weaker sense of belonging to Quebec than other immigrants in Canada, especially if they are racial minorities. But immigrants to Quebec also have a weaker sense of belonging to Canada, which according to Banting and Soroka suggests that, faced with competing national projects, Quebec’s immigrants withdraw and remain less attached to both communities.

47. Pevnick, "Social Trust," 160.

48. Two additional approaches are worth mentioning. First, the AAIP principle may be qualified to limit non-citizen voting rights when they jeopardize the capacity of a national minority to sustain its societal culture. But, as the discussion above shows, this qualification is notoriously difficult to gauge both because minorities and majorities often disagree about what jeopardizes the capacity of a national minority to sustain its societal culture (e.g., do national minorities need jurisdiction over linguistic policy, religious freedom, labor rights, immigration policy, or, for that matter, voting rights in order to offer their members a sufficiently robust set of options and protections for their identity?) and because the kinds of rules and regulations whereby cultural and linguistic security are translated in the practices of local institutions are many and varied. A second option is to exclude noncitizens from the franchise and compensate them when their interests are nevertheless affected. Robert Goodin’s influential argument (2007) shows that the inclusionary logic of the AAIP requires that states compensate those whose interests are affected by decision making but who are excluded from the vote. But, as the cases I have sketched above make clear, this possibility only exacerbates the opportunity for political mischief by the national majority, which, with the help of the AAIP, either imposes on national minorities risks to their identity or saddles them with the costs of compensating non-citizens who are affected by local decision making but excluded from the vote.
49. See Lenard and Munro, “Extending the Franchise.” Also see Lenard, this volume, for an argument that links the right to vote to the political self-determination of people and to guaranteeing the equality of political voice.

Bibliography

Critically Theorizing Folk Uses of Ethnoracial Terms: Wiggas, White Chocolate, and Afro-Latinicity
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Charles Mills, in his critique of Angelo Corlett’s Race, Racism, and Reparations, presents what he understands as an obvious counterexample to Corlett’s genealogical view of ethnic identity.
defined solely in terms of biological ancestry: “children adopted at an early age by parents from another ethnic group and raised in their culture—say, Asian kids adopted as babies by white US families and raised to assimilate to Anglo culture, with no attempt made to inculcate any knowledge of their original cultural heritage.” Mills goes on to say, “Wouldn’t we regard such children as ethnically Anglo even if their birth parents were Korean?” Taking the child as ethnically Anglo is counter-intuitive for Corlett. He states that it is “as counterintuitive as it would be to argue that I am an African American to the extent that I was raised around African Americans, yet having no genealogical ties to them.” Mills, on the other hand, has different intuitions. He responds to Corlett by saying, “I would reply that he [Corlett] would then be ethnically African-American, but not racially black, an indication precisely of the differential rules for determining these two identities.” Mills goes on to make the following point: “I would claim that—anticipating my later discussion—race is dependent on one’s genealogy (so the above child would be racially Asian), but ethnicity isn’t, and that his conflation of ethnicity and race obfuscates crucial differences.”

Is it true that Corlett is ethnically African American, even if Corlett himself denied it? What could it mean for it to be true that he is ethnically African American? It is an interesting example of what often happens when our embodied selves encounter others in our life world and there are slippages between self/other identifications. I cite the example Mills presents and his take about Corlett’s identity not only to bring out their conflicting intuitions about one and the same thing but also as evidence that an individual can be interpellated as ethnically African American even though that individual’s visible body may not look or have ancestral ties to people that are typically labeled “black” by US standards. What is interesting about Mills’ way of identifying Corlett is it almost seems to be an ethnorracial identification. I say “almost” because while Mills identifies Corlett ethnically he does not attribute a positive racial identification to him—he goes by way of negation and racially identifies Corlett as non-black. By implication non-black for Mills could include identifying Corlett as brown, yellow, red, white or by any other of the racial categories contemporary people use because of our inheritance of this vocabulary with roots in European modernity. Whichever way Mills may racially identify Corlett is not that important for this discussion, even though given Corlett’s light skin and aqualine nose I think Mills might racially identify him as white according to US standards. What is key is that the way Mills identifies Corlett involves both an acknowledgement of his visible body and that being raised around African Americans is tied to ethnicity. I want to take seriously Mills’ points that there are differential rules for determining racial and ethnic identity and that the differences are crucial. To this end I use Linda Alcoff’s and Ofelia Schutte’s conceptual tools in order to critically theorize about similar Mills-type folk uses ethnoracial terms and explore some implications for addressing the question about Corlett’s identity. While the ethnoracial interpellation expressed in Mills’ exchange with Corlett might seem somewhat contrived, since it occurs in a theoretical context, there are occurrences in daily life that echo the interpellation expressed by Mills.

One move that a philosopher could make to provide evidence of the use of some term would be to appeal to what “we” commonly say to each other. When philosophers appeal to ordinary language, in order to preserve the intention of the use of some term, in many cases the term that is consistent with some ordinary use often reflects the way a specific racial or sexual group of a specific socio-economic class talks. The universality explicit in these linguistic appeals to a generalized “we” can be parochial when they are not fully representative of the linguistic plurality in the United States, and they evade the way other marginalized folk speak in different places. Thus, I turn to the way some people that are on the periphery in the United States speak to each other, because this might be a place where we can learn something about the way racial and ethnic labels circulate from the top-down and bottom-up and can be used in ways that echo Mills’ use.

Take, for instance, the evolution of the expression “White Chocolate” as used in the sentence, “Jason Williams is White Chocolate.” The term was first coined in 1999 by Stephanie Shepard, the black media relations assistant for the NBA basketball team the Sacramento Kings. She gave him this nickname “because of his style. He has flash and pizzazz. The way he does things with the ball is incredible to me. It reminds me of, like, schoolyard street ball when I go to Chicago.” When first approached by Shepard with the nickname, “Jason Williams laughed. He is white. His game had been called sweet. Why not? he figured. Williams has white skin, blond hair, and blue eyes, but his use of braggadocio and style of playing basketball is associated with black inner city playgrounds. This contrasts with Larry Bird who has white skin, blond hair, and blue eyes, but whose style of play expresses simplicity and modesty. “The Kings’ organization, made uncomfortable by the nickname’s highlighting that a white player has what is perceived as a black game, has discouraged it. And Williams’ agent prays for it to fade away altogether.” However, “many black youngsters who turn up to see Williams play say he is the coolest white player they have ever seen, and they view White Chocolate as evidence of Williams’ embrace of, and acceptance in, the hip-hop culture.” Williams’ whiteness is flagged by the “White” in “White Chocolate” but the “Chocolate” seems to be working in a way that is more than just sweetness.

The term “White Chocolate” has evolved in such a way that the nickname now functions as a way of describing a kind of person. To get a sense of the meaning of a word, appealing to the authority of a dictionary can be a good starting place but not always. We defer to a dictionary because it is intended to be a catalogue of people’s use of terms. However, an obstacle can present itself because there are many words that are not in dictionaries. The limitation of “authoritative, standard” dictionaries is that they preserve the intention of some people’s use of terms but not minorities. Thus, if one were to look for the term “white chocolate,” one will be hard pressed to find an entry in the Oxford, Cambridge, or Merriam-Webster dictionaries that defines it in a way I am speaking of. Rather, entries would be found in marginalized dictionaries, such as the *Urban Dictionary*—which recognizes Ebonics as a language—and where the term “white chocolate” is defined as “a caucasian that embraces and is assimilated into black culture.” This notion is opposed to a “wigger” who “embraces the culture but does not gain acceptance by the community.” The entry goes on to give examples as any standard English dictionary would, with the exception that the examples are more localized in an inter-textual sense—allusions are made to persons and symbols that presuppose a certain reader familiar with a background in hip hop culture. In the entry it states: “Eminem is white chocolate and Vanilla Ice is a wigger.”

The category white chocolate is a significant contribution to understanding identity that emerges from the post-civil rights period of which hip hop is an integral part. It is a rupture from the tradition of earlier pejorative ethnoracial terms: “Oreo” (applied to blacks in the United States and signifying that one is racially black on the outside and ethnically white on the inside); “Coconuts” (applied to Latinos in the United States and signifying that one is racially brown on the outside and ethnically white on the inside); and “Twinkies” (applied
to Asians in the United States and signifying that one is racially yellow on the outside and ethnically white on the inside. It also seems to be discontinuous with these pejorative terms in that there seems to be some sort of inversion of the inside/outside binary such that a chocolate subjectivity/white exteriority is opposed to a white interiority/black exteriority. But we need to be careful about interpreting the older and more recent ethnorracial terms as inversions because part of the discontinuity has to do with a semi-color inversion where interiority shifts from white to something dark—I say “semi-color” because chocolate is a color and food. There are two more complicated ruptures; one has to do with understandings of the cultural and the other has to do with a limited notion of interiority.

The first pertains to different ways the category of culture operates— with the pejoratives culture is taken as a whole while with the non-pejoratives culture is taken as parts. Ofelia Schutte offers a helpful elaboration on this score when she distinguishes bicultural and hybrid identities. The former takes cultures as essentialized wholes that assume an either/or logic (I am Mexican or American, etc.), a mentality which strongly attaches culture to geographic regions, and carries with it misleading talk of “exiting one’s culture.” Hybrid identities allow for more flexibility by thinking of cultural parts that may be geographically scattered and which, the objective is to no longer master one, two, or more cultures as wholes, or totalities, that one must integrate or else juxtapose to each other in a neat, symmetrical fashion. The model is no longer to become a specimen of a cultural kind, which is conceived as an integral whole, but rather to “shop around” and become individuated by selecting from various aspects of cultural practices and options we can participate in.

The bicultural approach seems to map onto the older pejorative terms whereas the hybridity approach seems to map onto the more recent non-pejorative terms. For example, Eminem, Jason Williams, and others like them are interpellated by some—primarily black and Latino urban youth in the United States—as white chocolate while others are not. What is chocolate about them?

Compare the cases of Robert Van Winkle (aka Vanilla Ice) and Michael Mathers (aka Eminem). Both have white parents, light skin, blond hair, blue eyes, thin lips, and aquiline noses. Both participate in what are perceived to be black culture forms by virtue of the fact that they both rap, which is a part of hip hop culture. But is hip hop simply a black thing?

Before it became commercialized and mass mediated throughout the United States, rap was called “MCing” in the early 1970s in New York City. An MC referred to the Master of Ceremony—a person who rhymed and talked in order to provide an entertainment complement to the DJ (Disc Jockey) that was DJing—playing and mixing records. The MC rapped in localized, community-based spaces such as house parties, park jams, and neighborhood rhyme “cyphers.” Some early pioneers in rap were: Kool Herc, a Jamaican; Melle Mel, an African American; and Ruby Dee and Prince Whipper Whip, Puerto Ricans who were members of the Fantastic Five MC’s. Rap was a form of oral expression that was a product of the cultural interaction among African Americans, Puerto Ricans, and other Caribbean folks in the South Bronx. The rap that emerged around the late 1970s was influenced by African American rituals of toasting, boasting, and playing the dozens, Trinidadian calypso, and Puerto Rican plena and aguinaldos. Because of this history, it is inaccurate to think hip hop is simply a black phenomenon. It is more accurate to say, historically, it is partly an Afro-Latino phenomenon. To identify hip hop in this fashion does not limit its origins artificially. It provides us with a historical frame of reference by which we can begin to identify the emergence of a cultural trait shaped by historical intersections—a time before it emerged in a specific place, a time when it was being constituted in a specific place, and a time after it was created in a specific place and spread to different places. Thus, cultural parts that we can shop around for and take up often have hybrid roots. Also rap in its origins were listened to primarily by blacks and Latinos, then came a phase when it was marketed to white consumers and eventually became a global phenomenon taken up in different geo-historical locations.

Vanilla Ice was popular among some white upper-middle class people in some parts of the United States in 1989. Eminem was popular among these audiences as well and is highly respected by many poor black, Latino urban youths, and pioneering rappers in America. Vanilla Ice explains his success as a musician by referring to his close ties to poor, black neighborhoods, saying he grew up in the ghetto, comes from a broken home, hung out mainly with blacks, was nearly killed in a gang fight, and publicly sports his battle scars from the inner city. Yet, he lies about his past in order to try and gain street credibility in a music industry in which ghettocentrism is marketable. Thus, after reporters researched his background by tracking the house where he grew up and gathering personal testimonies, it was discovered he had been exaggerating the nature of his upbringing. He did not really have the “existential connections” to the black community that he had claimed to have.

Given his inauthentic claims, this would partly explain why some minorities would not identify him as white chocolate; some of the following internal and external aspects of his alleged chocolate ties do not cohere: (a) being raised around black cultural forms which he then (b) internalizes over a long period of time so that (c) these black cultural forms become part of his lived subjectivity which he then (d) goes on to embody in public spaces which in turn (e) trigger identifications by others situated in differential positions of power and with all the entangled aspects to their social identity. When experiential elements such as those in (a)–(e) do not cohere others will not attach the chocolate moniker to his visible racially white corporeality. When there is coherence then the chocolate is linked to whiteness as in the case of Eminem who is highly skilled in rap and is knowledgeable about the history of hip hop culture and its nuances. Eminem seems to be a good illustration of someone who has “shopped around” for cultural parts that were immediately available to him, but it was not such a quick matter of appropriation like buying a pair of shoes; internalization is often a long process involving a lot of practice and hard work. Also the way he appropriated the black cultural forms was not a kind of formalized economic transaction where he learned to rap by taking a class; it was part of his surroundings. Thus over time he was able to form a relatively coherent web of “organic” links to these cultural parts. What is interesting about these cases is that coherence is not a relation simply between beliefs but a plurality of elements: discourses, practices, documents, testimonies, and a whole host of other phenomena in our lived experience.

Consider the example of the salsa legend Larry Harlow who is identified by Puerto Ricans in New York City as el Judio Maravilloso (The Marvelous Jew). He is a white looking salsa musician with Jewish parents, no Latino ancestral ties, and his name given at birth was Lawrence Ira Kahn. He created the famous opera “Hommmy” that was the first Latin musical performed in Carnegie Hall that brought Celia Cruz out of
and his choices of how to compose, write, and perform all of the salsa songs he has played over the years (internal).

While these examples indicate that some people in some places are ethnoracially interpellated in a way that runs counter to the tradition of pejorative uses of ethnoracial terms in the United States, it remains an open empirical question how pervasive these kinds of non-pejorative ethnoracial practices of identification are and/or can be in different spaces. These habits of perception are not clear instances of ethnicity trumping race since the racialized body is not totally dislodged but still acknowledged, or better yet, as Alcoff notes, “ethnic identities operate alongside racial ones in everyday interactions, without in any way dislodging the racial identities.” But in these cases the racial properties on the visible body have less salience than ethnic behavior. This feature of the way these non-pejorative ethnoracial identities operate is significant because part of the aim of giving a theory of identity is not to simply describe the realities of how the entangled aspects of these social identities operate—to get at the truth—but also to determine if there can be ways of construing how in the future we should think about identities; how a certain take on identity might be an effective means of reducing racism or other ethico-political considerations. There is some liberatory potential for thinking about nonpejorative ethnoracial practices of identification because they focus more on a person’s agency as opposed to racial features the interpellated has in general less control over—skin color, lip thickness, nose shape, eye color, hair texture—racial cosmetics aside; skin bleaching, lip surgery, rhinoplasty, color contacts, and straighteners. While this non-pejorative way of thinking of ethnoracial identities de-links the congealed common sense that has accumulated over time that connects racial bodies and ethnic behavior, it is not the most effective means to reducing racism. This is because there are multiple axes of racism or, as Alcoff notes, racisms that target different axes—color, features-other-than-color, cultural origins, etc. At best, and at this time, it seems these kinds of nonpejorative ethnoracial identities chip away at the color axis. Having noted this, embodying ethnic traits is not a quick simple matter that one is born with, like having a certain skin tone, it is often a long process that involves a lot of practice, internalizing certain cultural forms over time, embodying them in public, having those embodiments contested by heterogeneous interpellators, responding to these interpellations—throwing back these calls from others in the world—and then gaining acceptance from some but not others.

Given the fundamentally relational, contextual, and historical dimensions to how ethnoracial identities operate we can return to the initial question of whether Mills is correct in identifying Corlett as ethnically African American. Is it true that Corlett is ethnically African but racially non-black? Mills and others might hesitate to identify Corlett as white chocolate in public partly because of a generational difference and the newness of an expression and the histories that expressing invoke. Or he might identify him in this way or feel more comfortable with identifying him as not racially black but ethnically African American. The point is sometimes even if two seemingly different social categories function in a very similar way people may continue to use the expression they are comfortable with because understanding how the category operates is sometimes not enough to make us change our use; the histories that certain expressions invoke, these meanings also determine our use. Whether Corlett is called “not racially black but ethnically African American” or “white chocolate” there is, without essentializing locations and thinking of horizons as open and fluid, an embodied African American ethnic subjectivity resulting from his being raised in an environment where black cultural forms were available to him. These
phenomena are what these categories try to track, but they are not the only considerations; ethical and political factors play a role in shaping relevance.

Notes
2. Ibid., 548.
4. Ibid., 545.
5. Ibid., 548. The same obfuscation problem of race and ethnicity directed against Corlett’s view of ethnicity can be extended to Jorge J.E. Gracia’s familial-historical view of ethnicity. See Surviving Race, Ethnicity and Nationality in the Twenty First Century (Malden, MA: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 49.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. I use the notion of minority not in the numeric sense but as one signifying the power relations groups of people occupy in a society.
12. The status of Ebonics has changed over time and continues to undergo a gradual process of legitimization. It was first called “Broken English” because it did not conform to the grammatical and syntactical structures of “correct English.” Later it was called “Black English Vernacular.” Now it has a scientific ring to it: “Ebonics.” This term was first introduced in 1973 by psychologist Robert Williams. This coinage blends the terms “ebony” and “phonics.” Robert Williams, Ebonics: The True Language of Black Folks (St. Louis, MO: Institute of Black Studies, 1975).
15. Ibid.
16. The term “black” is used here in an ethnic sense to refer to the cultural practices that are part of the African diaspora. This is opposed to the use of “Black” that refers to the cultural practices of African Americans. Racial labels are typically used to pick out skin color, ancestry, or some biological feature, but this label and others like it do not have to be used this way. People use racial labels ethnically too.
18. Cyphers are spontaneous and informal gatherings where participants arrange themselves in a loose circle to rhyme and dance and where improvisational skills have a primary role. See Tony Bones, Queen Heroine, and M.R.V. “The Cypher: Add Water and Stir,” Stress, issue 10 (December 1997): 44.
19. Tricia Rose discusses this case in her classic text, which was the first book-length study on hip hop, Black Noise: Rap Music and Black Culture in Contemporary America (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press, 1994), 11.
20. Corlett uses the notion of existential connections to capture the idea of experiential ties between persons. He contrasts existential connections with ancestral connections, which are more a matter of biological fact. Corlett, Race, Racism, and Reparations, 12.
23. Ibid., 246.
24. The term “Chinese Cuban” is used in Havana in such a way that has resonances with Mills identification of Corlett’s and Alcoff’s notion of an ethnoral identity. In 1847 a wave of Chinese immigrants came to Cuba when Cantonese contract workers were brought to work in the sugar fields to replace and/or work alongside African slaves. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese workers were brought in from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan during the 1850s to work in the sugar fields. After completing eight-year contracts or obtaining freedom, some of these immigrants of Chinese ancestry settled in Havana, although most of them longed for repatriation to their homeland. Most of them speak Spanish, dance cha-cha-cha, are knowledgeable of Cuban history, and some fought in the 1898 Spanish-American War to liberate Cuba from Spanish rule.

I cite this evidence because when some people in Cuba use the label “Chinese” in “Chinese Cuban” it picks out the visible, corporeal racial characteristics of these individuals and the “Cuban” component in the label seems to flag something more than just a nationality designation. When Fidel Castro overthrew Batista in 1959 many of these Chinese Cubans had established grocery stores, property, and shops that were taken over by the government. Many of them dispersed to parts of Latin America, some to the Dominican Republic and some to Puerto Rico and New York City. As a way of picking out the ethnic when these individuals settled in Puerto Rico they were called “Puerto Rican-Cubans of Chinese descent”; the ethnic strand picked out by the “Cuban” moniker in the whole label; the nationality and racial strands picked out by the “Puerto Rican” and “Chinese” labels respectively. The ethnic element in these combined racial-ethno-national labels reverberate with Mills’ ethnic interpellation and Alcoff’s ethnorace, albeit in a slightly more complex way by identifying three intersecting aspects of one’s social identity under one moniker. These individuals, some of whom live in el barrio chino in Havana, are discussed in Armand Chei and Martin Koppel’s Our History is Still Being Written: The Story of Three Chinese-Cuban Generals in the Cuban Revolution (Atlanta, GA: Pathfinder Press, 2006).
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