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Teaching Feminist Philosophy as Doing Feminist Philosophy

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Many of us spend a good deal of our time teaching. We teach courses specifically in feminist philosophy, but also include feminist content and teaching practices in courses that are not explicitly feminist. Students learn feminist philosophy as much from how we teach as what we teach.

The theme of this issue is doing feminist philosophy in teaching feminist philosophy—in particular, in undergraduate teaching. This is especially important for addressing the dearth of women in philosophy, since, as has been established, there is a fall-off of students from undergraduate courses to undergraduate majors. Three of the articles included herein address the newsletter’s theme directly.

In “Navigating Epistemic Push Back in Feminist and Critical Race Philosophy Classes,” Alison Bailey writes that many of the courses that feminist philosophers teach pose classroom difficulties not encountered in teaching non-feminist philosophy courses. This is because they “implicate the self in . . . deeply emotional ways.” In particular, in discussions of material that bears on their sense of self in troubling ways, students “hold their ground.” Holding their ground can come in the form of refusal to admit that gender or race disparity exist, or the use of philosophical concepts to displace the focus of the class. Bailey offers a strategy for dealing with this tendency, one from which others can benefit. She recommends “treating epistemic pushback as a ‘shadow’ text” and encourages “students to collectively navigate these texts alongside the assigned readings.” Bailey’s article shows remarkable understanding of and reflection on undergraduate teaching from a feminist and critical race theory perspective, and applies feminist principles and values to teachings. In particular, she engages with concepts of epistemic resistance and epistemologies of ignorance.

Crista Lebens’s essay, “Uses of Multimedia Representations in Undergraduate Feminist Philosophy Courses,” describes how she developed multimedia resources for teaching feminist philosophy in collaboration with undergraduate students. Both the “[digital] learning objects” (LOs or DLOs) and the process of creating them incorporate feminist principles and values, especially ideas drawn from Lugones. Lebens shares a link to the products of this collaboration in the essay. Both the LOs and the description of the process of creating them are useful to all of us in our feminist teaching and mentoring.

In “Academic Pressures and Feminist Solutions: Teaching Ethics against the Grain,” Kate Parsons addresses the increasing emphasis on “market-based skills” as the aim of higher education, along with the way in which ethics in the undergraduate curriculum has traditionally been justified. She finds that both rationales tend to draw attention away from the needs of underrepresented and oppressed groups, a distinctly unfeminist tendency. Parsons suggests a feminist pedagogical “shift” to accommodate the “neutrality” that the emphasis on market-based skills and traditional justifications for philosophy in undergraduate education seem to require, while still focusing on the needs of oppressed and underrepresented groups, which feminist philosophy requires. This shift seems small but requires a complete rethinking of the ethics syllabus. Parsons’s effort to work through the competing demands on undergraduate philosophy teaching results in a practical and helpful way of rethinking one’s role as a teacher of philosophy.

The two other essays in this issue address “doing feminist philosophy” in relation to other, non-classroom contexts of life.

Sally Scholz’s “State of the Union: The APA Board of Officers” provides an explanation of the structure of the APA, with special focus on the history of the gender demographics of the APA board of officers. As she claims, the history of the APA helps to explain what many see as its failings. However, Scholz provides plenty of evidence that the APA is changing, and can be an instrument for change. Finally, she suggests what we should be doing to ensure that philosophy as a discipline becomes what we want it to become.

Jane Duran’s essay, “Mary Wollstonecraft and the Voice of Passion,” seeks to reconcile the two faces of Wollstonecraft, as exemplified by her claim that women have reason, and the passion in her life and writing. As Duran points out, these two are not incompatible, and she argues that Wollstonecraft addresses the unity of reason and passion in the life of a woman. This can be seen by taking her work as a whole, paying attention to her fiction, and her
writings on religion and metaphysics. Duran particularly emphasizes Wollstonecraft’s awareness that the ability of a person to unify reason and passion depends in part on the structure of the society in which she finds herself, and in her own situation within that society. This is a thought-provoking essay, especially for those of us who include Wollstonecraft’s works in our courses or scholarship.

ABOUT THE NEWSLETTER ON FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY

The Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy is sponsored by the APA committee on the status of women (CSW). The newsletter is designed to provide an introduction to recent philosophical work that addresses issues of gender. None of the varied philosophical views presented by authors of newsletter articles necessarily reflect the views of any or all of the members of the committee on the status of women, including the editor(s) of the newsletter, nor does the committee advocate any particular type of feminist philosophy. We advocate only that serious philosophical attention be given to issues of gender and that claims of gender bias in philosophy receive full and fair consideration.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES AND INFORMATION

1. Purpose: The purpose of the newsletter is to publish information about the status of women in philosophy and to make the resources of feminist philosophy more widely available. The newsletter contains discussions of recent developments in feminist philosophy and related work in other disciplines, literature overviews and book reviews, suggestions for eliminating gender bias in the traditional philosophy curriculum, and reflections on feminist pedagogy. It also informs the profession about the work of the APA committee on the status of women. Articles submitted to the newsletter should be limited to approximately ten double-spaced pages and must follow the APA guidelines for gender-neutral language. Please submit essays electronically to the editor. All manuscripts should be prepared for anonymous review. References should follow The Chicago Manual of Style.

2. Book reviews and reviewers: If you have published a book that is appropriate for review in the newsletter, please have your publisher send us a copy of your book. We are always seeking new book reviewers. To volunteer to review books (or some particular book), please send the editor a CV and letter of interest, including mention of your areas of research and teaching.

3. Where to send things: Please send all articles, comments, suggestions, books, and other communications to the editor, Dr. Margaret Crouch, at mcrouch@emich.edu.

4. Submission deadlines: Submissions for spring issues are due by the preceding November 1; submissions for fall issues are due by the preceding April.

NEWS FROM THE COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN

DIVERSITY CONFERENCE

The next Diversity Conference will be held May 28 to May 30, 2015, at Villanova University, in conjunction with the Hypatia conference. The call for proposals can be found at http://www1.villanova.edu/villanova/artsci/hypatiaconference/ and the deadline for submissions is January 15. Additional features of the conference include professional workshops on publishing feminist philosophy, a workshop on sexual harassment and bystander training, the APA Diversity Summit (May 29), and the APA/CSW site visit training workshop (May 31). Modest travel grants are available for presenters who could not otherwise attend. Many thanks to those of you who gave so generously to make the conference and training programs possible.

SITE VISIT PROGRAM

Three site visits were conducted in the 2013-2014 academic year and three more are scheduled for the fall of 2014. Most visits were or will be to philosophy departments with Ph.D. programs, and one is at a small liberal arts college with no graduate programs.

CSW WEBSITE

The CSW website (http://www.apaonlinecsw.org/) continues to feature bimonthly profiles of women philosophers. Links to excellent resources include one to a database on teaching with articles and readings, another to the crowdsourced directory of women philosophers, and one to the APA ombudsperson for nondiscrimination, who will receive complaints of discrimination and, where possible, serve as a resource to APA members regarding such complaints.

TASK FORCE ON INCLUSIVENESS

The APA executive committee has formed a new task force on inclusiveness to provide top-down help for diversity initiatives. Chaired by Elizabeth Anderson, its members are Lawrence Blum, Susanna Nuccitelli, Ronald Sundstrom, Kenneth Taylor, Robin Zhang, and Peggy DesAutels. Anyone who has recommendations concerning the status of women should give them to Peggy DesAutels, who will pass them on. The task force is expected to issue a report by November 2014.

CSW SESSIONS AT APA MEETINGS

The CSW-sponsored sessions at the three APA meetings held in 2013-2014 were well attended and well received. Eastern Division: Men Behaving Splendidly—Why and How to Organize a Gender-Balanced Conference

Chair: Kathryn Norlock (Trent University)
Speakers: Kathryn Norlock (Trent University)
John Protevi (Louisiana State University)
Matthew Smith (University of Leeds)
Jason Stanley (Yale University)

**Central Division: Attracting Women Philosophy Majors**

Speakers: Morgan Thompson (University of Pittsburgh)
Toni Adelberg (University of California–San Diego)
Najah Magliore (Colby College)

**Pacific Division: APA/CSW Site Visit Program**

Speakers: Peggy DesAutels (University of Dayton)
Carla Fehr (University of Waterloo)
Joseph Rouse (Wesleyan University)

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**ARTICLES**

### Navigating Epistemic Pushback in Feminist and Critical Race Philosophy Classes

**Alison Bailey**

**ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY**

Racism is especially rampant in places and people that produce knowledge.

- Gloria Anzaldúa

There are days when I envy my colleagues who teach a standard western philosophy curriculum. Students do not show up to their office hours in tears because they have realized the shortcomings of substance dualism. And I’m fairly certain that they never think about how to manage the class if the Gettier problem triggers discomfort and anger. When an audible episode of student resistance occurs in their classrooms, it is usually about grading practices, workload, a comment made in class, or a general frustration with the opacity of the readings or lectures. With the possible exception of discussions about God’s existence, most traditional puzzles do not implicate the self in the deeply emotional ways that courses in feminist and critical race philosophy do. It is no wonder students respond by holding their ground.

I want to work with, not against, this ground-holding reflex by offering a strategy for navigating it productively. My focus is on undergraduate feminist and critical race philosophy classes that have a strong applied intersectional content. I use four examples of the resistance I have in mind as a point of departure. I suggest that these ground-holding responses cannot be reduced to a healthy skepticism. In addition, I argue that both critical thinking and “safe spaces” pedagogies are not entirely an effective way to navigate resistance. The pushback in these classrooms is very specific and our pedagogies should reflect that. I recommend treating epistemic pushback as a “shadow” text and encourage students to collectively navigate these texts alongside the assigned readings. I conclude with a concrete suggestion for helping students to become mindful of the ways cognitive-affective classroom dynamics influence how we navigate the course content.

**DOES THIS HAPPEN WHEN YOU TEACH?**

DeEndré walks into class and sits in his usual seat in the far back row. We are discussing Claudia Card’s “Rape as a Terrorist Institution.” He busily searches the web for statistics on sexual assault and domestic violence against men. He finds one, raises his hand, and says, “Men are victims too, according to a recent statistic from Center for Disease Control and U.S. Department of Justice, more men than women are victims of intimate partner violence. It’s over 40 percent!” Armed with this new statistic, he asserts that our discussion would be less biased if we focused more generally on intimate partner violence. DeEndré makes these de-gendering moves with such regularity that women in the class cringe and audibly sigh when he raises his hand.

The class is reading articles on privilege including Andrea Smith’s critique of the privilege literature. Bethany, a white woman, tells the class that she does not want to read “propaganda.” She insists that people of color have privileges too because “they can get affirmative action benefits and NAACP scholarships.” She tells a story about the time she applied for a manager’s position at a local restaurant, but “a Mexican took her job.” A few white students nod in agreement. Some Latina/o and Black students become visibly agitated.

Our feminist epistemology class has read Frantz Fanon and we are discussing racialized embodiment. James, an African American student who is taking his first philosophy class, shares an experience about what it’s like for him to move through the world in a Black male body. Raymond, a young white (and kind of nerdy) philosophy student, listens to James and then wonders aloud whether there might be a possible world in which Black bodies are not regarded with suspicion. He believes Black men are regarded with suspicion, but he thinks “the hypothetical question is more philosophical and thus more interesting.” He wants to use possible world semantics as an objection to Fanon.

We are discussing the persistence of racism. Jennifer, a white philosophy student, offers as evidence some racist graffiti she saw recently in a dormitory bathroom. She tells the class that the graffiti said “N----- go back to Chicago!” She animates her description with that little two-fingered scare quotes gesture. I pause our discussion and address her use of the N-word, and ask her to consider that the word might mean something different coming out of white mouths. She responds with an appeal to the “use-mention distinction,” and explains that because this is a foundational concept in analytic philosophy that it’s perfectly acceptable to “mention,” but not “use” the N-word.

**WHAT IS EPISTEMIC PUSHBACK?**

Feminist philosophers and critical race theorists will be intimately familiar with the kinds of epistemic resistance these examples illustrate. Perhaps your own stories spring to mind as you read them. What I am calling *epistemic pushback* is an expression of epistemic resistance that happens regularly in discussions that touch our core
beliefs about the world and how that worldview shapes the understandings we have of ourselves. These responses are not limited to academic classrooms; one hears them everywhere, but I focus on philosophy classrooms because this is where I spend most of my time engaging them.

Epistemic pushback broadly characterizes a family of cognitive, affective, and verbal tactics that are deployed regularly to dodge the challenging and exhausting chore of engaging topics and questions that scare us. These topics are unsettling because they directly call into question our sense of self. No one likes to consider the possibility that they might be part of the problem, that they might be complicit in fortifying social structures that re-inscribe racist and [hetero]sexist practices. We like to think of ourselves as good people, so when discussions of injustice challenge our goodness we push back. What Alice MacIntyre calls "white talk" is a classic example of epistemic pushback. As McIntyre explains, white talk is a predictable set of discursive patterns that white folks habitually deploy when asked directly about the connections between white privilege and institutional racism that serves to insulate and excuse white people "from the difficult and almost paralyzing task of engaging [our] own whiteness." White talk signals a tactical refusal to understand, characterized by a general unwillingness to consider and engage ideas that directly challenge our sense of identity, and the worldview that gives our identity weight and substance. It has deeply affective roots around which our cognitive habits defensively wrap themselves.

Bethany’s characterization of the white privilege literature as propaganda marks a fearful refusal to consider her role in the maintenance of everyday racism. Her discomfort is expressed by her attempt to re-direct our attention back to her experiences with so-called "reverse discrimination," back to her belief that the principles of meritocracy have been violated. DeEndré does not want to think about the ways rape culture contributes to sexual violence against girls and women, so he re-focuses the discussion on violence against men, then advocates for a more general discussion on intimate partner violence. Here resistance is deployed to derail conversations, interrupt or dismiss testimony and counterarguments, or to facilitate retreats into silence. Fear, vulnerability, and anxiety drive these conversational detours, dismissals, and denials. Each offers a means of pre-emptively deploying disbelief in ways that allow would-be knowers to reject an uncomfortable position without seriously listening to, hearing, and making a sincere effort to understand that position.

The next two examples are subtle. I ask readers to keep them in mind because they happen with predictable regularity. Raymond and Jennifer’s epistemic engagements may count as sincere efforts to apply philosophical concepts from other classes to the material in our class. But I wonder whether these efforts might also be a subtle way of pressing philosophical concepts into the service of a broader tactical refusal to understand. When Raymond steers the discussion to the safety of possible world semantics he refuses to hear James’s testimony. He is more comfortable addressing injustices in the abstract. His appeal to possible worlds is neither appropriate nor useful here: it distracts from the project of exploring the lived bodily dimensions of oppression. When Jennifer justifies her deployment of the N-word with an appeal to the use/mention distinction, she privileges philosophical conventions over the safety of students of color in our class.

Epistemic pushback cannot be attributed to the healthy skeptical stances that philosophers are encouraged to adopt as part of our disciplinary best practices. As Phyllis Rooney notes, "the 'default skeptical stance' that many philosophers regularly adopt can (among other things) be epistemically problematic, particularly when it is likely to discourage or misrepresent the views of those who belong to minority subgroups within the discipline—not least when they seek to examine 'new' topics of particular significance for their subgroup (topics of race or feminist philosophy for example)." When skepticism becomes the default stance in discussions on gender, race, and their intersections it can discourage, silence, depress, frustrate and anger members of marginalized groups. When skepticism is falsely equated with knee-jerk doubt, it becomes especially difficult to engage.

Unlike healthy forms of skepticism that move conversations forward by encouraging open-minded and curious doubting, epistemic pushback is driven by psychological defense mechanisms, what José Medina identifies as the need for "cognitive self protection." I don’t want to silence this resistance. I want students to understand the difference between resistance that is beneficial to knowledge production, and resistance that serves as an obstacle to knowledge production. As Medina suggests:

[...]resistances can be a good and a bad thing, epistemically speaking. The resistances of your cognitive life keep you grounded. As Wittgenstein would put it, in order to have a real (and not simply a delusional) cognitive life, "we need friction," we need to go "back to the rough ground." But there are also resistances that function as obstacles, as weights that slow us down or preclude us from following (or even having access to) certain paths or pursuing further certain questions, problems, curiosities.

Epistemic resistance is beneficial when it works to establish a toehold, to gain ground, and to move discussions forward. In Medina’s words, there is a beneficial epistemic friction, that prompts us "to be self critical, to compare and contrast [our] beliefs, to meet justificatory demands, to recognize cognitive gaps, and so on." What I’m calling episodes of epistemic pushback "function as obstacles, as weights that slow us down or preclude us from following (or having access to) certain paths or pursuing further certain questions, problems and curiosities." Epistemic resistance offers no epistemic friction. It keeps our affective-cognitive wheels spinning in place by censoring, distracting, dodging, silencing, or "inhibiting the formation of beliefs, the articulation of doubts, the formulation of questions and lines of inquiry, and so on."
that epistemic pushback cannot be navigated exclusively using academic philosophy’s critical thinking toolkit. I’ve lost entire class sessions trying to engage pushback argumentatively only to realize that adversarial formats fuel this resistance. Critical thinking solutions treat epistemic pushback as a failure to argue well. But these are affective as well as cognitive responses; as such they are stubborn, deep, volatile, unmovable, and practically immune from argument-focused pedagogies. No amount of argument analysis, informal fallacy review, or appeals to the principle of charity can defuse this pushback. These topics push buttons; they prompt feelings of fear, guilt, shame, anger, and vulnerability, and this is where we should begin.

If the pushback is more affective than cognitive, then maybe creating safe spaces can address resistance at the source. I’ve tried integrating pedagogies from anti-racism workshops, SafeZone trainings, and community diversity summits into my philosophy classes. Once I spent an entire class session collectively crafting a “Contract for a Liberated Space” that listed guidelines for productive, compassionate, and respectful discussions. The contract helped focus our discussion. It also gave students permission to step in, educate, correct, or call one another out on bad behavior, but it did not create the desired “safe space.” Safe spaces have normative goals: They are typically characterized as places where “participants can be relaxed and express ourselves freely without fear of being made to feel uncomfortable, unsafe, unwelcome, or marginalized.”

Accounts of safety that privilege free expression and comfort over listening and being heard are problematic from the start. I first realized this when two students repeatedly ignored a sexual assault survivor’s testimony and, under the banner of “freedom to speak,” deployed rape myths and “men too” reasoning to dodge questions about their complicity in rape culture. Sexual assault survivors are not safe in spaces where freedom of expression is not balanced equally with responsible and compassionate listening. This makes sense: we feel most safe and comfortable when our fears, unease, and anger are engaged and heard. Listening and hearing each requires a shift in our attitude toward risk. Risk taking by definition involves recognizing that taking chances makes everyone vulnerable: a student’s contributions to a discussion can evoke anger, laughter, tears, joy, rage, a smile of recognition, eye rolling, fist pounding, a request for clarification, empathy, or pleas for patience. Safety is an unstable, slippery, and relatively context dependent. Identities are intersectional and topics that feel safe, interesting, and empowering for some students will be grueling, difficult, and annoying for others. So, there are no pure safe spaces. We can only work with what we offer one another. I want us to go into these conversations together knowing this.

**EPISTEMIC PUSHBACK AS AN EXPRESSION OF WILLFUL IGNORANCE**

Teaching feminist and critical race philosophy requires a distinctly nuanced pedagogy: one that begins with a mindfulness of how cognitive-affective resistance functions and then moves to a deeper understanding of the arguments. We must learn to identify and navigate the resistance students offer before thinking critically. Navigating epistemic pushback is frustrating, annoying, and time consuming. I treat it seriously because I’ve come to understand it as social practice that contributes to the active production and maintenance of ignorance.

Good teaching should not only track the production of knowledge but also the production of ignorance. As Nancy Tuana explains, “if we are to fully understand the complex practices of knowledge production and the variety of factors that account for why something is known, we must also understand the practices that account for not knowing; that is, for our lack of knowledge about a phenomenon.”

A central premise in the literature on epistemologies of ignorance is that ignorance is not a simple gap in knowledge: It is an active social production. My examples point to a deeply seated and active resistance to knowing, which is carefully choreographed and skillfully maintained though discursive tactics, body language, and countless other habitual acts of omission and negligence. To persist willful ignorance requires daily management. Its uninterrupted repetition is required for speakers to keep habitual detours, dismissals, and denials in good working order. If epistemic pushback tactically maintains ignorance, and if this form of epistemic exchange regularly circulates in feminist philosophy classrooms, then we need a strategy for navigating resistance that is productive. How should we do this?

**TRACKING IGNORANCE: TREATING EPISTEMIC PUSHBACK AS “SHADOW TEXT”**

Willful ignorance circulates in even the most progressive classroom spaces. No classroom can be fully ignorance free, but we can work toward making these spaces “ignorance mindful.” To this end I’m recommending that feminist classrooms work towards becoming collectively mindful of epistemic pushback and use any detected points of resistance as opportunities to reveal the ways we are all prone to embracing ignorance in the interests of dodging discomfort. I work with students to cultivate this mindfulness by making epistemic pushback visible and treating it as a “shadow text.”

I use the term “shadow text” metaphorically to point to the unwritten, and sometimes unspoken, content of epistemic pushback. DeEndré’s claim that “Men are victims too!” is a shadow text. His response shadows the readings in the same way that a detective shadows a suspect whom he considers to be suspicious. Bethany’s insistence that “affirmative action benefits count as privileges” is also shadow text. Her remarks run alongside of the claims about privilege as unearned advantage that should be a basic human entitlement. They punctuate the course content with a stubborn refusal to understand. If Jennifer and Raymond continue to press philosophical concepts into the service of a broader tactical refusal to understand, and if the concepts they introduce offer no epistemic friction, then we should also treat these moves as shadow texts.

My use of “shadow” is intended to call to mind the image of something walking closely along side another thing. I picture an informal unwritten utterance or bodily gesture
moving alongside of a more formal written one. Shadow texts can certainly be thought of as reactions to course content, but I’d prefer to understand them as “being called up by” the course content. There are reasons why DeEndré and Jennifer “go there”; their reactions are not knee jerk. Shadow texts spring from these deeply affective-cognitive spaces. I want to superimpose a second meaning on this account of shadow texts. Shadows are more commonly understood as the products of obstacles; that is, as dark areas or shapes produced by bodies (obstacles) coming between a light source and a surface. Recall Medina’s claim that epistemic resistance can “function as an obstacle, as weights that slow us down or preclude us from following (or having access to) certain paths or pursuing further certain questions, problems and curiosities.” When epistemic pushback functions in this way, it casts a shadow text. Here, shadows are regions of epistemic opacity. The discursive detours and distractions signal epistemic closure; they tell listeners “I’m not going there.” I’ve coined the term “shadow texts” to focus students’ attention on this double meaning.

Treating epistemic pushback as a shadow text doesn’t always offer us the beneficial epistemic friction that knowledge production demands. This, however, doesn’t mean that shadow texts can’t be navigated in pedagogically useful ways. Shadow texts may be obstacles, but they are not immoveable barriers. I prefer to think of them as “sticking points,” preludes to epistemic friction if you will. Epistemic sticking points don’t always give us the necessary friction we need to move a conversation forward, but they can be used to create a toehold that serves as a useful point of departure for future difficult conversations, even if the speaker remains unconvinced in the end.

NAVIGATING SHADOW TEXTS

I have a section on our syllabus that defines and describes shadow texts. I introduce students to this concept on the first day of class, but we don’t begin to navigate shadow texts until there is a clear moment of epistemic pushback. Shadow texts must be engaged carefully. DeEndré and Bethany’s concerns must be navigated in ways that do not re-center maleness and whiteness. Jennifer and Raymond’s concerns must be navigated in ways that point to my concerns about whether these concepts have epistemic friction.

At the first moment of epistemic pushback, I ask the class if we can pause to consider what happened. For example, suppose I’ve asked the question, “What does Card mean when she claims that ‘rape is a terrorist institution’?” I write this question on the board. A few students usually respond by defining terrorism and explaining how the definition helps us to understand rape culture. I write the responses on the board, including DeEndré’s response. My concern is not whether he has answered the question (he hasn’t). I want to know why his answer “went there” and not to Card’s definition, and I want to know what is driving this move.

I invite the class to consider the question and the responses that I’ve put on the board. The class then does a free-writing exercise where they (1) identify the resistant response, (2) explain how this response differs from the others (e.g., What is this response to the question doing? Where does it take the conversation and why?), and (3) speculate what might have driven this answer. The point of this exercise is to make visible the tension between the question and the reply, and to speculate about what triggers this discursive move. I try to keep the conversation short. I have them do the exercise for the next two or three instances of epistemic pushback before I introduce them to the idea of shadow texts. My hope is that they will begin to identify shadow texts on their own. At some point I ask them to think about how naming shadow texts might help us to track the production of ignorance. This requires some work. Students will almost always understand ignorance to mean that the speaker is saying something stupid. It’s essential for them to understand that tracking ignorance requires our attentions to be focused not on a few problem individuals, but learning to see epistemic pushback and to tie these ignorance producing tactics to a more general refusal to know. In short, I want us to focus on what’s happening, and not who is making it happen.

Framing epistemic pushback as a shadow text is pedagogically useful for a number of reasons. First, naming pushback turns these epistemic exchanges into teachable moments. I’ve had some success with helping students to understand that resistance is not reducible to just bad behavior or obnoxious interruptions. There is something more deep and complicated going on here and it’s worth exploring this resistance alongside of the readings. Next, acknowledging resistance as a text to be engaged, rather than as an interruption to be managed can help to diffuse the anger or fear. When a resister’s concerns are engaged respectfully she or he will feel heard and will hopefully listen more carefully. Using shadow texts to navigate epistemic pushback can also serve as a productive point of entry into larger discussions about the social production of ignorance. Shadow texts may not initially offer the beneficial epistemic friction Medina finds necessary for positive epistemic resistance, but if navigated in the ways I’ve recommended they can help to steer classes onto a more active discursive terrain.

NOTES


2. I want to recognize that my identity as an able-bodied, straight, white, cisgendered, middle-aged woman has a huge impact on the classroom dynamic, the kind of “push back” I get from students, and ultimately the strategies available to me. My observations and suggestions are not offered as a one-size-fits-all pedagogy for addressing epistemic pushback in academic environments.


4. José Medina’s The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice and Resistant Imaginations (2013) has enriched the nuanced political and epistemological implications of what is now called “the epistemology of resistance.” I am very inspired by his account, the conceptual vocabulary he crafts, and the vision he offers. However, I don’t want to simply adopt his terminology wholesale and apply it to classroom pedagogies at this point. So, I bring it in where helps to ground the pedagogy. I use “epistemic pushback” to point specifically to one species of epistemic resistance. Medina would categorize this as either internal or external negative epistemic resistance. See Medina, The Epistemology of Resistance, 49-50.
5. For a complete discussion of complicity and goodness, see Barbara Applebaum’s *Being White, Being Good: White Complicity, Moral Responsibility, and Social Justice Pedagogy*.

6. Alice McIntyre, *Making Meaning of Whiteness: Exploring Racial Identities with White Teachers*, 46. White talk includes the following sorts of utterances: “My ancestors never owned slaves. I’m not like my bigoted father. I don’t care if you’re Black, red, or yellow with polka dots, everyone should be treated equally.”


10. Ibid., 50.

11. Ibid., 8.

12. Ibid., 50.

13. See Laura Freedman, "Creating Safe Spaces: Strategies for Confronting Implicit and Explicit Bias and Stereotype Threat in the Classroom." This exact language also appears regularly in Internet searches for safe spaces, usually in the context of mission statements for LGBTQ+ resource centers.

14. George Yancy advocates for the creation of "unsafe spaces" that involve marking whiteness, maleness, and other privileged identities, making it visible, rendering it strange, or decentering it. Creating unsafe spaces should not be mistakenly equated with fomenting hostile situations; instead, the goal is to tackle privilege and power by inviting members of privileged groups to become uncomfortable with their power. I share his concerns about the focus on making classrooms safe. See his “Loving Wisdom and the Effort to Make Philosophy ‘Unsafe’.”


16. For example, see Elizabeth Spelman’s "Managing Ignorance in Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance," eds. Shannon Sullivan and Nancy Tuana.


**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


**Uses of Multimedia Representations in Undergraduate Feminist Philosophy Courses**

Crista Lebens

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Philosophy is a discipline that seemingly requires few visual aids, but we live in a visually oriented culture. In discussions of gender and race construction, visuals are crucial. How can abstract philosophical concepts, especially about gender and race, be illustrated visually? In this essay, I discuss a project in which I collaborated with two undergraduate students on the development of multimedia learning objects (short videos and PowerPoint presentations). I currently use these digital learning objects (LOs) in my Philosophy of Gender & Race and Feminist Philosophy courses. These LOs incorporate current events and contemporary aesthetics to bring abstract concepts to life. Though their contribution is significant, almost more important than the product was the process. Despite the fact that I was the instructor, we all learned from each other in some respect. The process was transformative for all of us. In this essay, I will describe the process of constructing these LOs. Whether or not producing this type of material interests the reader, the process of engaging undergraduate students in any sort of collaborative work offers a rich and rewarding experience far beyond the contribution the product makes in the classroom.

First, some background: I work at the University of Wisconsin–Whitewater, a regional university in the Wisconsin State University system with a 4-4 teaching load; teaching takes up the bulk of my working life. As I began developing a new course on race and gender, I looked for funding opportunities to support the production of teaching materials. I had explored digital repositories such as Merlot, and searched YouTube videos and other online resources. While there is a substantial body of work online that illustrates standard (non feminist) philosophical concepts and texts, I did not find materials that directly addressed the concepts or the texts I use in my courses. I decided to create my own.

The grants officer at my university suggested I consider collaborating with undergraduates (NB: we do not have grad programs in my department or in women’s studies). The motivation for this project, creating short videos to illustrate complex concepts, came from my belief that using visuals to convey concepts of gender and race construction would strengthen a course on gender and race. The process was successful in terms of engaging students in the course and building strong mentoring relationships with the student collaborators. As a result, I applied for and received a second grant to develop videos for my feminist philosophy class.
I chose two students with whom I was familiar. Nik and Amy had taken two courses with me previously, namely, Feminist Philosophy and Lesbian Studies, and had been especially interested in my area of specialty, the work of Maria Lugones, which we had studied in both classes. Furthermore, I knew Nik had both the technical skills to create videos and the interest in the subject matter. In the Lesbian Studies course, I had offered the class the option of producing a multimedia presentation as an alternative to the standard essay exam covering material for that segment of the course. This alternative was not an easy out; the project had to engage the ideas in a meaningful way. Nik is a gifted digital media artist, and she produced an outstanding multimedia presentation. Amy is a skilled writer and thinker. She and Nik were interested in collaborating on this project. In short, we were in the right place at the right time. It is not surprising that this collaboration came out of a series of women’s studies classes they took with me. In those classes it was clear that they found Lugones’s work as engaging as I have. The process of working together was an exercise in feminist practice. We came from multiplicitous backgrounds and journeys, navigating differences of age, institutional power, class, race, and gender identity, and we shared commonalities of lesbian and/or queer identities, as well as a politics of resistance to multiple enmeshed oppressions. Without these political commitments, the project would not have been successful. For a project like this, one has to know and love the work to be able to teach it to others.

The first project took the three of us most of a summer to produce.

**My tasks:**

- Choose the readings I want to emphasize
- Identify key concepts or issues to illustrate
- Write overviews of what I want covered
- Be available as a resource
- Stick to the timeline

**Students’ tasks:**

- Read the material from which these concepts were drawn
  - Note: This took a few weeks of preparation and discussion. It was really exciting to discuss the ideas and work out what concepts to illustrate and how to do it visually.
- Collaborate on parts of the writing and presentation
- Nik: choose the images or film clips and music and compose the videos
- Keep in contact; ask questions to clarify difficult concepts
- Stick to the timeline

From my end it appeared to be helpful for them to have each other to consult. We met face to face regularly and online quite frequently as well, which helped because we all lived significant distances from campus. Amy was not available for the second project, but Nik and I collaborated a great deal online via Gmail chat and Google docs.

**RESULTS**

I have made examples of digital learning objects available on my blog. We produced seventeen learning objects in total (between the two projects), including short films (up to eleven minutes), and PowerPoint presentations with embedded multimedia. In addition to exploring Lugones’s Logic of Purity/Logic of Curdling, we covered a range of topics, for example, the following:

**Video: Sonia Sotomayor: Standing before the law**

- **Purpose:** introduce the course’s emphasis on conceptualizing race and gender simultaneously
- **Introduce the idea of the social contract**
- **Chronology:** shown the first day of class
- **Key ideas:** social contract; multiple enmeshed oppressions

**Video: “Post Racial” America**

- **Purpose:** show real-life examples of how the social contract fails. Supplement readings by Carole Pateman and Charles Mills
- **Chronology:** shown about four weeks into the course
- **Key ideas:** social contract; racial contract

**Video: Mold, Immobilize, Reduce**

As a product of the second collaboration, this video shows a more sophisticated aesthetic.

- **Purpose:** highlight key concepts found in two theories of oppression: Marilyn Frye, Iris Marion Young
- **Create a historical context for theories of oppression**
- **Situate theories of oppression in relation to multiple axes of oppression**

**OUR PROCESS**

One thesis presented throughout the Gender and Race course is that the social contract does not work for everyone in the United States. That requires some discussion of the concept itself, as well as introducing concepts such as classical liberalism and radical critiques of liberalism. Texts that serve these purposes include Carole Pateman’s and Charles Mills’s analysis and criticisms of the social contract, as well as selections on the social contract from the anthology *Hip Hop and Philosophy.*
To illustrate both the social contract and the criticisms, we chose the example of the confirmation hearings for Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor. The hearings were taking place at the same time as we were working on the project, so there was much interest and discussion of them. We chose this example for several reasons; first, we wanted to use a current event. Even though the example is now five years old, race and gender dynamics have not changed significantly in such a short time. The confirmation of a Supreme Court justice has lasting significance. Second, I specifically wanted an example that incorporated both race and gender dynamics. As the record shows, Sotomayor was questioned on her racial politics and asked if she has “an anger problem,” a question that has gendered and raced implications. I chose this example over another event widely discussed at the time, namely, the arrest of Professor Henry Louis Gates as he tried to enter his home, the criticism of the arresting officer, and the ensuing “beer summit.” While that series of events, too, has gendered and raced implications, from the stereotype of the Black Man to the rapprochement over a few beers, I wanted the images and analysis in this LO to highlight a woman, particularly a woman of color. A “Beer Summit” video would reinforce the absence of images of women of color, especially ones that depict them in positions of power. Second, the Beer Summit example would reinscribe racial dynamics as strictly a “black-white thing.” I wanted to begin the series by presenting images highlighting the marginalization/othering of race and gender simultaneously and that depict race outside of the black/white binary. The Sotomayor example served these purposes well, and functioned to set a visual and conceptual framework for the course.

The video has already received critical responses. For example, Marilyn Frye expressed the concern that ultimately the video reinforces the idea of the social contract, given the inclusion of footage from Judge Sotomayor’s swearing-in ceremony. While it may reinforce the myth that the “system” basically works, albeit with a few unfortunate bumps for some individuals, in class discussion I emphasize the fact that the barriers exist at all, in the form of the questions she was asked, demonstrating that not all stand “equal before the law.”

A second response, from Mariana Ortega, elicited provocative questions to take up in class discussion and beyond:

And it is in these examples such as Judge Sotomayor being questioned that I see [whiteness as impartiality] . . . being more explicit—whiteness as gatekeeping with the pretense that it is not gatekeeping but justice and neutrality. Sad. Judge Sotomayor must make the case that she is impartial in a way that was not required of her white and male colleagues. “Whiteness” is the mark of impartiality. In Lugones’s terms, Judge Sotomayor must split-separate herself from her Latina identity, yet retain it.

A second example of an aesthetic and political choice we made concerns the images in the “Mold, Immobilize, Reduce,” video on oppression. There Nik made the primary choices of images. Aesthetically, Nik favors archival images, and made frequent use of copyright-free images from 1950s-era American movies. In the case of the oppression video, she chose images of white women, eschewing images of women of color from movies of that era because she found the depictions to be problematic. Even though the images of white women depicted them in objectifying situations, the narrative of the video serves to challenge that. As a team, we agreed that it would be more difficult to undercut the sexist, racist stereotypes conveyed by images of women of color. Rather than risk reinforcing these stereotypes for my (primarily white) audience, we avoided them. The analysis that supports this choice added a layer to my understanding of historical racism and sexism. Pedagogically, I use this as a teachable moment. When I show the video in class, I explain the reasoning behind this choice, prompting students to notice the presence of the absence of strong images of women of color) and consider why that is.

Finally, I learned from working with Nik and Amy how to be a better teacher. We shared a love of the intellectual creative work we were doing together. We worked together to solve creative problems in illustrating the concepts, and through that experience, as I saw their commitment to the work, my commitment to keep connecting with students renewed. In short, the experience has kept me from “burning out” as a teacher. I will always know that there are students who really care about these ideas, and for whom these ideas make a significant difference in their lives. That is sustaining.

The experience was also one of feminist practice. Clearly we worked within an asymmetrical power structure; I had been their instructor and would be again, and I was their supervisor and director of the project. At the same time, I trusted their decisions and their authority as knowers, and reinforced their sense of themselves as “authoritative female interlocutors” as described by the Milan Woman’s Book Collective. With my guidance, they wrote sections of text and shaped the messages of the videos. Second, I think it was helpful overall for them to work together on the project, insofar as they had a partner with whom they could test ideas. For students who might be less forthcoming in an academic environment, working with another student can make the interpersonal dynamics a bit less intense than working solo with an instructor.

**PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS**

The students were paid a stipend of $750. To alleviate payroll complications, I scheduled flat-rate payments over the course of the work period. I encouraged them to stay within the time budgeted, but, as is often the case, they exceeded that time. The books and other materials, such as software and DVDs, purchased to produce the learning objects belonged to them after the project. Though they received no direct academic credit for their work, both Nik and Amy referenced this project in successful job applications. Second, we presented our work at a statewide Women’s Studies Consortium and at a Midwest Society for Women in Philosophy meeting. Finally, to date, our collaboration has led to Nik’s presentation of an original video at a Midwest Society for Women in
Philosophy conference and sale of the video screening rights to another university.

STUDENT RESPONSES
At the end of the initial offering of the Philosophy of Gender and Race course, I asked students to comment on the learning objects using the standard evaluation form. The consensus among the students was positive. One student in that class went on to present original work at a professional conference. I certainly cannot give sole credit to the learning objects, but the LOs project demonstrated to my students that they could produce work outside of course assignments and gain professional recognition for it.

In the second offering of the course, I used an online survey to record students’ evaluation of the learning objects, and again they rated them positively. Anecdotally, when we presented the LOs at the Women’s Studies Consortium, a student who had taken my feminist philosophy class remarked that such materials would have been helpful in that class as well. As a result of these positive responses, I was able to secure funding for the project to develop learning objects for the feminist philosophy class.

The subsequent developments, in and out of the classroom, have been overwhelmingly positive. I, with and without Nik and Amy, presented this work at several conferences and received positive feedback and requests for links to the works. Having worked on the digital learning objects, I was more oriented to the use of multimedia in the classroom, and I make regular use of additional media beyond those produced specifically for this course. These additional materials help to illustrate more concretely than otherwise the abstract concepts of political philosophy and theories of race and gender construction.

ROADBLOCKS
Time and money are significant barriers. This work can’t be done during the semester with my teaching load and the students’ course load. Work over the summer requires either enough funding to support the student(s) without the need for a second job or negotiating work and life schedules. Finally, undergraduates graduate faster than grad students, so to continue this work, I will need to find ways to support ongoing collaboration or rethink the kind of project I would pursue. Given the specific skills and interests Nik and Amy brought to the project, and the “bonding experience” we shared, it would be difficult to duplicate the results produced by the original team.

CONCLUSION
Most instructors currently use multimedia digital learning objects in our classrooms. Though it is changing, teachers of feminist philosophy and/or philosophy of race may find appropriate or relevant materials are scarce. In that case, it is possible to collaborate with others to produce them. I welcome questions and comments regarding the process and the results; contact me via email, lebensc@uww.edu, or my blog. Even if this particular project (multimedia learning objects) is not feasible, consider developing some other type of learning object or conducting research in collaboration with undergraduate students. It is an enormously rewarding experience. The project and the process together demonstrated feminist practice deeply informed by the philosophical concepts we worked to illustrate.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am grateful to Nik DeLeon and Amy Michaels for their commitment to this project. They have given permission to use their names. Thanks also to the participants who gave feedback at the following conferences: University of Wisconsin System Women’s Studies Consortium, 2010; Midwest Society for Women in Philosophy, 2011; American Association of Philosophy Teachers, 2012; and the anonymous reviewer for the APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy.

NOTES
1. Private communication, August 2009.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Academic Pressures and Feminist Solutions: Teaching Ethics against the Grain

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Margaret Crouch begins her important article “Implicit Bias and Gender (and Other Sorts of) Diversity in Philosophy and the Academy in the Context of the Corporatized University” (2012) with the insight that two things that she values most—the movement toward increased diversity in philosophy and the existence of our discipline in higher education—are both under fire by the same threat: neoliberal thinking and practices. I would like to add another dimension to her compelling claims, and suggest that these threats become especially potent, and particularly hard to navigate, in
introductory-level philosophical ethics courses. I argue that, in the context of such classes, a desire to prove academic philosophy’s relevance to a society enamored with the promise of market-based skills (Crouch’s “corporatizing” forces) often works counter to the goal of increased attention to the needs and contributions of oppressed and underrepresented groups. Yet feminist philosophical strategies can help demonstrate that emphasis on the market-based skills that emerge from philosophical training need not run counter to increased attention to the needs of oppressed groups. By way of one modest example, I suggest a feminist pedagogical shift that might help address the needs of underrepresented students while still satisfying some of the market-based and tradition-based justifications of philosophy as a discipline.

For years it was a kind of mantra of mine—both when talking about my philosophy department and our ethics center—that in philosophical ethics courses we don’t teach students what to think, we teach them how to think. The distinction, although simplistic and admittedly problematic, served an important purpose: for the layperson it helped me differentiate philosophical instruction from religious instruction, and also from “character education”—two areas that also lay claim to teaching ethics, but from a position where values are more explicitly and unabashedly predetermined. In our courses, I often explained (sometimes defensively, sometimes self-righteously) the content, definition, and conception of one’s values are laid out for scrutiny, open to challenge, and yet-to-be determined. We teach students how to examine their values comparatively and critically, and we leave it to them to determine which they will ultimately adopt. Guided primarily by the pedagogical values of promoting autonomous and rational thinking, I invoked the traditional boast that students come out of our classes with more questions, with less certainty, than that with which they entered. Debate is encouraged, differences in perspective are explored, students’ eyes are opened, and sometimes their worlds are turned upside down. I tended to see all of this as perfectly consistent with my department and university’s commitment to diversity, for when everything is open for question, and no view is immune to criticism, we all are presumably better equipped to operate on equal footing.

In ethics courses, particularly those that deal with practical, contemporary moral issues, this pedagogical approach would seem to be well fertilized by a “pro vs. con” or “conflicting perspectives” structure. Students get a better understanding of the contentiousness of (and their own positions in) the debates over abortion, euthanasia, the death penalty, gun control, etc., by examining opposing viewpoints, and by refusing to view any position as immune to scrutiny. While, for me, it can be personally difficult and emotionally taxing to assign and promote consideration of perspectives radically different from my own, I could not come up with “diverse” readings in the “pros and cons,” “conflicting perspectives” sense of the term. The topics in my course (I assumed unreflectively) were best examined, and the students best served, by reading authors who would disagree profoundly with one another, who would confront one another with equally compelling arguments, and who would compel students to consider perspectives radically different from their own. Yet I could not imagine how to do that responsibly on this issue. Sure, I might assign controversial pieces on rape—some by feminists, and some even by female anti-feminists such as Camille Paglia or Katie Roiphe—but given the near-certainty that many of my female and some of my male students are survivors of rape and sexual violence, the risk of creating a class discussion that might result in these students feeling further alienated, misunderstood, or blamed for the violence they had suffered was simply not a risk I was willing to take. It seemed safer simply not to address the issue at all.

I justified my decision to leave this issue out primarily in terms of the safety and emotional well-being of my female students. But beneath that justification, I believe, I was also worried about the academic “safety” of including issues...
in my syllabus about which I could not be, or at least not be perceived as, neutral. Such worries are propped up by Stanley Fish, former dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at the University of Illinois, Chicago, who counsels academics never to reveal our ethical and political positions to students. In light of the current political climate, under which higher education is at risk of being co-opted and transformed by a for-profit model, he argues that professors ought to avoid advocacy of any particular political position in the classroom. His provocatively titled book Save the World on Your Own Time (2008) rails against professors who try to do too much “engaged” or advocacy work in their classes.

Our job, he claims, is simple and twofold: “(1) introduce students to bodies of knowledge and traditions of inquiry that had not previously been part of their experience; and (2) equip those same students with the analytical skills—of argument, statistical modeling, laboratory procedure—that had not previously been part of their experience; and to engage in independent research after a course is over.” When we try to go beyond this, he says, we become ineffective teachers, and, most importantly, play into the hands of those who attempt to co-opt or deny the value of higher education, particularly those who doubt the value of the liberal arts. For, it is “when teachers offer themselves as moralists, therapists, counselors, and agents of global change rather than as pedagogues that those who are on the lookout for ways to discredit higher education (often as a preliminary to taking it over) see their chance,” Fish claims.

When we reveal what we ourselves think in the classroom, he says, we step over the line of what’s appropriate to, fitting for, our jobs. His exhortations rest on affirming a line “between analysis and advocacy.” The work of the scholar in higher ed is to engage students in the former and (at least in the classroom) to refrain from the latter. To those of us that might suggest, “Teaching is a political act,” Fish sharply rejoins: “Only bad teaching is a political act.”

Of course, plenty of academics dispute Fish in compelling ways. And although philosophers are well-equipped (as highly trained critical thinkers) to take issue with the conceptual lines Fish attempts to draw, my sense is that few of us feel particularly safe in doing so publicly, as we are less well-equipped to be taken seriously by administrators, boards of trustees, and the wider public. These days our discipline has a tough time justifying its existence in higher education, mostly because our departments are not leading contributors to the university’s bottom line (particularly in numbers of majors). Crouch notes that, when threats to cut philosophy programs are made “the administrative justification is usually that philosophy departments are not cost-effective, are not graduating enough students per year, or are not garnering enough external funds for research.” Despite the fact that our cost-effectiveness can typically be disputed easily (in the number of students—in- stead of numbers of majors—we teach, and in the relatively inexpensive ways in which we teach without labs or other research and instructional expenses), we find ourselves often on the defensive. In my case and I suspect in many others, this defensiveness finds its way into the classroom, construction of syllabi, and perhaps even creation of texts. It translates into my defense that I am not teaching value-laden “content”, I am teaching value-neutral critical thinking “skills”—how to think, not what to think.

In philosophical ethics courses in particular, I find myself in a kind of perfect feminist-philosophical storm that makes responsible inclusion of an issue like rape especially difficult. Winds from one direction push me to worry about being perceived as a political (liberal) “advocate” rather than an apolitical (neutral) “scholar.” Winds from another direction push me to worry about the institution’s perception of my department and discipline’s relevance for millennials (who are presumably best served by having transferrable “skills” rather than “knowledge”). Crouch notes that “the academy has, to a large extent, accepted the neoliberal model of the university as a corporation, the primary mission of which is to sell information and skill sets and to produce workers.” So the academy generally, and philosophy specifically, seem justifiable, save-able, if we can prove our fittingness to this model. Crouch contends, “Public universities and liberal arts colleges once considered it their mission to further the ‘common good’, by educating students to be good citizens and better economic agents.” But the second component of that mission is clearly overshadowing the first these days, and what it means to be a good citizen is increasingly intertwined with capitalist production. Students have become “consumers” and knowledge in terms of “marketable skills” has become our “product.”

Fish’s solution amounts to the recommendation that we protect ourselves by proving that our work does not run contrary to this new game (played on the corporatized model). He does not accept or endorse the game, but following his advice ultimately undermines our ability to question the “game” itself. In the current climate, Crouch notes, “[t]he understanding of what it means to be human is apparently not in demand . . . anthropology, literature, and philosophy—all of the humanities, in fact—are valueless in the corporatized university.” Fish decries the view that the humanities are “valueless,” but his solution leaves us and our students relatively powerless to examine “what it means to be human” and to confront the assumption that there is a single answer to this question. This, Crouch and I believe, should be our “business.” As Crouch notes, “philosophy should be one of the best disciplines for clarifying the limits of neoliberal higher education, and for showing that there are significant moral and pragmatic arguments for the inclusion of diverse groups, diverse disciplines, and diversity within disciplines, in the university.”

Yet in order to do this, philosophers need to sort through the ways in which Fish’s exhortations seem to parallel some of the values deeply embedded in philosophy as a discipline, and challenge them, particularly from a feminist perspective. For instance, I initially found some of Fish’s advice compelling because my traditionally conceived discipline so highly values autonomy and critical thinking; indoctrination of my students runs directly counter to these values and most of I what I take pride in. Philosophy as a discipline has encouraged me to feel proud of the fact that students protest teasingly and good-naturedly, in the classroom and in their evaluations, that I am “so frustrating” because I rarely tell them what I think; instead, I insist that they answer their own questions. I respond, perhaps
ad nauseum, “what do you think?” And I believe it is pedagogically crucial that students not feel they are being preached to, and that they do their own work of thinking critically and evaluating all claims. Elements of this seem to complement Fish’s recommendation to “academicize”:

“to academicize a topic is to detach it from the context of its real world urgency, where there is a vote to be taken or an agenda to be embraced, and insert it into a context of academic urgency, where there is an account to be offered or an analysis to be performed.”

If I stick to the level of questioning whether there is a problem—what its terms are, how it might be analyzed from different perspectives—but don’t necessarily presume in our discussions that something is a problem, then I seem to conform to Fish’s advice. The difficulty with this, of course, is that sometimes the act of questioning whether something “is” a problem is to betray or convey a kind of political position itself. Questioning whether rape, for instance, “is” a problem seems to indicate at best ignorance, at worst skepticism, of the suffering of many of my female students.

In my Feminist and Gender Theory courses (courses Fish says are clearly outside the bounds of “academicization”), I build from a political position that interlocking oppressions are a serious problem. I certainly don’t take this as a given—we examine texts that make this argument, and also ones that provide counterarguments—but in order to advance to a deeper level, at some point I assume that students also see these as problems that require solutions. This, presumably, would constitute a failure to academicize, according to Fish, and goes perilously beyond “doing my job.” The great risk, he says, is that I cannot effectively defend myself against conservative interest groups that might claim I am brainwashing my students from a left-wing perspective. If I cannot claim that I am objectively, neutrally examining a topic, keeping my own political commitments out of the classroom, then I (and academia in general) cannot effectively stand ground against the accusation that we are “indoctrinating” our students.

I do not want to downplay the seriousness of the risk Fish is concerned about in today’s political climate. But it is worth keeping in mind, I think, that there are related risks in not questioning the game, as well, in trying to prove our worth to a standard we did not set. Kristin Shrader-Frechette, for instance, reminds us that “alleged neutrality [rather than advocacy] actually serves the status quo,” and she adds: [“To] avoid uncritical acceptance of status quo values one must criticize values rather than remain ethically neutral in all cases.” Returning to the topic of rape, then, my failure to address it and to name it as a “contemporary moral problem” only cements or adds to its invisibility and thereby its intractability as a problem. In failing to engender philosophical debate or even discussion on this topic, I was allowing myself to be constrained by a certain conception of what debate in my courses had to look like: that philosophical debate “proper” would revolve around whether an issue is right or wrong, permissible or impermissible, and would involve sharply opposing views; since I could only, in good conscience, represent rape as wrong and impermissible, I would be unable to cultivate proper philosophical discussion.

What had not initially occurred to me when I first started teaching such a course—particularly when I was fresh out of graduate school—and seems so obviously narrow now, is that I could change this narrow conception of philosophy (and the academy). I could still engender philosophical debate by addressing diverse conceptions of responsibility for rape and diverse possible solutions. This has required changing how I structure the course, doing it differently from the structure of most ethics anthologies, and telling my students what I am doing: on some issues, I now tell them, we will focus discussions on whether a particular decision, act, or policy is morally permissible (e.g., abortion, euthanasia, the death penalty) and in what circumstances (if any) it would be so; with other issues we will start from the assumption that a particular issue is not morally permissible (e.g., racism, sexism), and that it is a problem requiring discussion about diverse solutions. For instance, I tell them, I will assume that most of you think rape is a problem—in the sense that it is wrong—and our discussions will focus on various ways to understand and to solve the problem. In this way, students are still encouraged to challenge one another (and themselves) and confront unfamiliar perspectives, but they do so in a way that runs a much smaller risk of alienating and/or doing harm to rape survivors in my classrooms.

This rather simple shift, I suggest, has been a small but useful strategy toward correcting the ways in which academic philosophy “has largely ignored its own whiteness and maleness, both among its faculty and among its students.” Students (of all genders) typically report at the end of the semester that their discussion of rape was one of the most eye-opening and transformative of the class. Given that it is a topic that almost all of the women in the class (and some of the men) can identify with, in one way or another, it helps them feel connected with, excited by, challenged by, philosophical thinking. Almost all of them have personal experiences that stimulate and spur critical analysis, helping them to grasp the ways in which philosophical thinking is for them, relevant to them, helpful to them. Crouch reminds us that “we should explore the possibility that philosophy has failed to integrate the sorts of issues, problems, and methodologies that women and nonwhite people find interesting and relevant” and this is one small but perhaps useful shift for highlighting and correcting implicit bias in our discipline.

NOTES

1. Crouch describes neoliberalism as follows: “Neoliberalism is devoted to the principle that the market is the best means of producing and distributing resources. This principle is familiar from some forms of classical liberalism, often termed ‘free market’ capitalism.” See Crouch, “Implicit Bias and Gender (and Other Sorts of) Diversity in Philosophy and the Academy in the Context of the Corporational University,” 213.

2. Webster University, where I teach, is difficult to describe as a whole, since it includes a global network of campuses in Europe, Africa, and Asia, as well as a number of small campuses in metropolitan and military sites throughout the United States. Yet the home campus where I teach at the undergraduate level, in suburban Saint Louis, Missouri, is perhaps best described as a small, private, liberal arts institution, where my classes of mostly traditional-age, non-military students are no larger than twenty-five seats. A significant component of our marketing and self-description includes the claim that “Diversity and inclusion are
core values—we offer a welcoming environment." http://www.webster.edu/about.


5. Perhaps this will change, now that rape and sexual assault on college campuses have been identified as a major issue by the White House: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/22/memorandum-establishing-white-house-task-force-protect-students-sexual-a. (Thanks to APA newsletter editors for this reminder.)

6. Fish, Save the World on Your Own Time, 12.

7. Ibid., 14. Fish’s counsel runs counter to the trend in U.S. higher education to promote more “engaged” scholarship (see Association of American Colleges and Universities: https://aacu.org/civic_learning/index.cfm), and perhaps even to the new REF (Research Excellence Framework) standards to be rolled out in the UK by the end of 2014, through which funded research must demonstrate its impact beyond the walls of its academic institution: http://www.ref.ac.uk/.

8. Fish, Save the World on Your Own Time, 50.

9. Ibid., 70. In response to the objection that value-neutrality is impossible, that teaching on this model requires apathy and indifference, Fish qualifies his argument: we need not be indifferent, but our hopes for students must not translate into any kind of betrayal of our partisan leanings, or encouragement of one form of advocacy over another. Fish is not arguing that we cannot hold such commitments, but that as instructors we should keep them to ourselves. The difficulty of achieving the type of neutrality Fish advocates has nothing to do with its legitimacy and importance, he might say. If it’s tough to keep our views to ourselves, he might answer, then we’ll just have to try harder.


11. Ibid., 222.

12. Ibid., 213.

13. Ibid., 214.


15. Ibid., 213. My emphasis.

16. Of course, the conception of autonomy valued is not always particularly well defined or nuanced. Just as “rational” is sometimes simplistically defined as the opposite of “emotional,” “autonomous” is sometimes simplistically understood as the opposite of “heteronomous.” For more sophisticated and compelling conceptions of autonomy, see Marilyn Friedman’s Autonomy, Gender, and Politics, and Catriona MacKenzie and Natalie Stoljar’s edited collection Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self.

17. Fish, Save the World on Your Own Time, 27. Italics in original.


19. Ibid., 636. She also notes that “Advocacy of any kind . . . is viewed as inimical to objectivity in general and to the academy in particular” (634), and “[t]o represent objectivity as neutrality is also to encourage persons to mask evaluational and ethical assumptions in their research and policy and hence to avoid public disclosure of, and control over, those assumptions” (636).

20. This is not unlike Peter Singer’s strategy in Famine, Affluence, and Morality; “I begin with the assumption that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. I think most people will agree about this, although one may reach the same view by different routes. I shall not argue for this view. People can hold all sorts of eccentric positions, and perhaps for some of them it would not follow that death by starvation is in itself bad. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to refute such positions, and so for brevity I will henceforth take this assumption as accepted. Those who disagree need read no further” (221). Students rarely find fault with this particular strategy of Singer’s, even if they are much less sympathetic to some of his other claims. I have yet to have a student protest to me, at least, that my starting point—that rape is morally wrong—is an unjust approach to teaching the topic of rape.

21. It does not mean, however, that no harm is done. I still worry profoundly about these discussions, and always introduce the class and preface our discussions with a note of caution for survivors of rape. I warn them that they will read and view material that may have a “triggering” effect, and that they should feel free to leave the classroom at any time or set up alternative assignments ahead of time if they do not feel safe participating in class discussions. I am aware of the recent debates about “trigger warning” requirements for college syllabi, and although I have not made up my mind about whether this is good policy, and certainly appreciate some of the academic risks to such policies, it is perhaps fair to say that I offer a verbal “trigger warning” in my own classrooms. (Thanks to the APA newsletter reviewers for pointing to the relevance of these debates.)


23. Ibid., 220. Crouch notes: “Feminist philosophers and critical race philosophers have revealed these assumptions in their critiques of mainstream philosophy . . . their revelations seem to have been taken up by few, primarily philosophers whose work focuses on issues of justice and oppression. That is, the bias has been revealed, but it has not been recognized as a bias by many of those who possess it. . . . The bias is about gender, race, and ethnicity, as well as the very definition of philosophy, and so has significant practical implications for those who wish to study and develop careers in philosophy” (219).

BIBLIOGRAPHY


State of the Union: The APA Board of Officers

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The mission statement of the American Philosophical Association specifies that, as a professional organization, the APA “works to foster greater understanding and appreciation of the value of philosophical inquiry.” In this paper, I offer a glimpse into the history of the APA board of officers focusing on gender demographics. Given the unique structure of the APA, this look into our past as a professional organization offers some insight into where we are now and what sort of projects the board and its constituents ought to undertake in the future. I argue that in order to “foster greater understanding and appreciation of the value of philosophical inquiry” the APA must
embrace a reflexive praxis, and I offer some suggestions for incorporating such engaged insights into the APA board of officers’ agendas.

A number of different histories of the APA have been published over the years, including James Campbell’s A Thoughtful Profession: The Early Years of the American Philosophical Association, which John Lachs described as essential for understanding the “current problems” of the APA. What makes that history so interesting, in addition to the personalities involved, is the federal structure of the APA. If you have ever wondered why the APA can’t seem to accomplish what other professional organizations seem to accomplish, more likely than not, the answer lies with this structure. Yet, I would wager that the vast majority of APA members (as well as most of those professional philosophers who opt not to join) do not understand the federal structure or have no clear idea about what that structure means.

The brief statement on the APA’s website reveals only a hint of the full implications. I would like to start with that statement and then offer a more complete picture of our professional organizational structure, focusing on women. We read:

The American Philosophical Association was founded in 1900 to promote the exchange of ideas among philosophers, to encourage creative and scholarly activity in philosophy, to facilitate the professional work and teaching of philosophers, and to represent philosophy as a discipline.

Having grown from a few hundred members to over 10,000, the American Philosophical Association is one of the largest philosophical societies in the world and the only philosophical society in the United States not devoted to a particular field, school, or philosophical approach.

The APA’s three divisions, the Central, Eastern, and Pacific, founded in 1900, 1901, and 1924, respectively, conduct annual meetings at which philosophers present research and exchange ideas. Since 1927, the American Philosophical Association has functioned under a constitution providing for a national board of officers.1

It is specifically this board of officers that I would like to address in my brief comments.

I. FEDERAL STRUCTURE AND BOARD OF OFFICERS

The American Philosophical Association’s unique structure is unlike any other professional organization. What is not clearly articulated in the brief history I just quoted is that each of the divisions is more or less autonomous. Each has its own officers, and its own agenda. Each division also has its own personality and, over the years, there have been major rows and sustained efforts to maintain the distinctions as well as the autonomy (except during the war years, 1942–1944). Currently, the divisional officers (past president, president, vice president, secretary-treasurer, and representative) sit on the executive committees of their divisions as well as on the national board. The national office, located at the University of Delaware since 1975, runs the business of the APA, an official non-profit organization.

I will jump back to more history in a moment but I want to pause here to fill in more about the current make-up and functioning of the board of officers.

As you may know, the APA has a number of committees. Not all committees are created equal; six are designated as “standing committees” and an additional fourteen are “special committees.” Only the chairs of the six standing committees sit on the board of officers. The standing committees include the committees on academic career opportunities and placement; inclusiveness in the profession; international cooperation; lectures, publications, and research; status and future of the profession; and teaching philosophy. The committee on inclusiveness also includes the chairs of a number of special committees. As its charge reads, “The chairs of the six diversity committees (Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies; Status of Black Philosophers; Hispanics; Indigenous Philosophers; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender People; and Status of Women) and the ombudsperson for nondiscrimination serve as ex officio members of this committee. The committee includes also a member appointed specifically for her or his expertise on issues related to disability.”2 The other special committees, to complete the list, are the committees on (1) the defense of the professional rights of philosophers, (2) non-academic careers, (3) philosophy and computers, (4) philosophy and law, (5) philosophy and medicine, (6) philosophy in two-year colleges, (7) pre-college instruction in philosophy, and (8) public philosophy.

All committees submit annual reports that are read and discussed (albeit briefly) by the board; the reports were formerly published in the Proceedings and are now published online. Some reports show more activity than others; and committees do, on occasion, recommend their own demise or, less drastically, their own reconfiguration.

The current board is composed, then, of a chair, a vice chair, the executive director of the APA, the officers from each of the divisions, the six standing committee chairs, and, beginning in July 2014, three additional at-large members for a total of twenty-eight members.

This structure makes the APA board interesting and challenging. The work of the APA is conducted through ad hoc committees, task forces, the divisions, the standing and special committees, and of course the national office staff. Currently (as of 2012), the board meets four times a year (three by conference call and once in-person for a grueling but productive three-day meeting). Prior to 2012, the board met only once a year at the annual, in-person meeting (which was not always as long as it is now). Given that many decisions or actions of the board prior to 2012 would have to wait until that annual meeting, the business of the professional organization was very slow. Issues about or at the divisional conferences are handled...
by the divisions. The board oversees the national office, which manages membership, member benefits such as the newsletters and PhiJobs: Jobs for Philosophers, and many of the named prizes and lectures. Some issues actually cross the borders between divisions or otherwise affect every division. In addition, the board addresses issues of the profession including addressing sexual harassment in the profession (especially policy for APA-sponsored events), articulating best practices for interviewing, and establishing recommendations for childcare at divisional meetings, among other things. The national office runs the day-to-day business and provides the variety of member services, including publishing the newsletters and managing the member list. In recent years, the work of the national office has expanded tremendously as the APA seeks to provide more benefits and a more cohesive professional body for the membership.

II. HISTORY OF WOMEN ON THE BOARD
Women have been involved in the APA from the early years, but, as might be expected, not in the numbers required for a “critical mass” for social change. Mary Whiton Calkins was the first woman president of the American Philosophical Association (later the Eastern Division) in 1918-1919. The next was Grace Mead Andrus De Laguna (Eastern) in 1941-1942 and the third, Katherine Everett Gilbert (Eastern), served from 1946 to 1947. Margaret Georgiana Melvin was the first woman president of the Pacific Division in 1951-1952, and Isabel Payson Creed Hungerland held that office in 1962-1963. In other words, there was roughly one woman president across all the divisions each decade from the forties through the sixties (with no female presidents in the 1920s and 1930s). The early 1970s had clearly seen the effects of a revolution in inclusiveness committee. As the numbers show, she was as secretary of the Pacific Division and later as chair of the divisional offices on the national board. The history shows, inauspicious until recently. From 1980 to 2000, the number of women on the board was anywhere from one to five annually, with two being a pretty steady state. It is also worth noting that during many of those years, one of those few women was Anita Silvers. She joined the board in 1983 and was a more or less constant presence for thirty years: as secretary of the Pacific Division and later as chair of the inclusiveness committee. As the numbers show, she was at least once the only woman in the room and for many—far too many—years, she was one of two. Ruth Barcan

The chart shows both the size of the APA board of officers and the number of women on the board. In the 1980s, the Board consisted of just sixteen members: the executive director, a chair, chairs from five standing committees, and three officers from each division. The three officers included the divisional presidents. It was not until the late 1980s that presidents served for more than a single year. That explains quite a lot about why our professional organization appears to be so far behind other professional organizations. We were very late in deciding that longer-term commitments (or commitments per se) were needed for the health and well-being of the professional body. The minutes of the board’s annual meetings are available in the published Proceedings (usually the November issue but often in the January issue as the annual meeting floated a bit back then). While those minutes are not always as thorough as we might like, they do reveal many progressive attempts to bring about change in the organization. The various efforts to ensure childcare at divisional meetings are an excellent case in point. The history of that cause stretches back decades and includes many of the leading philosophers of generations. However, the history also shows the difficulty of working with the federal structure with rapid rotation of divisional officers on the national board.

The story of women on the board is, as the chart in Figure 1 shows, inauspicious until recently. From 1980 to 2000, the number of women on the board was anywhere from one to five annually, with two being a pretty steady state. It is also worth noting that during many of those years, one of those few women was Anita Silvers. She joined the board in 1983 and was a more or less constant presence for thirty years: as secretary of the Pacific Division and later as chair of the inclusiveness committee. As the numbers show, she was at least once the only woman in the room and for many—far too many—years, she was one of two. Ruth Barcan

If you will humor me, I would like to continue this walk down memory lane by looking at the last thirty-five years of the national board.

Figure 1. Women on the APA board of officers.

![Women on the APA board of officers chart]
Marcus was chair of the board for six years (1977–1983) and in 1982–1983 Philippa Foot was president of the Pacific Division; aside from those two positions, the numbers for the 1980s show women in the position of divisional secretaries. Truly, that position is vital for the functioning of the national organization as well as the divisional meetings, but it is also worth noting that the social imaginary needed to be changed.

As I mentioned, sometime in the late 1980s, the board increased to twenty-two members to include the vice presidents and the past presidents of each division. This allowed for three-year terms, rather than the single-year honorific terms of former divisional presidents. The early 1990s experienced a “surge” of involvement of, or inclusion of, women, but by the late 1990s, things were back to normal with women making up 5–14 percent of the board. Between 2000 and 2001, additional positions were included: a vice chair, a treasurer (a position held by the remarkable Steffi Lewis the entire time), and the chair of the inclusiveness committee. We see a marked increase in the number of women on the board at that time. There were some turbulent years in the mid-aughts. Karen Hanson took the reins as chair of the board; she not only brought things under control, she also conducted a thorough study of the APA and issued what is now called the “Hanson Report,” making crucial recommendations for significant changes. From 2004–2008, there was no vice chair, bringing the overall number on the board down to twenty-four. Dramatic changes are evident in 2010, when the number of women on the board really starts to climb, reaching over 50 percent for the first time for the 2009-2010 board year (52 percent). Moreover, it is worth mentioning that while feminists were powerful voices in the prior years, four well known feminists sat on the 2011-2012 board, including Claudia Card, Alison Wylie, Linda Alcoff, and Anita Silvers—and all in positions of power over other branches as past presidents or presidents of a division or as chair of one of the standing committees.

For 2014-2015, the board has grown again to a total of twenty-eight with three additional elected “at large” members, all three of whom are women. Currently, sixteen women are on the board for 2014-2015, including the board chair, Cheshire Calhoun. The executive director, Amy Ferrer, is a remarkable force, who brings a wealth of knowledge running non-profits. In short, in the last five years, we have taken our place as 50 percent of the national board of officers.

My reading of this all too brief account of the APA’s history—specifically the history of the national board—is twofold. On one hand, we have a right to be impatient. This profession is very late in changing and embracing a gender balance. On the other hand, we are living in exciting times. The last three years on the board have seen dramatic changes and I was genuinely thrilled to look around the table to see 50 percent women, 10–20 percent people of color, and approximately 10 percent disabled as well (depending on the year). There are also a significant number of people on the board who are young enough to know the importance of using new technologies.

But, obviously, there is a lot more work to do.

III. REFLEXIVE PRAXIS

Susan Moller Okin invited us to imagine a situation in which the people in power—the people who make policy and laws at all levels—have also nurtured a child and parented on a day-to-day basis. Although she was thinking of a liberal state, her insight carries over to the profession of philosophy. It also should be augmented significantly with other imaginations, such as where the people in power in philosophy have lived through struggles with poverty, sexual and/or racial harassment, inaccessible institutions, and a general sense of not being welcome. Patricia Hill Collins explores the standpoint of an academic insider-outsider through her work as a black woman in sociology; this concept is useful in philosophy as well. As academic insider-outsiders, those of us who hail from underrepresented groups experience the academy often as foreign and perhaps even hostile. We are also uniquely positioned within the academy to reveal elements hitherto unseen. The academic insider-outsider is useful when thinking through the background work necessary for bringing about change in the profession that is so important but rarely acknowledged or seen. As the governing body of the American Philosophical Association, the board of officers needs the standpoint of academic-insider-outsiders—at least until it no longer makes sense to speak of academic insiders at all.

Recently, the Pacific Division adopted a broad statement on program diversity, began collecting data on conference participation, and began actively encouraging support of diversity efforts by welcoming volunteers for session chairs, program ideas, and paper submissions. The Eastern Division conducted a similar demographic survey this past year. Understanding who we are—a widely diverse group of philosophers—and what we need in order to flourish as academics has become a model of what the APA national board can, should, and must do. I offer three suggestions for us as regular APA members (and non-members whom I hope might join or rejoin) for how we might help to change the profession. I focus on the board not because that is the best or the only avenue of changing the profession but because that is my focus in this reflection on the state of the union.

IV. INCORPORATING ENGAGED INSIGHTS INTO APA BOARD AGENDAS

First: Learn about the organization. So many of us learn about the unique structure and governing bodies of the APA by actually being on the board. Even regular committee members are rarely aware of the complex structure or decision-making policies and practices. They don’t know what role their committee plays in the overall structure. I say this from the experience of being on two standing committees and one special committee. It was not until I chaired a standing committee and attended my first board meeting that I began to understand the APA’s complex structure. I think most committees or committee members are unaware of their place in the overall governance (and financial) structure.
Those of us on the board ought to share what we know both for transparency and for strategic planning (including networking between committees). As chair of the committee that issues awards and prizes, for instance, I learned that the APA could and should receive more nominations. The committee in its current instantiation is attentive to diversity (demographic and philosophical), but we are not always given the candidates that allow us to act on that. My advice: nominate. The APA has over two dozen prizes, ranging from $500 to $30,000. We worked with other committees to generate applicants and even design new prizes. This sort of networking between committees works to the benefit of the organization and helps to create an atmosphere where a variety of voices and perspectives are respected.

Moreover, all of us in the profession should think about the right people to serve on the board. When that call for nominations comes, think of the positions of committee chairs differently. These are not CV-building positions; they are profession-shaping positions. In addition to the elements of diversity previously mentioned, there is one more that needs to be considered. All too often, the majority of members on the board come from R-1 institutions with large endowments. The research support funds and teaching releases at those institutions do not reflect the reality of most academic philosophers. As we think about board nominees, I would encourage us to think about populating the board with a wider variety of academic social classes. It might be argued that that further burdens the burdened—and it does—but the profession will not change unless the reality that most of us live is reflected in the discussions and decisions of the board.

My second suggestion is to use the organization. Ask a board member to take up a topic; use the committee structure. The six standing and fourteen special committees of the APA were designed and developed to address specific concerns in the profession. When they are chaired well, they function well. The task forces and ad hoc committees—like the recent task force on sexual harassment chaired by Kate Norlock and the task force on diversity chaired by Elizabeth Anderson—are particularly effective. They offer timely reports to problems identified by the board, problems often brought to our attention by regular members using the organization.

When we have longer-term issues of concern, we can raise them with specific committees. Many chairs welcome this input. All chairs ought to. We might also approach chairs or committee members with a plan of action that seeks the support of the APA committee structure.

My third point is what I call “Pay the dues.” Here I don’t mean merely paying the APA dues, although that is important. The APA cannot operate without our financial support. It has been and continues to be the governing body that sets the standards for interviews, sexual harassment policy, accessibility, etc. These professional standards and interventions have been historically important in changing hiring and retention matters. As professional organizations go, our dues are quite a steal.

But even more than that, by pay the dues I mean that we ought to put in the time—and expect others to put in the time—before issuing a complaint. It is too easy to use the blogosphere to air grievances but as the past few months have demonstrated, many of the grievances people raise against the APA are really issues that the APA as a formal organization has addressed—and was a leader in addressing. The APA is too easily seen as a scapegoat for issues that afflict the profession generally. Pay the dues by learning what policies the APA has and discussing issues with committee chairs before blaming the organization that, flawed though it is, has also been a defender of rights within the profession.

Each step forward often includes a step back. But we are building momentum and having the critical numbers of folks on the board who have lived through racism, sexism, heterosexism, poverty, welfare, domestic violence, disability, illness, injury, childbirth, menstruation, and all those other real things that make us interesting and human is crucial to continuing to change.8

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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NOTES
2. The rich resources of the APA website are available at http://www.apaonline.org.
3. The “Western Division” became the “Central Division” in 1985-1986.
4. Data collected by author from culling the board lists from the minutes. Available to APA members at http://www.apaonline.org/members/group_content_view.asp?group=110449&id=209151 and JSTOR.
5. I was also on the board at this time.
8. I am here using “real” in the same sense as the woman cited in Gloria Steinem’s essay “If Men Could Menstruate,” whose period came while she spoke at a conference. Steinem reports, she “said to the all-male audience, ‘and you should be proud to have a menstruating woman on your stage. It’s probably the first real thing that’s happened to this group in years.’” http://www.haverford.edu/psych/ddavis/p109g/steinem.menstruate.html.

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Mary Wollstonecraft and the Voice of Passion

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Mary Wollstonecraft’s tempestuous life and work have been the subject of extended commentary, and, in a sense, it would not be fair or accurate to say that hers is a reputation that needs resuscitation. Nevertheless, there are, so to speak, two Marys—there is the Enlightenment thinker who is the author of both the *Vindication of the Rights of Men* and the *Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, and the other Mary, author of novellas and letters, and passionate woman of her time. Indeed, the two dramatis personae here have long been seen by many as being at war; it has been difficult for commentators to reconcile Wollstonecraft’s appeals to reason with her writing style, or with some aspects of her own life.¹

None of this would be as problematic as it might immediately seem were it not the case that Wollstonecraft wrote the second *Vindication*, manifestly, to attempt to show that women are human beings possessing the same moral rights as men, and that they have capacities for reason that, in general, are unfulfilled and unused. Thus the very emotional qualities that Wollstonecraft often employs in her work might be deemed to be somewhat at variance with her stated theses, or so one could argue. That there is a holism at work here is an important point that requires argument, and an examination of Wollstonecraft’s work tends to support it.

*Maria, or the Wrongs of Woman,* is one of Wollstonecraft’s attempts to put some of her ideas in fictional form.² Edited by Godwin after her death, it is—like so much literature of the time—somewhat difficult to read today, but it is extremely helpful in elucidating the role that passion plays for a woman of sensibility. The Wollstonecraft of the *Vindications* is concerned that women have never been allowed to use their faculties; part and parcel of a woman’s faculties, however, is her capacity for passionate attachment. Before Maria is able to tell her story to Jemima, she already says a good deal that leads us to expect that she has had her own trials in adapting some sort of rationality to a life of high feeling:

> “Have patience!” exclaimed Maria, with a solemnity that inspired awe. “My god! How I have been schooled into the practice!” A suffocation of voice betrayed the agonizing emotions she was labouring to keep down; and conquering a qualm of disgust, she calmly endeavored to eat enough to prove her docility, perpetually turning to the suspicious female, whose observation she courted, while she was making the bed and adjusting the room.³

At this point we do not know about Maria’s marriage, but what we do know is that her trials in keeping her emotions in check bespeak the sort of personality that will always encounter difficulties with a slow pace.

Wollstonecraft was herself, of course, that sort of person; in a sense, her pleas for the vindication of women as creatures possessing a generally responsible human rationality run at cross purposes to some of the events of her own life. But the two strands of Mary merge, so to speak, in her larger purpose: what Wollstonecraft is after is a commitment to rationality with a sensibility behind it to point it along the way. Thus the difference between the life that Wollstonecraft sees for an educated woman and the possibilities that she sees for an educated man revolve around the notion of commitment and care for others, melded by a sort of trained passion. That these are important beliefs for Wollstonecraft is obvious from a perusal of all her works.⁴

What Maria needs is an adequate marriage, and a way to yoke the emotional power that she possesses to a life that would be worth leading. In an essay titled “Reason and Sensibility,” Catriona MacKenzie has written:

> [T]he overriding preoccupations of Wollstonecraft’s work, as well as of her life, were to articulate what it means for women to think and act as autonomous moral agents, and to envisage the kind of moral and political organization required for them to do so. Although at times she seemed to identify autonomy with reason, defining it in opposition to passion. . . . Wollstonecraft also struggled to develop an account of women’s moral agency that would incorporate not only a recognition of women’s capacity to reason but also of their right to experience and give expression to passion, including sexual desire.⁵

The expression of both passion and sexual desire were, of course, central issues in Wollstonecraft’s life. Perhaps one of the best exemplars of Wollstonecraft’s position on the unification of passion and reason is the character of Jemima in *Maria*. More so than the title character herself, Jemima embodies the challenge of a female intellect with the misfortune of grinding poverty at that stage in England’s history. It seems in her case that her every attempt to better herself—to make herself more aware of the world around her, and how to cope with it—leads to further degradation, which is made all the more painful for her because of her sensitivity, intelligence, and thoughtfulness.

In constructing this character, Wollstonecraft seems to want to be able to say that a different sort of social structure might provide for women in general, but would have a decidedly beneficial effect on a woman like Jemima who finds herself at the bottom of the social scale. If it is difficult for the woman of high social standing, how much more so for the woman with no connections. After Jemima has told a large part of her tale of woe, Wollstonecraft has Maria say the following:
And as for the affections . . . how gross, and even tormenting do they become, unless regulated with an improving mind! The culture of the heart ever, I believe, keeps pace with that of the mind.\textsuperscript{6}

This might serve as a summation for all that Wollstonecraft truly wants to assert—women have been deprived of ways of guiding their affections, and this lack of guidance (and the general improper social channeling to which women are often exposed) gives rise to the vain creature of fashion, so contemptuously treated by Wollstonecraft in the \textit{Vindication}.

The import of the second \textit{Vindication} is such that it is crucial to get clear on both why it must be seen, historically, as a significant philosophical work, and what the relationship of that work to Wollstonecraft’s other writings is. Although, as has been noted, Wollstonecraft’s personal life and relationships sometimes belie what she claims to be her reliance on rationality, we must note that such considerations are almost never taken into account in the work of male philosophers. Thus getting to the heart and core of her work is of considerable import.

II

Although it is clear that Wollstonecraft valorizes passion yoked to reason and commitment, much of the commentary on her work fails to take note of her position on religious questions and, tersely, of her metaphysical views, somewhat sketchy though they may have been. Spelling them out helps to fill in the blanks on why the uniting of reason and emotion are so important for her.

Wollstonecraft posits a general sort of Creator, and in Enlightenment fashion refuses to be specifically Christian about some portions of her doctrine. Instead, in a section of the second \textit{Vindication} titled “The Rights and Involved Duties of Mankind Considered,” she notes:

\begin{quote}
In what does man’s preeminence over the brute creation consist? The answer is as clear as that a half is less than the whole; in Reason.

What acquirement exalts one being above another? Virtue; we spontaneously reply.

For what purpose were the passions implanted? That man by struggling with them might attain a degree of knowledge denied to the brutes; whispers Experience.\textsuperscript{7}
\end{quote}

In other words, Wollstonecraft clearly sees a moral obligation on the parts of human beings to reaffirm their place in the scheme of things by fulfilling the duties for which their Creator has prepared them. Although by today’s standards Wollstonecraft is no doubt guilty of speciesism—and, in much of her work, Eurocentrism—it is obvious that the progressive import of her work is that there is to be no separation of the sexes insofar as these human characteristics are spelled out. Thus “Reason” is as available to women as to men, and Virtue is also available to all, given that any individual takes the care to attempt to inculcate it. Where Wollstonecraft shines is in her ability to discern that the bare conditions for the exercise of Reason and the attainment of Virtue may not be available to all. Thus she sees that many among the most poverty-stricken—men and women—are denied these conditions, and (among the upper classes) women preeminently. The uselessness of the lives of upper class women is not a fate to which they must be destined; it is a product of social conditions, and Mary Wollstonecraft is quite adept at delineating those conditions.

Contra Rousseau, Wollstonecraft does not see a “state of nature” as an ideal state. But she is well aware of the different uses to which states or governments may be put. In a society geared toward a humane notion of egalitarianism, the gifts that various individuals have—especially females—would be allowed to grow and put to some use. Indeed, as was customary at the time, it is clear that Wollstonecraft does feel that women have some special gifts, a point also made by Rousseau. In such a society, which had been put into place by the Creator, to so speak, would be allowed to grow in its own way, and to profit. The problem is that inegalitarian institutions, particularly those aimed toward the wealthy, or toward the betterment of males, have a tendency to encourage and inculcate behaviors that ultimately lead to “vice.”\textsuperscript{8}

Once again, Wollstonecraft sees no apparent contradiction between passion and reason, if they live on amicable terms in the same soul. But both her political essays, and works such as \textit{Maria}, show that the unrestrained growth of the passions can be harmful indeed.

Examples of the unhealthy society and what it can produce—a society based on privilege, and one that protects only or mainly privilege—abound in Wollstonecraft’s writings. In the second \textit{Vindication} she notes:

\begin{quote}
Strengthen the female mind by enlarging it, and there will be an end to blind obedience; but, as blind obedience is ever sought for by power, tyrants and sensualists are in the right when they endeavor to keep women in the dark, because the former only want slaves, and the latter a playing. The sensualist, indeed, has been the most dangerous of tyrants, and women have been duped by their lovers, as princes by their ministers, whilst dreaming that they reigned over them.\textsuperscript{9}
\end{quote}

Again, a social structure based on aristocratic dominance produces a sphere in which everyone is kept on a lower level, for the good of those on top. But, specifically, with respect to women, much that takes place allows for women to be demeaned within the confines of the home, even while they “dream that they reign.” Such a society is sunk in corruption and allows for the proper growth of virtually no one.

III

In a sense, Wollstonecraft aims at a sort of perfectibilism that is at least not incompatible with what will later become a fully developed utilitarianism. It is clear that she feels that the greater good of each—the fuller development of each—leads to the greater good of the whole. Her feminism,
as we have seen, leads some critics to be wary of her emphasis on passion, but leads still others to be concerned about her lack of what we might label (in today’s terms) a “gender” view. Thus Wollstonecraft is, preeminently, a feminist whose avowed goal for women is a set of rights compatible, insofar as is possible, with those given to men. As Moira Gatens says,

In her attempt to stretch liberal principles of equality to women she neglects to note that these principles were developed and formulated with men as their object. Her attempts to stretch these principles to include women results in both practical and conceptual difficulties. These principles were developed with an (implicitly) male person in mind, who is assumed to be a head of household (a husband/father) and whose domestic needs are catered for (by his wife). . . . No matter how strong the power of reason, it cannot alter the fact that male and female embodiment . . . involved vastly different social and political consequences.¹⁰

But a fair assessment of this line of critique must make implicit (and explicit) allusion to the period in which Wollstonecraft was living. We know that her first Vindication was specifically addressed to Burke, the same Burke who, in his Reflections, wants to know why a thousand swords did not come to the defense of Marie Antoinette. Wollstonecraft has to fight battles on at least two major fronts: the blows for women come in the context of the French Revolution, the primary blows of which were aimed, obviously, at the aristocracy. Any move that is made at the time for a full establishment of women’s rights perforce must be a slant or take which draws on the greater line of the establishment of human rights in general, and it is, of course, men who are paradigmatically the possessors of these rights.

All of the foregoing is consistent with what we have already articulated as Wollstonecraft’s anti-Rousseauian, or anti-state of nature, stance. Again, it is not society or civilization itself that is the issue: it is the way in which society is structured. Gatens is correct in that we see very little evidence in Wollstonecraft of the type of feminism that, in today’s terms, gives gender its due. But it simply was not possible for Wollstonecraft to theorize in that manner at that time.

IV

We have been arguing that the apparent tension and contradiction alleged to exist in Wollstonecraft between the voices of reason and passion is not nearly as serious an issue as some have made it out to be. What Wollstonecraft is after is a uniting of reason and passion so that the one governs the other, but the latter enriches the former. This, along with education and a striving for wholeness, will, according to Wollstonecraft, ultimately yield the society that is best for all.

Part of our argument has been that much of the commentary on Mary Wollstonecraft as a thinker omits works such as Maria in the discussion of the two Vindications. Although we have no evidence that Wollstonecraft thought seriously about the notion of genre, the fact that she wrote in a variety of modes should signal to us that she took her fiction to be important. It is clear that the characters drawn in Maria—both the title character and Jemima, for example—are intended to further her own arguments in a literary sort of way. Jemima is a victim of England’s worst social conditions, and she is female. She develops what at the time would have been regarded as a peculiarly female range of vices, and she is herself a proponent of the idea that social conditions forced her into such a state. But, as we have seen, Wollstonecraft is concerned about egalitarianism as a whole. The point of creating more equal social conditions is, ultimately, the betterment of society. And there is no exaggeration in saying that everything Wollstonecraft wrote is dedicated to this end: a society infused with passion and governed by reason.

NOTES
1. Catherine Villanueva Gardner, for example, in her Women Philosophers (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2003), has an entire chapter on Wollstonecraft to address these issues. Part of her argument is that Wollstonecraft’s style cannot easily be separated from her claims. As she says, “the expression and form of her work is integrally connected to its moral content” (83).
3. Ibid., 63.
4. Gardner remarks that “This is not to say, of course, that Wollstonecraft is not aware of the way that sensibilidad is a double-edged sword for women” (Gardner, Women Philosophers, 110.).
6. Wollstonecraft, Maria, 88-89.
8. Ibid., 16.

BOOK REVIEWS

Immigration Justice


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According to what criteria should states grant or refuse admission to prospective immigrants? In Immigration Justice, Peter Higgins provides the first systematic feminist analysis of the philosophical question of immigration. Formulating just immigration policies, Higgins argues, requires analyzing immigration as a matter of structural
justice, and hence using gender, race, class, sexual orientation, etc., as central analytical categories. That is, to the extent that immigration policies have an impact on individuals as members of particular social groups, whether immigration policies are just can be assessed only by considering the particular social institutions and relations from which those social groups result. Specifically, Higgins's central thesis, which he calls the Priority of Disadvantage Principle (PDP), holds that "just immigration policies may not avoidably harm social groups that are already unjustly disadvantaged" (20). Because the empirical context that renders certain social groups vulnerable varies from state to state, which particular immigration policy a particular state should adopt will depend on the particular empirical circumstances that characterize it. In our non-ideal world, then, the justice of immigration policies cannot be determined a priori, but instead will always be context-dependent. Since it requires that immigration policies be adopted by each state on a case-by-case basis, the PDP by itself thus neither universally supports nor universally precludes restrictive or permissive immigration policies. Higgins's position stands in sharp contrast with the three main types of position in the current philosophical debate on immigration: the moral sovereignty of states view, the prescriptive nationalist view, and the open borders view advocated by many cosmopolitans. Philosophically innovative and empirically informed, *Immigration Justice* fills a crucial gap in the literature.

In the first chapter, Higgins introduces the general empirical and philosophical contexts surrounding the question of immigration. The chapter begins by setting aside some common misconceptions regarding the patterns and causes of international migration, such as the belief that most of the world's migration is from the south to the north, by the world's poorest, who choose the destination that they know will maximize their economic prospects; that emigration is mainly driven by poverty, persecution, and overpopulation; or that open-borders immigration policies represent an effective means of alleviating global poverty. Global migration data, Higgins explains, shows instead that south-north migration accounts for only 35 percent of global migration; that most migrants are people from socially intermediate classes and from parts of the world that are witnessing economic development; that the main causes of emigration are personal connections (such as family and friends), ecological disasters, and globalization; that migration flows tend to follow historical colonization and military ties; and that migration from the global south to the global north contributes to keeping the former dependent on the latter. These empirical observations take on particular significance in light of Higgins's concern with the structural character of immigration justice. Precisely in virtue of this concern, Higgins goes on, in the remainder of the chapter, to challenge two problematic assumptions that often underlie and shape the philosophical debate on immigration: John Rawls's view that immigration can be usefully be analyzed through an ideal-theoretical lens; as well as the view, held by Joseph Carens or Thomas Pogge, for example, that immigration is merely an epiphomenon of global poverty. Higgins argues that ideal theory, by failing to consider the structurally unjust character of our non-ideal world, will yield normatively inadequate policy recommendations; and that immigration policies and international migration constitute exacerbating factors in global inequalities of wealth and opportunity. Higgins concludes the chapter by drawing out its implications in light of the PDP: determining which particular immigration policies are just for a particular state will be contingent on two main factors, namely, the global economic and political position of that particular state, as well as the social groups most vulnerable to the immigration policies adopted by that particular state.

Chapters two and three identify significant problems with two prominent types of position in the philosophical debate on immigration. In chapter two, Higgins carefully examines nationalist approaches to immigration justice. Higgins considers well-known arguments advanced respectively by Michael Walzer, David Miller, and Stephen Macedo—all proponents of prescriptive nationalism, which holds that a state's immigration policy should be guided by that state's "national interest," understood in political, cultural, or economic terms. Collectively, these arguments presuppose the following: there is a morally salient difference between citizens and foreigners; great global harms such as severe poverty and major basic rights violations are due entirely to domestic causes (the explanatory nationalist view); immigration is a matter of beneficence rather than one of distributive justice (let alone structural justice); nations are unified, homogeneous entities; and the economic welfare of the receiving state has normative priority (and might accordingly require admitting more or less immigrants). Higgins's careful examination of nationalistic approaches reveals that they rest on both morally inadequate and empirically inaccurate assumptions: for example, "national interest" more transparently corresponds to "dominant interest" and speculations regarding the economic impact of skilled versus unskilled migration either fails to take the full domestic, let alone global, picture into account or turns out to be simply false.

In chapter three, Higgins thoroughly reviews cosmopolitan approaches to immigration justice. He first considers inclusive cosmopolitan arguments. In this section, he surveys two of the most famous arguments in the debate on immigration (made respectively by Carens, Chandran Kukathas, Will Kymlicka, and Phillip Cole, among others): that opening borders represents an effective remedy for global poverty, and that it is logically entailed by liberalism. Higgins shows that both arguments rely on inaccurate empirical assumptions. First, the world's poorest most often do not have the means to emigrate. Second, poverty does not result merely from domestic factors plaguing certain countries. Indeed, brain drain and remittances can each exacerbate poverty. Third, structures of inequality impacting members of vulnerable groups (women, racialized, and poor people) tend to constitute a transnational constant between sending and receiving societies. The other inclusive cosmopolitan arguments challenged by Higgins in this section are the Rawlsian, libertarian, and democratic arguments for open borders (advanced respectively by Carens, Hillel Steiner, John Exdell, and Carol Gould). Higgins next considers exclusive cosmopolitan arguments, which hold that the equal moral status of citizens and foreigners sometimes requires
restricting immigration. In this section he addresses four arguments: the environmental impact, egalitarian ownership, political burden, and global harm arguments (advanced respectively by Robert Chapman, Mathias Risse, Michael Blake, and Shelley Wilcoxon). Higgins's thorough review of extant cosmopolitan approaches ultimately shows that they suffer from an internal inconsistency, from a lack of empirical or philosophical support for their own conclusions, or from both. Higgins makes clear, however, that he does not oppose cosmopolitan approaches in principle. Indeed, his own PDP is a further type of cosmopolitan approach (since it denies that there is a morally salient difference between citizens and foreigners).

Chapters two and three having seriously called into question some of the most prominent positions on immigration justice, chapters four, five, and six proceed respectively to explain, defend, and apply the PDP. In chapter four, Higgins spells out each of the axiomatic terms that make up the PDP: "just immigration policies may not avoidably harm social groups that are already unjustly disadvantaged" (108). Drawing on the work of Iris Marion Young and of Ann Cudd, Higgins defines social groups as "constituted and differentiated from one another by members' relation to social institutions, which condition the opportunities of the members of a social group in similar ways" (111). Social institutions refer to formal and informal norms and practices. Because the existence of social groups is a function of social institutions, membership in a social group does not depend on self-identification and what social groups there are will vary across space and time with the social institutions whose product they are (112-113). A social group is disadvantaged "when its members tend to lack central human capabilities, relative to the members of the corollary privileged group" (119). Higgins conceives of capabilities as positive freedoms or individuals' effective ability "to do certain things or achieve certain ends (that is, to function in certain ways)" (122). Individuals' capabilities, like the social groups to which those individuals belong, are determined by the way social institutions operate (123). Higgins's conception of the metric of disadvantage in terms of capabilities avoids the problems of both underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness that both a subjective welfare and a resource account face (124). A social group's disadvantage is unjust, moreover, when either membership in that social group is not voluntary or when individuals have a moral right to voluntary participation in the group (132). Higgins specifies that he conceives of the PDP not as a backward-looking principle that would impose "a duty of rectification owed to socially disadvantaged groups on account of the unjust disadvantage they have experienced" but rather as a forward-looking, consequentialist principle (135). (The difference between the backward-looking and forward-looking understandings of the PDP, Higgins explains, matters not in its defense but in its application.) An immigration policy harms a disadvantaged social group when an alternative policy would bring about more expansive capabilities for that group's members. This harm is avoidable if there is an alternative policy that "harms that group less" and that "does not harm a more disadvantaged social group" (141).

With the definition of the PDP firmly in place, Higgins turns, in chapter five, to the defense of the PDP. Against the moral sovereignty of states view, which holds that states are free to choose whatever policies they wish, Higgins argues that states must choose their immigration policies according to certain principles of justice. He rejects the international state of nature, communitarian, freedom of association, and associative ownership arguments for the moral sovereignty of states view (advanced respectively by John Scanlan, O. T. Kent, Walzer, Christopher Wellman, and Ryan Pevnick). The moral sovereignty of states view is a non-substantive view that challenges all views that hold that states' immigration policies should be subject to certain principles of political morality (that is, all views that provide a substantive criterion by which to assess the justice of immigration policies). Upholding the PDP (Higgins's own version of the cosmopolitan approach) thus requires defending it against prescriptive nationalist principles of political morality as well as against competing cosmopolitan principles of political morality. In doing so in the remainder of the chapter, Higgins stresses the normative priority that the capabilities of members of unjustly disadvantaged groups should be accorded when selecting immigration policies.

Because capabilities play such a crucial role in Higgins's argument, somewhat more detailed account of capabilities would have been a pertinent addition to delineate more precisely the PDP and its implications. Relatedly, Higgins's defense of the PDP, in chapter five and throughout the book overall, emerges primarily from the negative critique of competing approaches rather than as a positive argument. As an explanatory rather than a justificatory chapter, chapter four specifies, rather than positively argues for, the PDP. Still, by successfully challenging its many rivals in chapters two, three, and five, Higgins makes a robust and persuasive case for the PDP.

Higgins closes, in the sixth and final chapter, by making concrete policy recommendations based on the PDP. Specifically, he assesses eight exclusion criteria (poverty or financial need, cultural dissimilarity, national origin, social group membership, medical condition, criminal history, national security, and annual quotas); two admission criteria (economic potential and family relationships); and three admissions-related immigration policies (emigration compensation, emigration restrictions, and emigrant taxation).

Like the nationalist and the other cosmopolitan approaches, the PDP is not defined by the specific type (restrictive or permissive) of policy recommendation that it makes. What makes the PDP a uniquely forceful approach to immigration justice is that it fundamentally rethinks the relevant social ontology of global migration. Migration involves, first, individuals not as isolated atoms but as members of particular social groups. Migration affects, moreover, not only migrating individuals but also non-migrating members of unjustly disadvantaged social groups in both the receiving and especially the sending societies. This means, finally, that migration flows are not causally prior to states' immigration policies, as if the former occurred entirely independently of the latter. States' immigration policies have a direct impact on global migration and their
significantly yet avoidably harmful consequences can no longer be ignored in discussions of immigration justice. Those discussions must therefore be empirically informed in the relevant ways—that is, in ways that take the relevant social ontology into account.

In addition to providing an extremely thorough and insightful survey of the literature, Immigration Justice offers a novel, compelling, and important contribution to the debate on immigration. The book will be of great interest not only to scholars and students working on immigration in particular, but also to anyone working on territorial rights, nationalism, cosmopolitanism, global justice, poverty, development, international relations, and feminist philosophy.

Our Bodies, Whose Property?


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In Our Bodies, Whose Property? Anne Phillips argues that human bodies should not be understood as property. Her novel and engaging argument for this thesis has two steps. First, we are all fundamentally embodied beings and, in this way, we are all equally vulnerable, regardless of our material positions. Therefore, bodies are not like objects we can sell because embodiment is fundamentally linked to our moral equality. Secondly, applying property conventions to bodies would further undermine economic justice because bodily markets are intrinsically unequal, and allowing markets in body parts or bodily services would have unjust macro-level effects. Together, these arguments are a powerful challenge to the idea that property conventions should extend to the human body.

In this review, I argue that, contrary to Phillips, we should think of bodies as objects, and that property conventions should apply to body parts and bodily service markets. I first refute Phillips’s claim that we are fundamentally embodied beings. This has important implications for her discussion of rape and why rape is harmful. I then turn to Phillips’s arguments about property and markets. I argue that property conventions should apply to bodies because organ and surrogacy markets are at least voluntary, unlike legal limits on markets. Policies that restrict bodily service markets risk making the bodies of the worst off involuntarily subjected to the authority of the political community, which is a greater harm than the harms associated with markets.

1. RAPE AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BODIES

In contrast to other objects, bodies could be especially morally important either because of their conditional relationship with other experiences or goods, or in their own right. Phillips argues that bodies are morally distinctive in their own right because people are intrinsically embodied and the self cannot be understood apart from the body (11). Most ethicists would acknowledge that people are valuable whether they are valued or not. Phillips’s claim is that bodies are also unconditionally valuable because they cannot be separated from the people who inhabit them. The alternative view, what Phillips calls “dualism,” is that the person is distinct from the body. Dualism holds that bodies are just like other objects, except for the fact that people think of bodies as especially valuable and they are usually instrumental to health, autonomy, or happiness.

Phillips begins by noting that there is a gendered subtext to dualism that elevates the mind and reason at the expense of emotions and the body (29). From a feminist perspective, embodiment is morally significant because women and men do have different concerns in virtue of their distinctive bodies, and devaluing the body perpetuates the idea that the male body is a kind of moral default, while the female body is an anomaly. Moreover, bodily experiences like pain and fear are important in understanding the distinctive harmfulness of rape (64). Insofar as dualism encourages us to think of rape as a “mind crime,” or as “sex minus consent,” dualism misses important aspects of the phenomenology of rape, particularly the significance of harms to the body (63).

I am skeptical about the intrinsic significance of embodiment, though I believe that embodiment can be significant for conditional reasons, such as the fact that many people experience their embodiment as especially significant. I am convinced of dualism in part because of science fiction hypotheticals such as Derek Parfit’s example of a teletransporter. Parfit asks us to imagine a teletransporter that obliterates every atom in my body on earth and creates an atom-by-atom replica at a space station on Mars. Though my body (including my brain) has been obliterated, I have survived because “what matters” about me, my psychology and my memories, woke up on Mars. If this example is unconvincing, we needn’t appeal to science fiction to make this point. Brain transplants and artificial bodies are almost technologically possible. The intuition that we do not think that transplants or teletransportation are a threat to what matters about a person suggests that we do not believe that people are intrinsically embodied, and that bodies are more like objects we can possess or inhabit. These examples also challenge the claim that dualism is question-begging because it cannot explain what is left of the self without the body (26). It is true that minds happen to require bodies, but bodies are not intrinsically necessary for the existence of a mind.

If dualism is plausible, Phillips’s critique of the dualist “sex minus consent” theory of rape merits a closer look. There is an entire subculture of people who seek consensual sex that causes them pain and fear, and view masochistic sex as a form of empowerment. Emphasizing the bodily aspect of rape seems to suggest that there is at least something pro tanto wrong with BDSM, but as long as it is consensual, it’s not clear why painful sex or sex that causes fear is wrong at all. On the other hand, some rape victims may not experience pain or fear when they are raped, yet even without pain and fear, rape is nevertheless an unconscionable violation. This suggests that lack of consent is sufficient to explain why rape is wrong.
One concern about the dualist approach is that it makes it more difficult for people to identify with rape victims because it masks the fact that we are all vulnerable as a result of our embodiment (64). Yet a focus on embodiment doesn’t necessarily benefit rape victims. Implicit association tests reveal that men who score highly on rape-behavior analogues and display rape proclivities are more likely to associate images of female bodies with objects. Moreover, social psychologists find that when women are objectified, they are less likely to be perceived as having independent minds, and objectification also diminishes perceptions of women’s ability to experience pain and causes perceptions of incompetence. These studies suggest that attentiveness to embodiment may diminish people’s ability to identify with rape victims, since objectification overemphasizes embodiment and de-emphasizes a woman’s mind.

2. BODIES AND EQUALITY

Phillips’s rejection of dualism is also significant because it supports her arguments against thinking of bodies as objects within a broader property framework. If persons and bodies are inseparable, then bodily markets could be interpreted as akin to markets in people. Phillips rejects this equivalence, but she does argue that dualism threatens to disparage the body (53) in a way that can potentially legitimize thinking of one’s own and others’ bodies as resources to be bought and sold (104). Yet this possibility is only a concern if it is a mistake to think of bodies as marketable resources. In this section, I turn to Phillips’s arguments against applying property conventions to bodies. While I agree that the property system should treat bodies differently from other objects, I will suggest that the specialness of bodies is actually a reason in favor of thinking of bodies as property.

Even though bodies are not intrinsically different from objects like cars or computers, they are very different from other objects in virtue of their very close connection to people’s minds. Harm to the body can cause physical pain as well as emotional distress. At least for now, whole bodies are irreplaceable. More than other objects, bodies are necessary for people to carry out their intentions. Bodies tend to be more intimately tied to a sense of self, and people tend to think of their bodies as sacred or morally significant. Even if those views are mistaken, it is at least morally significant that people overwhelmingly think their bodies different from other objects and value them differently.

One lesson to take from the fact that people tend to value their bodies as especially intimate and important is that of all the objects that a property system would deny people control over, bodies should be the last on that list. For this reason, taxes on income are generally more acceptable than the kidney taxes that are proposed by Cecile Fabre. Conscripting a person is morally worse than copying and using an idea for the greater good. Of all the objects that can be appropriated and controlled, bodies are off limits. Phillips interprets this as a consideration against extending property conventions to bodies, whereas I will suggest that the subjective importance of bodies is actually a consideration in favor of bodily markets.

Phillips endorses limits on bodily markets such as organ sales and surrogacy contracts for the sake of economic justice. She claims it is delusional to think that anyone would choose to specialize in selling body parts or services were it not for their economic deprivation, so bodily markets are inherently premised on inequality (120). Property systems should not promote markets that are inherently unequal, so property conventions should not extend to the body. Elsewhere, I have argued that bodily markets are not more linked to material inequality than other markets, and that bodily markets may alleviate other troubling inequalities between healthy and unhealthy people. I reject any property system that requires people to sell their labor or body parts in order to survive, which is why I advocate for a basic income. Unlike a basic income, limits on bodily markets address material inequality by limiting the options of the worst off, rather than by redistributing the wealth of the better off.

A related argument against markets is that property conventions should not reliably undermine people’s ability to recognize our common humanity, which bodily markets would do. On Phillips’s account, embodiment highlights our shared vulnerability and grounds our moral equality (39), and thinking of bodies as property makes it easier for purchasers to discount the sacrifice that is made by people who sell bodily services or body parts (117). Still, I am not convinced that the fact that we all have bodies grounds the specialness of the body (18). Time is also a scarce resource that highlights our shared vulnerability, yet all labor markets sell human time and that practice does not undermine perceptions of the moral equality of people who work long hours. One could reply that allowing time to be governed by market norms does make it harder to identify with workers and easier for employers to discount the sacrifice of employees. But this argument against property conventions risks proving too much by condemning all labor markets as pro tanto unjust.

Finally, even if markets in bodily services do undermine perceptions of equal moral status, it is not clear that limiting surrogacy contracts and organ markets solves the problem. Phillips is admirably nuanced in her policy solutions. One concern about these solutions, however, is that they treat potential surrogates and organ vendors differently from other workers. In this way, limits on organ and surrogacy markets could undermine perceptions of moral equality rather than protecting moral equality. If people who would be inclined to provide surrogacy services or organ sales are denied the legal right to do so, especially if the reason for limiting their occupational freedom are linked to their lower economic status, then limits in bodily markets could heighten perceptions of inequality and contribute to other paternalistic or infantilizing attitudes towards women and the economically worst off. Indeed, the same reasons that make bodily markets problematic also make any policy solutions intended to restrict bodily markets even more problematic. I will expand on this argument in the final section.
3. MACRO-LEVEL EFFECTS AND THE PROPERTY SYSTEM

Phillips favors limits on bodily markets because she maintains that the property system should promote equality. Above, I suggested that treating surrogates and organ vendors differently in a property system could contribute to perceptions of inequality. But Phillips is not only concerned with the equality of particular surrogates and organ vendors; she is also concerned with the equality of women and economically vulnerable people as groups. She suggests that property conventions applied to bodies could prevent policy makers from considering the macro-level effects of body part and bodily service markets (145).

For example, organ markets could mean that kidneys are viewed as permissible forms of collateral for loans and bodily service markets could contribute to a society where even more invasive uses of employees’ bodies are accepted. Phillips draws an analogy to other labor regulations when she suggests that governments in both cases should restrict the options of the vulnerable individuals for the sake of vulnerable groups (90). This position is not paternalistic; rather, the worry is that thinking of some people’s bodies as commodities could ultimately make everyone worse off by introducing pressure for everyone to commodify their bodies.7

I grant that these macro-level harms are possible, although I’m not sure it would be a bad thing if people felt pressure to sell organs, since that pressure would make organ shortages less likely. But even if surrogacy and organ markets do lead to social pressure to participate, at least the participants in those markets still give their consent. In contrast, any policy that limits bodily service markets coercively deprives would-be participants control over their bodies without giving them the opportunity to consent. For this reason, property conventions should apply more strongly to body parts and bodily service markets than other kinds of markets, because it is more important that people are able to consent to what happens to their bodies than other objects they control. Even if it is morally problematic that poor and middle income people’s bodies are used to patch up or gestate the bodies of the rich, it is more problematic if poor and middle income people are prohibited from making decisions about their own bodies for the sake of social and economic justice. Phillips is aware of this concern but does not address the objection that legal regulations of bodily markets are particularly wrong because people cannot consent to them (30).

Opponents of bodily service and body part markets frame the issue as if the pro-market side is exploiting the bodies of the poor for their own goals, which in this case are the goals of solving organ shortages and assisting infertile couples. Those who favor limits on bodily service and body part markets also deprive the worst off of control over their bodies by supporting legal limits on occupational freedom. The difference is that the worst-off consent to participation in markets but are never asked to consent to legal limits on their economic options. My concern is that any effort to limit bodily service and body part markets potentially trades voluntary subjugation in the marketplace for involuntary legal oppression. Even if property conventions applied to bodies did undermine economic justice in some ways, the refusal to extend property conventions to bodily services and body parts is a greater injustice.

NOTES


Holding and Letting Go: The Social Practices of Personal Identities


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This is a book about the social practice of personhood and personal identities. Rather than thinking of personhood as a status conferred on an individual only in virtue of some capacity the individual has, as many philosophers have traditionally done, Lindemann argues for a relational understanding of personhood in which existing persons not only initiate other humans into personhood but also collaboratively define their personal identities, hold each other in them, and eventually let each other go. She explores what such holding and letting go looks like in a variety of different contexts through the life course—pregnant women considering their fetuses, parents rearing children, relatives attending dying loved ones—and offers analysis of how we might morally evaluate such work. What is it to hold others well, when are we required to let go, and how can we recognize clumsy, but still valuable, holding done by individuals whose own identities are beginning to fray?

To give the relatively abstract discussions traction, Lindemann populates the book with well-crafted, illustrative stories. These short narratives offer the reader a glimpse of how identity work plays out in the complicated relationships that make up human lives. As she notes in the closing chapter, the social practice of holding and letting go of the stories that in part comprise the identities
of our fellow humans is so natural to most of us that it
goes unnoticed. We do it, but we may not recognize or
at least make explicit what we are doing. With this book,
Lindemann encourages the reader to broaden the meaning
of personhood, to appreciate its deeply social nature.

Personhood, for Lindemann, is the "practice of physically
expressing one's personality to other persons who recognize
the expression for what it is and respond accordingly" (97).
To be a person, then, a human must have sufficient mental
activity to have a personality and aspects of that personality
must be expressed somehow (even if not in language). This
means that fetuses are not yet persons, and individuals in
persistent vegetative states and anencephalic infants are
likewise not persons. But many others—including very young
infants and individuals with profound cognitive disabilities—
would indeed be persons, not only because they can
express personality but also because other people can help
to hold them in their identities. On this view, personhood
is socially made, not individually discovered. Other persons
call individuals into personhood and help them develop and
hold on to their personal identities. Because of this, one
cannot be a person if one is never recognized as such by
any other person.

Lindemann opens the book with a chapter that relays her
family's experience holding her sister Carla, a child born
with hydrocephaly, in personhood. Although Carla had
significant cognitive disabilities and a relatively brief life,
hers family helped to weave an identity for her—a vulnerable
infant daughter, a playmate, a valued member of the
household. The identity conferred by each family member
needed a ground in Carla's personality and her situation,
but each family member saw her somewhat differently, and
the web of these narratives combined with her personality
gave Carla a personal identity. In Carla's case, her identity
was maintained more fully by her family members than
through her own active contributions. In more typical
cases, individuals contribute significantly to their personal
identities from a first-person perspective, based on how
they understand and identify themselves; but even here,
the stories and perspectives of others inevitably shape
one's personal identity.

One might naturally wonder, though, if some nonhuman
species ought not be recognized as persons on this social
view. Is my dog—who decidedly has his own personality,
expresses it and gets recognition for it, has narratives told
to help shape his identity—also a person? On this question,
Lindemann notes that other species may have their own
social practices that result in something like a community
of shared assumptions and an interconnected way of being,
but such creatures do not "share in our form of life" (19).
Unlike a nonhuman animal, Carla was "born into a nexus of
human relationships that made her one of us" (20). We love
other animals and share our lives with them, but they do
not thereby become persons; what we mean by "person"
is a social achievement of humans. (This leaves open the
possibility that other social species may have their own
versions of something like personhood, which is unique to
their group and built from their particular social practices; it
also recognizes the reality that human persons have moral
obligations to nonhuman animals even if they are not our

kind of person.) This line of thinking, also explored by Cora
Diamond (1991) and Eva Kittay (2005), has an intuitive
appeal, but one imagines some readers wanting more
justification here.

In chapter two, Lindemann explores the way we might
begin to call a fetus into personhood. A newly pregnant
woman, for instance, cannot appeal to any personality of
the embryo inside her, but if she wants to be a mother,
she may begin to tell stories about the embryo, her
relationship with it, and her own evolving self-conception.
She sets the stage for the arrival of a new person, and
prepares others to expect him/her as well. The stories that
are told call up new narratives of identity, and these create
normative expectations about how others should respond.
Lindemann, borrowing from Ruddick (2000), suggests that
we can have "proleptic" or forward-looking relationships
with the fetus, in which we act as if a future state of affairs
already existed (as if the fetus already is a person) (48).
Nonetheless, Lindemann is clear that, on her view, fetuses
cannot count as persons because they do not have their
own personality to express early on, and later, any proto-
expression of personality is hidden from view and cannot be
socially recognized. (She grants that the pregnant woman
herself may recognize some expressions of personality in
the later stages of pregnancy—"she's a real kicker"—and
such stories may begin to form a proto-identity for the late-
term fetus, but Lindemann asserts that "fetal identities are
too rudimentary to get a purchase on [personhood]" (59)).

Chapter three, "Second Persons," explores the ways in which
babies gain personal identities and personhood, even well
before they are capable of reason or language or many of
the other traditional philosophical marks of personhood.
Even very young babies interact with their caregivers and
imitate them, learning bit by bit how to participate in the
human social game: its expressions, rules, norms, etc.
Over time, they learn habits of both thought and action
that become what Aristotle thought of as "second nature."
This chapter also explores how young children get sorted
into, and learn to sort others into, social categories, such
as gender, race or ethnicity, religious group, ability group,
etc. Belonging in such categories is not simply discovered
through acknowledgement of natural facts but is conferred
based on widely shared rules that find expression in our
language, our categorization schemas, our power systems,
etc. Lindemann cites work by Asta Sveinsdottir (2013) and
a paper by Sally Haslanger (2003); Haslanger's 2012 book
Resisting Reality is a good resource here as well. Resisting
the identities bound up with deeply engrained social kinds
is incredibly difficult. We can have an identity conferred
on us that we want to resist, but it is still possible, even
likely, that "we will be treated according to who we seem
to be, even if that's not who we are" (82). A young black
man can resist mainstream society's implicit categorization
of him as a potential threat or a possible criminal, but he
may nonetheless be understood that way and feel trapped
in an imposed narrative web that he struggles to escape.
Even social misrepresentations of identity, then, can have
surprising power in holding us in identities we resist. This
leads to a discussion about the importance of letting go
of some identities, of recognizing when others whose
personalities and identities we thought we had characterized
aptly turn out to contest those characterizations, or simply to grow away from them. Our personal identities, then, are achieved through interpersonal recognition and response. They are not simply an aggregate of our experience and narratives told by us and others about that experience but a chosen selection of those experiences that confers a particular identity: this helps to define me, while that was an aberration or a fluke that does not play a significant role in my ongoing story.

In the fourth chapter, Lindemann takes up “ordinary identity work” and what it means to “respond accordingly” to a personality, as well as why that is an important part of the practice of personhood. She starts from the under-appreciated idea that we are all practicing improvisation in our lives: we can never be sure of what to expect, whom we will encounter, or what role we might need to play in response, and so we end up performing some roles and identities awkwardly (101). Indeed, performances of identity and responses to them can go wrong in a variety of ways, including 1) someone being “off” mentally, because drunk, insane, obsessively holding on to negative stories; 2) someone offering misleading expressions of identity, as in someone withholding important information relative to their identity, or deliberately deceiving another about one’s identity pretending to be someone else; 3) others misinterpreting what they see, what Lindemann calls “misfiring recognition” (109), in which others either simply fail to appreciate or give uptake to the individual they behold, or they cling to old stories that fail to accurately represent the present individual; and 4) others offering “misshapen responses” (115) to the persons they encounter, as when a woman is recognized as a woman but treated as inferior because of an entrenched master narrative grounded in sexism. Lindemann explores these possibilities and ends the chapter with a discussion of what our obligations might be to hold people in their identities and/or personhood, or to let them go.

Chapter five explores situations in which people struggle to perform their identity work: adult children whose parents have dementia, wondering how to appropriately hold their loved ones, and when/how to let go, transpersons and their families, attempting to articulate and claim seemingly impossible identities given engrained social categories and master narratives, and hypocrites and wantons, who seem to claim identities to which they are not entitled, or fail to have fully formed identities at all. In this discussion, Lindemann rejects the idea that there is a “real self” to be discovered (133) and instead seeks to understand how our identities evolve over time, and what responsibilities our families, friends, and strangers have to participate in that evolution (looking at the link between vulnerability and special responsibilities) (151).

The final chapters of the book take up the question of when to let go of identities (and persons) at the end of life (chapter six), and offer a short conclusion about the significance of the social conception of personhood and personal identity described in the book (chapter seven). The discussion of letting go pits the protection of “critical interests” from Dworkin (1993) against Jaworska’s (2009) protective stance toward the minimal autonomy of people with dementia, who may appear to change course by voicing preferences seemingly contrary to their previously espoused wishes. Lindemann sides with Dworkin here, noting the importance of holding an individual in his identity even if, or perhaps particularly when, he is flailing and scared in the face of death. While the social conception of personhood adds an intriguing twist to this debate, I am not convinced that Lindemann gets it right, given her recognition of the ways that our identities can change in response to difficult circumstances. I look forward to continued discussions of this topic in the future.

All in all, this is a wonderful book, starting with a provocative thesis and filled with stories and examples that enliven the argument. Readers familiar with Lindemann’s work will recognize themes from her book Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair, as well as chapters built from previously published articles. The completely new pieces, and the collection as a whole, however, offer much to be appreciated, with thoughtful and compelling analysis of issues the previous works raised but did not fully answer.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


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**Fortunes of Feminism: from State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis**


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This is a very fine collection of essays written from the late 1970s to the present and organized to reflect major shifts in feminist theory and practice. Nancy Fraser describes Act One, when the “personal became political,” as a time when feminism, in connection with other radical movements, “exposed capitalism’s deep androcentrism and sought to transform society root and branch” (1). Act Two turned from
a concern with redistribution to a focus on identity and social difference. Act Three refocused on the struggle to “subject runaway markets to democratic control” (1). This last act should be, Fraser argues, one of the current central foci of feminist theorizing and practice.

Part One, titled “Feminism Insurgent: Radicalizing Critique in the Era of Social Democracy,” includes four essays. The first, “What's Critical About Critical Theory?,” is a feminist critique of Habermas’s analysis of late-capitalism. She rejects Habermas’s concern that reforms of the domestic sphere are intrusions on symbolic reproduction activities while reforms of the paid workplace are legitimate, and notes that the domestic sphere is thoroughly infused with market dynamics, so that reforms must be waged on both fronts simultaneously. Fraser concludes by noting the shape that a critique of welfare-state capitalism ought to take. First, it ought to be cognizant of the thorough integration of market dynamics into family functioning. Second, it should be sensitive to the “ways in which allegedly disappearing institutions and norms persist in structuring social reality” (51). Third, it must foreground “the evil of domination and subordination” (51).

Chapter two, “Struggle Over Needs,” addresses the various discourses that are used to conceptualize need. The struggle to win satisfaction of needs proceeds through the following stages: first, one must achieve political recognition of the need. Next, one must struggle to interpret and define the need. Finally, one struggles to provide for the need. The state adjudicates between these discourses through the vehicle of a bureaucratized expert needs discourse. This discourse, administered by members of various professional classes, redefines needs in terms of “bureaucratically administrable (sic) satisfaction” (70) and in terms of states of affairs that could affect anyone, like unemployment. Fraser offers two kinds of considerations that must be considered and balanced in deciding between interpretations of needs. First, she argues that consequences must be relevant. Second, she argues that we should understand legitimate social needs in terms of rights.

Chapter three, “A Genealogy of 'Dependency': Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State,” coauthored with Linda Gordon, provides a fascinating account of the concept of dependency from its normatively neutral roots in the preindustrial era to its entirely negative connotation in the contemporary world. In the preindustrial era, dependency was a fact of life, and dependence on one’s master in the feudal era was modeled on dependency on God. In the current environment, dependency is a despised, gendered, and raced concept, inflected with individual moral and personality defects.

Chapter four, “After the Family Wage: A Postindustrial Thought Experiment,” considers three alternatives to the now largely extinct model of a family existing on one wage. The first is the Universal Breadwinner, where everyone works in the paid labor force. The second is Caregiver Parity, where caregivers are given compensation and recognition for the importance of their caregiving activities. While she finds something to like about each of these models, she notes that both “assume background preconditions [such as] . . . major political-economic restructuring . . . public control over corporations, the capacity to direct investment to create high-quality permanent jobs, and the ability to tax profits and wealth at rates sufficient to fund expanded high-quality social programs” (133). She defends the third, Universal Caregiver, as the only postindustrial world compatible with gender justice: “A social world in which citizens’ lives integrate wage earning, caregiving, community activism, political participation, and involvement in the associational life of civic society—while also leaving time for some fun” (135).

There is something odd about rereading discussions about welfare-state capitalism in a world in which some of its critics are beginning to feel some nostalgia about its loss. But I think that much of what Fraser has to say in Part One is important for what it reveals about our current reality, and for what it imagines. Her analyses of need and dependency perfectly capture present day political maneuvering about federal extensions of unemployment insurance, for example. And given the new neoliberal order in which job security is a vanishing idea and caregiving responsibilities are increasingly privatized, a world in which we all have time for some fun seems more important than ever.

Part Two turns to Second Act questions, as Fraser addresses identity and social difference. In chapter five, “Against Symbolicism: The Uses and Abuses of Lacanianism for Feminist Politics,” she argues that Lacanianism is an inhospitable resource for feminist theorizing, in contrast to pragmatic discourse analysis, which Fraser says as extremely useful for feminist theorizing. She notes that this is not a critique of Lacan, but a critique of “an idealypical newstructuralist reading of Lacan that is widely credited among English-speaking feminists” (145) and a critique of Julia Kristeva. She faults the reading of Lacan for a number of reasons. First is its determinism, including the view that the subordination of women is “the inevitable destiny of civilization” (146). Secondly, she argues that this view differentiates identity in a binary fashion: having or lacking a phallus. Third, she notes that it cannot account for changes in identity across time. Fourth, this view makes social solidarity not potentially emancipatory but illusory. Fifth, in its focus on the symbolic order, it makes other cultures and pluralities of speakers inconceivable. Since Fraser sees a rejection of biological determinism, a plurality of identities, the possibility of identity changing across time, and emancipatory social solidarity as key themes in feminism, these flaws are devastating from a feminist perspective. She argues that while Julia Kristeva’s work is an initially plausible feminist reworking of Lacan, it too fails because it “leaves us oscillating between a regressive version of gynocentric-maternalist essentialism, on the one hand, and a postfeminist anti-essentialism, on the other. Neither of these is useful for feminist theorizing” (157). Fraser concludes that if Lacanianism is not the answer, and a focus on language is instructive to feminist theorizing, then pragmatic discourse analysis is the solution. She offers the following advantages of pragmatics: it insists on social context and practice, studies a plurality of discourses, and understands identity as “complex, changing, and discursively constructed” (157).
While I am very sympathetic to Fraser’s preference for pragmatic discourse models, I wonder if she hasn’t begged the question against Lacanian models by insisting that the advantages she cites for a pragmatic model are really essential to feminist theorizing. While I want to believe that identity is “complex, changing, and discursively constructed,” what if I am laboring under an illusion? I think there are good reasons in favor of the former view, but it needs to be argued for, especially in the face of a great deal of feminist theorizing in the Lacanian tradition.

Chapter six, “Feminist Politics in the Age of Recognition: A Two-Dimensional Approach to Gender Justice,” argues that a feminist focus on recognition alone fails as an analysis of and solution to problems facing women today. Fraser argues that an analysis of gender and a principle of gender justice must combine concerns with redistribution along with concerns about recognition. Redistribution focuses on the political economy where women are disadvantaged both in the family and in the paid work force. Recognition focuses on the cultural arena where androcentrism holds sway. While she insists that these two realms have some interaction, she also claims that no solution which ignores one of them will be sufficient to address the subordination of women. In chapter seven, “Heterosexism, Misrecognition, and Capitalism: A Response to Judith Butler,” she reiterates this claim: “both sides have legitimate claims. Social justice today . . . requires both redistribution and recognition; neither alone will suffice” (186). The principle of justice she argues for is the principle of “parity of participation . . . justice requires social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to interact with one another as peers” (164). Two conditions must be satisfied for participatory parity. First, every member must have access to the material resources that allow independence and standing in the conversation. Second, all members must be seen as entitled to equal respect and equal opportunity for self-esteem. She illustrates how these principles work in a number of examples. One instructive example is the French banning of the foulard (head scarf) in state schools. This example illustrates the dual use of the principle that she advocates when cultural and gender issues intersect. First, she argues that we should apply the principle to the culture. In this case we ask whether the ban is an unjust treatment of Muslim community values. Next, she says that we must ask whether these norms subordinate women. The answer to the first question is clear: Christian crosses are not banned in state schools, while the answer to the second question is more controversial.

These two chapters combine the concerns of both Part One and Part Two by showing that neither set of concerns is alone sufficient to theorize or address the subordination of women. While there are a number of questions that remain, I think she has made a very persuasive case.

The essays in Part Three situate feminist theory and practice in the global, neoliberal world. She begins, in chapter eight, “Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World,” by adding to her account of justice, which previously focused on redistribution of resources and access to recognition and self-esteem, a third dimension: the political. This dimension is concerned with representation: the criteria of social belonging and the procedures for who can make claims for redistribution and recognition. So there are now three dimensions of justice that play a role in analyzing and responding to the subordination of women: redistribution, which concerns the allocation of material resources; recognition, which concerns cultural questions of identity and exclusion; and representation, which concerns the question of who is entitled to make claims of redistribution and recognition.

Chapters nine, “Feminism, Capitalism, and the Cunning of History,” and ten, “Between Marketization and Social Protection: Resolving the Feminist Ambivalence,” may be the most controversial chapters in this collection. In these chapters, she raises the question of the connection between recent feminist theory and the triumph of neoliberalism. Her view is twofold: the first is that neoliberalism has cunningly availed itself of feminist theory and practice; the second is that feminists need to rethink their theory and practice in light of both the dangers of neoliberalism and its flagrant use of feminist insights and practices. Her insights here are telling. She describes, for example, how neoliberalism embraced feminism’s preoccupation with hierarchies of status rather than explorations of economic class. Similarly, feminist concern with the injustice of state-organized capitalism and welfare state paternalism was a great comfort to neoliberals intent on freeing markets from state interference.

Nancy Fraser has been, and continues to be, a champion of the political-economic analysis even when this analysis was out of fashion. She is, however, also committed to the view that the subordination of women must be separately analyzed and addressed through the lenses of misrecognition and misrepresentation. The new crisis of neoliberal ideology coupled with rapacious international capitalism thoroughly vindicates her commitment to socialist feminism, and these essays have certainly withstood the test of time. The current crisis of persistent unemployment and increasing economic insecurity cannot be addressed by a focus solely on problems of recognition. But neither can we address these economic problems by failing to note their gendered and global dimension. This wonderful collection of essays does justice to all these approaches while suggesting new ways to bring them into conversation.

Hard Feelings: The Moral Psychology of Contempt


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Macalester Bell, author of Hard Feelings: The Moral Psychology of Contempt, gives a four-fold definition of the moral emotion “contempt.” First, contempt is “partially constituted by an appraisal of the status of the object of contempt” (37); second, it is a “globalist response towards
persons” (40); third, contempt must have a “comparative or reflexive element” (41); and fourth, contempt initiates a withdrawing from the condemned (44). She constructs her project largely as a defense of contempt as a moral emotion; from beginning to end, she engages with naysayers, acknowledging likely objections and demonstrating the flaws in such objections.

In the process of defending contempt as a moral emotion, Bell constructs an engaging and effective argument for the acceptance of contempt as a positive moral emotion. She articulates the justified form of contempt—apt contempt—as “a positive moral accomplishment insofar as it answers certain faults,” but situates her treatment of the emotion outside of the standard discourse, claiming that “it is difficult to account for contempt’s positive value using the tools of contemporary moral theory” (7). In short, she argues that “contempt is an apt response to those who evince . . . the vices of superiority” (9).

What comes through as most distinctive about contempt for Bell is the hierarchical, stratifying, and status-oriented element of contempt. Throughout her work, she refers to the necessity of hierarchical status structures to the existence of active (rather than passive) contempt. Such structural identification is central to what distinguishes contempt from “its closest cousin,” disgust, and the status orientation of contempt is necessary for its “downward looking” attitudinal characteristics (54). That is, contempt is most notably a social manifestation signifying a politically and morally imbued response to persons.

The way in which this is a response to persons, in fact, is central to its distinctiveness from the competing moral affect that is more accepted in contemporary moral theory: resentment. Resentment, unlike contempt, is act-focused, rather than global. That is, “resentment” in its standard treatment is presented as resting in the self-respect of the resenter, and the correlating “holding responsible” of the resented for her actions (10). Rather than addressing the whole person, resentment is act-focused; we resent an agent’s actions, but we condemn whole “persons” as contemptible. Bell is clear that she appreciates the use and import of “resentment” as a moral affect, but she rejects the push to focus on resentment, only, as an adequate moral response to persons. Fundamentally, “resentment is characteristically focused on wrongdoing as opposed to badbeing”; the latter is associated with contempt (163).

Bell addresses what she identifies as “the fittingness objection,” insisting that the global nature of contempt is consistent with an identification of contempt as a potentially positive moral emotion. Objections centered around “fittingness” express concern over the identification of certain attitudes such as shame and contempt as moral because these attitudes may fail to ever properly “fit,” or accurately represent, their targets (65). Because contempt, like shame, is a “globalizing” emotion, it identifies an entire person as “shameful” or “contemptuous,” rather than just her actions. But justifying the identification of a person as contemptuous would mean, according to critics, that the whole person be on the hook for one trait she happens to harbor. And, they claim, evaluating a person based on one trait of many is inappropriate. Thus, objectors would suggest, contempt is never fitting.

Defending contempt as a moral emotion that is both globalizing and yet still fitting is one of the most interesting claims she makes. In defending contempt in this way, she introduces the full force of what she means in presenting contempt as containing positional and relational elements (80). As a positional and relational, globalist emotion, contempt can succeed in meeting the fittingness objection, while still being both “objective and subject-relative” (81). What this entails is that there be a third-person, objective perspective from which one could identify a contemptuous characteristic as the most important of all characteristics, to the evaluation at hand. Further, Bell insists on a subject-relative aspect of moral evaluation as legitimate and necessary to our judgments. The subject-relative aspect refers to our need (and ability) to take up the subject’s perspective with regard to the object of contempt, and thus “the fittingness conditions for our globalist emotions are contoured by the relationship between the subject and target of the emotion” (85). Who the subject is in relation to her object of contempt matters to our evaluation of the aptness of her contempt, and the importance of the failure of the contemned, in relation to his other character traits, and in the context of the contemnors evaluation, is relevant to the fittingness of her contemptuous response.

The structure of Bell’s account of contempt as rooted in a hierarchical societal structure suggests a special focus on the vices of superiority, and at what she terms “superbia”: essentially the vice of considering oneself superior to someone. Superbia “poses a threat to our shared practice of morality,” and Bell identifies contempt as the strongest and most effective response to superbia’s divisive character (162). She explains, “superbia damages our moral and personal relationships, and contempt answers that damage” (148). It appears that, in the context of superbia, contempt is the most appropriate response to inapt contempt. This is most obviously discernable in instances of racism: a vice of superbia that largely displays inapt contempt. This is most obviously discernable in instances of racism: a vice of superbia that largely displays inapt contempt, and is most appropriately challenged with apt forms of contempt (203).

Though many critics of contempt site its potency for disrupting and dissolving relationships as negative, Bell defends the withdrawing from associated with contempt, as signifying contempt’s appropriateness in some circumstances. Contempt’s ability to address racism brings together its fittingness as a response to superbia, with the characteristic withdrawing from that it motivates. Bell’s discussion of racism highlights the role that contempt plays within a social world that can harbor oppression and other systemic political injustices, and she devotes chapter five to a closer evaluation of the harms and merits of contempt with regard to racism.

Of particular concern to critics is the potential for contempt to disproportionately affect victims of stigmatisations in a negative way and to a greater degree. Bell rightly highlights these critics’ confounding of inapt, racist contempt, with the apt contempt that she suggests is an appropriate response to racists. She clarifies for these critics that
“race-based contempt is objectionable,” because as an attitude it is “fundamentally at odds with the respect and affective openness characteristic of unimpaired moral relations” (213). She goes on to defend instances of incivility as appropriate resistance, and explains that apt counter-contempt is “often the best way of answering this objectionable attitude” (226). In this context contempt represents an appeal to self-respect, and the rejection of the constraints of “civility” is therefore warranted.

Bell’s defense of contempt as a moral emotion is both timely and well executed. She also addresses the role of contempt in forgiveness and reconciliation, which are both very important aspects for consideration, and likely of import to many readers here. In the remainder of this review, however, I would like to focus more pointedly on some already noted issues that may be of particular interest to readers with a focus in feminist and social philosophy and theory.

From the perspective of a general philosophical audience, Bell’s work addresses central issues and objections to “contempt” as a moral emotion, and she does this very well. Bell often points to and invokes glaring social issues that an acceptance of the moral value of contempt appears to connect with, and she does this most effectively when she identifies race and racism as the foreground of many disturbing displays of inapt contempt. She does this, however, from a position that is often situated from within the traditional narrative of mainstream philosophy, and seems to shy away from engaging these issues too far outside the constraints of the traditionally proscribed debates in contemporary moral theory.

Bell’s project is understandably responsive to central concerns about contempt that arise for contemporary moral theory’s attachment to an “ethics of action” (16), given that she rightly identifies such theories as dominant in the literature. She also engages cognitive theories of emotion and the feeling-based theories of emotion favored in the moral psychology literature. Bell does a good job of explaining how her defense of contempt must exist outside these debates, and she is convincing in her arguments for moving beyond the standard repertoire of normative theories that philosophers are wont to latch onto. She instead requires only a “minimally acceptable morality” as support for her defense of contempt (23).

The concern I have is that she does not go far enough in pointing out the inadequacies of the standard theoretical approaches to capturing the moral importance of powerful “negative” emotions, and is tacitly accepting of the use of terms such as “inappropriate,” “uncivil,” and “irrational” to characterize such emotions, as well as the actions that these emotions might motivate. On the one hand, perhaps some emotions might be “shameful.” More often, however, such terms are used to stack the deck against us; these are the terms used from positions of power, to maintain control, and promote the Panopticon’s self-policing of the oppressed.

The skirting of a more critical engagement with topics that directly invoke a multi-layered evaluation of power, as well as her avoidance of a more explicit conversation regarding the social ontology of “emotion,” results in Bell accepting as relevant some basic starting points that warrant serious scrutiny. This is evident in her treatment of moral psychology, specifically. While she is critical of approaches in moral psychology that lack the nuance necessary to properly evaluate and value emotions such as “contempt,” she stops short of questioning the project of investigating moral emotions as if they were natural kinds to be discovered, rather than socially entrenched phenomena to be analyzed. Bell often remarks on the cultural dependency of “contempt,” noting that Americans may not have a conscious understanding of the emotion, pointing to Jane Austen’s beautiful illustrations of the social power of contempt, and identifying social hierarchy, itself, as a necessary element under-girding the very possibility of active contempt. She stops short, however, of engaging directly with the larger implications of “contempt” as a necessarily socially situated, moral emotion.

Overall, Bell’s Hard Feelings is extremely successful and engaging. The strongest feature of this work is that it successfully constructs the bridgework needed in order for further projects, such as those I outline above, to gain traction in mainstream conversations. Bell explains the setting and placement of her work very well, and she does an excellent job pushing the boundaries of the conversation outward, opening up space for further work in many areas of philosophy interested in the moral worth and place of contempt, as well as other “hard feelings.”

NOTES
1. Along with the absence of nausea in most cases.
2. Active, rather than passive, contempt is the sort that Bell is concerned with in her treatment here.
3. With regard to any naturalized approaches to moral psychology.

Identities and Freedom: Feminist Theory between Power and Connection


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In Identities and Freedom: Feminist Theory between Power and Connection, Allison Weir argues for a conception of identity as a practice of identifying-with, which she believes can be a source of freedom. The purpose of the book is to reorient feminists’ perspective on and valuation of identity. She argues that the typical association of identity with liberal conceptions of freedom has generated a static understanding of identity that functions as a trap, since the liberal focus on individuality qua self-creation produces an understanding of identity as a metaphysical category. Identity conceived of in this way imparts oppressive effects on the identity bearer, given that identities as categories are strongly tied to stereotypes about those identities. Thus, she argues, there is a paradox of identity
in connection to freedom, since the markers of freedom in the liberal tradition are sources of stasis that ultimately reduce the notion of identity to one of sameness. Instead of limiting our understanding of identity to one bound by liberal conceptions of freedom, Weir suggests that we understand identity through a plurality of freedoms. More specifically, she maintains that a dynamic conception of identity that evolves out of practices of identifying-with must be located within a framework of social freedom, which is the freedom to flourish and to live a meaningful life through one’s connections to others. Weir constructs an analysis of identity as a nuanced, but complex, web of interactions among and between relations of power and relations of meaning, connection, risk, and solidarity that are sources of freedom.

Frequently, feminist theories of freedom regard identity as something that must be overcome if freedom is to be obtained, because identity is often a product of power relations meant to subjugate. However, Weir views this opposition between identity and freedom as unwarranted. Her conception of identity derives, as I have noted, from practices of identifying-with, particularly the practice of identifying with one’s commitments, connections, and values. These practices are themselves practices of freedom. Weir claims that the call of some feminists to eliminate identity is unrealistic because women cannot simply step out of the processes of social construction that determine or contribute to their social location. Because identities are socially constructed, we depend on them to create and sustain meaning about who we are and what we value. She explains that this meaning is what holds us together as selves and in relations. For example, Weir argues that identity should not be something women aim to overcome and transcend, because the resistance to power relations and oppression that women have enacted historically depict practices of freedom via recreation and renegotiation; women as women have, through practices of freedom, created resistant identities in response to patriarchal conceptions of the category of woman, which has allowed the identity to be transformative. When women identify with the category of woman, they are identifying with the commitments and values of themselves and others who thwart subordinating aspects of the identity. One particularly powerful claim she makes is that the feminist objective to transcend the identity of woman diminishes the importance of the work women have put into reshaping what it means to be a woman. Additionally, to reject identity is to reject the extent to which social construction has precluded an identity politics grounded in feminist solidarity, as opposed to metaphysical sameness. Identity as a practical, ethico-political practice must be acknowledged if solidarity is to be achieved, because women must be capable of identifying with commitments and ideals of women who are differently socially constructed and interrelated to one another through divergent power relations. When the conception of identity is conceived in terms of sameness, solidarity is impossible, because women over-simplify, gloss-over, or denigrate experiences of women unlike themselves. The practice of identification is a practice of asking oneself to whom and what one is connected and committed. Weir argues that when identification as a practice of affirmation of commitments and relations replaces the static concept of identity, space opens for the creation of a “we” for the purpose of and struggle for freedom.

There are three significant contributions that Weir’s conception of identity makes to feminist theories of freedom: practices of identification as sources of social freedom, practices of belonging, and the importance of risk in connection. While analyses of social freedom have been developed, the relationship she articulates between identity and freedom evolves from a highly original approach. Weir posits that practices of identification can be practices of freedom through a combined process of authenticity seeking and critical reflection—neither of which can be done outside of relations. The authenticity of individual identities evolves from an affirmation of one’s desires and connections against a background of one’s personal history and the history of one’s social category. These histories and relational contexts are crucial for the purpose of initiating and sustaining critiques of the social categories and constructions that generate meaning for one’s life. The freedom that one pursues through these practices is the freedom to orient oneself in relation to defining communities that offer alternative interpretations of the constructions the practices challenge. Identity, as a source of freedom, then, is about (re)negotiating the connections one shares with others, and, importantly, securing and sustaining desired but given relations that engender one’s sense of belonging. While this argument appears to reiterate a multitude of feminist arguments regarding autonomy and freedom, Weir’s argument stands out insofar as the processes for authenticity and critical reflection are not done internally in conjunction with recognition of interrelatedness and givenness; they are active practices that must occur in the midst of and through one’s relations to guide and validate the identifications with which the individual ultimately resolves for the purpose of resistance and transformation. Weir’s argument for practices of identification connected to social freedom does more than merge the domains of power and connection; she evidences that the two cannot occur apart.

The practice of belonging and the risk of connection are intimately wound together through the analyses of home and identity politics. Weir’s account of relationality is both active and symbiotic; that is, identity is a process of identifications with one’s own commitments and with others. If an individual adjusts her identifications, others with whom she is connected will experience adjustments in their own identity. For this reason, practices of belonging become central to one’s identity, and those ideals and people with which she identifies. In turn, practices of belonging are practices of freedom via identity when individuals move towards communities that will shore up their identifications. Belonging and home, then, become entwined, because home is a place of safety, but not ideally so. Weir argues that home is not an absolute safe space, nor should one expect it to be. Even when patriarchal considerations of home are sequestered, the home is often a space of conflict because it is a space of relationships. Weir emphasizes that conflict is part of the practice of belonging and, consequently, there is considerable risk in connection because relationships are
about renegotiating identities that hold individuals and relationships together. This is also why she views identity politics and the construction of a new “we”—solidarity—as viable. Social freedom and its practices of identification deconstruct the liberal dichotomy between autonomy and dependency for the purpose of iterating the necessity of belonging to cooperative, but conflicting, communities that recognize and navigate relations of power so as to yield relations of mutuality and flourishing. This complex and cumbersome process is the means of generating alternative interpretations and transformative identities necessary to overcome the oppressive tendencies that have attached to identity perceived as a category, and it relies on an initial experience of disidentification that reveals that one does not necessarily belong to a group that one has been assigned by others.

Disidentification not only underlies an individual’s process of developing a resistant identity, it also grounds identity politics, because solidarity exacts recognition of the power dynamics that exist between individuals before they can begin to critically evaluate and transform their identifications with others. Thus, disidentification and solidarity are brought together through needed dissent and conflict between individuals in connection so that shared interests and needs can be uncovered. For Weir, dissent and conflict, the risk of connection, are foundational for practices of engagement and openness that reveal division for the purposes of identity formation. This is one of the important reasons why she maintains the significance of home; home is prone to conflict, but home can also be the safe space in which individuals can struggle together in a practice of belonging, which is a practice of creating unity in identifications. Like the belonging of home, solidarity will never call for a resolution of struggle, but it will permit a continual transformation through that practice, so that continually renewed conceptions and understandings of “we” can emerge for the purpose of resistance. Weir utilizes the notion of world-traveling to demonstrate how struggle and conflict can open new mechanisms of meaning production and narrative in relations, and argues that the active relationality that obtains can and should drive reciprocal incorporation and amendments to identification with others and their commitments. Solidarity as belonging and a place of home, all in pursuit of freedom through identity, calls for individuals to expand themselves through learning about others with whom they are or desire to be connected. One of her most powerful claims is that these practices and processes are effective for solidarity because they cannot be engaged, differences and dissent cannot be addressed, without producing a change in the individual.

Weir’s analysis of the connection between identity and freedom appears subtle during a cursory read. Very few, if any, of her arguments would be regarded as opposed to or inconsistent with many mainstream feminist arguments. Even her controversial claim that solidarity can be achieved is carefully embedded in the arguments of activists and theorists of color in order to address the dangers of identity and sameness in usual understandings of identity politics. What Weir does that is unique is simply shift the conversation away from identity as it is typically conceived to a more dynamic but nuanced understanding of the notion qua practices that generates significant and original conclusions and implications. That is, her approach is cautious and subtle, but her argument has considerable impact on how feminists should regard and employ identity for the purpose of attaining liberation. But her most outstanding argument is her recognition and appreciation of conflict and dissent in belonging—risk in connection. Of all the dichotomies Weir addresses, one particular dichotomy is more implicit or is assumed. Typically, feminists theorize from an optimistic perspective of the possibility of unity, or they theorize from a non-ideal perspective that moves them quickly to the place of irresolvable difference. Weir’s conclusion that home and belonging will be a difficult place to occupy is haunting but accurate. Relationships are never secure, are never without struggle. Relationships are always lived as sources of pain, but if they are healthy relationships, the pain experienced in connection can generate stronger bonds through the commitment to one another. That Weir acknowledges and embraces the reality of persistent turmoil in connection as a source of or path towards freedom individually and collectively is a fresh perspective on a lived experience that many feminists seem to want to gloss over for fear of frustrating liberation politics and coalitions.

Overall, Weir’s insightful project reorients her audience anew to the importance and potential of identity for freedom. But most importantly, Weir’s development of risk in connection as a facet of belonging will transfigure her audience’s outlook on how feminists can and should pursue freedom together.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Two great conferences are being held together! Villanova Conference Center, Villanova University, May 28–30, 2015

HYPATIA: EXPLORING COLLABORATIVE CONTESTATIONS

We are happy to announce the call for papers or panels for the 2015 Hypatia conference. This year’s theme, Exploring Collaborative Contestations, aims to create a space for diverse perspectives, difficult conversations, and marginalized voices within feminist philosophy. We welcome papers and panel proposals on topics that address a commitment to diversity, broadly construed; an openness to disagreement among feminists on difficult issues; and opportunities for collaboration among feminist philosophers within and across various disciplines, subfields, and theoretical orientations. Submissions on any topic in feminist philosophy will be considered. The submission deadline for 250–500 word proposals for papers or panels is January 1, 2015. Submissions must be made through the online submission form on the conference website.
Suggested topics include the following:

- Collaborating with social scientists
- The consequences of sexual, gender, racial, disability, and sexuality harassment
- Implications for survivors
- Implications for departments/communities in which there is harassment
- Implications for the discipline
- Bystander training (empowering community members to create an environment that doesn’t tolerate harassment)
- Analyses of cronyism and alienation for women and members of other marginalized groups
- Intersectionality
- Structural intersectionality in the academy
- Putting intersectional analysis to work in the profession
- Political intersectionality transforming the discipline
- Embracing the range of philosophical careers
- Academic philosophers outside four-year colleges and universities
- Philosophers in other disciplines

APA/CSW: DIVERSITY IN PHILOSOPHY
The APA/CSW conference seeks to examine and address the underrepresentation of women and other marginalized groups in philosophy. Participants are invited to focus on hurdles and best practices associated with the inclusion of underrepresented groups. The submission deadline for 250–500 word proposals is January 1, 2015. Submissions must be made through the online submission form.

Suggested topics include:

- Subverting canons, old and new
- Undergraduate pedagogy
- Graduate pedagogy
- Continuing education for established philosophers
- Critical thinking, epistemic diversity, and relativism
- Ethical and epistemic benefits to creating diverse philosophical communities
- Theoretical and quantitative empirical approaches to inclusion and exclusion
- Stereotype threat
- Implicit bias
- Ideal worker/philosopher
- Creating and using demographic data

Additional features of the 2015 Hypatia conference:

- Professional workshops on publishing feminist philosophy in journals, anthologies, books, blogs, and more hosted by the Hypatia local board
- The APA Diversity Summit, May 29, 2015, during the conference
- Workshop on sexual harassment and bystander training
- APA/CSW Site Visit training: May 31 at Villanova
- Modest travel grants available for presenters in need

Presenters are encouraged to submit papers to Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy after the conference. The Hypatia editorial office is committed to rapid review for all papers affiliated with the conference.

Conference website: http://www1.villanova.edu/villanova/artsci/hypatiaconference/

For accessibility planning in action, please contact the conference coordinator at editorialassistant@hypatiaphilosophy.org.
Sponsored by Hypatia, the APA Committee on the Status of Women, and the College of Arts and Sciences, Villanova University.

PHILOSOPHICAL PROFILES
Submitted by Jami Anderson

Philosophical Profiles is a new series of interviews with distinguished and influential philosophers working on a range of issues of interdisciplinary interest, from political philosophy, the rights and status of children, bioethics, sex, and gender, the nature of free will, personhood, right through to the physical structure of the universe. Each philosopher discusses his or her particular area of focus and how he or she became interested in that area in a way that should be accessible to a general audience. The production of Philosophical Profiles is under the aegis of the Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics.

THE PHILPAPERS FOUNDATION
Submitted by David Bourget and David Chalmers, Directors, The PhilPapers Foundation

The PhilPapers Foundation and the Philosophy Documentation Center will be joining forces to bring the best possible research index to the community of philosophers.

The Philosophy Documentation Center (PDC) is a non-profit organization dedicated to providing affordable access to essential resources in the humanities and social sciences. PDC supports scholarly work in many fields with customized publishing and membership services, digitization solutions, and secure hosting. PDC produces the Philosophy Research Index, a database of bibliographic information on articles, books, reviews, dissertations, and other documents in philosophy comprising over 1.3 million entries. The Philosophy Research Index is currently the largest research index in philosophy, with more entries than PhilPapers (1.1 million entries) and the Philosophers’ Index (540,000 entries).

The agreement between PDC and the PhilPapers Foundation has two main components. First, the Philosophy Research Index (PRI) database will be incorporated as part of PhilPapers. Second, PDC will become responsible for the management of PhilPapers subscriptions, lending to PhilPapers its extensive expertise with this type of operation.

PhilPapers users can expect PhilPapers’ index to grow significantly over the coming weeks as a result of the integration of PRI. PhilPapers has traditionally been focused on recent publications in English. In contrast, PRI has excellent coverage of older publications and very good coverage of non-English publications. While the PhilPapers team has worked hard to expand the index’s coverage to additional languages and include older material as part of the index, some gaps remain. The incorporation of PRI is expected to make PhilPapers much more complete. It will without doubt be the most complete index of philosophical research available. The joint database will also incorporate thesaurus data that belong to PDC.

There will be no change to PhilPapers’ access policies. The service will continue to be available on the model where non-institutional use is free and only institutions located in high-GDP countries and that offer degrees in philosophy are asked to subscribe. Institutional users will benefit from this agreement by leveraging existing accounts with PDC to manage PhilPapers subscriptions. Additionally, an optional bundle of PhilPapers and other services provided by PDC will be offered.

We are also pleased to announce important upgrades to PhilPapers. Our search system has been upgraded to improve the relevance of search results returned. OpenURL/SFX linking, which enables users to access resources through their institutional libraries, has been improved to be more readily available for users affiliated with subscribing institutions. More upgrades are coming soon.

THE ASSOCIATION FOR FEMINIST ETHICS AND SOCIAL THEORY (FEAST)

FEAST invites submissions for the fall 2015 conference.

Contested Terrains: Women of Color, Feminisms, and Geopolitics

October 1–4, 2015
Sheraton Sand Key Resort, Clearwater Beach, Florida
Submission deadline: February 27, 2015

Keynote speakers:

Kimberlé Crenshaw, distinguished professor of law at UCLA and Columbia and founder of the African-American Policy Forum. An international activist, Crenshaw is well known for her foundational scholarly work on intersectionality and critical race theory. Professor Crenshaw’s publications include Critical Race Theory (edited by Crenshaw et al., 1995) and Words that Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment (with Matsuda et al., 1993). Her work on race and gender was influential in drafting the equality clause in the South African Constitution, and she helped facilitate the inclusion of gender in the U.N. World Conference on Racism Declaration. In the United States, she served as a member of the National Science Foundation’s committee to research violence against women and assisted the legal team representing Anita Hill.

Sunera Thobani, associate professor at the Institute for Gender, Race, Sexuality, and Social Justice at the University of British Columbia. A founding member of RACE (Researchers and Academics of Colour for Equity) and a past president of Canada’s National Action Committee on the status of Women, Thobani’s research focuses on critical race, postcolonial and feminist theory, globalization, citizenship, migration, Muslim women, the War on Terror, and media. Professor Thobani is the author of Exalted Subjects: Studies in the Making of Race and Nation in Canada (University of Toronto Press, 2007) and numerous other works. As a public intellectual, Thobani is well known
for her vocal opposition to Canadian support of the U.S.-led invasion into Afghanistan.

Invited Sessions:
- Invited panel honoring the work of María Lugones
- Invited panel on U.S. wars/imperialism and the women within

FEAST encourages submissions related to this year’s theme. However, papers on all topics within the areas of feminist ethics and social theory are welcome.

Description of this year’s theme

Engaging in feminist theory in the twenty-first century requires placing emphasis on the “where” of its production. Such an emphasis includes considering the situated perspectives and geopolitical locations out of which a given theory is produced. Another equally important part of contemporary engagement in feminist theory concerns appreciating the ways that theory travels and changes through the traveling. The notion of contested terrains is invoked to refer to the many junctures of perspective, location, and travel with which feminist theory must contend in an era of multinational reception.

For example, it is at the juncture of perspective, location, and travel that one finds the often contested political identifier “women of color.” The term is contested not only because there is no singular “woman of color” perspective and/or location but also because of the diversity of possible stories of travel in and out of “women of color” spaces. As Jacqui Alexander explains, one is not born but becomes a woman of color. That “becoming” is by no means a given and, for many, “woman of color” is not a personal identifier. The term is contested, and its meaning is continually recreated through the contesting.

Feminism is practiced and theorized within contested terrains in a transnational world. Understanding the connections and disputes created by borders, castes, classes, and other boundaries is at the heart of geopolitics. Feminist geopolitical analyses concern the spaces, places, relations of power, and interchange among feminists in local, regional, and global contexts, paying careful attention to the locations out of which we theorize and practice feminism(s).

This year’s FEAST conference invites submissions that take up this notion of contested terrains in relation to women of color, feminism, and geopolitics. We welcome papers that take both theoretical and practical approaches to these issues and related issues in feminist ethics, epistemology, and political and social theory more broadly construed.

Topics to consider may include, but are not limited to the following:
- Situated knowledges, including the racialized terrains of knowledge production
- Intersectional theories of space and place
- “Women of color,” “third-world women,” “women of the global South,” “postcolonial women,” and other descriptors as contested identifications
- Tensions between white/U.S. feminism, women of color feminisms, third-world feminisms, and transnational feminisms
- Women’s agency and autonomy as contested feminist assumptions
- Contested conceptions of home and homelands
- The different social locations and embodied experiences of racism
- Perspectives on trauma and violence, terrorism and conspiracy, security and danger
- The geopolitics of mobility and immobility, including tourism, migration, detention, and deportation
- Gatekeeping geographies, technologies of surveillance, and border patrols
- The geopolitics of intimacy, including the racialized affective labor of mail order brides, transracially and transnationally adopted children and migrant domestic workers
- Geopolitical analyses of neo-liberalism, global capitalism, and militarism, including their effects on women of color
- Ecofeminisms and resource conflicts
- Solidarity movements among diverse groups of women of color and white feminists

Call for abstracts: Difficult conversations

A signature event of FEAST conferences is a lunch-time “Difficult Conversation” that focuses on an important, challenging, and under-theorized topic related to feminist ethics or social theory.

In keeping with this year’s theme of Contested Terrains, this year our topic for the difficult conversation panel is Damage by Allies. This conversation hopes to provide an environment conducive to dialogue for and among women of color and white academics concerning the harm that can be done by well-meaning feminist allies who, despite possible commonalities of values, can sometimes undermine the viewpoints and work of women of color. We hope that women of color will be able to bring to light both subtle and obvious experiences of damage done by allies and open a discussion about how this might be avoided or dealt with effectively in the future.
We are soliciting abstracts (see below) that address, in both North American and transnational contexts: concrete experiences of the sorts of hardship that academics and activists of color experience at the hands of allies; well-intentioned but misplaced pedagogical and political strategies; strategies for being a better ally to marginalized peoples in academia and elsewhere; strategies for women of color to respond to misplaced attempts at solidarity; and effective transnational activism that does not undermine the agency of its intended beneficiaries.

Submission guidelines

Please send your submission, in one document (a Word file, please, so that abstracts can be posted), to FEAST2015submissions@ucf.edu by February 27, 2015. In the body of the email message, please include your paper or panel title, name, institutional affiliation, e-mail address, surface mail address, and phone number. All submissions will be anonymously reviewed.

Individual papers

Please submit a completed paper of no more than 3,000 words, along with an abstract of 100–250 words, for anonymous review. Your document must include: paper title, abstract of 100–250 words, and your paper, with no identifying information. The word count (max. 3,000) should appear on the top of the first page of your paper.

Panels

Please clearly mark your submission as a panel submission both in the body of the e-mail and on the submission itself. Your submission should include the panel title and all three abstracts and papers in one document, along with word counts (no more than 3,000 for each paper).

Difficult conversations and other non-paper submissions (e.g., workshops, discussions, etc.)

Please submit an abstract with a detailed description (500–750 words).

Please clearly indicate the type of submission (Difficult Conversation, workshop, roundtable discussion, etc.) both in the body of your e-mail and on the submission itself.

For more information on FEAST, or to see programs from previous conferences, visit http://www.afeast.org.

Questions about this conference or the submission process may be directed to the program chairs, Ranjoo Herr (rherr@bentley.edu) and/or Shelley Park (Shelley.Park@ucf.edu).

This will be a terrific conference and we look forward to receiving your submissions! Please feel free to circulate this CFP to your friends and colleagues. Thanks in advance for helping us get the word out!

Ranjoo Herr and Shelley Park for the 2015 FEAST Program Committee:

Celia Bardwell-Jones
Asha Bhandary
Elora Chowdhury
Natalie Cisneros
Kristie Dotson
Saba Fatima
Nathifa Greene
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Denise James
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CONTRIBUTORS

Alison Bailey is a professor of philosophy at Illinois State University where she also directs the Women's and Gender Studies Program. She has published on issues at the intersections of feminist theory, philosophy of race/whiteness studies, and epistemology. Her recent scholarship includes “White Talk as a Barrier to Understanding the Problem of Whiteness” (What Is It Like to Be a White Problem, 2014); “On White Shame and Vulnerability” (South African Journal of Philosophy, 2011); “Reconceiving Surrogacy: Towards a Reproductive Justice Account of Indian Surrogacy” (Hypatia, 2011); “On Intersectionality and White Feminist Philosophy” (The Center Must Not Hold: White Women Philosophers on the Whiteness of Philosophy, 2010); “On Intersectionality, Empathy, and Feminist Solidarity” (The Journal of Peace and Justice Studies, 2008); and “Strategic Ignorance” (Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, 2007). She co-edited The Feminist Philosophy Reader (2008) with Chris Cuomo, and currently co-edits, with Ann Garry, the “Feminist Philosophy” category for PhilPapers. She serves on the editorial boards for Hypatia and the new Lexington Books Philosophy of Race series.

Amandine Catala is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Quebec at Montreal. She received her Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Colorado at Boulder. Prior to joining UQAM, she was a postdoctoral and visiting fellow at the London School of Economics, the Australian National University, and the University of Louvain. Her current research focuses on secession and territorial rights.

Jane Duran is a lecturer in black studies and the Gevirtz Graduate School of Education at the University of California at Santa Barbara. She has also been a visiting fellow in the department of philosophy. She has a special interest in analytic epistemology and in the work of women philosophers, and some of her most recent books include Eight Women Philosophers (2005), Women, Philosophy, and Literature (2007), and Women in Political Theory (2013). She has also published extensively in philosophy of science and feminist theory.
Jessica Flanigan is an assistant professor of philosophy, politics, economics, and law and leadership studies at the University of Richmond, where she teaches ethics. Her work mainly addresses paternalism and public health policy. Flanigan has published articles in the *Journal of Medical Ethics, Political Theory, Public Health Ethics*, and *HEC Forum*.

Sara Goering is associate professor of philosophy and member of the Program on Values in Society at the University of Washington, Seattle. Her research interests are at the intersections of feminist philosophy, disability studies, and bioethics. Recently, she is working with a neural engineering center on ethics engagement, and exploring how neural prosthetics may affect identity and responsibility. She also spends time discussing philosophy with children in the Seattle public schools through her role as the program director for the UW Center for Philosophy for Children.

Crista Lebens is professor of philosophy in the department of philosophy and religious studies at the University of Wisconsin–Whitewater, where she is an affiliated member of the women's and gender studies department. Her teaching, research, and activist interests include feminist social ontology and resistance to multiple, enmeshed oppressions.

Rita Manning is a professor of philosophy at San José State University. She is the author of *Speaking From the Heart: A Feminist Perspective on Ethics* (Rowman & Littlefield), *Guide to Practical Ethics: Living and Leading with Integrity* (coauthored with Scott Stroud, Westview Press) and *Social Justice in a Diverse Society* (co-edited with René Trujillo, Mayfield Press). She has published articles and book chapters in the fields of moral philosophy, applied ethics (business ethics, health care ethics, and environmental ethics), philosophy of law, social and political philosophy, feminism, and critical thinking. Her most recent works are "Immigration Detention and the Right to Health Care," in *Global Bioethics and Human Rights: Contemporary Issues* (Wanda Teays et al., eds., Rowman & Littlefield), and "Punishing the Innocent: Children of Incarcerated and Detained Parents" (*Criminal Justice Ethics*).

Kate Parsons is associate professor and chair of the philosophy department at Webster University in Saint Louis. She teaches courses in several interdisciplinary programs, including women and gender studies, sustainability studies, the Center for Ethics, and the Institute for Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies.

Sally J. Scholz is professor of philosophy at Villanova University. Her research is in social and political philosophy and feminist theory. She is the author of *On de Beauvoir* (2000), *On Rousseau* (2001), *Political Solidarity* (2008), and *Feminism: A Beginner’s Guide* (2010). Scholz has also published articles on violence against women, oppression, and just war theory, among other topics. She has served on the APA committee on inclusiveness and the APA committee on the status of women, and chaired the APA committee on lectures, publications, and research. She is a former editor of the APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy and is currently editor of Hypatia: *A Journal of Feminist Philosophy*.

Devora Shapiro is assistant professor of philosophy at Southern Oregon University, where she also serves as affiliated faculty for gender, sexuality, and women’s studies. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota, with a focus in feminist epistemology, philosophy of science, and modern philosophy. She recently published work on experiential knowledge and “objectivity,” and is currently in progress on additional research in this vein.

Shay Welch holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from Binghamton University. She is an assistant professor of philosophy at Spelman College. Previously, she was the Gaius Charles Bolin Fellow in Philosophy at Williams College, and was awarded the Future of Minority Studies Fellowship in publishing for her upcoming book, *Existential Eroticism: A Feminist Ethics Approach to Women’s Oppression Perpetuating Choices*. She teaches courses on freedom, ethics, and feminism. Her recent publications include *A Theory of Freedom: Feminism and the Social Contract* (Palgrave-Macmillan 2012); “Social Freedom and the Values of Friendship,” in *Amity: Journal of Friendship Studies*; “A Discursive General Will,” in *Constellations*; and “Transparent Trust and Oppression,” in the *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*. In addition to her current book project, Professor Welch is developing research on Native American philosophy, especially in relation to feminism. She has completed her first article, “Radical-cum-Relational: A Feminist Understanding of Native American Individual Autonomy,” for publication and will be contributing a chapter on Native Feminism to the upcoming *Routledge Companion to Feminist Philosophy*. Her third book will be an analytic philosophical articulation of the ethical and political concepts within the Native framework.